

Chapter 14

Cosmopoly: Occidentalism and the New World Order

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Once it is accepted that Western culture is the most advanced culture, all "minor" cultures were inherently un-modern, and every step they took towards Western culture was regarded as progress ... the question whether traditional culture had to be abandoned for the sake of economic progress was the question on the lips of all developing and Third World nations. Japan chose the way of Westernization, cutting itself off from the Edo period and categorizing all of traditional culture as un-modern.... The Position that Japan finds itself in today is clearly a dangerous one, on the very edge of a precipice. Its teacher, the Western world, is engaged in serious self-criticism, and is beginning to identify new goals for itself. This will leave Japan an honors student without a school, and the fact of the matter is that Japan does not know what to do.

—Kisho Kurokawa

A Zen master once said to his disciples as he lay dying, "I have learned only one thing in life: how much is enough."

The First Commandment of market capitalism is: "There is *never* enough ... the market that stops expanding dies."

—Harvey Cox, Harvard theologian

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

This chapter is about communications on a global level, its predominantly one-way flow from a tiny rich and aggressive minority to a vast majority, and its consequences. International communications is made up of any human artifact crossing national boundaries accidentally or deliberately. This includes pollution;

disease; tourism; international student exchanges; military, diplomatic, and religious missions; trade, and mass media messages. Culture is constituted of the values, beliefs, expectations, motivations, and behavior patterns of a people who recognize themselves as a group.

Today, as the human race dramatically increases in numbers, qualitative differences in the form of cultural diversity are rapidly decreasing. The human race is undergoing what has been called a great transformation, not only in behaviors but, more important, in habits of mind, beliefs, expectations, motivations, and values (Gebser, 1985; Greider, 1997; Polyani, 1957). The emerging world culture is not village-like, as the early Marshall McLuhan and some of his not too careful readers (for his later work was not so optimistic) would have us believe, but rather exhibits the qualities of a single global urban culture.¹

COSMOPOLY

The main thesis of this chapter is that the world is *not* becoming a global village but instead a global city or cosmopolis (Kramer, forthcoming). This is an important difference, for although one constitutes community the other is formed by an aggregate of disinterested if not competing individuals. One is casual, intimate, and spontaneous and the other rushed, impersonal, and rigidly organized. The village offers the security of the clan and the meaning of traditional identity, an identity that is shared (group membership), whereas the city is the place where the stranger is the predominant type of person one encounters. In the cosmopolis, just maintaining contact with one's parents, children, and siblings becomes difficult such that even the traditional respect for and tending of graves is abandoned to indifferent professionals.

The allure of the cosmopolis is rooted in an idealized urban modern lifestyle, a utopian ideology I call cosmopoly. Cosmopoly appeals to the egocentrism that marks Western modernity and perhaps the most base desire of the species. Cosmopoly promises the liberation of the individual from personal obligations and attachments as the very essence of progress, and this spells the end of traditional communities (Lerner, 1958). As cosmopoly moves across the globe, we can trace how many things change. For instance, two things occur. The "primitive" superstitions that articulate a world that is full and alive (full of manna, chi, spirits) and that therefore demands care and obligation for Others, including the environment, gives way to an indifferent universe that is empty and dead (piles of vibrating atoms in utter void). Thus, although a traditional clan may take care to be respectful and perform elaborate and lengthy rituals before cutting a single tree to make a canoe, the modern can cut down an entire forest without hesitation.

A second major change that accompanies modernization is the implosion of the psyche in a way that would have made Ayn Rand proud and that Walter Rostow championed in his anti-*Communist Manifesto* (1952). This implosion

amounts to a shrinking and hardening of the ego into a "position," a distillate of personal interests and desires, a singular limited yet arrogant perspective (Gebser, 1985). As cosmopoly spreads we see the village as clan shrink to the extended family, then shrink further still to the nuclear family, and finally that basic unity of society split into monadic individuals immensely selfish of their personal space, time, property, and thoughts. It takes a great concentration of wealth (exploitation of resources) to sustain such happy positivism because competition displaces cooperation.

As nature and culture bifurcate at the level of mythological articulation, the dispersed sacred forces of animism collapse and distantiate into a limited polytheism of anthropomorphic (jealous, emotional) gods that enunciate laws (legality) (Kramer, 1997). The sacred becomes increasingly materialized, spatialized. The divine takes on physical qualities, such as structural ordination, and retreats to distant places like mountain tops. Eventually the articulation of the sacred mirrors the emergence of the modern ego as monotheism comes to dominate, and God exists at an almost infinite distance. Morality and legality become disconnected. Finally, as Friedrich Nietzsche (1886/1973) notes, the sacred and values vanish entirely, leaving only a dead and empty physical (hyletic) substrate governed by deterministic logic.

Cosmopoly is a combination of cosmopolitanism and hegemonic homogenization of world culture, a monopoly of a single set of values, beliefs, motivations, and behaviors. The utopian ideology of cosmopoly is global in reach and claims for itself exclusive validity as to what is positively beautiful, good, (inalienably) right, and true. But such valuations are not honestly presented as judgments, which are contingent, but as transcendental laws of nature codified by scientific notation and verified by scientific observation, which claim to have no perspective. The intense abstraction of late-modern conceptual idealism (formula, for instance) comes to govern the world.

The problem is, *ou topos* literally means "nowhere." In other words, utopias are virtual and not actual phenomena. Therefore, as cosmopoly spreads on the wake of classical European colonialism and exploits new channels of expansion, including telecolonialism (which works its hegemonic magic more on the virtual and ideological level, from the inside out as it were, than classical imperialism that worked more on the level of out-group foreign domination and extraction of physical resources), cosmopoly is erasing the very self-identities of billions of people in the name of its own brand of progress. As the virtual ideal meets the actual limitations of the Earth, we are witnessing an emerging mess made by a very spoiled and childish mentality.

Utopian Modeling

The relationship of virtual to actual in most knowledge systems, including religions, gives ontological priority to the virtual objective ideal over the contingent actual subject (imperfection as the distortion of limitation). Virtual rule

and law govern contingent actualities. However, mimetic modeling stresses the priority of the actual such that, for instance, a child will make a plastic small-scale replica of an actual airplane or ship and judge its value by how well it conforms to the proportions of the actual object. Thus, the actual constrains and guides the model. According to mimetic truth, priority goes to the already extant thing. But increasingly this process is being reversed so that the virtual imagination is being liberated from any and all actual constraints. This is what Gebser (1985) has called the will to will in the form of hypertrophic self-expression. Modeling—for instance in the design of cars, buildings, cities, genetics, and so on—is done first on a computer and then made into an actual object. The reduction of the world to building blocks has opened the path to the pure mechanistic might of rearrangement at will and in the service of pure desire. This, as will be discussed, is important to the model minority, for that is a person who by definition should be willing to undergo "psychic disintegration" so that his or her ways of thinking, feeling, and acting can be reorganized in a way that suits the dominant culture's wants and needs, that maintains system stasis (equilibrium) (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, pp. 367–69). Here we have the flip side of modern hypertrophic individualism, the passivity of modern mass society (Gebser, 1985).

Modernity, for all its claims to emphasize empiricism, manifests the liberation of desire by way of eliminating obligation. It is, as Joseph Campbell (1988) notes, "Libido over credo" (p. 190). If primitivism and savagery are the uncontrolled expression of instinctual drives, the modern West has proven less self-constrained than many traditional cultures. Modernity is the origin of virtual parallel (often mathematical) realities that articulate desires and values, which are then operationalized, thereby claiming the mantle of objective reality. Modern Western magic works with profound impact. Its products are physically demonstrable. They are empirical fact, and so we have the fact-ory. Modernists like to say that the best way to predict the future is to make it. Sometimes vision must wait for engineering to catch up to enable plans to be actualized. Two popular examples are the designs of architect Frank Gehry and President John F. Kennedy's proclamation that the United States would send a man to the moon and return him safely within a decade of the pronouncement. Vision comes before operationalization. Technology and other forms of physical culture manifest desire, ambition, hope, and fear. Waiting for material sciences to make the dream actual involves problem solving and retooling.

This process also applies to model minorities. Minorities are told by dominating Western culture that they must strive to embody the transcendental values and desires of the dominant culture. The tools used to make model minorities were first supplied by eugenics and later by behaviorism (rewards and punishments). The developing world (societies and peoples) is seen as a problem and as a work in progress by the already developed. The progress of minorities can be measured against the presumed ideal that dominates their lives and is imposed from outside their value and belief systems. Across the planet it

is presumed that the more Westernized a person or society, the more modern and therefore developed they are. To progress or evolve to a "higher level of self-understanding" the underdeveloped must be willing to "disintegrate" so that they can be reconstituted as moderns in behavior, ways of thinking, and feeling (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003; pp. 379–82). This presumes the modern Western mechanistic metaphysic that twentieth-century physics abandoned, which is ironic for it is from the physical sciences that this metaphysic was originally transferred to the social sciences (Bohm, 1980; Gamow, 1966; Heisenberg, 1958). This metaphysic applied to the self reduces it to a mere resource base that can be fragmented and reorganized at will. This willpower-drive characterizes the modern West and is the origin of its instrumental orientation and definition of the world. It extends even into the biological realm as mere substrate (foundation of building blocks) available for genetic engineering.

