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  1. Pinned Tweet

    A frozen & an incoherent hamper 's Berlin process on . Yet, -backers' maneuvering also ripens the landscape for cooperation between an assertive & a machiavellian . My latest 's

  2. Retweeted

    NYT on Syrian mercenaries sent by Turkey and media access to the Tripoli frontlines:

  3. Scapegoating others for the rise of Haftar negates the own man's agency. Haftar makes some of his own decisions & isn't a victim that rose as a symptom of Libya's post-2011 failures (he is responsible for many of them). There's some 40 years of history pre-2011 showing this.

  4. "'s spox Ahmed Mismari said that the Libyan people are the ones who closed the oil ports & fields, & prevented oil exports" People can't voice a political opinion without risking their life, but they somehow can casually halt oil exports overnight.

  5. Retweeted

    المسماري في مؤتمر صحفي، تعليقا على مطالب إغلاق المؤاني :«هذا عمل مدني نحن في القيادة العامة قلنا له سمعا وطاعة من خلال العمل علي الأرض لتنفيذ أوامر الشعب الليبي». ضمنيا دعمهم لعملية الإغلاق، وحتى مساء اليوم تتواصل العمليات ولم تتوقف بعد، ومن المتوقع توقفها خلال الساعات المقبلة.

  6. Retweeted

    This week on the podcast I was joined by MEI scholars , , and to discuss the outlook for the Middle East in 2020, touching on Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Algeria.

  7. Some wild quotes in this interview w/ Italy's FM Di Maio. The one that stands out most to me is this one: "Europe & Italy lost ground in Libya for one simple reason: We were not willing to supply weapons to the belligerents" That's completely wrong.

  8. In addition, the theory that a blockade could be the organic symptom of some economic tribal/social grievances - that momentarily arose 3 days ahead of Berlin's conference - is pretty far-fetched (at best). It's both LAAF-driven & would be LAAF-enabled if it materialises.

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  9. My 2 cents on the oil closure: weaponizing the control over the oil infrastructure by blockading it isn't a winner's strategy. It also contradicts the claims that Haftar is "confident" going into Berlin. Anything that involves politics isn't something he is comfortable with.

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  10. Reasons Greece's recent posturing is comical: - there isn't a deal that could come out of Berlin that everyone would accept anyway -Greece can, in practice, do little on Libya & even less on the East Med - Athens has little influence over anything that comes out of Berlin anyway

  11. And by significant I mean unprecedented build-up. At this rate, the fact this conference is being expediently held now (& with no clear goal whatsoever) will solely end up further diminishing the credibility of Europe (& particularly Germany) as mediator.

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  12. The dissonance between Berlin & developments on the ground in Libya is astonishing. There's been significant amounts of weapons transferred to both sides of the conflict in the last week - something that isn't at all reflective of an intention to play "politics".

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  13. "Con l’offensiva lanciata ad aprile ha cercato di evitare un accordo di condivisione del potere. Ora sarebbe difficile presentarsi ai suoi sostenitori con un accordo in cui lui non appare essere l’unico vincitore" Parlo con per .

  14. Retweeted

    Reactive policy making has only marginalised Europe in Libya and will continue to do so Greece needs to compartmentalise, as such statements only lessen Europe's credibility as a broker and push those with influence on the ground towards bilateralism rather than multilateralism

  15. A power-sharing agreement where he'd be accommodated was an arrangement refused w/ his offensive in April '19. His attack was a "winner takes all" gamble. It's naive of policymakers to expect any less than "taking all" would be acceptable to him. I speak to .

  16. What armistice? The one he didn't commit to so wouldn't be held accountable when him and his allies decide to resume the offensive on Tripoli? ...

  17. " has pledged to abide by the ceasefire, regardless of the fact that he did not sign the ceasefire agreement in earlier this week. This is extremely important" says 's FM. If this isn't textbook appeasement, I don't know what is.

  18. It's an extremely polarized context. Whatever you'll say re "popular sentiment" is infused with your own biases & influenced by other factors. Unless you've spoken to 10,000 people (thru a medium they aren't afraid for their lives voicing their opinion), it's bound to be flawed.

