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PREVENCIÓN
DE LA CRIMINALIDAD

5th International Report

CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: Cities and the New Urban Agenda

**The 5th International Report
Crime Prevention
and Community Safety:
Cities and the New Urban Agenda**

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), located in Montreal, Canada is the leading crime prevention institution at the international level. It has been promoting international standards of crime prevention and criminal justice with the goal of advancing community safety and improved quality of life for 20 years. ICPC works with member governments, international institutions, local authorities and organizations in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Oceania, by offering a knowledge base on crime prevention; policies, practices and tools to reduce risk factors associated with crime, violence and insecurity.

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Editorial and Production Team:

The 5th International Report was produced under the supervision of Daniel Cauchy, ICPC Director General.

Editor in chief: Pablo Madriaza Ph.D (c)

Invited Editor: Dr. Margaret Shaw

Research: Pablo Madriaza, Céline Monnier, Anne-Sophie Ponsot, Pier-Alexandre Lemaire, Kathryn Travers, Margaret Shaw, Salvador Hernandez

Research Assistants: Alexandre Chevrier-Pelletier, Cécile Amiot, Yessica Lara, Jean Ismert, Carolina Cuervo

Production Manager: Anne Onana

Layout and cover design: Épicentre

The Report also benefited from the collaboration of ICPC staff members: Kassa Bourne and Serges Bruneau.

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International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
465, rue Saint-Jean, bureau 803
Montréal (Québec) H2Y 2R6
CANADA

Telephone: 1 514 288-6731

Email: cipc@cipc-icpc.org

The report is available in English, French, and Spanish on ICPC's website: www.cipc-icpc.org

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Mr Erich Marks, Vice-President, German Congress on Crime Prevention

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Dr Vincenzo Castelli, Administrator, *Onlus Nova Consorzio per l'innovazione sociale*

Dr Adam Tomison, Administrator, Australian Institute of Criminology

Ms Anie Samson, Administrator, Mayor Villeray – Saint-Michel – Parc-Extension, Montréal

Ms Kalpana Viswanath, Administrator, Member of the Steering Committee – Global Network of Safer Cities of UN-Habitat and Board Member – International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)

Professor Peter Homel, Administrator, Griffith Criminology Institute, Griffith University, Australia

Dr Tina Silbernagl, Administrator, Programme Manager of the GIZ Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention for Safe Public Spaces (VCP) programme

Mr Peter Sloly, Administrator, Deputy Chief, Operational Support Command, Toronto

Mr Claude A. Sarrazin, Administrator, SIRCO

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Mr Marcelo Aebi, University of Lausanne, Switzerland

Mr Kauko Aromaa, Director, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI), Finland

Dr Elena Azaola, *Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social*, Mexico

Dr Claudio Beato, *Universidad Federal de Minas Gerais*, Brazil

Dr Benoit Dupont, University of Montreal, Canada

Mr Peter Homel, Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) and Asia Pacific Centre for the Prevention of Crime (APCPC) Australia

Dr Tim Hope, University of Salford, UK

Dr Azzedine Rakkah, *Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)*, France

Dr Dennis P. Rosenbaum, University of Illinois at Chicago, US

Dr Elrena van der Spuy, University of Cape Town, South Africa

Dr Anne Wyvekens, *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*, France

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A message from the President of ICPC

Like previous iterations of the International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety, this 5th edition is in line with ICPC's objective to contribute to the development of evidenced-based national and local crime prevention policies and initiatives.

The international nature of this report creates the opportunity to bring a unique perspective to crime prevention experts, whether in governmental, non-governmental or academic institutions. Indeed, this international analysis enables us to shed light on local trends.

This report is central to ICPC's mission as an international forum for meetings and knowledge exchange on crime prevention. We hope that, once again, this rigorous analysis of trends on an international scale will guide us in the constant improvement of local crime prevention policies and initiatives by providing an empirical anchorage.

We take great pride in publishing this 5th International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety, and are profoundly grateful to the Government of Canada for its support.

We hope this report will address your questions in the quest for greater community safety.

Chantal Bernier

President, ICPC

A message from the Director General of ICPC

2016 is a year during which we must focus on the long term. As we address current issues of concern, we have to devise solutions that will withstand the test of time and allow us to offer future generations an environment that will encourage the development of their full potential.

It is with this in mind that ICPC has chosen to play an active role in the reflection on the New Urban Agenda to be launched in October 2016, at the Habitat III Conference in Quito, Ecuador. It is important for us to ensure that the urban safety component is constantly at the centre of discussions when debating issues or opportunities resulting from urban development. And this New Urban Agenda will become the United Nations' plan on the subject for the next twenty years. Therefore, we have planned this 5th edition of our International Report with the input of our colleagues from UN-Habitat's "Safer Cities" programme.

Starting with our 1st International Report, we have become a reference point in time when it comes to documenting the state of crime and its prevention, with each edition including a chapter devoted to the issue. It is important, before taking a position on which paths to follow in the future, to assess the current situation and trends, and this is exactly what the first chapter does. Although the trend seems to be holding steady, the global reduction in major crime is not a reality in all regions, some of which are even experiencing an increase. Efforts that have been made in the past should be sustained for their effects to be lasting. Sadly, as advances are made to reduce crime, a financial disengagement can occur that will, in turn, result in the rise of criminal acts. Actions that require a multidisciplinary social response, which are very hard to implement and supervise, are often the first to be cut due to their high costs. Also, with the many recent events, how can we not highlight the feeling of insecurity increasing in various regions due to terrorist attacks?

This 5th International Report, planned with the underlying theme of urban safety, provides an international overview of major issues in crime prevention, more relevant than ever as the UN reflects on urban development. We begin by portraying the global situation of safety in the urban context. It is, seen through an international perspective that will define safety and also set the stage for the following chapters.

The chapter on case analysis in Latin America allows us to acknowledge the importance of both multilevel and multidisciplinary coordination contributing to the success of actions promoting crime prevention. Then, safety in public transport is examined as an important issue due to its impact on the particularly rapid urban development currently underway. This aspect can make the difference between a harmonious urban expansion and a fragmented and criminogenic territory. The prevention of drug-related crime is addressed next, bringing to the forefront the UN's significant change in approach. Indeed, inefficiency in combating drug trafficking has forced a paradigm shift so that henceforth social solutions are considered first, particularly in terms of public health. Finally, it is impossible to consider urban safety without mentioning the prevention of radicalization leading to violence in an urban context. A highly publicised phenomenon that is by no means new, generating a strong feeling of insecurity that needs to be addressed, with Mayors amongst the primary providers of solutions to the problem.

I am very proud to present the 5th International Report, produced by the staff of ICPC and many other collaborators, with a special mention to Margaret Shaw, guest editor. I sincerely hope that in this report, you will discover elements to advance crime prevention in your region through your ideas, your decisions or your actions.

Daniel Cauchy

Director General, ICPC

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

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100RC: 100 Resilient Cities

A

AFP: Agence France-Presse
AFUS: African Forum for Urban Security
AIC: Australian Institute of Criminology
AMT: Metropolitan Transport Agency
ANCI: National Confederation of Local Authorities
APTA: American public transport association
AQAP: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AUC: African Union Commission

B

BISA: Brussels Institute of Statistics and Analysis

C

CANN: Clear Air Network-Nepal
CAPRI: Centre for Action and Prevention against the Radicalization of Individuals
CAWI: City for All Women Initiative
CBPR: Community-based Participatory Research Approach
CCB: Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá
CCSA: Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse
CCTV: Closed-circuit television
CEN: Clear Energy Nepal
CICAD: Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission
CIR: Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation
COHRE: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
CPRLV: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence
CPTED: Crime prevention through environmental design
CSR: Corporate social responsibility
CSIC: Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSW57: Commission for the Status of Women, 57th Session
CTITF: Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
CVE: Counter Violent Extremism

D

DFID: Department for International Development
DNA: Deoxyribonucleic acid

E

ECAD: European Cities Against Drugs
ECDP: European Cities on Drug Policy
ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council
EFUS: European Forum for Urban Safety

EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit
EMCDDA: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EU: European Union
EUCPN: European Union Crime Prevention Network

F

FASP: States and Municipalities Public Security Contribution Fund
FFT: Functional Family Therapy
FIA: International Automobile Federation

G

GBV: Gender Based Violence
GDP: Gross domestic product
GDS: Geneva Declaration Secretariat
GNSC: Global Network on Safer Cities
GPP: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform
GPRTC: Global Platform for the Right to the City

I

IAP2: The International Association for Public Participation
ICCS: International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes
ICESI: Citizens' Institute for Studies on Insecurity
ICLEI: Local Governments for Sustainability
ICPC: International Center for the Prevention of Crime
ICSDP: International Centre for Science in Drug Policy
ICT: Information Communication Technology
ICVS: International Crime Victimization Survey
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank
IDP: Internally Displaced People
IDPC: International Drug Policy Consortium
IDRC: International Development Research Centre
IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO: International Labour Organization
INCB: International Narcotics Control Board
INEGI: National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico
IS: Islamic State
IVAWS: International Violence Against Women Survey

L

LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
LEAD: Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion
LSC: local security contract
LST: Botvin LifeSkills Training

M**MDG:** Millennium Development Goals**MDMA:** 3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine**MINUSTAH:** United Nations Mission in Haiti**MTA:** Metropolitan transport authority**N****NCDDR:** National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration**NCPC:** National Crime Prevention Centre (Canada)**NCPS:** National Crime Prevention Strategy**NGO:** Non-government organization**NIDA:** National Institute on Drug Abuse**NREPP:** National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices**NUA:** New Urban Agenda**NYPD:** New York Police Department**O****OAS:** Organization of American State**OECD:** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development**ONDS:** National observatory on social issues and solidarity in Italian stations**ONDT:** National Transport Crime Observatory**OSCE:** Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**P****PAHO:** Pan American Health Organization**PIOCOM:** Alliance for security (El Salvador)**PPS:** Project for Public Spaces**PROMEVIL:** Promotion of new city jobs**PRONASCI:** National Programme for Public Security with Citizenship**PS:** Public Safety Canada**PVE:** Prevention of violent extremism**R****RAR:** Antiradicalism Network**RATP:** Autonomous Operator of Parisian Transport**RER:** Regional Express Network**RMH:** Latin American Women and Habitat Network**RTRC:** Boston Children's Hospital Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center**S****SAMHSA:** Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration**SAT:** Situational Action Theory**SCFNZ:** The Safe Communities Foundation New Zealand**SDG:** Sustainable Development Goals**SFP:** Strengthening Families Program**SIDAC:** General-Directorate for Intervention on Addictive Behaviours and Dependencies [Serviço de Intervenção nos Comportamentos Aditivos e nas Dependências]**SINASEC:** National Citizen Security System**SMDHC:** Municipal Secretariat for Human Rights and Citizenship**SNCF:** National Society for French Railways**SPVM:** City of Montreal Police Service**START:** Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism**SUBSEMUN:** Municipal Public Security Subsidy**T****TAPAJ:** Alternative Work Paid by the Day**TFL:** Transport for London**TND:** Towards No Drug Abuse**TTC:** Toronto transit commission**U****UCLG:** The United Cities and Local Government**UDPC:** Urban Drug Policy Conference**UIC:** international union of railways**UITP:** International Association of Public Transport**UK:** United Kingdom**UMT:** Urban Mass Transportation**UN:** United Nations**UN Women:** United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women**UNDCP:** United Nations International Drug Control Programme**UNDESA:** United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs**UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme**UNGASS:** United Nations General Assembly Special Session**UN-Habitat:** United Nations Centre for Human Settlements**UNODC:** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime**UNSC:** United Nations Security Council**UNSD:** United Nations Statistic Division**UPP:** Police Pacification Unit**USA:** United States of America**UTP:** Public and Rail Transport Union**V****VAWG:** Violence against women and girls**VCP:** The Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention for Safe Public Spaces**VPUU:** Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading**W****WHO:** World Health Organization**WICI:** Women in Cities International

Achim Wennmann

Senior Researcher at the Centre on Conflict
Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP)
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Executive Coordinator of the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform

Alessandro Radicchi

Director ONDS and president of Europe Consulting Onlus

Benjamin Ducol

Research Manager
Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading
to Violence

Benjamin Flander, LL.D

Assistant Professor of Law
Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security
University of Maribor, Slovenia

Bernardo Pérez-Salazar

Independent researcher based in Bogotá, Colombia

Fabrice Leroy

Centre for the Prevention
of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV)

Franca Lannaccio

ONDS Researcher

Gianni Petiti

ONDS referent person for “Gare Européenne
et Solidarité” project

Gorazd Meško, PhD

Professor of Criminology
Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security
University of Maribor, Slovenia

Heidi Ellis

Director
Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center
Boston Children’s Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

Hugo Acero

International expert on themes of public safety
and coexistence

Javier Sagredo

Advisor, Democratic Governance and Citizen Security
Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
United Nations Development Programme

Jorge Mantilla

Advisor, Secretary for Public Security
City of Bogotá

Julie Savignac

Research Division
Public Safety Canada

Lucie Léonard

Manager
Research and Knowledge
Public Safety Canada

Marco Calaresu

Assistant Professor
Dipartimento di scienze politiche, scienze
dellacomunicazione e ingegneria dell’informazione
Università di Sassari

Mariam Yazdani

Programmes Coordinator
Viva Rio Haiti

Matjaž Ambrož, LL.D

Associate Professor of Criminal Law
Faculty of Law
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Peter Homel

Professor, Griffith Criminology Institute
Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia

Saida Abdi

Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center
Boston Children’s Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The prevention challenge

Working on crime prevention entails dealing with two paradoxes: first, while prevention helps address the factors that drive crime and violence, the link between preventive interventions and these phenomena is always indirect. In relation to violence, for example, although the aim of any prevention strategy is to eliminate violence or at least reduce it, prevention, especially community and social crime prevention, seek to achieve this through action which is often carried out far in advance of any violence. This includes interventions such as social integration, education, sensitization and cooperation, for example.

Meanwhile, if prevention is successful, it is often difficult to demonstrate the link between the interventions and the subsequent absence of crime and violence. This issue is at the heart of problems related to programme evaluation: how can we assess impact in terms of a phenomenon that has not taken place? Social prevention works on two invisible fronts: what we can see is far from what we are implementing, and what will never happen if the implementation is a success.

This double paradox means we need to redouble our efforts in the context of highly complex issues such as those dealt with in this report, which often push decision-makers to focus more on visible actions which entail reaction, urgency and repression. But many prevention approaches work on a different time-scale: in the medium to long term. This means that **prevention which is initiated today** aims to eradicate violence and crime in five, ten or twenty years. This causes problems for many people who work to fight crime. Some might feel that, as the effects of prevention become visible in the long term, there is a lack of urgency and activities can take place slowly. On the contrary, the fact that much prevention activity produces results over the long term does not mean that this is a topic to leave for the future. **Prevention means working today with urgency** and in a consistent manner in the knowledge that often the desired results will be achieved in subsequent years.

This is the fifth International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety to be published by ICPC since the series was initiated in 2008, and is the result of a renewed effort internationally to promote a preventive perspective to tackle crime and violence in the world. This is based on the conviction, as well as on the evidence, that crime prevention is less costly economically and socially, and more effective over the long term than traditional reactive and repressive crime control methods, and at the same time minimizes the negative consequences that the latter generate (vigilantism, loss of liberties, etc.).

International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety

As with all previous editions, this version presents a unique opportunity to reflect on the evolution and development of crime prevention globally, and to look at some of the challenges and the promising policies and practices that are emerging. This is always a daunting task, since information on prevention policies and practices is not always easily accessible or publically available, and there are many dimensions of prevention that need to be considered, from international norms and national policies to local practices, and from issues of process and implementation to evaluation and research.

The report is intended primarily for three key sectors: decision-makers and elected officials who are responsible for creating safer and more inclusive societies, whether at national, state or local level; practitioners and professionals whose work has a major impact on building safe and healthy communities, ranging from the police and the justice sector to social and health workers, teachers and civil society and non-governmental organizations; and the research community, including those in universities and institutes who help build knowledge and evidence on the effectiveness and the costs and benefits of prevention policies and practice.

The information in this report comes from a wide range of sources, from reports produced by UN entities and international and regional bodies such

as the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the Organization of American States; national and local governments; and non-governmental organizations and research and academic sources. As always, ICPC's extensive international network of member governments and organizations involved in crime prevention and community safety is a privileged source of information.

In 2014, we chose to focus the fourth International Report on migration and the increasing movement of people across borders. This theme was chosen in response to the huge waves in migration evident in many regions in recent years, whether to seek a better life or to flee from war or disaster. The report was presented at ICPC's Colloquium "Crime Prevention in a Mobile World" in Palermo, Sicily, in November 2014, a year when the loss of migrant life in the Mediterranean reached unprecedented levels. Sadly, the loss of life and the flow of migrants have continued and increased since 2014 – and not only in Europe – and the need to develop national and local community safety and prevention policies that can help promote inclusion and equality is even more critical.

The theme for this edition: Cities and the New Urban Agenda

We live in a world of cities. The year 2007 was a turning point: until that time, never in the history of humanity have the majority of human beings lived in urban settings (UN-Habitat, 2016). In the past 20 years alone, the population living in cities has increased by 50% (UN-Habitat, 2016). In fact, every month, around five million people in the world move to cities, of whom 95% live in developing countries, and a third of these are living in informal settlements (UN-Habitat, 2016). This process of global urbanization has in recent years entailed a radical transition in human relations, in ecology, and in the environment in which we live. Some cities, for example "global cities", comprise international capitals and global bureaucracies, whereas the new "megacities" (cities with more than 10 million inhabitants) represent agglomerations which have never existed before, and many of them are in developing countries. Many rapidly expanding cities are in fact considered fragile in relation to their ability to guarantee safety and provide for their inhabitants (Muggah, 2014). By 2020, 12 of all the megacities will be in Asia, and only four in developed countries (UN-Habitat, 2016).

This growth in cities and the change in population dynamics is posing new global challenges. An example of this is urban governance. In an ever-globalizing world, cities are progressively taking on greater importance and autonomy in relation to central governments. Many of them, as we see throughout this

Box 1 International Reports on Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 2008–2014

Previous International Reports have reviewed *trends in crime and insecurity, selected topics or themes and trends in aspects of crime prevention and community safety.*

Main themes

- 2008: women's safety, youth safety, school safety, safety in public spaces
- 2010: migration, organized crime, drugs and alcohol
- 2012: human trafficking and exploitation, informal settlements, post-conflict and post-disaster areas, drug production in developed countries
- 2014: migration and the movement of people within countries and across borders

Trends in crime prevention and community safety

- 2008: global prevention norms, international exchange networks, national and local strategies; knowledge-based prevention; the role of public authorities including the police and judicial authorities; supporting community safety with new services (private security, mediation and conflict resolution); expanding the role of local government and community actors
- 2010: developments in crime prevention; good governance (devolution of powers, legitimacy, regulation of private security, developing civil society's role); social and educational approaches; training, professional development and capacity-building; evaluation of crime prevention
- 2012: global survey of city safety strategies and their components
- 2014: indigenous migration, prevention of human trafficking, intimate partner violence against women

report, not only develop different strategies to those at the national level, but also use strategies that openly oppose the policies implemented by their national governments. The city of New York, for example, has developed integration plans and social service provision for immigrants in irregular situations, whereas the federal government has not yet achieved any such agreement in this regard (ICPC, 2014). In other cases the emphasis is different. Amsterdam, for example, despite adhering to the national plan for the prevention of radicalization, has preferred to continue to implement its own prevention programme based on social cohesion, which is more in line with broader, longer-standing work developed in relation to local realities (see

Chapter 6). This growing autonomy presents us with an opportunity to rethink the role cities play, and, specifically in the case of this report, how safety is conceived in a world dominated by recent urbanization.

Thus, following the central mandate of ICPC, this new edition of the International Report focuses on analysing the role of cities in relation to safety and crime prevention (see Box 1 for a summary of themes in past editions). This is also in recognition of the significance of the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Development – Habitat III – which will take place in Quito in October 2016. The Quito meeting is only the third opportunity in 30 years for global debate on cities, and on the challenges of increasing urbanization, environmental disaster and climate change for governance and safety. Habitat III is also the first major global conference following the adoption of the Sustainable Development Agenda in September 2015.

Crime prevention and the urban sphere

Urban crime and violence are among the most important challenges in contemporary cities, and as such one of the major concerns of citizens and governments throughout the world (see Chapter 2). Crime not only has an objective impact on its victims and their surroundings, but also one that is subjective and much more difficult to eliminate: fear of crime. On a daily basis fear, violence and crime all have an impact on the quality of life of individuals and communities, as well as their chances of development and the development of their potential. It affects their human rights, stability, social cohesion and relations, and sustainable economic development (Kramer, Harting, & Kunst, 2016; UN-Habitat, 2015).

Cities are at the centre of this issue. In many cases, **urban dynamics and characteristics have an influence on crime and violence**. These include segregation, inequality and loss of social cohesion (Integrated Safety and Security for Smart Cities, 2013). Indeed, the development of infrastructure, space and services for citizens is often advancing more slowly than necessary for the needs of a rapidly growing urban population, particularly in developing countries. These settlements are characterized by poverty and lack of access to basic services such as health, education, transport and security. Many of these settlements also lack access to the police. All these factors drive an increase in crime and a heightened fear of crime. Segregation and problems of integration in minority communities in relation to violence and radicalization, especially in European cities, are particularly illustrative of this (Chapter 6). In fact, at an urban level, these factors explain clearly the higher involvement of youth in this process, as well as factors which lead to violence.

Urban transport is another example of how urban characteristics influence crime (Chapter 4). Public land-based transport is the backbone of a city and is, at the same time, a kind of micro society that reproduces in movement the benefits and problems of the urban sphere. On the one hand, it is the location of much criminal activity; on the other, it is a significant factor in development and social inclusion. The types of crime are related to the characteristics of transportation, including the concentration of people and the specific structure of the transportation system, but also, and this is a significant factor, they depend on the relationship with the city – its location, its social and economic surroundings and the infrastructure that surrounds it. Consequently, solutions to crime on public transport cannot be generated without understanding the interaction between the transportation system and the city itself.

Despite these challenges, **urban factors** are not only at the root of crime and violence but also offer **the basis for their prevention and the potential for development** benefiting individuals and communities. Cities provide opportunities for education, health and emotional, professional and economic growth, and also are a space for meeting and community building. The urbanization processes and the ties that bind people and communities are key to intervention and the avoidance of factors that lead to crime. Thus, the city holds a huge potential for transformation.

Some of these factors, including urban governance and processes of coordination and local-territorial relationships, were touched on at the beginning of this introduction. Urban governance is understood as a process that includes multiple actors and levels of government, at different geographic levels. Safety is no longer the exclusive domain of the police and the government, but is now one which also includes civil society, communities, the private sector, etc. In this regard, the notion of the co-production of safety is crucial to understanding how to co-produce prevention too. Notions of multi-level governance (Jessop, 2004; Kazepov, 2014) and nodal governance have emerged as ways of understanding the implementation of urban security policies, and the prevention of crime (Shearing, 2005; Shearing & Wood, 2003). In this context, citizenship is seen as an actual level of governance, not merely an object of intervention.

Meanwhile, the significant growth and autonomy of cities presents new challenges in the development of relationships between different levels of government, as well as horizontal coordination between different entities. Problems of articulation between these diverse levels are associated with, for example, increased delinquency (Rios, 2015). At the same time, nodal security entails establishing relationships not only between different types of actors but also

between many entities, which are working simultaneously in one area and, in many cases, despite sharing objectives and roles, are intervening in a contradictory and competitive manner. However, as we can see in each of the chapters in this report, both coordination and partnerships are often cited as key factors in improving processes of prevention of crime and violence. Improving these processes seems then to be a priority to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of these policies.

Topics addressed

This 5th International Report develops, from the urban perspective, various topics relevant to the current context in cities. These chapters can be classified into three types. The first is a constant of ICPC's International Reports, reviewing major trends in crime and in its prevention. The following two chapters address the relationship between the urban setting and the prevention of crime through two distinct lenses: the first gives a general overview of the issues and major trends facing cities; the second, in contrast, offers a comparative perspective, particularly in relation to national–local relationships in the Latin American context. The final three chapters address three fundamental topics on the prevention of urban crime: public transport, the prevention of drug-related crime, and the prevention of violent radicalization.

For the first time, chapter three of this ICPC International Report provides an in-depth comparative study. It examines 10 Latin American cities in order to explain the problems related to the territorial development of prevention strategies. In this respect, this chapter is a turning point in the report, separating the chapters covering overall trends from those linked to specific topics. Each of these chapters is summarized briefly below.

Chapter 1. Trends in crime and its prevention

This chapter provides a brief resume of **knowledge and practice in relation to the prevention of crime at a global level**. It presents a snapshot of recent trends in crime, as well as some of the ideas and debates raised by researchers, decision-makers and practitioners working on prevention on a daily basis. Together, they provide a historical perspective on some of the changes observed, and on the characteristics of specific problems identified. For example, the chapter examines trends in the reduction of homicide and traditional crimes at the global level. However, these trends continue to illustrate how unequally they are distributed not only between different regions, but also within regions and within countries. The

continuing decline in violent and property crime is evident in Western countries, but less so across Latin America. Countries with high levels of inequality and low income, for example, continue to have high rates of homicide.

The past two years have witnessed a series of significant events and developments at global and regional levels that are likely to have an impact on prevention. The first and second chapters of this report in particular present a panorama of some of these initiatives. For example, the 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and 2016 Habitat III summit. In this first chapter, three recent areas of research on the impacts of crime prevention are also examined: the first discusses the results of studies that on the one hand demonstrate the benefits of support to families in crime prevention, and on the other evaluate a series of prevention programmes. The second area of research concerns recent evidence on the effectiveness of community policing and its role in prevention. Finally, the third discusses the possible disadvantages of certain models of crime prevention.

Chapter 2. Urban safety

The second chapter looks at **crime prevention from an urban perspective**. It describes trends, debates, challenges that cities of the world are confronted with and some of the solutions they are using today in relation to safety. In particular, it outlines some of the discussions being animated by UN-Habitat leading up to the adoption of the New Urban Agenda at Habitat III in Quito. The chapter has several sections. The first describes the evolution of international norms and standards which have recently been adopted on the city. The second looks at a series of trends and challenges at the urban level: the growth of megacities, the increase in socio-spatial segregation, migration and natural disasters and the situation of women and children in the development of urban safety. The third and fourth look at the role of cities in implementing prevention policies from a perspective of urban governance, and at one of the biggest innovations in city management: the use of technology to improve urban safety. The final section focuses on some examples of effective urban crime prevention practice.

Chapter 3. Cities, territory and public safety policies: A Latin American perspective

The third chapter looks at a cross-cutting issue in the implementation of safety policies – that of **territorial coordination**. Processes of decentralization, and

the increase in the relative power of cities in relation to nation states present important challenges in terms of local governance. How can national and local policies be coordinated to improve the outcome of prevention strategies? This chapter attempts to look at this question with a comparative case study of selected Latin American cities. It analyses the specific coordination processes between their national governments and the cities of Ciudad Juárez and Aguascalientes (Mexico), San Salvador (El Salvador), Bogotá (Colombia), Quito (Ecuador), Lima (Peru), Santiago (Chile), Rosario (Argentina) and Recife and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

The first section of the chapter defines the processes of territorial coordination from the perspective of urban governance. The second contextualizes trends in urbanization and crime in Latin America. The third studies the evolution and emergence of citizen safety policies in the region, looking at normative and institutional developments. The fourth section analyses specific processes of territorial interaction between these cities and national structures. The final section assesses the findings, placing an emphasis on recommendations for improving the development of territorial aspects of safety and prevention policies.

Chapter 4. Crime prevention on urban public transport

The fourth chapter focuses on an essential aspect of cities: **urban public transport** and particularly its relationship with the prevention of crime and fear of crime. It puts a particular emphasis on risk factors of transport spaces, but it also looks at the influence that the organization of the city has on the safety of these spaces. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first gives an overview of trends related to crime and fear of crime on transport systems around the world. This is a particularly complex exercise because the data related to these phenomena are few, incomplete and disaggregated at different levels, which problematizes comparisons between countries. Although common trends exist between different public transport systems at a global level, they confirm the importance that local factors have on the nature of crime in each urban context. The second part presents the risk factors related to crime and fear of crime in this area. These may be related to the transportation itself, for example the architecture of the transport space or the mass of people, but also to the location of transport inside the city, to the influence of the built environment, commercial activities and the social organization that surround it. It is the combination of these factors that fosters criminal activity on public transport and increases fear of crime. Finally, the third part looks at prevention strategies. It puts a special emphasis on

integrating crime prevention on public transport with that of the city itself. It also highlights international norms that have recently been adopted in this regard. The chapter concludes by presenting a classification of prevention practices.

Chapter 5. Crime prevention in relation to drug use in the urban environment

The fifth chapter focuses on the **prevention of drug-related crime** in the urban context – in particular the responses of cities to this phenomenon. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first examines different theories on the relationship between drug use and crime, including whether there is a direct causal link, or only a correlation. It also highlights the fact that the consumption of different types of drugs has different impacts in terms of the crimes associated with them. The second part presents global trends in drug use and legislation, and the prevention role of cities. Given that drug use is not homogenous at the global level, and that the nature of associated crime changes, depending on the drug used, the chapter underlines the importance of prevention methods that are adapted to local contexts. The chapter discusses the evolution of international conventions on drug prevention which provide guidance to countries and cities. The third part aims to identify the necessary elements for effective drug crime prevention strategies. It outlines three elements: the prevention of drug use itself, the prevention of crime linked to drug use, and the prevention of recidivism. Finally, and drawing on recent research undertaken by ICPC, the chapter illustrates the components of effective drug crime prevention strategies with an analysis of prevention approaches developed in eight cities in a range of countries.

Chapter 6. Cities and the prevention of violent radicalization

The sixth chapter looks at **urban issues linked to violent radicalization**, including the role cities have gradually taken on in relation to preventing this phenomenon. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first presents a global review of radicalization as an emerging concern at the global level. Among other issues, it examines the unequal distribution of terrorist attacks in different regions of the world, as well as the under-estimation of the role of the extreme right, especially in North America. Of particular concern is the situation in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. In addition, the chapter emphasizes the limited knowledge available on this subject, the strong presence of young men involved in radicalization and the growing concern about the role of young women. Finally, this first part highlights the

processes of decentralization and autonomization of terrorist cells, and the role religion can play in this process.

The second section focuses on the local factors that have an influence on processes of radicalization. In this regard, it highlights the problems of integration and social cohesion of minority communities as a route into radicalization. Radicalization is explained at the urban level by a combination of individual and group factors grounded territorially in communities that are often isolated, or see limited integration with the rest of the city. This generates the opportunities necessary for radicalization to develop, particularly in Western countries. The last parts of the chapter address interventions implemented at the international, national and local level to prevent radicalization. The third part deals with international norms and standards. Of particular importance is the plan of action recently developed by the UN. The fourth part analyses the main types of national strategies, as well as the different types of methods which cities are using to decrease radicalization. This includes a comparative analysis of cities which have implemented such strategies.

The main conclusions of this International Report

- Even though there has been a reduction in violence and traditional crime at the global level, rates vary substantially between regions as well as between countries. Although this reduction is significant and continuing in Europe, North America and parts of Africa, Latin America still experiences high levels of violence.
- This global reduction has been explained by an improvement in governance, in penal justice systems and in prevention practices, but also by a transformation in the types of crime being committed. Cybercrime, for example, could be replacing many traditional forms of crime.
- A focus on prevention continues to grow around the world: 51% of countries have reported national plans to reduce various types of violence. However, despite this increase, governments at all levels have been less enthusiastic about developing monitoring and evaluation systems to evaluate their strategies and programmes.
- The main factors that contribute to urban crime are rooted in urban inequalities that are created, reinforced and maintained by the combination of poor urban planning and design, and poor urban governance. It is not the size of cities, nor population density, that causes the lack of safety in cities; rather, it is the rapidity of urbanization, which exceeds the rate at which cities can receive new urban residents while maintaining the quality of public spaces and services. This creates the conditions for urban crime and violence to flourish.
- It is critical that municipal governments take on leadership to champion urban safety, equality and inclusion in their cities. Efforts to enhance urban safety are successful when:
 - Municipal governments are supported by national and subnational governments, in terms of capacity, human and financial resources and the decentralization of responsibilities, enabling them to localize national safety plans and to carry out prevention policies that reflect local contexts and priorities.
 - Governance structures support the participation of the diversity of urban residents to participate in developing, implementing and monitoring community safety strategies.
 - The principles of inter-sectionality are applied to develop comprehensive, responsive and inclusive urban safety strategies that acknowledge gender, race, age and cultural differences.
 - City development strategies embrace a long-term vision that incorporates a balance of social and situational prevention as cross-cutting issues in all urban sectors, including urban planning and design, housing, poverty reduction, employment, education, gender equality and social cohesion, as well as in times of urban humanitarian crises.
- The success of prevention policies in cities is rooted in the processes of territorial coordination between different levels and government entities, and the use of tools with the objective of reducing the crime rate. In these processes, citizen participation has been fundamental.
- These processes of coordination have been successful when:
 - The respective territorial authority has been directly and permanently involved.
 - The community has been involved through participatory processes.
 - Processes of coordination have been institutionalized.
 - Internal teams have been created and formed that specialize in safety and security.
- In the case of public transport, although this has its own social and physical characteristics, an effective crime prevention strategy must be developed in an integrated way with the overall city prevention strategy.
- As with many other prevention strategies, it is clear that they will be effective when:
 - They carry out an in-depth diagnosis of the situation.
 - They include the participation of all stakeholders.
 - They have an integrated and multi-sectoral approach to interventions.

- They incorporate implementation monitoring and evaluation.

- There is no direct linear relationship between drug use and crime, but many common factors are often associated with problems of criminality and with drug abuse.
- Apart from the elements common to effective urban crime prevention, those concerned with the prevention of drug abuse should include the following:
 - Strategies should be holistic and multi-sectoral, and facilitate integration between the different levels of government, as well as promoting a favourable social environment that reduces marginalization.
 - They need to leave space for municipal autonomy, especially in the case of harm reduction programmes.
 - They need to incorporate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
 - They need to promote the continuous sharing of information between non-governmental and governmental entities, as well as at the local, regional and international level.

- Cities are becoming more aware of their important role in understanding and preventing violent radicalization, and in a number of cases have attained an important degree of autonomy.
- Violent radicalization in cities is a result of a combination of individual and group factors rooted in communities that are often isolated, with limited integration into the city. In this respect, the factors which explain radicalization in the city are not that much different from the problems that many citizens face – in terms of inclusion, cohesion, marginalization and segregation. The solutions are in many respects similar to prevention policies developed by municipalities to respond to such issues as youth crime or family isolation.
- Apart from the religious component, therefore, models of intervention for the prevention of radicalization have many similarities with other crime prevention projects at the local community level. Successful programmes that reinforce integration, cohesion and community resilience could be effective in preventing radicalization.
- The future debate, therefore, will focus on whether interventions designed to specifically counter violent extremism will be an effective and useful response at the local community level, or whether interventions which focus more generally on integration and inclusion will be sufficient.

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1

**TRENDS IN CRIME
AND ITS PREVENTION**

Trends in crime and its prevention

1

Introduction

All countries, regions and cities across the globe are affected by trends in crime, violence and insecurity. Safety concerns have a major effect on peoples' quality of life, affecting how they live, when they feel comfortable going out, how they travel and where they go. It affects the work environment and business and industry, and the willingness of people to invest in housing and development.

In order to place developments in crime prevention and community safety in context, Part I of this chapter provides a brief synopsis of global trends in crime and some of the significant regional and country differences. It also looks at emerging concerns. Part II considers some of the significant international agreements and meetings which have taken place since 2014 which have implications for the conduct of crime prevention. It looks at recent developments at the regional, national and local level, and provides an update of trends in crime prevention practice and research findings, and debates about crime prevention and its impacts. While Chapter 2 of this report provides a detailed review of the role of cities and local governments in crime prevention, some recent research findings on local government crime prevention practice are also discussed.

Part I – Trends in crime


Global trends in crime

As previous editions of the International Report have stressed, measuring global trends in crime is a complex and difficult process, given that there are many gaps in the availability and accuracy of data collected from different countries and regions of the world. In terms of police recorded crime, people are often reluctant to report crimes to the police for a variety of reasons, and lack of capacity and differences in definitions affect the extent to which data collection systems and police records are accurate or comparable between countries.

Countries also vary in their use of victimization surveys, which are generally regarded as providing a more accurate picture of the extent of crime than police-recorded crime. However, many countries do not conduct victimization surveys at all, or not on a regular basis. There have been no recent findings from international victimization surveys such as the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS). The ICVS began in 1989 but has not published any results since 2010. Similarly, no new findings have been reported from the International Violence Against Women Survey (IVAWS) since 2010.

One significant development which will help to alleviate some of the differences in definitions between countries, and difficulties in making comparisons, was the adoption by the UN Statistical Commission in 2015 of the new standardized *International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes* (ICCS). It was accompanied by the development by UNODC of a technical manual to guide the implementation of the classification system (UNODC, 2015a). Based on agreed principles, concepts and definitions, this new classification system will enable countries to improve their data collection on all aspects of crime and the justice system, using standardized frameworks and definitions, and in the development of victimization


Figure 1.1 International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)



surveys. Apart from enabling countries to undertake better analysis within their own borders, the ICSS will enable comparisons to be made between countries, and aid understanding of regional and transnational issues. In the longer term it will help in the measurement of the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in September 2015.

UNODC compiles an annual report on global and regional trends in crime. This normally covers homicide – generally regarded as the most accurate measure of violent crime – as well as key conventional crimes including drug-related offences, robbery, burglary, theft, rape, and motor vehicle thefts. In 2016, the report also focuses on some of the targets for the SDGs including the gender-related killing of women and girls, homicide in cities, corruption, trafficking in persons, and the illicit trade in finance, wildlife and firearms (UNODC, 2016).

Since the publication of ICPC's last International Report in 2014, overall trends in crime rates around the world appear to have continued in the same direction. Between 2003 and 2013 there has been a continuing decline in rates of homicide and other violent offences, and especially in property crimes such as burglary and motor vehicle theft. Drug trafficking offences have remained stable, while police-recorded drug possession offences increased by 13% between 2003 and 2013 (UNODC, 2015b). See Figure 1.2.



The decline in conventional crime is especially marked in some countries. In England and Wales, for example, since the mid-1990s when crime levels were at their highest, the number of police recorded crimes has fallen from 19 million a year to 6.6 million in 2015, or 60% (Home Office, 2016b). As ICPC's 4th International Report discussed, one of the explanations for the general decline in conventional recorded crime appears to be the widespread increase in cybercrime and internet-based fraud and theft and other offences (ICPC, 2014). Nevertheless, with all types of conventional crime there are wide variations between and within regions, and within countries themselves.

Global trends in homicide and violence

The *Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014* published by the WHO in collaboration with UNODC and UNDP (WHO, 2014) looks in some detail at trends in homicide between regions.¹ The report, which is based on data from 133 countries, estimates that in 2012 there were 475,000 homicide victims worldwide, an overall rate of 6.7 per 100,000 people.² Over the twelve years from 2000-2012 rates of homicide are estimated to have declined by 16%, although the decline is more marked in some regions than others (WHO, 2014). The decline is evident even in countries in Southern Africa which have had very high rates of homicide, although not in Latin America (see below).

The rate of homicide varies markedly between regions, and especially in relation to levels of income and inequality. For example, as Figure 1.3 below indicates, all *high income* countries had an overall rate of 3.8 homicides per 100,000, compared with low and middle-income countries in the Americas with a rate of 28.5 per 100,000 people (WHO, 2014, p. 8). However, as UNODC also underlines (Figure 1.4), rates of homicide are more closely associated with levels of inequality in a country and region, where there are very marked differences in income distribution (UNODC, 2016).³

While the great majority of victims of homicide are males aged 15-44, 90% of them are killed by men, and in only 10% of cases are women the perpetrators (UNODC, 2016, p. 8). In Latin America, homicide is the leading cause of death among young men aged 15-29, and guns are a major contributing factor (PAHO, 2016).

Among women who are victims of homicide, intimate partners are often responsible. An estimated 38% of women were killed by intimate partners in 2013 compared with 6% of men (WHO, 2014). Among homicides committed by intimate partners or family members, 60% of the victims are female (and 78% for intimate partners alone). Figure 1.5 below shows that across all the regions, victims of intimate partner or family

Figure 1.3 Estimated numbers and rates of homicides per 100 000 population, by WHO region and country income status, 2012

WHO region and country income level	Number of homicides	Homicide rate per 100 000 population
African Region, low- and middle-income	98 081	10.9
Region of the Americas, low- and middle-income	165 617	28.5
Eastern Mediterranean Region, low- and middle-income	38 447	7.0
European Region, low- and middle-income	10 277	3.8
South-East Asia Region, low- and middle-income	78 331	4.3
Western Pacific Region, low- and middle-income	34 328	2.1
All regions, high-income	48 245	3.8
Global	474 937*	6.7

* Includes 1604 homicides estimated for non-members states.

Source: WHO (2014, p. 8)

homicide are far more likely to be female than male. Unlike other types of violence there is little variation between regions in the rate at which females are killed by intimate partners, and it is prevalent in all regions of the world (UNODC, 2016).


The WHO report also looks at other types of violence, apart from homicide, which have major impacts on safety in communities, and considerable health and other costs to individuals and society. They include armed violence, gang violence, youth violence, intimate partner violence, sexual violence and elder abuse, but they note that in many countries, key data on the incidence of these different phenomena is not collected (WHO, 2014).

In relation to intimate partner violence it is clear that, as with homicide, it is prevalent across all regions of the world as Figure 1.6 shows. (Chapter 6 of ICPC’s

fourth International Report (2014) looked at intimate partner violence and its prevention).


In relation to urban areas which Chapter 2 discusses in more detail, it has long been known that homicide rates are usually higher in cities than in rural areas (UNODC, 2016). In keeping with the overall decline in rates of homicide globally, UNODC reports that there has been a consistent decline in levels of violence and homicide in the largest cities in all regions (UNODC, 2016, p. 11).

Figure 1.4 Intentional homicides per 100,000 population, by level of income inequality, 2003-2014




Source: UNODC (2016, p. 7)

Figure 1.5 Victims of intimate partner/family related homicide as a percentage of total victims, by sex and by region (latest year)



Source: UNODC & HEUNI (2015, p. 3)

Figure 1.6 Prevalence of intimate partner violence, by WHO region



Regional trends in homicide

In the European Union (EU), Eurostat figures confirm that rates of homicide and violence continued to decrease between 2007 and 2011 in most of the countries (24 out of 34) (HEUNI, 2014, p. 26). Other types of crime also declined over the same period in 20 of the countries.

A new study of homicide in six Balkan countries has recently been set up to map patterns of violence in those countries (Balkan Criminology News, 2016).⁴ Along with other regions there has been a steady decline in homicide in these countries since the late 1990's, belying stereotypical views about the region as prone to violence.

As suggested above, however, the decline in homicide and violence is not evident in many Latin American countries. In a review of the welfare costs of crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, Jaitman (2015, p. 5) notes that this is the only region in the world where levels of homicide and other crimes have remained high, and continued to rise since 2005. Not all countries in the region have high rates of violence; Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, for example, are well below the regional average. And in all countries there are wide variations in rates of homicide and violence, as the Mexican Peace Index illustrates across the states of Mexico (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). For 17 of the 27 countries examined, however, rates of violence are endemic, or at the level of civil conflict. Jaitman also notes that levels of theft are very high in

the region, and that robbery has increased dramatically in the past ten years, with six out of ten incidents being violent robberies (2015).

Trends in other types of crime and levels of insecurity

Cybercrime is now recognized at international and national levels as a major concern, as discussed in ICPC's 2014 International Report. Along with corruption, transnational organized crime and terrorism, it was one of the key topics of discussion at the 13th UN Congress in Doha.⁵ UNODC now maintains a central database, the Cybercrime Repository, containing information on cybercrime laws as well as 'lessons learned'.⁶ This enables them to continually assess the needs and criminal justice capabilities of countries, and provide technical assistance. Countries such as England and Wales plan to invest £1.9 billion over the next five years to protect Britain from cyber-attacks (Home Office, 2016a).

Concern about terrorist acts in urban centres in many regions has also increased levels of insecurity. There has been an increase in recorded deaths as a result of terrorism since 1970, but there are also wide variations between regions, with South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa experiencing the greatest incidence and increases. Chapter 6 discusses these trends in more detail, and some of the ways in which cities are responding to the increase in recruitment of young people.

Part II – Trends in crime prevention

International developments – a strong preventive turn⁷

In the two years since the last International Report was published a number of international meetings with very significant implications for crime prevention have taken place, and a number of new agreements and goals established.

a) The 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

A major milestone was the **13th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice** which took place in Doha, Qatar in April 2015. This marked the 60th year since Congresses began in 1955 (see Box 1.1). Held every five years, the Congress brings together all Member States of the UN and a wide range of policy makers, practitioners and academics to discuss pertinent issues in crime prevention and criminal justice. In 2015 the Congress included over 4,000 participants from 149 countries.

The agenda for the 13th Congress included the promotion of comprehensive crime prevention strategies to support sustainable development, in anticipation of the more recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals; international cooperation to combat transnational organized crime; new and emerging forms

of transnational crime, including cybercrime, and the theft of cultural property, wildlife, timber and plants; and national approaches to public participation in crime prevention and criminal justice.

The four workshops which formed part of the official Congress programme provided an opportunity for a more in-depth discussion of policies and practices in specific areas. The first workshop focused on UN standards and norms in justice and prevention, including prisons and the needs of women and children, and the social reintegration of offenders. Workshop 2 looked at trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. Workshop 3 was concerned with ways to strengthen crime prevention and criminal justice approaches to cybercrime and trafficking in cultural property. Workshop 4 focused on public contributions to crime prevention and criminal justice. The Doha Declaration adopted by the Congress sets out the agreed conclusions on the debates and workshops, outlining priorities for action by Member States and the international community.⁹

Workshop 4 on *'Public Contribution to crime prevention and raising awareness of criminal justice: experiences and lessons learned'* was organized by the Australian Institute of Criminology, and included sessions on public participation in prevention at national and local levels, as well as on the role of social media and new communication technology, and on the media itself. The Workshop was the only one with a strong focus on crime prevention rather than criminal justice matters.¹⁰ ICPC's contribution was

Box 1.1 United Nations Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 1955–2015 60 years

“Every five years policy-makers and practitioners working in crime prevention and criminal justice gather for the United Nations Crime Congress to help shape the agenda and standards of the UN on crime prevention and criminal justice. The Doha Congress in 2015, which marks the 60th anniversary of the Crime Congress, will consider how best to integrate crime prevention and criminal justice into the wider UN agenda.

The United Nations Crime Congress is the world's largest and most diverse gathering of governments, civil society, academia and experts in crime prevention and criminal justice. For 60 years the congresses have had an impact on criminal justice policies and strengthened international cooperation against the global threat of transnational organized crime.

The practice of holding international conferences on crime control matters at five-year intervals dates back to 1872 when conferences were held under the auspices of the International Prison Commission which later became the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (IPPC).

The First United Nations Congress was held in Geneva in 1955.

Sixty years later, this tradition continues with the Government of Qatar hosting the Thirteenth United Nations Congress in Doha. The theme of the Thirteenth Congress is “Integrating crime prevention and criminal justice into the wider UN agenda to address social and economic challenges and to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and public participation”. (UN, 2015, p. 2)⁸

on *Public Private Partnerships in Crime Prevention*, drawing in particular on the action guide developed in 2011 in collaboration with the World Bank, the Bogota Chamber of Commerce and Instituto Sou da Paz in Brazil (ICPC, World Bank, Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, & Instituto Sou da Paz, 2011). Other contributions included a Canadian presentation on the police–community mobilization *Strategy for a Safer Ontario*, and the Brazilian Caixa Seguradora Youth Expression Project to promote social responsibility, supported by a private insurance company.¹¹ The contribution by Peter Homel at the end of this chapter provides a synopsis of the workshop and its conclusions.

The agenda of the UN Congress and the annual meetings of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2015 and 2016, reflect current global concerns including the continuing flow of migrants, corruption, transnational organized crime, and terrorism.

b) Sustainable Development Agenda 2030

“The Sustainable Development Agenda ‘reflects a shift in global thinking on development’.”¹²

A second milestone since the publication of the last International Report was the adoption in September 2015 of the **Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**, and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.¹³ They include a series of 17 goals and 169 targets to be achieved by 2030. The SDGs are seen as reflecting a global shift in understanding of how development is to be achieved, and one which will require interventions to be ‘holistic, inclusive and backed by multi-stakeholder partnerships...’ all of which are components of effective local crime prevention practice.

As UNODC emphasise a number of the goals have specific implications for cities and crime prevention.¹⁴ They include:

- SDG 3 which is concerned with ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being, including promoting a public health approach to substance abuse prevention and treatment;
- SDG 5 which is concerned with gender equality & empowerment, preventing violence against women and trafficking, and developing gender-sensitive justice systems;
- SDG 11 which focuses on making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable;
- SDG 16 which is concerned with promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, including preventing crime and promoting effective, fair and humane criminal justice systems. Among the targets for goal 16 are the significant reduction of violence and related deaths, exploitation and trafficking in persons,

and promoting the rule of law; and

- SDG 8 which focuses on promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.

c) UNGASS

A third milestone is the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs, which took place in April 2016. It was only the third General Assembly meeting on global drug policy, and it marks a major shift in drug policy, away from the ‘war on drugs’ and the primary use of repression and deterrence through the criminal justice system, towards a much more overt public health approach. UNGASS is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

d) Habitat III

Finally, the third global meeting on human settlements, Habitat III, takes place in Quito from 17-21 October 2016, following previous meetings in 1976 (Habitat I) and 1996 (Habitat II). The New Urban Agenda (NUA) which will be adopted in Quito, will help to provide guidance and standards for urban development for the next twenty years. It will also see the adoption of new international guidelines on safer cities, which will complement the 1995 Guidelines for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in the Field of Urban Crime Prevention (UN 1995), and the 2002 Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN 2002; UNODC, 2010). Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of these developments.

National, regional and local policies and initiatives

In 2002 the World Health Organization’s groundbreaking *World Report on Violence and Health* argued strongly for the importance of seeing violence as a public health issue rather than a justice one. It outlined the huge burden of interpersonal violence of all kinds across all regions of the world, and the particular impacts on different groups, including young men, women, children and the elderly, as well as deaths from collective violence and suicide. Since then, a number of countries have accepted the challenge and developed programmes which use a public health approach to violence prevention – one which is very much aligned with international norms on crime prevention. The Violence Reduction Unit set up by the police in Glasgow, Scotland in 2005, for example, was inspired by the WHO approach. Its success in reducing homicides led to the establishment of the Violence Reduction Unit for the whole of Scotland in 2006.¹⁵

Figure 1.7 World Report on Violence and Health



WHO and its associates continue to build knowledge and practice on prevention, with data collection, tools and resources, such as a recent publication which focuses on the public health approach and summarizes accumulating evidence: *Violence: A Global Health Priority* (Donnelly P.D. & Ward, C., 2016). WHO also initiated the *Global Campaign on Violence Prevention*, and the *Violence Prevention Alliance*, which help to raise awareness, and bring together global networks of governments, practitioners and organizations working on violence prevention. More recently, in collaboration with UNODC and UNDP, WHO published its *Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014* discussed above (WHO, 2014) with

Figure 1.8 Global Status report on Violence Prevention 2014



the primary purpose of assessing the progress made by national governments since 2002 in preventing violence.

The report notes that in the 133 countries surveyed, half of them (51%) had on-going national plans to reduce the various types of violence which affect individuals and communities. These range from gang and youth violence, to intimate partner violence, sexual violence and elder abuse (see Table 1.1). Figure 1.9 shows the types of violence prevention programmes which have been implemented. However, it was evident that national plans are not always supported by good data collection systems. This means national governments are not able to respond to changes in patterns nor to evaluate the impacts of any programmes developed. Similarly, violence prevention activities are not always centrally coordinated or led, so that there may be gaps or overlap in interventions, given the multiple agencies involved.

The WHO report concludes that while there is now much greater violence prevention activity than in 2002, the amount of investment by countries is not commensurate with the seriousness of the problem. Countries have indeed invested in prevention programmes, but not at a level which meets the scale of the problems they face. Similarly, the survey suggested that while many countries had enacted legislation to deter various types of violence, it was often inadequately enforced (WHO, 2014).

In relation to women's and girls' safety from sexual violence and harassment in urban public spaces, civil society organizations among others have continued to put pressure on governments. Countries such as Chile (2016), Peru (2015) and Portugal (2015) have passed legislation to criminalize sexual harassment, including making it punishable by fines or prison. Other countries including Saudi Arabia and Morocco are discussing the possibility (Kearl, 2016). Nevertheless, while criminalising these behaviours may send a message of validation to victims, it will not change the unequal gender power relations that underpin it. Furthermore, there are some concerns that criminalising street harassment could lead to a potential abuse of the law by criminalizing some racial minority groups (Serrano, 2015).

e) Europe

In European countries there continues to be a focus on the importance of crime prevention policy, increasingly including not only conventional crimes, but various types of cybercrime and issues related to human trafficking and smuggling and to terrorist activities. There have also been shifts in the kind

Table 1.1 National action plans by type of violence and WHO region (n = 133 reporting countries)

Type of violence	African Region	Region of the Americas	Eastern Mediterranean Region	European Region	South-East Asia Region	Western Pacific Region	All countries
Armed violence	41%	62%	44%	32%	50%	25%	40%
Gang violence	30%	62%	44%	33%	38%	25%	37%
Youth violence	41%	71%	44%	63%	38%	45%	53%
Child maltreatment	56%	91%	69%	78%	88%	55%	71%
Intimate partner violence	63%	86%	44%	78%	75%	55%	68%
Sexual violence	70%	86%	38%	63%	75%	60%	65%
Elder abuse	33%	52%	50%	39%	50%	35%	41%
Plan covering all types	41%	76%	50%	46%	50%	50%	51%


Source: WHO (2014, p. 24)

of emphasis which some governments are giving to different types of prevention approach, while researchers continue to track some of the outcomes of practice on the ground.

The EUCPN

After some sixteen years in existence, the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) appears to be strengthening its presence and support to member states of the European Union. The network was established in 2001 to provide a supportive network for

Figure 1.9 Proportion of countries reporting implementation of violence prevention programmes on a larger scale by type of programme (n = 133 reporting countries)



Key: CM-child maltreatment; EA-elder abuse; IPV-intimate partner violence; SV-sexual violence; YV-youth violence. While each programme is shown as relevant to a particular type of violence, some of the programmes listed in the figure have shown preventive effects on several types of violence.

Source: WHO (2014, p. 26)

governments in the development of crime prevention policy and practice. It has worked on a rotating presidency system, in common with the European Union itself, so that different countries have been responsible for determining the topics of meetings and initiatives over time.

The network has been very much dependent on the resources provided by individual countries, but it illustrates the growing spread of crime prevention across the EU. Over the past five years the network has worked on topics selected by the presiding country, including domestic violence, cybercrime and trafficking. It has also discussed the notion of establishing an Observatory on crime prevention (EUCPN, 2016). In recent years, the network appears to be better funded than in the past, and with its own permanent secretariat. The new five year plan 2016-2020 suggests that the network aims to become a much stronger organization which will be able to

provide assistance to countries and cities, maintain good data and information on prevention programmes and their effectiveness, and help to establish higher standards for prevention programmes across the region (EUCPN, 2015). See Box 1.2.

However, it is interesting to note that in a number of European countries there has been recent criticism of the use of certain types of crime prevention approach, notably to control specific targeted populations, and to control behaviour which is not actually criminal. The contribution by Gorazd Mesko and his colleagues from the University of Maribor in Slovenia at the end of this chapter reflects on what they term a retreat from the use of social crime prevention in a number of countries in the region in recent years. They speculate that the EUCPN itself may have been instrumental in spreading more 'Western' systems of social control and deterrent approaches to prevention to Eastern European countries which had traditionally endorsed

Box 1.2 European Union Crime Prevention Network

The European Union Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) was established in May 2001 by Council Decision 2001/427/JHA to promote crime prevention activity in Member States across the European Union, and to provide a means through which valuable good practice in preventing crime, mainly "traditional" crime, could be shared. In 2011 a new Network Secretariat was established to strengthen its profile and impact. The goals of the Network are:

- a) To be a point of reference for the target groups of the Network.
- b) To disseminate qualitative knowledge on crime prevention.
- c) To support crime prevention activities at national and local level.
- d) To contribute to the EU policy and strategy of crime prevention and to contribute to various aspects of crime prevention at EU level in respect of the strategic priorities of EU.

The Network target groups are practitioners and policymakers at the local and national level and relevant EU and international agencies, organisations, and working groups.

