Dana Nawzar

2. Imam Khomeini’s ideology in Iran is not a party. It is not a group of people in power. It is also not in rivalry with military, judiciary, and businesses. Khomeini’s ideology is the state ideology. It is the regime. The entire state structure is there to serve it.

3. Khomeini’s ideology has stood the test of time. He smartly neutralised all domestic ideological and political rivals. He also protected the new system from being destroyed by outsiders. And now, Iran the country is strong but so is the state ideology.

4. Imam Khomeini’s pan-Islamist (mostly in a Shi’a sense) ideology was meant to be exported. And after decades of dynamics, the ideology (supported by common sectarian background) has now become a footprint for an unannounced regional network.

4. Each member of the network not only can depend on Iran for support but can also support Iran unequivocally. Because the policy in Tehran and the state ideology doesn’t change every four years. It might change in an uprising or an invasion but that isn’t likely in short run.

5. Iran is a proud country with a proud civilisation and history. It is also multi ethnic and multi religious. And not everyone agrees on every policy. But the system’s son’s, be reformists or conservatives, agree on its broad principles.

6. If you are a Hezbollah member or a PMU fighter or a Houthi rebel, you can safely take Iran’s side and rip its reward later without fearing consequences, at least in the short term. But can one say the same about Turkey? NOT AT ALL

7. Erdogan has been in power for 18 years but the system is still Ataturk’s. He did try -and I believe sincerely- to change it. But he failed. He made small changes here and there but all in policy. Any future government can reverse it overnight.

8. Erdoğan has been in power for 18 years but he is there not in a ‘supreme leader’ form of leadership but in a majoritarian democracy where he may lose elections any day. Nothing is stable about his presidency let alone the system he might have once envisioned.

9. The constitution under which Erdoğan serves was put by the 1980 army coup leaders who carried out the coup to, among others, protect the secular order. The first 3 articles which can’t be changed says Turkey is ‘Turk’ and ‘Secular’!

10. Erdoğan’s rule is a ‘one man rule’ not in the sense that he can do whatever he wants -although it is partially true- but in the sense that his vision is only his. In his party, allies and in the country, his vision is challenged. It is no where a state vision or ideology.

11. So even if we assume Erdoğan is still loyal to his pan-Islamist vision, it is still not good enough. His vision is a ‘one man vision’. It is challenged inside his party and in the country. It is nowhere near being ‘state ideology’

12. So when Erdoğan is gone, for any natural or political reason, his legacy will not be state ideology or a system. He will be just another Turkish President who came and left. Certainly AK Parti or that trope of centre right movement will be there but only as anothe party.

13. The opposition to Erdoğan has not allowed him to make any significant changes to the system. Every policy he has made can be changed with one signature. What Ekrem Imamoglu is doing these days as mayor is a very good example.

14. This will sound as an exaggeration but so far Erdogan is still a Morsi who has managed to stay in power for 18 years. A coup, a natural death or an electoral defeat means the end of all the policies that Erdogan pursued.

15. Forget about CHP which will undo everything Erdogan has done, even people like Abdullab Gul don’t share his vision especially on foreign policy. Turkey’s policy on Syria, Egypt and many more conflicts will change dramatically.

16. So it is only natural for a Muslim Brotherhood member displaced by Sisi and hosted by Erdoğan to feel affinity with Erdogan. But when he supports Erdoğan’s actions he has to ask 2 questions: is this moral and is this smart?

17. More importantly, one has to go beyond the simplistic ‘Erdogan good you becuse he supports my cause’ and assuming that whatever he does is automatically good.

18. I have explained in detailed threads before how the war is a part of a change of heart by Erdogan and how it only saves Turkey as a nation state. The losers are Erdoğan, conservative Turks and Kurds -the natural victims of Kemalism-

19. Conservative Turks may not care much because whether this war is for Sykes-Picot borders or not, it is still for Turkey. And whether Turkey is run by Erdoğan vision or not, it is still their ‘country’ but non-Turkish Islamists, especially Arabs, can’t afford that thought.