Constructing Model Minorities: The Systematic Elimination of Different Selves

Social "science," born of the age of engines, was conceived to engineer a better, more productive human and society, a society that would be an engine of wealth creation. To do this, to achieve optimal competence, a few eggs must be broken. The world is being changed by industrial mass productive and mass consumptive interests, and so nonindustrial ways of being must be transformed. Positivism sees this as growth. Jourard (1974) defines growth this way: "Growth is the disintegration of one way of experiencing the world, followed by a reorganization of this experience . . . the disorganization, or even shattering, of one way to experience the world is brought on by new disclosures from the changing being of the world, disclosures that were always being transmitted, but were usually ignored" (p. 456). Since Gudykunst and Kim (2003) argue that culture is "internal to the person" (p. 272), then as people's psyches disintegrate under stress and reintegrate, what is happening is that cultures are disintegrating and reintegrating (developing) as what? People are being encouraged to develop, evolve into what? Western-style moderns.

What is clear here is that Jourard presumes the seventeenth-century mechanical metaphysic that characterizes modernity (Cartesianism). Thus the individual is posited as not being an integral part of the world but instead as being confronted by a world that is "transmitted" to him or her in fragments. Not being part of the dominant world-system, the individual is thus perceived to be a passive target for compliance gaining. The individual is not a part of change but must continually adjust to it. This metaphysical prejudice has been debunked already by many scholars, yet it persists, leading to the variable analytic notion of human behavior.

The variable metaphor of reality suggests that as a person moves toward one end of a line, he or she must move away from the other end with equal and opposite momentum. Thus, as I learn something new, I must unlearn something

old as if my mind is a finite container. This version of reality as uncritically applied to human behavior is exemplified by any number of dichotomies, including the popular cultural variable collectivism versus individualism, two cultural orientations that face each other at opposing ends of a presumably single continuum (Parson, 1951). In this case, for instance, as a person moves toward individualism, that person must move away from being collectivistic. However, observation demonstrates that a person may exhibit both tendencies in differing contexts and even at the same time, as when a teenager resists peer pressure to do something she perceives to be against her personal interest, like smoking, but at the same time will facilitate her cohesion to the group to which she wants to belong. This is cognitive and *affective* dissonance.

In analytic philosophy and the natural sciences, from where the either/or version of analytics was transferred to the social sciences, the scholars are much more careful so that such distinctions are more adequately defined. Thus, in analytical terms one should say up or not up (which is not necessarily the same as down). Or collectivistic, not collectivist, would be the proper nomenclature in this example, rather than collectivistic versus individualistic. The adjectives *individualistic* and *collectivistic* should not a priori be presumed to be anathema nor even symmetrical phenomena. Each one describes a very complex mode of being.

Similar problems plagued the early cognitivist version of variable analytics, which still holds currency in much social science writing, including Gudykunst and Kim's (2003) description of "growth," which they borrow from Jourard (1974). What they call growth is a process whereby each time something new is learned something old must be "unlearned." But this one-dimensional mechanical version of learning and growth is absurd. In the hermeneutic school of thought, which has had a great impact on learning theory, growth is not a linear zero-sum closed system. Instead it is additive and integrative, so that as a person learns new ways of thinking and behaving, old ones are not necessarily unlearned. Instead the process is more like a musician building his or her repertoire of songs and styles. According to Kramer's (2000a, 2000b) theory of intercultural fusion, this is what occurs when a person such as an immigrant or refugee adopts a new home culture. Learning is not the same thing as unlearning or forgetting, which is the absurd notion put forth in the theory of intercultural adaptation.

For positivists, change, though it is imposed on the individual who is presented as a hapless dissociated monad, is presented as positive-sounding growth. To variable analytic either/or positivists, such forced compliance is even seen as emancipating. According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), "The process, if successful, means that the individual grows into a new kind of person at a higher level of integration. Even extreme mental illness . . . can be viewed as a process of potentially positive disintegration followed by reintegration with new material at a higher level" (p. 381). Notions such as higher and better presume a final goal; otherwise such relative measures are impossible. For

Gudykunst and Kim (2003) the final goal is the evolution of the individual to the point of abandoning the cultured self at the very "limit of humanity itself" per the Buddhist precept of nirvana (p. 385).

Therefore, if global industrialization and cultural extinction are driving people crazy, that is okay because eventually they (at least the ones who keep an optimistic mindset) will conform to the "external system" and be happy with their new lot at a "higher level of self-understanding" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 382). The better a person understands the system, which Gudykunst and Kim equate with being satisfied, the better he or she will understand him- or herself and thus become enlightened. Passive conformity, not active integration, is thus defined as a higher level of self-understanding, and as "maturity," and wisdom. People will, if successful, "emancipate themselves from the constraints of various limited, *conventional* perspectives" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 382; emphasis added). According to intercultural adaptation theory, conformity is absurdly equated with emancipation, and only the value perspective of Gudykunst and Kim is not conventional.

Another contradiction is Gudykunst and Kim's claim that for people to grow, fit in, be competent, and be psychologically healthy and happy, they must adapt themselves to their host culture as fully as possible. But to achieve ultimate adaptability the person should strive to stop identifying with any culture and evolve to "intercultural personhood" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 383). These intercultural experts present two totally contradictory views. On one hand they advise strict nationalism, that a person should strive to unlearn their previous life and assimilate as much as possible. On the other hand they are anticultural, for they also advise that a person should abandon the defilements of culture in general and become somehow transculturally free of all embodied perspectives. Actual cultures, which are not merely conventional but defiled, must be renounced, otherwise the absolute posthuman perfection of cosmopolitan identity cannot be approached (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, pp. 379–85). This is clearly confusing prescriptive advice, and manifestly Hegelian (except that Hegel was consistent and more plausible in that even the grand idealist himself argued that progress can be manifestly realized only through contingent human history).

According to the advice offered by Gudykunst and Kim (2003) to learn how to fit in and be well adjusted in a new setting, one must forget how one lived before and even how to live in *any* conventional way. According to hermeneutic theory, such prescriptive advice is preposterous. Willful forgetting is impossible, and even if possible unwise because we integrate new information in accord with who we already are. This hatred of being an embodied human, all too human, which is to say hatred of being perspectival, is pure idealism and can only lead to either delusional mysticism or self-hatred.

Another claim of intercultural adaptation theory is that if one successfully abandons one's traditional indigenous culture and language for the new, improved positive intercultural personhood, such a person will become cognitively more complex and achieve "a special kind of personal orientation that promises

greater fitness" in the emergent global system, which is apparently not conventional but natural if not supernatural (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 383).

I argue that it is false to claim that cognitive complexity would increase if it were possible to unlearn entire repertoires of behaviors, attitudes, values, and beliefs. Absurdly, according to Gudykunst and Kim (2003) this reorganization of one's cognitive, emotional, and behavioral self to fit with the requirements of the dominate system equals emancipation. Just as Francis Galton (1904) urged that his solution to the defilements of society be "introduced into that national conscience, like a new religion," so do Gudykunst and Kim (2003) argue that

the educational system has a monumental task of projecting and cultivating a new direction for human character formation. If successful, the educational system can help members of future generations embrace the intercultural world and its diversity and give up outdated national, racial, ethnic, and territorial perspectives. . . . If intercultural personhood is deemed a valid educational goal, and we believe that it is, an extensive search for ways to articulate and implement intercultural human development must be undertaken. The propagation of the goal must go beyond the educational process directly to the political processes and the mass media (pp. 388, 389).

First, this is not a recipe for adaptation to an existing condition but for manufacturing the right kind of condition and person. The educational system itself is to be manipulated to promote a singular perspective, a certain set of beliefs and values. Second, the important question is, if we eliminate outdated perspectives—indeed, pluralistic perspectivism as outdated in general and with it all forms of identity—then what diversity will exist? Their solution to sometimes clumsy multiculturalism is the elimination of cultural differences entirely.

Gudykunst and Kim (2003) have misnamed their ideal model "intercultural personhood," for what they are calling for is the elimination of all differences so that intercultural awareness will become impossible. If they were to be successful, there would be no cultures left for intercultural or interidentity interaction to occur. What they mean is global monoculturalism or cosmopolitan personhood. In the interest of system efficiency, the management if not elimination of all potential sources of misunderstanding and conflict is the final solution offered by Gudykunst and Kim (2003). Kramer (2000a) notes that already by 1878 Nietzsche had recognized this dream as a nightmare wherein the ancient mysticism of numerology finally finds its stride. "Here is the 'great liberation' into pure metaphysics—German idealistic philosophizing. This is the realm of the positive scholar who is objective, who sets herself in the position of the interpreter of all our experiences with a knowledge of preconditions and a 'standard of ecumenical goals'" (1878–1880/1996, p. 188).