In 2011-15 the EUCPN Secretariat and Network focused their research on topics chosen by the EUCPN presidencies, including domestic violence, cybercrime, secondary victimization, trafficking in human beings, as well as on the economic costs of crime, cost-benefit analysis, the impact of context on crime prevention, and more theoretical issues concerning the concept of crime prevention. Some of the challenges for the Network include differences between national approaches to crime prevention and concepts of crime prevention, difficulties in assessing the impacts of projects, and working with 23 different languages.

The current EUCPN action plan 2016-2020 aims to raise the profile and strengthen the Network and working methods, including its ties with the European Commission and universities. There has been recurring discussion within the EUCPN about creating an observatory on crime prevention, but the high costs, and the lack of a clear definition about what the observatory would do or how it would fit into national structures of crime prevention organisations has created practical obstacles. Smaller crime prevention organizations and forums have high expectations of the EUCPN as an organisation which can really bring about change at the European level in relation to crime prevention, especially since all Member States are represented in the Board. The current work programme for 2016 chosen by the Presidency Trio (the Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta) will focus on Organised Crime together with Cybercrime and Terrorism, which are also key priorities of the European Commission. Within this topic, the Netherlands will focus on the illegal trafficking of firearms.

a welfare approach to social problems, and supported social programmes. What the contribution reflects is the important issue of the range of approaches which is subsumed under the title of crime prevention and how they are employed. In some cases countries may give much great emphasis to deterrence and defensive action – a culture of control – with less emphasis on inclusion and the support of marginalized communities.

In England and Wales, the Conservative government which was re-elected in 2015, announced its 'Modern Crime Prevention Strategy' in March 2016 (Home Office, 2016a). Noting the rapid drop in recorded crime in the past 20 years, the report suggests that the drop is in part the result of specific legislation and enforcement (being 'tough on crime'), and crime prevention measures which involve industry, the business sector and the public. These include incentives offered by house insurance companies to improve home security, and improvements by car manufacturers which make it much more difficult to steal cars. But the strategy also argues that the methods of criminal activity are changing quite noticeably, from traditional and face-to-face methods, to internet-based theft and extortion, which is "faceless, contactless and conducted from a distance" (Home Office, 2016b). The strategy outlines a number of initiatives to strengthen police skills to prevent and detect cybercrime, including increased sharing of data information systems and working closely with business and industry.


The new Strategy is, however, significant in the context of the recent history of crime prevention in England and Wales, and the heavy emphasis since the 1990's on both situational crime prevention and the controlling of behaviour deemed to be annoying or 'anti-social'. This includes the controversial 1998 legislation allowing the imposition of civil Anti-Social Behaviour Orders for non-criminal behaviour introduced under the Labour government of Tony Blair (Ashworth, 2004; Garland, 2001). The new Strategy suggests there are six 'key drivers' of crime, which move away from the now commonly accepted language of communities and risk factors, or concern with the structural factors which affect peoples' lives. The key drivers are listed as "opportunity, character, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, profit, alcohol, and drugs" (Home Office, 2016a, p. 6). The curious choice of the word 'character', while citing long-standing developmental research on individual factors associated with deviant and criminal activity, such as self-awareness and self-control, seems to belie much of the evidence-based knowledge about the value of investing in social and educational crime prevention programmes, as well as issues of inequality and poor urban infrastructure. Among other things, the strategy places an emphasis on targeting high risk individuals and their families, and high risk places.

Police-community partnership models

A number of recent studies of crime prevention in European countries have focused on the practice of developing community safety partnerships which has been a feature of government strategies over the past two decades or more. The Nordic model of crime prevention initially developed in the 1980's and 1990's, combines situational prevention with social welfare policies, and in Sweden comes under the National Crime Prevention Council, Brå. Since 2008 local authorities, the police, and social and welfare authorities have been encouraged to develop cooperative crime prevention agreements, and 90% of municipalities in the country now have such agreements (Johansson, 2014; see also ICPC's 4th International Report 2014). A recent study of one regional network in Sweden, Regbrå, provides a detailed account of what the 13 municipalities in the region actually do, and how the network itself supports them (Johansson, 2014). In most cases each municipality has a coordinator for crime prevention, and an executive board at a high level in the municipal organization having ultimate responsibility for prevention initiatives.

The members of the Regbrå network mainly included municipal representatives and the police, with university researchers and others, but excluded civil society and business stakeholders (see Figure 1.10). Network members were in general agreement that prevention was a cooperative process, and that it worked well. However, municipalities often felt their crime prevention work was under-resourced and funded, and that they lacked the necessary training and skills, something which other studies of crime prevention at the local level have also found (see below for Victoria and New South Wales, Australia). The author suggests that cooperation across sectors is a very important aspect of local crime prevention work, requiring changes in

Figure 1.10 The members of the Regbrå crime prevention network, Sweden¹⁶



Source: Johansson (2014, p. 148)

attitudes and values among the partners, and that greater attention should be given to research and training. She also argues that the current emphasis on applying market principles to the public sector, including reducing inefficiencies and getting value for money through the use of evidence-based practice, for example, risks rejecting important tools in crime prevention. It ignores the value of scientific and empirical local knowledge, and the considered reflection which comes from cooperation between services and sectors.

A comparative study of police-community partnerships approaches in Germany and the UK provides a useful analysis of the different trajectories taken by governments and police organizations in the two countries since the 1990's (Frevel & Rogers, 2016). In the UK, as discussed above, crime reduction partnerships were mandated by the national government in 1998, requiring police and local authorities to undertake safety audits and to consult the public in developing strategic responses. The result was a strong focus on community-focused interventions and public involvement. Under the current government, however, there is less funding, and expectations that the police should revert to their 'core role' of fighting crime, leaving the new elected civilian Police and Crime Commissioners to liaise with the community and civilian volunteers.¹⁷

In Germany in the 1990's, the municipal Crime Prevention Councils established in Denmark and Sweden inspired the federal and state governments to consider their development. Given Germany's federal structure, the federal government suggested a more open approach, recommending that Crime Prevention Councils and later Public Order Partnerships be established at the local level as seemed fit in different contexts.¹⁸ The result has been that the German councils and partnerships work in a variety of ways, include different partners, and see their role in different ways. For the most part they are police-led, with the local authorities playing a less directive role. They tend to be used as vehicles for police-planning and organization. Unlike the UK councils, there is very little public consultation, and private citizens and local communities do not have any formal role (Frevel & Rogers, 2016).

f) Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) continues to support crime prevention through its on-going Citizen Security Initiative launched in 2012, providing grants for project development. The programme has a strong focus on social crime prevention, particularly with

the most vulnerable groups including youth at risk and women. They also support projects on the role of police in prevention especially community policing, and on strengthening institutional capacity. Box 1.3 below provides a more detailed outline of the Citizen Security Initiative (2009).

The future plans for the programme continue the focus on these areas, but with an added emphasis on crime in city spaces, and the role of technology in policing. Overall, IDB is especially concerned to help to improve the collection and analysis of data across the region, and the measurement of crime and its impacts, including the costs of crime and the evaluation of programmes (Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán, 2015). Some of the findings of recent innovative studies on the costs of crime in the region have now been published (Jaitman, 2015). IDB also urges the continued development of observatories on crime and social problems in the region; something which ICPC continues to support, with its 5th International Observatories meeting organized in Mexico City in November 2015.¹⁹ The contribution by Hugo Acero in Chapter 3 of this report discusses some of these issues in more detail.

A specific report *Status Report on Violence Prevention in the Region of the Americas, 2014* has also been published by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in collaboration with WHO (PAHO, 2016). As with the conclusions of the WHO Global Report, the report finds that 16 out of 21 countries in the region have developed National Action Plans on violence, but many do not collect data to enable them to base policy developments on good evidence. In addition, "less than half the countries surveyed are implementing national social and educational policy measures to mitigate key risk factors for violence" (2016, p. 4).

An innovative development, designed to increase transparency and knowledge about recent and current projects in the region, is the *Citizen Security Dashboard*, an accessible mapping tool.²⁰ It has been developed by IDB and the Igarapé Institute based in Brazil, and documents over 1,350 citizen security interventions which have taken place in 20 countries in the region since the late 1990's (Alvarado, Muggah, & Aguirre, 2015). Some of the trends which the mapping identifies include the heavy concentration of citizen security interventions in countries with the highest level of violence, notably Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Central America; a focus of interventions at the national level rather than the city level; and a focus on preventing common (traditional) crimes and youth crime. The mapping tool also enables users to track positive impacts from initiatives. Nevertheless, preliminary assessment suggests that very few programmes have been well ('robustly') evaluated, again underlining the lack of attention to data gathering and assessment.

Box 1.3 Inter-American Development Bank – Citizen Security Programme²¹

“The concept of citizen security first gained prominence in the region during the 1990s, when LAC countries transitioned to democracy. It was considered an alternative to the concept of public security. The term originally referred to the physical security of persons and goods, but increasingly, it has become synonymous with activities that also focus on addressing the interrelated issues of reducing crime and violence, improving citizen safety, and increasing a sense of citizenship. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (ICHR) (2009) states that citizen security involves ‘those rights to which all members of a society are entitled, so that they are able to live their daily lives with as little threat as possible to their personal security, their civic rights and their right to the use and enjoyment of their property; on the other hand, citizen security problems occur when a State’s failure to discharge, either in whole or in part, its function of providing protection against crime and social violence becomes a generalized situation, which means that the basic relationship between those governing and the governed has broken down’” (Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán, 2015, p. 4).

“[...] the Citizen Security and Justice Cluster supports the efforts of member countries to tackle crime and violence from a developmental perspective, pursuant to IDB’s mandate. It has framed its work around citizen security by establishing the Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civic Coexistence and Public Safety and the Operational Guidelines for More Effective Justice Administration Systems (IDB, 2012a). The Citizen Security and Justice Sector Framework Document (IDB, 2014b) illustrates the extent to which the Bank supports crime and violence prevention, and identifies four areas that guide the institution’s undertakings on the subject:

1. Social prevention of crime and violence. The IDB supports social interventions that mitigate risk factors that increase the vulnerability of youth to exhibit violent and criminal behavior. Social interventions include domestic violence prevention from the side of the parents to that of the children (intergenerational transmission of violent behavior) and against women, as well as situational prevention policies to reduce opportunities for crime and violence that arise from environmental factors.
2. Police strategies to prevent crime. The IDB supports the police as a fundamental agent responsible of implementing strategies to prevent crime and violence and detect potential criminal opportunities from occurring, such as community policing.
3. Efficient and timely criminal justice. The IDB supports the judiciary system (courts, prosecution) to prevent crime and violence by detecting, prosecuting, and sentencing offenders, as well as the penitentiary system to improve the offerings and coverage of rehabilitation programs for the criminal offender population.
4. Institutional coordination for citizen security governance. The IDB supports institutional capacity building to enhance state effectiveness and efficiency to prevent crime and violence by increasing policymaking capacities and promoting evidence-based policies at the national and local levels, in order to improve decision making, expedite intersectoral coordination, and optimize the implementation of sector interventions” (Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán, 2015, p. 9).

Source: Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán (2015, p. 4, 9)

Given that gang violence is one of the main factors contributing to the very high rates of homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean, discussion continues on the value of gang truces brokered between governments and gang members (Kan, 2014; Muggah, Carpenter, & McDougal, 2013). While levels of homicide do appear to decrease when a government-gang truce is agreed, they often break down and are short-lived. They may also benefit gangs and organized crime networks when governments are weak and unable to respond to criminal activity. Robert Muggah and his colleagues argue that while there are many differences between the national contexts of gang truces in different countries in Central America, Brazil or the USA, for example, in general they fail to deal with the underlying causes of gang formation such as unemployment and marginalization.

The authors suggest that gang truces might be more successful if they were combined with mediation and peacemaking processes, such as those used to end civil wars, together with structural changes addressing underlying causes of gang formation.

g) Africa

UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme was originally launched 20 years ago in 1996 at the Habitat II meeting in Istanbul, and specifically at the request of African Mayors. Since that time, the Safer Cities Programme has worked with many African mayors to help them establish crime prevention strategies and implement international guidelines on urban crime

prevention. However, urbanization and the rapid expansion of informal settlements have also continued over that period in many African cities. Levels of crime, violence and insecurity continue to present challenges. Currently, Africa is the least urbanized region in the world, but along with Asia the most rapidly urbanizing. By 2050 the world's population is expected to increase by over two thirds, and almost 90% of that increase is expected to take place in African and Asian cities (UN, 2014, p. 12). This underlines the importance of developing much stronger and inclusive programmes and policies to promote safety in cities in Africa for all their inhabitants.

In anticipation of these developments, a major event to celebrate the Safer Cities Programme was held at the end of June 2016 in Durban, South Africa. The Africities Global Conference 2016 highlighted the challenges and achievements of the Safer Cities Programme, and worked to develop a new vision for the future. It also saw the launch of the *African Forum for Urban Security* (AFUS), with a permanent secretariat based in Durban, in recognition of that city's long-standing commitment to safer cities. It is expected that the AFUS will work in partnership with the African Union to implement the SDGs. A network database of cities and civil-society organizations working on safer cities was also established at the conference, and it is expected that an African Institute for Learning will be set up as a regional Centre of Excellence to coordinate better knowledge and evidence-based learning on urban safety. The African Union also launched its Africa Vision 2063 in 2015 (see Chapter 2).

The contribution by Bernardo Perez-Salazar at the end of the chapter reflects on some of the challenges faced by growing cities in Southern Africa and elsewhere, and the development of 'hybrid order' governance models. These are rapidly emerging in cities, as the traditional 'state-centred' governance model comes under increasing pressure from exponential urban growth.

h) Asia Pacific

In Australia, crime prevention is primarily a state and local government responsibility, and a number of recent studies have been tracking developments on several levels. A study in the State of New South Wales notes changes in how the current State government views crime prevention (Shepherdson, Clancey, Lee, & Crofts, 2014). Interviews with local government Community Safety Officers suggested that the State government's view of prevention, and as outlined in its 2013 plans, is almost exclusively focused on situational prevention approaches, and especially around responses to local graffiti. This is in contrast

to the emphasis on Aboriginal and minority community development, parental support programmes and youth development, which have formed the basis of crime prevention policy in the state since the 1990's. They also report evidence of cost shifting by the State to local authorities, with the State expecting municipalities to act on safety issues without providing resources. In addition, there were difficulties accessing State data for local safety audits. Community Safety Officers were also expected to take on a heavy administrative load by the State, and one which was unrelated to their main community safety role.

"In Australia, '[...] local government has continued to play a key role in crime prevention and community safety efforts for more than a quarter century'"²²

In the State of Victoria, Australia, a detailed survey provides valuable insight into how cities themselves perceive their role (Homel & Fuller, 2015). As the authors point out, while cities have been actively involved in prevention for the past twenty five years, little is known about what local governments actually do and how they view their role. As part of a State parliamentary review on drugs and crime prevention, all local governments in Victoria were surveyed to assess local approaches to crime prevention and community safety.

Drawing on a survey originally developed by ICPC²³, 76 local governments were asked about the kinds of problems they faced, their planning processes, the types of programmes set up, and their assessment and evaluation procedures. For the majority of local authorities alcohol-related problems and domestic and family violence were identified as the most common issues (81%), but few local authorities had set up programmes to combat them. The majority of programmes focused on community safety partnerships with other stakeholders. It was also sobering to learn that almost all the local authorities *still* saw crime prevention as the responsibility of specialized agencies – notably the police or health authorities – a view which preceded the emergence of crime prevention as an alternative to justice and the law. Nevertheless, the majority of programmes established suggested an emphasis on underlying social and risk factors leading to offending and victimization (Homel & Fuller, 2015, p. 6).

What was also evident is that many local authorities felt poorly equipped to make informed decisions about programme development, both in terms of a lack of funds and the necessary skills and knowledge. Further, only a third had developed a strategic plan based on consultation and data analysis. It was evident that those authorities which had developed a strategic plan were able to establish more tailored programmes. Finally, only 12% of the local authorities

had undertaken any type of evaluation. As the authors stress, given that Australia is one of the most urbanized countries in the world, local governments need to be given much more recognition and support for their role in crime prevention, both in terms of resources, and to build their capacity and expertise (Homel & Fuller, 2015, p. 11).

In relation to encouraging greater *evaluation of crime prevention projects*, Anthony Morgan provides a helpful discussion of the benefits of research-practitioner partnerships (Morgan, 2014). Based on a number of evaluations undertaken by the Australian Institute of Criminology, he argues that partnerships which involve practitioners and programme developers in the evaluation process throughout the project can be very beneficial. They help in designing the indicators and evaluation to a high standard, such as using quasi-experimental designs, in collecting relevant data, in ensuring that the results are meaningful and that the recommendations are useful and relevant to project or policy improvement. While governments increasingly require funded prevention projects to be evaluated, there is a tendency to continue to require 'objective and impartial' external evaluation to avoid bias. His conclusion is that in crime prevention projects, the benefits of close collaboration between the evaluators and the practitioners well outweigh the possibilities of bias.

Recent debates and developments in knowledge-based crime prevention

a) Fragile Cities and Smart Cities

As Chapter 2 discusses in more detail, two concepts now attracting growing attention at the international level are 'fragile cities' and 'smart cities'. Fragile cities are seen as cities with weak governance structures and high levels of inequality and violence, and tend to be located in the global South. The concept, which has many parallels with crime prevention in terms of analysis of the causal factors generating crime and violence in urban areas, has emerged from a development perspective.²⁴ Some of the rationale for the use of the term relates to concerns that issues of violence and safety have been dominated by research and practice in northern and developed countries, and that south-south knowledge and exchanges may be more meaningful. Nevertheless, as the work of UNODC, UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme, the World Bank and IDB has demonstrated, a considerable amount of innovative and effective crime prevention has been accomplished in middle and low income countries, and countries in the South such as Colombia and Brazil. Work on the notion of Smart Cities is also being advanced with the goal of helping city governments

harness technical advancements to plan for safe and sustainable cities. The work of the City Leadership Initiative located at University College London, for example, responds to many of the concerns raised by those working to strengthen city governance.²⁵

b) The benefits of family support for crime prevention

"Bridging the significant gap between needs and resources to reduce youth offending, or more generally to improve children's lives, necessitates a focus on the whole developmental system, on institutions and social arrangements, not just on the deficiencies of individuals".²⁶

The most recent findings from the seminal *Pathways to Prevention Project*, a longitudinal study established in Queensland, Australia, in 2002, reinforce the value of early intervention and developmental approaches to prevention (Homel, Freiberg, Branch, & Le, 2015).²⁷ This research-practice project was set up in a very disadvantaged area of Brisbane with a youth crime rate eight times higher than for the city as a whole, and operated for 10 years until 2011. The overall aim of the project was to assess the impact of participation in family support and in enriched pre-school-based programmes on families and on children's behaviour and wellbeing over time. Earlier findings from the *Pathways* project showed that the combination of family and preschool programmes was effective, resulting in improved behaviour by the end of preschool, but also that both approaches were effective on their own.

Reanalysing the data based on almost 5,000 children, the authors found that not only did family support alone reduce the behaviour problems of children in school, but that quite low-level involvement with up to 10 contacts with families over 2-3 months had the strongest impacts. It significantly affected their children's behaviour at school in terms of social relationships and self-regulation capacities (Homel et al., p. 8). The authors underline that these are important findings, showing that low-level family support is a very cost-effective form of crime prevention which has big benefits for schools and their staff. This is especially the case when school exclusion and suspension have been increasingly used to deal with disruptive behaviour. As they point out, "school disciplinary policies rarely acknowledge the central role of the family circumstances in contributing to a child's challenging behaviour [...] supporting parents to deal with the challenges of poverty, family violence, being a single parent or recent immigrant and so on" (2015, p. 8).

The importance of investing in support for families at risk is also underlined in a detailed study of Mexico City. The researchers Carlos Vilalta and Robert Muggah tested the applicability of North American explanations for the distribution of crime patterns in the city – social disorganization theory and institutional anomie (Vilalta & Muggah, 2016). They found that both explanations had some applicability, in particular finding that areas with high rates of female-headed households tended to have high crime rates. Rather than increase the policing of these areas, the authors emphasise the need for targeted social development, and social and educational programmes to support families and children in those areas.

In Canada, the early results of a series of prevention programmes targeting 12-17 year olds also suggest promising results (Laliberté, Rosario, Léonard, Smith-Moncrieffe, & Warner, 2014). Eleven promising or model programmes which were funded by the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) were examined. They ranged from programmes directed to school-related issues, aggressive behaviour, personal and social skills, or substance abuse. Overall, most of the programmes showed a positive impact on the behaviour of the young people referred to them.

Another Canadian report examines the implementation of crime prevention projects, based on an external analysis of 71 projects funded by the National Crime Prevention Centre (Currie & Roberts, 2015). Implementation has long been recognised as requiring just as much attention as the content of a programme itself. Even a well-evaluated and tested programme is likely to be unsuccessful if there are major implementation problems.²⁸ The researchers found, not surprisingly, that over a third of the projects experienced some type of implementation challenge including:

- data management (42%),
- the recruitment and referral of participants (42%),
- partnership building (38%),
- management issues (37%),
- programme content (35%),
- staff turnover (34%),
- participant engagement (31%),
- and planning (30%).

The report noted that successful implementation strategies included the need to invest considerable time in planning all aspects of the project and its goals. It also found that increasing the engagement of parents in projects working with young people and children was very beneficial to the success of those projects. A *Guide to the implementation of evidence-based programs: What do we know so far?* was published by NCPC in 2014.

c) Police – community relations and procedural justice

“You can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar”.²⁹

The last International Report in 2014 considered some of the global impacts of declining crime levels and economic recession on crime prevention. It suggested that in a number of countries cuts to public services had reduced the budgets of the police, and of social and welfare agencies which provide many of the support services for disadvantaged families and communities. The impact on community policing and citizen-police support schemes was of concern.

Community-based policing remains a central aspect of most city crime prevention programmes, in spite of some of the challenges of reduced municipal budgets. Given that crime tends to occur in particular places in cities, there has been an increasing focus in recent years on the policing of specific places or areas to maintain control and prevent crime. This includes crime ‘hot spots’ for example. One of the concerns about the policing of specific places is that it can be misused and create resentment on the part of local communities, who may legitimately feel unfairly targeted or that racial profiling is being used (eg. Sweeten, 2016; Wästerfors & Burcar, 2014).

Two recent studies have examined how far well-conducted policing, which is fair and respectful of local residents, is effective in reducing crime and disorder in those areas (Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter, & Bennett, 2014; Higginson & Mazerolle, 2014). The first study examined some 25 reports to look at the impacts of community policing in the United States. The authors found that, overall, community policing had a positive effect on citizen satisfaction and trust in the police, and on their perception of disorder in neighbourhoods. However, while there were some reductions in actual levels of crime, they were not sufficiently high to be significant.

“Although the dominant approach to address social ills has been to intervene at the point of individuals, there is a resurgence in research that has examined interventions at the neighbourhood level. The findings also echo the calls by others to conduct research at the community, city, and structural levels that can translate into policy that intervenes at multiple levels” (Medina, 2015, p. 93).

In the second study, Higginson and Mazerolle undertook a systematic review of 33 projects from a range of countries, using what they termed ‘spatially-focused legitimacy policing’. The projects were undertaken between 1980 and 2012, and all included some attempt

to enhance citizens' perception of the legitimacy of the police, and use aspects of what is referred to as procedural justice.³⁰ These are projects which use one of four key approaches when they interact with citizens: citizen participation; being neutral in their encounters with the public; communicating 'dignity and/or respect for citizens'; or demonstrating trustworthy motives on the part of the police.

All the studies examined used experimental or quasi-experimental designs enabling the impacts of encounters to be measured against crime levels. The authors found that there were significant reductions in serious crime, and in total crime levels in the project areas, and argue that individuals who are treated well by the police are more likely to cooperate and change their behaviour. Given that the programmes included covered a range of types of interventions, the authors suggest that the legitimacy of interactions with the public may be more important in helping to prevent or reduce crime than the programme itself. They also underline the importance of increasing the training of police to reinforce procedural aspects of their culture and work.

Another study of the links between social capital in neighbourhoods and firearm victimization in the US city of Philadelphia found that good levels of trust were associated with lower levels of subsequent violence later in time (Medina, 2015). The author echoes the work of researchers such as Robert Sampson (2012) who demonstrate the importance of neighbourhoods and the quality of their social capital in relation to crime and victimization, and the need to develop policy which works at multiple levels.

d) Disadvantages of crime prevention?

While it is important to discuss good practices and the positive outcomes of crime prevention initiatives, it is just as important to take account of negative outcomes, and of critiques of some aspects of the practice of crime prevention. A number of recent studies consider aspects of this issue, a tribute to the length of time over which crime prevention has become an accepted alternative to the use of the criminal justice system to deter or repress crime.

In a review of police-community 'co-production' partnerships in the United States, Brewer and Grabosky (2014) examine the benefits and disadvantages of one of the most common local crime prevention strategies. The 'co-production' of community safety and prevention, enlisting of the support of local civil society organizations, individuals and businesses to work with the police, has been a central characteristic of local strategies, and programmes such as Neighbourhood

Watch or Crime Stoppers, for the past 30 or more years. This was itself in part because governments in a number of countries recognized that the police and criminal justice system alone did not have the capacity to prevent crime. In academic terms it led to the notion of the 'responsibilization' of citizens and civil society to help reduce crime, rather than the state alone.

The authors note that in some cities in the United States, not only neighbourhood watch type programmes, but also neo-vigilante groups have emerged, attempting to take on policing functions, while the use of private security guards is now much more common than in the past. They argue that police-citizen programmes should not go beyond the optimal point when citizen participation is desirable. Past that point it becomes action which threatens privacy or the rights of minority groups. As they suggest, police-citizen co-production "should be used as an instrument for driving social cohesion – not one encouraging divisiveness" (Brewer & Grabosky, 2014, p. 143). While the great majority of neighbourhood watch schemes have been found to be effective and perform legitimate roles in reducing crime, they suggest there is a 'dark side' of co-production. In some cases it has been found that levels of fear of crime were increased by neighbourhood watch programmes, or that the citizens involved felt empowered or encouraged to create divisions between residents, and distinctions between 'us' and 'them' (Brewer & Grabosky, 2014, p. 148). The killing of Trayvon Martin in Florida in 2012 by a neighbourhood watch coordinator, represents the ultimate 'dark side' of citizen-police involvement, and underlines the importance of careful recruitment, training and deployment of civilians, on the part of the police.

Another concern about the application of crime prevention relates to the heavy emphasis which has been given to evidence-based approaches, regardless of the effects they may have *beyond* reducing crime. One of the most famous 'hot spots' initiatives is the 'stop, question and frisk' policy (SQF) developed by the New York Police Department from the 1990's onwards. SQF has been heavily criticised for racial profiling, given that most of those stopped were from minority backgrounds (Sweeten, 2016). The policy was eventually ended by a US Supreme Court ruling in 2013, on the grounds that it violated the constitutional rights of minorities. In a reanalysis of the New York data on 'stop and frisk' David Weisburd and his colleagues report that the policy had "a significant but modest deterrent effect on crime" suggesting that such techniques can be commended as effective in reducing crime (Weisburd, Wooditch, Weisburd, & Yang, 2016, p. 31). In response to their research, Sweeten (2016) argues that while they acknowledge the unconstitutionality of 'stop and frisk' policies, the authors still focus on its effectiveness, not whether it is

procedurally just. The fact that such approaches may alienate many young people and neighbourhoods is more important in Sweeten's view than questions of effectiveness.

Two other recent articles debate somewhat broader but similar concerns with the dangers of the misapplication of the concepts of prevention by governments (Peeters, 2015; van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014). Both articles base their arguments on the example of the development of crime prevention policy in the Netherlands since the mid 1980's. They draw especially on British and American critiques, and again on the notion of the 'responsibilization' of citizens, and the targeting of risky individuals. In both cases they conclude that immigrant neighbourhoods and families have been those most heavily targeted by prevention policies and interventions. As academic critiques, their analysis is interesting in showing how, in their view, crime prevention strategies have developed in the Netherlands and been applied at the local level in cities such as Rotterdam. However, unlike some of the research discussed above, they do not consider what alternative strategies could be used to ensure that police or social intervention does not unfairly target minority groups, or how the social networks of communities can be supported and strengthened, and community safety maintained.

Conclusions

The downward trend in traditional crime and violence in most regions of the world, which was noted in the last International Report in 2014, continues. It also appears that levels of violence in many large cities have declined. Explanations range from good governance, effective crime prevention and justice systems, and improved design, to the widespread emergence of cybercrime with internet-based theft, fraud and exploitation. However, the decline in crime is with the exception of some countries in Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean, where levels of violence and in some cases, theft and robbery, have increased over the past decade. While there remain very large differences within regions and countries in rates of crime and violence, one form of violence – intimate personal violence against women – remains persistently evident across all regions.

Continuing global trends including high levels of migration, much of it the consequence of conflict, corruption, trafficking and transnational organized crime, and terrorist acts, all remain concerns for countries in all regions. They are likely to continue to have negative effects on perceptions of safety and security, and risk further exacerbating racism and

intolerance in cities and neighbourhoods. This creates an increased challenge for governments at all levels, especially local governments.

At the international level there has been some notable affirmation of the importance of prevention – with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 in 2015, the first UN General Assembly session to adopt a preventive approach to drugs replacing the very costly and decades-long 'war on drugs' in 2016, and the adoption of the New Urban Agenda at Habitat III in 2016, with its strong focus on safe and sustainable cities. The World Health Organization has also reviewed progress globally in the adoption of its public health approach to violence prevention, finding that many countries have now created national strategies to prevent violence, although implementation lags well behind.

In some countries crime prevention which incorporates international norms and standards has now been practiced for over a quarter of a century, and this provides opportunities to undertake large-scale and long-term reviews of aspects of crime prevention. This includes reviews of the development of national strategies, of local community safety action, community-policing, and police-community partnerships, for example, providing valuable insights for policy makers, practitioners and researchers into the beneficial and the negative aspects of some crime prevention programmes. The importance of training and resources is underlined to ensure that programmes and initiatives are inclusive, and that human rights are respected.

Work on crime prevention continues to expand in all regions, but it is clear that, as always, governments at all levels tend to neglect the monitoring and evaluation of strategies and programmes, or to pay sufficient attention to issues of implementation. This is especially true at the level of local governments who often feel they lack resources, training and skills. While some countries have responded to economic and social pressures by emphasising greater surveillance and regulatory controls, the effectiveness of social and educational programmes, and of neighbourhood prevention programmes which help support families, young people and communities, continue to be very clearly demonstrated.

“Hybrid order” governance in rapidly expanding urban areas

Bernardo Pérez-Salazar³¹


Introduction

As cities rapidly expand across the world, local officials struggle to control surges of spontaneous urbanization and respond adequately to swelling demands for public goods and services. As a result, local governance models are changing and new forms of public policymaking and implementation are taking shape. Some examples of urban planning and crime prevention initiatives drawing on recent experience in Southern Africa and Latin American illustrate these shifts in different urban expansion contexts.

Rapidly expanding urban areas 2015 – 2050

According to the United Nations (2015), the world’s urban population will record a 60% increase between 2015 and 2050; by then, urban dwellers will total around 6.3 billion. The bulk of this growth is expected to be in Asia and Africa.

Figure 1.1 World urban population prospect by regions 2015 – 2050 (in thousands)



Source: United Nations (2015)

Contribution

Lagging government response

In large cities, this population bulge will be partly absorbed through formal business and government activities, as seen in many Asian cities in the recent past. Yet in the coming decades, the livelihoods of large numbers of new urban households will depend on bundles of informal activities – including selling drugs and other smuggled goods – which will deliver diversified income sources, and enable the urban poor to endure seasonal income fluctuations in cash-strapped environments. Because of the sheer scale and speed at which these activities will emerge and disappear, many will be outside the scope and reach of local government planning and control mechanisms (Lipsky, 2010; Roy, 2005, 2009).

Presently, local social movements in South Africa and Colombia, for example, are already putting pressure on local governments for housing, public services and infrastructure. They resort to a range of options such as seeking patronage of local politicians and their parties; or establishing alliances with rights-based movements to engage governments through judicial actions and orders; or coming to terms with local criminal organizations with “political connections” in exchange for votes, loyalty or sanctuary, among other things (Benit-Gbaffou, 2015; Demarest, 2011).

However “state-centered” mechanisms no longer represent the main option available to meet public needs in expanding cities. Informal mutual help groups have consolidated as safe alternatives to secure loans, instead of “bloodsucking” profiteers or banks; households are building their dwellings incrementally according to resources available to them, while developing management capabilities that enable them to adapt their housing units to respond to local income generating opportunities; local nuisance and petty crime are increasingly brought before customary leaders for sanction and punishment, instead of corrupt and inefficient police and justice officials; households seeking social guidance and service routes to deal with their daily problems look for religious groups, private charities, universities and even corporate social responsibility programs, instead of cutting

through the red tape to access government services (Arias, 2010; Baker, 2010; Marks & al., 2011; Wakely & Riley, 2011).

E-government is seen by officials as an alternative for keeping in touch with a growing citizen base in urban settings and to assure relevant public responses to their needs. Yet civil discontent is rife and is aired not only by protest but, increasingly, by judicial, fiscal and disciplinary actions against public officials held responsible for not delivering public goods and services satisfactorily. Disturbingly, as a result, government actions are increasingly determined by judicial orders, which in turn increase inefficiencies and hinder the ability of public agencies to deliver their mandates (Tissington, 2012).

Shifting to “hybrid order” governance models

Local “state-centered” governance models are clearly in crisis. Gradually they are being replaced by networks in which local, provincial and national governments have a role to play, but not a “leading role”. Achieving public policy goals in local contexts no longer depends mainly on public administrative rules, regulations, procedures, decisions or resources. Instead, local agendas are set collectively, by a mix of stakeholders. They have resources, as well as connections, and the ability to deliver relevant responses to legitimate citizen demands concerning different issues and geographic areas. Shaped by these “hybrid orders” in which local governments are simply another stakeholder sitting at the table, “hybrid” governance models are replacing the old “state-centered” models (Maria Kyed, 2011; OECD, 2011).

In local hybrid orders, public policy is no longer exclusively under the control or the initiative of state authorities. In Medellín, Colombia, for many years illegal armed groups established their criminal practices in marginal neighbourhoods through violent dominance; they exploited these territories as prisons or graveyards for their victims, as well as for illicit taxation, clandestine manufacture and trade in drugs, firearms, counterfeit ID cards, uniforms, money, and recruitment. Innovatively, responses to counter these illicit practices are not based exclusively on law enforcement; opening slum upgrading projects to participatory prioritization and design has led to construction and maintenance of public facilities that reduce violent territorial fights in these neighbourhoods; dealing with child care for working parents and after school activities has committed joint government and civic resources and efforts to protect youths from violence and recruitment; cable car services now extend the metropolitan public transport system to these previously marginal neighborhoods,

opening up educational and job opportunities that were previously inaccessible for residents (Demarest, 2011; Perez-Salazar, 2011).

In South Africa, during the late apartheid period, a focus on the fortification of home and office space led to the construction of increasingly high walls in the suburbs to keep intruders out. Joint research conducted by the Durban Urban Futures Centre and the Durban Metropolitan Police found that, from the perspective of public and private security agencies, high walls and electric fences hinder policing and security management, as well as neighbourly contact and natural surveillance of urban spaces (Marks & Overall, 2015). However, police and private security now face widespread resistance from the public to embrace these counterintuitive conclusions, and reduce excessive fortification. In response, the Durban Urban Futures Centre and the local Alliance Française are now leading a demonstration experiment to bring down the walls of the Alliance Française’s quarters in the city suburbs to test the effectiveness of shifting from the “walls and security” to the “neighbourly contact and natural surveillance” paradigm.

Concluding remarks

Rapid urban expansion is a messy process, and it will increasingly reveal the limitations of the scope and reach of “state-centered” planning and control mechanisms, to adequately respond to growing and increasingly complex demands for public goods and services. As the above cases illustrate, local governments must learn to work in “hybrid order” environments and embrace pluralised arrangements that involve resources and efforts coming from formal state agencies, as well as from civic organizations and the private sector, in order to provide satisfactory responses to public demands. In many cases, non-state actors and informal systems are seen by large social groups as accessible and effective providers of public goods and services, including crime prevention, urban safety and justice. Engaging constructively with these actors and systems can improve the legitimacy of the state and its institutions; repressing them will only succeed in exacerbating tensions in rapidly expanding urban contexts.

A brief overview of social prevention in Europe

Gorazd Meško³²

Benjamin Flander³³

Matjaž Ambrož³⁴

Among the different approaches to crime prevention, social (crime) prevention gained a lot of attention in Western and particularly European countries until the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Subsequently, in academic debate as well as in policy, the concept of social crime prevention has played a less important role. With the processes of globalisation, individualisation and neo-liberalism, actively promoting welfare (state) for all has ceased to be a central ambition of governments and policy makers. With the rapid economic, political, social and cultural changes that have taken place during the last decade, it is difficult to make a prognosis about the future development of social crime prevention in neoliberal Western societies. It is necessary to reconsider the importance of social (crime) prevention and to implement it to reduce the “root causes of crime”.

On social crime prevention

Social crime prevention includes preventive strategies that aim to modify social environments and influence offenders’ motivations, preferably with planned and co-ordinated multi-agency approaches. It focuses on interventions that seek to strengthen socialisation agents such as informal controls (e.g. family, peers, school, etc.) and education, employment, and support schemes for ex-prisoners in order to minimize opportunities to (re)offend (Groenemeyer & Schmidt, 2012; Meško, 2002).

Key post World War II developments in social crime prevention

After World War II until the end of the 1970s, the concept of social crime prevention gained attention in several European countries. Initially, it was incorporated in educational, public housing and social policies in the developing social welfare state, and in criminal justice systems which emphasized the reintegration and rehabilitation of convicted offenders and delinquents. While the 1960s and 1970s are considered the ‘golden age’ of social crime prevention, even during the 1980’s it was used to prevent the marginalization and exclusion of vulnerable

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social groups and their members. According to Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012) French sociologists and socialist-oriented policy makers influenced the development of a so-called *French social crime prevention model*. Drawing on an urban and structural view of social crime prevention, and state-driven policies relating to education, leisure and work, the model aimed at changing the structural conditions for young people at risk of crime. The model was exported to a significant number of other European countries and even other continents. Throughout this period the *Nordic model* was also developing, based on the Scandinavian concept and practice of welfarism. This model involved social and educational programs aimed at eliminating or reducing the social causes of crime. The third model of the 1980s, identified as the prevalent alternative to situational crime prevention in the UK and other Anglophone countries, was the *community crime prevention model*, relying primarily on affirmative action aimed at communities and young people in socially deprived areas.

Until the end of the 1980s, social crime prevention was also at the peak of its development in communist countries. In Slovenia (formerly a republic of Yugoslavia), for example, the idea of social crime prevention was somehow integrated into the socialist state’s welfare programs and activities. This period was characterised by a crime policy devoted to re-socialisation and rehabilitation practices, and a critical examination of the role of the police in society. During the democratization process of the second half of the 1980s, social crime prevention was still a part of crime policy and responses to crime (Meško, Kanduč, & Jere, 2012). In Hungary too, a political and professional environment had emerged during the 1980s that clearly encouraged the idea of the prevention-oriented transformation of crime control and a complex system of crime prevention, which included social initiatives and programs (Kerezsi, 2012).

The neo-liberal-inspired “first turn in social crime prevention” of the 1980s in the UK redirected the focus to crime prevention and control through the deterrent effects of the criminal justice system and situational crime prevention, aiming to reduce opportunities to commit crime (Hughes, 2007). These new

developments played a central role in the crime policies of the Conservative administration of the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. According to Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012), under British influence, the “preventive turn” took place in The Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy among others. The dismantling of the social welfare state in these and the great majority of other European countries was, however, less pronounced than in the UK and the United States, their role model countries. In most of these countries, social crime prevention policy remained an integral part of broader social policies. Their respective crime control policies became more flexible and reactive to real and immediate social needs. For example, while the Nordic countries were equally influenced by neo-liberal ideas and introduced situational crime prevention strategies, post-war social crime prevention policies remained the leading component of their social and criminal policies. Throughout the Nordic countries, the concept of the welfare state was maintained, albeit not to the same extent in all of them.

While from the beginning of the 1990s punitiveness became a dominant feature of penal policy in the great majority of democratic countries, there was a “second turn in social crime prevention”. Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012) argue that this was in response to the new wave of neoliberal situational crime prevention policies developed initially in the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In the Netherlands and Belgium this second turn took the form of “an integrated administrative crime prevention policy”, while in England and Wales it was realised by implementing the concept of “community safety” (Crawford, 2007). Social crime prevention reconfiguration reached its fullest development in the security and safety policies of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour government.

The second turn in social crime prevention also influenced developments in crime prevention in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, and some other “old” European democracies, as well as in some post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. In Hungary (Kerezsi, 2012), the prevention-oriented transformations were interrupted by the change of political regime in 1989, so that the idea of a complex crime prevention system was taken off the agenda until the mid-1990s. In contrast, it was not until the late 1990s that Slovenia underwent a “turn” towards a more punitive stance, and a withdrawal from the past “inclusive” orientation in crime prevention practice. Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012) argue that the transfer of the new Western “safety and security” policies to post-socialist countries was realised, in part, by the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) set up by the European Union, and

by incorporation of EU laws into domestic legal systems. Together with other “agents”, this helped to transfer Western social control, and especially deterrence practices, which seem to receive more public and policy-making support than social programmes. The latter remind people of the welfare state, and even more, of the former socialist/communist welfare programmes in Eastern European countries.

Concluding remarks

The latest reconfigurations in social crime prevention policies towards a more individualized, control-oriented and authoritarian crime prevention model in the great majority of European countries prioritises, among other things, the fight against anti-social behaviour and public disorder. These policies incorporate measures aimed at reducing individual motivation to offend via the institutions of socialization, focusing on communities, neighbourhoods and social networks. This neo-classicist and neo-positivist approach to social crime prevention ties in with the individual positivist perspective prevalent in the second half of the 19th century. The neoliberal pressures that cause greater social differentiation need somehow to be reduced. We believe that governments have to implement social policies, which can have a preventative effect on the most disadvantaged people in society, instead of increasing punitiveness even for minor offences.

Workshop 4 at the 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

Peter Homel³⁵

The role of community members, civil society organisations and the private sector in the prevention of crime and raising awareness and encouraging participation in the criminal justice process.

UN Workshop 4 was part of the formal programme of the 13th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which took place in Doha, Qatar between 12th and 19th April 2015. The Workshop was developed and run by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), and organized by Peter Homel, then Principal Criminologist at the Institute, in collaboration with UNODC. The Moderator was Adam Tomison of the AIC and the Chair Matti Joutsen (Finland).

The Workshop was specifically designed to demonstrate through practical examples that a programme of active public participation was not only possible, but also desirable for achieving effective and sustainable crime prevention and criminal justice processes, in a variety of very diverse communities and settings.³⁶

Workshop 4 addressed the following themes:

- The role of social networks and new technologies,
- public participation at the local level: specifically grassroots initiatives and,
- the role of private sector business in crime prevention and criminal justice.

The development of measures to ensure that civil society organisations have the appropriate skills and knowledge to build confidence, ensure transparency, and prevent corruption was also emphasized in the Workshop. This was an important theme that reflected specific recommendations arising from the Salvador Declaration from the 12th UN Crime Congress in 2010. The Workshop was constructed to give a strong voice to presentations from international experts and experienced practitioners from a range of mostly civil society organisations or academic institutions. Although there were a small number of government

Contribution

officials as workshop panellists, each spoke as international experts in their respective fields, rather than as government representatives.

The panellists came from all regions of the world including Asia, Africa, Europe, and North and South America. Some of the organisations represented included the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, the Centre for Law Enforcement and Public Health, Sydney Institute of Criminology, Avocats Sans Frontières, Soroptimists International, the Quakers, the Latin American Committee for Crime Prevention, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, the International Anti-Corruption Academy, *Caixa Seguradora* and the African Commission in Human and People's Rights. Expert government panellists came from the Japanese Ministry of Justice, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (Mexico), as well as from the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services from the Canadian Province of Ontario, Canada. There was also a speaker from the Australian Institute of Criminology and a presentation by a participant in the Qatar World Youth Forum, held in the days before the Congress.

What was made very clear from these presentations is that the task of moving policies and guidelines into effective and sustainable practice at the local and regional level requires significant investment of experience and expertise. Very often this expertise could reside in a range of very different organisations, regardless of whether they are government agencies, non-government or civil society groups, academic institutions or the private sector. What was required to convert these policies and guidelines into effective programmes that produce meaningful outcomes for individuals and their communities, was openness to cooperative and collaborative arrangements that saw the most appropriate expertise and skill bases applied to delivering the most effective solutions to the most pressing problems.

Social networks and new technologies

Three workshop presentations provided some insightful perspectives on the role of the media, social networks and new communications technologies in promoting participation in crime prevention and access to criminal justice processes, based on practical experience from across the world. A panellist from the Sydney Institute of Criminology in Australia demonstrated how police organizations have emerged as leaders in social media application showing best practice for the integration of social media into departmental routines. More than any other state agency, police organizations have managed to successfully harness social media as an effective communications tool recognizing early on its significant potential to meet a range of police public relations objectives. However, police organisations need to develop internal policies and guidance frameworks to support and regulate their engagement with the freewheeling environment of social media, in order to avoid the risk of acting unethically or inappropriately, or abusing the privilege of access into this medium. Being an effective participant in social networks does not always come easily to police officers, and they can benefit significantly from advice and training from professionals with more experience with operating in this medium. Examples of police engagement with social networks has led to increasing levels of confidence and trust at the public level, especially among young people who are generally the most prolific social media users. But this benefit is also seen to extend to the capacity to engender greater trust in the police among some of the most vulnerable groups in the community.

Another presentation by the Mexican Institute INEGI reported on the development of its more open data collection system in collaboration with UNODC. The system works across complex national, provincial and local systems where information availability and stakeholder information needs differ significantly. It has sought to encourage participation and engagement with a wide range of stakeholders and the public, when relevant and available, creating transparent and accessible information portals using new technology and social networking systems.

Social marketing approaches have also been applied to crime prevention including drunk driver prevention, family and domestic violence and burglary prevention. Social networking sites directly interact with and empower the very people they are designed to assist to achieve their objectives. The strong message from this presentation was that as the sophistication of communications technology continue to rapidly develop, and the cost of developing and delivering social network and new communications based interventions becomes easier and cheaper

through platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, etc., it is vital to maintain a focus on ensuring that such interventions are research based, and developed in a systematic manner with a clear focus on outcome effectiveness.

Private sector involvement

In relation to private sector involvement in crime prevention, the presentation on the 'Youth Expression Project' in Brazil proved an excellent example. Initiated by UNODC in collaboration with the major insurance company *Caixa Seguradora*, the project was developed and evaluated, and designed to address youth homicide and violence, especially in disadvantaged areas. It worked with over 100 young people on youth-led individual and social capital-building initiatives in satellite cities around Brasilia. The key role and specific capacities of the insurance company were highlighted in the presentation. They contributed leadership and organisational skills to address this difficult social problem.

The Chair's conclusions from the workshop were that:

- Rapid developments in media, social networks and new communication technologies bring undeniable potential benefit to society, in particular to law enforcement as means of spreading information, encouraging reporting and cooperation with authorities, building trust, identifying community risks and providing safety tips. Exchanges among states and sharing of best practices are important for addressing common challenges that emerge from these new developments, such as new forms of crime and victimisation and negative impact of the media; and for building national and local capacity to generate and analyse relevant data.
- Public participation can widen and strengthen efforts to prevent crime and deliver criminal justice services. To be effective, inclusive, evidence-based and sustainable, multi-sectorial approaches to public participation should be developed, in line with national laws and circumstances. Top-down approaches to fostering public participation should be combined with a bottom-up approach in order to ensure that community concerns are appropriately reflected.
- Public participation in enhancing access to justice is useful in raising awareness, extending outreach, and empowering members of the community, in particular those members of society recognized as vulnerable, as well as women and children. Members of the community, in line with national law and as appropriate, can play an important role

in national criminal justice systems, for example in victim support, restorative justice programmes, legal aid, probation and reintegration of offenders into society.

- Public-private partnerships in crime prevention and criminal justice have potential benefits, for example in the area of preventing corruption and in empowering local communities to become involved in crime prevention initiatives that aim to improve the well-being of the community as a whole.
- An appropriate regulatory and institutional framework based on clear and targeted policies provides a framework for public participation, and may be complemented by measures to ensure that civil society organisations have the appropriate skills and knowledge, as well as measures to build confidence, ensure transparency and prevent corruption.

Endnotes

- 1 UNODC also published its second in-depth *Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends Contexts and Data* in 2014, and this joint report draws in part on that work.
- 2 In its *Global Study of Homicide* (UNODC, 2014) UNODC estimated a rate of 6.2 per 100,000. The difference is explained by the use of different data sources, with UNODC using criminal justice rather than public health sources, and different estimation methods (UNODC, 2015a, p. 9).
- 3 As measured by the Gini co-efficient.
- 4 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey.
- 5 World Justice Project maintains an Index on the Rule of Law which tracks issues related to security including conventional crime, political violence including terrorism, corruption, and vigilante violence. See World Justice Project, 2015.
- 6 <http://cybrepo.unodc.org>
- 7 See Crawford, 2009; Edwards & Hughes, 2009; Garland, 2001; Hebberecht & Baillergeau, 2012.
- 8 The publication *United Nations Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 1955–2015 60 years of achievement* (2015) provides a useful synopsis of the growth in size and the coverage of the previous twelve Congresses.
- 9 See the *Doha Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice into the Wider United Nations Agenda to Address Social and Economic Challenges and to Promote the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, and Public Participation*. A/CONF.222L.6. www.unodc.org
- 10 For more information see the Congress Working paper *National approaches to public participation in strengthening crime prevention and criminal justice*. A/CONF.222/9. www.unodc.org
- 11 Matthew Torigian, Deputy Minister, Community Safety, Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, Province of Ontario, Canada – Community mobilisation – a new approach to community and police engagement; Alice Scartezini, Caixa Seguradora Youth Expression Project, Brazil – Social responsibility and crime prevention: lessons learned from the Expression Youth Programme in Brazil.
- 12 See UNODC's response to the SDG's: *Contribution by UNODC in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and a proposed role of the CND and CCPCJ in reviewing the progress of the SDGs*. (EN/CN.7/2016/CRP.1) para.1
- 13 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. GA Resolution 70/1, 25 September 2015.
- 14 UNODC (2016). Contribution by UNODC in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and a proposed role of the CND and CCPCJ in reviewing the progress of the SDGs. E/CN.15/2016/CRP.1
- 15 See Violence Reduction Unit www.actiononviolence.org.uk
- 16 The overrepresentation of municipal officials in the figure can be explained by the fact that municipalities are responsible for numerous services, such as schools, social services, health care, urban planning, etc.
- 17 One excellent example of volunteer action in the UK is *Community Speed Watch* which works with the police to reduce the incidence of speeding, and improve safety in cities and rural areas. The organization helps in the recruitment and training of volunteers, and has developed specialized web-based tools to assist the volunteers and the police. See www.communityspeedwatch.co.uk
- 18 The German Forum for Crime Prevention was established at the same time at the federal level to bring people and institutions together and provide advice and support (Frevel & Rogers, 2016, pp. 139–140).
- 19 See ICPC's website for more information on the 5th International Conference on Crime Observatories and Criminal Analysis, Mexico City, November 3–6th 2015.
- 20 www.citizensecurity.igarape.org.br
- 21 References included in the quote can be found in Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán (2015).
- 22 Peter Homel and Georgina Fuller, 2015, p. 1.
- 23 See ICPC's 3rd International Report published in 2012.
- 24 This includes the work of the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), and the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
- 25 See for example *Smart and Safe Cities*, 2015, published by the City Leadership Initiative www.cityleadership.net
- 26 Ross Homel, Kate Freiberg, Sara Branch, and Huong Le, 2015, p. 1.
- 27 Professor Ross Homel presented earlier findings from the project at the Workshop on crime prevention organized by ICPC at the 10th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Bangkok in 2005 (Shaw & Travers, 2007).
- 28 The Crime Reduction Programme introduced in the UK in the 1990's is a prime example of major implementation, rather than programme, failure. See (P. Homel, Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004).
- 29 Higginson & Mazerolle, 2014, p. 451.
- 30 In addition to community policing, they included beat policing, reassurance policing, partnership approaches to gun control, neighbourhood watch, and school resource officer programmes (Higginson & Mazerolle, 2014, p. 449).
- 31 Bernardo Pérez-Salazar, MA, Independent Researcher, Bogotá, Colombia.
- 32 Gorazd Meško, PhD, Professor of Criminology, Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia.
- 33 Benjamin Flander, LLD, Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia.
- 34 Matjaž Ambrož, LLD, Associate Professor of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.
- 35 Professor Peter Homel, Griffith Criminology Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.
- 36 A copy of the programme for the workshop can be found here www.unodc.org/documents/congress//workshops/workshop4/PDFs/Programme_Workshop_4_final.pdf. A brief overview of the presentations and the substantive issues discussed appeared in the Report of Committee II: Workshop 4 www.unodc.org/congress/en/documentation.html.

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2

URBAN SAFETY

Urban safety

2

Introduction – The changing nature of urban safety

“A city-level (safe city) campaign promotes a city where all urban inhabitants – regardless of socio-economic status, gender, race, ethnicity or religion – are able to fully participate in the social, economic and political opportunities that cities have to offer. Engaging the urban poor, youth, and women in particular at all levels of planning and decision-making is key to creating a safer city” (UN-Habitat, 2015a, p. 10).


Ensuring citizen safety is an important role of government. City governments, due to their proximity to local populations, are well positioned to champion urban safety and to ensure that it responds to local priorities, even when national governments have developed overall prevention policies (ICPC, 2013). It is for this reason that several organisations including ICPC, the European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS), the National League of Cities (USA), the National Crime Prevention Centre (Canada), UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme and the Ministère de sécurité publique du Québec, among others, have advocated for the role of cities in implementing local safety strategies since the 1990s (ICPC, 2013). The support of national and subnational government to enable cities to carry out this role is essential.

Urbanization: challenges and opportunities

We are living in a primarily urban world with an estimated 3.5 billion people living in cities today (UN, 2015b). This trend is projected to continue in the next decades, with 95% of urban expansion happening in cities to occur in the developing world (UN, 2015b). By 2050, the urban population will be bigger than the world population today (*Revised zero draft of the new urban agenda*, 2016, p. 1). See Figure 2.1.

In the recently adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the first stand-alone goal on urban signifies that the international community acknowledges

Figure 2.1 Urban population by major area, 1950-2050 (Urban population (billions))



the critical role of cities in sustainable development. Ironically, there is no internationally agreed upon definition of ‘urban’. Some argue that its definition is related to its productive capacity, centred around non-agricultural activities (Rashed & Jürgens, 2010), while others, including the United Nations Statistics Division, simply refer to cities with populations of over 100,000 as urban. Either way, there seems to be a relative consensus that the interconnectedness between cities and rural areas is increasing, and the lines distinguishing the two diminishing (Rashed & Jürgens, 2010).

Urbanization and migration to urban areas is occurring faster than municipal infrastructure, spaces and services are able to expand, resulting in inadequate delivery of urban infrastructure and services, affecting the urban poor and women particularly. Some governments, Vietnam for example, are now trying to address this by bringing urban infrastructure to rural

villages in an attempt to curb migration to the city (Rashed & Jürgens, 2010).

The majority of cities today are marred by inequalities and lack social cohesion. The divides and dualities that are manifest in the form of urban inequalities are important root causes of crime. For example, as cities expand, so does the establishment of gated communities and informal settlements. In both cases, the availability of urban services including safety services and the police are often lacking, on the one hand replaced by private services, and absent or inadequate on the other. It is in informal settlements, areas characterised by poverty, lack of access to quality basic services, unplanned settlements, and high rates of insecurity and crime, that we find some of the greatest challenges to urban safety. It is also these areas that 828 million people call home; a number that continues to grow (UN, 2015b). Inequality is often correlated with levels of urban crime and violence, in both the Global North and South (GIT Security, 2013).

In spite of these challenges, cities are hugely important in their potential for sustainable development. They are sites of opportunities, for education, employment, social cohesion, gender equality, freedom of expression of sexual orientation, etc. and in that sense urbanization has the potential to be transformative. New policy approaches are needed to turn urbanization into opportunity (AUC, 2015). Technology is increasingly important for city management, and offers potential for integrated urban management and citizen participation in urban development, management and monitoring.

Defining urban safety

There are many different ways of understanding crime prevention and urban safety, and these definitions change from one language to the other, and from one region or country to another. ICPC's working definition, reflected in the concepts of crime prevention and community safety, "emphasizes the role of residents – or communities – in developing and implementing these policies. Likewise, the development of personal capacities, whether by education, professional skills development, leadership, etc., promotes good social integration and the building of peaceful living environments" (ICPC, 2010b, p. 4).

