Nicholas A Heras

2-The SDF was never meant to go to DEZ. In fact, the Obama team thought Assad and Allies would seize that province from ISIS. When Raqqa concluded and the next stop was ISIS consolidated in DEZ the SDF was sent to finish the job. The Coalition had no other Syrian partner capable.

3-The awful truth is that the other LOEs in the Coalition's C-ISIS campaign from DEZ, especially NSyA and MaT, failed to create the "inkspot" they promised deep in ISIS territory, a "Syrian Sahwa." ISIS was too strong, these groups had no actual pull, and local tribes too weak.

4-Turkey, which hosts thousands of Deiri fighters, mostly wouldn't let these fighters partner w/the Coalition, even as a force separate from the SDF under Coalition command, because the Coalition would not throw away the SDF. Very unhelpful. So, the SDF had to do the job alone.

5-DEZ is not an easy place. The tribes there were mostly atomized before 2011, no one actor held the province between 2012-2014 when tribes and armed groups had home rule+lots of feuds and creating a united governance+security+administration structure was only done by ISIS.

6-Truth is the SDF (and later DAA/NES) had to "learn on the job" with DEZ. They understand incorporating Arabs (they do it all the time in Hasakah, Raqqa, and Aleppo provinces) but DEZ was a tougher challenge, almost a foreign place. But SDF leaders knew they needed local help.

7-Here's the rub: when SDF leaders started networking w/locals through contacts in Hasakah, like the Baggara tribe, they saw how complicated even something like Baggara politics is. Shamiya vs. Jazeera. This fakhd vs.That fakhd. But they managed to get Baggara, and then others.

8-The DEZ campaign was slow+painful. ISIS fought hard against the SDF. A lot of recovery efforts still need to be done there. And ISIS had a lot of time to create local sleeper cells. But the security issues in DEZ are likely easier to solve than the governance ones. Sadly.

9-Post ISIS, DEZ under the Coalition is being run kind of oddly. The Coalition(despite US officials' occasional sheikh summits, sword dances and town halls)is subcontracting to the DAA/NES+SDF, which is subcontracting to the DEZCC+DEZMC, which subcontracts mostly to local tribes.

10-This situation in DEZ isn't sustainable. The more authority is passed down to tribes, it undermines DAA/NES+DEZCC efforts to build governance and administration for all Deiris, not just whichever tribes are least atomized. Building civil society beyond tribes is very vital.

11-Pushing more power to tribes in DEZ, as some are call for, has big consequences that aren't being really discussed. It might seem like a way to counter ISIS (or Iran, for some folks in high places), but it means tribes run most things. Maybe they shouldn't have that power.

12-My research and field interviews indicate that in post-ISIS DEZ, tribes and tribal law have a lot more power than is being stated. All that subcontracting of authority down means tribes and tribal law runs a lot on a day to day basis. That is problematic for a few reasons.

13-One reason is it means certain better organized tribes-say like the Shaytat-have more authority in the system than others. And that disparity will grow as certain tribes with oil on their lands keep more of the profits, get more guns, and are positioned to be DEZ powerbrokers.

14-Another reason is relying on tribes/tribal law means that if more powerful tribes want to, say, apply jali (exile) as collective punishment on a weaker tribe/family, by saying they backed ISIS, without a strong DEZCC to mitigate that, DEZ becomes strong preying on weak.