Kan Kimura

Coda: no, attempting to actively misrepresent the US position on this does not help. I award the ROK government zero points, and may God have mercy on their souls.https://twitter.com/GalloVOA/status/1164676028750389248?s=20…

15. Ironically, Japan is the only one who benefits. Both parties in this dispute have tried to get the US to take their side by painting the other as unreasonable. With this decision, Moon has slammed the nail in the ROK coffin. Abe will be uncorking some champagne tonight /end

14. We've already lost POTUS. Losing the desk officers and assistant secretaries, the colonels and brigadiers could genuinely be the end of the Alliance. And as we rapidly approach the cost-sharing negotiations cliff, that unfortunately looks to be where we're headed.

13. That sort of working-level interference has been vital to preserving the Alliance in difficult times. Now those people are going into negotiations this year with the feeling that the ROK screwed them over. When the pressure from above intensifies, will they still play ball?

12. Take last year's defense cost-sharing negotiations for example. We were able to get away with a nominal one-year increase because at some point, the US negotiators had a come-to-jesus moment and said "look, let's just figure out something that will placate our boss for now."

11. The most concerning thing is not how this affects POTUS, who hates alliances and if anything is celebrating today. It's how it affects the working-level officials who have been working their butts off trying to distract Trump from torpedoing the ROK-US Alliance entirely.

10. Cancelling GSOMIA, on the other hand, is a slap in the face to the US. It basically says "Fuck you, we value the Alliance so little relative to our need to bloody up Japan that we're not even going to keep this costless, symbolic agreement you spent 6 years mediating."

9. That's the thing: even if sharing info with Japan is a national security threat, the agreement costs nothing. It doesn't force us to share any! But for the ROK-US Alliance, it means everything. It signals that despite disagreeing, we can be sensitive to our Allies' concerns

8. But Pres. Moon and the liberals would eventually come around. Why? Because in practice, not much information was ever shared. More important was the symbolic purpose: showing the US that for the sake of the Alliance, the ROK was at least willing to listen on trilateral issues.

4. GSOMIA is perfect for this. It's a symbolic agreement that doesn't cost the ROK anything now, but leaves the door open for things in the future. This is why the Obama Admin zeroed in on it as an "easy" deliverable when more substantive trilat efforts hit a brick wall.

3. Its no secret that the US has pushed for stronger trilateral military ties. It's also no secret that a lot of Koreans hate the idea. The trick for ROKG has always been to signal to USG that it remains open-minded about future cooperation without actually committing to anything

2. This is not going to be a thread about how GSOMIA is critical to national security. I don't think it is. It's also not going to be about how Japan doesn't "deserve" this. I want the ROK to "win" this dispute. But I think today's decision will prompt quiet celebrations in Tokyo

1. What is GSOMIA? Why is canceling the agreement the worst possible thing President Moon could have done? And why does it have nothing to do with Japan and everything to do with the US? /thread

昨夜のBS日テレ「深層ニュース」である出演者のコメント 「51対49で日本が譲った」 比率はともかく、「輸出管理で譲った」と言うのは、「日本の措置撤回に向けた協議」という韓国の説明を真に受けたもの。 これまでもやっていた「対話」の再開。しかもボールは輸出管理の改善を示すべき韓国にある。

“일본이 사과했다” “그런 사실 없다”… 사사건건 치고받는 한일 출처 : 한국일보 | 네이버 http://naver.me/Fq9BpqEH 

国際協力系で職務経験積んでから博士進学するほぼ唯一のメリットが、長期休暇にインターンとか気にせず博論に集中できる点かな。一次データで勝負したいならアドバンテージだけど、制約のある二次データを分析するスキルを示すために一次データ単独で博論へ行くのはおススメされないので、あれだけど。

「ＧＳＯＭＩＡによる韓日間の情報交換は、何らかの軍事的状況が発生した際に、即時に行われるのではない」　ちなみにこの部分の答弁も正しいです。

たまにGSOMIAの事を弾道ミサイル警報の緊急連絡用と思い込んでいる人が居ますけど、違いますからね。https://twitter.com/rockfish31/status/1169679888543936513…