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  19. I am painfully aware of how difficult it is to gauge public opinion about anything in war-torn (I don't even begin to try) - so Diwan's work is v useful. However, I don't get where some get the confidence to make wild claims about "popular sentiment" in right now.

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  20. Latest Diwan report poses interesting questions, but statistically speaking, a sample size of 1136 (w/ 300 to 400 people called/interviewed by phone in West, East & South) is not representative - the corollary is nothing can be accurately inferred from its results.

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  21. Opening mixed coffeehouses but channeling the radical tendencies of your regime to close them off in other contexts...

  22. This title should be completely turned around: the moral from 's policy towards is the complete opposite of this. The reason why is intervening this forcefully on the 's side is because it has few allies in the region.

  23. " added that will continue to use all diplomatic & military means to ensure stability to its south, including in "

  24. This quote alone speaks volumes about 's foreign policy towards - but also other countries in Sub-Saharan . The fact that considers the alternative to Gadaffi should have been "another (better) leader" helps elucidate ' approach to Libya today.

  25. The "Berlin Process" was envisioned as one where states involved in would commit to halting foreign interference in & respecting the arms embargo. Sarraj & Haftar being invited reflects a relapse into an all too familiar - & flawed - approach to conflict resolution.

  26. This occurred after 's arrived to for the opening of a military base in the Red Sea Governorate (some sources report is there too). Hard not to see a correlation.

  27. Retweeted

    JUST IN: will attend Berlin conference on

  28. An Emirati propaganda outlet shamefully distorted both our comments in an attempt to paint Haftar in a good light. Personally, I find it funny that the UAE is so intellectually bankrupt it can't even get real, let alone good commentary from the pro-Haftar mob it funds.

  29. (Which - if true - also highlights Russians didn't behave as mediators . They saw themselves as the actor that could ripen Haftar for a "pre-cooked deal". In essence, Moscow's meeting was a failed attempt to bully Haftar - renown for being stubborn - into signing on).

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  30. Can totally imagine that being said in a Russian accent

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  31. "Is 's threat to today a real, or is it plain talk? It would be an empty threat if wasn't intervening in . In the past few days, has ramped up its military footprint in West Libya" I speak to ~26:45.

  32. It's high time for policymakers to question whether the inclusion of can be reconciled w/ any peaceful resolution of 's conflict. The other question is whether his LAAF can retain some cohesion without a state of war or without him at its helm. Both are a no.

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  33. What worries is that the current "political process" isn't one that is exclusively designed by his foreign backers (or states amenable to him) in order to enable his "military win". It's what also explains his fear ahead of Ghadames 10 months back too.

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  34. "Let's do what everyone else is doing to maintain relevance"

  35. Retweeted

    As Haftar left Moscow, UAE began to funnel military aid to Benghazi: • UAE owned two jets arrived in Benghazi • More armoured vehicles and canons are deploy near Tripoli • : Haftar is gaining time to consolidate supplies for an attack

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  36. " also plans to establish an ops center, headed by a lieutenant general from the Turkish land forces & comprising officials from land, naval & air forces, w/ the aim of coordinating ’s defenses" The general in question is already in .

  37. : " realises that he is guaranteed support by , which is personally & ideologically invested in him & their common project. Now, he is likely weaponising this lull to consolidate supplies for another offensive" I tell .

  38. Retweeted

    ماذا هو سبب توقيف محمد بن زبلح و فهد البكوش لدى الاستخبارات العسكرية في سيدي حسين منذ اكثر من ٢٤ ساعة؟ هل المبادرة التي اقترحوها أزعجت أحدا؟

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  39. Didn't know why - which was flanked by 5 Emirati advisors yesterday- didn't sign the ceasefire agreement? Look no further.

  40. Retweeted

    Will there be any consequences to walking away from ? We’ll know soon enough after the next drone strike in Tripoli. must withdraw its equipment and operators for Haftar to feel real pressure. Putin couldn’t deliver that. 1/

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  41. Retweeted

    ERDOGAN SAYS TURKEY IS ABLE TO GIVE GEN. HAFTAR A LESSON reporting