It has been argued that today's definition of urban safety is complementary to crime prevention, as it considers how to enhance a person's individual rights and well-being, in terms of their physical (Kelly, 2015), social and psychological integrity, in addition to addressing the prevention of crime and violence (Habitat III, 2015c). Urban safety thus "starts from the observation that inadequate urban development


and local governance and social and territorial exclusion patterns encourage crime and violence. In this perspective, urban safety adopts a citywide and participatory process to address the risk factors, and above all, protection factors of insecurity in cities, creating the conditions of more sustainable, inclusive, cohesive and just cities" (Habitat III, 2015c, p. 2).

Urban safety is an important political, social and economic issue. Much knowledge has been gained in this area over the past twenty years, since the adoption of the first UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Urban Crime in 1995. The follow-up 2002 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime assert "there is clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to the sustainable development of countries" (UNODC, 2002, p. 2), now reflected in the SDGs in Agenda 2030.

This accumulated knowledge and experience has resulted in a shared understanding of the basic elements of effective urban safety strategies (WICI, 2016, p. 17). Firstly, connecting different levels of government from the national to the community is key (see Chapter 3). While national governments develop safety strategies for the country, municipal governments localise crime prevention efforts through their own plans. Multilevel coordination is fundamental to successfully developing and implementing crime prevention and urban safety strategies, and "addressing the interlinkages between transnational organised crime, and local crime, violence and insecurity" (Habitat III, 2015c, p. 3). National and subnational governments must support cities in ensuring urban safety, including sufficient power and resource allocation for effective implementation and monitoring. Community engagement and participation of a diversity of the urban population inclusive of age, gender, indigenous status and other factors in safety diagnosis, planning, implementation and monitoring is important, since different identities face safety disparities (see Figure 2.2). In this sense, a complementary bottom-up approach is important in successfully localizing safety strategies. Finally, a multidimensional and multi-stakeholder approach to understanding and addressing crime and violence is essential across all levels. This will allow for a more robust, effective and comprehensive safety strategy (UN-Habitat, 2007a; WICI, 2016).

Urban safety is increasingly being integrated as a cross-cutting issue in sustainable urban development and governance (UNODC, 2014). The connections between safety and the physical design and infrastructure are widely recognised, as are the links with governance (UN-Habitat, 2007b). It is argued that "sustainable urban development will only be achieved when well-planned city-wide, gender-sensitive,

Figure 2.2 Safety gender gap (% of people feeling safe walking alone at night)



Source: Authors, adapted from ICPC (2014, p. 168)

community-based, integrated and comprehensive urban crime prevention and safety strategies have been put in place” (WICI, 2016, p. 4). This is reflected in urban safety strategies that use rights-based approaches to include elements of social development and inclusion.

Overview of the chapter

This chapter begins by exploring how international norms and standards on prevention and urban safety have evolved and are currently being updated to better reflect the composition of cities. It explores the state of urban safety today, highlighting some relevant trends and exploring ongoing (gangs, violence against women and girls) and emerging challenges

(migration, fragile cities). It considers the increased interconnectedness between cities, and the new urban governance that places greater emphasis on citizen participation. The chapter also looks at how technology is being used by both city governments and citizens to make cities safer and smarter, including in particular geo-mapping. Finally, it looks at some policies, programmes and projects developed to respond to the challenges facing cities.

Norms and standards on urban safety

We are at a pivotal point in modern history where many international norms and standards are being revisited to reflect major changes in demographics, and rapid urbanization. Urban safety is considered a major issue of concern in cities around the world, regardless of the degree to which they are affected by crime and violence. Many of these norms and standards call for strengthening inclusion, particularly of youth, refugees and other excluded groups; for governance that is transparent, accountable and inclusive; for multi-level and multi-sectoral partnerships to confront challenges; for planning that accounts for diverse city users and that involves diverse people’s voices in planning; for gender equity and ending violence against women and girls; and for urban opportunities to be made available to all. While many of these messages are consistent with the previous crime prevention normative frameworks, they are being updated to incorporate new understanding and knowledge, and reflect current challenges such as migration.

From the MDGs to the SDGs

“SDG 11: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”.

“Target 7: ‘By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities’ (UN, 2015a)”.

When the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were adopted in 2000, development efforts were still largely focused on rural areas and developing countries. Fifteen years later, with the adoption of Agenda 2030, and the majority of the world’s population living in urban areas, cities are recognized as key to sustainable development. This is reflected in the inclusion of a stand-alone SDG 11 on making cities inclusive, safe and resilient. The explicit inclusion of safety is noteworthy in that it is recognized as an essential condition for sustainable urban development, and positions urban safety as a development issue.

From UN guidelines on crime prevention (1995, 2002) to UN guidelines on safer cities (Shaw, 2010)

Two sets of guidelines relating to crime prevention already exist: the *Guidelines for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in the Field of Urban Crime* ECOSOC Resolution 1995/9; and the *Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime*, ECOSOC Resolution 2002/13. These guidelines articulate the need for crime prevention strategies to be developed and implemented alongside criminal justice responses. Among other tools, a Handbook on the 2002 Guidelines is designed to help their implementation by national and local governments (Shaw, 2010). See Box 2.1 for other pertinent UN guidelines and resolutions.

UN Guidelines on Safer Cities are now being developed. The purpose of the new guidelines is to provide policy makers at national and local levels with a clear normative framework that builds on the earlier guidelines and on accumulated knowledge about the development of safe cities, and provides a practical basis for practitioners. This reflects the recognition of the rapid changes affecting cities, and the benefits of incorporating recent knowledge and tools into crime prevention approaches, and new technologies. They are being strategically aligned with other normative initiatives, including Agenda 2030 and the New Urban Agenda (NUA).

Box 2.1 Other UN resolutions touching on urban safety

- 2014 – Economic and Social Council Resolution E/2014/30 on the recommendation of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on strengthening social policies as a tool for crime prevention.
- 2008 – Economic and Social Council Resolution E/2008/24 on “Strengthening prevention of urban crime: an integrated approach”.
- 2005 – Economic and Social Council Resolution E/2005/22 called on UNODC to strengthen its emphasis on crime prevention to establish a balance between prevention and criminal justice responses.
- 2002 – General Assembly Resolution 56/261 calls for close cooperation between sections including justice, health, education, and housing to support effective crime prevention.
- 2002 – General Assembly Resolution 56/261 calls for working with civil society for effective crime prevention strategies.

From the Habitat II Agenda to the New Urban Agenda

In 2016, countries around the world will be adopting a New Urban Agenda (NUA) at the Habitat III meetings in Quito, Ecuador. The NUA will guide countries in their urban development plans and goals for the next twenty years. The 2016 NUA strives to be transformative and sees urbanization as an opportunity for sustainable development, for building social cohesion and for social development (UN-Habitat, 2015b). Urban safety is a necessary condition for cities to flourish as reflected in the Draft, with crime prevention specifically mentioned as a key strategy.

From the EU Urban Charter to the EU Urban Charter II

In 1992, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe adopted the Urban Charter. The move was regarded as ground-breaking, as it

Box 2.2 Making the links: the SDGs, Habitat III and the NUA, and SC 2.0

The Habitat III meeting in Quito, Ecuador in October 2016 is the first major international conference following the adoption of Agenda 2030 and the 17 SDGs. The Habitat III meeting will adopt the NUA, a new global normative framework. The NUA will serve to guide urban policy and development for the next twenty years, just as did the earlier meetings in Vancouver in 1976 and Istanbul in 1996. Since the SDGs are a binding agreement of Member States, it will be important that the NUA, a non-binding normative framework, be linked with the SDG, and the urban SDG 11 more specifically. At the same time, UN-Habitat and UNODC are championing the development of new UN Guidelines on Safer Cities, and UN-Habitat is evaluating what it has learnt from the past twenty years of its Safer Cities Programme and what the next phase of the programme will look like. To guide this next phase, it is developing a Safer Cities 2.0 (SC 2.0) framework document. Strategically, the new Guidelines and SC 2.0 should be seen as pathways to implementation of SDG 11 and 11.7 as well as the NUA.

These important global normative conversations and agreements have inspired much reflection and stocktaking. ICPC’s decision to choose Urban Safety as the theme of the 2016 International Report is one example.

recognized and legitimised urbanization across the continent. In 2008, the European Union Urban Charter II – Manifesto for a new urbanity was developed to reflect the social, economic and cultural changes that had taken place in cities since the first Charter was drafted. The following principles and concepts guide the Charter II: ethical governance, sustainable development, and increased solidarity in public policies, all seen as essential for confronting rapid urbanization (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe & Council of Europe, 2009).

Africa Vision 2063

The African continent has experienced unprecedented growth, growing from about 229 million people in 1950 to 1.2 billion in 2014 (AUC, 2015). Africa Vision 2063 is an ambitious 50-year vision and action plan for the continent and aims, inter alia, to respond to the challenges brought on by rapid urbanization. It strives to be transformational in its impact, and identified cities as the place where national and continental transformation will take place. While not always the stated objective, several of its seven aspirations address the root causes of urban crime and violence, and can serve to strengthen urban safety throughout the region: poverty reduction; reducing inequalities; good governance and strengthening institutions; respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; strengthening mechanisms to build, maintain and restore peace; appropriate financing for safety and security; gender equality and parity in political, economic, and social spheres; ending violence against women and girls (VAWG); and people-driven development. Africa Vision 2063 aspires to build social cohesion with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics, and recognizes diversity as a source of wealth (AUC, 2015). Additional actions related to enhancing urban safety include: calls for a gun-free Africa in the short term, and no conflicts arising from social exclusion in the long term; a capable and accountable police force; mechanisms of cooperation for addressing and preventing transnational crime; adequate financing for sustainable urban development to contend with the anticipated urban growth; and it is considered imperative to create safe urban neighbourhoods (AUC, 2015).

The state of safety in cities: trends and challenges

Increased attention to the role of cities in development has put a spotlight on urban safety challenges as barriers to sustainability, and incited researchers to revisit urban crime prevention strategies and their effectiveness. Invariably, issues such as the

privatization of safety and the proliferation of gated communities, the presence and prominence of gangs, VAWG, urban safety in the context of conflict and disaster, and the influx of refugees to urban centres are all being examined closely. The Safe and Inclusive Cities Initiative, launched by IDRC (Canada) is one example (see Box 2.3 below).

The prevalence of urban crime and violence in today's cities

The Economists' Safe Cities Index 2015 assigns 50 cities in the world with a ranking according to a number of factors, including personal safety. According to their assessment, Tokyo ranks first as the safest city, while Jakarta occupies the last spot (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015a). As aforementioned, urban crime and violence is a central preoccupation of city residents and governments. It threatens social cohesion and economic stability and has negative health impacts on residents. The harm and fear it instils threatens quality of life, human rights, social stability, and sustainable development, and disproportionately affects the urban poor (UN-Habitat, 2015a). One in five people in cities has been a victim of violence and crime (UN-Habitat, 2015a). This rises to 70% of people in parts of Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa (UN-Habitat, 2007b), while globally, one in three women is a victim of violence (ICPC, 2014; UN Women, 2016).

Homicide rates are noticeably higher in cities than rural areas, especially settlements with populations exceeding 50,000 (UNODC, 2014). Similarly, a majority of armed violence and homicide by firearms occur in cities. In 2013, 46 of the 50 most violent cities were

Box 2.3 The Safe and Inclusive Cities Initiative: efforts to understand urban safety (IDRC, 2015)

The *Safe and Inclusive Cities Initiative*, a five-year global programme (2012-2017) to invest in research to better understand urban safety and violence. Five factors driving urban violence have been identified so far:

1. Poor access to basic services can foster competition and fuel conflict between groups.
2. Population displacement can increase vulnerability by severing community support networks.
3. In some high-crime areas, criminal gangs play the dual role of perpetrator and 'protector'.
4. Poverty and unemployment undermine households and may fuel domestic and community violence.
5. Segregated urban planning can leave a legacy of community tension and insecurity.

in the Americas, yet none were experiencing armed conflict (Muggah, n.d.). Contrary to popular assumption, there is no consistent correlation between the size of a city, or its population density, and levels of crime and violence (ICPC, 2010a; Muggah, 2014; Shaw & Carli, 2011), although UN-Habitat notes that when a city is in a condition of rapid growth, there is a link (UN-Habitat, 2007b). Apart from levels of inequality it has been argued “it is not the size of urban agglomerations that create criminal surroundings but rather poor planning, design and management of urbanization” (Habitat III, 2015c, p. 2).

Beyond the city: Metropolitan areas, informal city expansion, and privatized spaces and services

Some current trends in urban development – notably gentrification, metropolitan expansion and the growth of informal settlements – require us to rethink urban safety strategies. UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities model, for example, emphasizes enhancing urban safety through planning, management and governance with the municipal authority (and mayor if possible) taking a strong leadership position. Yet when we consider metropolitan areas beyond city centres, informal settlements and gated communities, it is often not the municipal authority that takes the lead in the planning, management or governance of these areas.

One response to fear of crime and violence is the increased privatization of space and safety through gated communities and private security. Further, with gentrification, the urban poor are often displaced to peri-urban areas where they experience greater exclusion. The privatization of city spaces creates real and perceived barriers and segregated spaces – often based on class, which has been described as ‘infrastructural violence’ (Moser & McIlwaine, 2014, p. 336; Rodgers & O’Neill, 2012). In Harare, Zimbabwe, for example, colonial planning based on racial segregation now reinforces economic segregation, which has the consequence of limiting the freedom of mobility of the urban poor (IDRC, 2015, p. 3).

Some informal settlements in many cities in Latin America, the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa and others are considered too dangerous for local police officers to manage urban crime and violence, leaving the informal management to gangs (Muggah, 2013). For example, in San Salvador gangs require urban residents and business owners to accept their protection against other gangs. This produces “a coercive form of social cohesion, whereby survival hinges on tolerating the sources of insecurity” (IDRC, 2015). In these cases control, power and authority are negotiated at a neighbourhood scale (Muggah, 2014). Interventions aimed at enhancing urban safety in these areas must

be prioritized but also reconceptualised, as we know that urban crime and violence are the results of the combination of inequalities, lack of institutional and social control, and social exclusion, all characteristic of these ‘no-go’ zones (Habitat III, 2015c).

The cities with high inequality, segments of the urban population often end up living in situations of exclusion and marginalisation, disempowering conditions and environments conducive to crime (UN-Habitat, 2015a). There is a need for city governments and planners alike to consider how these different areas interact with the city, and to take account of the daily movement of people residing in them. Thus, it is essential to invest in understanding these new governance gaps and mobility patterns to inform planning strategies that promote inclusion. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion in relation to Latin American cities.

Identities, exclusion, and crime in cities

“Youth are the agents of change and women the advocates of safety in the city. They must be fully engaged as resources – not problems – in the design and delivery of any sustainable violence and crime prevention strategies” (UN-Habitat, 2015a, p. 10).

Patterns of urbanization have resulted in fragmented cities with sharp divisions and contrasts from one neighbourhood to the next. In order to better understand the nuanced perspectives of the diversity of residents, it is important to consider how an individual’s identity markers intersect to shape their urban experience.

Each person’s identity is shaped by many intersecting factors including age, gender, sexual orientation, income, race, and ability. The way these factors interconnect with one another has a predictable impact on their degree of inclusion, access to opportunities, sense of safety, experience of harassment, or involvement in illegal activities and gangs (CAWI, 2015; WICI, n.d.). By understanding the needs and experiences of different people, we are better able to design crime prevention initiatives that promote the inclusion of all. This requires a strong shift away from current urbanism and urbanization patterns, which tend to produce places of exclusivity (UN-Habitat, n.d.-a).

Sense of safety guides mobility choices and has a direct link with one’s ability to benefit from urban opportunities. More than half of women surveyed in the European Union reported avoiding places and situations ‘sometimes’ as a direct result of fear of violence. This has human rights implications as it can limit participation in social, political and economic life (UN Women, 2015a). It affects access to and use

of public transport as Chapter 4 discusses. A large number of studies have documented issues of gender and urban safety using sense of safety as the entry point for diagnosing community safety issues.

An important element of preventing urban crime and violence involves building social cohesion amongst diverse urban dwellers (see Chapter 6 and ICPC's 4th International Report, 2014). France has instituted a public policy in this regard, which also remains the basis for the powers given to the inter-ministerial structure responsible for crime prevention (ICPC, 2010b). Thus specific forms of systemic and infrastructural exclusion in cities require local governments to systematically include those different populations in the development of urban safety strategies. Strengthening the identity of people with their city and creating a sense of belonging starting at the local level (neighbourhoods), are effective ways to build local democracy and engage people in the production and maintenance of urban safety (WICI, 2016).

a) Preventing violence against women and girls in cities

The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action explicitly highlighted ending VAWG as "one of the 12 critical areas to achieve gender equality" (UN Women, 2015b, p. 1). VAWG is an endemic problem in cities around the world. It manifests itself in many forms, from physical or sexual, to psychological or economic violence, in private and public spaces (UNDESA, 2010). Consistent with other crime prevention initiatives, efforts to prevent VAWG are shown to be most successful when they are coordinated, multi-sectoral and involve "multiple strategies implemented in a mutually reinforcing way with individuals, as well as communities and organisations, and at the broader social level" (UN Women, 2015a, p. 8). Efforts are increasingly being made to transform the underlying factors that encourage or allow gender discrimination to flourish, including discriminatory laws and policies and social norms, attitudes and behaviours; all of which are dynamic features that promote unequal power relations based on gender.

Greater international attention to ending VAWG in public urban spaces is a significant new trend. It departs from a past focus mainly on intimate partner violence and victim response services. The 2013 UN Commission for the Status of Women (CSW57), for example, "identified various forms of sexual violence against women and girls (SVAWG) in public spaces as a distinct area of concern, and called on governments to prevent it" (UN Women, 2015b, para. 2). The recognition of the importance of preventing, reducing and ending gender based violence in public spaces is

also encapsulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which calls for "the elimination of all forms of VAWG in public and private spheres", as Target 5.2 (UNDESA, 2015a).

Several international safer cities for women and girls' programmes have been initiated in the past decade.¹ One of the first findings from these programmes was the important and previously overlooked link between experiences of street harassment and sense of safety. For example, UN Women's Safe Cities Global Initiative, now working in over 20 cities worldwide, shows that "sexual harassment and other forms of sexual violence in public spaces are an everyday occurrence for women and girls around the world – in urban and rural areas, in developed and developing countries" (UN WOMEN, 2013, para. 1). Recently, some striking figures from various studies were released: 68% of women experienced sexual harassment or violence in the past year in Quito, Ecuador, and 43% in London, England; 55% of women experienced sexual violence in marketplaces in the past year in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea; and in Delhi, India – 92% of women had experienced sexual violence in public spaces (Blumenthal, 2014).

Today's safer cities for women and girls' initiatives recognise that efforts must go beyond infrastructural change, to consider "how laws, regulations and policies governing city life can help to promote greater safety for women, and the importance of public education and awareness of the issues" (Shaw, 2016, p. 10). A combination of longer-term situational and social prevention initiatives is needed to effectively reduce VAWG in urban public spaces. These will help to change negative gender stereotypes, roles and the cultural norms that enable gender discrimination and gender-based violence to flourish in cities. Finally, men and boys must be engaged as allies and important actors in this transformation.

b) Boys, young men, and gangs

A recent global review of youth gangs underlines the importance of identity politics and belonging as underlying foundations for involvement, and a means of escaping exclusion (Winton, 2014). The study argues that identity is the main output of transnational gangs, and a shift is needed away from studying and programming for individuals, to gaining "an understanding of the intersection of structural violence (the exclusion from legitimate means of making a living) and symbolic violence (stigma)" (Moser & McIlwaine, 2014, p. 334).

Evidence from cities around the globe shows that young men aged 15 to 25, or younger, are most likely to be or become involved in crime. Research in three

Figure 2.3 The three pillars for a safer city



Source: UN-Habitat (2015a)

cities in Côte d'Ivoire revealed that the average age of gang members is ten years old (IDRC, 2016). Additionally, young men are the most likely to kill and be killed, accounting for approximately 70% of homicide victims (Habitat III, 2015c). The presence of gangs in urban areas and the involvement of young men in them has been explored and documented for decades. Gangs in Brazil and Central America in particular have been the subject of many studies and interventions, and initiatives aimed at engaging youth, particularly from childhood, show some positive results (Muggah, 2014). Some good practices are highlighted in the final section of this chapter. Understanding more nuanced identities of young men will help to inform future prevention programmes and show how youth can both perpetuate and prevent cycles of urban violence and crime (UN-Habitat, 2015a; IDRC, 2015). The Diagram on the Three Pillars for a Safe City below illustrates the role of social programmes, in conjunction with urban design, management and planning, and law enforcement, in achieving urban safety.

c) New residents: migrants and refugees in cities

In our globalised and connected world, there is much fluidity between borders, and more than one billion people are migrants, with more women and girls migrating than ever before (ICPC, 2014). In our urban world, most of this movement ends up in cities, accounting for 60% of the total 14.4 million refugees and 80% of the 38 million internally displaced people (IDPs), where they are most likely to find successful social and economic integration (Habitat III, 2015a, p. 2). The urban growth patterns in some countries such as Colombia, Angola and Sudan, have themselves been shaped by the movement of people escaping conflict (COHRE, 2008).

While there has always been migration and displacement resulting from conflict and disaster, the high levels of urban violence in some cities also result in forced and voluntary transnational migration, as in Colombia for example (Moser & McIlwaine, 2014). Additionally, many women and girls migrate to cities

to escape gender-based violence, including domestic violence, genital mutilation and early marriage (Blumenthal, 2014; Plan International, 2010, 2013). In all cases, new urban residents must contend with challenges in cities, including structural and infrastructural violence, lack of access to housing, discrimination, and lack of access to services (see also Chapter 6).

Racism, prejudice and xenophobia in cities can make migrants and refugees feel excluded. A lack of understanding or appreciation of their social, economic and cultural contributions means that they “are frequently seen as burdens rather than assets” (Habitat III, 2015a, p. 2). This can create further frustrations and alienation, which can give rise to urban crime and violence in the public sphere, and domestic violence in the private sphere. The reality is that the economic and social benefits that come with migration outnumber the drawbacks (ICPC, 2014). Further, research shows that immigration can have an unexpected benefit of reducing crime and itself contribute to crime prevention, through the revitalization of neighbourhoods and cities, strengthening social cohesion in the community, and strengthening the local economy, which reinforces social controls (ICPC, 2014). Prevention efforts aimed at building inclusion and integration should be built into urban development and planning. This will help cities to plan in advance for receiving migrants, IDPs, refugees and others, and will build resilience to urban crime through social and spatial development planning.

Urban safety, conflict, and disaster

Living in an urban world means that the majority of global emergencies will be in urban areas. In fact, the World Disasters Report (IFRC, 2010) predicted that there would be three to five significant urban disasters between 2010 and 2020. This appears to have been underestimated, considering the events in Haiti, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, and Syria (de Boer, 2015). Further, cities have become the place where civil unrest, interstate conflict and terrorism are increasingly being played out, and terms such as ‘urban wars’ and ‘slum wars’ are evidence of this (ICPC, 2012; Moser & McIlwaine, 2014). This has changed the face of conflict and humanitarian aid agencies are now starting to begin to plan for how to respond to humanitarian crises in urban areas. In fact, urban violence in some cities is so extreme and endemic that humanitarian response is justified, again pointing to a significant shift in the precedent for international intervention.

Cities affected by conflict are also more at risk for disasters, and those living in informal settlements are most vulnerable in all instances (de Boer, 2015;

Muggah, 2013). Efforts to build community resilience and strengthen capacities of the state, especially municipal governments, to prevent and respond to conflict or disaster are needed. Social crime prevention initiatives are important for resilience building. Specific efforts must include a gender dimension, since VAWG increases in times of conflict and disaster (COHRE, 2008).

Crime prevention and urban safety strategies should be core components of post-conflict and post-disaster rebuilding, although this is rarely the case. Rebuilding efforts offer unique opportunities for engaging women and men in shaping their neighbourhoods, articulating their needs and fixing challenges from the past. For women in particular, this can be an opportunity for empowerment and increased participation in local development and decision-making (UN-Habitat, 2014).

Fragile cities

As noted in Chapter 1, the term ‘fragile city’ has emerged, echoing references to ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states. It is the inability of city governance structures to keep up with rapid urbanization that creates an environment where cities are considered to be fragile. Fragility causes citizens to lose trust in the government due to its inability or unwillingness to provide adequate services, including security (Muggah, 2014). As de Boer points out “in some cities, systems of law and order, ranging from the police, judiciary, penal systems, and other forms of legal enforcement, are dysfunctional and considered illegitimate by the citizens they are intended to serve” (2015, p. 2). Unfortunately, this lack of capacity and credibility makes cities even more vulnerable to disasters, extreme poverty and violence (de Boer, 2015).

Critics of the fragile cities approach question the potential self-fulfilling prophecy of such a stigmatized designation, while Muggah (2014, p. 2) suggests “fragility can be understood as a kind of continuum, (...) a dynamic state that affects different areas differentially. Stable and functioning areas of cities can, and frequently do, co-exist alongside fragile and violence-affected spaces.” Research shows that the degree of urban vulnerability to disaster, extreme poverty and violence is “the aggregation of risk”. In the context of urban crises, many risks manifest in a very short period of time and can stall or completely overpower the ability of the state to respond and manage the crisis. This leaves those urban areas particularly exposed and prone to violence.

In spite of these challenges, there are city level efforts aimed at rebounding from fragility through resilience building. In particular, these efforts are aimed at building social cohesion, strengthening institutions

and confidence in the city and state, or working with gangs through truces or pacification programmes (see Chapter 1). While evidence supporting their varying degrees of success is limited, it does indicate that the most successful approaches are those that engage communities in a coordinated and multi-level government initiative to enhancing urban safety, with a focus on prevention, not repression (Muggah, 2014).

City to city networking and the new urban governance

“Well-planned citywide community-based integrated and comprehensive urban crime prevention and safety strategies, not only prevent crime and victimization, but also contribute to sustainable urban development” (Habitat III, 2015c, p. 4).


Urban crime prevention strategies require a coordinated governance approach to be successful, across different levels of government, across different sectors, and bringing together a diversity of stakeholders, including women, youth and others. The establishment of networks between cities to help them address urban safety issues has been one important way in which cities have learnt by example and exchange. There is also an increasing number of multi-city initiatives connecting cities working on similar issues.

New urban governance: citizen participation and the ‘co-production’ of urban safety

“Successful experiences show that good governance and safe cities are reciprocal: where inhabitants are free from fear, and where safety is improved for citizens and neighbourhoods, interaction among people, groups and with the public institutions becomes possible” (Habitat III, 2015c, p. 6).

While supported by international norms and standards, as well as national laws, policies and action plans, it is at the city level that the normative becomes operational, and urban safety, or its lack thereof becomes tangible. As Rodgers and O’Neill (2012, p. 402) explain, in cities, “infrastructure is observable, its stakeholders identifiable, and its functions variable”. Municipal governments impose laws, govern urban development, and manage local crime prevention strategies, making them arguably the most important actors in preventing urban crime and violence (Modaberi & Momeni, 2016). Their capacities to do so must be strengthened and supported by national and subnational governments, with open communication, collaboration and cooperation between the different levels. Many tools, guides and other resources have been developed to support local governments in developing effective urban crime prevention strategies (EFUS, 2007; ICPC, 2014; Shaw, 2010). Increasingly, cities are moving towards a new model of urban governance, explored in more depth in Chapter 3, which calls for citizen participation in urban development (See Figure 2.4 for different forms of public participation). Moreover, engaging the community can create

Figure 2.4 Spectrum of public participation



Source: Lam (2015)

a ‘culture of prevention’, and a shared responsibility to prevent and respond to urban crime and violence, referred to as the ‘co-production of safety’.

France’s urban strategy – the *Politique de la ville* includes urban upgrading, prioritizing investment in the more deprived urban areas of cities. Priority is given to urban renewal projects that encompass elements of both the social and built environments, and are multi stakeholder processes for developing and implementing city contracts (Ministère de la ville de la jeunesse et des sports, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). Arguably the greatest innovation in these contracts compared with their predecessors, is the 2014 law that mandates the participation of citizens in the co-production of all aspects of the urban policy. This is achieved through the establishment of a citizen’s council in priority neighbourhoods, to act as a space for civic engagement, capacity building and ensuring that a diversity of citizens participates in setting the priorities for their communities.

A useful paradigm for exploring participation in developing and implementing urban safety strategies is the Right to the City. This approach sees the city as the place where human rights should be attained and supported, and calls for governance based on the principles of transparency, inclusion, accountability and citizen participation in urban planning and governance (Global platform for the right to the city, 2014; Habitat III, 2015d). Since urban safety is a priority for urban residents, it can be an entry-point for engaging with the city. Citizen participation has been institutionalised in some cities as the example of Sao Paulo illustrates in Box 2.4 below.

With increasing participation, we are seeing a corresponding language shift, referring to local actors as “agents of change”, not “beneficiaries” (UN Women,

2015a). This same logic must be applied to the diversity of all urban dwellers, especially those most excluded from local governance processes. However, while community participation in urban safety strategies is key, it is equally important that they be supported by experts who can share their knowledge and experience (Muggah, 2014).

Finally, recognizing the important role of identity in gang involvement, several initiatives have harnessed their neighbourhood leadership position to transform them into positive community leaders. In Barcelona, Spain, for example, ‘gangs’ became cultural community ‘associations’ to enable their participation in the community. As associations, the former gangs organize cultural events for the community, including music and sports events (ICPC & EFUS, 2014, p. 11).

City to city networking

As cities continue to grow, not only in terms of their populations, but also in terms of their political, economic and social significance, there is an increasing need for them to connect with one another to share lessons, challenges, knowledge and experience. The United Cities and Local Government (UCLG) organization does just that, and advocates for the participation of local governments in global governance, an arena still dominated by national governments. Linked with UCLG is Metropolis, which draws its membership from cities with populations of over one million. There are many more networks of cities with specific thematic focuses: the World Cities Network aims to build resilient cities; the WHO Global Network of Age-friendly Cities; ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability; and the newly launched Strong Cities Network to Strengthen Community Resilience against Violent Extremism are some examples.

Box 2.4 Municipal Secretariat for Human Rights and Citizenship, São Paulo, Brazil (Prefeitura de Sao Paulo direitos humanos e cidadania, n.d.)

The Municipal Secretariat for Human Rights and Citizenship (SMDHC) was created in 2013 and is responsible for human rights and social participation. The SMDHC recognizes the importance of public spaces in building social cohesion and creating a sense of belonging to a city. The Secretariat brings together various departments representing 13 thematic areas: youth, the elderly, LGBTQ, children and adolescents, education on human rights, migrants, the homeless, the right to memory and truth, the right to the city, social participation, the promotion of decent work, public policies on drugs, and the Municipal Human Rights Ombudsman.

The SMDHC has two main action areas:

1. Working to deconstruct a culture of violence while strengthening a culture of human rights by ensuring that these objectives are reflected in all municipal public policies.
2. Recognizing civic participation as an administrative method, and encouraging such participation through both traditional methods (conferences, public hearings) and new methods (social dialogues, social media).

The Safe Communities Foundation New Zealand (SCFNZ) aims to increase safety in cities by building on the evidence-base from local violence and injury prevention strategies and safety education. It was inspired by the WHO Safe Communities approach originally established in 1990. It uses the following criteria for designating cities in the country as 'safe communities': leadership and collaboration, programme reach, priority setting, data analysis and strategic alignment, evaluation, and communication and networking. The SCFNZ continues to make use of its link with WHO by drawing on global research and resources in injury prevention, safety management systems and crime prevention through environmental design, for safe community development.²

A growing trend has been the creation of multi-city initiatives around thematic issues. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation launched the initiative 100 Resilient Cities (100RC, n.d.) to support cities in building their resilience to the causes of urban vulnerability, including fragility, and crime. The World Urban Campaign (UN-Habitat, n.d.-d) has also launched a 100-cities initiative towards sustainable urbanization.

When it comes to confronting urban safety challenges specifically, the distinction between the Global North and South is less pronounced, with much innovation and promising practices emerging from cities in the South to inform other cities around the world. A number of networks have been put on place to facilitate these linkages, with a specific focus on crime prevention and urban safety.

ICPC continues to be a leader in this arena. Its membership is global and brings together organisations, cities, research institutes, and other networks working on issues of crime prevention and community safety. Other networks working on urban safety globally include the Global Network on Safer Cities (GNSC), led by UN-Habitat, bringing together urban safety and crime prevention experts, organisations and cities (ICPC, 2014). The GNSC has supported the development of Technical Working Groups on a number of issues related to safer cities, including peacebuilding, gender, and smart cities. Women in Cities International (WICI) works to make cities safer and more inclusive with and for all women and girls. Several long-standing regional networks work on urban safety issues in their respective regions. The European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS) brings together 250 local authorities from 16 countries to strengthen crime prevention policies in cities throughout the region and to promote the role of local authorities in national and European policies. Red Mujer y Habitat de America Latina (RMH) works to make cities free of VAWG, CityNET works to enhance

urban safety programmes and strategies for Asia Pacific, and, most recently, the African Forum for Urban Safety launched in 2016.

Technology and smart cities


With the unprecedented technological innovations of the past years, it should be no surprise that there are efforts to explore how urban development and governance can use them to make cities socially, economically and environmentally more sustainable. The increasing availability and affordability of mobile technologies in particular, and the accompanying infrastructure to support their use, has meant that more and more people in all regions of the world have access to telecommunications and the internet.

Smarter, safer cities

The increased use of information communication technologies (ICTs) (Figure 2.5) have inspired cities to strive to be 'smart cities', where ICTs play a central role in shaping the urban agenda. Smart cities endeavour to improve quality of life and respond to the demands of an increasing population by making urban infrastructure work 'smarter', to allow for better service provision without requiring time-consuming and costly infrastructure development (Habitat III, 2015b; Moon, Heo, & Lee, 2014; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015b).

In terms of urban safety, a smart city approach involves a networked connection of safety and security systems (CCTVs, police, traffic, etc.), across four stages: prevention, protection, response and recovery.

**Figure 2.5 Global ICT developments
(Subscription per 100 inhabitants, 2005-2015)**



Source: UN-Habitat (2016, p. 42)

A complementary approach is networked urbanism, considered to be more people-centred, which promotes accountable governance by enabling citizen participation through ICTs, often focused on urban planning and design to redevelop neglected neighbourhoods and slums with the active participation of community men and women (Gil, 2014).

The private sector plays an important role in making cities smarter and safer through the provision of technology solutions to safety and security challenges in cities. These technology companies are changing the way cities are run, and this is rapidly evolving (Woods & Goldstein, 2014). The Thales Group, for example, specializes in security technology and is working with cities to find integrated solutions, streamlining information across government departments, essentially digitizing multi-stakeholder cooperation. The group boasts “the citizen centric approach to security has been proven to deliver a measurable reduction in crime, by as much as 35% since deployment” (Thales Group, n.d.). Similarly, SAP has a dedicated programme to assist cities, the Urban Matters programme. It strives to assist cities to respond to the challenges of rapid urbanization, with a focus on good governance, community engagement, better service delivery and resilience building to enhance urban safety (SAP News Center, 2012).

ICTs can be a governance tool, encouraging accountability by creating opportunities for community monitoring of public spaces and services (see Figure 2.6 below). Safetipin, for example, the digitized safety audits application initially developed in Delhi, India, can be used to monitor sense of safety in public spaces, and rate the quality of the built environment across nine safety principles (Safetipin, n.d.). Similarly, ICTs can encourage participatory governance and can facilitate the participation of typically excluded groups in city life. For example, accessibility features are available for many ICTs and can allow people with limited mobility and communication capacities to participate actively. ICTs can provide

detailed and disaggregated data to cities to better inform their urban safety plans (Habitat III, 2015c; Moon et al., 2014) and can be used to make public safety information open and accessible.

Unfortunately, gender and income gaps in access to ICTs are another example of social division and exclusion. Therefore, any initiative by a city to be smarter should be grounded in a human rights-based approach to be inclusive (Habitat III, 2015c). In some instances, it is important that the possibility of engagement through ICTs be complementary to other methods in order to accommodate broad and inclusive participation.


There is also a darker side to the increase in access to ICTs, which has been used to incite urban violence. Furthermore, ICTs are being used by youth gangs to expand their operations and make them more sophisticated as tools for recruitment, hiring illegal services or for intimidation purposes (Muggah, 2014). On the other hand, ICTs and social media can be used to challenge social norms for the better. For example, young women in Pakistan are working to debunk myths that women should not use public spaces through the Girls at Dhabas initiatives, where they share images on social media of young women at street cafés, areas typically occupied solely by men (Khan, 2016). Today’s crime prevention efforts must understand cyberspace as an extension of city space, closely linked to real potential for urban crime and violence.

Geography, mapping and crime prevention

The geography and spatial dimensions of crime have long been studied and are now important tools used by police, criminologists, crime prevention specialists and others (Argun & Dağlar, 2016; Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 1). The USA-based initiative Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety (MAPS) served to develop and advance tools and knowledge about crime mapping, and legitimized and spread their use to several countries in Latin America, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa which adapted and replicated the work (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005). Analyses based on these datasets on the geography of crime, understood in a social, economic and political context of neighbourhood demographics and geographical boundaries, inform and dictate many police and prevention decisions, including allocation of resources, infrastructure development, social programming and prevention strategies (Argun & Dağlar, 2016; ICPC, 2013).

It is important to consider the findings from these geographic tools in a broader social context in order to understand the nuances of a given space, which is

Figure 2.6 An ICT-based enabling environment for cities



why data must be minimally disaggregated by gender, age, and income. Cultural, historical and social considerations are equally important (Ardian et al., 2014, pp. 113–114). For example, in Yazd, Iran, findings saw low crime rates in areas used for cultural or religious purposes, which informed subsequent crime prevention measures to include both social and situational recommendations to reduce crime in hot spots (Ardian et al., 2014).

Today's technological advances mean that crime mapping and Geographical Information System (GIS) are widely integrated as core components of security tools and applications, serving to "make the data visible" (Argun & Dağlar, 2016). The *Carabineros* in Chile, for example, make wide use of the information they gather through GIS, which they make available through their online platform. This allows them to visually understand which crimes are being committed where. Digitizing the information has allowed for it to be analysed against a variety of other data to make the links between cause and crime and to better inform prevention strategies (Argun & Dağlar, 2016). In Guatemala, women are using GIS and map-based technology to illustrate local safety audits and to show how neighbourhoods can be transformed. By adding different layers to satellite images of the city, the women are able to show how adding lighting or animating public spaces could make the area feel safer (Fundación Guatemala, 2016).

As discussed in Chapter 1, there are some important drawbacks and challenges to using GIS and hot spots policing. For example, there is concern that by making information about crimes available online, victims could be identified and threatened (Argun & Dağlar, 2016). Another challenge posed by GIS is the potential for stigmatizing neighbourhoods by labelling them 'hot spots', 'no-go zones', or simply 'dangerous'. This messaging increases exclusion among those residing in the area. It can also increase crime and violence if people avoid going where it is considered to be too risky, perpetuating the cycle of isolation, neglect and abandonment.

Recent examples of urban safety policies, projects and programmes

As this chapter has underlined, it is now accepted that successful urban crime and violence prevention initiatives must be part of integrated and inclusive safety strategies that embrace multi-dimensional, multi-level, multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder collaboration. The production of safety is a shared responsibility, and it is only by meaningfully including the diverse men, women, boys and girls who live in those cities that safe cities will be created, and sustainable urban development achieved (Shaw, 2010).

This section looks at some examples of urban safety projects and programmes, illustrating the range of approaches that are being used around the world. Examples are drawn from a number of sources, in particular *100 Promising Practices on Safer Cities* compiled by ICPC and EFUS for UN-Habitat in 2014 (ICPC & EFUS, 2014). Other examples can be found in reports on workshops organized by ICPC during the 11th and 12th UN Congresses in Bangkok, Thailand, and Salvador, Brazil (ICPC, 2005; Shaw & Carli, 2011; Travers & Shaw, 2007) and from ICPC colloquiums (ICPC, 2008). The examples illustrate the active involvement of local city services such as the police, or community-based organizations, and in some case the private sector. Others focus on particular issues such as VAWG or youth involvement as victims and perpetrators of violence and crime. Good practices relating to safety on public transport are included in Chapter 4 of this report. However, as has been the pattern for many years, city-based projects are not always evaluated, or evaluated to a standard that would allow them to be seen as replicable and transferable.

Improved city data collection

The use of local safety audits to assist the development of local crime prevention strategies has been well documented (EFUS, 2007; Shaw, 2010; WICI, 2008). However, in cities in many parts of the world, there continues to be a lack of data about urban safety, particularly data that is disaggregated according to age, gender, ethnicity, etc. There are some exceptions to this, however, with a number of cities investing in rigorous data collection on crime and perceptions of safety (Valera & Guàrdia, 2014). The Rotterdam Safety Index, a survey administered to residents in all areas of the city to measure crime based on both objective and subjective factors is one such example (ICPC & EFUS, 2014). Studies exploring safety on transportation, as discussed in Chapter 4 are also an exception.

Local authorities in Saint-Gilles, Belgium developed a local safety audit based on an integrated, multi-sectoral and collaborative process to ensure that urban safety efforts are balanced in terms of prevention and crime control, and include ongoing evaluation to assess the effectiveness of both. To begin, a local analysis is made of crime data (crime statistics, GIS and mapping) and data related to feelings of safety (surveys, perceptions of safety) collected, to create a baseline. Both of these steps are regularly repeated to assess the efficacy of different prevention initiatives (ICPC & EFUS, 2014).

There are a number of local crime or violence observatories (eg. Ciudad Juarez, Mexico; Brussels Belgium), and regional ones (e.g. the Central American

Observatory on Violence; the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion Crime Observatory; etc.) which collect and analyse crime-related data. Information from the observatories informs current and future urban safety initiatives, but different data collection methods and definitions make it hard to compare one place with another. Some initiatives including the Inter-American Bank's Citizen Security Indicators (Inter-American Development Bank, n.d.) are trying to overcome this, to make data available for meta-analysis. Finally, there have been some efforts to make better use of the data collected through diagnostic ICTs. For example, iHollaback partnered with Cornell University to analyse the large datasets it has collected on street harassment (iHollaback, n.d.).

Urban development, social urbanism and upgrading

As discussed above, urban planning and design can be a transformative tool to change social relations, build social cohesion and transform real and perceived safety in public spaces (Cozens, 2011). One innovative practice is Placemaking, which involves communities coming together to identify and transform a space into one that a diverse range of men, women, boys and girls want to use. It is increasingly used as a tool for transforming neighbourhoods. There are several examples of placemaking projects with Latino gangs in American cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago and Portland (Project for Public Spaces, 2015).

The City of Brest, France, used urban planning to transform crime hot spot areas into public spaces used by a diversity of people. Evaluations found that they succeeded in increasing diversity, and decreasing urban crime and violence rates, without causing displacement (ICPC & EFUS, 2014, p. 75). Examples of planning for safer transportation in cities are discussed in Chapter 4. While changes to the built environment are only one component of comprehensive prevention strategies, they have the power to be transformative, as Rodgers notes, "infrastructure can be a key means through which social improvement and progress is distributed throughout society" (Rodgers & O'Neill, 2012, p. 402).

As underlined earlier, women and girls use and experience public spaces differently from men or boys, yet gender is seldom considered in urban planning practices. Women and girls in cities in both the global north and south have used women's safety audits to bridge gender gaps in planning (UN-Habitat, 2014; WICI, 2012). The audits have resulted in both small and low-cost changes, from street naming in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to high visibility infrastructural changes in cities, as in the redesign of metro exits in

Montreal, Canada. Efforts have been made to adapt the tool for use by a diversity of women and girls (Plan International, 2013; WICI, 2010, 2012).

In Cape Town, South Africa, the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) initiative is an integrated approach that focuses on urban upgrading, capacity building, access to cultural facilities, victim support and other crime prevention measures. Much of their work involves making changes to the built environment to deter and prevent crime, drawing largely on the broken windows theory. For example, investment in making buildings more aesthetically pleasing and in ensuring greater maintenance of public spaces signalled that the area was cared for and worth investing in. More clearly defined boundaries between residential properties encouraged greater personal responsibility for caring for property, while higher barriers between properties worked to prevent criminal mobility. A complementary Social Development Fund was set up to support community-initiated projects, with funding having been provided to over 80 different projects. These collective efforts have resulted in an important reduction in homicide rates (Barolsky, 2016; ICPC & EFUS, 2014).

Investing in changing the built environment can have major impacts in decreasing urban crime and violence, and in stimulating social and economic growth. One of the most well-known examples is the city of Medellin, Colombia, where the term 'social urbanism' has been used to show how urban upgrading was specifically intended to affect social and economic change (Hernandez Garcia, 2013; Pérez Salazar, 2011). Investments in connecting the informal settlements built on steep hills with the city, through a cable car system, combined with public infrastructure improvements and better services including education, signalled to the population there that they were worth investing in. This has helped to build inclusion and social cohesion. The transformation quickly led to a sharp decline in urban crime and violence. It has attracted the interest of visitors to Medellin, which has now become a tourist destination (Hernandez Garcia, 2013; Pérez Salazar, 2011). In another example, city officials negotiated with informal vendors in Warwick Junction in Durban, South Africa, to organize and create a safe and regulated market space. The area was transformed from a disorganized and high crime area, to a flourishing market and tourist destination, with a marked reduction in traffic injuries, crime and violence (Dobson, Skinner, & Nicholson, 2009; ICPC & EFUS, 2014; Travers & Shaw, 2007).

Several factors have led to the successes of these and similar urban upgrading initiatives: the participation of the users of the space in redefining it; the support of the local authorities in investing in improving

infrastructure and service delivery; and, importantly, concurrent initiatives aimed at building capacities and providing access to opportunities, including education and employment.

Putting youth at the core of urban safety

The majority of urban violent crime is perpetrated by the youth – young men in particular – against each other. Therefore, a large number of city-level initiatives are aimed at enhancing urban safety through engagement. There are many sources of good examples (ICPC, 2005; Shaw & Travers, 2007; Shaw & Carli, 2011).

Many crime prevention initiatives aim to provide alternatives to crime, by making positive activities available during their leisure time, by providing skills training to empower them to harness urban opportunities and employment in particular, or by empowering them to engage in transforming their neighbourhoods for the better. Other programmes offer economic incentives and job training to youth. For example, the TAPAJ programme (Montreal, Canada and Bordeaux, France) provides youth in vulnerable situations with paid work opportunities. The youth are closely followed by front-line workers, as they gradually increase the number of hours they work, allowing them to gain experience and take on more responsibility until they are independent (ICPC & EFUS, 2014, p. 128). Another example of a programme that provides economic opportunity is the REMIX project (Toronto, Canada). REMIX offers a 6-month programme where the youth are mentored and have access to facilities to improve their skills, be they in music, photography, video editing or business development. The youth can receive high school credit and internship opportunities to practice their skills in the real world (ICPC & EFUS, 2014, p. 47-48).

The Youth Expression Programme (Brazil) demonstrated its commitment to invest in youth to prevent urban violence. The programme strived to address the two most important manifestations of violence in Brazil – male on male homicide and VAWG. The evidence-based project was designed to respond the root causes of violence – social and economic exclusion with a pilot programme in three communities. The programme responded by offering financial and entrepreneurial education, encouraging self-expression through the development of socio-cultural projects, and offering social dialogues on topics such as sexuality, violence, and health. Some of the initiatives included the organization of the Urban Arts festival, and the establishment of cultural and sports activities for youth. Finally, the programme underscored the importance of partnership and dialogue

between the government, private sector and civil society in order to prevent and reduce urban violence. Part of the evaluation included a cost benefit analysis which found that every R\$ 1 invested yielded R\$ 1.87 in social profit.

The Safe Cities for Girls programme, (jointly led by Plan International, WICI and UN-Habitat) engages girls in making their cities safer and more inclusive through Girls' Clubs. The clubs allow girls to learn new skills, about urban development and governance, how to have influence, and build their leadership skills to speak out on the issues that affect them and offer recommendations for change (Plan International, n.d.). School-based safety clubs, girls' clubs or broader curriculum are used to reach large numbers of young men and women.

Similarly, the Schools of Peace programme in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, built a culture of peace through workshops and civic education, with students reporting a reduction in school violence by 69.5%, violence in the neighbourhood by 43% and violence at home by 36.3% (ICPC & EFUS, 2014).

Chicago's Cure Violence programme is a well-known programme with impressive results, noting a 67% reduction in shooting deaths in one year (ICPC & EFUS, 2014). The programme identifies high-risk individuals and mediates conflict before it turns violent (Cure Violence, n.d.; WHO, n.d.). Another example is the *Programme de suivi intensif* (intensive follow-up programme) (Montreal, Canada) that works with gang-involved youth and those at risk of involvement. The programme works by providing intensive support, training and education to individuals who engage in activities for 20-40 hours per week (Centre jeunesse de Montréal, n.d.).

A common component of these programmes is that they appear to be most effective when the strategies are personalised to the individual, efforts are made to connect and better integrate them within the community, and long term support is offered to follow the individual's development (cf. Laliberté, Rosario, Leonard, Smith-Moncrieffe, & Warner, 2015).

Prevention through institutional change

In some communities and cities, there is a lack of trust in the criminal justice system and in the police to uphold justice fairly. Issues including racial profiling, police violence, re-victimisation of sexual violence survivors, and corruption have received much attention, as demonstrates the discussion in Chapter 1. Several initiatives have developed to transform institutions to build accountability and

trust and, more importantly, to change the culture of those institutions. They challenge oppressive practices and discriminatory policies so that they can promote a culture of prevention while respectfully upholding and administering justice in cities. Police in Montreal, Canada, for example, have received training on how to handle cases of sexual exploitation and human trafficking where underage girls are often the victims, ensuring that they receive adequate support afterwards (ICPC & EFUS, 2014, p. 68). In Newport, USA and Emilia Romagna, Italy, efforts have centred on breaking down cultural and ethnic barriers to build positive relations between particular communities and the police. There have been and continue to be many initiatives aimed at improving police response to gender based violence in cities around the world. There are women only police stations or specially trained officers who handle such cases. The Women and Habitat Network of Latin America is currently carrying out a programme aimed at building relationships between the police and local women's organisations to better respond to cases of GBV. Police are offered training on how to be gender responsive and sensitive to victims of violence (Red Mujer y Hábitat de América Latina, n.d.).

There are a number of initiatives that use aspects of restorative justice or alternative justice. For example, social mediation has been used since the 1990s both in the community and in schools in Brussels, Belgium. The purpose of the mediators is to provide immediate support and conflict mediation to diffuse escalating situations, immediately followed by an analysis of the situation to identify appropriate prevention strategies. Regular meetings are held between multi-level partners (community mediators, local and national safety officials) to share information to better plan integrated prevention strategies (ICPC & EFUS, 2014). In Stuttgart, Germany and New York City, USA, community courts are used to provide rapid responses to youth offending and to consolidate the justice and support services into one integrated approach to prevent reoffending (ICPC & EFUS, 2014). Similarly, New Zealand's youth courts, which favour a flexible alternative approach to justice, centred on accountability and making amends, have been heralded as a success, noting new lows in youth crime rates.

Integrated governance programming for urban safety

Many of the most comprehensive urban safety programmes include a strong governance focus. While many cities lead their own urban safety strategies, it is important that they be supported at the subnational and national levels. In South Africa, the Nelson Mandela Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention for Safe Public Spaces (VCP) programme is being carried

out to support the government's objective that all people in South Africa feel safe. The project is a public private partnership focused on connecting government and non-government actors at the national, subnational and local levels to work together to make cities safer. The project concentrates on working on challenging areas where there is much exposure to violence, especially targeting youth, women and girls. There are four main areas of intervention: (1) up-and wide-scaling of violence prevention practices (establishing and strengthening exchange mechanisms and platforms); (2) professionalization of violence prevention practitioners in different communities (increasing capacities); (3) active citizen participation in creating safer communities, focusing on youth; and (4) mainstreaming of a safety lens in local government (ICPC & EFUS, 2014, p. 193).

In Brazil, initiatives in the state of Pernambuco underscore the importance of integrated urban safety strategies that are coherent at different levels, in this case the subnational and local levels. This *Pacto Pela Vida* (Pact for Life), the State Plan for Public Safety was localised through the development and implementation of 138 projects (ICPC & EFUS, 2014, p. 205). It has parallels with the National Programme for Public Safety PRONASCI (Observatório de Segurança Pública, n.d.), originally introduced in 2007, which has provided support to states and municipalities. Finally, in Colombia, the city of Bogota has seen many innovative initiatives since the mid-1990s led by its mayors. The Bogota Humana programme, for example, was introduced in 1998, following the success of the former Mayor's *Cultura Ciudadana* strategy (Mockus, 1995). It was designed to create an equitable and inclusive city where all residents are able to participate and benefit from urban opportunities. To realise this vision, eight complementary programmes were carried out focusing on developing different areas: inclusiveness, economy, mobility, environment, transparency and anticorruption, crime prevention and reduction, democracy, participatory planning and budgeting (ICPC & EFUS, 2014). It embodies the actions called for by the UN-Habitat Safer Cities programme for effectively enhancing urban safety.

Conclusion and looking forward

With ongoing global urbanization, and widespread concern about crime and violence in cities, successfully enhancing urban safety must be a global priority. Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, and the forthcoming New Urban Agenda and UN Guidelines on Safer Cities, recognize urban safety as an essential condition for sustainable development. Even though these are new agreements and normative standards, urban crime prevention is not. We have acquired much knowledge and experience since the adoption of the 1995 and

Box 2.5 From the Birth of UN-Habitat to safer cities +20 and safer cities 2.0

Since UN-Habitat's Safer Cities Programme was launched in 1996 it has supported initiatives in 77 cities in 24 countries worldwide. The Safer Cities Programme has evolved over time as knowledge on the drivers of urban insecurity has been gained and approaches to addressing it have been refined. Today the Programme embraces a holistic, integrated, multi-level government and multi-sectoral approach to improving the livability of cities and quality of life for all urban residents, predicated on the confidence that good urban governance, planning and management can improve the safety of neighbourhoods (UN-Habitat, n.d.-c).

The Safer Cities approach is described as a:

“Prevention policy frame advocating for safety as a ‘public good’ and with public space as the arena for the co-production of safety for all and the site for the construction of citizen’s values and manifestation of citizens’ rights for all and particularly for the most vulnerable. At the heart of the safer cities approach is ‘attitudinal change’ and the “co-production of security for all” which requires the leadership and vision of the mayor and the concerted effort of a wide range of local government departments working together with national government and non-state actors to identify the causes of crime and insecurity, develop a coordinated response at the community level and supported by a national level policy framework” (UN-Habitat, 2015b).

There is an increased global recognition, including within the context of the Agenda 2030 that inclusive, safe and resilient cities and societies are a cornerstone for, and primary outcome of, sustainable development. The majority of the world’s poorest people live in cities affected by high crime and violence and largely in the context of tenure insecurity, weak social support networks and areas prone to manmade and natural disasters – over 1.5 billion people (Muggah, 2012).

At the local level, the Programme provides direct support to cities and local actors formulating and implementing citywide crime prevention and urban safety strategies. Tools and approaches are developed and tested in different contexts and the programme has been reinforcing its approach through constant exchange at regional and international levels. The strategy includes strengthening institutional capacity, mobilizing key partners, implementation, and institutionalizing the prevention approach within the municipal structure.

In the past 20 years, the increasing mobilisation of local resources in support of urban crime prevention and improved local partnerships on this issue led to a total of 32 cities and 55 municipalities having adopted the Safer Cities approach by the end of 2015, and a continued growing unmet demand.

The Safer Cities 2.0 programme seeks to build linkages with the new urban agenda in the areas of urban planning, urban legislation, urban economy, basic services, slum upgrading and urban risk reduction. It foresees the strengthening of UN-Habitat’s mandate in this area, the consolidation of a Global Network on Safer Cities (GNSC), the development of a shared conceptual framework on safer cities, and the production of specific flagship products, including tools/guidelines for local level interventions.

2002 guidelines, and have a greater understanding of the essential elements of a citywide crime and violence prevention strategy. For example, UN-Habitat’s World Urban Campaign toolkit on making cities safer calls for the integration of local crime prevention strategies in urban planning and slum and neighbourhood upgrading plans (UN-Habitat, 2015a). It recognizes the potential of urban public spaces as “sites for enhancing urban safety by nurturing the values of social cohesion and co-existence” (UN-Habitat, n.d.-b, p. 10). There remains, nevertheless, an ongoing gap in investment and prioritization of the evaluation of strategies. Relatedly, there is a need to refine the global system for measuring urban crime and violence, to better understand and enhance urban safety (IDRC, 2015).

Technology, smart cities strategies and ICTs (beyond the mass installation of CCTV which does not prevent crime) can be useful tools for cities in integrating their data to inform safety planning.

Localised city-level urban prevention strategies are key, and are most successful when supported by subnational and national prevention frameworks. Cities need the mandate, capacity and financing to properly carry out prevention work, which requires multilevel partnerships and collaboration with a diverse range of actors. Similarly, there is renewed attention to city strategies championed by mayors who work in partnership with civil society. This allows for further localising strategies, ensuring they

are locally-owned and respond in appropriate ways to community priorities. Participatory methods and approaches that instil community involvement in governance are particularly important. There is greater understanding of the importance of an intersectional approach, developing comprehensive and inclusive strategies that acknowledge gender, race, age and cultural differences.