SOCIAL SCIENCE RHETORIC AS PROPAGANDA

Western social science not only is self-promoting as the positive priesthood that can lead us to salvation but also acts as an ideological apparatus for

promoting as not contingent but as absolutely natural, even hereditary, an ideology I call cosmopolitanism, which in many ways is bourgeois positivism on a global scale. Quite the opposite of liberating us from conventional perspectives, it claims itself to be the only path to growth, evolution, and happiness. As Gebser (1985) notes, positivism promotes itself as the *non plus ultra* of human development and claims objective (absolute) status for this proclamation. Appreciation for alternative cultures (motives, values, and belief systems) and ways of being is off-limits. Gudykunst and Kim (2003) well exemplify the belief that multiple cultures and identities (in a word, diversity) are the biggest problem facing humanity today because difference causes uncertainty, inefficiency, misunderstandings, and the potential for conflict. We are left to believe that such parochial deviations are quaint echoes of a more primitive, less productive time that might at best function as entertaining caricatures of themselves in the new world order. Otherwise, the elimination of cultural, ethnic, racial, and other identities is the best way to manage conflict.

But there is a problem. Very often people who clearly understand each others' interests are still in conflict because those interests are not identical. To argue that understanding means conformity is false. This is derived from the ancient Aristotelian notion of successful communication defined as perfect reproduction of the sender's intent in the receiver's mind, a model of communication appropriate to machine interaction via passive reception or downloading but not applicable to human communication, which always involves active interpretation. This is clear, as Gudykunst and Kim reiterate the Aristotelian linear model of encoding intent, transmission (sending), and inert channel, which presumes that the act of encoding does not alter in any way intent, reception, and decoding as their communication model. For them language differences, for instance, should make no difference in the meaning of a message. According to Gudykunst and Kim, good communication means identity between encoded intent and decoded message, a model based on the dualistic notion of a correspondence theory of truth proven to be illogical by many scholars, most notably Nietzsche (1882/1974), Gadamer (1960/1975), Heisenberg (1930/1958), and Derrida (1967/1973).

This dream and ambition of perfect fidelity, of disintegration into synchronous cohesion (appropriate fit), leads Gudykunst and Kim (2003) to argue that people should join the same system, think in the same code. But the same can never be proven. In any case, such uniformity in interests, beliefs, and values is a recipe for stagnation and nihilism (Kramer, 2000a).

To be sure, if everyone became identical with everyone else, that would solve the problem of intercultural misunderstanding and conflict, but at what price? There would be nothing left to talk about. The solution to misunderstanding and conflict offered by Gudykunst and Kim (2003) is the elimination of difference, of culture, and identity, and the cessation of communication. Logically they conclude that this will mean the elimination of humanity, of "approaching the limit of humanity itself" (p. 385). Mindless and silent doing (automation)

perfect friction-free operation and performance is the definition of the model minority that Gudykunst and Kim (2003) offer. They equate such a state of being with blissful enlightenment. According to their model, equilibrium with the system is anathema to thinking, creativity, deviance, action, and resistance. According to Gudykunst and Kim's model and definitions, such proactivity manifests as nothing but immature, unbalanced, unfit, and mentally ill behavior because such behavior disturbs the zero-energy state of no mind, of utterly silent equilibrium. Just as Ralph Ellison recognized in 1952, the model minority should be invisible, manifesting silent stillness, totally assimilated into the mainstream. According to the theory of intercultural adaptation, the only good minority is a nonexistent one.

Equilibrium is a zero-energy state within a system. Accordingly, the model minority is a person who is ultra-conservative, who works tirelessly to make sure that nothing changes or disturbs the system, and even such effort (if such a word is meaningful in this context) should function at a prereflective, thoughtless level of subconscious behaving in accordance with system requirements, meaning not just scripted behavior but prescribed behavior and thinking. This is why the robot would be, according to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), the ideal model minority and that which all newcomers should strive to emulate (Kramer, 2000a). The model minority is a person who is absolutely compliant, absolutely selfless, not even human anymore.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the social scientific description of development is the claim that the less developed are not just economically poorer than the developed but less "cognitively complex" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 383). But their mindsets and behavior can be modified, developed, corrected. Their evolution and growth can be properly guided by the values of positive social science. This sounds disturbingly like the nineteenth-century rationale Alfred Binet offered for ranking peoples according to intelligence testing, and Thomas Huxley and Galton's (Darwin's cousin and the inventor of the term *eugenics*) attempt to extend the notion of evolution to character traits and intelligence (Binet & Simon, 1913; Kramer & Johnson, 1997). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) argue that immigrants are "simple minded" and less "cognitively complex" or childlike when they first arrive in an advanced society, but the more they assimilate the smarter they become. "This transformation means their psychic patterns are reorganized on a higher level of cognitive complexity, allowing for a greater capacity to overcome [unlearn their] cultural parochialism [which means to abandon their original cultures and selves in favor of the new, more advanced culture and self]" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 383). In short, it is smart to forget who you are, especially if you are an inappropriate primitive.

It is unwarranted to presume that people from "traditional societies" are any less cognitively complex than people from modern urban environments. Such testing itself has problems with cultural variance because it attempts to simplify and reduce intelligence to a contingent set of competencies. Only one culture imposes itself on others this way. As the world shrinks, greater numbers of

people are lumped together, and so it is in this context that Lambert A. J. Outelet, the first person to apply statistical methods to human beings, became an influence on Galton. During World War I, the U.S. Army began using intelligence testing to sort large numbers of conscripts into job positions even though Wilhelm Stern (who had modified Binet's original instrument in an attempt to measure "mental age") and Binet had both come to doubt the practical value of such tests because they had failed to predict a student's success in school.

Civic Worth and Effective Adaptation

G. W. F. Hegel set the tone for modernity as he understood the emerging relationship between modern authority, morality, organization, and the role of the individual to manifest that order.

For it is the Unity of the Universal, essential Will, with that of the individual; and this is "Morality." The individual living in this Unity has a moral life; possesses a value that consists in this substantiality alone. . . . It must be understood that all the worth which the human being possesses—all spiritual reality he possesses only through the State Then only is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of morality—of a just and moral social and political life. For Truth is the Unity of the Universal . . . and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws and rational arrangements. (Hegel, 1822/1956, p. 31)

In 2003 Gudykunst and Kim wrote, "Becoming intercultural is a gradual process of liberating ourselves from our limited and exclusive interests and viewpoints and of striving to attain a perspective in which we see ourselves as part of a larger, more inclusive whole" (p. 385). This psychic transformation characteristic of the universal person is "the achievement of an *increasingly inclusive and transcendental perception and awareness*" (p. 385) characterized by a "pattern of perceptual development . . . toward greater clarity, depth, scope" (p. 383) like, Gudykunst and Kim (2003) claim, the ancient Chinese sages had (p. 385) and that "upwardly mobile immigrants tend to [have to a greater extent] than those who are less upwardly mobile" (p. 382).

Such a reduction of experience to a single perspective actually contradicts the notion that adaptation leads to an enhanced ability to discern differences (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 383). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) contradict themselves, arguing that on one hand adaptation leads to greater cognitive complexity, which is the ability to discriminate (p. 383), but that adaptation also leads to liberation from, the dissolution of, the very same distinctions (p. 385).

According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), successful fit persons have a "higher level of self-understanding" and awareness (p. 382); unlike unsuccessful adapters whose "perception of the environment is simplistic" (p. 362), pliant successful adapters "possess a mental outlook that exhibits greater cognitive differentiation" (p. 384). Fit persons "can and do increase their operational capabilities to enact appropriate and effective technical and social behaviors" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 342). This ability is traced by Gudykunst and Kim

(2003) thus, "Along with ethnicity, the *personality* of individual strangers plays an important role in their adaptation" (p. 368), as well as appropriate cognitive and affective orientations (p. 364). Minorities ("strangers") are said to "experience satisfaction" when they "synchronize" their interactions and "achieve a cohesive functional relationship" with mainstream, dominant behavior patterns (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 364).

In the 1700s Hegel (1770–1831) invented positivism, systems theory, organizational values of operational efficiency and appropriate arrangement, evolution, and the "law of progress," launching the age of ideology. Ideology, as the grand should, is utopian thinking. It is about where we should go as a species, and thus science was transformed into prescriptive engineering, a decapitated philosophy, as Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1972) put it. The point was no longer to discover and describe the universe but to change it, to improve it, but without honest debate about what would constitute an improvement. Because philosophical debate proved too indecisive, it was discarded for "scientific" improvement in the form of overt social engineering.

