Keyboard shortcuts are available for common actions and site navigation.
Who are the forces fighting each other in Tripoli? Is this a war between an “army” and “the militias”? A thread about social media, access for researchers and journalists, and narratives of the conflict.pic.twitter.com/ejYVy3tVOw
Since April, foreign journalists & researchers have extensively covered the war in Tripoli, going to the frontlines and talking to members of GNA-affiliated forces. Many, incl. myself, have been moving around without minders, constraints or prior notice to groups at the front.
For some of the coverage and analysis that has come out of this, see for example that of @raghavanWaPo @ddknyt @CelianMace @FrdricBobin @mannocchia @Beccamurr @SameralAtrush, as well as my August report http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-2019.pdf … or @FWehrey's recent piecehttps://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/05/with-help-of-russian-fighters-libya-s-haftar-could-take-tripoli-pub-80511…
By contrast, no foreign journalists have covered the other side of the frontlines, that of Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan Arab Armed Forces”. And even if they did, they’d be embedded and their encounters would be heavily scripted.pic.twitter.com/tNVir5a2BI
There is thorough analysis on western Libyan forces. Research there has been difficult but possible over the past years. But there is a big gap in research on eastern Libya & the LAAF, because access is very difficult, and those who have access don't want to lose it.
This is how Haftar’s LAAF presents itself. They’re styling themselves as an army, and have a formidable propaganda machine that puts out such photos and videos. Many people on Twitter share official LAAF material, inadvertently promoting the image the LAAF seeks to cultivate.pic.twitter.com/8oRDR3a1jV
But fighters in the forces attacking Tripoli since April have also shared their own photos & videos. These have starkly altered the perceptions of those in western Libya who believed the steady stream of LAAF photos showing recruits graduating from military training in the east.
This was one of the first to appear after the beginning of the offensive in April: a member of the LAAF’s 106th Brigade threatens to shell and destroy a civilian neighbourhood, just as the LAAF were actually shelling that same area.pic.twitter.com/urXBZk31Qi
There is an entire genre of self-made videos from LAAF fighters that shows them under the influence of drugs, shooting and randomly firing artillery. Here is one.pic.twitter.com/Zh689YW8OS
A different, much more shocking genre involves LAAF fighters desecrating the dead bodies of enemy combatants, often prisoners whom they’ve executed. I’m not posting those videos, but here's one fighter who recently appeared in one of them, identified as Ali al-Mansuri from Bayda.pic.twitter.com/ihyQCZpAYn
These are fighters in Haftar’s forces who appeared in an earlier video that showed them killing a prisoner and desecrating his corpse. They are members of the Saeqa and of Brigade 166.pic.twitter.com/pIczESWKQD
So who exactly are the forces fighting for Haftar? Here’s Adel Daab, a militia leader from Gharyan who was with Libya Dawn in 2014, but who on 3 April allowed Haftar’s forces to take Gharyan. Without his cooperation, Haftar could not have launched his Tripoli offensive.pic.twitter.com/yEf90QpJVi
Much more important for Haftar’s offensive was the support of the Kani brothers and their militia from Tarhuna. Here’s Mohsen al-Kani, who was killed at the front in September. To establish control in Tarhuna from 2015 onwards, the Kanis killed 123 people, incl. entire families.pic.twitter.com/szAN9pukZg
Then there is Abdelmonem Dardira, leader of the Borg al-Nasr militia from Zintan and a core pro-Haftar faction in that town. Dardira is the prime suspect in the 2014 kidnapping of the parliamentarian Suleiman Zubi, who was held captive in Zintan for more than two years.pic.twitter.com/t5RBVzhPc7
This is Mohamed al-Shtiwi, leader of the “Brigade of Arabism” militia from Ajeilat, who is accused of numerous - and particularly gruesome - murders in that town. He was killed in Tripoli in July.pic.twitter.com/ZSMllqr8Fm
Alongside thugs and criminals, there is also the other extreme in Haftar's forces: the Madakhila Salafis, disciplined followers of the hardline Saudi preacher Rabi' al-Madkhali. This is Tawfiq Emkeka, leader of a Madkhali faction from Zintan & Rujban, killed in Tripoli in July.pic.twitter.com/5HOIWdQYD0
So, are the units Haftar has deployed from the east somewhat closer to regular forces? This is Abdesselam al-Drik, a field commander from Benghazi who was killed in Tripoli in November. There's also a pic of him with Haftar's son Khaled.pic.twitter.com/NOZf9PQCZZ
No doubt there are some unsavoury elements among the anti-Haftar forces too. But these examples should make it clear that Haftar’s forces include many of the very worst militias you’ll find anywhere in Libya. The LAAF is NOT "the closest Libya has to an army".
A detailed analysis of the LAAF & its evolution is the single biggest gap in research on Libya since 2014. Much has yet to be said about the conflicting interests in Haftar's alliance in Benghazi (2014-17) and the very different configuration in his Tripoli operation today.
For a breakdown of the forces on both sides, see my report for @smallarmssurvey from August, where I debunk some of the narratives that are being advanced about the conflict by Haftar and his foreign backers.
(END)
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-2019.pdf …pic.twitter.com/fTvP5bOfZD
![](data:image/svg+xml,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="73" height="73"><rect fill-opacity="0"/></svg>)