These lessons and past promising practices need to inform future safety planning to confront the new and emerging challenges facing our cities – both a cause and consequence of rapid urbanization. Migration, environmental disasters, climate change, and conflict are just a few. Our cities must build their resilient capacities to better integrate new city residents, ensuring access to equitable, affordable, and quality city spaces and services. This is accomplished not only through infrastructure upgrading, but also through social resilience, achieved through inclusive governance and social cohesion, particularly given the diverse backgrounds and cultures represented in today's cities. City development strategies should incorporate the principles of social urbanism, and be cross-cutting and inclusive across all urban sectors, including urban planning, housing, education, gender equality, poverty reduction, employment, marginalisation and exclusion (Habitat III, 2015c).

There are still important gaps in terms of effective implementation of urban safety strategies. Social crime prevention in particular requires a much longer investment in order to demonstrate impact. With short political terms and public demand for quick results, crime prevention initiatives often continue to be short term and stand-alone. Further, in fragile cities, local authorities and weak institutions make it very challenging to effectively implement urban safety initiatives. Elsewhere, there are still challenges in terms of lack of decentralization of power, and insufficient resources to enable cities to implement plans adequately.

Current urban safety strategies often focus on the neighbourhood and call for participation and meaningful inclusion of women, boys and girls, and people who are differently abled, elderly, etc. From creating citizen committees to participatory urban planning or placemaking, the scale of interventions is more focused, while remaining in line with municipal or national policies and priorities. Coordination between the neighbourhood and the wider city can promote fluid movement of people, increase diversity and interactions, and access to urban opportunities. This is a strategy to building spatially just cities, and territorial cohesion (Habitat III, 2015c). Reducing urban crime and violence is a shared responsibility, involving participation across institutions (police, courts, governments), communities (women's and youth groups, local organisations, NGOs), and individuals (the diverse men, women, boys and girls).

“Public safety must be considered a right of all citizens” (UN-Habitat, 2015a, p. 9).

Viva Rio in Haiti: Peace through community development

Mariam Yazdani³

Traditional development models are increasingly being recognized as inappropriate in rapidly changing urban contexts. Such models, though widely used in the past and successful in other contexts, fail to account for the complexity of violence in urban areas. The nature of the relationship between urbanization and violence highlights the diversity that exists in violence, its causes, correlates, and solutions in cities such as Port au Prince. The underlying causes of violence are difficult to isolate, complicated by urban growth, which often outpaces municipal capacities, social relations, economic factors, and political marginalization (Kivland, 2012; Lemay-Hébert, 2014; Muggah & Calpas, 2009).

Urban violence in Haiti is understandably complex. On the one hand, cities typically have more access to institutional support, which can facilitate coping with violence and addressing systemic problems that encourage the proliferation of armed gangs and criminal groups. Urban areas have a greater concentration of resources, access to information, and infrastructure to support violence reduction efforts. Yet on the other hand, social relations in urban areas can be more strained and the pressures of poverty combined with urban living are often associated with higher levels of both crime and interpersonal violence (Chelsey L. Kivland, 2012; Lemay-Hébert, 2014; Muggah & Calpas, 2009).

Viva Rio has addressed urban conflict in Port-au-Prince by drawing on principles and techniques developed during more than 20 years of working in Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* and strategically applying them to the Haitian context. Viva Rio offers a community development approach to tackling issues plaguing poor urban areas. This approach has been adapted through an interactive learning process involving community members, armed urban groups, MINUSTAH (the United Nations Mission in Haiti), and many Haitian partner organizations.

Viva Rio Haiti's flagship project, *Tambou Lapè*, embodies the organization's philosophy of social integration as key in efforts to reduce violence. Using a unique participatory framework, Viva Rio works from within and in collaboration with the community,

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which allows the organization to actively confront its "outsider status" and grants it the opportunity to be more spatially and socially connected to reality on the ground than most other external development actors in the country.

The *Tambou Lapè* project emerged several years after Haiti's violent 2004 coup d'état, the aftermath of which included armed combat between gangs, police, UN peacekeepers, and United States marines. Bel Air, one of the capital city's most neglected and socially marginalized neighbourhoods, was a hot spot for violence with violence against residents by state and non-state actors as well as violence by neighbourhood bases against each other, the state, and foreign peacekeepers. The *Tambou Lapè* project was not just a response to this armed conflict; it also grew out of Viva Rio's efforts to improve the daily lives of urban residents in Bel Air. With projects addressing violence, urban renewal safety, development and human rights, Viva Rio's integrated approach intentionally addressed both conflict drivers and connectors (F. Neiburg & Nicaise, 2010).

The *Tambou Lapè* project is aimed at reducing community violence by managing and transforming conflict in the intervention area. The most visible element of the project has been peace accords, a negotiated covenant with local power structures through a process of peace negotiations between local community leaders. The tangible outcomes of the peace accords included both a written agreement but also the ability of Viva Rio to facilitate the implementation of other community projects, thus solidifying the process of stabilization and development as well as the presence of Viva Rio in the neighbourhood.

As a first step, Viva Rio commissioned research to establish the shared connectors across groups within Bel Air as well as the community's unmet needs and possible correlates of armed conflict. Connectors across groups within the community included common dependencies, school institutions, attitudes, values and shared experiences. The limited access to potable water in Bel Air was identified from the beginning as both a basic need and a "cause" of local conflict.⁴ Initial research also indicated the

importance of access to solid waste management, the creation of alternative energy sources, access to education, sports programming, and school health. These areas of need became the primary focus of Viva Rio's first interventions in Bel Air.

In May 2007, the first peace agreement was signed between the rival bases of Delmas 2, Bel Air, Solino, La Saline and Fortouron.⁵ The peace agreements had the particularity of being structured by people of the zone. An evaluation conducted in 2012 noted that the agreements read as though they were "written by people from the zone" (A.R. Kolbe, Muggah, & Campbell, n.d.). Meetings are organized once a month between the National Haitian Police, Viva Rio and the UN Brazilian battalion – until 2010, these meetings also included the Commission Nationale de Désarmement Démantèlement et Réinsertion (CNDDR)⁶ – to discuss the safety of the community and to establish a contextual consensus on homicides and their circumstances. These encounters are more than just a monthly check-in to see if the peace accords are holding; they also encourage a fertile debate among the local leadership and the forces of law and order, during which the basic needs of each locality are discussed, food distribution by MINUSTAH is organized, and gaps in police presence and other subjects relevant to the community are identified.

The peace agreement incentivized compliance. For each month without homicides or armed confrontations between the bases or with the Haitian authorities, Viva Rio rewarded the peace accord signatories, including the Haitian National Police, with school scholarships that gifted to children and youth in their locality. A drawing was used to select candidates for the scholarships and if a violent death occurs as a result of conflict, the lottery draw was suspended for the month in question. Similarly, grants for vocational training to the young members of the rival bases in each locality were offered after two consecutive months of peace. Training courses included French, English, music (percussion, guitar and electric piano), handicrafts, poetry and the production of cultural events. Other incentives for compliance with the peace accords included bimonthly neighbourhood cultural events hosted by Viva Rio and a lottery drawing to leaders of the bases in recognition of the advances made for the safety in Bel Air. The awards vary and sometimes include motorcycles, which are a symbol of prestige.

Viva Rio's success in Haiti has been grounded in its integration with the local culture and the centering of activities and interventions on women, children and youth, community leaders and groups whose role is critical in the stability and prosperity of the local community. These populations are not only

the victims of much of the violence but are also the potential change agents, with the power to transform their communities and keep the peace.

Some of the most important connectors used by Viva Rio are symbols and celebratory occasions. Therefore, Viva Rio began its intervention in Bel Air with a voodoo ceremony. Viva Rio doesn't just draw on the local culture; it also contributes to a greater pride in the local culture through support for Creole music and sports activities. With an increase in self-esteem, the general attitude towards violence can be changed. Although homicide statistics are a fundamental indicator of the control of violence, they do not capture other aspects of safety.

Viva Rio's success is also grounded in a theory of change that emphasizes stabilization through social integration. This premise infers that political, social and economic dynamics in environments such as Bel Air – indeed in any society – are highly persuasive in defining how these communities flourish or deteriorate. Societies rife with identity-laden or predatory violence can be fractious and lead to social disarticulation, even disintegration (Kolbe Athena, 2013). However, an underlying assumption of Viva Rio is that communities are socially resilient and can be supported in their integration efforts. Carefully targeted "catalysts" (spanning the security development continuum) can hasten this process of integration. Viva Rio emphasizes the dividends of advancing both security-style activities and socioeconomic development in a mutually reinforcing fashion. As a social catalyst and mediator, Viva Rio emphasizes the role of mediation, dialogue and communication to neutralize prejudice and social marginalization, which are often the source of conflict (Muggah, 2010; Federico Neiburg, Nicaise, & Braum, 2011). Furthermore, it challenges essentialist views of deviant groups such as "gangs" or "criminals", and underlying risk factors that shape the onset and persistence of violence (Athena R. Kolbe, 2015; Muggah & Moestue, 2009). It is evident that the situation in Bel Air has changed since *Tambou Lapè* was created; although everyday violence still exists to some extent, armed territorial conflict has diminished (Chelsey Louise Kivland, 2009; A. Kolbe & Muggah, 2012; A.R. Kolbe et al., n.d.; Muggah & Moestue, 2009).

'Sustaining peace' in the city: Perspectives on urban safety

Achim Wennmann⁷

What is the role of conflict resolution and peacebuilding practice in shaping responses to crime and violence in cities? In government and diplomatic circles, 'peacebuilding' is frequently understood as something the UN does after inter-state or civil wars. It is also understood to involve an interventionist *modus operandi* imposed on countries. More recently, however, the UN has reviewed its approach to peacebuilding and coined the term 'sustaining peace' that repositions peacebuilding as an activity across all stages of conflict and as a priority for the entire UN system (UN Security Council, 2016). This repositioning may be an opportunity to re-emphasize the "the community-based origins" of peacebuilding practice and its "multi-stakeholder, context-sensitive, inclusive and bottom-up nature" (Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2015). It could also assuage the fears of some governments (and mayors) that 'peacebuilding in the city' is about foreign intervention at the city level. A focus on 'sustaining peace' could therefore frame approaches in the city that build on "the use of dialogue, trust-building and consensus-seeking to resolve or manage conflict through non-violent means" (Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2015) and the processes of "engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict" (Lederach, 2003; Miall, 2004, p. 4).

Why should mayors consider the potential value of conflict resolution and peacebuilding practice? First, the dynamics of conflict and violence are changing in many parts of the world, with cities becoming a future flashpoint (Butchart & Mikton, 2014; Organisation of American States, 2015; Secretariat, 2015). Traditionally, violent conflict has been associated to inter-state or civil wars; but there is a growing convergence among experts that most violent conflicts no longer fit these 'traditional' categories (Krause, 2014). While wars in Syria, Iraq or Yemen make the headlines, the great majority of violent deaths occurs in non-traditional conflict settings with Central America, Southern Africa, the Caribbean, and South America being the worst-affected regions (Butchart & Mikton, 2014; Organisation of American States, 2015; Secretariat, 2015). Such violence is the result of chronic political

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instability, persistent social volatility and other risk factors. In the future, these dynamics are expected to find their violent expressions in cities, and they call for new solutions and responses.

The second reason is that the political power of crime groups has become more apparent, and an expanded toolbox is necessary to fight crime as a political issue. The political power of organized crime is well documented in research on North Africa, the Sahel, and Central and South America (Briscoe, Perdomo, & Burcher, 2014; Kofi Annan Foundation, 2012; Shaw & Mangan, 2014; Táger & Aguilar Umaña, 2013). In the contexts of dysfunctional institutions and weak state-society relations, crime groups infiltrate and influence local and national political systems to serve their needs and, in the process, affect institution building, urban safety and development efforts supported by national governments, municipal authorities or international donors (Wennmann, 2014). Reframing the challenge of organized crime as a 'political' rather than a 'criminal' issue can enable city leaders to go beyond the default policy choice of legal and security instruments, and strengthen the case for conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches.

So far, many city policies have emphasized repressive approaches where state authorities crush crime through 'law-and-order' or a 'war on drugs'. These approaches have, however, been largely proven ineffective in terms of violence and crime reduction (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). In Latin America, heavy-handed policies and securitized responses to crime and violence had tremendous human cost and led to even greater levels of violence (Jütersonke, Muggah, & Rodgers, 2009). While securitized approaches remain popular among politicians (Gagne, 2015; J. Gutiérrez, 2016), approaches that are integrated across a range of sectors and work at different levels have shown strong results (Canadian Consortium on Human Security, 2007; Comunidad Segura, 2011; Eavis, 2011; F. Gutiérrez, Pinto, Arenas, Guzmán, & Gutiérrez, 2013; Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán, 2015; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011a; United Nations Development Programme, 2010).

What are the responses to conflict and violence that work? And how do they work? What counts as 'success' (and for whom) is highly contested in the conflicted political environments in which conflict resolution and peacebuilding occur. But when considering 'success' as a measurable reduction of violence, as the number of saved lives, and as stronger relationships to prevent, transform or resolve conflict, several components of what 'success' entails and how it is reached do emerge:

- Successful conflict resolution and peacebuilding practice has evolved from aligning several strategic building blocks, including trustworthy data, collaborative analysis, progressively expanded coalitions for change, targeted interventions that address the most acute risk factors of conflict and violence, and sustained institutional support by an honest broker (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016, pp. 168–182).
- Key principles for successful practice are relentless prioritization of the prevention and reduction of violence and conflict; engagement of the conflict parties on their partisan interests; ensuring vertical linkages within the conflict system; work within the de-facto political economy; and limiting the role of outside actors to strategic accompaniment (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016, pp. 183–191).
- Positive results also emerge from addressing conflict and violence deliberately and on their own terms; from stepping outside the formal, top-down approaches; from reaching out to atypical actors; and from building systems and institutions on the foundations of those functioning parts of society that are found in even the most fragile contexts (Andrews, 2015; Wennmann & Ganson, 2016).
- Successful conflict resolution and peacebuilding builds on an acute awareness of labels. Labels such as 'organized crime', 'criminal', 'warlord', 'gang' or 'terrorist' can obscure the multiple facets of an individual or group, especially when the distinction between public and private, and crime and legality, is blurred. Labelling can be a deliberate political strategy to stigmatize specific individuals or groups, or to undermine peace processes or violence reduction programmes (Wennmann, 2014, p. 270).

This practical knowledge is largely considered 'mainstream' in the fields of conflict resolution and peacebuilding; and some of it is already applied at the city level. Due to the El Salvador gang truce between 2012 and 2014, "at least 5,539 Salvadorians are alive today who would have died had the gang violence not been curtailed through dialogue and negotiation" (Wennmann, 2014). Many mayors in Latin America have been at the forefront of integrated programmes that have measurably reduced violence (Muggah & Aguirre, 2013). A review of armed violence reduction initiatives shows that informal mediation is the most common instrument with respect to interventions

targeting perpetrators of violence (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011b). From the peacebuilding side, there is also a small, but growing literature about building peace in urban contexts (Björkdahl, 2013; Grob, Papadovassilakis, & Ribeiro Fadon Vicente, 2016a, 2016b; Jütersonke & Krause, 2013; Milliken, 2014; Wennmann, 2015).

Despite this record, many urban safety professionals still perceive conflict resolution and peacebuilding practice as untested at the city level. In order to bring urban safety professionals closer to such practice and adapt conflict resolution and peacebuilding to the city level, 'city labs' can be an important space to build confidence and create policy space. City labs are understood as spaces for locally-led innovation to prevent and reduce violence and crime. They represent a space for the application of best practice from the fields of urban safety, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, to adapt practice from elsewhere to a specific local context, and to protect the sometimes sensitive dialogue and negotiation processes from the influence of spoilers. Overall, city labs can contribute to building stronger relationships between people and authorities in urban settings, and thereby also play a strategic role in the implementation of the New Urban Agenda.

For seasoned professionals in the fields of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the current tendency to view dialogue and negotiation with perpetrators of criminal violence as something morally reproachable, illegal or impossible is reminiscent of the state of their field over 20 years ago, when the same attitudes were present in relation to the then outlawed 'liberation movements', 'insurgents' or 'rebel groups'. There is an ever better understanding that negotiating with today's outlawed 'gangs', 'crime groups', 'terrorists', or 'violent extremist' is not much different from negotiating with what is more neutrally called 'non-state armed groups' (Atran, 2010; Powell, 2015; Van den Eertwegh, 2016). What is more, research finds that terror campaigns end because terror groups join a political process or as a result of better policing (Cronin, 2011; Jones & Libicki, 2008). Over the last decade, the conflict resolution and peacebuilding profession has evolved into a discrete, global web of facilitators and experts. These networks do the important exploratory work with armed actors – be they part of state security forces, rebel groups, or other perpetrators of violence – to assess if parties are ready for talks before more formal 'peace talks' or if humanitarian access is possible. They can also provide expertise to accompany parties during a process. Over the years such 'mediation support' has become commonplace and is supported by many international organizations and governments (United Nations, 2012).

With the coming tide of conflict in cities and the increasing recognition that urban crime and violence are a 'political' issue, there is good reason to believe that in 20 years from now (and hopefully earlier) there will be a well-established support network for mayors and other city leaders as a dedicated resource for discrete engagements with perpetrators of violence. Such networks can provide access to the expertise and know-how necessary to drive 'peace processes' in the city, and help to better protect the facilitators and the political space for the processes necessary to sustaining peace in the city.

Endnotes

1 See Women in Cities International's website for more information: www.womenincities.org

2 See Safe Communities Foundation for more information at www.safecommunities.org.nz/become-safe-community/become-safe-community

3 Programmes Coordinator, Viva Rio Haiti.

4 Experts were commissioned by Viva Rio to undertake a seismic study to identify potential water sources in the area and to assess water quality. This included the drilling of four wells (two in higher and two in lower Bel Air) and a study of water markets; see Neiburg & Nicaise (2009).

5 An important concept to understand with regard to this work is that of the base, which has a territorial definition but also includes other elements. Bases represent complex groups that combine the following four characteristics: local leadership, political affiliation, cultural expression and criminal activity. Members are usually associated with one dimension more than another, although the base contains all the types. Together, these characteristics form the profile and the internal dynamic of the base and its impact on the territory with which it is associated. After the period of strong conflict between 2004 and 2006, the Tambou Lapè project identified 14 localities that were involved in five rival area bases: Bel Air, Delmas 2, Solino, La Saline and Fortouron. It is not uncommon for these bases to be perceived as purely criminal, an understanding that neglects the more complex dynamics at play. Integration of the local base leadership into networks is essential, and the incentives Viva Rio offers can provide the only realistic driving force to maintain the commitment to a peace agreement, especially in a poor environment like that of Bel Air.

6 The CNDDR dissolved in 2010.

7 Dr. Achim Wennmann is Senior Researcher at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and Executive Coordinator of the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform.

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3

CITIES, TERRITORY AND PUBLIC SAFETY POLICIES: A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Cities, territory and public safety policies: A Latin American perspective

3

Introduction

Previous chapters have focused on trends in crime prevention and urban safety from an international perspective, emphasizing the relevant tools developed by the United Nations in recent years. Chapter 2 looks at the main issues and challenges in relation to urban governance, and the role of cities and governments, analysing trends in terms of safety. This takes account of the development of the New Urban Agenda, which will be adopted at the Habitat III conference in Quito in October 2016.

This chapter examines the issue of governance from the perspective of territorial coordination. This is a cross-cutting theme throughout this report, and thus appears in one form or another in other chapters. The challenges involved in coordinating the various key players and levels of government in formulating and implementing urban safety policies is an important theme at the national level, and a priority also for municipal governments. Good coordination makes it possible to increase the impact of policies at the local level. In a context of decentralization, large-scale urban development, and the growth in the authority and powers of cities, coordination between national and local levels has become a factor in the success of any initiative. At the national level, different methods and tools have been developed to ensure such coordination, including local security contracts, community safety partnerships, and the creation of multi-sector coordination authorities, among others.

The chapter analyses the evolution and development of urban safety and crime prevention policies from a territorial coordination perspective in Latin America. It looks in particular at the coordination processes that exist between national, regional and local policies in a series of cases studies: the cities of Ciudad Juárez, Aguascalientes (Mexico), San Salvador (El Salvador), Bogotá (Colombia), Quito (Ecuador), Lima (Peru), Santiago (Chile), Rosario (Argentina) and Recife and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).¹ It aims to show how such coordination influences local implementation and the success of programmes and policies, and draws some general conclusions to guide future interventions. The chapter thus explores, from an

empirical point of view, the evolution in urban safety and crime prevention policies and their coordination processes, and the technical tools that support them.

Two contributions are included in the chapter. This first is by Professor Marco Calaresu, who looks at the evolution and limitations of urban security contracts in Italy. The second is by Hugo Acero, expert and international consultant on urban security policies, who has acted as an advisor and taken part in implementing a number of successful urban safety policies in Latin America. He discusses the importance of human and technical capital in the implementation of urban security policies, and the development of technical capacities to improve institutional coordination.

Urban change, the reshaping of territorial authority and the importance of examining coordination: Some general issues

Cities have become the most important arena in terms of the changes brought about by globalization. Discussions on the urban environment have taken on increasing importance in planning, especially given changes in territorial authority (Sassen, 2006), transfer of competencies from national to local governments and transnational organizations, and the increasingly important role of cities in overall economic planning (Sassen, 1999, 2001). This has become evident in a number of countries, with the decentralization and devolution of regulatory powers and responsibilities as a result of government reform.

Among these responsibilities, safety and crime prevention are a priority theme. In an international context marked by changes in territorial authority, by accelerated urban development in developing countries, and by the appearance of megacities and global cities, municipal crime prevention and safety policies are becoming increasingly important. For such policies to be effective, they require a complex process of coordination between the large number of key players and jurisdictions involved in implementing them, particularly between local and national levels.

Concepts of multi-level governance (Jessop, 2004; Kazepov, 2014) and nodal governance (Burris, Drahos, & Shearing, 2005; Shearing & Wood, 2003) have emerged as frameworks for understanding, and support the implementation of urban safety and crime prevention policies. These approaches underline the importance of involving the different stakeholders in determining objectives, strategies and actions through a collaborative process, making it possible to coordinate efforts and capacities, and to resolve issues that emerge. This approach to the development of new safety policies is built on the relatively new paradigm of urban governance, and is reflected at the international level in the UN Guidelines for crime prevention adopted in 1995 and 2002.

Urban governance

Urban governance is understood as the process of interaction (cooperation/conflict) between different urban actors in deciding on the social objectives and planning of city policies (Le Galès, 1995). In this sense, it entails shared management of the planning processes involving different stakeholders, and takes place at different scales simultaneously (Brenner, 1999). This definition, derived from public policy analysis and adopted by multilateral organizations, is particularly useful for understanding crime prevention policies and the approaches governments apply in such interventions. Governance is a process of institutional change to improve public sector decision-making using market mechanisms (Moreau Defarges, 2003). This entails a complex process of coordination of the actions of government, the private sector and civil society, in order to develop policies for different sectors, and requires a major input by all parties in planning, defining objectives and implementing public policies (Kliksberg, 1999). This represents both a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge because it involves overcoming “punitive populism” (Basombrio & Dammert, 2013). And it is an opportunity because it makes possible the development of prevention policies in partnership with local communities and civil society organizations working in this domain.

Territorial strategies and tools

As suggested above, a number of tools have been developed to aid coordination processes; these include community safety partnerships, security contracts, multi-sector coordination committees, safety guidelines, institutional coordination bodies etc. (Hernandez Latorre, 2015). They respond to the changes which have taken place in the way responsibilities are now distributed, leading to planning that is more horizontal, less hierarchical and based

on the participation of the different actors involved in all phases of public policy-making. Such participation takes place in different ways, since some actors play a greater role in implementation than others (Swyngedouw, Page, & Kaika, 2002).

The transfer of powers and the empowerment of municipalities enables public prevention policies to take into account local contexts. It is important that strategies consider the realities of each specific area of intervention, by ensuring that local actors are mobilized and involved (participation) in helping to define the main safety issues in the conduct of safety audits, and in identifying appropriate interventions (ICPC, 2013). Thus, the development of local strategies means putting in place local partnerships that become the basis for reaching agreements. Such partnerships help to take account of different viewpoints, to generate a shared collective vision to guide action, and to ensure the legitimacy of the policy and the commitment of the actors.

The development of such participatory and local approaches has been the focus of much of ICPC’s work since it was founded (ICPC, 2010, 2013, pp. 115–138), and in keeping with the UN Guidelines on the prevention of crime. It has underlined that in order to be able to develop successful prevention policies, it is essential to take into account the specific context of the relationship between the territory and its stakeholders in developing prevention policies.

Territorial coordination

Coordination is one of the most important factors in the effective application of safety policies within any urban governance framework. In a context of the horizontality of relationships and the creation of partnerships with the private sector and civil society, coordination becomes a significant variable in understanding the success of initiatives in the field. The success of crime prevention policies is linked specifically to knowledge of the problems (good empirical data), the design of appropriate interventions (pertinent, efficient, effective, participative), the establishment of socially shared objectives and, finally, the real participation of the actors involved, at all levels, in the implementation of the interventions outlined in the policy. Coordination implies the construction of a joint vision that takes into account the context, the different points of view, and the strengths and weaknesses of the actors participating in the initiative.

Territorial entities, and in particular municipal governments, must establish responsible bodies and coordination tools that make it possible to mobilize actors, organize partnerships and ensure the

development of concerted actions. These must take into account horizontal (non-hierarchical) and vertical (hierarchical) coordination processes. When the case studies are analyzed, it becomes apparent that, for coordination to work, it must take into account the institutional context of the different levels of government, and the specific circumstances of policy application. And this must work in both directions. First, national policies must be conceived as general directives whose application can be adapted to local circumstances, and be sufficiently wide-ranging to give municipalities autonomy when implementing them. Second, the local level must take into account and understand national policies by drawing on the opportunities and benefits they provide to enhance local policies. This two-way process makes it possible to create considerable synergy that can increase the impact of action. Achieving it requires openness, and the generation of monitoring and outcome data to enable evaluation, and the adaptation of policies as they develop to increase their effectiveness.

Urban planning and crime in Latin America: The context


Latin America has been one of the most fertile testing grounds for government reform and the principles of good governance (Fleury, 1999; Pereira, 2005). Urban safety and crime prevention policies in the region are relatively recent, but have developed in a prolific manner with a wide range of approaches. They have usually emphasized participation, and guaranteed public safety as a civic right (H. H. Frühling, Tulchin, & Golding, 2003; Hernandez Latorre, 2015; Montero Bagatella, 2014).

The urban population in Latin America

Latin America is one of the most urbanized regions of the world. In 2012, almost 80% of its inhabitants lived in cities (UN-Habitat, 2012, p. 17) and, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1999), this will have risen to approximately 85% by 2020. Between 1990 and 2000, the urban population increased from 71% to 75%. Although urbanization rates vary in the countries across the region, and have historically been heterogeneous, in the past few years the rates seem to have become more homogenous.

Urbanization became a general phenomenon across the region from the 1970s onwards. Countries such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela in the 1970's had urban population rates of more than 70%, while in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru they averaged 55%, and in Bolivia, Ecuador and El Salvador were below 40% (Bárcena, 2001). In the 1980s and 1990s,

Figure 3.1 Urban populations of the countries under study



Source: UNSD (2016)

urbanization intensified and completely transformed the relationship between land use and population in the region. The urban population increased to 73% in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru by 2000, and 63% in Ecuador and 55% in El Salvador (ibid.). This led to the proliferation of very large cities and increased their relative weight in their country's economy and land-use planning. According to the United Nations (2011), Latin America now has 37 cities with more than two million inhabitants; seven of which have more than nine million inhabitants. The metropolitan areas in the region with the highest populations are Mexico City with 25 million inhabitants, São Paulo with 20 million and Buenos Aires with 15 million.

Crime trends in Latin America

Latin America has also been significantly affected by crime. As a whole the overall homicide rate in the region has tripled, while traditional crimes affect or have affected some 10% of the population (Soares et al., 2013). Crime and violence have high economic impacts at the regional level, with costs amounting to around 8% of gross domestic product in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela (Buvinic, Morrison, & Orlando, 2005). Reducing crime and violence is thus one of the main objectives on the public agendas of Latin American countries. Again the growth in, and incidence of, crime and violence across the region varies markedly. At the same time, the diversity of institutions and political contexts makes it difficult to make generalizations. Countries and civil society face realities and problems of different types, different magnitudes, and in very different contexts. For example, while the homicide rate in Argentina and Chile is relatively low (5.5 and 3.31 per 100,000 inhabitants),² Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico are among the countries most affected by homicide in the world. Another important

problem is that within a single country, the criminal contexts can be very different. This becomes clear when we look at the homicide rates in the large cities in each country. For example, in the case of Colombia according to the National Police, the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Medellín was 38 in 2013, but in Cali it was 84.7.

Another important factor making generalization difficult is the diversity of administrative and institutional structures in the countries under study. These have influenced the responses of each country to crime. In centralized countries such as in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Peru, policies are determined at the national level, generally based on a top-down model in which municipalities have varying degrees of autonomy. By contrast, in federal countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, there are multiple institutional configurations, with each giving different degrees of autonomy to states and provinces in relation to security responsibilities, and the training of police. This in turn results in considerable diversity in involvement at the regional and local levels.


While crime in the region is diverse and complex, a certain number of trends and continuities can be identified. They help in the understanding of urban dynamics and the public policies adopted in response to them by these countries in the past few years. The first is the impact of organized drug trafficking and micro-trafficking on crime levels in the countries of the region (Dammert, 2009; Tedesco, 2009). In the 1980s, this phenomenon affected Colombia the most, but ultimately the power gained by organized

crime had a significant impact on the entire region and on criminal activity in general. The increase in organized crime and in gangs on the outskirts of Latin American cities now represents a serious threat to safety. The proliferation of gangs, syndicates and illegal organized groups, with clear territorial control, is a recurrent phenomenon in a number of Latin American cities, including Ciudad Juárez, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Caracas, Medellín, Rosario and Buenos Aires, to name just a few.

Territorial control by groups of drug traffickers was particularly intense in the 1980s in the case of Colombia during the war against the drug cartels, and more recently in Mexico (Escalante, 2009; Palacios & Serrano, 2010). The rise and expansion of drug trafficking in these two countries has resulted in a significant increase in homicide, abduction and extortion, and its effects have extended to other countries in the region. Organized groups specializing in low-level drug trafficking have become criminal enterprises, with military control of the areas through which drugs transit.

Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras and Venezuela now suffer from the presence of criminal organizations dedicated to low-level drug trafficking who control territories on the urban outskirts of the largest cities. This presence has led to an increase in crime, in particular, low-level drug trafficking, abduction and extortion, that sustains these organizations. Examples include the main drug cartels (Medellín, Cali, Sinaloa, El Golfo) and the paramilitary and guerrilla groups that are directly funded by the drug trafficking economy (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Rastrojos,³ Los Zetas, Los Caballeros del Golfo, among others). In Central America at the urban level, there is territorial control by gangs, primarily the Salvatrucha and “the 18”. In Brazil, such groups include the Comando Vermelho in Rio de Janeiro, and the Primeiro Comando de la Capital in São Paulo. These groups control the illicit economy and, in many cases, the poor districts in these cities.

Figure 3.2 Evolution in homicide rates in the countries under study (rate per 100 000 inhabitants)



Source: UNODC (2013)

Socio-spatial segregation and crime

These urban crime phenomena are clearly associated with high levels of socio-spatial segregation and social exclusion that have historically marked Latin American cities. It is not by chance that several Latin American cities are among the most unequal cities in the world. For example, UN-Habitat's *State of the World's Cities 2010/2011: Bridging the Urban Divide*, notes that the cities of Goiana, Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte and Brasilia have a Gini coefficient⁴ of more than 0.60. In Bogotá, Barranquilla and Cali, it is

more than 0.55, and in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Quito and Mexico City more than 0.51. These high levels of urban segregation have a significant influence on crime dynamics, which tends to be concentrated in the most socially and economically deprived areas of these cities. Repressive interventions have had a limited impact on reducing crime in the region, since they focus only on the consequences and do not target the causal factors. Despite this, so-called “punitive populism” (Basombrio & Dammert, 2013) has been one of the tools used recurrently by Latin American governments with regard to public safety and security policies.

Municipal powers in relation to safety

In addition to drug trafficking, the marked urban segregation and weak institutions in the periphery in these countries, have in some cases enabled a form of cohabitation between criminal groups and local authorities. This cohabitation is reflected in widespread impunity, resulting in increased criminal activity unrestricted by the police or the application of the law. Latin American cities face this issue in different ways, using different territorial strategies. Crime prevention policies in the countries analysed reflect their respective institutional structures and histories. The diversity of prevention approaches reflects the various contexts, and the powers and responsibilities of the municipalities in each country.

Table 3.1 Urban regime characteristics

Country	City	Type of regime	Autonomy of urban regime	Faculties in relation to security and/or the police
Argentina	Rosario	Federal	Depends on the province and provincial constitution.	The municipalities support the provincial and federal policy organisms. They can create municipal guards. Their role is focused more on prevention and the implementation of policies.
Brazil	São Paulo Recife	Federal	Autonomy of states and relative autonomy of municipalities.	In terms of safety, municipalities are primarily involved in prevention. They can create municipal guards.
Chile	Santiago (Peñalolén)	Central	Relative autonomy of municipalities in the implementation of security policy.	The municipalities support and promote prevention policy, as well as participating in its implementation.
Colombia	Bogotá	Central	Relative autonomy of municipalities. Advanced decentralization.	The municipalities have security responsibilities; the mayor is the head of the police but depends administratively on the national government.
Ecuador	Quito	Central	Concentration of decisions in terms of security and safety policy at the national level and coordination of implementation with the territorial authorities.	The municipalities depend on the national government, and contribute to implementation of national policy.
El Salvador	Salvador (Santa Tecla)	Central	Relative autonomy in terms of safety of the municipalities.	Part of the remit of municipalities is service provision through the Municipal Police, and they contribute to the implementation of the national prevention policy.
Mexico	Ciudad Juárez Aguascalientes	Federal	Autonomy of the states and municipalities in terms of safety policy.	The municipalities have safety functions, in particular for prevention and transport.
Peru	Lima (Miraflores)	Central	Relative autonomy of municipalities in terms of public safety and security.	The municipalities have powers in terms of public safety and contribute to the implementation of national directives. They have the power to create municipal guards (serenazgos).

The new governance of urban safety in Latin America: The emergence and evolution of urban safety policies

Analysing changes in urban safety policy in Latin America is a difficult task because it is relatively recent and institutionally complex across the region. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace trends and changes in policy and institutional frameworks, particularly in the role of municipal governments in implementing safety strategies.

Discussions regarding the incorporation of safety as a collective right emerged during the process of the transition to democracy of the 1980s. Constitutional changes (reforms or the development of new constitutions) put an emphasis on citizens' rights, as well as changes to police and security institutions (Arriagada & Godoy, 1999; H. Frühling, Tulchin, Golding, Zimerman, & Escobar, 2005). This evolution marked the transition from national security policies created in the context of the Cold War and the fight against communism at the hemispheric level, to a new security paradigm based on the rights of citizens to enjoy public peace, and with the creation of institutions to guarantee that right. In this sense, security policy came to be known as urban safety policy, since constitutional changes implied participative and decentralized democracy, based on the construction of new types of citizenship. As a result, the institutional reforms privileged a series of transfers of powers from national to local levels, giving rise to the emergence of the municipality as the centre of administrative and democratic action (Borja, 1999; Velásquez & others, 2013). Thus the municipality has been transformed into the centre of the relationship between citizens and the state. Municipal regimes have been at the centre of the transformation of land-use planning, and have been given political and administrative autonomy, as well as powers in terms of safety and crime prevention.

While this transformation was taking place at the constitutional level, significant changes were also taking place in the structures for responding to safety problems, and in the development of public policies for urban safety. These were beginning to move away from repression towards a multi-causal and more complex conception of crime. This conception focuses on the range of causal factors which lead to crime, and the establishment of effective prevention policies. Collectively these changes required fundamental institutional changes, which were accomplished at different times, and took different forms in each country (see Table 3.2).

In the face of the huge increase in violence and crime mentioned above, a number of special expert commissions were set up to help establish national

crime policies that transcended government party policies (Hernandez Latorre, 2015). This required the development of a series of relatively strict procedures requiring new administrations to adopt an urban safety policy that took into account the progress and problems faced by the previous administration. Public urban safety policy had to become a permanent policy within the country, respecting constitutional values, such as decentralization and participative democracy. It was then necessary to create administrative bodies responsible for the development, implementation and evaluation of crime prevention policy of each country.

Institutional changes were particularly evident in the transition of responsibility for the police and security from state departments for security, to recently created departments for the interior and/or justice. Furthermore, in most countries, specialist community safety and crime prevention authorities were created, in the form of ministerial secretariats or sub-units. The latter were responsible in particular for developing, evaluating and monitoring safety policies. This transition was achieved in a variety of ways and at different times in each country. Community safety and crime prevention policy has seen a multitude of adaptations and developments, each involving local community aspects. Table 3.2 describes the main changes at the institutional level in the safety policies of the countries studied.

As has been seen, institutional changes led in the mid-1990s to the implementation of various national strategies for prevention and community safety in

Figure 3.3 Location of cities studied



Source: Authors

these countries. These reforms included the creation of institutions with specific responsibility for safety and prevention, whose functions depended significantly on whether countries were federal or not. In the federal countries, safety and crime prevention are the responsibility of the states or provinces, whereas in the centralized countries, this is the remit of the national government.

In federal governments policy is based on:

1. a coordination process with the provincial or state level;
2. the creation of bodies responsible for implementing coordination;
3. the development of an incentive system that makes it possible to direct action at the local level;

4. the creation of a federal monitoring body to evaluate the evolution of policies in all the territories under its jurisdiction.

In the case of centralist governments, a national urban safety policy applies a top-down perspective:

1. the governments have created specialist offices that are responsible for safety diagnosis and the development of policies;
2. coordination authorities have been established to support and improve action at the local level;
3. the follow-up process has involved the setting up of bodies responsible for the management and monitoring of data at the national level.

Table 3.2 Evolution in the institutional contexts that provide a framework for public security in the countries studied

Federal governments

Argentina	Brazil	Mexico
National Prevention Plan <i>[Plan Nacional de Prevención]</i> (2000-2008)	National Secretariat for Public Security <i>[Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública]</i> (1995)	National System for Public Security <i>[Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública]</i> (1995)
National Programme for Vulnerable Communities <i>[Programa Nacional de Comunidades Vulnerables]</i> (n.d.)	National Council for Public Security <i>[Conselho Nacional de Segurança Pública]</i> (2000)	National Council for Public Security <i>[Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública]</i> (1995)
Employment and Training Programme <i>[Programa de Empleo y Capacitación]</i> (n.d.)	National Public Security Plan <i>[Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública]</i> (2000)	National Secretariat for Public Security <i>[Secretaria de Seguridad Pública]</i> (2000)
Ministry for Security <i>[Ministerio de Seguridad]</i> (2010)	National Public Security Fund <i>[Fundo Nacional de Segurança Pública]</i> (2003)	National Public Security Programme <i>[Programa Nacional de Seguridad Pública]</i> (2008-2013)
	Unified Public Security System <i>[Sistema Único de Segurança Pública]</i> (2003)	General Law on the Public Security System <i>[Ley General del Sistema de Seguridad Pública]</i> (2009)
	National Programme for Public Security with Citizenship <i>[Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania]</i> (2007)	General Law on the Prevention of Violence and Criminality <i>[Ley General de Prevención de la Violencia y la Criminalidad]</i> (2012)
	National System for Information and Public Security <i>[Sistema de Informação de Segurança do Brasil]</i> (2007)	National Centre for Crime Prevention and Citizen Participation <i>[Centro Nacional de Prevención del Delito y Participación Ciudadana]</i> (2012)
	National Public Security Plan <i>[Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública]</i> (2011)	Public Security Commission <i>[Comisión de Seguridad Pública]</i> (2013)
		National Programme for Social Prevention of Violence and Crime <i>[Programa Nacional para la Prevención Social de la Violencia y de la Delincuencia]</i> (n.d.)

Centralist governments

Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Peru	El Salvador
Quadrant Plan [<i>Plan Cuadrante</i>] (1998)	National Strategy Against Violence [<i>Estrategia Nacional de Lucha contra la Violencia</i>] (1991)	Sub-Secretariat for Citizen Security [<i>Subsecretaría de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2006)	National Citizen Security System [<i>Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2003)	Citizen Security Strategy [<i>Estrategia de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (1994)
“Comuna Segura” Programme (2000)	National Security Plan for the People [<i>Plan Nacional Seguridad para la Gente</i>] (1993)	Law on Public Security [<i>Ley de Seguridad Pública del Estado</i>] (2009)	National Citizen Security Plan [<i>Plan Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2013)	Security Alliance [<i>Alianza por la Seguridad</i>] (1999)
Public Security Commission [<i>Comisión de Seguridad Pública</i>] (2004)	Reform of the National Police and the Participation System [<i>Reforma a la Policía Nacional y el Sistema de Participación</i>] (1995)	Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública [<i>National System for Public Security</i>] (2009)	Regulations for the National Citizen Security System [<i>Reglamentación del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2013)	“Paz Social” Programme (2000)
National Public Security Strategy [<i>Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública</i>] (2006)	Presidential Programme for Cohabitation and Citizen Security [<i>Programa Presidencial para la Convivencia y la Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (1994)	Ministry for Security Coordination [<i>Ministerio de Coordinación de Seguridad</i>] (2009)	“País Seguro” Programme (2004)	National Plan for Prevention and Social Peace [<i>Plan Nacional de Prevención y Paz Social</i>] (2004)
“Chile Seguro”: National Public Security Plan [<i>Plan Nacional de Seguridad Pública, Chile Seguro</i>] (2010)	Presidential Strategy for Cohabitation and Citizen Security [<i>Estrategia Presidencial para la Convivencia y la Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (1998)	State Security Commission [<i>Comisión Estadística de Seguridad</i>] (2011)	Commission for Citizen Security and Social Peace [<i>Comisión de Seguridad Ciudadana y Paz Social</i>] (n.d.)	Directorate for Citizen Security [<i>Dirección de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2007)
Regulations for Public Security Plans for Each National Administration [<i>Reglamentación de Planes de Seguridad Pública para Cada Administración Nacional</i>] (2011)	National Strategy of Coexistence and Citizen Security of the Democratic Security [<i>Estrategia Nacional de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana de la Seguridad Democrática</i>] (2001)	National Citizen Security Plan [<i>Plan Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2011–2013)	Directorate-General for Social Prevention of Violence (2009)	Directorate-General for Social Prevention of Violence (2009)
Plan Nacional de Seguridad Pública [<i>National Public Security Plan</i>] (2014)	National Policy for Cohabitation and Citizen Security [<i>Política Nacional de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2011)	Ecuadoran Centre for Security Analysis [<i>Centro Ecuatoriano de Análisis de Seguridad</i>] (2013)	National Policy for Justice, Public Security and Cohabitation [<i>Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia</i>] (2010)	National Policy for Justice, Public Security and Cohabitation [<i>Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia</i>] (2010)
		National Citizen Security Plan [<i>Plan Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana</i>] (2014–2017)	National Strategy for the Prevention of Violence [<i>Estrategia Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia</i>] (2012)	National Strategy for the Prevention of Violence [<i>Estrategia Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia</i>] (2012)

Source: Authors

Local authorities thus participate only in the implementation phase at the local level, where they are also responsible for ensuring the participation of local stakeholders.

Federal safety and prevention policies in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico

The development of policies in these three countries varies. Brazil and Mexico are in an advanced stage of policy development, while Argentinian prevention policy is less developed.

In Argentina, a Plan Nacional de Prevención was created in 2000, but with a limited time span and objectives. It remained in force until 2008, but had neither the continuity nor the resources necessary to establish a national prevention policy (Ayo, 2013). Various prevention projects took place in provinces and municipalities. In 2010, the federal Ministry for Security was created, and within this, an office specializing in crime prevention. Under the new government, priority was given to the creation of a national prevention strategy for the country.

In the case of Mexico, the development of policy has been quite extensive. The issue has been one of the country's priorities, given the recent increases in crime associated with drug trafficking. From 1995, the foundations for the construction of a safety plan were established, particularly with the development and implementation of the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública in 1995, and the improvement of coordination processes through the creation of the National Council for Public Safety, responsible for harmonizing actions between the federal government and the states. These bodies made possible the creation of the National Secretariat for Public Security (2000), transformed in 2013 into the Commission for Public Security. There is a focus on the multi-causal nature of crime, on crime prevention, and on creating an institutional infrastructure which will ensure continuity for public safety policy (Barrachina & Hernández, 2012).

Two government programmes have been developed: the Programa Nacional de Seguridad Pública (2008–2012), which was also the first integrated crime prevention programme, and the Programa Nacional para la Prevención Social de la Violencia y la Delincuencia (2012–2016). This programme provides funding through two funds, the Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública de los Estados y de los Municipios, and the Subsidio para la Seguridad de los Municipios. Funding from both funds is primarily directed to priority intervention zones with high crime rates.

In Brazil, the increase in crime in cities, and in territorial control by drug trafficking gangs made it necessary to put in place a federal coordination strategy to tackle violence across the whole country. In 1998, the National Secretariat for Public Security was created, and developed the first Plan Nacional de Seguridad Pública (2000). Through the creation of the Fondo Nacional de Seguridad Pública (2000), it aimed to create a national coordination strategy for safety policy that did not threaten the autonomy of the states.

In addition, the Plano de Integração de Programas Sociais na Prevenção da Violência formed the social prevention component of the Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública. A specialized public safety body was created, allowing for in-depth discussion of public policy on safety and prevention at the federal level. In 2003, the Sistema Único de Segurança Pública was created; this established an information management system, as well as coordination bodies with the states. The Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania (PRONASCI) was set up under the new government in 2007, and included a specific emphasis on funding integrated policies at the municipal level (Cano, 2006; Shaw & Carli, 2011, pp. 101–102). Despite the significance of these changes, there were implementation problems, which in turn hindered any significant progress in terms of reducing the crime rate. In 2011, a new and more pragmatic Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública was developed, with a strategic focus on improving the information system by defining the types of interventions to be funded, and targeting projects to areas with high crime risks.

Despite the efforts made by the governments of Brazil and Mexico and the creation of a normative and institutional framework for prevention policies, the results appear to have been limited. There has been no significant reduction in homicides or criminal acts. It seems that one of the problem comes from the clash of powers between the federal and the local levels (Hernandez Latorre, 2015). In basic terms, there is a problem of coordination. Although public security powers are supposed to be the mandate of the federated units, federal state interventions have in practice attempted to displace those of local government. In theory, the federal state should play a secondary role in the formulation of policies, and focus primarily on influencing action through the creation of funding incentives and coordination of information. However, the role it has played in the interventions analysed has seen it come into conflict with the states and provinces. The priority is to consolidate the coordination tools necessary to improve the integration process and the federal governments' understanding of local realities.

Safety and prevention policies in centralized countries: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Peru

In the case of centralized governments, the implementation of community safety policies has in some cases been punctuated by tension between municipalities and national governments. Although the powers and the degree of autonomy of the municipalities are different in each country, policies are in general implemented in a top-down manner; the municipalities play a key role in local implementation, but this is often predefined by the national government. Nevertheless, methods of developing and monitoring policies have improved, at both municipal and national levels.

Changes are particularly evident in Chile and Colombia. In Chile, the local neighbourhood policing model has been expanded to policing operations in the region. Colombia has seen the development of municipal crime reduction bodies and policies. The effectiveness of municipal public safety policies in Bogotá and Medellín have been considered at the national level. In this sense, an important element to take into account is the relative flexibility with which certain countries have been able to develop their policies. Perhaps the best example is that of Peru, which created the *serenazgos* or municipal guards, created as a result of tensions between the municipal and national government in the 1990s. They provide municipalities with the ability to intervene quickly, and have become a component of local safety and prevention policies.

Some countries, such as Colombia and El Salvador, have had public safety policies since the 1990s. In both these countries, the fight against gangs led to the early development of national policies against violence. Colombia developed its first Estrategia Nacional de Lucha contra la Violencia in 1991 under the new constitution. El Salvador developed its Estrategia de Seguridad Ciudadana in 1994 against the backdrop of the demobilization of guerrillas. In Ecuador and Peru, this has occurred much more recently. In Ecuador the Secretaría de Seguridad Ciudadana was created in 2006, and the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana in Peru in 2003. However, it is worth noting that, in both these countries, the development of safety policies advanced because of the emergence of the municipality as a key player. In Chile, the Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Pública was created in 2004, but safety policy is now institutionalized, obliging each national administration to develop public safety plans.

The following section discusses the evolution of safety policies in centralized countries.

In the case of El Salvador, three factors have had an influence on policy development: 1) the punitive nature of intervention; 2) modifications made to policies and institutions by each administration; and 3) the overreliance on international aid for the development of national prevention policies. Although municipalities enjoyed relative autonomy, in practice they did not have sufficient resources to implement local policy, which prevented them from having any real impact. The development of crime prevention plans vacillated between preventive and punitive approaches. In 1994, the country's urban safety strategy included key elements for prevention, but these were modified in the 2000s, mainly because of the fight against gangs. It was only in 2007 that the Comisión de Seguridad Ciudadana y Paz Social was created, and this had an influence on the later development of the policy, and the Dirección General de Seguridad Ciudadana responsible for implementing it. This commission led to the creation of the Dirección General de Prevención Social y Violencia in 2009, the development of the Política Nacional de Justicia in 2010 and the Estrategia Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia in 2012 (Jiménez Larios, 2010). This latter strategy entails the creation of municipal prevention councils, requiring participation and coordination within the municipalities.

Colombia provides perhaps the best example of successful municipal violence prevention policies. The constitution of 1991 placed the municipality at the centre of public administration, granting it responsibilities and resources. The mayor is the head of the police force within his or her jurisdiction and the person responsible for public order. They have the power to develop integrated plans and programmes related to community safety. Mayors have played a leading role in the development of community safety policies in the country in the past few years. At the national level, it is important to stress that, since the 1990s, the different national administrations have developed specific safety strategies. These strategies have varied but for the most part seen crime and violence as multi-causal in nature. Policies have incorporated the management of armed conflict and the prevention of crime which have primarily affected cities (Rivas, 2005). Alongside this, significant legislation has been passed to enable local participation in the development of such strategies, and support the police. For example, Law 62 of 1993 created the National Police and the Sistema Nacional de Participación Ciudadana. In the past few years, safety policy has been more actively concerned with prevention. This is illustrated by the creation of the Política Nacional de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana in 2011.

Table 3.3 Summarizes each of the initiatives studied

	Mexico		Argentina	Brazil	
	Ciudad Juárez	Aguascalientes	Rosario	Rio de Janeiro	Recife
Name of initiative	Todos Somos Juárez	Política Pública de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana	Vínculos para la Prevención Social de la Violencia	Unidades de Policía de Pacificación y Rio Más Social	Pacto por la Vida de Recife
Period analysed	2010–2012	2010–2014	2014–2016	2004–2014	2007–2012
Initiator of policy or plan	Federal government	Municipal government	State government	Federal government + state government	State government + local government
Policy approach	Military + integral, multi-causal	Public space intervention ('urban acupuncture')	Military + multi-causal	Military + multi-causal	Multi-causal participatory
Funding	Federal funding	Municipal and federal funding	Provincial funding	Federal funding + state and municipal funding	State funding
Technical elements for follow-up and monitoring (staff training and analysis tools)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Source: Authors

Ecuador established its national community safety policy under the Correa administration in 2007 and the change of constitution in 2008. Prior to this, an increase in crime in the early 2000s meant urban safety had become a priority for Ecuadorians. During this period, pressure regarding security led to a change in municipal administrations, which took over management of the issue. This was the case for the cities of Quito, Cuenca and Guayaquil, which put in place local safety policies. The influence of the municipalities on these policies was limited in 2008 by the enactment of the new constitution and, in 2009, the creation of a law on public and state security. This law defined urban safety policy as a government policy, creating the Consejo de Seguridad Pública and the Ministry for Security Coordination. The law also established urban sectoral councils and local councils, but nevertheless left municipalities with powers in the field of safety that are today exclusively the mandate of the central government. The law was further developed *post hoc* in the national security plans of 2011–2013 and 2014–2017, applying a top-down approach. In 2011 the Ecuadoran government created the Comisión de Estadística de Seguridad, and in 2013 the Centro Ecuatoriano de Análisis de Seguridad Integral, which are responsible for information management monitoring and evaluation. Community policing units were

also established throughout the country, while the setting up of provincial and canton safety councils, under the authority of the national government is being considered. This central policy appears to have resulted in a reduction in homicides and crime in general, but at the same time has had a negative impact on the autonomy of municipalities.

In Peru, development of the national policy for community safety has been influenced by the active role which municipalities have played since the 1990s. In 2003, the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana was created, headed by the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad and, at the local level, by regional, provincial and district urban safety committees (Costa, 2012). This system relies on good coordination between the different territorial units which draw up urban safety plans, and the central government. While it was put in place in 2003, it was only in 2012 that it was given institutional and technical support within the Ministry of the Interior, to develop its work and improve evaluation and monitoring. This has made it possible to improve project implementation and will, in future, enable information-sharing between the various institutions in the field, including the police and municipal guards – *serenazgos* – using an electronic platform. In 2013, the national plan for 2013–2018

Chile	Peru	Colombia	Ecuador	El Salvador
Peñalolén	Miraflores	Bogotá	Quito	Santa Tecla
Plan Integral Barrios Seguros	Plan Estratégico de Seguridad Local	Subsecretaría de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana	Sistema Metropolitano de Seguridad Ciudadana	Política Pública de Seguridad Ciudadana
2005–2012	2007–2015	1998–2006	2000–2008	2004–2012
Local government	Local government	Local government	Local government	Local government
Multi-causal Multi-approach	Multi-causal Multi-approach	Multi-causal Multi-approach	Multi-causal Multi-approach	Multi-causal Multi-approach
National funding + municipal funding	Municipal funding	Municipal funding + international loans and funding from central government	Municipal funding + international loans and funding from central government	Municipal funding + international loans and funding from central government
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

put particular emphasis on improving coordination between the national and local level, strengthening policies and developing safe public spaces. In 2014 the Sistema Nacional de Información para la Seguridad Ciudadana was established to provide data for the monitoring and evaluation of the national policy.

Finally, in Chile, institutional change has made it possible for safety policies and structures to become sustainable. In the transition to democracy, and since the first safety policy was adopted in 2004, urban safety has become much more important (H. Frühling, 2011). Subsequent administrations adopted Planes Nacionales de Seguridad Ciudadana: in 2006, the Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2006–2010, in 2010 the Plan Nacional de Seguridad Chile Seguro 2010–2014, and in 2014 the Plan Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2014–2018. At the institutional level, in 2011 Law 20.502 was adopted, obliging each administration to generate a national security policy, and an institutional framework was created that was responsible for security and crime prevention in the Ministry of Interior, the sub-secretariat for crime prevention. Although the policy has a top-down approach, local administrations participate actively in implementation, providing information, taking care of logistics and promoting participation. The

multi-causal prevention approach is very important and has influenced the development and direction of policies under the various administrations. The urban safety plans have thus incorporated a major prevention element and have developed coordination systems with local governments.

Coordination at the local level: Local experiences

As suggested above, difficulties have been experienced between national and local governments in the coordination of prevention policies. This is complicated by the fact that a multitude of key players and particular circumstances are involved. Many of the policies analysed are targeted to areas which have the highest rates of crime. Interventions in those areas may not necessarily consider the causes of those high crime rates, or the political and administrative reality of the area. Many national plans select the areas of intervention on the basis of crime rates, and often institute policies which combine prevention with increased police control and patrols. In many cases, some form of social crime prevention may be included, to be undertaken by the police, but it is often limited and short term.

The following section looks at local problems in coordination on the basis of the experiences analysed. It is easier to understand territorial dynamics by looking at local projects and then at relationships with national policies.

Experience in federal countries

Among federal countries the experiences of the cities of Ciudad Juárez and Aguascalientes in Mexico; Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil; and Rosario in Argentina were examined. These five cities have seen a significant increase in violence associated with drug trafficking, and interventions at the local level have tried to work with different levels of government in the development of prevention policies.

In Ciudad Juárez, Rio de Janeiro and Rosario, interventions have involved two stages. First, military intervention was used to reclaim territory from organized crime. Second, a range of more long term social and community crime prevention approaches were developed. This second phase tried to coordinate the actions of municipalities, the states and the federal government through the implementation of a global strategy to fight crime. Thus in all cases, the policies combined repression and preventive approaches.

