Can Okar

The context for this is the tweet below but also a broader debate in both the Turkish twittersphere and amongst prominent English-language, academic/journalist twitter:https://twitter.com/amberinzaman/status/1126052163791261698?s=20 …

The moment the YSK decided on a new election, the opposition had two choices: 1) to say elections had been delegitimized and that a boycott was the only option or 2) to stand again. They chose to stand again because they rightly saw that a boycott would be counterproductive.

Why would CHP choose to boycott? Firstly, you send an international message that elections were unfair. Second, you might want to delegitimize the process domestically. Third, you might seek to create the seeds for alternative means of power-transfer.

A boycott would add nothing to the international perception of these elections. The YSK invalidated one ballot out of four from the same envelope on grounds that would also invalidate every past Turkish election. Everybody in the world knows this.

Domestically, anyone who observes Turkish politics knows that an opposition boycott would have been used by the AKP to actually legitimize the YSK decision. “Look!” they would have said. “They’re not brave enough to enter an election where they can’t cheat.”

We can also establish that an alternative means of power-transfer simply isn’t on the table and certainly wouldn’t be made more likely by a boycott that would be roundly criticized as running away from the fight.

We have to remember as well that, for all the media bias and for all the concentration of AKP power in every Turkish institution, the CHP did win Istanbul. They won! This was in a context where almost all major city turned its back on the AKP.

Having decided to run again, the opposition has to recognize both that it will be fighting a completely different campaign second time round and that the AKP will use all the institutional, legal and electoral clout available to it to ensure it somehow wins.

The opposition will need to embrace three, interconnected objectives: 1) to win (obviously), 2) to raise the cost of electoral manipulation so it is either deterred or incredibly obvious and 3) to lay the ground for future opposition organization.

How can the opposition win? Content-wise, it will need to discuss the YSK decision but without appearing to moan. The victims here shouldn’t be framed as the CHP – it is Turkey’s institutions and the majority of voters in its biggest city.

But the election cannot be framed only as a referendum on what kind of democracy Turkey is to have. That is too esoteric and too distant from the reasons the opposition is winning cities. The economy remains the key issue and needs to be front and center.

The AKP will likely try to pull the messaging of the election into all kinds of other directions. The CHP needs to have the ground-game and the discipline not to get sucked into debates that are side-shows. And so let's talk about that ground game.

Tactically, there is a temptation to hold mass rallies in CHP-strongholds. Not a good idea. There are three electoral dynamics at play: 1) get out the vote (GOTV) in your strongholds, 2) switch voters in areas you lost and 3) bring out the non-voters.

The opposition should use its volunteers to get out the vote in places it always wins. Helping students travel back from summer holidays is one example but it is a broader responsibility of opposition voters to support one another and keep up hope.

The real target, however, has to be what Ekrem İmamoğlu has been great at: reaching out across the aisle and doing it in the language of the AKP but with a smile. There is clear dissatisfaction amonst AKP ranks and this needs to be heard without blame.

That will mean smaller meetings in AKP strongholds. It will mean really strong security and avoiding organized provocation. It will mean positive messaging about Istanbul and the economy rather than constant negation of the YSK or AKP.

But we all know that the election will take place in an institutional environment even more heavily stacked in favour of the AKP. The opposition will need to accept that it cannot win every fight on that unlevel playing field. It can only raise the costs of manipulation.

Every autocracy has a “menu of manipulation” but the different tactics are associated with different costs, whether those are domestic (continued legitimacy) or international (largely economic due to Turkey’s indebtedness).

The opposition needs to be as vigilant as possible and push the AKP into positions where open manipulation is either too high-cost to do or where the AKP simply accepts the costs and bakes them into its future politics. All politics is iterative so those costs will matter.

The two areas where vigilance is most required are electoral rolls (who is allowed to vote) and the counts (how we decide who got the most votes). Everything needs to be as out in the open as possible because the YSK are clear on where their side is.

Democracy and the sanctity of the ballot box has been the rallying cry of the AKP for 25 years. There needs to be a test of how far the AKP is willing to leave that behind because without it, the AKP loses a great deal of water from its well of legitimacy.

It is important also that the opposition keeps its democratic and organizational reflexes alive and indeed strengthens them. With the Turkish economy as it is, there will be further opportunities to transfer power in the future.

The opposition needs vibrant get out the vote mechanisms. They will need strong legal support. They will need alternative media strategies. They will need the data-crunching teams who define campaign messaging and targeting. These should be nurtured.

The YSK couldn’t overturn a very clear victory in Ankara. There is certainly a breaking point at which it is impossible to change the outcome even with all of the state’s resources. The opposition has to believe that it can create those kinds of outcomes and prepare for that.

Finally, the opposition needs to keep its alliances intact. The AKP will seek to divide the constituent parts of that alliance through tactics that we can’t even predict right now. We can assume they will be creative and utilize the full force of the state.

That is why, with the decision to stand in the elections, personal boycotts need to be avoided if possible. It is why the HDP remains important and why Western Turks should be vigilant and vocal about what happens in the East with kayyums.

Istanbul was won once before so there is no reason to believe it can’t be won again. It will just be massively more difficult to do it this time. The opposition has to be in it to win it. And whatever happens, there is more at play than just Istanbul. Remember that.

Turkey’s opposition has been remarkably resilient to hopelessness over the last 20 years and in particular since 2014. The decision to re-stand was sensible but it is the start of a 45 day struggle that may not always go as planned. Hope will be vital at every step.