Auguste Comte vigorously promoted this mixture of religion, moral imperialism, and the worship of ordination. In 1798 Comte and Auguste St. Simon published *Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for the Reorganization of Society*. In the eighteenth century the charge that it is social science's heroic duty to improve the human condition by application of scientific (but actually organizational) principles in the service of moral and functional progress commenced. The duty was to help people understand their place within the system, to help them identify with it and thus achieve better functional fit, improving the system and individual performance, making everything and everyone better and happier. Mental equilibrium and system equilibrium are thus mechanically perceived to be identical: "A healthy psychological state involves a dynamic fitting of parts of the internal system and external realities, that is, an attainment of internal harmony and a meaningful relationship to the outside world. The psychological health of strangers is associated directly with their ability to communicate and their functional fitness in the new environment" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 372). According to intercultural adaptation theory, competent communication ("appropriate techniques") and mental health are synonymous, and all of this is based on a congruence between the individual and the external system. To avoid being disturbed one must get with the mainstream flow by thinking and acting in appropriate, efficient ways in accord with their station. But Gudykunst and Kim (2003) argue that the ability of one to do this is influenced by an individual's "adaptive predisposition" (p. 370). Psychological traits determine a person's "adaptive potential" (p. 370).

According to their eighteenth-century notion of system, dissonant components, by definition, cannot be regarded as parts of the system. The concept of system presumed by Gudykunst and Kim is an outdated version of statics abandoned first by Goethe and Nietzsche and in physics in 1929 when Edwin Hubble and Milton Humason (1929) discovered that the universe is not in a

steady state but expanding. More recently, after studying a 12-billion-year-old stream of light, John K. Webb and his colleagues (2001) have discovered that the fine structure constant (in this instance the speed of light) has slowed over the age of the universe. The point is that not even in physics, from where social science borrowed its version of system, are statics relevant. The static notions of certainty and uncertainty, of individual and system, are misleading metaphors for the reality of fusional field dynamics both in natural and social sciences (Kramer, 1997, 2000b).

Happiness for a positivist is constant certainty, and it is the goal of positivists to construct a closed system that will ensure such (nihilistic) constancy. Positivists presume that the happiest minority is the one who knows and accepts his or her inescapable place according to the system. But their version of system is outmoded. According to positive ideology, the more a person identifies with the goals and motives (the logic) of the system, the more he or she will achieve equilibrium with it, which will be manifested by him or her as appropriate and competent behavior (as perceived by others). But the very notion of equilibrium has proven to be pure idealism. No actual system ever realizes equilibrium, except perhaps consciousness after death. The goal of knowing and accepting one's fixed place within a fixed system, according to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), is essential because otherwise the unhappy individual may become hostile and aggressive toward the system, which is, by definition, bad (p. 372). Meanwhile, systemic and constant cultural forces that compel conformity are natural and as such, objectively, factually beyond good and evil, beyond critique. Mental health and evolutionary progress in both the system and the individual are synonymous. On the other hand, if an individual does not identify with the goals and motives of the system, evolutionary progress cannot occur. The system does not comply; the individual must.

The reader should notice this is absurd because change, including progress and evolution, is by definition a form of disequilibrium. No actual system has a zero-energy state and changes always cascade in uncertain ways (Kramer, 1997). Therefore this absurd story of static progress is exposed as an ideological apology and justification for reactionary status quo and as a rhetoric that attempts to discredit proaction as nothing but troublemaking.

IMPROVEMENT EQUALS CONFORMITY

According to the positive-sounding assimilation ideology, the improvement of society depends on the improvement of its individual members. As will be discussed later, this initially meant breeding humans to better fit the needs of the system; later, as this became unpopular, it meant control and guidance of physical behavior by means of operant conditioning and other forms of systematic behavioral modification. Currently, we are on the cusp of a paradigm that combines both approaches to promoting conformity to the dominant val-

ues as personality and physical traits are being modified by both genetic and social engineering techniques.

After being traumatized by the collapse of the monarchical system and the "chaos" that followed, Comte and St. Simon believed that the discredited ordination that the Catholic Church had instituted had to be replaced by a new religion and that the conflict of revolution had to be stopped. They could not appreciate that the disturbance of the peace functioned as the protean cradle of their own vision. Their reaction to the liberation movement was manifested as an aversion to even the smallest obstacles to smooth political-economic operation. Behavior had to be managed by the priests of the new religion in conjunction with financial and industrial leaders. It was presumed that markets do not do well in unstable environments. Political/industrial leaders were envisioned as paternalistic exemplars of appropriate fit and behavior.

Philosophy, which had concerned itself precisely with what constitutes the good life, was summarily abandoned for not being practically effective enough. The new charge, as both left and right Hegelians agreed, was to change reality, not merely describe or debate it. So commenced the new technological enterprise of social engineering presumably without the obstacle of political or philosophical debate, of openly debating what is good, right, and just. However, nothing is as political as the claim to be apolitical. Society and its members would be made better, improved, even though better was never defined except in terms of military success against other systems and the wealth it ensured. Such judgments became self-evinced by the European conquests of others everywhere, proving the doctrine of survival of the fittest.

Science Is Reduced to Quantification and to a Disinterested Handmaiden

In the nineteenth century, so-called positive reason was advanced in the form of a mathematical approach to social progress (engineering), which meant market expansion. Four Victorian-era members of the Royal Statistical Society constituted the core trendsetters that became modern (statistical) social science and the motor for scientific proof of comparative economic performance linked to hereditary or otherwise internally located (character or personality) traits. They were Francis Edgeworth, Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, and George Yule. Edgeworth (1845–1926) was a major influence on Pearson (1857–1936). In 1881, Edgeworth's effort to mathematically study human character (morals) and conduct appeared as *Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to Moral Science*.

In 1870, the codiscoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russell Wallace, published a favorable review of Galton's book *Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences*, which was one of Galton's many efforts to mathematically demonstrate correlations between hereditary intellect, talent, character, and economic performance. Galton's goal was to promote scientific selection,

to give a scientific basis to the problem of improving the human breed, rather than allowing natural selection to take its course, being random and slow as it is. To this end he invented regression analysis (which he initially called reversion) and formulated the statistical correlation coefficient, which he described in an 1890 paper on kinship. These techniques were expressly devised to enable him and other interested parties to discriminate and evaluate different groups of people. His follower, Pearson, later published an improved technique for deriving the correlation coefficient and also the chi-square test.

From 1893 to 1912, Pearson published eighteen papers in a series titled "Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution." In 1893, Pearson coined the phrase "standard deviation." For over twenty years (until the mid-1930s), Pearson held the eugenics chair, which was endowed by Galton, at the University College London. In 1925, Pearson founded the journals *Biometrika* (Pearson's choice of a *k* rather than a *c* in the spelling is another story that space does not permit) and *Annals of Eugenics* as outlets for studies establishing classifications and distributions based on anthropometric and psychometric (human measurement) data.

To be practical, to lead to civic worth, everything must have measurable outcomes, and so these journals helped institute one of Galton's dreams, which was the systematic gathering of human measurements in schools (still considered, along with econometrics, to be a major indicator for how well society is doing) and archiving them in huge databases. The effort was to study individual and group variability and to find ways to thwart regression toward mediocrity or worse. Race, of course, is still used today as a popular, defining variable.

Pearson hired Yule (1871–1951), who was interested in agriculture and human demographics and who became an ardent follower of both Galton and Pearson. Up into the 1960s, an introductory statistics textbook for social science written by Yule was considered the standard. Yule's first publication, with Pearson, is "On the Correlation of Total Pauperism with Proportion of Outrelief." Pearson's effort to create a field called biometrics and Yule's work influenced the American racist biologist Charles Davenport. Politically, as one might expect, Galton, Pearson, and Yule often warned against unions and any kind of organized "voice of mediocrity" or resistance to the system.

The point of this summary of the origins of modern (mathematical) social science is to demonstrate its original motive for segregating and comparing groups of people and explaining their economic behavior by correlating it to measures that were salient to the eugenicists and how such learned research was a powerful source of legitimation for Western-style colonialism (including imperial Japan's doctrine of the sphere of coprosperity). They hoped to discover and eliminate the causes of mental deficiency, resistant thinking, and sluggish economic behavior by means of selective human breeding. This synopsis also shows how books like Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's (1994) *The Bell Curve* are not aberrations. Instead it and other writings are a consistent extension of the central effort of positive social science to mathematically mea-

sure and compare groups of people in the interest of "progress." This synopsis also shows how such arrogance manifests itself in the form of policy suggestions for social engineering, usually on a massive scale in schools and increasingly through the mass media.

Inherent in this process is a rank ordering of comparative human worth, the view that humans should be seen as either assets or liabilities to the system and that they can be measured as such. Everything is reduced to the accounting of a singular value. This ideology sees variance as an obstacle to efficient, competent communication, and it stresses compliance over cooperation. Such measures and comparisons define some groups as being simple minded, retarded in development, as less or underdeveloped. The causes may be hereditary or cultural. Increasingly the two loci of causation are converging as the will to will is taking the form of genetic engineering. The prospects for controlling uncertainty by systematically constructing planned communities and designer people, of cognitively and physically constructing a world entirely in one's own interests and values is becoming realized. The goal of being a self-made man is being operationalized. Thus we have the realization of total assimilation as individuals can be modified to embody and reproduce transcendental system needs, values, and motives. Soon, it will be possible to manufacture embryos with appropriate traits and attributes. The ambition is to create a closed and thus securely predictable system that is self-organizing and self-perpetuating (tautological). Given such a totalistic desire, it is no wonder that even the slightest and "inevitable mosquito bites" of actual existence, as Nietzsche (1882/1974, p. 113) refers to the struggle and uncertainties of life, would be viewed as "shocking," as a "disease for which adaptation is the cure" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 379).