In Ciudad Juárez between 2010 and 2011, the Mexican federal government invested around \$380 million in a programme called Todos Somos Juárez, to tackle the increase in crime in general, and in homicides in particular. Despite good intentions and a significant reduction in the number of homicides, the programme encountered two main problems: the role of the federal level in planning and implementation, which displaced the lower level, and, in the short term, problems arising from a change in administration and in prevention policy.

In Rio de Janeiro, the state government, with the support of the federal government's Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania, implemented two programmes to regain territorial control over the *favelas* in the city. The Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Units, UPP) and the social UPP were later replaced by the Rio Más Social programme (Braga & Pierce, 2005; Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, n.d.; Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2015). Coordination in this case focused mainly on the disbursement of federal resources for implementation at the state level, with the municipality participating in the development of the initiative. Even though coordination worked well, the lack of a long-term vision and the over-emphasis given to repression raises doubts about the sustainability of the initiative in the future.

Finally, in Rosario in 2013, the Ministry of Security in the province of Santa Fe created the programme Vínculos para la Prevención Social de la Violencia y el Delito en Gobiernos Locales. This emphasised training and the co-production of a safety strategy with the community. The programme is still in the implementation phase, and outcomes are not clear. However, the model has two notable elements: 1) the use of a local safety diagnosis, and 2) making participation a central element in urban safety. The programme is being developed in conjunction with other initiatives that have the same objective of reducing violence.

Generally speaking, the local coordination of initiatives such as these is complicated. This is mainly because of the dependence on federal resources and the limited power of the municipal administrations in terms of the scale and size of interventions. Municipalities largely accompany the implementation process and adapt it to their context. Another major problem lies in the sustainability of the initiatives, because of the secondary role given to prevention, and the limited role of community participation in them.

In other cases, local policies are developed at the local level and then integrated into the national policy framework. Examples include the Mexican experience in Aguascalientes, with the construction of the Green Line; and in Brazil, Pernambuco's implementation of a state policy, the Pacto por la Vida to reduce violence and homicide rates. In both cases, there were successful local planning exercises to develop strategies to prevent crime.

Aguascalientes developed its model of citizen ownership and participation in 2010–2013. It drew on the experience of the Green Line in Curitiba, situational crime prevention and the notion of 'urban acupuncture', to bring about change in the city. The municipal government collaborated with other governmental agencies to incorporate land surrounding a pipeline and integrate it into public space, generating a sense of belonging and participation among the surrounding communities.

In January 2007 the state of Pernambuco implemented a series of changes to improve safety, with a state security action plan. Participatory diagnosis of crime problems was achieved through a series of public meetings between January and May 2007. The resulting plan was a wide-ranging one emphasising respect for human rights, participation and prevention. The plan, Pacto por la Vida, required a major process of institutional change involving all the organizations working in the field, setting up a coordination process, as well as management coordination committees and monitoring and evaluation capacities.

In both cases, the safety policy was a cross-cutting one and a priority, with responsibility shared by the various institutions participating in implementation. Both these strategies were supported by significant participation from the communities and local institutions, in terms of discussion of interventions and their implementation. This guaranteed their success and a significant reduction in homicide rates in both cases.

Experiences in centralized countries

In Colombia and Peru, municipalities have relative autonomy in the development of initiatives, which has encouraged them to design their own strategies. The central government supports local processes with economic resources and technical expertise, on the basis of a relatively flexible policy framework. Even though the functions of the police remain mainly national, municipal safety and prevention initiatives are complementary.

In Chile and El Salvador, policies are top-down. The municipality participates in implementing the national safety policy, with the addition of social interventions and citizen participation projects within its sphere of authority.

In Ecuador, experience has been mixed. In the 2000s, the municipalities played a leading role in the implementation of public safety policies, but this role was restricted in subsequent years in favour of a stronger role for the central government.

In addition to these administrative differences, there are differences in the crime contexts in each of the cases. While San Salvador and Bogotá have very high rates of violence and homicide, in Miraflores, Quito and Santiago, homicide and violence rates are very low, and the influence of organized crime is much lower.

Bogotá, San Salvador and Quito have a number of commonalities. First, safety forms part of the broader development of urban planning, and permeates all planning and intervention approaches. In all three cases, significant community participation is required and there is major coordination between the different levels of government.

Bogotá is an emblematic case in terms of the local development of crime prevention policy (Martin, Arévalo, & Ariza, 2004). In a context marked by the fight against drug trafficking, Bogotá succeeded in developing an effective policy in the 1990s with financial support from the Inter-American Development Bank. This was one of the first times that a multilateral bank had financed the implementation of a security policy. In this case, the aim was to create an urban culture

that privileged and respected life, an institutional structure for decision-making, information on safety, and a strong coordination process between the various entities and the different levels of government. The most important aspect was the city's approach, with public space and safety as cross-cutting themes orienting the policies. It is also important to note the importance of systematic planning and data collection on crime and safety issues. The success of Bogotá's policies has had an influence on the development of safety policies in the region.

In the past few years, the municipality of Santa Tecla in San Salvador has been transformed by the success of strategies to reduce violent crime. This has been achieved mainly through the use of community participation strategies in management and security, in addition to the creation of an observatory on crime that provides data for the crime information system. The municipal safety policy of Santa Tecla is based on participation and coordination among key stakeholders, together with data collection to enable it to track the evolution and incidence of crime. One of the most significant lessons learnt relates to the excellent coordination between the international, national and local stakeholders, which ensured success and continued funding.

In Quito, constitutional change took place in 2008, when municipal powers in relation to security became broader than they are at present. Inspired by the successes in Bogotá, in 2000 Quito created its Sistema Metropolitano de Seguridad, which involved a number of reforms:

- 1) creation of a security tax;
- 2) establishment of an inter-institutional coordination organization with considerable participation from civil society, known as the Consejo Metropolitano de Seguridad; and
- 3) setting up the Dirección Metropolitana de Seguridad, responsible for implementation, and a citizens' security observatory responsible for collecting and processing information. Perhaps the most significant success of the policy related to coordination between the government and the national police. This made it possible to improve the decision-making tools subsequently used.

In Chile and Peru, two different approaches are evident. In Chile, the national policy takes account of the role of municipalities in implementation. In Peru, the municipality has much more autonomy to decide on safety policies. In both cases, nevertheless, there is good coordination between the national and local levels. For example, the commune of Peñalolén in Chile implemented an integral plan for safe neighborhoods, but had relative freedom in doing so. The policy was cross-cutting and participatory, and combined primary prevention programmes to reduce inequalities, as

well as secondary and tertiary ones. National support of local stakeholders helped to increase the impact of the plan in the commune.

In Peru, the municipality of Miraflores in the Lima metropolitan area, has under different administrations, created and consolidated a Plan Integral de Seguridad Ciudadana. Innovative approaches have resulted in a sustained reduction in crime rates. This has included municipal guards or *serenazgos*, data collection and analysis tools, and the use of new technology. The Comité Distrital de Seguridad Pública acts as a coordination authority for the plan and undertakes regular evaluation. Miraflores has used its autonomy on safety policy to strengthen the role of the municipal guards, by coordinating their work with the national police and other levels of government.

Conclusions and recommendations

Citizen or community safety is an emerging public policy in Latin America, which aims to guarantee safety as a citizens' right. This focus on citizens' rights and participatory approaches has gained ground since the 1990s, shifting away from a "doctrine of national security". Crime prevention has become a key theme which has gradually been incorporated into legislation and the institutional structures of the countries examined, and often become institutionalized. Specific bodies have been created to consider the issues, and units responsible for developing plans and implementing crime prevention policies established within central and regional governments, as well as to develop empirical evidence and evaluation and analysis tools to help guide policy decisions.

In all cases, the importance of the coordination process between different levels of government is evident, helping to ensure civil society involvement in prevention initiatives, as well as a sense of ownership and continuity. The creation of sector and local safety committees has helped to ensure the participation of communities in the implementation of projects.

By examining good practices it is possible to identify common methods and approaches which lead to successful outcomes, and show how they function across environments. Such "replicability" cannot be a mechanical or uncritical transfer of one project to another place. It requires a careful understanding of each specific context, and an assessment of how far an intervention in one city or neighbourhood can be adapted to another context, in order to maximize its effectiveness.

In conclusion, based on the case studies analyzed in this chapter, the following would appear to be key components of effective crime prevention policies:

1. each territorial authority needs to have direct and permanent involvement in prevention policy. Community safety must not be delegated to other political sectors or left to the police. Reducing and preventing crime must be a key part of the government agenda;
2. it is essential to establish a coordination process for decision-making and information-sharing that makes it possible to create links between all the key sectors involved. This includes information and data collection, analysis and development of a plan to respond to the crime and safety issues identified. There needs to be a permanent body which functions on a regular basis, such as an inter-sectoral safety committee which brings together stakeholders, as well as academic institutions and the communities themselves;
3. all administrative, technical and other staff working on safety issues need specific training. Those involved in data collection and analysis need to deliver information to decision-makers on a regular basis, as in the example of the city of Miraflores;
4. in all cases, it is important to involve the community and to keep people informed of the entire process. The participation of local residents needs to include not only assessing their safety concerns, but all aspects of planning interventions. The use of new technological tools – from the internet and virtual government to technological applications such as mobile phones and social networks – can all be used to enhance communication and participation;
5. it is important to take into account the risk factors for crime, and to initiate social and economic policies to help reduce them. Improving infrastructure, schools and leisure facilities will all help to reduce inequalities. Local initiatives need to be cross-cutting, and must use appropriate tools to diagnose the problems, if they are to have an impact on crime;
6. the sustainability of prevention policies is especially important for successful outcomes, and this involves the commitment of communities themselves too. Reducing and preventing crime is a long term process, and future administrations must undertake to continue to fund and support successful projects that are dear to the hearts of communities.

Finally, common sense is central to resolving problems. The implementation of safety policies requires informed discussion, good evidence and knowledge. Rational discussion of the facts is, thus, a fundamental part of the implementation process.

Urban safety, human capital and technology

Hugo Acero Velásquez⁵

For city dwellers, administrations and experts in general, the problems of insecurity that affect the countries and cities of Latin America are today's number one concern, in that the high rates of violence and crime affect not only the well-being and tranquility of their citizens but also the democratic governance and socioeconomic development of the countries in the region.

Countless efforts and analyses have been made in the region to tackle these issues. However, the results have not lived up to expectations; on the contrary, insecurity has increased and has become more complex, as the traditional problems of insecurity, such as theft, injury and murder, are intertwined with crimes that are seen as transnational, such as drug trafficking, the illegal arms trade, human trafficking, smuggling and carjacking, for example. These crimes can end up affecting citizens in their daily lives. This is the case with the sale and use of drugs on the streets of certain districts, the illegal sale and use of firearms in private possession and the spreading of the mafia culture, which expresses itself by means of stereotyping and the indiscriminate use of violence as the solution to any form of conflict.

Human capital and state management of security

Looking at the complex problem of insecurity, we need to recognize that countries have made progress: many states and cities now have departments and secretariats devoted to security, as well as diagnoses, plans and analyses that have, since the end of the past century, relied on the firm support of multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the Organization of American States, the agencies of the United Nations, international cooperation agencies, universities, specialist non-governmental organizations and independent experts.

Given all the diagnoses carried out to date, we cannot deny that we know what is happening in the countries in the region, as well as what needs to be done in terms of security. Nevertheless, there are still problems in this area in terms of state management,

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in that governments are not supported by specialist human capital, such as expert officials. Most security ministers, vice-ministers and secretaries, who generally do not keep their posts for very long, are former members of the armed forces. They continue to privilege the military, police and punitive justice method, ignoring the multi-causal, interrelated approach needed to respond to the problems identified in the diagnoses and the solutions proposed in the plans. These documents generally end up gathering dust on the shelves of government offices.

While other sectors, such as the economy, mobility, health, education and public works, receive support through public policies (administrative structures, professionals, resources, plans, etc.), urban security continues to be the realm of the armed institutions, which reduce the solution to problems of insecurity to enforcement actions and repression of crime.

In this area, the actions of public and private, national and international, bilateral and multilateral institutions must aim to create the human capital needed to reinforce the capacity of civil governments in the field of urban security; it is essential to obtain support from state officials who are highly qualified in designing and implementing public security policies, at all levels of government (national, state/provincial, municipal) and in other state institutions (justice, taxation). It is necessary to reinforce the skills of the key players entrusted with security by the government and of the agents responsible for designing and implementing violence and crime prevention policies, for controlling personal security, for reforms to and modernization of the police and for criminal prosecution, as well as of those dedicated to promoting urban participation in terms of controlling how the system functions.

In the absence of human capital, technological development suffers

No one doubts that technological development in the field of urban security is important for facing up to current and future problems of violence and crime. What security and justice institution does not want to have cutting-edge technology at its disposal?

However, the vast majority of these institutions in Latin America are unprepared to take full advantage of these developments.

As an example, we can cite a certain number of experiences in which requests for technological developments from security and justice authorities do not correlate with the human and institutional ability to use that equipment in the best way.

First, in 2000, the administration of Bogotá, Colombia, decided to invest \$3 million dollars in reinforcing the capacities of the criminal investigation institutions (police, public prosecutors and forensic medicine). The first thing they did was work with the institutions to define how they intended to invest the resources. The officials from these institutions requested ballistics and DNA machines, laser microscopes and other costly and sophisticated crime lab equipment, which cost six times more than the assigned budget.

At this time, with the resources available, some of the equipment requested could have been bought, but in the field there was no professional crime scene management; the police did not have equipment for collecting evidence and had not been trained for the task; they did not have vehicles and, if they did, did not have the money for maintenance or fuel; the investigators did not have computers, recorders or video cameras; and the criminal investigation institutions did not have suitable premises and did not work in teams – that is, they were not able to collect evidence and even less able to correctly operate the sophisticated equipment requested, improve investigations and reduce lawlessness.

Against this background, before buying the specialist equipment, a decision was made to start from the bottom and invest the resources in four basic areas: 1) training for all police officers in managing a crime scene and for investigators in crime lab practices; 2) acquisition of equipment for collecting evidence, basic laboratory equipment and vehicles; 3) better premises; and 4) inter-institutional training to encourage teamwork. That is to say, first the administration had to attend to the most basic requirements before embarking on a modernization process underpinned by trained human capital with the ability to use in the best way possible the specialist equipment acquired several years later.

Second, reconstruction in 1999 of the Cárcel Distrital de Bogotá, one of the best prisons in Colombia⁶, was carried out using all the latest technology, such as remote controlled operation of doors, video cameras, an audio system, scanners, security equipment, etc., all controlled from a centralized monitoring station. With these developments, great effort was made to

train the guards and other prison staff in handling the equipment, but it was very soon clear that corruption, misplaced “solidarity”, the routinization of the job and low staff capabilities would lead to inadequate use of this technology. Faced with this situation, the decision was made to entrust the monitoring station and the operations and maintenance of the equipment to external qualified personnel – that is, professional external monitoring that forced the operating protocols of the prison to be respected and improved the performance of the prison guards and administrative staff. The traditional problems of the prison then decreased substantially.

Similarly, in certain countries in Latin America, the police and justice organizations proudly show off all their technology to visitors, even though in many cases it has been shown that very little actual use is made of it. The staff almost always have no idea what the technology is for, and treat it like a “totem” that they can adulate and take care of, but that they do not master and whose full potential they do not exploit. In this case, the first thing to do is to demystify the technology, train human resources in how to use it and develop institutional capacity-building to understand that technology is only a means that allows security and justice officials and institutions to perform their duties in the best way possible, in this case ensuring the security and cohabitation of citizens.

In the region today, it is fashionable to talk about “smart cities” and to limit this concept to filling them with video cameras, monitoring stations and 911 systems (911 being the single emergency number). These are costly systems that push aside investments in response teams, such as cars and motorcycles for the police, the fire brigade, ambulance and traffic services, and all other equipment. Above all, it is forgotten that there is a need to train and professionalize the staff who receive the distress calls and who have to attend the emergencies.

In conclusion, without ignoring the progress that has been made in terms of security management in the countries and cities of Latin America, it is nevertheless necessary to focus actions on training and qualifying human capital so staff can approach the problems detected during diagnoses with professionalism and carry out the actions suggested in plans. Perhaps then these documents, written by experts, may then not end up abandoned on the shelves of public offices, and professionals will carry them out and monitor the results.

The puzzle of security: Are “contractualization practices” a good or bad solution for governing the fight against crime and disorder at the local level?

Marco Calaresu⁷

An increasingly higher demand for security has been recorded in the political market of the “full-grown democracies” during the last fifteen years (Hughes, McLaughlin, Muncie, & Open University, 2002). The cities seem to be the first institutional place to deal with this demand, with the citizens asking their elected representatives for more extensive guarantees on personal safety, better protection against terrorism, and even to be able to live in conditions of “full security” (Bauman, 2006; Boutellier, 2004). In this perspective, various European⁸ and international bodies (ICPC, 2008, 2010) – such as the United Nations⁹ – consider security and crime prevention as the first condition (or at least a necessary precondition) to economic and social development at the local level (Malik, 2013; UNDP, 2013; UNODC, 2013). As recalled by the SecurCity program¹⁰: “In many cities, neighbourhoods with a high degree of criminality move toward a downward spiral, while companies and citizens move elsewhere. Issues related to violence and other kinds of serious crimes and drugs, anti-social behaviour, urban blight, less serious crimes, cannot be left without a direction”.

It is in this “direction” that the puzzle of security lies for both scholars and policy-makers. Indeed, if it is true that the urban security problem cannot be left without a political direction, we should ask ourselves which institutional actor – and at which level of government – should be providing this direction. At a first glance, it is hard to deny the importance of the national government’s powers concerning the policy of public order, as well as the criminal and penal policies (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011; Stenson, 2008). These policies remain, in fact, still in the hands of the central government that has conceded neither the legitimate monopoly of violence nor the strategic resources needed to produce security at the local level. We know that local governments play a decisive role in governing crime and disorder (Hebberecht, Sack, Duprez, & Groupe européen de recherches sur les normativités, 1997; Lagrange & Zauberman, 1991; Ponsaers, Edwards, Recasens, & Verhage, 2014), designing their own security model through a multitude of territorial policies, which can be attributed to the general field of security (cultural policy, immigration policy and regeneration policy,

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just to name a few). These types of policies, which can be classified as multi-purpose policies, have different objectives, tools, techniques, practices and operating procedures, in addition to the basic ideas of what security is and how it should be guaranteed to citizens. To further complicate the puzzle, some authors report a progressive and contemporary “relative loss of sense” of all the abovementioned levels of government (Calaresu, 2016a; Donolo, 2005; Vino, 2007). In fact, the central and the peripheral levels decreased their ability to autonomously produce public goods. The security good is no exception, and it seems to be more difficult (or even impossible) to produce without the contribution of local and national bodies, and the participation of networks capable of aggregating a plurality of public authorities placed on different institutional and substantially equal levels (Le Galès, 1993, p. 598).

Restating our initial argument: the puzzle of security actually lies in the relationship between the different institutional actors, on different levels of government, trying to give a political direction to the problem of urban security. These actors are divided between a centre – responsible for the distribution of resources and unwilling to relinquish, at least formally, the generation of rules concerning security issues (but increasingly unable to carry out its duties) – and one or more peripheries – which benefit from their own resources (at least in terms of visibility and symbolic resources) and with the consequent need to manage, within certain limits, the same issues. From this perspective, policy-makers have tried to solve this puzzle using pacts, contracts and similar devices to prevent or repress everything that might disturb the peaceful development of public relations (Wacquant, 2009) and, ultimately, for governing crime and disorder. Not by chance, the spread of contractualization practices (Gaudin, 1999) has been considered “one of the most significant processes of political-administrative change” (Bobbio, 2000, p. 112). Using the contract as a governance instrument, in other words “governing by contract” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2004), would, in fact, be nothing more than a response to the need to reconfigure the relationships – and the responsibilities – between the national and the local level of government.

But how does contractualization work in practice? Has “governing by contract” actually solved the puzzle of security? In other words, are contractualization practices considered a good or bad solution (at least in terms of their efficacy, intended as the capacity or power to produce a desired effect and results) for governing the fight against crime and disorder at the local level? We will try here to formulate an answer to these questions, on the basis of an extensive research conducted in Italy on the contractualization of urban security policy, implemented through protocols and security pacts between 1998 and 2009.

The first phase of contractualization in Italy (1998-2005) began on 9 February 1998, with the signature of the protocol between the mayor and the prefect of the city of Modena, Italy. The protocols signed in this phase – inspired by the French experience of *Contrats Locaux de Sécurité* and the British “contract culture” (Le Galès, 1997, p. 444) – could be considered an attempt to establish forms of partnership on security issues between the local governments and the national government in order to improve operational capacity and integration within the area concerned. Seven years after the Modena protocol (2005) the catalogued contracts amounted to more than 300 (Calaresu, 2013, p. 55).

The second phase of contractualization (2007-2009) started on 20 March 2007, with a National Pact – designed to initiate as many agreements as possible within the indicated framework – signed by the then Minister of Interior, the ANCI (National Confederation of Local Authorities) President, and the mayors of the metropolitan cities (Bari, Bologna, Cagliari, Catania, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Palermo, Rome, Turin). The pacts, like the protocols signed in the first phase, aimed to promote innovative forms of cooperation between the central government and the local level, providing a two-fold additional function. On the one hand, they bound prefectures (as the peripheral bodies of the central government) to agree in promoting certain activities with regional and local authorities, and in sharing their information; on the other hand, they tried to redistribute responsibilities within the prevention and control functions, allowing local police to cooperate in the fields of prevention and repression with national-level services (Calaresu, 2013). Three years after the National Pact (2009), 51 pacts were signed between public bodies and regional and local administrations (not only at the metropolitan level). Although the only institutional actor that is always present in the pacts is the prefecture (signing alternatively with municipalities, provinces, and regions, and thus generating different institutional configurations), the municipalities are the main actor involved in this second phase (Calaresu, 2013).

Based on the empirical findings of our research, we can try to underline some general implications to be taken into account when choosing to govern by contract.

Starting with the “where” of contractualization practices, data shows that in Italy a high level of income and quality of life at the regional and municipal level is connected with a higher interest in using protocols and security pacts. In a nutshell, contractualization practices are most likely to be used by the peripheral governments to defend the status quo (and promote the already safe areas), rather than to fill an existing security gap, probably due to the fact that the wealthier classes (although smaller and isolated in the territory as a community) are more capable of organizing defensive strategies by leveraging their capacity to organize themselves (Calaresu & Tebaldi, 2015).

This implication also leads us to understand how pacts and contracts acquired specific territorial configurations rather than others – even to the extent of drawing borders different from institutionally established ones – while it remains to be clarified what can be obtained by using contractualization practices. Our conclusion is that the protocols used in the first phase of contractualization in Italy – due to the lack of a basic protocol adopted at a central level – did not manage to prompt any joint action or operational projects able to last over time, to really test new forms of cooperation between local administrations and the State. The integration model suggested seemed to be inadequate and was characterized by a ritualistic and bureaucratic involvement by the national government representatives (Selmini, 2016). The commitments made were almost always ineffective and considered of poor quality from the start, or, at least, not sufficient to ensure collaboration between different levels of institutions and agencies. In the second phase, with the signing of a National Pact that contained guidelines with a given organisational formula, the central government was able to impose – at least at the formal level – some activities and duties onto the peripheral actors, who had to support most of the costs of this “new form of governing at a distance” (Garland, 1996, p. 454).

In fact, it is worth noting that, according to the Italian experience, when contractualization practices are used, a contextual decrease in national government expenditure is more likely to be observed, which could affect the local administrations and their capacity for governing crime and disorder. Furthermore, contracts and pacts seem to be associated with a higher level of punitiveness and with an exclusionary approach to crime and disorder, which is likely to target marginal social groups (Calaresu & Selmini, 2016; Selmini, 2016).

Last but not least, our findings show why it could be difficult to make generalizations in terms of contractualization practices being a good or bad solution for governing the fight against crime and disorder. As a matter of fact, a remarkable variance is shown at the local level in Italy in terms of the efficacy of the practices (intended as the capacity or power to produce a desired effect and results), depending on the degree of interaction predictability between institutional and private actors, and the complexity of the organisational context. The more unpredictable the interactions are, and the more complex the organisational context is, the less efficacy is expected to be found for the contractualization practices. It could be said then that policy-makers have to consider that governing by contract, when used to solve the puzzle of security, may be overrated in terms of efficacy if not properly contextualised, based on the degree of interaction predictability and the complexity of the context at the local level (Calaresu, 2016b).

If this was, in descriptive terms, the where, how, what, when, and why of the contractualization practices, one must wonder, in prescriptive terms, by what means policy-makers can actually try to solve the puzzle of security.

Firstly, the main objective of the contractualization practices should be to make an impact on crime (control and prevention) and disorder at the local level, instead of using the practices to set the rules of the game between centre and peripheries. In this perspective, policy-makers should move their strategies on a more practical level, setting the priorities of the contracts, the objectives and clear ways to achieve these objectives, and to evaluate the results obtained, after their implementation. In this regard, the contractualization practices should provide some positive selective incentives (e.g. the possibility to spend more money in a forthcoming contractualization season) and/or specific penalties (e.g., on the contrary, the prohibition to sign others contracts in a given time frame) against non-complying actors at the local level, with an envisaged arbiter able to make an independent judgement about the fact that the signatory administrations have or have not complied (and why) with the terms of the contract.

Secondly, an antidote to the ineffectiveness of protocols and pacts, for policy-makers, could be to adopt a strategy in which the central governments also take into account the potential financial difficulties of the local governments in which the practices have to be implemented. The central governments – if really interested in reaching the stated objectives instead of only reaffirming roles and hierarchies between the different levels of government – have to financially support the practices and avoid budgetary

uncertainties at the local level for the duration of the practices. Only by virtue of these arrangements does it seem possible for policy-makers to avoid the fact that protocols and pacts could easily become useless instruments for control and prevention of crime and disorder at the local level, and dangerous instruments to govern with crime instead of instruments to govern crime itself.

Endnotes

1 This chapter is based on a study undertaken by ICPC at the request of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá in 2015. That data has been augmented by the city of Bogotá and Colombia.

2 Data from the OAS Hemispheric Security Observatory.

3 Los Rastrojos is the name given to one of the so-called emerging syndicates in Colombia. These are new generation paramilitary groups, active since the demobilization implemented between 2002 and 2006.

4 Gini coefficient is a composite indicator of inequalities (mainly used to measure income distribution). It varies between 0 and 1, in which 0 represents a perfect equality and 1 a perfect inequality.

5 International expert on public safety.

6 For a video of Cárcel Distrital see www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2zhsArnp4

7 Assistant Professor, Dipartimento di scienze politiche, scienze dell'informazione e ingegneria dell'informazione, Università di Sassari.

8 The European Union's interest for the local dimension of urban security policies has a long tradition. Suffice to say, e.g., about the final declaration of the "Conference on the Reduction of Urban Insecurity" (Council of Europe, 1987) and the "European Urban Charter I" (Council of Europe, 1992, chapter 6).

9 Also the interest of the United Nations for crime prevention and development has deep roots in time: as an example of this interest, see the "International Forum On Urban Poverty" held in Nairobi, Africa (United Nations, 1999), suggesting "the necessity of crime prevention in managing cities to promote social integration".

10 As part of the European program URBACT on urban settlements and integrated urban development. In this regard see also the latest "EU Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (2007-2013)", developed in the field of community planning, under "security".

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CHAPTER 3

Cities, territory and public safety policies: A Latin American perspective

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4

PREVENTING CRIME ON URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT

Preventing crime on urban public transport

4

The importance of public transport in urban setting and the impact of crime

Urban public transport¹ is a city's backbone – an essential element for both its development and its connectivity. It facilitates day-to-day travel for individuals throughout the urban environment. In London, 2.35 billion bus journeys take place every year (Gov.uk, 2014); there are more than 3 billion underground journeys in Tokyo and more than 1.6 billion in New York (UITP, 2014b). In Cali, in Colombia, 70% of the population use the public transport system (Jaramillo, Lizárraga, & Grindlay, 2012).

Despite this, crime on public transport and the fear of crime associated with it can have a negative effect on how the service is used, and thus on the development of the city in the broadest sense of the term. Crime implies risk to the physical safety of both passengers and staff, as well as financial losses. Some studies have shown that the consequences of theft on public transport are very serious given that they affect poor people more than others. People from poor environments tend to carry cash, since they do not necessarily have bank accounts, making them easy targets for potential thieves (Paes-Machado & Levenstein, 2004).

Perceptions or anticipation of this type of crime by the users and staff of public transport can provoke fear of crime, discouraging people from using public transport or making travel unpleasant or even stressful. In Mexico in 2009, for example, fear of crime discouraged 25% of individuals surveyed from taking a taxi, and 17% from using other forms of public transport (ICESI, 2010).

When people do not have any alternative means of travelling within a city, which is often the case for families with low socioeconomic status (Jaramillo et al., 2012), this lack of access to transport can result in marginalization. Access to public transport has a significant impact on social development, particularly for the most deprived since it provides access to jobs, education, health services and leisure activities (UK Department for Transport, 2013). For example, in a study carried out in England, 38% of jobseekers said that a lack of private or quality public transport was

a hindrance to employment. In addition, one person in four was obliged to restrict his or her job search because the cost of a ticket to travel to the interview was too high (Social Exclusion Unit, 2003).

This issue is particularly visible in the case of women. The harassment they are exposed to makes them less confident about travelling freely in public places. A recent study highlighted a vicious circle whereby women find themselves excluded from the job market because of problems of access to safe means of transport, which in turn prevents them from ever being in a strong position to demand safe public transport, and effectively increases their social exclusion (FIA Foundation, 2016). Read more on women's safety in chapter 2.

Furthermore, crime on ground public transport can have an even wider impact on the social construction of a city, and particularly on the stereotypes that lead to social exclusion. A study in Brazil showed that crime on buses increased racist and elitist attitudes. When drivers try to protect themselves against potential aggression, they sometimes chose to exclude certain clients, and black people and the poor were frequently targets of these arbitrary choices. Such choices were even sometimes supported by other passengers (Paes-Machado & Levenstein, 2004).

Consequently, crime and fear of crime on urban public transport are doubly important. On the one hand, they affect millions of city-dwellers who travel daily, risking their physical safety and lowering their quality of life. On the other, they have a much wider influence on the development of the city in general, and social inclusion in particular. This makes it essential to develop policies to prevent crime and fear of crime on urban public transport.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the risk factors specific to public transport, as well as the influence of the organization of a city on such crime and associated fear of crime. It then discusses measures to prevent crime and fear of crime.

Trends in crime and fear of crime on public transport around the world

This section focuses on trends in crime and fear of crime on urban public transport around the world. It compares data from different cities and countries to determine whether or not there are any constants: the same rates of theft, fraud or personal injury found across the world? Are crime levels on public transport higher or lower than those in the city as a whole? Are some personnel more often targeted than others? Are women more likely to feel unsafe using public transport than men?

Finding clear information on these situations is a complex process, given the difficulties associated with obtaining global data on this subject. In effect they are among the least studied in criminology (Martin, 2011). It is, however, possible to look at trends and differences in rates of crime and fear of crime around the world.

Public transport is a microcosm in itself which takes many forms, and has particular characteristics. It involves enclosed, moving spaces, transporting large numbers of individuals, or others in isolation. It has its own infrastructure and personnel with specific functions. The specific characteristics of public transport make it possible to examine common issues in terms of crime and fear of crime globally.

Levels of crime and fear on public transport also vary considerably from one city to another. This is because transport systems are strongly influenced by their urban environment, and reflect the dynamics of local crime.

Thus, transport is a distinct aspect of a city, but one that must be studied in the context of urban dynamics. In other words, it is a system within a system.

Box 4.1 Crime and fear of crime on urban public transport – three public spaces

Three separate **public spaces** need to be taken into consideration when studying crime and fear of crime on public transport, each with their own characteristics. The first relates to the route travelled between a journey's start and end points, and public transport stops. While these are part of the city in general, it is important to ensure that they can be used in safety. If this is not the case, people may choose not to use public transport. The second relates to the transit stop itself, and the third relates to the area within the public vehicle.

Crime and fear of crime on public transport are the result of interactions between both these dimensions, and preventing them means examining them together.

Measurement challenges

Measuring crime and fear of crime in urban public transport is generally problematic, making international comparisons complicated. Data are often of poor quality or incomplete. There are many reasons for this, but they can be grouped into seven categories.

First of all, there is a **lack of definition** of infractions linked to transport. In particular, the area in which crime takes place is not clearly defined: should it refer only to infractions in vehicles or also those that occur at stops, or on the route leading to and from stops (Martin, 2011)? This problem is all the greater with regard to fear of crime, given that this concept does not have a universally accepted definition.

Second, the **data collection methodology is not standardized**: there are different sources, collection processes are weak, and measures of crime and fear of crime are heterogenous (Racineux & Mermoud, 2003).

Third, there is often **no body responsible** for collecting such data. Police forces are not obliged to record infractions which take place on public transport unless they are reported, and transport companies usually have no obligation to publish data on incidents that occur within their area (Newton, 2004).

Fourth, it is estimated that between 70% and 97% of **incidents are not reported** (see in particular Levine and Wachs, 1986a in Newton, 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999; Martin, 2011; Vilalta, 2011). Transport companies tend to be more aware of serious crimes since victims require treatment, but in the case of theft, victims do not always realize something is missing until they have left the transport system (Fussy et al., 2012).

Fifth, a particularity of crime while on public transport is it that takes place in motion, it is **not static**. In other words, it is difficult to report a geographically precise location for an infraction in a moving vehicle, as with traditional data-recording methods (Newton, 2004).

Sixth, **lack of transparency** can also have a negative impact on knowledge of the extent of crime on public transport. Since security is a sensitive subject, some institutions may not be willing to share such information (Racineux & Mermoud, 2003).

Finally, it is apparent when reviewing safety audits on public transport, that public authorities often fail to collect **disaggregated data** concerning the different groups of users, such as men, women, the elderly and

Box 4.2 Promising initiatives for measuring crime

Given these various challenges, a number of tools and initiatives have been implemented to improve the data collection process.

Among the *tools* implemented are victimization surveys and women's exploratory walks.

The Chamber of Commerce in Bogotá, Colombia, uses a **victimization and perception survey** twice a year. This survey integrates the measurement of crime in transport into a broader survey of urban crime, making it possible to compare public spaces and measure their levels of crime and fear of crime. The victimization survey responds to the difficulties outlined above regarding the lack of bodies responsible for collecting such data, to unreported crime levels, and lack of transparency – the problem of unwillingness to disclose crime data.

The **women's exploratory walks** also makes it possible to obtain information about crime on public transport. Groups of people are invited to travel around a specific area in order to identify the places which make them feel unsafe and to propose solutions (ICPC, 2014). The French rail company, SNCF, as well as the operator AMT in Montreal, Canada, have used this method (see, for example, SNCF, 2014). The exploratory walks makes it possible to establish a link between crime and fear of crime on public transport and their urban context. This tool can also be used in relation to routes between a given stop and the final destination in the city.

Certain countries, cities or transport companies have also implemented *more wide-ranging initiatives* as a means of improving the quality of the data and their analysis.

In the US, the Transportation Research Board, which acts as a consultant for various government bodies, has developed *guidelines for collecting, analysing and reporting on transit crime data*. This project had a dual objective: proposing an operational definition of crime in transport and developing a unified method for collecting data relating to transport (Chisholm, 2001).²

In France, in 2008, a decree³ made it possible to create the Observatoire National de la Délinquance dans les Transports (National Observatory on Delinquency in Transport) within the Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy. It is responsible for collecting data from transport operators, analysing them in relation to their context, and conducting studies on current issues such as violence against women on public transport, victimization and fear of crime, and social mediation. In addition, this research helps to strengthen public policies to reduce crime and to support transport providers (Ministère chargé des transports, 2016).

Finally, in Belgium, criminologists have been recruited by transport companies to study crime in their networks (EVA-Académie européenne pour un transport respectueux de l'environnement gGmbH, 2012).

indigenous populations, for example. This in turn makes it difficult to develop policies that are adapted to the needs of these different groups.

Transport crime trends around the world

This section looks at trends in crime and fear of crime in relation to specific public transport systems in cities around the world.


Offences against property are much more common than those against people (see Figure 4.2 and 4.3). This is significant given, as discussed above, that theft is rarely reported compared with serious and violent crime (Fussy et al., 2012).

Generally speaking, the type of crime varies between day and night. During daytime and rush hours, theft appears to be the most common, while crimes of violence are more likely to occur at night.

Globally, certain types of employees in the transport sector are more likely to be victimized than others. For example, bus and taxi drivers are more likely to be victimized than underground train drivers.

In France, one study found that 94% of attacks concerned personnel in surface vehicles (buses and trams), versus only 5.1% on underground metro trains (UTP, 2009). The International Labour Organization (ILO) also stresses that driving a bus is "an occupation with high risks" and that, in comparison with other professional groups, absenteeism and disability rates

Figure 4.1: Types of crime on buses (TransMilenio) in Bogotá



are higher (Essenberg, 2003, p. 11). Finally, taxi drivers are particularly exposed to the risk of homicide. For example, in the US the risk of being a victim of homicide among taxi drivers is four times higher than for law enforcement officers (Schwer, Mejza, & Grun-Réhomme, 2010), and it is the legitimate profession that is the most at risk in Canada (Perreault, 2013).

In terms of victimization of men and women, certain trends can also be identified. Generally speaking, men are more often victims of crime on public transport than women (Morgan and Smith, 2006 in Smith, 2008), but for women fear of crime is higher (see, for example, Guilloux, 2012 & Smith, 2008). However, this can be explained by the protective measures that women impose on themselves: a recent study showed that all women adopt “specific transport practices that range from vigilance to avoidance” (Guilloux, 2015, p. 6).

Women are more often victims of certain types of crime, such as sexual assault, for example (TTC et al., 1989 in Smith, 2008 & Smith, 2008) and snatch thefts (Smith et al., 1986b in Smith, 2008). A recent international study on the safety of women on public transport also highlighted that women and girls face high levels of harassment (both physical and verbal)

Figure 4.2 Types of crime on the New York underground in 2013





Figure 4.3 Feelings of insecurity, Stuttgart, Germany



almost everywhere when they use transport systems, and are particularly vulnerable when walking to or from stops (FIA Foundation, 2016). The report also shows that the level of security decreases when vehicles are overcrowded.

Although there are very few national studies of crime on public transport, and even fewer at the international level, it appears that rates are for the most part decreasing, in line with the international decrease in crime in general (Transit Cooperative Research Program, 2009 in Newton, 2014). For example, in New York, USA, the crime rate on the subway has decreased by 87% since the 1990s, even though use of the system has almost doubled (NYPD, 2014). This tendency can also be seen in London, England, where transport crime roughly halved between 2004 and 2014 (Mayor of London & Transport for London, 2014).


A variable phenomenon⁴

Crime and fear of crime on public transport also vary considerably in terms of their distribution across a city and often in relation to specific areas of a city.

a) Crime

Crime on public transport needs to be seen, **compared to the city**, as areas which have higher or lower rates of crime. For example, in Bogotá, Colombia, 33% of all urban crime occurs on public transport (Dirección de Seguridad Ciudadana y Empresarial, Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, 2015); in Ecuador, 20.68% of thefts (Instituto nacional de estadística y censos, 2011); and in Montreal 1.7% of criminal offences (SPVM, 2008).

Figure 4.4 Evolution in crime in relation to number of users of the New York subway




Source: NYPD (2014)

Certain types of crime also affect some countries more than others. In 2016, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, for example, were particularly at risk of kidnappings (Control Risks, 2016). This is also reflected in public transport, particularly taxis, where what is known as “express kidnapping” or a “millionaire tour” [paseo millonario] happen. The passenger is forced by accomplices who get into the taxi to withdraw cash from cash machines (Cawley, 2014). Such events are very rare in Europe in general (Control Risks, 2016). The same is true for terrorist attacks on transport systems. Such attacks have generally been more common in countries in which there is political instability, or armed conflict (Jenkins & Gerston, 2001).

Rates also vary from one city to another with regard to the **segment of travel** where most crime occurs on public transport – whether on the journey to the stop, at the stop itself, or on the vehicle. In Los Angeles, USA, for example, one study shows that 67% of offences occur at bus stops (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999); this figure is 6.5% in Bogotá (Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, 2009).

Figure 4.5 Crime on London’s transport network (TfL), rate per million journeys




Source: TfL Enforcement and On-street Operations


It would also seem that no one **means of transport** is safer than others, but this does depend on the city. For example, in Washington, DC, USA, commuter trains have the highest crime rate, and much higher than buses (Metro, n.d.), whereas in London this trend is reversed (URBS Team, n.d.).

Figure 4.6 Victimization – where did the crime take place?

FIRST HALF OF 2015




FIRST HALF OF 2014



Base: 1,336 direct victims

Source: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (2015)

Figure 4.7 Victimization per million passengers in public transport



Sources: Mayor of London & Transport for London (2014), The City of Calgary (2014) and TransLink (2014).

b) Fear of crime


Fear of crime also varies significantly between cities, ranging from as low as 5% in Auckland, New Zealand (Ministry of Transport, 2012) to 68% in Mexico City (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad, 2015), and 74% in Bogotá (Dirección de Seguridad Ciudadana y Empresarial, Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, 2015).

Again, fear of crime varies depending on travel segment. In London, England, transit stops are seen as the least safe, with 25% of individuals feeling insecure, followed by 21% for the route leading to the stop. The safest place seems to be within the vehicle, with only 17% feeling insecure (Future thinking, 2015). On the contrary, in Bogotá, the least safe place is the route leading to the stop, with 95% feeling insecure, compared with 79% at the stop, and 68% on the bus (Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, 2015).

Generally, fear of crime is higher at night, but again with major variations. For example, in Calgary, only 20% of users report feeling unsafe at night (Calgary Transit, 2016) whereas in Kathmandu, 55% of women and 45% of men feel unsafe (CANN & CEN, 2012).


In conclusion, data on crime and fear of crime on public transport show that it relates to two factors: the transport network itself, and the urban environment in which it is situated.

Figure 4.8 Type of crime on public transport in Victoria, Australia, 2013-2014



Source: Victoria Police (2014)

Figure 4.9 Feelings of insecurity in public transport



Sources: Dirección de Seguridad Ciudadana y Empresarial (2015); Mayor of London & Transport for London (2014); Ministry of Transport New Zealand (2012); Public Transport Council (2015)

Risk factors for crime and fear of crime on public transport: A system within the city

Crime and fear of crime in urban public transport are related to a number of risk factors that are common to all systems around the world. On the one hand, these risk factors are linked to how the city is organized. As discussed above, transport systems are an integral part of a city and they are affected by its organization and characteristics. On the other hand, since public transport is a microcosm of urban life, it has its own risk factors. This section looks at the influence of a city’s organization on levels of insecurity in public transport.

The influence of the city on security in public transport

As shown above, crime and fear of crime on urban public transport cannot be understood in isolation from their social and environmental context. This section analyses the influence of a city’s organization on the transport systems that cross it, as well as the continuity of crime between the different areas. This analysis makes it possible to grasp the importance of implementing integral prevention strategies articulated around the city and its public transport.⁵

a) The influence of environmental design

Criminologists have long been able to show that crime is not the result of chance. On the contrary, certain situations make it easier to commit crimes. The environment can have an influence on an individual’s decision as to whether or not to commit a crime, by making it more or less easy. Dark areas, the presence of hiding places and a possible escape route are all elements that decrease the likelihood of being caught,

thus making the act more attractive. Crime on public transport is well-suited to the application of such classic theories.

Four aspects of the principles of CPTED set out in Box 4.3 can be applied in the case of public transport.

First, the **sense of belonging** among people in neighbourhoods is often cited as an important element in crime prevention. For example, in Toulouse, France, unemployed residents in a neighbourhood were entrusted with the maintenance of transport stops. Since they were well known in the district, this discouraged others from committing crimes, making those stops the best kept on the entire network (EFUS, 1996).

Second, the design of an area should facilitate **natural surveillance**. This applies, for example, to the areas around transit stops: when there is insufficient lighting, this can make crime more attractive by creating opportunity.

Third, crime on public transport is also influenced by the city's **land-use planning**. The position of transit stops, and thus the buildings and activities around them, has a significant influence on crime. For example, it has been shown that the presence of bars and shops selling alcohol, pawn shops, empty buildings and adult book shops and cinemas near transit stops, all tend to increase crime levels in an area (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999). Other studies show that commercial areas (Ceccato, Uittenbogaard & Bamzar, 2013), mixed use of surrounding areas (Uittenbogaard, 2014), areas with few inhabitants (Ceccato et al., 2013) and the presence of infrastructure such as motorways (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2002 in Uittenbogaard, 2014) also have a negative influence. Meanwhile, heavy road

traffic around transit stops has been correlated with lower crime rates (Loukaitou-Sideris, Liggett, Iseki, & Thurlow, 2001).

Fourth, in the case of bus drivers, the organization of **the area they drive through**, and the opportunities that it offers to potential offenders affects the level of danger they are exposed to. For example, if rest breaks are scheduled in isolated areas, drivers are at risk of violence, but far from assistance. Similarly, certain areas make vehicles more vulnerable to crime and vandalism, such as tunnels or multi-storey buildings, where people can hide and throw objects at them, or bus stations situated by trees and bushes, providing hiding places for potential offenders (Lincoln & Huntingdon, 2013). The safety of the passengers and personnel thus depends in part on the areas buses travel through, and consequently the choice of their itinerary in the city.

Finally, vandalism is similarly influenced by opportunity created by the urban layout. In Montreal, Canada, for example, it has been found that isolated areas which are far from residential areas, or surrounded by trees, encourage the theft of metal from trains (AMT, 2014).

b) The influence of the social context on crime in public transport

The social milieu also has an influence on the commission of criminal acts, and public transport is no exception. Several studies have shown that crime is correlated with that of the districts surrounding transit stops: crime at transit stops is generally higher when the crime rate in the areas in which the stops are situated is high (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2001). This is valid for both transit stops and the vehicles themselves, since crime on public transport vehicles is higher on routes that go through zones with high crime rates (Newton, 2008). In France, for example, research show that violence against staff is more common in disadvantaged districts (UTP, 2014); and that there is more fraud on buses in districts with high levels of violence (Le Parisien, 2011). In Montreal, one study has shown that taxi drivers are more exposed to aggression when they work in disadvantaged areas (Commission sur le transport et les travaux publics, 2014a).

Second, some studies show that offences are more common on public transport when the surrounding districts have lower socioeconomic levels (see, for example, Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2002), particularly a high unemployment rate (Cozens, Neale, Whitaker, & Hillier, 2003). For example in Bogotá, the probability of a homicide near a bus stop (TransMilenio) is five times greater in a poor district than in other districts (Schäfer, 2015).

Box 4.3 Crime prevention through environmental design

Newman developed the concept of *crime prevention through environmental design* (CPTED) to help explain how an area can defend itself against crime (1972 in Tilley, 2005), using four approaches:

- **Natural territorial reinforcement:** organizing the built-up area, which encourages a sense of belonging among residents and a desire to defend the area, and discourages potential criminals from coming in.
- **Designing the area in such a way as to make natural surveillance possible.**
- **Maintenance:** keeping the area clean and in good condition.
- **Natural access control:** a safe surrounding environment.

Other studies show that a characteristic of the profile of offenders includes coming from an area with a low socioeconomic status. A study of the profile of bus aggressors in Brazil found that they shared the following traits: coming from underprivileged districts, and a failure to complete primary school (Paes-Machado & Levenstein, 2004).

In certain cases, criminal activities go beyond the public transport context. In Honduras and El Salvador, for example, taxis and buses are forced to pay \$25 and \$34 million dollars annually in extortion by members of street gangs (Dudley & Lohmuller, 2015).

Crime on public transport can be understood in relation to its physical and social environment. Thus, crime prevention on public transport cannot be envisaged in isolation, but must be integrated into a broader crime prevention strategy within the city.

Risk factors particular to public transport spaces

Urban public transport is also a subsystem of the city, a microcosm with its own crime issues, some associated with all types of transport (underground, taxi, train, bus) and others specific to one type.

a) Situational factors specific to transport areas

Public transport is influenced by a number of specific situational factors that have an impact on safety. How underground stations, bus stops, stations and carriages are designed and maintained, for example, affects the likelihood that crime will take place there.

Other characteristics also influence the level of security, such as the internal design of vehicles and the fact that there is movement. It also attracts certain types of crime, such as fraud and, terrorism.

Public transport and its specific built environment

CPTED principles also apply to the built environment around public transport, affecting in particular the potential for surveillance, and the regular maintenance of areas to prevent deterioration.

The level of **surveillance** of the public transport infrastructure influences crime and fear of crime, through formal or informal controls (Ceccato et al., 2013; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999).

Formal control includes the presence of security guards, police or surveillance cameras in vehicles or

at stations. *Informal controls* refer to the presence of people which discourages potential offenders, and helps to increase a sense of security, although this can vary significantly over the course of the day. The same sites can be busy during rush hours but deserted at night. Informal controls also may be provided by the presence of shopkeepers or passers-by.

Surveillance also depends on the *infrastructure of the transit stop*, such as blind corners or hiding places, or limited visibility. For example, a study of the Los Angeles subway showed that the higher stations had less visibility and crime was more likely, and that crimes against person were more common where station lacked surveillance eg. on platforms and staircases (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2002).

Finally, the influence of *lighting* seems to play a role in variations in the crime rate (Ceccato et al., 2013). A study in the UK found that poorly lit places increased fear of crime (Crime Concern, 2004).

One of the most innovative examples is the Washington, DC subway, where crime does not appear to vary in relation to the districts it passes through (LaVigne, 1997 in Ceccato et al., 2013). The infrastructure of the subway was designed with the help of police chiefs, who tried to ensure that the stations had excellent visibility. Evaluations show that crime rates are lower there than in most other underground railways around the world (LaVigne, 1996 in Piza, Crime Mapping & Dr. Kennedy, 2003), as well as other sites in the same city (de Greiff et al., 2015).

The **maintenance of transport spaces areas** also has an influence on crime and fear of crime. The “broken windows theory” of J.O. Wilson and G. Kelling, developed in 1982, effectively argues that spaces that are allowed to deteriorate through vandalism, and left in that state, will provoke a rise in criminality such as thefts and assaults (Roché, 2000). In public transport, this also appears to be the case, especially in relation to incivilities such as litter, drunkenness and graffiti (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999).

The characteristics specific to public transport

The design of public transport vehicles influences the crimes that occur within the system, including movement.

Each transport vehicle has its own particular design, and distinct problems. For example, the design of buses often places the driver at risk, preventing their escape from potential offenders (Cahute, 2012). Their vulnerability is increased by their proximity to passengers, and when they handle money (Essenberg, 2003; Kompier and DiMartino, 1995; Moore, 2010; Morgan and Smith 2006, in Lincoln & Huntingdon, 2013).

Figure 4.10 Fraud on the New York subway



Source: TRB Publications (2010)

Since public transport involves movement, victims and offenders do not necessarily get on at the same stop, or go to the same destination. This complicates the assessment of victim profiles in relation to their context.

Similarly, public transport can be both the site of an offence and a means of escape. Police intervention on buses can be difficult or dangerous given the limited space, and the risk of collateral damage (Paes-Machado & Levenstein, 2004). In addition, crime on buses may result in loss of control of the vehicle, affecting all passengers.

Finally, certain types of crime are intrinsically linked to public transport, including, for example, fraud and terrorism.

Transport users who do not buy a ticket are committing fraud, and this is often a function of the design of stations. On the underground system, for example, doors next to turnstiles may be left open allowing people to enter without paying. On the TransMilenio bus system in Bogotá, glass doors separate passengers waiting on the platform before they can get on a bus. Some people manage to open these doors from the outside, and enter the bus without paying. Elsewhere, passengers may take advantage of doors at the back of a bus and get on illegally.

The specificities of public transport systems also make them a target for terrorist attacks: they bring together a large number of individuals, and pass through key parts of a city (Hess, 2006). It is often too costly in terms of both time and money to establish systematic controls at all points of entry and, attacks can potentially cause a huge amount of damage and high levels of panic, both of which are essential elements for terrorist attacks (Nascu, 2009).

b) Urban public transport systems as a social environment

Although public transport is influenced by the social environment that surrounds it, it also represents its own social environment. It brings together individuals who are socially and demographically different (Cozens, et al., 2003), resulting in a level of heterogeneity that is found in few other parts of a city. In addition, at rush hour, public transport may have one of the highest densities of population in the city, which itself raises specific problems. In the case of underground trains, for example, the limited space tends to induce anxiety in passengers (Lopez, 1996). On the contrary, at off-peak times people waiting for public transport may feel isolated waiting at a bus stop, or travelling in an empty carriage without witnesses. This makes them vulnerable eg. to violent crime, especially at night.

The role of public transport staff combines checking but with low level enforcement powers (Bruser & Kalinowski, 2008). Taxi drivers are especially vulnerable, since they have cash, work alone and in close proximity to passengers who have easy escape routes – all significant risk factors (Commission sur le transport et les travaux publics, 2014).

In conclusion, the risk factors for crime on public transport are as much urban factors as they are factors specific to its own environment. Although the trends regarding crime and fear of crime differ across cities and countries around the world, the risk factors are very similar.

Preventing crime in urban public transport systems

Integrating prevention in the city: The importance of partnerships

As outlined earlier in this chapter, crime on urban public transport systems cannot be understood without analysing its social and environmental context: the city. The same is true for prevention, a transport organization cannot prevent crime and fear of crime alone, multi-sector partnerships are required. The value of such partnerships lies in the fact that they allow a range of institutions and sectors to establish common objectives – in the present case, safety on public transport – through coordinated action.

a) Participatory design and adoption of prevention measures

It is important to include the key stakeholders from the beginning in developing prevention strategies. Transport users need to be identified and represented in any initiatives implemented. This helps to give prevention programmes legitimacy and take account of the experience and views of users. Among other things it contributes to the co-construction of safety among the main actors.

It is also important that different communities of interest are included in the safety audit process which forms the basis for designing the prevention strategy. The real-life experiences of communities and groups can be very different. For example, it is important to take into account the views and experience of women in order to ensure that interventions will help to prevent crimes against them. This can be achieved through the use of women's exploratory walks described above, making it possible to identify the factors that make places unsafe for them, which may not be the case for men. One study found that the nature of fear varies: men tend to be more fearful of large groups, and women of isolated individuals and sexual aggression (Smith, 2008).

b) Partnerships for implementing prevention initiatives

Given that crime on public transport can occur at different times, and in different points on a journey, each of these concerns has specific implications in terms of prevention.

Offences can occur on the **routes to and from a public transport stop** and particularly at night in isolated areas. Transport companies do not necessarily have control over public walkways, and need to work closely with other key sectors. One way of ensuring such collaboration is to implement *local security contracts*. This approach is particularly widespread in France. It aims to "create partnerships between representatives of the State, the local groups concerned and transport companies, in the fight against insecurity" (UTP, 2014). In other words, such contracts bring together all the key players in the area. Contracts generally include the following elements: deciding on the target area, undertaking a local safety diagnosis, and implementing a plan of action, a method (aims, tools, etc.) and monitoring the outcomes (Alvarez, Bezzozi, & Sanfaçon, 2006). The contribution by Marco Calaresu discusses local security contracts in more detail.

Initiatives to prevent crime and fear of crime at **stations and transport stops** also requires collaboration between key players. For example, the presence of

police may be necessary, in order to put in place a common safety plan with the transport company (Malyska & Rudolph, 2012).

Partnerships also make it possible to integrate those who may cause insecurity into a prevention project. For example, graffiti by young people may be blamed for the deterioration of sites. In Jemeppe, Belgium, the responsibility for revitalizing a station was given to young graffiti artists. Meetings were held with transport users, drivers and police officers to reach a consensus on the creation of a graffiti mural. Following this initiative, vandalism at the station decreased dramatically (Michel & Albers, 2006).

In the same vein, it is common for stations and transit stops to attract those who are socially excluded: the homeless or drug addicts who may, in turn, be seen as contributing to fear of crime. This provides an excellent opportunity for collaboration between the transport company and community and social services, to provide support and reinsertion programmes.

The same holds true in regard to **public transport vehicles**. For example, the harassment of women is common. An important way to prevent it involves educating passengers, and the general population on the social unacceptability of sexual harassment. In Cairo in Egypt, as part of a UN Women-funded project, non-government organizations have enacted plays in underground trains to raise the awareness of travellers. The actors re-enact real sexual harassment incidents without informing the passengers that they are actors (UN Women, 2013).

Such educational campaigns can also be carried out in schools who are key partners. In Montreal, for example, the transport company launched a campaign in middle schools inviting the principals to raise the awareness of pupils on the importance of respecting safety standards, and transmitting the messages to their parents (AMT, 2010).

Many issues facing transport operators are common, and some transport companies choose to join forces to try to combat them. This is the case with the French railway company SNCF. It is a member of an inter-company club concerned with anti-social behaviour, composed of around 50 companies and public institutions. Their meetings allow them to share experiences, comment on action and work together to find solutions (SNCF, 2013).

