As I’ve mentioned a few times, I’m working on a long essay. I am presently at 16,000 words, I expect the total word count to come to at least 25,000. This shall be a small preview of sections of that essay. I’ll note that they are yet subject to revision.
Ideology, Social-Historical Evolution, and the Phenomena of Civilization
or
What is Neoreaction?
History since Christ is the history of Catholicism.
You may take that as a theological proposition if you’d like. In fact, I do, but the sentence may be taken in another way. As a fact of human significance, there is no overarching narrative. All narrative is imposed from without. If there is any such meta-narrative of human history, it must have God as its author.
To say that history since Christ is the history of Catholicism, it means that I am imposing a narrative. There is a theme, there are protagonists and antagonists, certain virtues are praised and certain vices excoriated. This narrative is perceived through a lens. It is an ideologized history, even quasi-conspiratorial. I will show you how to see through this lens, the lens of ideology, and from within you will see how my account of history is produced by the ideology and intellectual event known as Neoreaction, or in other parlance, the Dark Enlightenment.
I understand many are tentatively dissuaded by my manner of speaking. My language seems far too concessionary, relativist, postmodern. I see that, and I can inform you it is not. You shall see that there is no worry to bask in the subjectivity of ideology, for this is only to make a vestment the subject puts on, rather than a body the subject takes into himself.
In order to explain the Neoreactionary perspective, you shall have to follow on an intellectual odyssey, and you shall have to be capable of questioning assumptions you didn’t even know you had. Not that you didn’t know you believed them; but you didn’t know they really are merely assumptions.
[...]
How may otherwise contradictory political philosophies manage to subsist together? I will borrow from my own Catholic religion to give an explanation. It is worth holding on to, for it will also explain what is Neoreaction.
Catholicism is a dogmatic religion. This means there are certain tenets within the Christian tradition which are non-negotiable. They are required for belief in order to be a member of the Church. Failure to believe makes one a heretic; failure to reform makes one an apostate.
An instance of this dogma is the definition from Vatican I, which declares that “God may be understood to exist by the light of unaided reason.” What it declares in no uncertain terms is that in theory there must be a successful argument for God’s existence. What it does not tell us is how that argument goes. Indeed, it does not even promise that such a successful argument has yet been crafted.
There is a formal separation between dogma and speculation. Dogma commands assent to a given proposition: speculation provides reason in favor of that proposition. What does not command assent in this equation is the particular speculation. Required Catholics are to believe that a successful argument for God’s existence there must be, Catholics are not required to believe in the success of some particular or even any expressible argument meant to establish such. The unity of dogma does not require speculative unity. Indeed, I and Thomas Aquinas are both Catholic, but he believes in God’s existence on the account of cosmological arguments, while I believe on the account of ontological arguments. This difference between us makes neither of us any less Catholic, for we are unified in dogmatic belief.
With respect to the occult motivation of an ideology, the particular manifestations that ideology concretely takes on are likewise speculatively pluralistic.
[...]
A distinct sense of nature is in use. We might compare the nature of a thing to what happens (in nature). It is the nature of a human body to live, yet it is also natural when it is afflicted by disease. These are the two distinct senses in use. The first sense is normative, in that there is the following of a prescribed order. The second sense is incidental, in that it occurs irrelevant of order.
What makes a social order natural in the normative sense? We can get at answering that question with another.
What do nature and the internet have to do with each other? A technology such as the internet enables a distinctly different optimal socioeconomic arrangement than if there were no internet. We can’t say the difference between those two is that one is “natural” and the other is not. As such, there is no one and only natural arrangement of society. Rather, there are a number of natural arrangements, and it depends on what form is available. It is much like saying there are a plurality of natures, since after are all there are cats and dogs, and there are cat natures and dog natures.
Then what is about an arrangement of society that makes it “natural” in the first place?
