Elizabeth TsurkovVerified account

* The joint efforts of the factions and civilians achieved the success of the campaign. * The Syrian state is burnt out. A state needs to have a military to be able to protect it, and the Syrian regime does not have this.

* The Syrian Army has become a group of militias competing against each other, unable to achieve the regime's goals. The Russians provided heavy airstrikes for the regime & regime wasn't able to achieve progress.

* The regime lost not only militarily, but is also struggling economically, in part due to the failed campaign: the lira fell by 20%, lack of fuel, bread, services, unemployment, emigration.

* A state requires an ability to manage the economy & the Syrian regime lacks this. The economy in regime areas has turned into a a group of economic gangs. Different security forces control different sectors, e.g. 4th Division collects "taxes" on highways.

The regime is giving away the resources & economic interests to Russia and Iran in exchange for their intervention. The Russians got the trade ports in Lattakia & Tartous, phosphate fields. The Iranians buy up lands in Damascus and the east in areas where they are present.

* "The Iranians have a long-term plan to replace the people who revolted against the regime, with a different people, that will be loyal to Iran & to control the ruler of Syria, whether it's Bashar al-Assad or if he's replaced with another criminal." [no mention of sects' names]

* "The regime take pride...in protecting minorities...the world always cares about minorities and lets the majority to be crushed, daily." 4 main minorities in Syria: 1) The Kurds took a piece of land for themselves and refuse to be ruled by this regime as before.

2) There are tensions between the Druze in Sweida & the regime. They refuse to accept being treated by the regime as before. 3) Many Christians left due to oppression of the regime & conditions on the ground produced by the regime [Jabhat al-Nusra kidnapped Christians previously]

4) "The Alawis themselves, the sect of this regime, today there are deeply frustrated... The regime tried to scare this sect that they will not survive unless under this ruling family... They offered many of their young men...Over 100,000 injured or killed in this sect.>

All of these [Alawi] souls killed en masse [أُزْهِقَ] so that Bashar remains in his seat...After all the sacrifices of this sect, we hear a great deal of frustration, for example due to lack of compensation to the families of the injured."

Analysis: * Golani makes sure to mention God now & then, but largely adopts secular rhetoric & reasoning. E.g., "Syrian revolution" as opposed to jihad. He refers to death in battle as pain & a sacrifice made to keeps others safe, instead of glory & something to be desired.

* Most importantly, Jolani adopts non-sectarian, even compassionate rhetoric when discussing Syrian minorities. He uses the neutral "Alawi" term instead of the derogatory "Nusayri" commonly used by HTS. Let's not forget that Nusra massacred Alawi civilians in Lattakia in 8/2013.

*Jolani is revered by his (largely young) fighters. His rhetoric matters. After the speech, the discourse in HTS WhatsApp groups I'm in & Telegram channels concerning Alawis remained the same [Nusayri regime]. Time will tell if he makes an effort to change discourse inside HTS

This speech, Muhaysini's recent interview and Jolani's May 2019 interview all mark the trajectory of moderation within HTS, in an effort to seek int'l normalization & acceptance of their rule over Idlib (Gaza-ficaton/Talibanization).