In conclusion, preventing crime on urban public transport cannot be considered in isolation, but must integrate all the key players: transport users, transport operators, community stakeholders and local government among others. Crime on public transport, at least partially, reflects its urban surroundings,

which implies that it is necessary to think of prevention as a continuation of crime prevention in the city as a whole.

Norms, standards and crime prevention strategies in public transport systems around the world

This section looks at international norms and standards which help to guide crime prevention on public transport, as well as national or local prevention strategies and their characteristics.

a) Norms and standards

At the **global level**, a non-governmental organization, the International Association of Public Transport (UITP), promotes sustainable urban public transport in urban areas around the world. The organization has a Security Commission which studies, assesses and promotes innovative approaches for improving security in public transport (UITP, 2014a). For example, at its 14th meeting, the Commission considered the theft of metals and relevant good practices, and made recommendations for preventing such thefts (UIC, 2012).

Specific sector organizations, such as the International Union of Railways, include promoting safety as a priority. This organization focuses on sharing knowledge between its members, including good practices, security policies and data (Colliard, Bonneau, Pires, & Papillault, 2014).

There are no specific international crime prevention standards for public transport (Soehnchen, 2016). The UITP is opposed to any obligatory regulations or standardization since the diversity of threats, environments, organization and local infrastructures all make it necessary to take into consideration a wide range of solutions (UITP-EuroTeam, 2011). Nevertheless, the organization encourages the exchange of good practices between stakeholders (Soehnchen, 2016).

At the **regional level**, in Europe in particular, companies have made efforts to standardize approaches to crime prevention in public transport. The Secured Urban Transport – European Demonstration project is one of the most important of the past few years. It lasted 42 months (from March 2011 to September 2014) and brought together 41 partners from 13 countries. Its aim was to provide tools to improve security (ranging from minor infractions to major terrorist threats) on public transport, adapted to the transport systems of medium – and large-sized European cities. The project

was developed on the basis of best practices and was composed of modular solutions that were validated via demonstrations in four major cities (Berlin, Madrid, Milan and Paris) and six medium-sized cities (Bergen, Bilbao, Brussels, Bucharest, Izmir and Lisbon).

The project made it possible to develop a glossary, *Public Transport Security Terminology & Definitions*, to standardize the use of security terms in transport systems in Europe.⁶ This provides users with definitions of terms such as “best practices”, “CPTED” and “terrorism”. Its coverage of prevention is, however, rather limited.

Another initiative that aims to coordinate the responses of operators throughout Europe is the COUNTERACT project, which focuses on terrorism. This project reviewed existing policies, methodologies, procedures and technology to identify best practices and develop guidelines for operators (UITP, 2006).

b) National and local strategies

A number of countries have **national crime prevention legislation or strategies** relating to public transport. France, for example, has passed several laws on this subject, most of them included in the Transport Code, under “Safety and Security on Public Transport” (Legifrance, n.d.). There is also a crime prevention policy that includes a section on public transport. In addition, a permanent mission evaluates crime prevention policy, and makes recommendations to improve public policies on public transport. In particular, it recommends assessment of problems, encouraging the creation of local observatories, local safety audits and surveys on fear of crime; successful practices such as mediation; and highlights partnerships between key players involved in prevention, including users of public transport (Chabrol, Mecheri, Ingall-Montagnier, Deschamps, & Laffargue, 2013).

In the US, the American Public Transportation Association promotes innovative approaches, and information sharing to strengthen safety on public transport by (APTA, n.d.). In particular, the association has developed CPTED standards for transit facilities.

Some **regional governments and cities** have adopted prevention policies for public transport. These may be integrated into more wide-ranging crime prevention policies, or be specific to one or more modes of transport. In France, the Northern Departmental Plan for the Prevention of delinquency 2013–2017 focuses on crime prevention on public transport as an integral part of crime as a whole. The city of Stuttgart in Germany has a specific plan covering security on commuter trains (Schairer, Schöb, & Schwarz, 2010).

In England, the Community Safety Plan for Transport and Travelling in London was developed as part of the the mayor’s strategy to improve transport safety and security.⁷ The plan is part of a broader objective to improve safety and security in the city, but focuses mainly on the transport networks. It uses a problem-solving approach, identifying the causes of crime and fear of crime as well as ways to prevent them. This requires an annual safety audit to analyse the issues affecting Londoners, to identify strategic priorities, any improvements in perceptions of safety, and enables resources to be channelled effectively. The Plan also assesses outcomes using indicators modelled on the Compstat system initially developed in New York (Transport for London, 2009).

The Plan highlights the importance of partnerships. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act made the development of community safety plans obligatory, requiring collaboration between local authorities and key partners to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour. Close collaboration between the transport authorities and the London Borough Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships enables safety planning to cover an entire journey, from door to door (Transport for London, 2009).

The contribution concerning Bogotá City Hall at the end of this chapter also describes the development of a public transport crime prevention policy for the city.

Crime and fear of crime prevention approaches in urban public transport

a) Types of crime prevention


A review of the literature shows that a number of different types of crime prevention approaches can be used for public transport. These are summarized in Figure 4.11 which is discussed below. The following sections discuss some of these approaches, and examples, in greater detail.

Crime prevention on public transport essentially involves two broad approaches: reducing the opportunities to commit a crime – an aspect of situational prevention – and social prevention which may include awareness raising to change behaviours, and reducing socioeconomic inequalities.

Situational prevention on public transport can include a number of different techniques:

- CPTED decreases the opportunities to commit crime eg. by reducing hiding places and escape routes, and improving lighting.
- Video surveillance – a CPTED tool, discussed separately because of its widespread use.
- Organizational methods such as keeping areas clean and preventing deterioration or regulations banning the consumption of alcohol in the public transport network to decrease aggressive behaviour.

Figure 4.11 Categories of approaches to crime prevention on urban public transport



- Ensuring the presence of witnesses, either formal controls (police, security agents) or informal controls (passers-by, shopkeepers, transport users) to provide surveillance (guardians).
- Training staff to intervene before a situation deteriorates, for example, by using *alternative conflict management*. These may also be implemented by specialized mediators.
- Public awareness campaigns to inform transport users eg. how to *protect themselves against risks* when travelling, for example, by keeping valuable possessions out of sight to prevent theft.

Social prevention approaches include *campaigns to raise awareness* encouraging transport users to adopt civic and respectful behaviour.

Social prevention also targets some of the risk factors for crime such as difficult socioeconomic conditions. Transport companies can *facilitate access to jobs* and *provide support to vulnerable populations* who tend to congregate in stations. More indirectly, social prevention interventions which prevent recidivism may help to reduce the incidence of offending on public transport.

b) Situational interventions

CPTED interventions

CPTED interventions in public transport networks often focus on improving visibility, through the design of infrastructure or improving lighting. This may also entail the use of more robust materials which are resistant to vandalism, or the use of physical protection barriers to prevent aggression, such as protective windows for bus or taxi drivers.

As transport networks are part of their urban environment, CPTED interventions must be envisaged in an integral and continuous manner between the two areas. A Safe Women project implemented in Australia involved re-designing public spaces to help prevent sexual aggression. This included improvements to a pedestrian walkway along the main access routes to the transport system, ensuring they were well lit and equipped with safety equipment, as well as improving lighting in the city centre and residential areas (UN Women, n.d.). This example underlines the need for transport operators to work in partnerships with the city to develop integrated strategies.

CPTED interventions can also be used at transit stops, in terms of town planning. As discussed above, some commercial activities and types of urban planning can increase crime rates around transit stops. This makes it important for a city to take this into consideration when planning routes and stops.

Social mediation

Social mediation is used to prevent crime and fear of crime on public transport, often by staff on buses or trains, at stations, or in areas surrounding them. Mediators intervene when conflicts start to escalate, provide a reassuring presence and discourage uncivil behaviour. Social mediation can be seen as situational prevention, since it anticipates problems and reduces opportunities for offending.

The recruitment of mediators may have dual benefits for the city and public transport. In France, for example, the PROMEVIL association recruits mediators from among the unemployed, helping to reduce fear of crime in public transport, and providing jobs (PROMEVIL, n.d.).

A recent evaluation by the French Ministry for the Environment, Energy and the Sea, found that mediation has a visible positive impact including deterring crime, reducing the incidence of fraud, and fear of crime among transport users (Ministère de l'Environnement, de l'Énergie et de la Mer, 2016).

c) Social prevention

Campaigns to raise awareness

Educational campaigns to raise awareness include those which provide information or aim to modify behaviours, in particular, preventing harassment against women or uncivil behaviour, promoting safety rules, or preventing terrorism.

Campaigns to **prevent the harassment of women** may *stigmatize harassment* by raising the awareness of transport users and personnel about such inappropriate behaviours, and may often form part of wider city campaigns.

Figure 4.12 “We don’t want this kind of contact” campaign



Source: Red Mujer (2008)

Box 4.4 Video surveillance

Video surveillance is a CPTED tool, and one which is increasingly being used. For example, Chicago has invested \$26 million in surveillance cameras in train stations (Rossi & Golab, 2013).

Video surveillance has three preventive functions. It allows authorities to **react quickly**. The PräViteS initiative in Germany installs surveillance cameras in buses, and the control room receives the image in real time when an incident occurs. The police receive precise information concerning the location of the incident, allowing them to intervene rapidly. In some cases, intervention may prevent more serious injury (EVA-Académie européenne pour un transport respectueux de l'environnement gGmbH, 2012).

Video surveillance may also **discourage** a potential offender from committing a crime. In this case, the cameras are clearly visible, stressing the probability of being caught.

Thirdly, cameras may help to **decrease fear of crime** among both passengers and transport staff.

While video surveillance has become widely used on public transport, its effectiveness in terms of prevention is not supported by evaluation. A meta-analysis carried out in 2008 on 44 studies from various countries showed, for example, that the presence of security cameras did not have a significant impact on reducing crime in public transport (Farrington, 2008). A number of studies have also shown that potential offenders are not affected by the presence of cameras (see Rossi & Golab, 2013).

Other studies have found limited effects. For example, in Île-de-France, there was a reduction in crime on one bus route, but not on the underground, RER, commuter trains, public and private buses (Institut d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région d'Île-de-France, 2004). David Bradford, Executive Director of the Northwestern University Centre for Public Safety in the US, suggest recent research has shown that cameras have positive effects when they are part of a more global strategy (Rossi & Golab, 2013).

Certain other studies suggest that cameras make it possible to decrease fear of crime – with in some cases a positive effect and in others a negative effect. In Île-de-France, for example, when fear of crime among personnel decreased, they felt less exposed and “more able to prevent violence in cases of conflict and aggressions, make contact with the clientele, and seemed to make it a significant element in the continuity of service” (Institut d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région d'Île-de-France, 2004).

Conversely, James Moore, Director of the University of South Carolina Transportation Engineering Program, suggests that security cameras can create a false sense of security, allowing transport users to believe they will be able to receive assistance quickly, making them less attentive and thus easier targets (Rossi & Golab, 2013).

As a result, and despite the attention that video surveillance cameras have received, some organizations are moving away from their use. This is the case for the “Comité de Suivi et d'Evaluation de la Politique de Prévention et de Sécurité dans les Transports en Commun Francilien”, in Île-de-France, which recognizes that their impact is limited and questions the use of resources which could be better employed on alternative prevention initiatives (Lafont & Kalfon, 2015, p. 55).

Campaigns may take the form of posters, as in Argentina with the “We do not want your support” campaign, which showed a man inappropriately pressing himself up against a woman (Red Mujer, 2008). They may also involve role playing as in the project in Cairo discussed earlier.

They may also *provide information* on ways to react, addressing victims, perpetrators and witnesses. A recent campaign in France formed part of the National Plan to Fight Sexist Harassment and Sexual Violence on Public Transport. It focused specifically on informing victims of their rights, perpetrators

with the legal consequences and seriousness of their acts, and witnesses of the kinds of action they could take in support of victims (Ministère de la Famille, de l'enfance et des droits des femmes, 2015).

In addition, these campaigns generally encourage people to report cases of abuse to a specific telephone number. The “Rub against me and I'll expose you” campaign in Boston which recouraged reporting, led to an 85% increase in arrests in one year (Guha, 2009).

Some campaigns aim to **prevent incivilities**, such as annoying or anti-social behaviour, or throwing litter.

Figure 4.13 “Stay polite all down the line” campaign (“No one who bumps into five people when they get in will get out any quicker”)



Source: RATP (2011)

As in the case of campaigns about harassment of women, they can take the form of posters or theatre productions. In Île-de-France for example, the “Stay civil all down the line” campaign employs posters comparing inappropriate behaviour with animal behaviour, thus ridiculing it (RATP, 2011).

In Brussels, Belgium, a troop of clowns in the underground recreate common day-to-day problems: aggressiveness, indifference, littering and vandalism, among others. The comic scenes are performed in carriages, on platforms or at the stations (Franca, Mathieu, & Dorzee, 2006).

Campaigns also **encourage transport users to respect safety rules**, either in the transport network itself, or other areas of the city. The Montreal example cited above used schools to raise the awareness of pupils and of their parents to train safety (AMT, 2010).

Campaigns have also been used to ask public transport users to report **suspicious acts** which might be linked to terrorism. The “If you see something, say something” campaign in the US uses posters and public announcements on television and radio, providing a telephone number to report suspicious activity to the government.

All these issues go beyond the context of public transport and relate to the wider urban environment. Harassment of women is a significant problem in all societies, and eradicating it implies changing attitudes about men and women. The same is true for incivilities, reflecting a breakdown of established codes of conduct, and a lack of respect between groups and for the city as a whole. And terrorist attacks wherever they occur can have a devastating impact. Overall, campaigns which raise awareness on public transport can have an impact that goes beyond

that network, but to be effective, they must form part of an integrated, multi-sector intervention with the city.

Facilitating access to jobs

As suggested earlier, public transport systems can play a broader role in facilitating access to jobs, such as through the employment of social mediators. In Toulouse, France, the project described above known as “Prevention in our neighbourhood”, sees employment at stations as a valuable way of helping the reintegration of people living in disadvantaged communities. The transport company has contracted an employment agency to hire local residents. In turn, the state subsidizes the company for its role in supporting reintegration. There are dual benefits: employing local residents as maintenance technicians on the underground discourages vandalism and crime because other residents know the employees. Secondly, the “prevention in our neighbourhood” project staff develop relationships with residents and with the employees on the underground, increasing their ability to provide support. As indicated above, evaluation of this project found that those stations were the best maintained in the network (“you don’t damage your own possessions”) (EFUS, 1993).

Conclusion

Crime prevention on urban public transport must take into account one fundamental factor: that while it has its own physical and social characteristics, it is part of the city as a whole and is influenced by the characteristics of that city. This chapter has discussed the risk factors specific to public transport, and shown how they are also linked to their urban context. In order to be effective, therefore, public transport prevention programmes must be implemented in an integrated way with those of the city.

An effective prevention strategy needs to include five elements: an in-depth safety audit, partnerships with all interested parties, an integrated approach, multiple approaches interventions, and monitoring and evaluation.

Undertaking a safety audit is a crucial stage but often neglected. Crime and fear of crime on public transport is heterogenous, affecting different groups in different ways (women, men, young people, etc.) and in different parts of the transport network. Interventions need to be adapted to the experiences and concerns of these different communities and contexts. The safety audit requires disaggregated and reliable data to track the distribution of crime and fear of crime along the transport network, and the experiences of

those groups. This enables the risk factors specific to different areas and groups to be identified, and enables appropriate intervention programmes to be developed.

Considering the continuity between the city and the transport network, the planning of safety audits and all crime prevention initiatives requires the input and participation of all interested parties, including local communities, and through the essential creation of partnerships.

An integrated strategy must take into account the socioeconomic context of different neighbourhoods, including land-use planning, and the influence surrounding areas have on crime at transport stops and in carriages or buses. It must also take into consideration situational factors which affect levels of crime or insecurity on public transport, while prevention initiatives in other parts of the city or in schools, can help to reinforce that strategy.

Crime prevention interventions must use multiple approaches considering the diversity of risk factors of crime. They must consider situational measures as well as social measures to get to the root cause of the problem.

Finally, as with any prevention strategy, it is important to monitor and evaluate interventions put in place on a regular basis, to assess their effectiveness and to adapt to changing circumstances.

Train stations as social opportunity providers

Alessandro Radicchi⁸

Gianni Petiti⁹

Franca Lannaccio¹⁰

The train station has for a long time been described as a “city within the city”, with its own character, and many functions going beyond its core business: it provides services, shops, transportation, toilets, food and restaurants, banks, post offices, information, special assistance, healthcare and even arts and entertainment, in some cases. And, in terms of human relationships, it is a theatre where the most diverse stories take place: comedies, dramas, romances, tragedies, crimes. Homeless people, or people in distress in a broad sense, are regular customers here, attracted by big stations for all the services they provide. In fact, they respond to several needs: a place to stay, nice architecture, cleanliness, safety, light, warmth or air conditioning (depending on the weather), food, money (both legal and illegal), human relationships, routine, help, solidarity. For those who have lost their home, job, and family, a better place is hard to find. Yet, the railway station is not the right place where marginalized people should stay: everyone has the right to spend some time at the station; however, living there, sleeping there – being stuck there – is another story. The acknowledgement of this simple statement, that homeless people deserve better living conditions, by all the stakeholders involved in this issue, is the starting point of the Help Center program in Italian railway stations.

The goal of this program is to provide within the station a proximity social service for homeless people, to help them find answers to their needs outside. These are not shelters, nor drop-in centers: these are places where homeless and deprived people can be assisted and guided to social services available in the city. Professional social operators, who receive special training, support homeless people in their process of re-inclusion, the result of which depends on two factors: resilience, which is the capability of people to regain strength for a new start, and the network of local social services, where users are sent to.

In terms of organization, the 16 Help Centers now open are based on the cooperation between (1) *Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane*, the railway company that provides the space in the train station area for free (over 11,000 square meters altogether), (2) a third sector

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organization, providing the service; and (3) local authorities, providing financial, or institutional support.

For *Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane* this program is one branch of a larger CSR action, aimed at regenerating part of the immense real estate for social and environmental scope.

The Help Centers are gathered in a network called ONDS (*National Observatory on poverty in Italian railway stations*), supported by *Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane*, the National Association of Italian Cities, and the Social Cooperative Europe Consulting Onlus, in charge of the operations. Since the creation of the Help Centers, Europe Consulting Onlus has developed advanced IT instruments to keep records of all the interventions and to create personal files for all the people who have benefited from the program, which resulted in a very complex web-based platform called Anthology®, winner of the 2012 Sodalitas Social Award. Data-protection legislation and protocols strictly regulate the recording of data, and all the users are duly informed of all these aspects.

Beyond the everyday use of this information, Anthology has two primary functions. First, it keeps a record of the development of social interventions for each user assisted, and allows all the operators to be aware of what has been done, so that no time is wasted in tracking back actions, or in doing anything twice, or wrong.

The second function is to provide, in real time, a picture of homelessness in railway areas, with a very high level of accuracy. Age, sex, physical and mental conditions, addictions, but also needs, expectations, housing conditions, job skills, education, can be investigated by Anthology query system, building up a detailed demographic description.

So strong is the potential of this system, that the City of Rome and the City of Naples, the first and the third largest cities in Italy, have adopted it to manage the social services network dedicated to marginalized people and, in the case of the Capital, also for the central Immigration Office.

The ONDS model inspired the creation of *Gare Européenne et Solidarité*, a network of major railway companies at the EU level, gathered around the Charter for the development of social initiatives in stations: studies, common projects, exchange of best practices around social issues have now been integrated in the CSR policies of the signatory members.

This shows, to go back to our initial purpose, how the train station – as much as the city as a whole – can provide opportunities for improving the quality of life of its population. In this respect, we think that Help Centers have achieved substantial results in terms of integrating security and solidarity.

First of all, they have brought together the station stakeholders to set up common strategies to face single cases or phenomena. The Help Centers play the role of “station social referent”, around which companies, public institutions, third sector organizations, police, local authorities gather to cooperate, each within their own field of action, vocation and institutional responsibility.

This multi-stakeholder cooperation has gone beyond the homelessness issue, proving to be very effective to face recent immigration waves too. Thanks to the ONDS, with the mediation of the Help Center, *Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane*, the Municipality and the Prefecture found a solution to shelter Somali and Eritrean refugees, prevented from moving north following the closing of Austrian borders, and therefore stuck at the Tiburtina station in Rome in June 2015. An emergency camp was laid in a parking area by the station, in accordance with the City of Rome and the Red Cross, and an entire building has been put at the Municipality’s disposal for sheltering migrants.

Even more acute was the emergency in Milan, where 87,000 people, Syrians and Eritreans for the most part, have found shelter in the Milano Centrale station since 2013. In this very case, *Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane* has set up with the Help Center and the City of Milan a special plan to facilitate assistance to those who could not be sheltered elsewhere, granting access to the station facilities as well as identifying and securing specific waiting areas, with the support of NGO’s.

These actions were made possible by the long cooperation and the networking carried on by the Help Centers.

From a sociological perspective, Help Centers have provided scientific evidence that marginalized people are not per se a threat to the train station’s safety. Data collected with Anthology, on the contrary, show thousands of poor people who have no intention at

all to harm passengers or infrastructures. Their problematic presence or behavior needs to be addressed with social instruments, the only ones which can be effective on the long term. Such evidence substantiates the important investments *Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane* makes to support this program, especially in terms of areas dedicated to social activities.

Moreover, Help Centers are actual social strongholds in the station, which contribute to create positive human interaction among the thousands of people who go there every day. We have noticed, in the last 4-5 years, a growing tension between social services users and between users and citizens. In fact, we must report an increasing intolerance especially towards migrants. Citizens are still confronted with the aftermath of the crisis, and see large masses of immigrants as parasites who are likely to consume the few resources left. Help Centers, with their everyday proximity work, can smooth these tensions and prevent them from developing into open conflicts.

Is homelessness a crime?

There is a narrative which tends to associate homelessness and criminality. Take the original title of Ettore Scola’s movie *Down and dirty*: in Italian it reads *Brutti, sporchi e cattivi – Ugly, dirty and evil*, as if evil was the top of a climax, the inevitable consequence of being ugly and dirty. These are the most common visible signs of homeless people, at least in their classic phenotype. Yet, another movie title may help us reverse this stereotype: *The Gentleman Thief* reminds us that very often we should be wary of those who don’t look down and dirty at all. To sum up, the sense of insecurity caused by the homeless is rarely objective. On the contrary, it rather comes from our sense of rejection for a condition we unconsciously view as our worst nightmare. In fact, it is not the homeless person we are afraid of after all: it is homelessness.

In almost 15 years of social work in Italian railway stations, we have seen that the large majority of marginalized people living or spending time there are harmless. Due to their condition, though, they live constantly on the edge of society, which means that they have the same chance to fall onto one side or the other. The ideal yellow line separating the safety area – where we behave legally – from the dangerous one, where we don’t, is very thin for those who have nothing left to lose. Some of them can be criminal *ipso jure*, even if they do not commit any crime: immigrants who have not been able to renew their stay permit because they have lost their job, for example, have unwillingly jumped over the yellow line and found themselves on the illegal side. Those who

have lost their home – for a number of reasons that are often very far from any criminal intention – may end up squatting in a train, again on the wrong side.

The difference between these people and a pickpocket or a drug-dealer is self-evident. And it is around this difference that the Help Centers' program has been set up in Italian railway stations, to put solidarity and security side by side, targeting social issues and crime respectively.

In this way, this work highlights that addressing a topic like *Security and solidarity in railway stations* urges us to expand our vision over the city, instead of focusing on the station only, or on the users of public transportation, namely trains.

Such an exercise is necessary to understand the origin of the sense of insecurity that pervades stations, and – from another standpoint – hits people when they enter or even think of it.

As stated elsewhere in this report, the rapid expansion of urban areas has led to an increase in segregation and inequality, especially in developing countries. In turn, these two factors explain the increase in crime, and in particular violent crime. However, cities are not only sources of problems; they also provide opportunities for improving the quality of life of their growing populations. In this case, the city plays a fundamental role in the prevention of crime.

The same concept applies to train stations, both as scenes of inequality and discrimination, and as sources of opportunity to prevent crime. If we acknowledge that the station is part of the city, where its specific task – welcoming trains and their passengers – is ceaselessly contaminated by other urban functions, we may easily understand that the higher the insecurity rate is in the city (or in the neighborhood), the higher it will be in the station. In parallel, the more the city promotes the quality of life, the more the station will benefit from the positive environment that surrounds it.

Crime prevention on the TransMilenio: The Bogotá experiment

Jorge Mantilla¹¹

Context and past history

The dynamics of population concentration and flow are one of the main challenges facing crime prevention in the city of Bogotá. The TransMilenio, the city's articulated bus system, transports around 2.19 million people every day. Among them, it is estimated that 8%, or 175,000 people, do not pay for their ticket.¹² This gives the system an average of eight passengers per 1 m², creating a concentration of people that complicates governability and crime prevention in a context where citizens encounter queuing, pushing and shoving, theft, delays and abuse on a daily basis.

Mayor Enrique Peñalosa's administration thus came up against a TransMilenio considered unsafe by 86%¹³ of the city's inhabitants. This, given the system's role as the nerve centre of the daily development of the city, was the motivation behind the formulation, implementation and evaluation of an integrated crime prevention strategy for the network. This strategy is part of a framework composed of the three pillars for security outlined in the "Development Plan 2016–2019: crime prevention, crime control and improving feelings of security".

The stakeholders

Despite the diversity of the stakeholders involved in maintaining security and good service provision in the TransMilenio, the Mayor's Office in Bogotá is the driving force behind the strategy, starting with the creation of the city's new Secretariat for Security. This is reflected in its role of leading, orienting and coordinating the formulation of policies by means of carrying out activities associated with preventing crime, infractions and unrest and that ensure the coexistence and security of the people. Future perspectives for crime prevention on the TransMilenio in Bogotá include giving people back their sense of belonging, on the basis of joint responsibility and city culture, as a means of attaining the following objectives:

- respect for life, through a practical, safe and modern service;
- respect for people's time, with a transport system that satisfies the minimum quality standards in

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terms of itineraries and journey times;

- respect for diversity among citizens, in a system in which citizens from different socioeconomic conditions come together without discrimination of any kind.

In strategic terms, the TransMilenio crime prevention strategy led by the district Secretariat for Security is a first step towards the creation of a Master Plan for Security on Public Transport. This tool will include crime prevention strategies for the TransMilenio as well as for other means of transportation, such as taxis and bicycles. It will also be geared towards reinforcing the scenarios of inter-institutional articulation, increasing operating, intelligence and infrastructure capacities and generating evaluation processes for the public policy.

To give impetus to a project of this size, a mapping and articulation process was initiated with strategic stakeholders, such as the TransMilenio management, including its operating teams; private operators in the system; the Metropolitan Police of Bogotá and its specialist units; the Defender Office of Public Space of Bogotá; the Secretariat for Culture; and finally associations of users or organized civil society. Each of the aforementioned key players has a determining role in the good running of the system and in ensuring security rates improve. In particular, the relationship with associations of users and the organization of initiatives and supportive citizen action from a civil security perspective must develop on the basis of joint civil responsibility and the elaboration of complete diagnoses that make it possible to implement situational and social crime prevention measures.

Strategy

With regard to social crime prevention, the strategy in Bogotá focuses on promoting civic behaviour within the system, which initially means reducing the number of people who do not pay for their tickets. In addition to being a financial problem that prejudices the system, not paying for tickets can be seen as fraud against the public interest and sends a message that there is a lack of authority and control over the city. It

is for this reason that the city is looking to generate a smart payment system that aims to decrease fraud and that contains, among other things, a smart verification system, legal proceedings against those who fraud, information and communication campaigns, management with relevant actors through the application of new measures such as police inspectors, user loyalty card systems and organizational and training reinforcement programmes for bus controllers and drivers.

Other social measures for preventing crime consist in progressive accompaniment, which will be given by the district authorities to the police schemes that operate in the system through management plans and social mediators. These human measures for preventing crime have become a real necessity in mass public transport systems around the world, as is the case with the TransMilenio in Bogotá, which transports millions of people every day.

As a result, and in agreement with the technical analyses carried out by the National Police's Department of Citizen Security, the accumulation of users combined with the infrastructure under which the system functions is one of the central risk factors in terms of cohabitation and urban security. After all, most of the personal injuries and fights that occur within the system arise from situations of intolerance and the inability of citizens to resolve interpersonal conflicts in a proactive manner. In this regard, teams specializing in social mediation, alternative dispute resolution, crisis management and first aid are an alternative means of preventing crime and also a way of consolidating a strengthened institutional presence.

Additionally, whenever their endeavours are not restricted exclusively to the transit stops on the network but also cover the management of localized security in the areas around the stops, these social measures represent an articulation between social and situational prevention measures. In addition to fraud and itinerant sales, theft, mainly of mobile phones, is the most frequent incident within the system and is the main crime that has an impact on perceptions of security in the network.

In this sense, situational interventions aimed at altering the structure of opportunity for criminals that focus on theft from people have become a priority for the district administration. Here, the measures range from technical means, with the commissioning of CCTV cameras with facial recognition technology, accompanied by improvements to the intercommunication structure and response times, to urban planning and design that favour local security, such as rehabilitation of public spaces in the areas around the most critical transit stops in the network.

Conclusions

In conclusion, combining the situational crime prevention measures described above is conceived of as a large-scale intervention project that uses mixed methods within the public transport system. This will generate social, economic and appropriation dynamics as much in public spaces as in the system itself, which in turn bring about a decrease in problems of insecurity.

Finally, it is important to mention the willingness of the city's administration responsible for the new Secretariat for Security to create an evidence-based security policy for the transport system. This means maintaining transparency in the management of security data for the system, developing strategic alliances with third parties to reinforce institutional capacities for the management of the system such as those of, for example, the Chamber of Commerce of Bogotá and the ICPC, and finally establishing internal and external evaluation criteria for the strategies implemented.

Endnotes

- 1 Urban public transport is understood in this study as including undergrounds, buses, commuter trains and taxis.
- 2 These guidelines are nevertheless not limited to public transport.
- 3 Le Larousse: “Executive decision, regulatory or individual, taken by one or more authorities in the administrative hierarchy (the minister, the prefect, the mayor)” (Larousse, n.d.).
- 4 Strictly speaking, the data discussed here are not entirely comparable between countries – they are not collected in the same way, and the comparison years vary – but they provide a general view.
- 5 The following sections focus in particular on the factors that influence crime on public transport, although many of them also have an influence on fear of crime.
- 6 SECured Urban transportation – European Demonstration (SECUR-ED) D21.1 Public transport security terminology & definitions, www.secur-ed.eu/wp-content/uploads/file/SCR-WP21-D-JRC-006-08-%20PUBLIC-%20D21_1%20Public%20Transport%20Security%20Terminology%20&%20Definitions.pdf
- 7 The Mayor’s Strategy to Improve Transport Safety and Security in London, 2010–2013.
- 8 Director of ONDS and president of Europe Consulting Onlus.
- 9 ONDS referent person for “Gare Européenne et Solidarité” project.
- 10 ONDS Researcher.
- 11 Advisor, Secretary for Public Security, City of Bogota.
- 12 TransMilenio figures, 2014.
- 13 Victimization Survey, Bogotá Chamber of Commerce 2015.

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5

CRIME PREVENTION AND DRUG USE IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Crime prevention and drug use in an urban environment

5

Introduction

Cities encompass many different kinds of neighbourhoods where a variety of types of drug use take place, ranging from recreational use, to problematic and abusive behaviours (Rhodes, 2002). As Kübler and Wälti (2001) point out, problems linked to drug use tend to be concentrated in urban environments, and especially city centres. Cities provide the conditions and infrastructure necessary to ensure that the drug market functions well: they provide anonymity – an advantage sought by both consumers and dealers; transport systems make it easy for key players in the drug market to meet; and cities are an important point of convergence for national and international drug trafficking (Kübler & Wälti, 2001). Equally there are places associated with drugs that are specific to cities, such as ‘open drug scenes’ where passers-by can witness drug use and trafficking in public spaces (Bless, Korf, & Freeman, 1995), as well as drug use in recreational settings such as nightclubs and festivals (EMCDDA, 2015). Given this concentration of drug-related issues, cities also find themselves confronted with the associated criminality. Among other factors, the concentration of poverty, and poor mobility in some areas of the city have a significant impact on the criminality associated with drug use (EMCDDA, 2015).


It is especially pertinent to consider the role of cities in relation to drug use, given that the international community is at a crucial turning point in terms of drug policy. The year 2016 was notable because the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) took place, with a specific focus on evaluating the effectiveness of long-standing prohibitionist and punitive drug policies (Lai, 2016). For many, this was an opportunity to review the negative consequences of repressive policies and the failure of the “war on drugs”, particularly the high levels of violence, criminalization and incarceration which have ensued (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011). It also highlighted alternative strategies which focus on prevention, human rights and public health approaches.

The Session helped to illuminate the conflicts that still persist in relation to the most appropriate drug policies. Such debates at the international level tend to obscure developments at a more local level, however. It is cities which are largely responsible for implementing drug policies, and which find themselves facing the problems on the frontline (EMCDDA, 2015). The experience of cities provides important information about the success or failure of different approaches, once they are put into practice on the ground.

This chapter, therefore, focuses on the prevention of crime associated with drug use from the perspective of those who implement it – that is to say – cities. It reviews the different conceptualizations of the relationship between crime and drug use identified in the literature. Secondly, it examines global trends in drug use, and the evolution of the legal drug control framework at the international level. Finally, the chapter examines the characteristics of an effective strategy for preventing crime associated with drugs, drawing on a comparative study of municipal drug strategies adopted by ten cities around the world.

Different conceptualizations of the link between drugs and crime

The link between drugs and crime has essentially been conceptualized in two ways by researchers: for some there is a causal link between drugs and crime; for others, the relationship is seen as correlational (Brochu, 2006). Among the proponents of a **causal approach**, some researchers argue that substance use leads to crime (Goldstein, 1985; Parker & Bottomley, 1996; Powell, 2011), while others conclude that the relationship is the opposite – that it is crime that leads to drug use (Powell, 2011; White & Gorman, 2000). Supporters of the **correlational approach** on the other hand, argue that the relationship between drugs and crime is coincidental, or that it can be explained by a set of common causes (Dembo, Williams, Wothke, & Schmeidler, 1994; Powell, 2011; Stevens, Trace, & Bewley-Taylor, 2005). These different conceptual frameworks are examined in more detail below.




While it is important to note that the majority of drug users never commit crimes (MacCoun, Kilmer, & Reuter, 2003), there is a significant correlation between crime and the use of drugs in a number of countries. This is the case, for example, in Canada (ICPC, 2012) and the United States (National Association of Drug Court Professionals cited in National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, 2015). Almost two-thirds of their respective prison populations have disorders linked to drug addiction, compared with only 10% of the general population of the two countries (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014; Health Canada, 2014).

Drug use leads to crime

The classic conceptual explanation of the causal relationship between drugs and crime is Goldstein's tripartite model (1985). It includes three explanatory models:

- 1) psycho-pharmacological,
- 2) economic-compulsive and
- 3) systemic. The third component of Goldstein's model – the systemic – refers to crime associated with illegal drug trafficking, rather than directly linked to the use of drugs, so only the first two components are discussed here.




a) The psychopharmacological model

Goldstein's psychopharmacological explanatory model "focuses [...] on the role of intoxication in the manifestation of aggressive behaviour" (Brochu, 2006, p. 127). **Intoxication is seen here as the cause of criminal acts.** More specifically, stimulants (Insulza, 2013), benzodiazepines (Sutherland et al., 2015) and phencyclidine (Bey & Patel, 2007) provoke uninhibited, aggressive and violent behaviour in consumers. Methamphetamines induce increasing difficulty in controlling anger and violent behaviour in those addicted to them (Sutherland et al., 2015). In addition, substantial and long-term use of this drug has the effect of modifying an individual's social behaviour (Baskin-Sommers & Sommers, 2006). Nevertheless, it should be noted that while drugs can trigger violent behaviour, there is a stronger correlation with alcohol use (EMCDDA, 2007).

b) The economic-compulsive model

The second explanatory model argues that **crime takes place in order to support a drug habit**, so theft and burglary, for example, are instrumental in providing money to buy drugs. "Unlike the previous model, this one does not attribute crime to impulsiveness



resulting from intoxication, but instead suggests that addiction to a drug and the high price of the product constitute an incentive for criminal action" (Brochu, 2006, p. 130). This type of criminal behaviour is generally associated with substances that are highly addictive. A UK study, for example, showed that heroin, cocaine and crack are most often associated with this type of acquisitive criminal activity (Great Britain Home Office, 2010; Insulza, 2013). A study in Colorado in the United States identified methamphetamines as being a particular risk (Gizzi & Gerkin, 2010). Other studies similarly show that addiction to an expensive drug can lead users to commit crimes such as shoplifting, selling drugs, prostitution and burglary (EMCDDA, 2007). Some researchers have shown that the amount of property crime committed by heroin addicts is significantly higher than crimes against the person (Bryan, Del Bono & Pudney, 2013).

Crime leads to drug use

Unlike Goldstein's three-way model, this theoretical model argues that involvement in crime and delinquency leads to subsequent drug use. The criminal sub-culture provides a range of resources that make it possible to start drug use and to maintain a habit. The criminal setting provides the **contacts** necessary to obtain illegal substances, and the sub-culture, with its own rules and protocols, gives **legitimacy** to drug users, while **the money** generated by criminal activity supports individuals in their drug habits (White & Gorman, 2000; Brochu & Parent, 2005; Grapendaal, Leuw et Nelen, 1995 dans Brochu, 2006).

The common cause model

When the link between drug use and crime is conceptualized as correlational, that link is not a direct one. This theoretical model argues that a series of common causal factors explain both drug use and criminal behaviour. These risk factors include low levels of social support, problems at school, and being involved in delinquent groups or gangs (Powell, 2011). The use of illegal drugs, therefore, is not seen as leading directly to criminal acts.

Thus the explanation for the strong link between crime and the use of drugs, lies in the combination of risk factors at the individual, relationships and community levels, which are shared by both types of behaviour. Atkinson, Anderson, Hughes, Bellis, Sumnall & Syed (2009) established a list of these common factors. They include at the **individual** level, depression, impulsiveness and a search for sensation. In addition, mental health disorders seem to be closely linked to both drug use and crime. In the US, 30% of people with a mental health disorder subsequently develop problems of

addiction to drugs or alcohol, or almost two times the rate for those without mental health problems (Reiger et al., 1990 in Skinner and CAMH, 2011).

In terms of **relationship** factors, the influence of the family is one of the main risk factors for adolescents in terms of drug abuse (Vakalahi, 2001 in Lee, 2012). Abusive use of substances by parents, family conflict, lack of supervision or rejection by the family are all factors that place children or adolescents at risk, making them more inclined to turn to crime or drug use (Atkinson et al., 2009). Relationships with peers are also very important, and association with people who are themselves involved in drug use and abuse is a major risk factor (Atkinson et al., 2009).

Finally, the **community** also has an influence on an individual's opportunities to commit crime or use drugs: living in a neighbourhood which is disordered, in which drugs are easily available, with low socio-economic status, for example, will increase their vulnerability (Atkinson et al., 2009).

Nevertheless, it is important to stress that no single risk factor is determinant, and it is rather the accumulation of risks and the absence of protective factors that lead to "problem" behaviours (Jessor and Jessor, 1977; Hawkins et al., 1992; Farrington, 1995 in Sansfaçon, Barchecheat, Lopez, & Valade, 2005).


Trends, global statistics and the evolution of the legal context

Trends and global statistics on drug consumption

Today, the use of illicit drugs is a phenomenon that affects all societies. As the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicated in its *World Drug Report 2015*, no less than "246 million people, or 1 out of 20 people between the ages of 15 and 64 years, used an illicit drug in 2013" (UNODC, 2015, p.3). However, the distribution of use and types of drugs is unequal. This fact is of particular interest given, as shown previously, that the type of drug has an influence on the type of crime associated with its use, and thus on the prevention measures which may be required.

Globally, **cannabis** remains the most commonly used drug by far. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates annual prevalence at 2.5% of the world population (WHO, 2016). However, the low prevalence of drug use in Asia, including cannabis, tends to considerably reduce the world average. In Oceania, the Americas and Africa levels of cannabis use are three or four times higher than the global average (see Figure 5.4). Cannabis use in Europe is also higher than

Figure 5.4 Use of cannabis around the world in 2013 (or last year available)*




the world average, and remains the most commonly used drug in the EU (INCB, 2016).

The use of **ecstasy** varies between continents, and even within a given continent rates can vary considerably. For example, in the Americas, the prevalence rate is 0.5%, ranging from 6.8% in the US to 0.1% in Paraguay and 0.01% in Ecuador (see Figure 5.5). Elsewhere, the annual prevalence rate in Oceania was almost 2.5% in 2013, or more than six times the world annual prevalence rate for ecstasy use of between 0.2% and 0.6% (UNODC, 2015). **Amphetamines** and, more specifically methamphetamines, are a major problem for Eastern and South-East Asia (INCB, 2016). In several countries there has been an increase in the use and abuse of amphetamines including ecstasy. Despite this, the annual prevalence rate (0.7%) remains lower than that in the Americas (1%) and significantly lower than that in North America (1.4%), which has the highest annual prevalence in the world.

Opiate abuse is a major problem in the Americas in general, and more specifically in North America where the annual prevalence rate reached 3.8% in 2013, compared with the global average of 0.7%. In South America, annual prevalence was 1.2%, still higher than the global average (INCB, 2016). Even if opiate use has remained stable, this type of drug use remains the most problematic since it is associated with most new cases of HIV transmission, and with deaths due to overdoses (UNODC, 2015). Heroin continues to have devastating effects in the US, with overdose mortality almost tripling between 2010 and 2013 (INCB, 2016).

In 2013 almost 35% of **deaths associated with overdoses** in the world were reported in North America. By contrast, Asia, which has more than 50% of the world’s population, accounted for only 7% of global mortalities due to overdosing (UNODC, 2015). In addition, of the 246 million drug users in the world in 2013, 27.4 million – almost one out of 10 – had

Figure 5.5 Prevalence of ecstasy use over a lifetime, in various countries in the Americas (%)



Source: OAS (2015)

problematic use and 12.19 million **injected drugs**. It should also be noted that almost a quarter of the 12.19 million people injecting drugs were living in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (UNODC, 2015).

The evolution of drug controls at the international level

The drug strategies adopted by cities – this chapter's main topic – have not evolved independently. They reflect legislation adopted at the national level, which is in turn shaped by international norms and standards. **Three international agreements** with almost universal adherence govern drug use:

- 1) the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961;
- 2) the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971;
- 3) the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.

Until recently, the international community has tended to favour **prohibition** because, in theory, the signatory countries to these conventions cannot authorize recreational use of the drugs listed.

A number of trends, which have changed over the decades, characterize the involvement of the UN in the field of drug control. In the **1990s**, a global consensus began to take shape around drug control. This resulted in the creation of the UN's institutional framework on drugs (Jelsma, 2015), including the first UNGASS on drug abuse in 1990; the implementation of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in 1991; and the first World Drug Report in 1997. The same decade was characterized by the militarization of the fight against narcotics (Jelsma, 2015), notably with the use of armed forces in the fight against drugs, for example, to eradicate crops, or dismantle organized criminal groups associated with the illicit market (Csete et al., 2016).

In 1998, however, at the second UNGASS on the world drug problem, the different parties were unable to reach an agreement. This resulted in two divergent approaches: one led by the US that was concerned with punitive prohibition and led to the development of the "war on drugs" in the 2000s (Bewley-Taylor, 2012), while the other encouraged a more pragmatic approach to drugs, aiming to reduce the harmful effects and/or introduce decriminalization.

The war on drugs resulted in serious social and economic consequences, especially in the producer countries in the South. For example, the forced eradication of crops such as coca in Latin America projected rural populations into the heart of the conflict (IDPC, 2012). Another notable example of the harmful effects of the war on drugs was the decision by the Mexican

government to directly involve its military forces in the fight against drug trafficking. The result of this intervention has been to increase the homicide rate to unprecedented levels, so much so that life expectancy in the country has dropped (Csete et al., 2016).

Furthermore, international pressure led some countries, such as Ecuador, to implement very strict drug laws, resulting in excessive use of incarceration and extreme overcrowding in prisons (IDPC, 2012). In Mexico in 2009, 75% of prisoners were incarcerated for possession of a small quantity of drugs, even though they had relatively little involvement in drug trafficking (Metaal and Youngers, 2011). In general, this type of mass incarceration does not decrease drug use, and actually plays a part in exacerbating health and social problems (IDPC, 2012). In addition, there has been use of torture and other forms of abuse during incarceration (Csete et al., 2016).

Since the results obtained did not live up to the expectations of 1998, many countries have questioned repressive drug policies. Tensions increased between the parties, particularly on the subject of the alternative use of risk reduction measures (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). This implied that countries had to recognize the failure of the main objective of international narcotic conventions, of a "world without drugs", and opt instead for alternatives shown to be more effective means of responding to the health and social problems linked to drug use. In 2009, therefore, 26 countries made a joint declaration announcing their interpretation of the term "related support services", cited in the Policy Declaration and Plan of Action as including "risk reduction measures" (ECOSOC, 2009).

More recently, countries have tended to adopt a broader interpretation of the clauses in the conventions. Some of these interpretations have in fact tested the principles of the international regime and reignited tensions among the interested parties. These disagreements focus essentially on legal flexibility with regard to personal use, reducing harmful effects, and the importance of respecting human rights. They are exemplified by Bolivia's withdrawal from the 1961 Convention in 2011, followed by its reintroduction with reservations; by the legalizing of the production and use of cannabis in certain states in the US (Boister, 2016); and the regulation of the cannabis market in Uruguay (2013). Given the ineffectiveness of deterrent policies, alternative approaches have been explored, particularly through the Declaration of Antigua Guatemala (2013), which gave the Organization of American States (OAS) the power to explore new evidenced-based approaches to deal with drug problems which respect human rights, and are in agreement with international treaties (OAS, 2013).

Box 5.1 UNGASS 2016

In 2012 the presidents of Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico sent a joint request to Ban Ki-Moon to rigorously review international drug policy (Murkin, 2012) and explore other, alternative, approaches (Rolles et al., 2016). The next UNGASS meeting, initially scheduled for 2019, was moved forward to 2016. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 April 2016, entitled “Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem” (A/RES/S-30/1, 2016), essentially returned to the aims of the three drug control conventions. More specifically, the resolution reaffirmed the determination “to actively promote a society free of drug abuse”. The new resolution thus calls for “effective measures aimed at minimizing the adverse public health and social consequences of drug abuse, including appropriate medication-assisted therapy programmes, injecting equipment programmes”.

Although the Session established recommendations for drug use prevention measures, crime prevention and treatment, many were disappointed by its results. The direction taken in the final document to a large extent recommends maintaining the *status quo*, with its focus on criminal justice approaches, and only some shift of emphasis towards alternatives (Lohman, 2016), as can be seen in the lack of specific indications with regard to reducing harmful effects and decriminalization (Ochoa, 2016). Certain themes are highlighted, such as human rights and proportionality in punitive sentences. However, it has been argued that it is not strong enough, and does not respond to the request of countries that hoped to see the abolition of the death penalty for crimes associated with drug use, a sentence those countries argue is contrary to international law (Ochoa, 2016).

Guidelines for an urban drug strategy

As this chapter has already discussed, the problems associated with drug use are primarily found in urban settings (EMCDDA, 2015). Cities are often the first to be confronted with (new) drug issues, and are often pioneers in terms of developing solutions. As suggested by Room (2006, p. 136), “the city is the level of government which has the immediate responsibility to deal with many of the problems from psychoactive substance use and intoxication.” Several initiatives have for example been developed by cities in response to the problem of drug injection in public places, such as needle and syringe exchange programmes, and supervised injection sites which help to reduce the harmful effects of drug abuse. Innovative measures are also often developed and tested by the community sector, which intervenes on the frontline to respond to the needs of drug users. Initiatives that are effective may then be adopted by the municipal authorities (EMCDDA, 2015).

Recognition of the importance of cities in the treatment of drug problems has emerged gradually. There have been several initiatives and declarations demonstrating the growing involvement of cities in resolving urban drug use problems. In 1990, Amsterdam, Zurich, Frankfurt and Merseyside organized a conference questioning the deterrent approach. These cities suggested that public health approaches and the reduction of harmful effects should be explored (EMCDDA, 2015). Subsequently, the *European Cities on Drug Policy* network emerged, along with the Frankfurt Resolution (1990). In 1994, however, the *European Cities Against Drugs* network was created

following the signing of the Stockholm Resolution, and favoured a prohibition approach with the aim of drug abstinence (EMCDDA, 2015).

More recently, the Declarations of Prague (2010), Vienna (2010), Athens (2013), Canberra (2016) and Warsaw (2016) have demonstrated the growing mobilization of cities favouring a public health approach to urban drug problems (EMCDDA, 2015). These declarations all include recommendations for implementing effective drug policies in urban settings. In particular, they recommend the following (ICS DP, 2010; Urban Drug Policies in the Globalised World, 2010; UDPC, 2016):

- Local policies must be adapted to local issues, and municipalities must continue to be the leading players when it comes to developing innovative policies and programmes.
- Municipalities must have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
- Cities must have a certain amount of autonomy in relation to their regional and national governments when it comes to implementing urban drug policies.
- Drug addiction is a health problem; it is thus neither ethical nor scientifically justifiable to criminalize it.
- Public health and public safety are not contradictory objectives, and mechanisms must ensure there is coordination between the key players from both sectors.
- The decision-making process regarding policy must be evidenced-based.
- Good evaluation and follow-up mechanisms for policies, programmes and initiatives must be set up.
- Information must be coordinated and shared – particularly *via* exchange platforms and partnerships – between local key players, as well as between the local, regional and national governments.

The characteristics of an effective prevention strategy

The aim of this section is to present the key characteristics of an effective drug-related crime prevention strategy:

- 1) the strategy must be holistic;
- 2) it must encourage coordination between the various sectors and interventions;
- 3) it must promote a favourable social environment and reduce marginalization; and
- 4) it must include effective evidenced-based intervention programmes.²

Adopting a holistic approach

The consumption of illegal drugs, and the associated prevention strategy, should not be considered in isolation, since it is intricately linked to other social problems. For example, as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, a significant proportion of the prison population in Canada and the US is affected by drug addiction, similarly being a gang member is known to greatly increase the probability of drug use (Atkinson et al., 2009).

Thus it is essential that a global approach be adopted, creating mechanisms that help to integrate strategies which focus on a range of different concerns. This is the approach taken by the governments of the US and Canada, who recognize that crime, gang membership, violence and drug use are closely inter-linked, and require a coordinated response with the creation of inter-agency and multi-sector programmes (ICPC, 2015).

The same is true with regard to the significant links between mental health disorders and drug addiction – referred to as concurrent disorders or comorbidities. It is important that strategies include close collaboration between both sectors. Individuals who develop an addiction as a result of a mental health condition must be able to access health programmes which can treat their drug problem.

Prevention strategies may vary in the extent to which they apply an integrated approach. At one extreme, the prevention policy in the Netherlands considers drug addiction as a mental health condition, and treats it as such (Trimbos Instituut and WODC, 2015). Other government strategies favour establishing close collaboration between institutions that treat drug addiction and mental health, as is the case in Switzerland, where integrated management standards have been established for people who are drug dependant (quality standard QuaThéDA: Qualité, Thérapie, Drogue, Alcool) (ICPC, 2015).

Encouraging coordination between different interventions and sectors

Another essential element for establishing an effective prevention strategy is the establishment and implementation of coordination mechanisms. This applies to different programmes which may focus on the various risk factors, to coordination between the different aspects of the overall strategy such as prevention, treatment, harm reduction and law enforcement, as well as coordination between the national strategy and local government implementation.

Given the many common risk factors associated with drug use and crime, it is important that interventions do not focus on a single factor, but rather integrate several. In other words, the initiatives must be **multi-sectoral**. Coordination mechanisms need to be well thought-out so that interventions which work at the level of the individual, in terms of family and relationships, and at the community level, are well integrated.

Secondly, there must be collaborative mechanisms to bring together the different **partners** involved in the strategy, to avoid counter-productive results. A common example is the misunderstanding and antagonism which can be provoked by both repressive or harm reduction interventions. If health services provide clean syringes for health reasons (harm reduction) and the police confiscates them (law enforcement), the lack of synergy between these two sectors makes it particularly difficult, not to say impossible, to achieve the objectives of the strategy (ICPC, 2015). This problem is especially important in relation to prevention programmes around drug use, since initiatives such as safe injection sites may reduce harm, crime and insecurity, but may not be seen as acceptable policy by the public or some governments.

Finally, **coordination between the national strategy and local government** must be well thought-out, in terms of the choice of programmes adopted, funding and the sharing of information. This can differ considerably from one country to another. Certain countries adopt a centralized approach, as is the case in Portugal, for example (SICAD, 2013), where central government decides on the interventions to be implemented at the local level. On the other hand, in the UK, municipalities have considerable flexibility in terms of the types of programmes they decide to implement (HM Government, 2010).

Promoting a favourable social environment and reducing marginalization

In light of the range of risk factors associated with drug abuse and crime, it is clear that the most effective prevention entails promoting social inclusion and improving social and economic conditions, to reduce vulnerability to depression or stress, support families and reinforce family ties, and create healthy communities.

Reducing marginalization, which is associated with poverty and inequality, is especially important. In terms of the risk factors for drug use, marginalization plays a central role. It manifests itself, for example, in difficulty gaining access to the job market, homelessness, and in the health system. It is so important in fact that the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) argues that poverty and inequality have more influence on a society's drug use than drug policies (IDPC, 2012).

Reducing marginalization as part of the prevention strategy requires a focus on three distinct stages: prior to drug use and addiction, by developing programmes to promote inclusive societies; at the stage of addiction; and reintegration after treatment. The aim should not be to isolate people with drug problems, but to support their links with and integration into their communities. This is particularly important in terms of measures to support employment, for example, by encouraging regular or daily work, and through appropriate access to the health care system and housing benefits. Finally, it is important at the end of the treatment period to help marginalized individuals reintegrate into society, so that they are not once again faced with the same risk factors which led to their addiction in the first place.

Implementing evidenced-based prevention programmes

In order to ensure an effective drug-related crime prevention strategy, the programmes implemented in the context of this strategy must be evidenced-based. Measures that have been evaluated and have proven their effectiveness present a higher success rate. In the context of evidenced-based programmes, crime prevention associated with illegal drug use can have one of three objectives. First, to **prevent drug use** so that the criminal behaviour associated either with the psychopharmacological effects of drugs, or to support a drug habit ceases. It may also be the objective to prevent harm, rather than focus on the associated crime or on stopping drug use, which is the approach used in **harm reduction**. Finally, the aim may be to **prevent recidivism** among individuals who have committed crimes linked to their drug use. Classification

of these programmes can be made on the basis of the *results* obtained. The contribution by Lucie Léonard and Julie Savignac at the end of this chapter provides an overview of programmes implemented in Canada, some of which adopt a harm reduction approach while others aim to prevent drug use among youth.

a) Preventing drug use

Traditionally, the prevention of drug use involves four types of approaches: awareness-raising campaigns, interventions in schools, programmes with families, and community-based interventions.

Awareness-raising campaigns generally aim to educate people about the harmful consequences of drug use and to discourage it. Reviewing a number of national strategies suggests that currently this approach does not receive much support (ICPC, 2015). This may be because of the difficulties of evaluating the impact of such campaigns, which are generally not very conclusive in terms of their ability to reduce drug use (see for example UNODC, 2013 and EMCDDA, 2013). In certain cases it has also been found that they are counter-productive, making people resistant to anti-drug messages (UNODC, 2013), or even openly adopt the proscribed behaviour on the grounds that their freedom of choice is under threat (Hornik, Jacobson, Orwin, Piesse, & Kalton, 2008). In addition, awareness campaigns may encourage the idea that using illegal drugs is a common practice, and thus encourage people to try them (Hornik et al., 2008).

The campaigns which have attracted more attention appear to be those that do not focus on drugs, but rather on reinforcing social resistance. This approach is discussed further below.

There are two main types of intervention in **school settings**: providing information to potential users about the risks associated with drug use, and reinforcing the ability to resist social pressure. Many countries are beginning to abandon the drug-awareness approach, recognizing that its impact is limited or counter-productive (ICPC, 2015). A number of studies have shown that neither drug-awareness (for example Botvin & Botvin, 1992 in Botvin & Griffin, 2007; Hawthorne, 2001) nor programmes which promote fear of the consequences (UNODC, 2013), discourage potential users.

The second approach focuses on reinforcing the ability to resist social pressure. Such programmes aim to strengthen young people's ability to refuse to use drugs despite pressure from their peers, or to avoid situations in which this might occur. This approach has been recognized as being more effective than awareness-raising. Based on a meta-analysis of such

programmes Botvin and Griffin (2007) identified the following elements which made them effective:

- interactive learning;
- reinforcing the skills that make it possible to resist the social pressure associated with drug use;
- correcting the false impression that using drugs is the norm for young people.