The natural arrangement of society is that which is conducive to human flourishing. Flourishing is not strictly identical to only the perpetuation of the species, but also the virtue of the individuals therein. We should not, in looking at the matter of virtue, concern ourselves with the mass of the public. The mass of the public is malleable by what social expectations are set for it from above. The virtue we are interested in is the virtue of the Potent; by this is meant not politically powerful, but those individuals with the greatest potential for social influence. Freedom entails greater responsibility than servitude, for a servant’s only responsibility is to serve his master’s will; a free master is responsible not only for his own, but for deciding his own will. The will of the Potent is virtuous for it is the will of a higher mind, which is beyond the understanding of the mass. As God was made to reply to Job, so will the Potent be unable to explain their reasons to the mass. It is not that there is a lack of reason, but that the reason transcends what the vulgar are capable of understanding.
I don’t know if you’re familiar with the work of Christopher Dawson (a late Catholic historian), but his ideas seem to forshdow what you are now arguing here. You might also want to check out the work of another Catholic historian reactionary, John Lukacs, and a book of his like his recent At the End of an Age.
I have to say though, I’m skeptical of your general thesis. For instance, the cult of the nuclear family developed at the same time as the growth of the state, that is, at the beginning of the modern age (i.e. around the Renaissance). Although I certainly agree that that the state can be antithetical to the Catholic family and all that, I really don’t think it can flourish without it. After all, if the state is unnecesary, then why has life historically been so violent without it? (Life in the Middle Ages was much more violent than it is today). Anyway, I suspect you know what I am getting at, and it’s a basic objection that you’ll have to honestly deal with. Best of luck in your endeavor.
I really wish I had time to get into history. I only have a little acquaintance of John Lukacs, and that through John C. Wright at his blog.
Life historically has always been violent, state or no state. Likewise, the majority of violence committed historically has been committed by states. One might argue that is only because even worse forces were kept at bay by states, but you really wonder what force but states would’ve been willing to decimate Europe twice.
Actually, during certain periods in the early Middle Ages you were the least likely of being killed by violent means such as murder or battle. In fact, during the early Middle Ages the “states,” if we must call them that, were profoundly weak and there was very little war. Again, one could suggest that there was little war only because there was little to war about, but the alternative thesis is equally compelling.
I’m not interested in defending the cult of the nuclear family, I actually think of that as being sub-optimal. I believe a more natural arrangement is an extended family arrangement, which we see undertaken by those families able to afford it, e.g. the nobility and elite of any age.
“Indeed, I and Thomas Aquinas are both Catholic, but he believes in God’s existence on the account of cosmological arguments, while I believe on the account of ontological arguments.”
As a recently baptized Catholic, and a new reader, this interest me greatly. I haven’t yet perused all of this blog or your previous one, and hope I’m not asking a question already answered: Which ontological argument(s) are the basis of your belief in God? Anselm, Descartes/Liebniz, Godel, others?
I’m a fan of Aquinas, Ways I, II and V, myself, but the more, the merrier (St. Thomas’s writings helped give me the final push toward coming into communion with the Church, so he will always be one of my two guiding lights, so to speak. Him and Archangel Michael, using his spear in the essence of its nature…)
I’ve crafted an argument here: http://amtheomusings.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/the-modal-set-ontological-argument/
I also have an unfinished essay on the nature of cosmological and ontological arguments. The gist of that essay is that every successful cosmological argument can be interpreted as an ontological argument which includes an empirically manifest example of an underlying ontological principle which does the “heavy lifting” in the argument. Perhaps someday I will finish it and put it up on the blog.
Your argument is very interesting; I’m doing some research comparing it to the other ontological arguments I mentioned above. Just for now: “If possibly A, then necessarily possibly A.” – Isn’t it also true that “If possibly A, then necessarily possibly not-A? Possibility does not require existence, as of all the possibilities in reality, some may never be realized, unless reality is presumed to last for an infinitely long time. And your set of possibilities can’t have an infinite set of members, unless we want to open up a big-ass can of worms…
No one accepts any axiom which states that “If possibly-p, then possibly-not-p.” If such an axiom were given, then you could prove a logical contradiction with all the modal logics. For example:
1) necessarily-p (given)
2) possibly-p (from 1, axiom D)
3) possibly-not-p (from 2, given your hypothetical axiom)
4) not-necessarily-p (from 3, equivalence rule)
5) necessarily-p and not-necessarily-p (1, 4, conjunction rule)
>Possibility does not require existence, as of all the possibilities in reality, some may never be realized
You are assuming that possibility means “will exist.” That is not what possible means.