In any case, the positive solution to everything is the elimination of undesirable psychological and physical attributes and character flaws. With philosophical inquiry debunked as being too indecisive, positive progress is what the priests of positivism, along with industrial and financial leaders, decree. Philosophy, cut off from any existential import, is reduced to checking the internal consistency of decontextualized propositions. Criteria are presumed without question and are rhetorically naturalized or legitimized as being pragmatic and utilitarian, as though such value judgments are neutral and do not presume interests in contingent goals and contexts. They are, as artificial intelligence experts say, implement-independent (absolute) truths. Validity is thus dissociated from common sense (Gadamer, 1975; Kramer, 2000a). Systems typically inoculate themselves from critique by claiming to be universal and natural. However, a provisional context is presumed, no matter how naturalized it may be.

The new positive social psychological technology set for itself the loftiest of goals, the maximization of human capabilities and efficiencies in the service of civic worth and cooperation in labor. Power flowed from coordinated effort, and so the new technology of social engineering would enhance colonial expansion, thus justifying its own versions of right and valuable from the self-evident fact

of might. It was a pragmatic tautology. Those who made the system proved most fit by its (their) own criteria. As the study of philosophy waned, business schools and departments of anthropology devoted to different regions of human behavior blossomed on university campuses. Galton, Binet, and others began to measure and predict the civic worth of individuals and groups of people. In a Huxley Memorial Lecture, the ambition Galton (1901) had for the social sciences was clearly stated:

To give a scientific [which to his limited thinking simply meant operationalized and measured] basis to the problem of race improvement under the existing conditions of civilisation and sentiment ... Men differ as much as dogs in inborn dispositions and faculties. ... So it is with men in respect to the qualities that go towards forming civic worth, which includes ... a high level of character, intellect, energy, and physique, and this would disqualify the vast majority of persons from that distinction. We may conceive that a committee might be entrusted to select the worthiest of the remaining candidates [for breeding], much as they select for fellowships, honours, or official posts. It is a fair assumption that the different grades of civic worth are distributed in accord with the familiar normal law of frequency. (p. 161)

It is important to separate science from technical engineering as, for example, Einstein sought to understand the universe, not improve it. The use of quantitative methods is not the definition of science.

Galton (1901) continues in his essay "Man" to equate character with moral behavior, which he claims to be highly correlated with "civic worth" as most easily measured by income. He observed, for instance, that "the large body of artisans who earn from 22s to 30s a week exactly occupy the place of mediocrity. ... So far as these represent civic worth they confirm ... a fairly normal distribution" (p. 161). He assessed the relative value of workers in East India Company factories in China (1868), and in his articles "Application of the Method of Percentiles to Mr. Yule's Data on the Distribution of Pauperism" (1896) and "On the Probability of the Extinction of Families" (with Reverend H. W. Watson, 1874), Galton argues that poor families should not be encouraged to have children because they will likely pass on the traits that cause pauperism. He even predicted the civic worth of offspring based on measurable family traits and observable behaviors.

Thus the premise of social science is that through the power of psychometry and anthropometry (statistical measures and tests, such as regression, correlation, and so forth, applied to human behavioral and personality traits) the human breed, its condition, and its prospects could be predicted, controlled, and improved. It amounts to a will to will as those who exhibit the greatest will to survive and propagate across the planet should be explicitly and aggressively cultivated. This new and bold positive ideology legitimized and guided Europe's colonial expansion in the Victorian mode, which in turn proved the worth of the ideology by conquering peoples who were thusly proven to be inferior. Mechanical clock-time became of the essence as European powers raced each other

for control of the globe overwhelming other "sluggish" if not flat-out "backward" peoples (witness the cold war). However, it was rather a haphazard effort until a greater precision of measurement and control could be devised.

In response to the protests of many intellectuals, including George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Friedrich Schiller, and Wolfgang Goethe, Galton (whom many consider the first modern, quantitative social scientist) wrote the article "Why Do We Measure Mankind?" (Galton, 1890). Statistical measures of humans began as an explicit way to categorize and compare groups of people and individuals, to be "a valuable guide to the selection of the occupation for which he is naturally fitted" (Galton, 1890, p. 238). Inspired by Binet's use of human measures in France, Galton proclaimed his "great hope of seeing a system of moderate marks for physical efficiency introduced into the competitive examinations of candidates for employment" (Galton, 1890, pp. 238, 239). A mark meant a grade assigned to a measure of predicted efficiency.

Galton's goal was to collect systematically a large database on individuals and families and categorize them according to what he called "civic usefulness," meaning their relative level of contributions to England's economic worth and might. Using the databases he had, he predicted which families were likely to have children with the desired attributes and to then aggressively select and encourage those families to rear more children. An example is his article "Gregariousness in Cattle and Men" (Galton, 1871). This trait, incidentally, was still being selected for in 2003 by Gudykunst and Kim (2003, p. 369) and other psychologists.

Galton claimed that it was science's duty to "improve and develop the inborn qualities of a race" (Galton, 1904, p. 82). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) claim that "individual traits alone can be used as a good predictor of communication effectiveness" (p. 273), that in the interest of efficiency researchers need to specify "the characteristics of the people who can communicate effectively with strangers (i.e., competence is in the person)" (p. 275). For the sake of "effectiveness" in working with others, they offer advice for how to enhance performance through identifying and encouraging certain psychological attributes while minimizing other undesirable ones. To not "act out" or deviate from appropriate and competent behavior patterns, Gudykunst and Kim (2003) suggest that a person become "mindful," that he or she constantly strive to control his or her emotions in a calculated manner (p. 275).

I want to be clear that I am not claiming that Gudykunst and Kim (1997, 2003) are eugenicists. However, they are presuming that some people are either inherently or culturally unfit (they are ambiguous on this point). In either case the problem is in the individual, not the system. The point of their practical, prescriptive book is to help maladjusted people fit in, which is, I contend, very nationalistic and penultimately ethnocentric. They offer no suggestion for how to change unjust systems but only how to change misfit individuals. For whatever the ethnic environment, they are telling the sojourner that he or she must become a high self-monitor and assimilate or face the threat of being mentally

ill (or mental deficiency is the cause of their inability to assimilate; again, they are not clear on the direction of causality perhaps because mental illness and a failure to agree with the system are equated by them).

Because they presume the Aristotelian mimetic model of communication competence, they wrongly believe that understanding is identical with agreeing. They are behaviorists who have misapplied ideas from cognitivism to explain culture and who have uncritically adopted a misapplication of the thermodynamic notion of equilibrium that makes sense only in a closed, zero-sum energy system. They presume that this metaphor accurately describes the human psyche, but it is a misapplication first made by Sigmund Freud and repeated by many psychologists. Human experience is not a closed system.

The point here is to demonstrate that positive social science has consistently, from Hegel and Comte to Galton and Pearson, to Gudykunst and Kim, postulated an ideology that the anthropologist Jules Henry (1963) identified as culture against the individual. The techniques of manipulation go through fashions, but the motives and function of positive social science as a technology for social engineering and a handmaiden to market interests and forced conformity are consistent.

After clearly stating his aim to improve society by improving the behavioral and psychological qualities of the people who constitute it, Galton cannot help himself. He then asks the obvious question, the philosophical question: What is meant by improvement? Claiming scientific disinterest as a refuge from such philosophical nonsense because open reflection on moral and ethical implications obstructs decisive action, he writes, "We must leave morals as far as possible out of the discussion on account of the almost hopeless difficulties they raise as to whether a character as a whole is good or bad" (Galton, 1904, p. 82). But then a line later he defines "better," writing that "all would agree that it was better . . . to be well fitted than ill fitted for their part in life" and on their way to a "common civilisation" (Galton, 1904, p. 82).

Why is this better? Because it serves his personal bourgeois values and interests in the hegemony of positivism and its expansion to a single worldwide system, suppressing possible uncertainties and inefficiencies that pluralism in the form of local identities and "cultural parochialism" may threaten. Standardization in all things, including interpretations and predictability, and control (management) are the tools to achieve the goal of smooth economic expansion.

The goal is "for work to be accomplished effectively in the multicultural organization" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 4). How do you do this? We are told by Gudykunst and Kim (1997, 2003) that we should do this by minimizing the salience of culture. Cultural distinction and perspectives must be generalized out of existence (which seems to contradict the notion of cognitive complexity), which is dubious advice because without a perspective knowledge and integration are impossible. Insofar as difference can lead to identity, contrariness, and resistance (no matter how minor), it must be managed for the sake of the overarching interest in perpetually increasing efficiency of performance and ever-

expanding reproduction of the system. The best way to eliminate cultural differences and the difficulties genuine intercultural interaction always poses is to simply eliminate cultural differences, to "evolve" and progress and become "transcultural" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 384). Such growth is not posited by Gudykunst and Kim (2003) as a regression toward a grand average or even as merely mundane progress but as nothing short of "psychic evolution" (p. 384). It is up or out. Gudykunst and Kim's version of evolution (conformity to system's needs and wishes) means to be eliminated.