Although these types of programmes have yielded positive results, it is important to underline that interventions in schools are generally not very effective if they are not associated with other prevention programmes (e.g. Botvin, 1999; Flay, 2000; Lloyd et al., 2000, in Ariza et al., 2013). As indicated earlier in this chapter, family and community factors also play an important role in drug use, and school interventions cannot be expected to impact these in any depth (Hawthorne, 2001).

Interventions which work with **the family**, are among the most effective. A number of studies have identified that to prevent young people from developing problems with drug use and addiction, the three most important factors are (Ary et al., 1999; CSAP, 2000; Dembo et al., 2000, in Kumpfer et al., 2003):

- a positive relationship with the parents;
- coherent supervision and discipline;
- parents with values that are contrary to those of substance abuse.

Thus to prevent drug use in young people it is essential to work with families as a whole (see for example Kumpfer et al., 2002, in Kumpfer et al., 2003). The most effective prevention programmes appear to be those which focus on the entire family (Gates et al., 2006, in EMCDDA, 2013); early interventions³ (Olds, 1997; Olds, Henderson, Cole, Eckendore, Kitzman, Luckey, Pettit, Sifora, Morris, & Power, 1998, in Dusenbury, 2000) extend across the life span, address multiple risk and protective factors, and generalize across settings; (3) and cognitive-behavioural programmes (Kazdin, 1995; Sanders, 1996; Serketich and Dumas, 1996; Taylor and Biglan, 1998; Webster-Stratton and Taylor, 1998, 2002, in Kumpfer et al., 2003).

Finally, **interventions in the community** aim to involve young people at risk of drug use in alternative activities (Jones et al., 2006), and to reinforce their relations with community organizations (UNODCCP, 2002 in Diamond et al., 2009). A number of studies have shown that the most effective preventive interventions at the community level combine the following characteristics (see Toumbourou, Duff, & Bamberg, 2003; Perry et al. 1996, Wood et al., 2006, in Diamond et al., 2009):

- they focus on more than one risk factor;
- they involve the entire community;
- they are implemented during childhood and adolescence.

Box 5.2 Example of good practice – Holyoake DRUMBEAT programme (Melbourne, Australia)

The Holyoake DRUMBEAT programme aims to develop relational abilities through the use of music and the expression of beliefs, emotions, behaviour and ideas. Initially developed for young Aboriginal men in a school setting to prevent future drug use, it now reaches out to several at-risk groups who can be reluctant to take part in traditional dialogue approaches. They include marginalized young people, prison populations and even refugees (Holyoake, 2003). It is argued that people develop their identity, their team spirit and their empowerment through music and self-expression. For example, if someone is unable to talk about a humiliating experience, the facilitator may invite them to play drums to express their feelings, and subsequently invite them to name the emotion they have just expressed. Positive changes have been observed in the groups targeted, among other things a decrease of almost 30% in risky behaviours, an increase of 10% in self-esteem, and a reduction in absenteeism (Wood et al., 2013).

As has already been shown, drug prevention programmes are often more effective in a family or community than a school setting. The Holyoake DRUMBEAT approach can be adapted to family, community or school contexts. It uses an experiential approach that focuses on corporal and musical expression, allowing young people who are reticent about communicating verbally to express themselves in another medium, in this case drumming.

b) Harm reduction and its role in crime prevention

A second approach to drug-related crime prevention is to **decrease the harm linked to drug use** rather than focusing on ending drug use (IDPC, 2016). This approach argues that achieving a drug-free society is illusory, and that it is better to acknowledge this and to protect drug users from harm. It focuses more realistically on the harmful effects of drug use in terms of both health and safety. This makes it possible to maintain good relations with those who are addicted, to avoid even greater exclusion, and to provide support to prevent their personal or social situations from becoming more critical (EMCDDA, n.d.).

For these programmes to be effective, IDPC (2016) stresses the following key elements: drug users must participate in the design and implementation of programmes; the programmes must be easily accessible;

the service must be adapted to local conditions; local law enforcement organizations must facilitate access to the services; and, finally, the entire local community must be both consulted and involved.

Thus, in addition to their health benefits for users, harm reduction programmes can help decrease criminal behaviour committed under the influence of drugs, feelings of insecurity resulting from drug use (the psychopharmacological effects), and acquisitive crime to finance drug use.

A number of countries have implemented programmes to reduce the **psychopharmacological effects** of drug abuse, ranging from safe injection sites to interventions in nightlife settings, legislation prohibiting specific drug use, and community reintegration programmes.

Safe injection sites allow people to use illegally acquired drugs – especially cocaine and heroin – in a supervised space (Great Britain Home Office, 2014). These sites also help to increase the sense of public safety and order, providing safe places away from the streets and public view (Hedrich, Kerr, & Dubois-Arbert, 2010).

Some countries have decided to focus on decreasing crime and insecurity generated by night-time drug use, such as that associated with bars, venues, discotheques and other places of entertainment and their surrounding areas. Drug use in recreational nightlife settings is often associated with high-risk behaviours, particularly violence, risky sexual practices and trafficking of illegal substances (Rhodes and Hedrich, 2010). Specific measures include ensuring that the clients of recreational night-time establishments have access to free drinking water and first aid services. Other measures implemented in some countries include raising awareness among nightclub clients (Rhodes & Hedrich, 2010).

In some countries such as Belgium, *legislation and municipal regulations* are used to prohibit specific behaviours including public nuisance, problem drug use, drug use in proximity to schools, or in some cases open drug use in public spaces (ICPC, 2010).⁴

Finally, *community reintegration* also makes it possible to decrease the insecurity associated with the use of drugs in public spaces, as well as public nuisance problems. This may include, for example, the use of housing benefits and supports for the homeless (ICPC, 2015).

Harm reduction may also help to reduce the **criminal behaviour associated with the acquisition of drugs** by, for example, dispensing heroin under government medical supervision. Heroin is a very expensive drug,

and highly addictive. Programmes which prescribe heroin to addicts who are very dependent under supervision, are usually utilized following the failure of other forms of treatment (Nadelmann, 2015). A number of evaluations of these types of programme show that they significantly reduce the crime associated with drug use among heroin users (Aebi, Ribeaud, & Killias, 1999; van den Brink et al., 2003).

Box 5.3 Example of good practice – Insite (Vancouver, Canada)

The Insite clinic opened in 2003. It was the first supervised injection site to be created in North America. Its operation and personnel costs are all funded by Vancouver Coastal Health, one of the regional health services in British Columbia (Vancouver Coastal Health, n.d.). The clinic provides some 12 cubicles where drug users can inject their drugs, acquired in advance, under the supervision of the nursing and medical staff. These health care professionals are able to react quickly in the case of an overdose. The staff of Insite also include social workers and therapists who can provide users with counselling and advice about the community services and resources available, particularly treatment services and housing (British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, 2009).

Wood et al. (2006) reviewed evaluations of Insite conducted between 2003 and 2006. On the basis of the results, they concluded that Insite provided the Vancouver community with a number of benefits, not only in terms of harm reduction, but also recidivism prevention. The evaluations demonstrated that Insite had been able to attract drug users who are typically difficult to reach through conventional public health programmes, and that these users were more likely to turn to treatment programmes for their addiction, having used the clinic. Gaining access to treatment helped to decrease their drug use (or at least reduce the associated harmful effects); and it reduced the probability that they would commit offences under the influence of drugs. In addition, a significant reduction in the number of injections performed in public was noted following the opening of the clinic, reducing in turn the insecurity generated by public drug use. Finally, it was shown that opening the clinic was not associated with any increase in drug trafficking or crime associated with drugs in the surrounding area.

c) Preventing recidivism among drug-related offenders

Preventing recidivism among drug users may be achieved through the use of law enforcement including imprisonment, or through public health approaches. The latter approach assumes that a drug addiction is related to pre-existing risk factors requiring treatment rather than punishment (Chandler et al, 2009, Dackis et O'Brien, 2005, McLellan et al., 2000, in UNODC, 2010). Some research has shown that **treatment programmes** (and thus a public health approach) reduce drug-related crime more than imprisonment (Gerstein and Harwood, 1990, Guzdish et al., 2001 in UNODC, 2010). As the contribution by Javier Sagredo underlines, prisons can, unlike prevention programmes, result in integration into a criminal milieu, or introduce non-users to drugs.

Drug treatment programmes are voluntary, and an individuals should never be forced to take part, which would be a violation of their human rights and accepted medical standards (UNODC & WHO, 2008, in

UNODC, 2010). Treatment programmes may be offered as an alternative to imprisonment by a court. Some national governments enable an arresting officer to direct a person to a treatment centre if they judge that this approach is suitable (ICPC, 2015).

At the sentencing stage, a court of law or a specialized drug court may offer a treatment programme (IDPC, 2012).⁵ In Canada, one evaluation showed that the courts which generally opted for the treatment of drug addiction rather than punishment, helped reduce criminal recidivism more than those using imprisonment (Bureau de la Gestion de la Planification Stratégique et du Rendement, 2012).

Treatment programmes may also be offered in prison, and have also shown a decrease in recidivism (see in particular Insulza, 2013 and National Institute of Justice, 2011).

In the case of indigenous populations, some national strategies include the establishment of **restorative justice and community justice alternatives**. Insulza (2013) stresses that these play a significant role in social integration and recidivism prevention.

Box 5.4 Example of good practice – Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison (DTAP) (New York, United States)

The DTAP programme was the first drug addiction treatment court established in the US in 1990 (National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, 2003). The aim of the programme is to reduce recidivism and drug use among drug-addicted offenders who have not been found guilty of violent crimes. The programme offers them treatment for their drug addiction for a period of 15–24 months, in a residential drug treatment centre (The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, 2003).

Evaluations of the programme have been very conclusive. In comparison with a control group of similar offenders sentenced to prison, the participants who completed the DTAP programme were 33% less likely to be rearrested, 45% less likely to be sentenced again, and 87% less likely to be receive a subsequent prison sentence. They were also 3.5 times more likely to find a job after completing the programme than before their arrest (National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, 2003). In short, recidivism rates were much lower, and the job placement rates much higher for those who had participated in the DTAP programme than for those sent to prison.

Comparing cities

The selection of cities

For the purposes of this chapter, ten cities were identified which had one or more drug prevention policies – either already implemented, or in the process of being adopted. The selection was based on three criteria: cities located in a country whose national drug strategy had previously been analysed by ICPC for its report on drug-related crime (ICPC 2015), this enabled in-depth comparisons to be made between municipal and national strategies; cities with readily accessible information on their drug policies; and ensuring a diverse geographical distribution. The final selection included five European cities (Amsterdam, Biel, Glasgow, Lisbon and Stockholm), two North American cities (Ithaca and Vancouver), one in Africa (Cape Town), one in South America (Bogotá), and one in Asia-Pacific region (Melbourne).

The aim of the analysis was not to provide a systematic identification of urban drug policies, but to identify strategies which have innovative aspects, those which help to prevent drug-related crime, and to identify similarities and differences between these municipal strategies.

Given the specific context of each city and country, it was also important to assess the degree of **autonomy** which respective local governments have in relation

to their national government strategies. The analysis examines the **approaches** and **objectives** targeted by each municipality, to assess whether they adopt a holistic approach, encourage coordination and multi-sector collaboration, promote a favourable social environment and reduce marginalization, as well as implement effective programmes. As discussed above, these are all necessary elements for an effective prevention policy.

Autonomy of the cities in relation to drug policy

To assess the degree of autonomy of each city, they were classified into two groups on the basis of their national government's jurisdictional policy:

- 1) a **centralized approach** (Canada, Portugal, the US) and
- 2) a **decentralized approach** (Australia, Colombia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK).

a) Centralized approach

The national drug strategies of Canada, Portugal and the US are centralized. In all three cases, the prevention processes are selected and implemented by one or more agencies or organizations under the control of the national government (ICPC, 2015; Reitox Network, 2012). For instance, as part of Canada's National Anti-Drug Strategy, the Anti-Drug Strategy Initiatives program provides funding to organizations – such as NGOs, universities, and other levels of government including provinces, territories and municipalities – to help them implement health promotion, prevention and treatment projects (Government of Canada, 2015). In Portugal, the *Serviço de Intervenção nos Comportamentos Aditivos e nas Dependências* (SICAD) comes under the Ministry of Health and is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the national plan with municipalities and non-governmental organizations.

b) Decentralized approach

Two types of decentralization can be identified: countries which delegate policy powers to regional or state authorities, as in the case of Australia, Switzerland and the UK, and those which delegate policy-making powers to municipalities themselves, as is the case in Colombia, the Netherlands, Sweden and South Africa.

Regions

The UK delegates part of the responsibilities associated with the national drug strategy to the governments of its constituent countries – for instance the Scottish and Welsh Governments – whereas in Switzerland and Australia the design and implementation of drug prevention strategies must take account of national and regional policies. Thus the cities of Biel, Glasgow and Melbourne are required to design their drug-related strategies in relation to both their regional and national governments. Nevertheless, all three cities had some autonomy over the kinds of prevention programmes they established and partnerships with local actors. Biel and Glasgow are responsible respectively for social and professional integration (Direction de la Formation, de la Prévoyance et de la Culture, 2011) and community reintegration of addicts (City of Glasgow, 2014). Biel and Melbourne have a certain amount of autonomy with regard to harm reduction (City of Melbourne, 2014; Direction de la Formation, de la Prévoyance et de la Culture, 2011). Finally, Glasgow has considerable autonomy regarding regional and national government in terms of the protection of vulnerable populations, particularly children, and initiatives for families which aim to reduce drug-related crime (City of Glasgow, 2014).

Cities

In the case of Colombia, the Netherlands, Sweden and South Africa, decentralization is to the advantage of cities. In all four cases, national strategies stipulate that municipalities must develop local policies to prevent drug use (Department of Social Development, 2013; Ministry of Health and Social Protection, 2014; Reitox Network, 2012). The four cities are responsible for coordinating action and play a major role in preventing drug use and its harmful effects, and

Table 5.1 National drug strategy approaches

Countries	Centralized	Decentralized	
		Regions	Cities
Australia		■	
South Africa			■
Canada	■		
Colombia			■
United States	■		
Netherlands			■
Portugal	■		
United Kingdom		■	
Sweden			■
Switzerland		■	

Source: Authors

reducing supply (City of Cape Town, 2014; Reitox Network, 2012; Secretaria de Salud, 2011). In addition, Amsterdam and Stockholm are also responsible for the regulations governing *coffee shops*⁶ in the Netherlands and *head/smartshops*⁷ in Sweden, as well as supervising night-life and preventing public nuisance (Reitox Network, 2012). Amsterdam also has responsibility for preventing recidivism, the reintegration of prisoners on their release, and homeless people who use drugs (Reitox Network, 2012a).

The views of the city governments examined are generally in harmony with those of their national governments in terms of their approach to drug issue, with the exception of Ithaca and Vancouver. For instance, both Stockholm's programme and the national Swedish strategy incorporate a range of policy objectives – prevention, supply and demand reduction, as well as treatment – geared towards achieving a drug-free society. Ithaca and Vancouver, for their part, recommend a public health approach, even though neither the US nor the Canadian governments have so far endorsed harm reduction in their strategy⁸ (ICPC, 2015). This is in spite of the fact that in both cases, their national government strategy favours centralized implementation and coordination. Portugal, which also applies a centralized approach, sees harm reduction as the foundation of the national strategy. The role of cities is recognized and their actions integrated into the framework of partnerships with the central administration (Reitox Network, 2012). It is possible that national strategies which take a strong prohibitive approach to drug use, and give little autonomy to cities, may encourage them to develop alternative approaches.

The characteristics of the municipal strategies in the study

How far do the city strategies meet the criteria for effective prevention? As we have seen, this requires an approach that is holistic; that encourages coordination between services and interventions; that promotes a favourable social environment and reduces marginalization; and uses evidenced-based practices and programmes.⁹

a) Adopting a holistic approach

Of the cities studied, several have adopted a broad vision on how to deal with drug issues which takes account of the range of associated factors. In the US, for example, Ithaca clearly stipulates in its strategy that: "Too often, our past approaches have failed to recognize that fundamentally, the community prevalence of health problems, such as problem drug use, and

social problems, such as participation in the illegal drug economy, reflect deeper issues related to social and economic opportunity and racial inequality" (City of Ithaca, 2016, p. 2).

A series of consultations carried out by the city concluded that the drug problem was intimately linked to unemployment, geographical isolation, racism and poverty, all factors that can encourage a sense of hopelessness and increase the probability of problematic drug use (City of Ithaca, 2016). This encouraged the city to set out objectives – such as reducing racial inequality, and economic and community development – that do not directly target drug use, but instead tackle the issues that have an impact on it. Factors such as poverty, social inequality and lack of job opportunities have been widely identified as risk factors common to crime and drug use (Atkinson et al., 2009). The interventions planned by Ithaca hope to reduce both drug use and crime.

While Amsterdam does not have an integrated drug strategy at the municipal level, the city targets a number of issues associated with drugs through a range of policies. This includes policies concerning *coffee shops*, the organization of social assistance, treatment for problem drug use, licencing of major events, educational and other prevention activities (Laar et al., 2013). These policies cover a range of prevention approaches: for example, social assistance and treatment programmes for drug addicts help to reduce harmful effects and prevent recidivism, while educational and other prevention programmes help prevent initiation into drug use. Thus while Amsterdam does not have a specific integrated drug strategy, the range of programmes help to respond to risk factors associated with drug use.

The city of Melbourne provides a good example of a holistic approach to drug-related crime prevention. Drug issues are integrated into its overall crime prevention strategy *Beyond the Safe City*. The strategy focuses on creating a safe and healthy environment in the city, and takes a global approach to the causes of crime, violence, drug and alcohol problems and other antisocial behaviours (City of Melbourne, 2014). Programmes target risk factors, for example, by developing resilience in children and young people, helping them develop their social skills, deal with stress through conflict management, and encouraging them to participate in the life of their city. This aim is not only to prevent crime and violence but also drug use.

Finally, given the close link between drug addiction and mental health disorders, prevention strategies need to include specific mechanisms to allow for collaboration. The city of Vancouver has a strategy that specifically targets the links between drugs and mental health. This helps to improve collaboration

between the different services involved in the treatment and prevention of drug addiction and mental health disorders, particularly health and housing departments, the police, and community organizations offering peer support services (Mayor's Task Force on Mental Health and Addictions, 2014). The strategy provides a framework for a harm reduction and recidivism prevention approach, ensuring that drug users with mental health problems can access addiction treatment programmes.

b) Encouraging coordination between sectors and interventions

The drug problem is a complex, multi-dimensional issue that requires a multi-disciplinary and multi-level approach. As Kübler and Wälti argue (2001, p. 43) "Contemporary drug policy in the urban context is mainly a question of creating coordinated action among a multitude of actors and agencies that are involved, in various ways, in addressing the drug problem." The effectiveness of the response depends to a large extent on how well a strategy is articulated between national, regional and local governments, and especially on coordination between policy makers and stakeholders at the local level.

Given that cities must liaise closely with their citizens, community organizations, the private sector and other levels of government, coordination is essential (ICPC, 2010). What kinds of framework mechanisms have cities developed to ensure that they can coordinate public health and public order concerns around drugs and drug-related crime (Hughes et al., 2013)? What is their *modus operandi*? Drawing on a descriptive review of drug coordination (2002), as well as a report on coordination agreements within the Member States of the EU (2001) carried out by EMCDDA, two types of mechanisms can be identified: a coordination unit and a specialized agency.

The coordination unit

The coordination unit is composed of public employees attached to a specific municipal department or agency, usually concerned with health or social services. According to the EMCDDA, this type of mechanism is fairly informal and does not have the strong coordination powers of a specialized agency or one specific to drugs (2002). For example, in Biel, a committee of specialists was created to coordinate the provision of services to people with addiction problems, and provide a network of experts on the subject. In this case, the coordination unit was overseen by both the Direction de la Formation, de la Prévoyance Sociale et de la Culture, and la Direction de la Sécurité.

Table 5.2 City coordination methods

Cities	Coordination unit	Specialized agency
Amsterdam		
Biel		
Bogota	Information not available	
Glasgow		
Ithaca		
Cape Town		
Lisbon		
Melbourne		
Stockholm		
Vancouver	Information not available	

Source: Authors

The specialized agency

The primary aim of a specialized agency or an agency specific to drugs, according to the EMCDDA, is to improve coordination between actors. A specialized agency is not under the authority of another department, and given its specific mandate in the field of drugs, it has wider and more holistic powers which than those of a coordination unit (EMCDDA, 2002). Of the cities studied, Cape Town, under the leadership of the central government, created a local drug action committee responsible for ensuring the coordination of specific drug actions within the city. Another example can be found in Lisbon, where all decisions in terms of coordination are made by SICAD, a specialized agency created by the central government.

c) Promoting a favourable social environment and reducing marginalization

Several cities include initiatives to reduce vulnerabilities by improving living conditions in their municipal strategies. Bogotá stands out in this respect: of the seven objectives in its municipal strategy which are specific to drugs, four aim to promote a favourable social environment. This includes reinforcing and developing the capacities of families and communities to prevent drug use, reinforcing social and emotional skills, encouraging full participation in the life of the city, and improving the quality of life. The right to protection and health for citizens is also underlined and promoting a culture of prevention (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2011).

In Ithaca one of the objectives of their strategy is directly concerned with reducing marginalization. The city aims to promote economic and community development to improve the living conditions of young people and families, including increasing the economic opportunities and public health services in communities, and ensuring that the most vulnerable individuals receive benefits (City of Ithaca, 2016).

Among other objectives, Vancouver's mental health and drug addiction strategy aims to reduce the stigma attached to those suffering from mental health disorders or addiction problems. The strategy sees stigmatization as a barrier to accessing services and treatment, and contributes to their sense of exclusion, especially those living in poverty (Mayor's Task Force on Mental Health and Addictions, 2014).

d) Implementing evidenced-based prevention programmes

As previously mentioned, evidenced-based prevention programmes in the field of drug-related crime can either aim to prevent drug use, reduce the harm associated to drug use, or prevent recidivism among drug-related offenders. We presented different types of evidenced-based programmes that could be implemented to achieve such objectives. Across the selected cities, many have incorporated similar programmes in their strategy.

Many municipal strategies aim to **prevent drug use** with awareness-raising campaigns and interventions in schools, with families and in community settings, including those in Biel, Bogotá, Cape Town, Glasgow, Ithaca, Lisbon and Vancouver. For example, Cape Town which has a holistic and integrated strategy targeting individual, family and social risks factors, includes programmes in schools, with families and in communities. As discussed above, programmes which work only in schools have been found not to be effective in preventing future drug use (ICPC, 2015), so the Cape Town model demonstrates good practice. School-based programmes help young people improve their communication skills, resist peer pressure and control feelings of anger. Family programmes reinforce the ability to cope with problematic behaviours. Other interventions aim to improve socioeconomic conditions. Thus the strategy targets the range of risk factors associated with future drug use.

As indicated above, several cities have adopted a **harm reduction** approach, including providing heroin under medical supervision, developing supervised injection sites and treatment programmes, all found to be effective in reducing harm and associated crime.

Biel and Vancouver both have supervised injection sites reducing the risks of illegal drug use and offering supports. Ithaca plans to open a 24 hours crisis centre, which will include a "decompression" zone for people under the influence of drugs. The aim is to connect people with treatment services, and minimize public intoxication and drug-taking, thus reducing the insecurity that public drug use can provoke (City of Ithaca, 2016). The city is also considering setting up a methadone clinic and a supervised injection site.

Several other cities also have a "treatment" component to their strategy. This can take the form of substitution measures, such as dispensing methadone. In Glasgow, the "path to recovery" is seen as unique for each individual (Alcohol and Drug Partnership, 2014). Treatment is seen as a process related to the objectives set by the person themselves. This could include developing techniques for avoiding relapse into drug use, rebuilding relationships damaged by drug use, or engaging with society in a significant manner. Thus intervention is not focused specifically on drug use, but on repairing the harm it has generated in the user's life. In Lisbon, the Alcântara refuge is a temporary residence for drug users. It provides a place where they can plan entry into a treatment programme, and takes them out of the environment which led to or enabled their drug taking. The refuge helps direct them to appropriate resources and treatment (Reitox Network, 2012).

A number of cities include the **prevention of recidivism** in their strategies, targeting those with a criminal history associated with drug use. Biel, for example, provides rehabilitation services, including job placements, training and housing (Direction de la Formation, de la Prévoyance et de la Culture, 2011). Drug treatment courts are also found in some cities, providing alternatives to imprisonment and reintegration programmes. Vancouver implemented a drug treatment court in 2001, the second city in Canada to do so after Toronto in 1998 (Somers et al., 2012). In a longitudinal evaluation Somers et al. (2012) concluded there was a significant reduction in crimes committed by those who went through the drug court, compared with a control group who did not.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined some of the main issues concerning the prevention of drug-related crime in an urban context. It is clear that such prevention must take into account a number of factors which can support and foster drug use and are specific to the city context. Global trends in drug use and drug control at the international level marked a turning point in 2016, with the UN Special Session on drugs, and the acknowledgment that punitive policies have been counterproductive and costly. Alternative approaches including prevention and harm reduction are now more widely endorsed.

The chapter also reviewed the two main theoretical models developed in the literature to explain the links between drug use and crime – one which sees a causal relationship between crime and drug use, and one which regards it as correlational. A number of risk factors for drug use and crime have also been clearly identified in the literature, relating to the characteristics of **individuals, family and relationships and**

communities. They underline the fact that the links between crime and drug use are complex and multi-faceted, and that drug use is often linked to a range of other problematic social issues.

On the basis of the literature, and drawing on a comparative analysis of ten cities, we can outline the key components of an effective strategy targeting drug-related crime issues. They include the importance of developing a **holistic strategy**, ensuring **multi-level and multi-sector coordination**, and promoting a **favourable social environment and reducing marginalization**. In addition, given that cities are where most drug use and drug-related crime take place, it may be important for them to have a certain degree of **autonomy** from national or regional governments in terms of deciding the appropriateness of specific strategies in terms of the context of their city. This includes in relation to the implementation of **harm reduction** programmes. Finally, it is also essential to build in **monitoring and evaluation mechanisms** into city strategies, to ensure that programmes and policies are built on good evidence and modified where necessary, as well as to ensure the **sharing of information** at the local level and with non-governmental organizations, at regional, and at the national level.

Drug-related crime prevention in the urban context – some examples of programmes funded by the National Crime Prevention Strategy, Public Safety Canada

Julie Savignac¹⁰
Lucie Léonard¹¹

The prevention of drug-related crime, especially amongst young people, is a major issue for the Canadian Federal Government. In the 2015 Throne Speech, the Government of Canada committed to legalizing and regulating marijuana; however, restricting access to marijuana and protecting children and adolescents by preventing them from obtaining marijuana remain two central objectives that the government seeks to achieve with the new policies and the new system of legalization (Government of Canada, n.d.).

Drug consumption, and more recently the legalization of marijuana, is a constant concern, particularly given the more prevalent involvement of youth and other vulnerable populations, economic costs, concerns about emerging issues, and the desire to foster healthier and safer communities for all citizens. Besides being a priority for public safety, substance abuse is a central priority for public health in particular because of the impact it has in adulthood, for example, in terms of chronic diseases, addictions and mental health problems (EMCDDA, 2009).

According to estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), approximately 200 million people worldwide have reported using marijuana on at least one occasion in 2012. A report by UNICEF released in 2013 ranks Canada amongst the countries in which young people consume the most marijuana in the world (EMCDDA, 2009).

In Canada, despite bans on consumption, marijuana remains the most consumed illegal substance. In fact, it is the second most consumed drug for recreational use in Canada, after alcohol, especially among young people. About 22 million Canadians aged 15 or older, around 75% of the population, drank alcohol in 2013. In comparison, 11% of Canadians aged 15 or older reported having used marijuana on at least one occasion in 2013. A deeper examination of the data shows us that in 2013, 8% of adults over 25 and 25% of young people aged 15 to 24 reported having consumed marijuana in the past year. This data is also corroborated by the 2013 Canadian Tobacco, Alcohol and Drugs Survey (Statistics Canada, 2015), where young people

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aged 15 to 24 were the group with the highest rate of self-reported illicit drug use in the last year among all Canadians. These young people were also four times more likely to report wrongdoing due to drug use than adults aged 25 and over. Young people are also more likely than adults to indulge in risky consumption and suffer more harm in their life trajectories (Young, M.M. et al., 2011). It has also been shown that investment in drug prevention is successful. For every dollar invested, between 15\$ and 18\$ could be saved (McInnis, O.A. & Young, M.M., 2015).

Through its multiple implications and repercussions, effective prevention of substance abuse among young people and a greater understanding of the issues arising from legalization requires an approach that is coordinated, holistic, and multi-sectoral between key players at various levels of government as much as at the local level.

Several federal prevention initiatives have emerged and one of the best known is probably the National Anti-Drug Strategy, an interdepartmental collaboration between twelve ministries led by Justice Canada, in operation since 2007. Through this strategy, the Government of Canada “contributes to safer and healthier communities by helping prevent use, treat dependency and reduce production and distribution of illicit drugs as well as by addressing prescription drug abuse.” (Government of Canada, 2014).

Public Safety Canada (PS) has been active within the context of the National Anti-Drug Strategy. Indeed, PS through its National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) has financed ten evidence-based programmes for the prevention and reduction of substance abuse among youth. Funding for such programmes comes under the NCPS mandate since the correlation between addiction to alcohol or other drugs and crime has been well established in scientific research, particularly the role of early alcohol and other drug abuse on crime, demonstrating the need for prevention and early intervention with young people (National Crime Prevention Centre, 2009).

Evidence-based programmes for the prevention of substance use among youth

When talking about evidence-based programmes, registries or programme classification systems do exist, their main objective being to categorize programmes based on their level of effectiveness of results, taking into account the rigidity, reliability and validity of the evaluation, factors related to implementation and, in some cases, the sustainability of results and the number of programme replications (Gabor, T., 2011). These registries act as search engines to identify the best programmes and are in a way a simple and interactive way to operationalize the evidence-based approach.¹² These registries also act as knowledge dissemination hubs for programmes and practices and are empowering local communities to choose the most appropriate programme to suit their situation and clientele.

In Canada, such a programme classification system does not exist yet. Currently, there are several in the United States, in different fields of activity.¹³ In the specific field of substance abuse and mental health, there is the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)'s National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP)¹⁴, which includes more than a hundred evidence-based programmes.

Backed up by the evidence/data provided by these classification systems, the NCPS has supported the reproduction of evidence-based programmes in the Canadian context for the prevention and reduction of consumption among young people. For example, from 2009 to 2013, six organizations received funding to implement the Botvin LifeSkills Training Program (LST)¹⁵, a school-based prevention programme that targets early drug and alcohol abuse by teenagers, especially those who are in middle school (sixth and seventh grades). Most of these projects included an Aboriginal clientele and the results of one of the projects have been the subject of an evaluation.¹⁶

Another prime example is Towards No Drug Abuse (TND)¹⁷, a programme designed to help young people, aged approximately 14 to 19 years, to reduce tobacco, alcohol or drug use as well as related violent behaviour. From 2009 to 2014, the John Howard Society of Hamilton (Ontario)¹⁸ has implemented the TND programme in schools under the Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board. Other programmes, also considered model and promising programmes that have a positive impact on reducing substance abuse among young people, are currently supported by NCPS and their results are under evaluation. For example, Functional Family Therapy (FFT)¹⁹ has been implemented in Alberta, and the Strengthening

Families Program (SFP)²⁰, has been replicated in nine sites across Canada since 2010, including three under evaluation.

Substance abuse prevention and reduction programmes for youth, whether they are programmes in urban or rural areas, should be evidence-based, and be evaluated systematically. Programme evaluation, in addition to renewing and developing new knowledge, also strengthens, through lessons learned, the key principles already supported by research²¹ to constantly guide future projects towards a strategic and effective approach.

Prevention of crime related to drug use

Javier Sagredo²²

Crime and drug use: Dominant paradigms

The institutional and social stereotypes that have facilitated the problematization of the illegal drugs phenomenon in today's societies have traditionally been characterized by fear and anxiety related to the substances themselves and the people involved. This fear of deviant behaviour, illness, violence, crime, and social exclusion, has been primarily translated into, by both the health and justice sectors, measures of repression and control, of imprisonment and exclusion, based on a conceptualization of drug use as a personal choice and not as a phenomenon with deep biological, psychological, health, cultural, economic, and social roots.

Bias in the literature and the data; spurious causal relationships

As we have seen, there is evidence that there are some correlations between drug use and crime. However, some studies have revealed a statistically significant negative relationship between drug use and violent crime (Valdez, Kaplan, & Curtis, 2007). Even when drug users commit an offence in order to obtain drugs, these offences are for the most part non-violent (theft, prostitution, selling of drugs), violence being avoided when alternatives exist (Johnson et al., 1985).

Other studies (French, McCollister, Alexandre, Chitwood, & McCoy, 2004; Pernanen, Cousineau, Brochu, & Sun, 2002) continue to focus on re-emphasizing the existence of almost direct causal connections between drug use and crime, using as evidence the confluence of both practices within the offending population. The relationship with crime is then automatic when we study in isolation the population in conflict with the law. Thus it seems sufficient to demonstrate that the prevalence of drug use or problematic drug use is higher than that among the general population. However, in such cases, the principal reference group should not be the general population; rather, the reference should be established across control groups of individuals who present similar personal, relational, structural, or other relevant risk factors.

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In chronological terms, drug use can also emerge *post hoc*, as a result of criminal behaviour or the consequences it involves for individuals (such as imprisonment). In this sense, it has been shown that there is a close relationship between incarceration and drug use (Montanari et al., 2014): up to 26% of drug users in European prisons started using drugs in prison, and up to 21% of imprisoned intravenous drug users began injecting in prison (Allwright et al., 2000; EMCDDA, 2002); similarly, prisoners also often take additional substances (Todts et al., 2008) or change to other substances or methods of use that are more problematic (Niveau & Ritter, 2008).

Beyond the three aspects proposed in the Goldstein model, which we have already seen (the psychopharmacological aspect, the economic-compulsive aspect and the systemic aspect), the connection between drug use and crime is often reinforced artificially with the addition of a fourth aspect – that inherent to those crimes that result directly from drug use, categorized in many cases as being “against public safety” or among crimes without victims (and, naturally, committed without violence), such as use (in private or in public) or possession of illegal drugs. Here, the link is direct and occurs in all cases, given the immediate penal classification.

These correlations and nexuses have historically been used as evidence to build profiles that automatically and causally link drug use and crime, and to justify repressive and educational measures as a means of reducing both phenomena.

And yet neither drug use nor crime occurs in a laboratory; rather, they are subject to a series of interactions with other pre-existing determinants that characterize their development (Otero López, 1997). The vulnerabilities, context-specific characteristics, social practices and dominant relational modes and ways of life, and the existence of cultural determinants that are associated with the informal, the violent and the illegal (or the pursuit of pleasure or new experiences, or the relief of pain), and the permanent interaction between these factors, are elements to take into account in efforts to understand the drug use–crime equation, even if the causal relationship can be shown to be spurious.

Responses in public policy

The impact of the criminalization of drug users has been dramatic. The connection of a large number of users with the penal justice system has had enormous personal, family, economic and social costs, making it hugely difficult to reintegrate such individuals both socially and into the job market, given the persistent presence of prior convictions. Moreover, many drug users have been exposed as a result to repressive police practices, abusive situations and restrictions to many of their basic civil, political and social rights. Meanwhile, criminalization has pushed drug use further underground, making it more difficult to implement inter-sectoral responses and to connect problematic users with health and social services and with treatment and harm reduction programmes. This has contributed to the transmission of serious illnesses, such as AIDS, and has put people's lives in danger.

These state responses have, in many cases, led to increased poverty and vulnerability, difficulties with reintegration in the social and work spheres and greater dependency on illegal economic practices and, eventually, on criminal activities that lead to violence. This has increased the potential for criminal recidivism of those who enter into this cycle, in which many are mired just because they are criminalized as simple users, without offering opportunities for recovery – social, economic or health-related.

We only need to look at the fact that prior convictions represent a formidable obstacle in the search for formal employment in many ways, leaving people with only informal or illegal income-generating opportunities. The rehabilitation function of the penal system has not been prioritized; on the contrary, prisons have emerged as an overpopulated space with the potential to generate violence, human rights abuses, criminal networks and criminal recidivism (UNDP, 2013).

Human development as the ultimate aim of interventions: Perspectives and promising initiatives

Anchoring drug policies in a human development paradigm supposes that these policies should no longer have a negative impact on the development of individuals, but should play out in favour of sustainable and inclusive development for all. Such policies, including those that relate to drug use problems, must not continue to insist on using objectives based on numbers of people detained, processed or imprisoned, but rather must look to count numbers of people who are positively and fully reintegrated in community life. When respect for human rights, public health, quality education for all, gender equity, citizen safety

and reduced violence, environmental sustainability and economic and social inclusion become our objectives, they also change our perspectives, as well as the incentives for and consequences of policies.

Using this lens brings us to a series of logical consequences that will facilitate a more effective approach to issues associated with problematic drug use and its possible links to crime, with priority given to the idea of “care” and individual well-being rather than zero tolerance and abstinence. This underlines the need for sustained efforts with regard to the determinants and risk factors that spread across people's involvement in criminal behaviour, based on what we have learned from the violence and crime prevention field. Social policies, as well as policies related to work and economic reintegration and social protection, should be at the centre of the response, along with appropriate prevention proposals targeting those who have already come into contact with drugs, whether or not this contact is problematic.

Another logical consequence will be the decriminalization of drug users, who should not be subjected to repressive methods or have to enter into the criminal or penal justice system. This would then substantially reduce the problems associated with this phenomenon. Approaching the problem from a community perspective, by contrast and, within this, offering access to treatment and harm reduction that is of sufficient diversity and quality, will promote social integration, reduce stigma and marginalization and facilitate the development of life plans within the community for those targeted. And it is more cost-effective to do this rather sooner than later.

This approach should incorporate specific measures, at the different intervention levels, to work with people who come up against the law and who also have problems with drug use (CICAD & OEA, 2014):

- Interventions before the criminal procedure aimed at avoiding contact with the criminal justice system and reducing prosecution, by means of programmes of “diversion” towards treatment and other social support services. Programmes like Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion in Seattle, United States, have produced interesting results.
- Criminal procedure methods that avoid imprisonment, in cases where prosecution occurs: alternative penalties such as fines or community service; judicial monitoring of treatment; or suspended sentence programmes (or the use of “conditional freedom”, as in the HOPE programme in Hawaii, United States) can eliminate some of the negative consequences of imprisonment. Similarly, these can play a role in mitigating the sentencing guidelines concerning drug-related offenses, as in Wales, England and the United States (Smart on Crime), in order to reduce convictions for this type of crime.

- Within the period of detention, facilitating universal access to treatment and harm reduction methods for the prison population, whose drug use problems are greater than those of the general population.²³
- Finally, post-procedural approaches that facilitate early release and improved social reintegration.

All these proposals entail adaptation of the programme design to specific contexts and populations. Involvement and active participation of the different public, private and civil society actors at the local level, and the provision of resources to facilitate effectiveness, are key elements in local communities developing successful solutions with an emphasis on economic and social inclusion.

Endnotes

1 The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the UN. Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined.

2 These characteristics were identified in a comparative study of seven national drug policies conducted by ICPC (2015). The study included a review of the literature and interviews with government representatives.

3 Early interventions generally support families with high risk factors from pregnancy onwards.

4 This refers to Belgium's *Directive commune de la Ministre de la Justice et du Collège des procureurs généraux relative à la constatation, l'enregistrement et la poursuite des infractions en matière de détention de cannabis*.

5 These specialized courts include representatives of social services and medical treatment, and work with users who have committed non-violent crimes (ICPC, 2015).

6 Establishments where the sale of cannabis is legal.

7 Shops specializing in the sale of legal plant based psychotropic drugs.

8 It must be noted that the Canadian government's approach to drug policy is moving towards a greater emphasis on harm reduction, as the Minister of Health, Jane Philpott, stressed during her plenary statement at UNGASS (Government of Canada & Health Canada, 2016). She noted the important work being done at supervised consumption sites such as *Insite* and mentioned the Canadian government is currently considering the legalization or decriminalization of cannabis.

9 See Section 4 of this chapter on *The characteristics of an effective prevention strategy*.

10 Research Consultant, Public Safety Canada.

11 Acting Director Research Division, Public Safety Canada.

12 See (Savignac, J. & Dunbar, L., 2015) for more details on the evidence-based approach and the selection of an effective programme.

13 See *Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development* for programmes for prevention and positive social development of young people; *Crime Solutions* for programmes related to prevention and the justice system; *Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy* and the *Top Tier* initiative for social programmes; *What Works Clearinghouse* for the field of education; and *What Works in Reentry Clearinghouse* for the reintegration of offenders.

14 See www.nrepp.samhsa.gov/ for more information on NREPP.

15 See <http://lifeskillstraining.com> for more information on the LST programme.

16 For more information on the evaluation results of the LST programme in the Canadian context, see (Rosario, G., 2016) Research report: Evaluation Summary of the Life Skills Training Program.

17 See <http://tnd.usc.edu/> for more information on the TND project.

18 See (Sécurité publique Canada, 2013) Evaluation summary: Results from the Towards No Drug Abuse (TND) Project.

19 See www.fftilc.com/ for more information on the FFT programme.

20 See www.strengtheningfamiliesprogram.org/ for more information on SFP.

21 See www.strengtheningfamiliesprogram.org/ for more information on SFP.

22 Advisor, Democratic Governance and Citizen Security, Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations Development Programme.

23 According to the US National Institute on Drug Abuse, only a fifth of prisoners who are dependent on drugs receive treatment (www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/criminal-justice/drug-addiction-treatment-in-criminal-justice-system#_edn4)

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CHAPTER 5

Crime prevention and drug use in an urban environment

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6

CITIES AND THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION

Cities and the prevention of violent radicalization

6

Introduction

Since the attack on the World Trade Centre in the United States (US), radicalization has been perceived as a global phenomenon, one that concerns both developed and developing countries (Bakker, 2006). *Al-Qaeda* and recently the *Islamic State* (IS) have become the symbols of worldwide networks and of the use of new technology to disseminate their messages across borders. Both organizations, in network form, have set up branches in different parts of the world, which take inspiration from their methods as well as from the demands and objectives of the umbrella organizations. In this sense, the phenomenon seems to be disconnected from the local context or the city. In addition, in Western countries, it seems as if cities have become the site of external threats.

Nevertheless, local factors are fundamental to understanding and intervening in relation to this phenomenon for a number of reasons. First, countries as dissimilar as Australia, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia,

Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the US, etc., on five continents, and each with very different characteristics, have seen the emergence of radical groups that utilize violence. They have emerged locally and historically, with varying degrees of seriousness, and drawing on different ideologies. Anarchists, Islamists, Christians, the extreme right, the extreme left, environmentalists, white supremacists, secessionists etc. have all embraced radicalization, drawing on the local problems and contexts from which they emerge. In this way, radicalization is a phenomenon with many faces, and Islamic radicalization is just one of them. Of the 201 terrorist attacks perpetrated in Europe in 2014, only 1% had a religious motive. The vast majority were linked to separatist groups, followed by anarchists and the extreme left (European Police Office, 2015). Meanwhile, in the US, there is relative agreement among researchers that the main terrorist threat does not come from Muslims, but rather from the local extreme right (Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013; Kurzman & Schanzer, 2015).

Following the attacks in London and Madrid, studies of terrorism have turned to the local characteristics of those involved (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). Unlike the attacks of September 11 2001, in which the perpetrators were essentially foreign, those in Europe have largely been perpetrated by native-born individuals who, even though they were inspired by *Al-Qaeda*, had become radicalized in their own countries (Kundnani, 2012; Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). This is what has become known as “home-grown terrorism”.¹ The vast majority of radicalized individuals active in Western countries were born, or have lived most of their lives, in the West. In the case of Islamism, many are converts to Islam. This is a theme that has become more accentuated by referring to them as “lone wolves” and “foreign fighters”.

In this new scenario, individual factors (profiles and backgrounds) are increasingly being linked to problems of integration, segregation and discrimination against individuals and communities, particularly in an urban context (Leiken, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Cities have also started to play an important role in developing interventions. While some national prevention strategies have encouraged work with

Figure 6.1 Percentage of terrorist attacks occurring in a city (1970-2014)

Australasia & Oceania	95,0%	
Central Asia	96,0%	
East Asia	99,7%	
South Asia	90,1%	
Southeast Asia	92,8%	
Middle East & North Africa	90,3%	
Sub-Saharan Africa	88,2%	
Central America & Carribea	97,1%	
South America	96,6%	
North America	98,8%	
Eastern Europe	85,1%	
Western Europe	99,6%	

Source: Authors, adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism -START (2014)

communities and local governments, it has been the cities themselves which have taken the initiative in this field by developing local prevention plans, many of which are considered as having some success (ICPC, 2015). This is the case in Aarhus and Copenhagen in Denmark, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Montreal in Canada.

However, we are still far from having developed an urban focus on radicalization. On the contrary, it continues to be seen as a national or international security problem. And yet increased attention to local factors and communities can help to illuminate the role and direction which cities can play. This chapter focuses, therefore, on examining some of these local factors and the role of communities, cities and urban environments.

Radicalization as a global phenomenon

Radicalization: A long-standing phenomenon

Despite the considerable resonance that Islamist radicalism has today, action which is considered terrorist has a long history in Western countries. It is generally considered that the “terror” period following the French Revolution was the starting point for the notion of “terrorism” (Khosrokhavar, 2014). Some historians date the phenomenon to much further back in history, such as the actions of the Zealots, a Hebrew movement that opposed the Roman colonization of Israel, as well as those of certain sects in the Middle Ages (Chaliand & Blin, 2015). At the end of the 19th and

Box 6.1 Defining violent radicalization


Radicalization is a broad-based phenomenon that does not always use violence, and that has, in many cases, encouraged social mobility. This is the case with feminism and the *Queer* movement within lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender groups, which have, despite being radical, made it possible to extend rights to large sections of the population. This chapter focuses on radicalization which uses or defends the use of violence, particularly that associated with the extreme right and Islamism², and in the Western context.

This type of violent radicalization has been defined in terms of “an individual or a group [which] adopts a violent form of action, directly linked to an extremist ideology with a political, social or religious aspect, and that contests the established order at the political, social or cultural level” (Khosrokhavar, 2014, p. 8–9).

beginning of the 20th centuries in Western countries a series of waves of extremism occurred (Chaliand & Blin, 2015; Grez, 2007). The first was associated with groups of anarchists in Europe, North America and Latin America. From the 1950s, and especially in the 1970s and 1980s, extreme left³ and separatist groups⁴ also emerged.

Figure 6.2 shows the evolution in the number of terrorist attacks per region and per decade between 1970 and 2014. As can be seen, between the 1970s and 1990s, Western Europe saw a period of intense

Figure 6.2 Number of terrorist attacks (1970–2014)



Source: Authors, adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism -START (2014)

extremist activity. Even if the attacks in France, Belgium and Germany in 2015 and 2016 were to be added, the rate in the 30 years prior to the new millennium was still higher than in the present decade. The case is similar in North America, showing a gradual decline in the number of attacks. Terrorism in Central and South America was widespread in the 1980s, when subversive far left groups emerged, both to start revolutions and to fight the military dictatorships in the region. This trend is reversed in Asia and Africa (except for East and Central Asia), with a constant increase in the number of attacks since the 1970s, and a big increase in the past few years. This is particularly true in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa – that is, the regions most affected by terrorism – which saw around 17,000 terrorist attacks between 2010 and 2014.

Sageman (2008a) has argued that there have been three waves of *jihadist* radicalization in recent years:

1. The *first wave* was established by Egyptians⁵ who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. They were the brothers-in-arms of Osama Bin Laden and help form Al-Qaeda. This wave involved well-educated men aged around 30.
2. The *second wave* was formed of young, well-educated Muslims aged around 25 who travelled to Afghanistan to train, and made up the majority of Al-Qaeda members.
3. The *third wave* is composed of young people of no more than 20 years of age on average, with no direct link with Al-Qaeda, but aspirations to become part of the movement. Unlike the other waves, not only is this group much younger, but also the individuals have lived most of their lives in the West, and have a much lower educational level.


In addition to these three waves, a *fourth* can be added, corresponding to the group of foreign fighters in the past few years who have travelled to Syria or Iraq to join the forces of IS or other organizations. It is estimated that there are now some 25,000 to 30,000 foreign fighters in these regions, from between 86 and 100 different countries (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015; Neumann, 2015; UNSC, 2015c). This new wave started in 2011 and grew rapidly in 2014, when it reached the figure of 18,000 (Schmid & Brief, 2015).

Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of foreign fighters around the world. Of all foreign fighters, 58% come from North Africa and the Middle East, 18% from Western Europe, and 17% from former Soviet republics (The Soufan Group, 2015). Of those from Western Europe, there is a high concentration from four countries: 74% from the countries of France (1,700), the UK (760), Germany (760) and Belgium (470). All of these countries have been the target of terrorist attacks in recent years.

Is the extreme right an underestimated threat?


Despite the extensive coverage which Islamic radicalism receives in the media, the extreme right is considered a major threat by security specialists. In the US in particular, incidents that can be attributed to the extreme right have been more frequent than those perpetrated by any Islamic counterpart. Between 1990 and 2010 for example, 140 “*lone wolf*” homicides were attributed to extreme right motives, while 30 were attributed to Islamic extremism (Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013). Figure 6.5 shows the number of people killed after the attacks

Figure 6.3 Number of deaths from terrorist attacks (1970–2014)



Source: Authors, adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism -START (2014)

Figure 6.4 Number of foreign fighters per country, 2015⁶



on the World Trade Centre. In this case, there were 48 victims of extreme right attacks, compared with 31 by *ihadists* (International Security, 2015).⁷ In reality, the main public security threat in the US does not come from *ihadists*, but from local extreme right groups (Kurzman & Schanzer, 2015).

In Europe, while the European Police Office (2014, 2015) reports that extreme right groups do not use terrorist methods, there has been a considerable increase in acts of xenophobic violence in both Western and Central Europe (Glaser, 2006; Melzer & Serafin, 2013). The increase began in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly in the former countries in the communist bloc (Rieker,

Schuster & Glaser, 2006). In the UK, there is a certain amount of evidence that such groups are more active and better structured than those associated with Islam (European Police Office, 2015).


A vast majority of young men

As suggested above, each new wave of Islamic radicalization has involved a group of people younger than the wave before, and essentially composed of males. In the first wave, those involved were around 30 years old; in the third wave identified by Sagemen

Box 6.2 Definition of a foreign fighter

UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2178, focuses on threats to peace and security as a result of terrorism, and states that “all Member States shall ensure that any person that participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice”. It defines a foreign fighter as “nationals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training” (UNSC, 2014b, p. 5).

Figure 6.5 Number of people killed in the US since 2001 per year by type of extremist group



Box 6.3 Lone wolves

According to Bates (2012, p. 2), “lone wolf terrorism involves violent acts by self-radicalized individuals designed to promote a cause or belief”. However, for others, neither self-radicalization nor organizational independence seem to be essential characteristics (Gill, Horgan & Deckert, 2014). Gill et al. consider there are three types of lone wolf (2014, p. 426):

1. individual terrorists who operate autonomously and independently of a group in terms of training, preparation and selection of targets;
2. individual terrorists who maintain links with organizations and who have received training and equipment but ultimately act autonomously;
3. isolated dyads of individuals who operate independently of a group.

(2008a), they were around 20. As Silber and Bhatt (2007) suggest, young men aged 15–35 years from patriarchal societies have a greater probability of radicalizing than others. The same age-span can be observed among foreign fighters (UNSC, 2015b), and in the case of Europeans, the age range may be even lower (18–29 years) (Briggs, Obe & Silverman, 2014). Age is also a factor that plays a role in other types of radicalization. For example, young men under the age of 18 on the extreme right have a greater probability of resorting to violence (Pauwels & De Waele, 2014).

As in other cases, *lone wolves* differ in many respects from other radicalized individuals. In terms of age, for example, a worldwide study by Gill, Horgan & Deckert (2014) found that even when the age range was broadened (from 15 to 69 years), the average age was still higher (33 years) than for other extremists. Again, the great majority were male (96.6%). The age of lone wolves at the time of their first violent incident also varied. Those motivated by Islamic jihadism were much younger on average than those from the extreme right. Another study of the extreme right in the US also found that lone wolves were much younger than other adherents (Gruenewald, Chermak & Freilich, 2013).

Women and radicalization: Anchored in traditional roles

Despite the overwhelming majority of men, the role of women in radicalization has become a concern in recent years, as a number of young women have left to join IS – a phenomenon that is thought to be increasing (UNSC, 2015c). An estimated 10% to 12% of the young foreigners present in the territories controlled by IS are women; this proportion approaches 18% in the

case of Europeans (Bakker, De Leede & Note, 2015; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). There are several explanations for this: religious, political and personal. In the specific case of IS, most of these young women appear to be motivated by religion and the formation of the Caliphate (Havlicek, 2015; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015a). In the US, the presence of women in extreme right groups has also increased significantly in recent years. It is thought to be influenced by the economic crisis, job instability among their partners, and fear of becoming victims of the actions of ‘foreigners’ or people who are culturally different (Blee & Creasap, 2010).

The role these women play in both cases continues to be traditional. Men who belong to extreme right groups tend to see women as accessories in the fight for white supremacy, motivated by their maternal responsibilities and emotions (Blee & Creasap, 2010). Blee (2005) suggests that some white supremacist groups use women because of their central role in families, because they are unlikely to become police informants, or because their commitment to the cause provides a more benign image of the organization. Their role in violence, however, remains secondary.

The case of Islamic extremism appears to be similar. Women are seen as inferior, and are frequently the victims of crime and sexual abuse (Havlicek, 2015). A study of frontline stakeholders in France (teachers, social workers, etc.) found that they considered the disrespect some men have for women as an indicator for identifying radicalized individuals (Beski-Chafiq, Birmant, Benmerzoug, Tabi & Goignard, 2010).

Even though few studies discuss the subject of gender in depth, conceptualizations of the roles of men and women within society would seem to be associated with the radicalization processes. Among other factors⁸, inequality between the sexes appears to be associated with countries with high terrorism rates (Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey & Feinberg, 2013).

Decentralization, autonomy and personal networks

Following the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, much of Al-Qaeda’s organizational support, training network and hideouts were dismantled by the coalition led by the US (Taarnby, 2005). However, this did not result in a decrease in radicalization, but rather in a change in the processes and the networks involved. As suggested by Sageman (2004, 2008b), as the influence of groups such as Al-Qaeda have decreased in terms of their formal structures, the networks are growing more autonomous and self-active, even while still inspired by the initial umbrella organizations. In this way:

“The Global Jihad does not resemble a traditional organization and there is no point in trying to portray the structure in any kind of organizational diagram. The global Jihad works on quite a different principle, much like that of a social movement defined by a shared ideology and personal interaction” (Taarnby, 2005, p. 25).

US military action, however, seems to have increased a trend which was already in motion. Al-Qaeda had already defined itself as a network that provided not only training and logistic support, but also an ideological framework and meaning for its actions, making it possible to reproduce these in other contexts. The same can be said for IS. Al-Qaeda developed branches of its umbrella organization in different regions, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has also had several branches both in the Middle East and in North Africa (Ashour, 2008).

This argument has been refuted by Hoffmann in the case of Al-Qaeda, who has suggested that the network Bin Laden created still has the ability to organize centralized attacks (2008). The confirmation of a direct, hierarchical relationship between IS and the cells that carried out the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016, could suggest a turning point in the decentralization trend.

In this context, more than ideology, the internet, or links to a particular organization, radicalization can be better explained by the personal links that individuals establish between each other, particularly within isolated communities (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Individuals of more or less the same age, who share life similar experiences and have similar opinions, and who live in more or less the same neighbourhoods, start a radicalization process together. In a study in the US, for example, 93% of Sunni militants, whether converted or not, have had a group influence in their radicalization process, and 42% have been radicalized by horizontal contacts – family, friends, etc. – (Kleinmann, 2012). This decentralization would explain the increase in home-grown terrorism and lone wolves, as well as self-activated and self-radicalized independent cells. Such cells lack direct contacts, not only with the umbrella organizations, but also between themselves.

Despite this decentralization, the role of the “recruiters” or “gatekeepers” continues to be important. “Gatekeepers” are former *jihadists* with experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, etc. who are used as bridges between cells and other extremist groups. They provide tactical, political and religious knowledge (Nesser, 2006). Even while many of them use websites as a recruitment source, most prefer their

Box 6.4 The influence of the internet on radicalization?