>your set of possibilities can’t have an infinite set of members
The set of natural numbers has an infinity of members, why would that be a problem?
We very much enjoy the direction your essay is taking, and hope that you will post the finished work on the blog for our perusal.
We consider the last paragraph to be particularly impactful and agree with its sentiment. Yes, the natural arrangement of society is that which is conducive to human flourishing. The individual human’s goal is his flourishing, so we should not be surprised by this shared objective shared when they coalesce.
We also agree that we should not concern ourselves with the mass of the public. We agree that they are largely malleable and, taking it one step further, propose that the mass of humanity has a hard cap on their ability to flourish. Thus to free them would do no good for themselves or their betters, and much potential harm.
We do contend a specific idea, that of the flourishing of virtue. First, do you suppose that flourishing via traditional virtue is the objective of the entirety of the species? We do not. We suppose that the growth of traditional virtues is the objective of a minority of the population.
We also disagree with your definition of the Potent. Yes, the Potent as described can be among the most socially influential of a society. But we must not forget that Psychopaths, with their devilish charisma and deceptiveness are experts at garnering social influence, and not a cell in them strives towards virtue. Their flourishing is violent and entropic nature.
We are curious how you can maintain that the natural arrangement of a society is human flourishing and virtue among the Potents, when both the flourishing can diverge between categories of humanity and virtue itself is entirely non-existent in a significant population of the Potents. A talent for trickery, deception, and a silver tongue has often led to celebration of one as a ‘higher mind’, virtuous in nature, with fatal results.
We’d like to see you grapple this specific contention. Other than that, we are eager to read the rest of your paper.
There is nothing that stops sociopaths from being virtuous. It is just very important to get the social structures right so that they are incentivized towards pro-social behavior rather than inclined to destroy for personal gain. I believe that social structure would at least resemble a nobility, if not outright be an aristocracy.
I don’t argue that some sociopaths cannot be reformed through their environment. I argue that psychopaths, by their very nature, are incapable of being virtuous, and there is an important distinction between the two groups. The potential for virtue or socially constructive activity has been an idea that has never bore fruit. It doesn’t matter on the structure their in, they simply have a different value system than you and I. The closest we’ve gotten is throwing them into the battlefield where, with their complete lack of fear, they become brave but quickly dead death squads. Needless to say that is a primarily viceful and destructive act.
In order for our society to work, we rely on a kind of skeletal collectivism. It is natural for human beings to form groups among the likeminded, and these groups become our societies.
Psychopaths are, by definition, lone wolves. Their few partnerships are parasitic in nature and always temporary.
You cannot form a successful society with a group creature and one that, by all accounts, seems to prey exclusively off the group creature. Our best option would be to follow the hunter gatherers and banish them, or alternatively use them as slave labor. Options are limited when your dealing with a creature of pure destruction.
I don’t think you know sociopaths. That is a potential for them more than others, but they can also be pro-social.
We would say the same thing about yourself, that your knowledge of psychopathy, sociopathy, and its relationship to antisocial personality order may be somewhat lacking, but we’d really have to have a thorough discussion about what we know in order to conclude such judgements with any certainty.
Until that time, we’ll simply say that we know of no such cases where a born psychopath (ie, psychopaths who are identifiable in childhood) developed virtuous behaviors. Can they be pro-social? Separating pro-social behaviors from virtuous behaviors, it may be possible. We doubt it, but a hypothetical case could (and should) be presented.
Considering our considerable experience with their ilk, we remain skeptical of any such idea. Please propose one, that we may consider it.
The closest we’ve gotten is forced labor and military service.
“As God was made to reply to Job, so will the Potent be unable to explain their reasons to the mass. It is not that there is a lack of reason, but that the reason transcends what the vulgar are capable of understanding.”
The beautiful symmetry here is that the potent, by definition, don’t need to explain anything. As they say, “If you’re explaining, you’re losing.”
“The weak must suffer what the powerful will.” Don’t know who said that, but it’s true.
Thucydides
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