According to this philosophy (though social engineers deny making value judgments), nonconforming individuals are seen as maladjusted, unfit, incompetent, counterproductive, inefficient, the cause of conflict, and in need of management from a transcending plane with greater understanding, maturity, and moral super-vision. What is moral is given the innocent-sounding monikers "practical" and "reasonable," which only begs the question. Efficiency and competence merge as operational and functional measures and also as the foremost values of the ironically "value-free" priests of the new positive religion (Comte, 1854/1891). This ideology is what Galton (1904) called the new "orthodox religious tenet of the future . . . to cooperate with the workings of nature by securing that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races" (p. 82). Of course, such an elitist view is not at all representative but prescriptive.

The bold move from philosophy to practical social engineering supposedly facilitates self-improvement en masse even if improvement comes to mean being practical so that social engineering is self-justifying. Nothing could be better than getting better (improvement), and no one is more heroic than those who engineer improved efficiency. Gudykunst and Kim (1997) recommend their book by extolling what they believe to be its greatest virtue, of being practical, for what is practical is good, meaning "helpful in the performance of their [the readers'] work" no matter what it is (p. xii). This dumb sort of morality of sameness was born of imperial, in this instance British imperial, thinking. Already in 1887, in *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche (1887/1967) accurately traced its origins thus: "Herbert Spencer espoused that the concept 'good' is essentially identical with the concept 'useful,' 'practical,' so that in the judgments 'good' and 'bad' mankind has summed up and sanctioned . . . the 'valuable in itself'" (Nietzsche, 1967, first essay, section 3, p. 27). What is the valuable in itself? The new positive religion answers the new Positive Religion, capitalized because it claims to not be merely a conventional perspective among other perspectives but something that is positively known (substantiated, embodied in appropriate behavior) to be wholly true.

Comte published the book *The Catechism of Positive Religion*. He came to regard himself as the founder of a new religion populated by priests who had a positive knowledge of good and evil and who should judge the abilities and worth of each member of society. Comte's plan for a positive social order would be carried out by such priests, along with the help of leaders in banking and industry. These priests would be the moral guides and censors of society and the

definers of community. They would be guided by "spiritual powers," a notion echoed in Gudykunst and Kim (2003) when they evoked Buddhism as the source of their inspiration to "pass beyond the world of opposites, a world built up by intellectual distinctions and emotional defilements ... achieving an absolute point of view," which, as already noted, they call "intercultural personhood" (Suzuki, quoted by Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 385). This is ironic because the previous three hundred pages of their book are dedicated to recounting a plethora of structural functional, cognitive, and behavioral definitions and categorizations.

Assimilation as the Great Leap Forward

Already, in the late 1800s Nietzsche challenged English psychologists (social Darwinists like Spencer) for their hatred of the human world of fallible perspectives and their promotion of a religion of nothing, as "a Buddhism for Europeans" (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 19). The priesthood of social scientists seeks to reduce anxieties by promoting order and stability as ordained by the new "positive truths," the most popular of which is the value of pliant malleability, which generally means being adaptable to the new industrial order. Control must be exercised to make things, especially markets, more stable, more predictable. According to Spencerians, uncertainty is regarded as solely the source of anxiety, which makes sense if you are trying to extract value from labor and the land but which actually leads to an ever-tightening process of command, feedback, and control—hardly flexibility. The bourgeois positivist's desire for steady progress and control leads to greater efforts to measure human beings, their consumption and output, and improve their stock. The goal is to minimize maladjustment to the system and maximize operational fitness. Certain physical and psychological traits—such as "positivity," an "internal locus of control [to blame oneself for system failures], persistence, hardiness, resourcefulness" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 369), but most important a willingness to conform—are selected for, promoted for reproduction through either overt breeding or carefully ascertained rewards and punishments (cognitive management, operant conditioning, and psychological reconstruction). The "internal locus of control" is a good example of what Nietzsche meant when he traced the origin of conscience and its usefulness to centralized command and control (Nietzsche, 1967). Nietzsche and Gudykunst and Kim agree that once individuals assimilate (meaning that they have internalized the goals and motives of the system, reaching equilibrium and aligning with it), they are much easier to manage because at that point they self-manage by keeping their behaviors and attitudes within the parameters of system tolerance. Max Weber called this becoming institutionalized (Weber, 1904–1905/1930). The goal according to Gudykunst and Kim (2003) is to promote change "toward assimilation," which is accomplished when the individual becomes fully acculturated, identical with the system (p. 360).

In short, here is the great "leap forward," the great *should* (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 381). Everyone is advised to be flexible and willingly obedient,

while the system remains implacably dominant. This, too, is an old value system espoused from the beginning of positivism by Comte and St. Simon in their writings on the industrial system and Spencer's linking of certainty with happiness in his book *Social Statics: The Conditions Essential for Human Happiness* (1850). A dependable person is a good person, just like clockwork (which was the prototype for the interdependent operation of the assembly line). Quality control checks tolerances, including measuring workers' mental and physical performance. It is a stringent, not loose attitude. While Spencer and others were singing the praises of an adaptable workforce, the soft stuff that fills the factory works to make it go, a tune still commonly heard, market laws and mechanisms do not manifest such flexibility or care. The market is a disinterested god. It is the flexible worker, the "just-in-time" permanent temporary worker who has to conform to the transcending rhythms of the market and the pace of industrial manufacture. As the omniscient and omnipotent market dictates, workers must be willing to retool themselves on demand. As Lewis Mumford (1964) observed, in the industrial world contingent individuals are subject to and serve the transcendent machine, not the other way around. Today, industry decries the state of education, demanding smarter labor, but it is a fact that market forces are driving millions to spend great amounts of money and time educating themselves in the hopes that they will be profitable to some corporation in the future. Work has taken over many peoples' lives. People have been very flexible, but there is much evidence that they are being stretched thin. To the market, workers are never pliant enough.

Successful fit involves more than just behavioral assimilation but also an adoption of the appropriate motivations and goals of the dominant system (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 290). "Competence" includes the adoption of "appropriate motivations" (pp. 275, 276) so that the assimilator will "work effectively with others" (p. 274). "Effectiveness is a function of professional expertise" (p. 274). There is a natural need for predictability, for reliable performance, just like clockwork (p. 276). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) strongly imply that a person who is not satisfied simply does not understand their place within the system (p. 275). Who could believe that being impractical is good? But what is practical to one is not to another because interests conflict. But according to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), those who are dissatisfied with the way a system works either just do not understand or are maladjusted and mentally ill. According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), such a person is not likely to be effective, which "involves minimizing misunderstanding" and which is practically the same thing as "competence" (p. 271–75).

The bottom line is that only a happy worker can be an effective and competent worker because only he or she will be easily assimilated. But it also seems that happiness is a product of assimilation. In Gudykunst and Kim (2003) the direction of causation is unclear probably because they equate conformity with being well adjusted, with communication competence, with mental health. They also incorrectly equate several other concepts and processes, such as integration, adaptation, growth, learning, assimilation, and evolution. It is a tautological

rhetoric, one that is self-contradicting, claiming that to evolve is to adapt to currently dominant conditions. Positivism claims that those who do not have a "positive orientation" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 369) will not be good candidates for assimilation, and that those who assimilate have, by definition, a positive orientation. Furthermore, assimilationists claim that if people are not satisfied it is *because* they have not assimilated, meaning that they do not understand themselves and their place vis-à-vis the system. The positivistic evaluation of behavior is tautological, for the evaluation and the behavior are the same thing. To be effective and competent is to behave in effective and competent ways as defined by the priestly judges.

The question remains. Why are some people good, effective, well adjusted, "mature," evolved, and competent, and others are not? Galton's answer is inherent traits. Gudykunst and Kim and other cognitivists say basically the same thing, but not entirely. They claim in part that adaptability is dependent on internal states of mind and personality attributes. The so-called positive thing about this situation is that, either way, efficiencies and incompetencies can be managed and corrected, either through culturally (not naturally, which is far too slow and uncontrolled for Galton's tastes) selective breeding or through operant conditioning with perhaps the aid of pharmacology. But for many, including Gudykunst and Kim, the situation is ambiguous. For they claim that people who behave inappropriately do so because they are incompetent and they are incompetent because they do not possess the correct qualities of character, the correct "personality attributes" such as having a "positive orientation," being "flexible," self-controlling, and beyond this, chronologically young (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, pp. 272–75, 370). Such characteristics may very well be beyond the control of an individual and may originate in genetic predisposition, which would lead to the solution originally offered by Galton and the other eugenicists like Pearson and Yule.