It is well accepted that the internet is a means of communication that is both fast and cheap, and has made it possible to propagate radical ideas, plan and coordinate actions and recruit new members widely (UNSC, 2015a). However, there is also a consensus that its influence in the radicalization process is relatively limited (Ducol, 2015; Pauwels, De Ruyver, Brion, Easton, Schils, & Laffineur, 2015). Rather than a fundamental factor, the internet appears to be a facilitator: the “virtual environment is actually one element amongst several others in producing radicalization paths” (Ducol, 2015, p. 267). Given this, the web may have more influence in the initial phases of the jihadist recruitment process, by helping to open peoples’ minds to radical ideas (Erez, Weimann & Weisburd, 2011; Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher & Sheenhan, 2012).

informal social connections. Within communities, gatekeepers are well known individuals who people know they can turn to (Hegghammer, 2006).

Religion: More than an explanatory factor – a facilitator

Religious motivation often seems to be associated with recent radicalization processes, particularly in the case of Islam. However, Islam is not the only religion involved in radicalization, and the relationship between the two phenomena is both relative and complex. Paradoxically, those who become radicalized do not necessarily have close links with religion to start with – either because they were not profoundly religious, or because they are only recent converts (Sageman, 2004, 2007). In both cases, a lack of knowledge about those religious beliefs seems to be a risk factor: as Khosrokhavar (2014) argues, *jihadists* in the West are more easily radicalized when they have a narrow vision of Islam. In Australia, for example, the profiles of extremists suggest weak religious beliefs (Zammit, 2010). Other studies demonstrate that frequency of mosque attendance does not increase sympathy for radical causes (Bhui, Warfa & Jones, 2014), and in the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany, such sympathy decreased, as identification with Islam increased (Simon, Reirchert & Grabow, 2013).

Contrary to the perception that radicalized individuals have a narrow traditional concept of Islam, there is some evidence that the religious focus of second generation immigrants in the West is more of an intellectual and individual one – that it combines as many

Box 6.5 What characterizes an extremist group based on religious beliefs?

1. *Apocalyptic beliefs* – “whereby the conventional rules and norms of society, and even its laws, are relativized in the face of the imminent fulfilment of God’s law; an anticipatory socialization and preparation for violent times and the persecution of the righteous; the demonization of opponents; and seeing the world in terms of an exemplary-dualism, sorting everything into simple categories of good and evil, “for us” and “against us.” (Dawson, 2010, p. 11).
2. *Charismatic leadership* – when groups are centred on the presence of a powerful, generally paranoid and narcissistic leader, with strong belief in his or her own ideas.
3. *Conspiracy theories* – essentially present in religious groups on the extreme right, which justify the belief that most main historical events are the result of secret conspiracies that benefit certain groups or individuals.
4. *Social encapsulation* – the process by which groups progressively put up barriers – both symbolical and physical – between their members and the rest of society.

Source: Bartlett & Miller (2010); Berlet & Vysotsky (2006); Borum (2014); Dawson (2010, p. 10-16); De Graaff (2010)

cultural elements of their religion, as of their experiences in Western society (Sirseldoudi, 2012). Thus religious individualization, it is argued, fosters the feeling among young people that they do not belong, which, when further enhanced by socio-economic and structural factors, can facilitate radicalization (Khosrokhavar, 2014).

Religious beliefs have also been found to be strongly associated with extreme right groups (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Rowatt, Shen, LaBouff & Gonzales, 2013). In the US, for example, 64.5% of such groups have some religious beliefs, 53.6% of them Christian, and 35.5% are highly religious (Fitzgerald, 2011). In the same study, those with a Christian identity had a higher likelihood of justifying the use of violence than others.

No clear profiles of radicalized individuals⁹


There is general agreement that the extent of scientific knowledge about radicalization and its prevention is still limited (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). This relates to the study of radicalization in general, but is particularly evident in relation to extreme right radicalization. In a systematic review undertaken by ICPC (2015) on a set of 32 factors used to explain both types of radicalism, only 11 found any consensus

between researchers (4 for both types, 5 exclusively for Islamist radicalism, and 2 exclusively for extreme right radicalism).

Thus apart from the fact that radicalization overwhelming involves young men, there is no consensus regarding other related factors such as socio-economic status, job, education, the type of family from which they come, or criminal history. Sageman (2004, 2007), for example, reported that his interviewees who were from a range of countries had a good educational level, were generally of middle-class origin, were mostly married, and did not have a criminal record. On the contrary, a similar European study found most individuals interviewed were single and of working-class origin, and many of them had a criminal record (Bakker, 2006). Nor do radicalized individuals appear to have more mental health problems than the general population (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010), except in the case of lone wolves, who are generally more socially isolated, and often suffer from depression or other psychological problems (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). Both personal crises, and unfavourable experiences (such as injustice and discrimination), more than being explanatory factors, appear to facilitate radicalization. This suggests they are not in themselves sufficient to lead someone down this path.

These findings underline that, despite the explosion of interest in the phenomenon of radicalization, and the considerable increase in research in the past few years (see Figure 6.6), very little is actually known about it. This can be explained by the nature of radicalization itself: the number of cases is limited and very diverse. The profile of radicals is the most pertinent example, given that there is no consensus on the common characteristics of those involved. Nor has a single radicalization ‘pathway’ been identified, despite the efforts of researchers to identify one. As McCauley and Moskalenko conclude: “there are many different paths. How many can be estimated by calculating how many different combinations can be made of the mechanisms already identified” (2010, p. 88).

Figure 6.6 Growth in the publication of articles on radicalization in 30 specialized journals



Source: Kundnani (2012, p. 7)

Nor do the sources used in many of these studies involve primary data. Information is frequently secret, and in most cases the exclusive preserve of intelligence agencies. Researchers often find themselves obliged to seek out open sources including the media, Google searches, and Wikipedia entries or Facebook profiles (ICPC, 2015).

Violent radicalization as a local phenomenon: Between global and daily experiences

While a number of countries and cities have placed an emphasis on building the capacities of citizens to prevent radicalization – the study of local urban factors that explain radicalization is relatively limited. To a large extent, global or international approaches predominate, together with a focus on the characteristics of individuals, such as the insistence on examining the profiles of extremists or their individual paths. Problems of integration are often cited as root causal factors, but even then they tend to be seen in relation to society as a whole, and few specific elements are identified in an urban context. The following section examines these factors in greater detail, looking first at the problems of social integration facing communities, and at how these problems are represented at the individual and group level. Lastly, it examines the relationship between social cohesion and radicalization.

Integration, segregation and marginalization

The lack of community integration, particularly of migrants, is generally considered a key factor explaining radicalization processes in Western countries (Belkin, Blanchard, Ek & Mix, 2011; Paris, 2007). Despite the emphasis that many European countries have historically placed on integration processes, none of the approaches used have been successful enough to prevent the development of parallel societies. There has been a progressive, symbolic and spatial isolation of these communities within cities, particularly Muslim communities (Leiken, 2005). As Leiken argues, “As a consequence of demography, history, ideology, and policy, western Europe now plays host to often disconsolate Muslim offspring, who are its citizens in name but not culturally or socially” (2005, p. 123). In North America, on the contrary, migrants arrive in countries that were built by migration, with vast territories making possible a geographical distribution of communities, and greater opportunities for success (Leiken, 2005). This may in part explain the lower rate of Islamist radicalization in North America in relation to Europe.

In most cases, integration and social cohesion have become the central objectives of policies to prevent radicalization (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Paradoxically, some of these strategies have succeeded in increasing the distance between local societies and their cultural minorities. The case of the national strategy PREVENT in the UK is the most obvious. For many, PREVENT has not only failed to improve the integration of communities and to prevent radicalization, but it has increased both the stigmatization of Muslim communities, and their feelings of exclusion (Awan, 2012). This may be because such policies create the idea that integration is the sole responsibility of immigrants or of Muslim communities themselves, rather than society as a whole (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010).

This lack of integration has two sides: one socio-economic, one ethno-cultural. From a socio-economic point of view, Muslims in Europe are systematically poorer, with higher rates of unemployment and low representation in public life compared with others (Murshed & Pavan, 2011). From an ethno-cultural point of view, they experience various forms of discrimination, stigmatization and negative attitudes from society as a whole, and suffer particularly from biases perpetrated in the media and by political rhetoric (Abbas, 2007; Bakker, 2015).

These factors have not only increased the symbolic distance between society and such minorities, but also the physical distance. In Europe in particular, as a result of problems of integration, cultural communities have tended to segregate themselves physically, operating in effect like parallel societies, speaking a different language and with their own cultural practices (Alexiev, 2011; Paris, 2007). The Molenbeek district in Belgium – the birthplace of those who carried out the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016 – is perhaps the most obvious example (see Box 6.6). However, this pattern is repeated in a number of countries, because of past colonial relationships. Muslim communities in Western countries are often former colonies of their host country, or form geographical enclaves (Pakistanis in the UK, Algerians in France, and Turks in Germany etc.), which can lead to conflict between them (Cesari, 2008). Cities change as a result of these problems of integration, and this becomes one more factor pushing people towards radicalization.

Grievances, isolation, identity, sense of belonging and personal networks

While there is no consensus on how far feelings of injustice or experience of discrimination play a role in radicalization (ICPC, 2015), for some researchers these factors function as symptoms of structural factors, providing a framework for ideology, and leading them into violence (Bjergo, 2005). Young people who

Box 6.6 The commune of Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, Brussels, Belgium


The commune of Molenbeek-Saint Jean (Brussels, Belgium) has sadly become infamous because of its links to the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels (Stroobants, 2015). In the media, it is presented at times as both a hotbed of radicalization and a *ghetto* (Laumonier, 2015).

Molenbeek, however, is a good example of the problems of economic, socio-cultural and spatial integration, particularly of immigrants. Just 15 minutes by foot from the centre of Brussels, this small commune of just 5.9 square kilometres, housing almost 96,000 inhabitants, is one of the poorest in the country, with a high unemployment rate and a high degree of spatial segregation (Englert, Luyten, Mazina & Yannart, 2015; IBSA, 2015). One in nine children lives in a household with no income, and there are high levels of insecurity (IBSA, 2013).

Numerous studies have shown the systematic discrimination suffered by immigrants in Belgium, particularly with regard to access to employment and housing (Teich, 2015). The latter is especially present in Molenbeek, where the immigrants most affected are of North African origin (Teich, 2015).

As this graph shows, Molenbeek has three very distinct sectors. That with the lowest average income is also one of the most densely populated areas, with a significant percentage of single-parent families, and a high rate of immigrants or children of immigrants (Observatoire de la Santé et du Social de Bruxelles, 2010). The so-called Arab quarter is also within this sector.

Figure 6.7 Average income geographical area in Molenbeek-Saint Jean, 2015



Even when socio-economic factors do not appear to have a direct influence on radicalization, the combination of poverty, lack of opportunities, experience of discrimination and urban segregation of communities has helped to create contexts which are favourable to radicalization such places as this (Coolsaet, 2015). The current generation of Belgian foreign fighters in Syria has experienced these problems first hand in Molenbeek or in similar urban areas (Coolsaet, 2015).

join extreme right groups also tend to see their own situation in terms of injustice or discrimination (Pauwels & de Waele, 2014).

In some cases, it may be less a function of personal experience, than of the group which is itself a cultural minority (Ponsaers, Noppe, De Ruyver, Hellinckx, Easton, Velde, & Verhage, 2015). This may explain why well-educated people who are well integrated into society, can be radicalized. Belonging to a diaspora, for example, especially among those experiencing rejection on a daily basis, as is the case in Muslim communities, may increase feelings of isolation. Establishing links with others with similar experiences or characteristics can provide protection within the wider society. In the UK, for example, the isolation felt by the Somali community has made it easy to recruit poor unemployed young men to the Al-Shabaab group (Taarnby & Hallundbaek, 2010). Beyond ideology or organizational ties, or causes

perceived as just, radicalization is often a process that is conducted through personal connections, and takes place in groups (Wiktorowicz, 2004). The feeling of belonging thus plays a key role in this process, particularly in isolated communities.

Simon et al. (2013) argue that the incompatibility of belonging both to a cultural minority and to the broader society in which one lives, is associated with an increase in sympathy for radical ideas. Conversely, compatibility between the two enables people to utilize traditional political processes. Another study that compares violent and non-violent radical groups found that non-violent radical groups were more accepting of pluralism and tolerance (Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010).

In segregated enclaves which are socially and culturally isolated, and in the absence of direct contacts with extremist organizations, the radicalization process is conducted through small groups of people

Box 6.7 The quest for identity and significance

The quest for identity and significance, especially among young people born in the West, is one of the key factors that many researchers agree about. Hogg (2013, 2014) for example, found in a number of studies that young people who are uncertain about their identity have a greater likelihood of identifying with a radical group. Kruglansky (2014) similarly found that a search for significance – a need for recognition – was a key motivational factor among such individuals. For some, this quest is typical of the identity crisis experienced in adolescence (Beski-Chafiq et al., 2010); for others, it is also influenced by macro-social variables associated with late modernity (Khosrokhavar, 2014). In the latter case, individualism and the values specific to western societies push young people to seek out an alternative individual identity (Khosrokhavar, 2014). Whatever the problem, armed combat appears to be a practical response to this quest for significance or identity, inasmuch as it provides normative certainties and “just causes” for life. In this way, becoming involved in a terrorist group makes it possible for people with low self-esteem to establish their identity, or others who are seeking to belong to defend their identity (Victoroff, 2005).

who live in the same areas, have experienced similar situations and have reached similar conclusions. In some cases they leave for conflict zones; in others, if they are lucky, they contact “gatekeepers” who provide them with ideological and tactical support. In many other cases, the groups continue autonomously, even if they are inspired by large terrorist organizations, and decide to act on their own.

Radicalization: Cause and consequences of social cohesion problems at the local level

Levels of social cohesion and resilience are also seen as explanatory variables for radicalization, particularly in national and local prevention programmes in Western countries (ICPC, 2015). Social cohesion has been defined as “the ability of a society to be inclusive of all cultural and social groups, so that they work co-operatively” (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley & Jones, 2012, p. 3). Zhao et al., suggest it is composed of five elements (Zhao, 2010, p. 41):

1. material condition (employment, income, health, education, and housing),
2. passive social relationships (social order, safety, and freedom from fear),
3. active social relationships (positive interactions, exchanges and networks between individuals and communities),
4. extent of social inclusion or integration of people into the mainstream institutions of civil society,
5. and level of fairness or disparity regarding access to opportunities or material circumstances.

In this case, radicalization is considered as much a cause as a consequence of poor social cohesion. In the case of violent racism, for example, extremism is seen as a threat because it does not only affects the victims, but those around them and society as a whole (Bleich, 2007). Schmid (2013) notes that radicalization is generally thought to occur only on one side, when

in fact the polarization process, both within a society and between societies, radicalizes people just as frequently on both sides. This is the case with waves of Islamophobia which individual Muslims and communities have experienced. Such attacks affect the targeted victims directly, but many others indirectly, by reducing social cohesion within a community. It tends to reduce access to better social-economic conditions for those groups, again impacting passive and active social relations, and integration within communities.

Some researchers see poor social cohesion as causal. In countries which have experienced long-standing conflicts, the weakness and deterioration of the state has led to a decline in social cohesion. Civil wars and political and social instability encourage the rise of fundamentalist groups (El-Said, 2015). A decline in social cohesion has also been associated with an increase in tension and cultural and religious conflicts, which can in turn facilitate polarization, radicalization and violence (Butt and Tuck, 2014).

Thus radicalization appears to work in a vicious circle, supported by the conjunction of socio-cultural factors, including the deterioration of social cohesion, and problems of integration at the community level. These factors, fuelled by the action of extremist groups, end up polarizing societies and communities, further increasing the decline in social cohesion, integration, and the isolation of communities. This is why many national, and especially local strategies regard increasing social cohesion as one of their main objectives (Vidino and Brandon, 2012): “Creating more cohesive societies has a number of social benefits, and can also increase resilience to violent and extremist ideologies although the relationship between the two concepts is not necessarily linear” (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2010, p. 23).

Box 6.8 Situational explanations

Situational prevention is probably one of the best-developed approaches in criminology. It links the personal and rational decisions of victims and offenders with opportunities in specific contexts, developing a causal model for action and explaining why individual acts takes place in those contexts (Schils and Pauwels, 2014). Situations offer opportunities for criminal acts – thus the model is well suited to urban contexts. It includes Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), which seeks to reduce opportunities for crime by changes to the design of housing or public spaces etc. (Shaw, 2010).

In relation to radicalization, opportunities studies have identified two sets of factors: political opportunities, and situational opportunities, which is the focus here.¹⁰ The classic theory of opportunities is based on the notion that offenders make rational decisions on the basis of an evaluation of contextual opportunities (Felson and Clarke, 1998). Clarke and Newmann (2007, 2009) have applied the concept to terrorism, with the objective of reducing the opportunities for committing a terrorist act. They identify five ways in which this can be achieved:

1. increasing the effort terrorists require to complete their actions, for example, through instituting identity controls,
2. increasing the risks of getting caught,
3. reducing the rewards for terrorists, for example, by reducing the damage they can cause,
4. reducing the provocation of terrorists, for example, by preventing the use of violence,
5. and eliminating the excuses for carrying out a terrorist act, for example, by promoting dialogue with them.

Situational Action Theory (SAT) developed by Wikström (2006, 2010) argues that

“(1) acts of crime are a special case of moral actions (acts of moral rule breaking stated in law) and therefore need to be explained as such; and (2) that people engage in acts of crime because they (a) come to see such acts as viable action alternatives, and (b) choose (habitually or deliberately) to carry them out” (Bruinsma, Pauwels, Weerman, & Bernasco, 2015, p. 365).

As a moral action, criminal or terrorist acts, in this case, have a definition of good and evil, which in turn is a redefinition of the moral rules defined at the societal level. The alternative perceived action and moral choice that a person makes depend on the interaction between their individual susceptibility (individual characteristics and experiences) and their exposure to specific surroundings (Bouhana & Wikstrom, 2011).

“Moral habits form in response to repeated exposure to particular settings and circumstances and are activated when the same (or similar) kinds of settings and circumstances are encountered, while rational deliberation (moral judgements) tends to occur when a person takes part in unfamiliar settings or circumstances, or encounters conflicting rule-guidance” (Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2011, p. 18).

The individuals act and develop specific settings, which are defined as the part of the entourage (people, objects, events) these individuals experience through their feelings (Bouhana & Wikstrom, 2011). The situational context is thus much more wide-ranging than that which is defined by Clarke and others.

Certain settings can trigger personal vulnerabilities in relation to radicalization. A hostile prison context, for example, and limited knowledge of Islam can produce this result (Bouhana & Wikstrom, 2011). Other factors that explain this situational triggering are socialization and personal experiences, above all those which are life-changing. Like many researchers, Bouhana and Wikstrom (2011) stress personal networks and attachment to sources of socialization and vigilance such as family, friends, etc.. In this way, an individual raised with unconventional and/or violent moral codes may see violence as a viable alternative. All these situational factors can lead to the development of a radical setting.

Schils and Pauwels (2014) demonstrate empirically that there is a relation between individual susceptibility and radical settings. In this case, those who have a high susceptibility for violent extremism are also those who are the most likely to be influenced by a radical milieu. On the contrary, those who are less likely develop more resistance to these contexts.

International standards

A number of recent initiatives by the UN and other international organizations relate to radicalization and its prevention. They include a range of resolutions, norms and standards and recommendations.

UN resolutions

The UN recently adopted several resolutions regarding aspects of radicalization, particularly in relation to local terrorism, indoctrination by violent ideologies, and foreign fighters (UN General Assembly, 2015a; UNSC, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016).

The UNSC Resolution 2250 (2016), for example, puts an emphasis on the importance of involving young people in the prevention of radicalization, by encouraging their active participation, and constructive political commitment in national and regional decision-making processes, and in relation to peacebuilding and countering violent extremism. To achieve this, it promotes a multi-dimensional approach that emphasises tolerance, inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue, and countering extremist rhetoric.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSCE has similarly invited its Member States to develop prevention strategies to reduce the risks of radicalization (OSCE, 2015). In particular, it promotes a multi-dimensional approach to the problem, targeting the range of factors contributing to the increase in extremism, reducing negative socio-economic factors,

and using educational approaches centred on tolerance and intercultural dialogue, among other things. It also promotes a cooperative approach, from the international to the local level, sharing information and good practices between governments as well as civil society, the private sector, universities and the media. Particular emphasis is placed on the inclusion of youth in prevention, the empowerment of women and sexual equality and inter-faith dialogue. Each of these elements mirrors the recommendations of the UN.

Council of Europe

In May 2015, the Committee of Ministers at the Council of Europe adopted the Action Plan for the Fight against Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism (Council of Europe, 2015). The plan aims to 1) reinforce the legal framework; and 2) prevent and fight violent radicalization through concrete measures, in particular in schools and prisons and on the internet.

In relation to the first objective, the action plan recommends the elimination of legal inconsistencies and loopholes between countries that could be exploited by extremists. This includes updating the legislation to include emerging topics such as foreign fighters, cross-border travel, terrorist training, the financing of terrorism and lone terrorists. It also gives priority to signing and ratifying relevant Council of Europe instruments between Member States.

In relation to the second objective, the plan recommends promoting skills training in the culture of democracy and intercultural dialogue in schools to promote more inclusive societies and a discourse that

Box 6.9 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism

The UN General Assembly Plan of Action promotes the development of national and regional strategies to prevent violent extremism. At the national level, it recommends the implementation of a multi-disciplinary platform that combines both repressive and preventive aspects. The fundamental aspects that must be taken into consideration in these plans are equality before the law and transparency, as well as participation, inclusion and representation in the political sphere and civil society. In particular, it promotes the participation of local populations and non-governmental organizations in the development of these strategies. Understanding that the basic conditions of countries are fundamental to this problem, and the action plan encourages national strategies to focus on poverty, education, equality of the sexes and the empowerment of women, economic growth, peace and justice. In this context, it emphasizes the importance of fighting against marginalization and promoting integration within societies and communities. In line with Resolution 2178, the plan also puts a particular emphasis on foreign fighters, promoting cooperation between states.

At the regional level, understanding that extremism has no borders, the UN promotes regional and sub-regional plans with the aim of improving coordination and cooperation processes between countries and institutions, promoting technical assistance and information exchanges.

Sources: UN General Assembly (2015b); UNSC (2014b)

Box 6.10 European conventions and protocols relating to violent extremism

- Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005 – No. 196) signed and ratified by 32 countries.
- Additional Protocol, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (2015).
- Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (2005 – No. 198) signed and ratified by 26 countries.
- Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (2003 – No. 189) signed and ratified by 24 countries.

Source: Council of Europe (2015)

counters radical extremism. In the case of prisons, it recommends developing prison and probation systems with practical guidelines on this subject. Finally, in relation to the internet, it strongly recommends combatting hate speech by extremist groups, primarily through awareness campaigns.

What is being done to prevent violent radicalization?¹¹

National prevention strategies targeting the local level

There are at least four types of public policy linked to counter-radicalization: those which focus on public security; those which outline broad-based integration strategies; strategies which specifically focus on the prevention of radicalization; and those which focus on the rehabilitation or de-radicalization of extremists. One common feature of national strategies is the tendency to develop a mixed approach that targets both security and prevention – for example measures associated with surveillance and identity control, as well as social prevention measures such as increasing integration and social cohesion (Lindekilde, 2012). The same can be said for local strategies. Given recent UN resolutions on terrorism prevention, and those of the Council of Europe (see above), it is likely that governments will develop specific national and regional prevention strategies. This appears to be the case in Canada, where the government anticipates developing an integrated prevention strategy (Bouvier-Auclair, 2016, June 2).

Box 6.11 Defining counter-radicalization and de-radicalization

“Counter-radicalization” policies are defined by the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force as:

“policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists”

And de-radicalization programmes as:

“programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence”

Source: UN CounterTerrorism Implementation Task Force (2006, p. 5)

Bakker and Singleton (2016) argue that in Western countries, governments have traditionally responded to radicalization and violent extremism from the perspective of **public security**, emphasizing protection of the values of the West and punishment (*hard policies*), rather than dissuasion or prevention. They argue these measures have been short-sighted in that they focus on symptoms rather than deep-rooted causes, and aim to “deter, disrupt, detect and detain, separate and raise the ‘cost’ of radicalization” (Bakker & Singleton, 2016, p. 22). These measures include criminalizing acts or attempts, giving law enforcement agencies more rights and resources, the withdrawal of passports and the deprivation of nationality in cases of dual nationality.¹² The reaction of the government of France following the attacks in November 2015 provides another example.

Other countries lack national prevention policies, but incorporate certain counter-radicalization measures into **comprehensive integration strategies**. For example, Spain, despite having experienced at first hand an attack in Madrid in 2004, has preferred to focus on cultural dialogue and understanding (Belkin et al., 2011).

Countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia have developed **programmes for de-radicalization and rehabilitation of extremists**, particularly in prison settings. These programmes are characterized by at least three components (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010):

- *psychological rehabilitation* that takes into account the emotional needs of prisoners;

- *religious rehabilitation*, whose aim is to counteract radical Islamist ideology; prisoners hold religious discussions with religious scholars concerning their conception of Islam;
- *social rehabilitation*, which aims to provide prisoners with training that will allow them to develop professional skills.

In addition, programmes in Saudi Arabia and Singapore, for example, provide family support with practical and emotional assistance to the families of prisoners, as well as monitoring prisoners in the community once they have been released (El-Said, 2015; Lankford & Gillespie, 2011). France has recently announced the creation of de-radicalization centres which will take young people who voluntarily agree to attend them, as well as those sentenced to attend because of their involvement in radical movements (Le Monde, 2016, March 10).

Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK are the first Western countries to have developed a specific public policy for the **prevention of radicalization**. These policies focus specifically on local and community factors, aiming to intervene with individuals encountered in the early stages of the radicalization process (Rabasa et al., 2010). These are what is known as *soft* or *liberal policies* (Lister, 2015). Denmark and the Netherlands have developed wide-ranging approaches that take into consideration all forms of radicalization, particularly Islamic and that of the extreme right. The British programme (CONTEST), focuses mainly on Islamic extremism. These preventive approaches stem from the emergence of *home-grown terrorism* in Western countries, and have been developed particularly since the attacks in Madrid and London, which, as suggested above were perpetrated by young men who were native-born (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013).

Such policies recognize the difficulty of distinguishing between individuals at risk because of their socio-economic status or integration problems, and those who are a potential risk to security. The strategies are, therefore, closely linked to concerns about the integration of communities, social cohesion and the fight against discrimination (Lindekilde, 2012). While there are general guidelines, these strategies leave considerable freedom for cities to develop initiatives locally, since it is recognized that local authorities are best placed to detect early signs of radicalization and to intervene quickly.

Given the strong emphasis placed on local work, and a multi-sector approach, coordination is a central priority. At both national and local levels, coordination is seen as fundamental to attaining the objectives (Bjørge, 2005). For example, the national plan in Norway highlights inter-ministerial coordination in its fight against radicalization (Vidino & Brandon, 2012).

Box 6.12 The role of police in the prevention of radicalization

Neumann (2011) argues that a community policing approach is fundamental in the prevention of radicalization, to increase trust between the community and the police, although it is important that that police role does not become mixed with a counter-radicalization strategy. It has been suggested that zero tolerance policing is inappropriate for preventing radicalization (Paris, 2007). It increases distrust between the police and the community, reduces sources of information, focuses police time on minor infractions, and leads to the violation of minority rights.

The role of the police in the prevention of radicalization varies between cities. In the US, for example, and particularly in Los Angeles and New York, prevention strategy has been delegated to the police departments (Neumann, 2011; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The Los Angeles Police Department has implemented a community programme with the aim of increasing the trust of the Muslim community (Neumann, 2011). In Utrecht and Almere in the Netherlands, on the other hand, the police also use a proactive rather than a reactive approach to radicalization, but form part of a network with the community (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015b). Rotterdam has developed a mixed approach (combining both *hard* and *soft* policies) (Rabasa et al., 2010). The police play a central role in detecting cases, and evaluating appropriate prevention interventions for individuals. France, on the contrary, has had a traditional policing approach that has been shown to be ineffective in its work with communities, as seen in the riots in Paris in 2005 (Paris, 2007).

Coordination between national and local levels

The relationship between national and local strategies varies from one country to another. In some cases cities have benefited from national initiatives and implemented **similar local plans**. De-radicalization projects in Copenhagen and Aarhus in Denmark were piloted by the Danish Ministry for Integration in 2009, and are among the best-known projects globally (Vidino and Brandon, 2012).

In other countries, cities have **developed policies that are distinct from national policy**, when they considered them unsuitable. The city of Breda in the Netherlands, felt that the national strategy was not

adapted to the reality of its Muslim communities, while Amsterdam prefers to work on the wider-ranging concept of social cohesion, using a range of interventions (Van Heelsum, 2011).

In other cases, cities have taken the initiative and preceded and inspired the development of regional or national policies. The city of Montreal, Canada, for example, recently created the “Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization leading to Violence”.¹³ Its approach combines aspects of work in Denmark and the Netherlands, including individual and psychosocial interventions modelled on Danish ones. The aims of the centre are:

- 1) to implement practical action to prevent radicalization and violent discourse;
- 2) provide psychosocial support to individuals, their families, interveners, and the community;
- 3) aid the social reinsertion of radicalized individuals;
- 4) undertake research to increase knowledge about radicalization; and
- 5) disseminate knowledge and information.

As a city initiative, its remit has expanded beyond the city with the support of the government of Quebec. It is hoped that in time it will work with other provinces in Canada. The model has also been copied by the city of Bordeaux in France, which has created its own centre for the prevention of radicalization. The contribution by Fabrice Leroy and Benjamin Ducol at the end of this chapter provides a more detailed account of their centre.

Cities and the prevention of radicalization

As will be evident from the previous section, cities have become progressively involved in the prevention of radicalization, in many cases preceding existing national policies. Table 6.1 presents a summary of selected cities which have implemented prevention plans. Some of the components of their policies, and specific examples, are discussed below.

Most local strategies focus on establishing ties between cultural communities and society as a whole, and improving **processes of integration, social cohesion and community resilience** in relation to radicalization. For example, the Al-Manara project, financed by the city of Berlin, works directly with young Syrian refugees, accompanying them in the integration process and “immunizing them” against Salafist extremism and recruitment (Violence Prevention Network, 2016). Another innovative example is the action plan in Slotervaart district in Amsterdam, which organizes debates to stimulate critical thought among young people in relation to extremist discourse (Ranstorp and Hyllengren, 2013).

Table 6.1 Components of city strategies for the prevention of radicalization

Prevention	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Training	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Investigation	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Disengagement or de-radicalization	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Mentors	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	UD	
Integration	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	UD	
Social cohesion	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Resilience	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	UD	
Religion	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Inter-sectoral coordination	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Countering hate speech	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	UD	
Repression	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
Reinsertion	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	UD	
Telephone information line	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	London	Bordeaux	Brussels	Berlin	Copenhagen	Aarhus	Montreal

UD = Initiatives currently under development

Sources: Briggs (2014); CAPRI (2016); Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles (2015); Municipality of Amsterdam (2007); Police and Crime Committee (2015); Rabasa et al. (2010); Radicalisation Awareness Network (2015b); Ranstorp & Hyllengren (2013); Vidino & Brandon (2012); Violence Prevention Network (2016)

Themes focus on the place of religion and Islam in Western society such as: What is Islamophobia? How can we preserve freedom of religion? What values are common to Islam and Dutch society? Amsterdam’s action plan also includes improving the representation of minorities in the press (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2007). The initiative entails not only efforts on the part of minorities, but also those which the larger society needs to make to help them integrate. This is referred to in ICPC’s comparative report on radicalization as “two-way integration” (2015). In this project, young Muslims review the stereotypes that appear in press reports about Islam and Muslims. Workshops are subsequently held with journalists to raise their awareness of their use of such language.

Inter-sector coordination is frequently cited as a key component of good practice. Bjørge (2002) notes that coordinated policies have better success rates

than single approaches which may work in opposing directions. It is essential that the key stakeholders at the local level, such as local governments, the police, social services, schools, social workers and non-governmental organizations, agree on their common objectives. Integrated approaches are likely to be more effective in preventing radicalization and the rehabilitation of radicalized individuals. For example, in Utrecht and Almere in the Netherlands, the police work with the community to develop a more proactive approach to radicalization (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015b). In Birmingham, in the UK, officials from different public agencies collaborate to identify emerging concerns and solutions, on the basis of local intelligence information (*Counter-Terror Local Profiles*) (Police and Crime Committee, 2015). Brussels has created anti-radicalism networks which bring together all the public agency services. Their role is to coordinate cross-cutting action (Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles, 2015).

Another common element in all these city strategies is **training**, particularly of those on the frontline, such as teachers, the police and social workers, as well as parents and young people. The objective is to raise awareness so that key players are able to identify the signs of radicalization and, as a result, act quickly. The content of the training can vary, but in general it takes into account the local context, legal frameworks, questions regarding privacy, and good practices for preventing radicalization (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015b). The VINK programme in Copenhagen places a significant emphasis on training people who are in direct contact with young people, as well as working in networks (Vidino and Brandon, 2012). Their aim is to be a resource for those working with young people when they need support. **Telephone information lines** have also become widespread in cities, both for receiving information and to answer questions and provide information to the community. The prevention centre in Montreal has developed a shift system where professionals associated with the centre answer calls from the community in full confidentiality. A number of city initiatives aim to **counter extremist discourse**, especially on the internet and through awareness-raising campaigns. The *Centre d'Action et de Prévention contre la Radicalisation des Individus* in Bordeaux plans to target hate messages on the internet by de-constructing radical arguments and conspiracy theories (CAPRI, 2016).

While **religion** is generally considered a difficult subject for cities in Western countries to tackle (Khosrokhavar, 2014), most have some type of approach. This usually involves working with moderate imams or Islamic scholars in the intervention process, or to help create links with the Muslim community. For example, in Brussels, religious leaders

work on specific interventions which question the dogma of radical groups (Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles, 2015). Religious information is also integrated into the training process, to make dialogue and mutual understanding easier.

Many cities have established **research capacities** to improve knowledge. Aarhus had a direct relationship with the Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalization Processes at Aarhus University to undertake local-based research. Unfortunately, this centre closed in 2013.¹⁴ During its short existence, it undertook comparative studies in similar cities in Europe, including Lille in France, and Leicester in the UK.¹⁵ The prevention centre in Montreal has a specific unit responsible for undertaking research on local issues.

Mentor programmes are being used to support young people at risk of radicalization, or who want to leave a radical group (Vidino and Brandon, 2012). Danish and Dutch cities in particular have implemented such programmes. Amsterdam, for example, organizes seminars with small groups of young people who could become leaders in the Muslim community, and thus act as positive role models or mentors (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). In the Danish cities of Aarhus and Copenhagen the role of mentors is to prevent young people from being recruited by extremist groups, by working with them on an individual basis (Briggs, 2014). The STREET programme in London operates in the same way.

A number of cities run **extremist disengagement or de-radicalization programmes**. In Europe, disengagement programmes focus particularly on extreme right groups, and provide individual support to those going through them (Schmid, 2013). This is the case of the EXIT programmes in Scandinavian countries and in Germany. Here, the aim is not to counter the ideology, but rather to break the relationship with extreme networks. On the other hand, **de-radicalization** programmes focus on changing the belief systems of those involved, to enable them to refute extremist ideology (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010). These types of interventions have been used particularly in prisons and with returning foreign fighters (Butt & Tuck, 2014; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2010). A good example is the project in Brussels, already mentioned, which aims to counteract extremist dogma. The contribution by Saida Abdi and Heidi Ellis at the end of this chapter discusses the feasibility of implementing Counter Violent Extremism programmes (CVE) at the community level. In the case of both types of programmes, **rehabilitation measures** also form part of the programme.

While prevention is a common component in all the city strategies, some of them incorporate more **repressive** and intelligence gathering components, especially involving the police. In Amsterdam, for example, one of the main strategic objectives was to work with the police to disrupt radical networks and limit the influence of recruiters (Vidino and Brandon, 2012). To do so, they distinguish between “doers”, “searchers” and “thinkers”.¹⁶ The *doers* are those targeted by repressive interventions, while *thinkers* are seen as suitable for preventive approaches. While most cities have adopted an essentially preventive approach, links with the police remain, and protocols for dealing with complaints are developed. The prevention centre in Montreal is a good example.

Conclusion

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. First, while there is no urban approach *per se*, cities are gradually becoming more involved in and knowledgeable about the prevention of violent radicalization, and are beginning to develop a range of specific strategies. In some cases, they follow the lead of their national governments, but in many others it is the cities themselves that have taken the initiative to act. In Western countries in particular, the emergence of radicalization can be explained at

the urban level by factors relating both to individuals and groups. It appears to be linked territorially in many cases to particular areas in cities, which house often isolated ethnic communities which are poorly integrated into the rest of the city, facilitating the development of radicalization.

Second, it is important to highlight a fact we have also seen in relation to intervention programmes that the risk factors that explain radicalization within cities are no different from those associated with other social problems facing contemporary cities on a daily basis – issues of inclusion, social cohesion, marginalization and segregation. Radicalization is one more example of the challenges facing many cities, particularly in Europe, in terms of effectively integrating migrant and minority populations, and providing them with the social and economic opportunities they need. This also leads to another perhaps unexpected conclusion: if these factors are no different from those related to other social problems of the city, then the solutions are also not far removed from those already in place in many cities.

Thus, apart from the involvement of religious advisors, and projects countering extremist ideology, the intervention approaches being used to prevent radicalization are very similar to other local prevention approaches at the local community level such as those that focus on crime. This opens up a number of opportunities, since integrated and global prevention strategies are seen as the most effective approach (UNODC & ICPC, 2010). Such comprehensive strategies target not only one specific problem through a range of related risk factors, but they could also have an impact on a number of different problems. A programme to prevent radicalization that focuses on integration and community cohesion is likely to have multiple benefits e.g. through the reduction of delinquency, drug use, bullying in schools, etc. This also applies in the opposite sense: successful programmes that reinforce integration, cohesion and the resilience of communities may be effective in preventing radicalization.

Finally, it would seem that currently there are as many programmes focused specifically on the prevention of radicalization, as there are broader and more integrated ones. The negative findings of the evaluation of the UK radicalization project PREVENT, raise concerns that other such specifically targeted programmes may be counter-productive, increasing stigmatization, discrimination and community isolation. The emerging debate, therefore, centres on assessing whether countering violent extremism (CVE) approaches are effective, useful and responsible at the local community level, or whether broader-based integrated approaches are likely to be more successful.

Box 6.13 The Aarhus Declaration – Cities against Extremism

The Aarhus Declaration demonstrates the interest which cities and regions have in finding solutions to the problems of radicalization. The Declaration was initiated by the European Forum for Urban Security and the city of Aarhus in 2015, during a summit of European Mayors.

This declaration highlights the role of local groups in the prevention of radicalization. It states, in particular, that when developing and implementing national strategies for prevention, local responsibilities must be taken into account. In addition, it commits participants to work together with all the local key players (civil society, religious organizations, social and educational services, security and justice services, etc.). In order to support its implementation, the Aarhus Declaration proposes an alliance between cities, especially with the establishment of a digital platform bringing together practices, experiences and resources related to preventing and responding to radicalization at the local level.

Source: Cities against Extremism (n.d.).

Beyond policing violent radicalization: Québec's prevention model

Fabrice Leroy¹⁷
Benjamin Ducol¹⁸

The emergence of violent radicalization as a social issue and prevention as its potential solution has been seen as a fruitful alternative to the traditional securitization approach that has prevailed over the last decade. Indeed, the policing of violent radicalization based on the principles of increased intelligence gathering, surveillance and incarceration has revealed its shortcomings.

The preventive approach toward violent radicalization concentrates instead on an upstream response. The Centre believes that the key to effective prevention lies in increasing the focus on the inherent societal causes of violent radicalization (i.e. stigmatization, identity crisis, public discourse and media representation of issues). It also believes in the importance of viewing the process of radicalization as a progressive one, evolving through linear stages (though not exclusively) rather than as a result of a simple cause and effect equation.

In line with this preventive paradigm, the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (*hereinafter*: CPRLV), a Montreal-based initiative, emerged as a viable solution as early as 2014. It was created in the wake of several terrorist attacks across Canada and, most importantly, as a result of an increasing number of young Canadians departing for the Middle East, eager to take part in militant and/or terrorist activities, primarily in the Syria/Iraq region. As this phenomenon gained in importance, it prompted concerns from parents, citizens and city officials and underlined the urgent need for dedicated solutions. Until then, the prevention of radicalization was only conceived through a law-enforcement lens, leaving little choice to parents and loved ones but to refer their concerns to national security agencies. Such an absence of alternative was problematic insofar as it risked propelling the referred individual into the criminal justice system, forsaking any potential early non-judiciary support.

Hence, in March 2015, the city of Montreal announced the launch of a free helpline that would allow concerned parents, citizens or any member of the community to access a hub where they could receive

Contribution

information, request assistance pertaining to violent radicalization or voice their concerns regarding a friend, a close family member or any individual experiencing a potential radicalization situation.

It quickly became clear that the purpose and efficiency of the helpline would be negatively impacted if it had links with the authorities or if it were perceived as being a police detection channel. Concerns that parents would be unable to speak freely were the impetus behind the creation of the Centre, an independent institution dispensed from any law enforcement oversight, be it local or federal. The Centre therefore proved to be the obvious host for the helpline.

The CPRLV emerged in March 2015, conferred with a provincial mandate, secured as a result of the findings and recommendations of the Quebec governmental action plan entitled *Plan d'action gouvernemental 2015-2018 « La radicalisation au Québec : agir, prévenir, détecter et vivre ensemble »*.

Preventing all forms of violent radicalization: broadening the scope of PVE

From the outset, the CPRLV decided to focus on the prevention of violent radicalization – the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) – therefore excluding from its scope the prevention of peaceful protest or the expression of contentious opinions, provided they remained within the bounds of democratic principles. Rather, the Centre focuses its attention on all groups and ideologies openly promoting violent radicalization such as the clandestine extreme left, the oppositional extreme right, jihadism and single-issue causes.

The Centre's approach is both practical, as violent radicalization implies the necessity to focus on all of its manifestations, and strategic, as it endeavours to raise awareness within the population regarding the diverse forms of radicalization. This is to avoid the potential stigmatization of a given group within the community.

Research, training and intervention: the CPRLV triumvirate

The CPRLV's three-prong approach is reflected in its organizational structure, comprised of three modules. The Research team represents its first module and fulfills several functions. Its main task is to conduct a variety of research projects and reports highlighting violent radicalization trends in Quebec and to develop prevention tools (for example, the CPRLV's behavior barometer¹⁹). The CPRLV's Research module also supports the other two modules, namely Intervention and Training, providing them with the necessary academic knowledge that will allow them to fulfill their tasks efficiently. For instance, the Research module can identify the main tell-tale signs of violent radicalization the other modules should be on the lookout for, or can assist the Training module with the content of their presentations, training sessions and outreach initiatives.

From the CPRLV's perspective, a key component of its prevention efforts is its Training module. In addition to its direct prevention efforts, a fundamental aspect of the Centre's work is its commitment to outreach initiatives. Given the Centre's numerous and various community partners, spanning areas such as social work, law enforcement, the corporate sector (businesses and workplace environments) and community organizations, the Training module aims to promote the Centre's mandate and PVE efforts as well as providing PVE training. The CPRLV's trainings are tailored to each organizations' needs and expectations, taking into account their specific context and reality.

Lastly yet no less central to the CPRLV's activities, the Intervention module is tasked with all violent radicalization cases that the Centre takes on through various channels including the 24/7 helpline. The Intervention module analyzes each assistance request in order to determine the level of danger the individual poses, and the individual's various social, emotional or financial needs. The module then decides on the best approach to efficiently engage with the individual and his/her immediate social circle.

From assistance request to psychosocial support: a tailored step-by-step approach

The Centre is a resource and support provider primarily geared toward parents and relatives harboring concerns for their loved ones who might be on a slippery slope toward violent radicalization.

The Centre's helpline represents the main avenue through which the Intervention module processes and registers incoming assistance requests. Active twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, the helpline offers a confidential platform to voice concerns regarding potential radicalization situations, to express more general concerns or to solicit information regarding the Centre's mandate and work.

Upon receiving an assistance request, the Intervention module decides to either take on the case or to dismiss it as non-relevant. The decision is made by professionals who base themselves on the summaries of the calls and on a subsequent assessment of the situation. Two exceptions should be underlined. The first pertains to cases presenting severe mental health issues. While the intermix of violent radicalization and mental health issues does not *de facto* exclude a case from the Centre's purview, individuals presenting mental health issues that bear overwhelmingly on the individual's radical ideology and intentions are automatically referred to competent mental health specialists on the Centre's partner list. The second exception pertains to cases presenting imminent danger either to the individual or the public at large. Should the initial risk assessment conclude to the likelihood of an imminent threat, the case is automatically referred to the Director who may transfer it to law enforcement agencies, in accordance with the Centre's cooperation protocols. These concern only extreme and urgent cases.

Any intervention relies on a clear plan of action. Since there are no typical profiles, violent radicalization situations require tailor-made solutions.

As soon as a strategy is developed, an initial meeting is scheduled with the individual and/or his family. The purpose of this meeting is to further assess, in person, the state of mind of the individual, his specific needs, and his environmental portrait. Should the initial meeting yield no relevance to the Centre's mandate, the case is referred to competent social services. On the other hand, when the Intervention module retains a case, it works in partnership with healthcare professionals and social services to ensure a cooperative intervention. Finally, the module follow up systematically with the individual to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention and to ensure that the needs were met. These follow-ups will show whether a new intervention plan should be put in place in order to tackle residual or re-emerging violent radicalization symptoms.

Ongoing challenges in the field of PVE: CPRLV'S road map

Since its creation, the CPRLV has been confronted with a number of ongoing challenges despite its considerable efforts in fostering trust amongst community organizations and partner social and governmental services.

The first set of challenges is due to misconceptions; it appears that community organizations need a deeper understanding of the independent nature of the Center's status and the confidential nature of its work. The CPRLV is recurrently battling to dispel any misconception surrounding its alleged (but unfounded) law enforcement affiliation and surveillance mandate. Secondly, the CPRLV is at times perceived as potentially stigmatizing specific communities despite its adamant discourse that the term "violent radicalization" encompasses a wide variety of movements and that its activities are non-discriminatory.

The second set of challenges concerns the ways the CPRLV interacts with social and governmental actors such as social and health workers, school staff and administrators and law enforcement organizations, to list a few. Violent radicalization and its emerging prevention aspect has had to confront not only pre-established conceptions as to what the term implies, but also how best to tackle it. Partner social services, for instance, have often perceived violent radicalization exclusively through either a security perspective or a mental health lens, minimizing social and identity factors.

As a side note, other challenges specific to the Intervention module pertain to a variety of issues such as determining risk assessment in each case, separating mental health cases from violent radicalization cases and the dilemma of information-sharing and confidentiality.

As a front-line player in Quebec's field of PVE, CPRLV will have to deal with a series of challenges that require an effort from the whole collectivity.

Where is the “community” in countering violence extremism (CVE)?

Saida Abdi²⁰
Heidi Ellis²¹

If you listen to policymakers talking about the CVE initiatives, you consistently hear the word “community”. And yet, communities being targeted for engagement are resisting involvement in these initiatives. This is not for a lack of agreement around the need to prevent terrorist acts in US or Canadian territory: given the multiple negative repercussions another terror attack would have for Muslims both as citizens of these countries and as Muslims, Muslims in North America are deeply fearful of terrorist acts being associated with their communities. But if Muslims in North America are among those who are most concerned about the possibility of a terrorist attack on US or Canada soil, what explains why many Muslim communities object to the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs in the US and Canada? In the past year, we have participated in multiple discussions between Muslim community members and policymakers around CVE, and what we learnt from these discussions leads us to suggest that the problem is one of divergent priority and perception of the Muslim communities and policy makers.

Priority

Like many others, Muslim immigrants and refugees in North America migrated to give their children a better future, yet must sometimes contend with severe challenges to their child’s healthy development. Some Muslim Immigrant communities, such as those who arrive as refugees, live in neighborhoods where there are problems with gangs/violence, failing schools, lack of job opportunities, and discrimination. Furthermore, community members are concerned about youth engaging in risky or dangerous behaviors that can affect both the youth’s future and the well-being of the community in which they live. In research done by Boston Children’s Hospital Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center (RTRC), for example, Somali youth reported high rates of unemployment, discrimination and high rates of negative interaction with law enforcement (RTRC, 2014, 2015). Communities have lobbied local and federal governments for resources to combat crime and provide youth with a better future. Yet, according to community members, there has not been meaningful resource allocation to identify

Contribution

the root causes of these issues and implement effective solutions. In addition, the gun violence related deaths of high numbers of Somali youth in cities such as Toronto, Edmonton and Minneapolis have been of great concern for communities in these cities. Yet, according to community members in these cities, these issues have not been adequately addressed and do not seem to be a policy priority (Aulakh, 2012; Hirsi, 2014). In contrast, from the community’s perception, a handful of youth have left the US and Canada to join al-shabaab or ISIS and the US and Canadian governments have responded with major policy and resource allocation to programs related to this problem, underscoring the priority of this issue for the government. Community members argue that for the majority of the mothers who wake up in the morning in Ottawa or Minneapolis, their biggest concern is not whether their children will get on an airplane to Syria, but whether their sons or daughters will be killed by a gang member in the neighbourhood, or whether their children will be able to secure a job when they finish college. There is, therefore, a significant mismatch between what the community sees as priorities – safer streets, a good education, access to jobs, and reduction in discrimination both in the streets and in institutions in their countries of settlement – and what the government sees as the priority – stopping youth from being radicalized. Until these two priorities become more aligned, there will be difficulty in engaging Muslim communities to accept and participate in CVE.

Perception

This disconnect is made worse by the perception among some Muslims that the immense attention paid to radicalization of youth has nothing to do with a real national threat but rather is driven by racism and religious bigotry disguised as national security. Some argue that this is about stigmatizing and sully the Muslim faith as a violent religion, and legitimizing hate towards Muslims.

This perception is very dangerous because it plays into the hands of those who want to divide Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and recruit youth to their

violent causes. It also puts community members who want to work with law enforcement and government at a disadvantage. It makes those community members look as though they are doing something that is detrimental to the very survival of the Muslim community in North America. As Muslim community leaders and academics who work in the CVE space struggle to articulate community concerns to policymakers, they run the risk of being accused of being self-hating “Uncle Toms” who are participating in the perpetuation of racist bigotry against their own people and working in a policy sphere that threatens the well-being of the very community they claim to represent. Even more importantly, this type of community perception might diminish protective factors such as social bonds which have been found to be protective against negative outcomes, such as gang involvement (Ellis, Abdi, Miller, White, & Lincoln, 2015).

Community-based participatory approach: creating convergence not conflict

At RTRC, we have a long history of working with communities using a Community-based Participatory Research Approach (CBPR). CBPR is a “collaborative research approach that is designed to ensure and establish structures for participation by communities affected by the issue being studied” (Viswanathan et al., 2004, p. 3). CBPR starts with a true partnership with communities who are involved in the issue that is being addressed so that they are partners in defining the problem, and formulating and implementing solutions. CBPR can “increase communities’ capacity to identify and solve their problems” while at the same time improve “decision makers’ and service providers’ ability to mobilize resources, improve policies, and enhance professional practices” (Jagosh et al., 2012, p. 313). In other words, it builds community and system resilience. CBPR is useful to avoid the very problem faced by current CVE programming: communities who are meant to benefit from programs feel that they are not being served by them and, in fact, that these programs are actually augmenting the problems. In our work at the RTRC, we have discovered that trust, relationship building, and common purpose are key to facilitating partnerships with communities. It is also the case that projects initiated, defined, and implemented by powerful institutions for communities are usually met with distrust and there is a risk of alienating communities even further. Instead of coming in with fully formed programs and expecting communities to buy in, a different approach is required. What is needed is a thoughtful, trust building process, one that comes to a community with an offer of support around a problem identified by the community, allows the community to frame the issue (and thus avoid stigmatizing and misunderstanding),

works with the community to formulate a solution that is respectful of community values and processes, and then finally works in partnership with the community to implement the solution (program). This approach does not simply engage a community; it also empowers and leaves a stronger and more resilient community.

Where do CVE efforts go from here?

If the ultimate goal is to achieve true prevention, all involved have to overcome this failure to align priorities and all have to alter perceptions. Radicalization to violence must be prevented; stigmatizing and infringing on the civil rights of Muslims must be also prevented. The question is how can both concerns be heard and integrated in a way that addresses them, thereby creating a convergence of priorities and diminishing perception that the Muslim community is being unfairly targeted? The chart below shows an adaptation of our approach to facilitate community partnerships in the efforts to reduce youth vulnerability to radicalization while also ensuring that community-identified needs are prioritized.

In conclusion, yes, the radicalization of youth is an issue that must be addressed and yes, the fear that a youth who has been radicalized might commit a terrorist act on US or Canadian soil is real. No one is more concerned and keen on preventing this than Muslims in North America. Muslims’ fears that CVE efforts can be used to limit their civil rights, stigmatize them as a group and encourage attacks against Muslim citizens is also very real. And no one should be more concerned and keen on preventing this than the federal governments of the US and Canada. What is needed is a true partnership that ensures that there is not just lip service to collaboration, but that the hard work of aligning priorities and altering perceptions is done by hearing community concerns and taking specific and concrete steps to address them. CBPR takes more work, more resources and more time but this is the hard work that must be done to engage communities in a meaningful way.

Table 1 Proposed CBPR approach to address barriers to community engagement inherent in current Countering Violent Extremism initiatives

Barriers to Community Engagement	Strategies to Address Barriers
Distrust of Authority Power	Engage Community
Fear of the Stigma of Radicalization	Embed activities in non-stigmatized services that support community well-being
Association of CVE with Prevent or Channel initiatives	Demonstrate in language and action that proposed activities are different from these programs
Community Concerns for Lack of Programs that Promote Youth Success (e.g., jobs, education)	Prioritize community identified youth needs as part of community building resilience and promote integration strategy
Fear of Community Violence	Address all types of risk behaviors and threat of violence
Perception that community is scapegoated while hate groups that target Muslims are not persecuted or targeted by policy	Have policies or programs that cover all ideologically based violence or use common language and common perception of threat
Fear of increasing discrimination due to CVE	Ensure language does not associate faith and violent extremism
Fear that CVE will be used to violate community rights/take away liberties	Ensure that violations are identified and dealt and that community concerns are addressed in a timely and transparent manner

Source: Ellis, Miller, Baldwin, & Abdi (2011)

Endnotes

1 This concept, despite being useful for differentiating international from local Islamism, covers up the fact that, in the West, terrorism has a local history that goes back many years.

2 Given the limited amount of information available related to the extreme right and the enormous quantity of information available on Islamic extremism, it is the latter that is discussed in this chapter.

3 For example, the Italian Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction in West Germany.

4 The IRA, ETA, etc.

5 Egyptian Muslim thought has had an enormous influence on modern Muslim extremism. Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian leader of the “Muslim Brotherhood” in the 1950s is considered to be one of the political ideologues of *Jihad*, through division of the world into Muslims and non-Muslims, and the development of the idea that the world, above all the West, is at war with Islam (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

6 With the exception of Canada, all the figures come from Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, produced by The Soufan Group in December 2015. In the case of Canada the total was cited by Michel Coulombe, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. For Afghanistan, Argentina, Georgia, Japan, Kuwait, Kirghizstan, Libya, Portugal, Qatar, Serbia, Somalia, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan, the figures come from non-official sources. All the rest are official figures. Finally, with the exception of Argentina (2012), Azerbaijan (2014), China (2014), Montenegro (2014) and the Philippines (2014), the data are from 2015.

7 If a religious motive is confirmed for the recent attack on the *Pulse* discotheque in Florida, in which around 50 people were killed, these figures could change drastically.

8 Other significant cultural factors revealed in this study were a feeling of fatality (a unique destiny) in societies and the presence of strict standards for behaviour and corresponding punishments.

9 For a full review of the factors that explain radicalization, see ICPC (2015).

10 A revision of these two sets of factors can be found in ICPC (2015).

11 A more detailed review of the measures can be found in ICPC (2015).

12 A review of legislative measures can be found in ICPC (2015).

13 www.inforadical.org

14 <http://cir.au.dk/en/>

15 <http://cir.au.dk/en/publications/>

16 *Searchers* are defined as those seen as having problems in relation to their identity and integration into society; *thinkers* those who do not commit extremist acts, but who support their ideas; and *doers* those who carry out actions that lead to violence (Vidino and Brandon, 2012).

17 Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV).

18 Research Team Leader at the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV).

19 To access the CPRLV’s Behavior Barometer, please consult the CPRLV website: <https://info-radical.org/en/to-train/guides-and-tools/>

20 Director of Community Relations of the Boston Children’s Hospital Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center (CHCRTR).

21 Director of the CHCRTR and Assistant Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychiatry at Boston Children’s Hospital/ Harvard Medical School.

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CHAPTER 6 Cities and the prevention of violent radicalization

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International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)

465, rue Saint-Jean, bureau 803
Montréal (Québec) H2Y 2R6
CANADA

+1 514 288-6731
cipc@cipc-icpc.org
www.cipc-icpc.org