James Redford wrote:
Enforcing fallacious "rights" in "intellectual property" actually violates genuine property rights, for then actual physical force is used against the physical property of people (including the property in their own bodies) who had not physically harmed, altered, or appropriated another person's physical holdings.
Since I'm a Marxist and am *against* the bourgeois institution of private property, I *appreciate* this repudiation of private-property intellectual property rights.
However, given the *three* frameworks at-play here, that of *status-quo politics*, *reformist politics*, and *post-capitalist politics*, I have to address empirical denotations for all *three* paradigms.
I don't think that the status-quo enforcement of private property rights in intellectual property *violates* property rights, because it's effectively *upholding* the private property rights of that intellectual property -- not that I politically *support* such, of course.
It *wouldn't matter*, technically, if the state used violent physical force in its *enforcement* of whatever private property rights, including intellectual property, or not, because it would be the official *legality* that would count.
If *enforcement* of status quo definitions of private property rights included *physical violence* against those who *violated* the status quo state definitions, then that would be the status quo *paradigm* of state legality and enforcement.
Your use of the qualifier 'fallacious', to spurn this status quo paradigm of legality seems to indicate an *alternative* proposal of (reformist) legality regarding private property rights -- that of saying that any and all intellectual developments are *not* intellectual / private property *whatsoever*, and so do not impinge on definitions of -- presumably *tangible* -- private property rights, like that of land and productive machinery.
You're pointing out that the state could use physical violence against alleged perpetrators of the theft of 'intellectual property', which, in the *reformist* perspective, is an injustice since 'intellectual property' is not acknowledged as being legitimate private property. So the greater transgression would be the state's use of physical force to uphold an unjust legal definition.
As a *Marxist*, I do acknowledge people's *personal property*, meaning whatever they themselves use as *persons*, for *use* values, separate from any private-entity holdings, like rental units managed via absentee landlordship, for example. In a *post-capitalist* context 'intellectual property' would be invalid and meaningless, along with *all* private-property-type accumulations of whatever tangible or intangible assets, like land, means of mass industrial production (factories), precious metals, unique artwork, finance, money / currency / exchange values, etc.