The best worker is one who has an "unusual degree of integration or stability, and who is socialized on the basis of cultural universals, and a marked telepathic or intuition sensitivity" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 273). Such mystical universals are presumably global in application, but actually they smack of a very ethnocentric bias and set of interests. Nevertheless, if things can be corrected through a proper regime of reeducation or resocialization, then the problem of inappropriate and incompetent behavior can be solved by proper parenting. This is exactly the move taken by social engineers, for when human breeding fell out of favor John Watson, Ivan Pavlov, and B. F. Skinner dedicated themselves to the study of child-rearing. The goal of appropriate behavior can be achieved "through the process of enculturation, cultural patterns are etched into our nervous system and become part of our personality and behavior" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 376). If we have been "programmed" to think, feel, and behave in unpredictable or "improper, irresponsible, or inferior ways" (p. 376), this can be corrected through reeducation by a process of "psychic disintegration" (also called "deculturation" and "unlearning") toward "greater personality integration and maturity" (pp. 380, 381).

In either case the prediction and modifying control of behavior toward some undebatable good (for that is philosophical nonsense) is the aim of social engineering.

Gudykunst and Kim (1997, 2003) argue that bad mental health, failure to adjust, and being unfit resides in the individual who does not accept the goals and motives of the system. This can be true, but for them this can never be seen as an appropriate response to injustice. Such an individual is defined by Gudykunst and Kim (2003) as "immature" because he or she does not manifest an "internal locus of control" (p. 369). Such a person cannot or will not "reorganize" him- or herself, and therefore they will not achieve the great "leap forward" after the resolution of dialectical stress (p. 381). According to Gudykunst and Kim (2003), to help individuals be more satisfied and the community more stable, the individual must be acculturated into a greater understanding of the system, which insofar as the individual identifies with the system equals greater clarity and depth of self-understanding and self-control. This is pure Hegelianism. Gudykunst and Kim argue that the more a person identifies with the dominant system, the more competent and therefore satisfied they will be and the more they will understand and behave appropriately (fit). Issues of fairness, justice, and the good are never discussed by them, demonstrating that their brand of operational philosophy is not nearly as sophisticated as even the Benthamites, who created the tradition that they unknowingly parrot.

The White Man's Burden and the Victorian Saints

In the nineteenth century Galton and others bombastically abandoned philosophy for objective science, claiming that they made no value judgments, even as they measured social improvement and the "civic worth" of individuals and groups (Galton, 1901). It was falsely assumed that markets could not thrive in the midst of conditions defined by their measures as either inefficient or chaotic (because a polyglot of diverse value and belief systems cannot work together). Assimilation and standardization constitute the recipe for making markets expand. Therefore, for the sake of the market, the values and motives of people must regress toward a common standard culture. The standard culture and universal truth must include committed belief in private property, legal contract, credit financing, profit taking, the virtues of labor, the morality of dependable uniformity, and so forth, all of which are essential to the success of only capitalist market expansion. But notice, market is universalized, as if there have not been for eons other types of economies that functioned successfully—types that were not capitalistic.

Summation

As the once-popular doctrine of human breeding became politically untenable, the effort to modify human character and conduct shifted from controlling hereditary characteristics to controlling cultural causes of outcomes. As

noted, this led to efforts to discover the most effective means of behavioral modification with a new focus on child-rearing practices. But as this is terribly complex, another strategy is to promote the elimination of pluralism, of multiculturalism altogether. Progress is thus construed as anticulture, for difference is an obstacle to expansion of the same, of reproduction of the system. With advances in bioengineering, the pendulum is swinging back toward enforcing values, desires, and preferences at the genetic level.

The point here is that although methods change and the locus of cause changes somewhat from heredity to culture, the fundamental motivation for social engineering informed by so-called value-free science remains the same. This shift was overtly manifested in U.S. and British economic policy during the early 1980s, when fashion in economic theory moved away from the Keynesian approach to the economic Darwinian approach of Friedrich von Hayek (von Hayek, 1948). Coincidentally this is the period when intercultural adaptation theory was formulated.

This shift from collective cooperation to comparative competition as the best way to encourage more production and consumption (for profit is realized with each unit sold) is central to understanding the difference between a global village and a global city, in understanding the qualitative global trend toward cosmopoly. In the world of Galton and von Hayek, economic performance is the sole measure of the positive values of "progress," "happiness," "mental health," and "success." This is the worldview being promoted across cultures. Authorities tell those that do not measure up that they must either conform, which became synonymous with being competent and functionally fit, or get out of the way of progress.

GLOBAL CITY

As the world shrinks, intercultural communications is being supplanted by a single emerging world culture that is chasing a dream of greater cosmopolitan sophistication and urban/cosmopolitan escapism from local cultural attachment and identification; what some modern Spencerians call the "incompetence" and "emotional defilement" of cultural identity, and "humanity itself," the corruption of having a sense of place (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 385). As Nietzsche understood, forced compliance to such a pseudo-religious doctrine of absolute identification (transcendental uniformity) does have actual consequences, though most of the actual consequences do not resemble the ideal at all. Rather than escaping suffering, the cosmopolitan dream, as will be discussed, seems to be causing it. Insofar as this dream of global conformity succeeds in eliminating diversity and thus meaning, it also causes despair. The elimination of difference (universal identification) means no identity and therefore no communication.

As New Age cosmopolitans chant the mantra of holism, confounding boundaries (identities) are indeed being rapidly eliminated. Such sacrifices are seen as

a sort of collateral damage that may be unfortunate but necessary for the sake of progress. The fundamental ideological justification behind this assault on local culture and identity was best stated at the height of Victorian colonial expansion by Herbert Spencer in his books *Social Statics* (1851) and *The Factors of Organic Evolution* (1887). It is a combination of Comtean and Hegelian colonial ordination with religious fervor (also see Andreski, 1972). Bourgeois positivism is a self-justifying ideology that offers a utopian vision while refusing to focus on the consequences of global uniformity except in terms of survival of the fittest, efficiency, functionality, and competence in systems operation (profit taking). Bourgeois positivism (including Hegelian historical evolution) forms the core set of ideas in the ideology of cosmopoly.

The cosmopolis is not the same as a physical city. To be sure, it does involve the physical migration and concentration of people into urban centers, but it is also about the idealistic promises that make city life seductive to billions of people (cosmopoly). The cosmopolis is the result of the global diffusion of the ideology of cosmopolitanism, which is a cultural bias and fantasy that originated in wealthy urban centers in the industrialized West.

The global village rhetoric has been an important ideological tool for justifying worldwide Western style urbanization. The village metaphor gives the false impression that the world is becoming less alienating, less stressed, and more stable and equitable. Meanwhile, the cosmopolitan ideology pushes for personal connectivity (which itself indicates fragmentation), social mobility, individualism, and endless economic promise. A major and self-serving aspect of the global village rhetoric and global urbanization is the promotion of competent communication itself as a key to modernity, which is equated with happiness, positive progress, and Westernization.

Yet many assimilationists cannot make up their minds. Do they want global assimilation ("totality"), which involves the elimination of national and cultural identities (transnationalism), or do they want strong assimilation (i.e., a single national language) at the national level?

ABSURD ADVICE

A contradiction emerges in the ideology of social Darwinism generally and intercultural adaptation theory as it is presented by Gudykunst and Kim (2003) specifically. In one hand, the ultimate dream of assimilationists is the elimination of inadequate or defiled cultures and the triumph of a single bourgeois positive culture and "meta-identity" (also called transcultural identity and universal personhood, both of which suggest the end of the possibility of *intercultural* personhood, not its equivalent). On the other hand, the same writers absurdly advise minorities to assimilate as deeply as possible into the dominant local (host) culture (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003). According to nationalists, assimilation is equal to "psychic evolution," "mental health," "functional fitness,"

"balance," and "maturity" (Bennett, 1993; Buchanan, 2001; Gudykunst & Kim, 2003). In short, if you want to get along, you had better think, feel, and act like the dominant mainstream culture or else you will not survive.

Perhaps the contradiction is only apparent. It may be that Gudykunst and Kim actually promote a linear process of homogenization in hierarchical fashion, such as eventually there should be only one world culture. But they are unclear. But Gudykunst and Kim (2003), also claim that

in becoming intercultural, we rise above the hidden forces of culture and . . . in this developmental process we acquire a greater capacity to overcome cultural parochialism and develop a *wider circle of identification*, approaching the limit of many cultures and ultimately of humanity itself. The process of becoming intercultural, then, is like climbing a high mountain. As we reach the mountaintop, we see that all paths below ultimately lead to the same summit. (p. 385; emphasis in original)

It is important to note the singularity of "a circle of identification." Arguing against Gudykunst and Kim, integration does *not* mean total agreement or identification on a global level. This version of happy positivism is just as hopelessly idealistic and potentially dangerous as their mystical notion of escaping the emotional defilements of this world by means of psychic evolution to "realize the spiritual world of non-distinction" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 384). By their own definition, their final solution of realizing a world of nondistinction would be the same as death: zero cognitive complexity, absolute equilibrium—no mind. This is why Nietzsche pointed out in 1887 that "pessimistic philosophers," who flee from life and action, instead embrace "administrative nihilism" and place "'adaptation' in the foreground, that is to say, an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity; indeed, life itself has been defined as a more and more efficient inner adaptation to external conditions (Herbert Spencer)" (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 79).

