Max Hoffman

While both sides are likely to try to compartmentalize and de-escalate the immediate crisis, US security officials will not look at Turkey the same way for many years to come – Ankara’s fundamental reliability as a NATO ally has been undermined.

In the mid-term, I expect US policymakers to accelerate adjustments to the security architecture in the region to reduce reliance on Turkey, leaving Ankara with less influence.

In the short term, Congress will follow through on its threats to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program through the NDAA, prohibiting the transfer of any jets to Turkey or the training of Turkish personnel on the system.

That is a huge blow to Turkish military capability and strategic heft, and Trump cannot do anything about it without provoking a constitutional crisis.

On the CAATSA sanctions, Turkey’s strategy of peeling Trump away from the US national security bureaucracy may work – I suspect Trump will choose the weakest of the sanctions options, and he may drag his feet on implementation. But this is far less certain, as Trump is rash.

The weak CAATSA option would probably include a menu of targeted visa restrictions, prohibition on access to export-import loans, prohibiting access to international financial organizations. @stevenacook & @nateschenkkan have great threads on this that everyone should read.

Even the "weak option" would be damaging to Turkey, given fragile investor confidence and the highly vulnerable currency.

The “nuclear option” would be some combination of cutting off Turkish institutions from US financial instruments, banning the issuance of arms export licenses, banning access to US financial institutions.

This stronger response would devastate the Turkish defense sector and do huge damage to the Turkish economy, potentially triggering a run on the lira and a balance of payments crisis.

Because this latter scenario would be bad for everyone involved—the US has no desire to destroy the Turkish economy, and European banks are exposed to Turkey—I do not expect it to happen.

But it is a sign of Ankara’s complete divorce from reality that they are even risking such an outcome for the sake of an unproven system purchased from an adversarial government.

Finally, looking back on this process, a few things are clear: -Trump undermined two years of consistent US messaging through his inability to deliver stern messages in face-to-face meetings with Erdoğan, and his vulnerability to the "it was Obama's fault!" argument.

-US policymakers STILL do not understand Erdoğan's ideological & personal hostility towards the US (since at least 2016), nor how isolated & ill-informed he is. They plan for a rational actor, but he is not one (or responds to different inputs than those attribute to him).

-Turkey, as presently governed, is incapable of effectively managing its strategic relations & is undermining its own position. This is about the whims of the leader & domestic politics, not strategic advantage. Senior Turkish diplomats & officers must be pulling their hair out.