Recognizing this nihilistic tendency, Nietzsche claims that "actually, what is steaming around all of these positivistic systems is the vapor of a certain pessimistic gloom, something that smells of weariness, fatalism, disappointment, and fear of new disappointments" (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 288, book 5, section 347). Nietzsche suspects Schopenhauer's "Buddhism for Europeans" for its admonition to give up and let go the miserable wheel of life. Insofar as Nietzsche (1974) is correct that "consciousness developed only under the pressure for the need for communication [that] consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings" (p. 298), we can see how Gudykunst and Kim's solution to intercultural misunderstandings and conflicts, which is the elimination of cultures and the striving for no mind, has a perverse sense to it. The solution to communication, which inevitably includes misunderstanding and conflicts, is to stop communicating altogether. This is accomplished by eliminating all difference.

This is also why such romantic pessimists valorize a "virtuous stupidity," the reduction of the self to a reactionary spectator if not the total elimination of the self. The redemptive goal is the reduction of the self to the impoverished status

of an object, a dishonest "it" that claims to be innocently free of all prejudice, all perspective, even while promoting a value-laden ideology (1974, p. 131). Nietzsche notes that the cosmopolitan Roman, who had all the world at her feet, lost her sense of self, of good and evil, that the Roman world became depersonalized, and this was embraced as "redemption and transfiguration as if it were an end in itself" (Nietzsche, 1972, p. 115). It became virtuous to regard oneself as an instrument, as a mirror, that the very notion of knowledge was reduced to a sort of mirroring. The disinterested observer, the "objective man,"

waits until something comes along and then gently spreads himself out, so that not even the lightest footsteps and the fluttering of ghostly beings shall be lost on his surface and skin. Whatever still remains to him of his "own person" seems to him accidental, often capricious, more often disturbing: so completely has he become a passage and reflection of forms and events not his own. (Nietzsche, 1972, p. 115).

Here we have the "sublimest kind of slave," human as formula, as pure form without content, "a delicate, empty, elegant, flexible mold which has first to wait for some content so as 'to form' itself by it—as a rule a man without content is a 'selfless' man," a person who can never "take sides between good and evil" (Nietzsche, 1972, p. 116). Utility transvaluates the just and the unjust. Herein lies the dishonesty of claims to objectively improve society, the rhetorical trick of naturalizing and universalizing contingent interests in an effort to outrun reflection and critique. For what sane person would argue with absolute truth?

A century before the popular theory of cultural adaptation resurfaced with a global focus as *intercultural* adaptation, Nietzsche offers a compelling explanation of its motives and dubious claim to be value-free and yet redemptive. Here, too, we can see what the virtuous minority, the perfect herd animal should aspire to be—if not a passive instrument of external forces then nothing at all.

To be a "profitable business manager in a multinational company," and to "increase our functional fitness and psychological health," we must follow Gudykunst and Kim's model of human development, which involves grasping the whole or totality (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 376). But Gebser (1949/1985) reminds us: "It is no accident that the ambivalence inherent in the (Latin) primal word *totus* is evident in the word 'totality.' Although in more recent times the word *totus* has meant 'all' or 'whole,' it would earlier have meant 'nothing.' In any event, the auidial similarity between *totus* and [German] *tot*, 'dead,' is readily apparent" (p. 18). As explained, this is precisely the ultimate goal of assimilationism, to achieve nothingness, no mind, the gloomy and ironic consequence of positivism.

OPERATIONALIZING HEGELIAN IDEALISM

Mass communications is an urban phenomenon that promotes the urban perspective. According to this perspective, it should not be surprising that a sure

sign of rural inferiority is the lack of print and telecommunication channels available to people. This constitutes the quintessential modern condition, an endless spiral of progress such that the more one is exposed to global media the more one wants to urbanize, which in turn exposes one to more media, ad infinitum (evincing what Rostow in 1952 promoted as the take-off stage in national identity building and economic development). Big cities are where life (news and entertainment) happens. The media plays a cultural binding role, promoting a common national language and set of interests and expectations. Modern ideology teaches that rural people are missing the party both within a nation and among variously urbanized nations. Thus, relative deprivation becomes the source of frustration and conflict. Ghettoization has gone global as information ghettos are popping up around the world. It is the height of arrogance, however, to assume that the information the West has to offer, if unattainable, renders people starved and culturally retarded. How much of their world do we in the urban centers know? Well, that doesn't matter because traditional cultures have nothing worthy of our attention anyway. We know this even though we do not know what we are talking about. According to this view, rural people are at risk of being left behind, of having no future. They are behind Rostow's curve. Thus we have the engineering of dissatisfaction, rising expectations that cannot be met, which leads to rising frustration. With the advent of the Western philosophy of positivism and its linear notion of progress, everywhere else is backward, for the city is forward thinking, the tip of advancing system and developmental evolution.

Model Minority Mind Guards

One important question regards how much we are willing to sacrifice for the sake of progress toward a homogenized global identity. Much has already been sacrificed for Western progress, which ethnocentrically presumes that it is the only kind of progress conceivable (Diamond, 1997; McWhorter, 2002; Zinn, 1980). On the planet there are not only the haves and have-nots but also the dominating and the dominated. Those who strive, who are willing to sacrifice to join the dominant cosmopolitan class are considered by assimilationists to be model minorities. They offer little or no resistance to the inevitable march of progress. Rather than resisting the trajectory toward overwhelming Westernization and modernization and the unprecedented collapse of cultural and therefore biodiversity (for only one version of nature is left when only one culture is left because nature is a cultural invention, and the Western version sees nature as primarily an exploitable base resource), the model minority, working from a Western concept of pure personal interest, fights to fit into the system, to conform for the sake of personal rewards. Model minorities may even become so enamored with belonging that they become what Irving Janis (1982) calls mind guards, or snitches and bullies seeking to curry favor. Though they have little power within the system, as it is given, they become the most fervent defenders of the faith.

Mind guards are self-selecting sycophants who seek to ingratiate themselves with authority by betraying deviants in the hope of personal recognition and reward. With their help everything is more predictable, redundant, and stable. The neo-Hegelian system, which jealously guards its equilibrium with cybernetic channels of feedback (i.e., the KGB in the Soviet system and the SS in the right Hegelian system) always and ethnocentrically defines itself as natural, rational, and good. What is most practical to any centralized command and control system is that which helps perpetuate it. Thus practicality has a perspective and an interest. The minority should never get involved in politics, for that is nonsense, mere subjective valuation and as such irrational. Conformity and certainty are the keys to happiness. Besides, minorities, by definition, don't understand reality. They are still "learning," becoming "civilized," "naturalized."

Only the positivists, the most evolved humans on Comte's hierarchy of knowledge, think right and grasp the Real. Only when minorities become one with the dominant culture, when they think and act like the mainstream, should they venture to participate as politically active members of society.

For assimilationists, conformity equals psychic evolution to higher levels of cognitive complexity and satisfaction. But there is no proof that smarter people experience less anxiety. Experts assure us that certainty and functional fit eliminate anxiety and alienation. But the end of redundancy (certainty and predictability) is boredom, which is highly associated with depression.

Finally, the model minority should unquestioningly accept the world order being handed down; otherwise the system will not reward him or her, the assumption being that he or she is not a part of the system until he or she is identical with it in all aspects of mind and body. Until then it is assumed that his or her presence has no impact on the system. The assumption is that integration means equilibrium. But this is false. Equilibrium means an identification of the part with the whole so that the distinction between the two disappears. But then communication is impossible. Janis (1982) calls this groupthink. Undoubtedly this involves cohesion, but it also results in no independent (critical) thinking. This is precisely why Nietzsche refers to the subjects of assimilationist ideology as herd animals.

Integration is not holistic homogeneity. Integration means that the parts do not dissolve or disintegrate into a uniform whole but rather that they maintain their unique identities so that the parts communicate and the overall system remains dynamic. I argue against Gudykunst and Kim (2003, pp. 383–85), who make an absurd claim that becoming intercultural is the same as becoming transcultural, which means the elimination of all cultural perspectives. I believe that integration does not conclude with equifinality, the ultimate goal of absolute oneness, holistic identity. The Hegelian notion of a final goal of equifinality means that the ideal minority is one who disintegrates and blends into the system, becoming invisible. The system uses the minority individual. According to this philosophy, a minority never brings anything of value or anything new to the community. According to the ethics of assimilation, goodness

(value) is only measured by how much the individual fits in (Spencer's survival of the fittest).

Civil and human rights protests, struggles for justice and equity, and resistance can give a person a great sense of purpose, pride, and satisfaction. But for Gudykunst and Kim, no resistance to the system can be seen as valuable, useful, or appropriate. To them, resistance is futile. Resistance to the "hidden forces of culture," the invisible hand, no matter how oppressive, is not appropriate for the model minority, who should instead strive to identify with the system no matter how unjust or oppressive it might be. The only suggestion they offer is to adopt the dominant values and beliefs, even if those values define you as inferior (Du Bois, 1903/1995). Thus the system is self-correcting; the status quo is reproduced with utmost efficiency. There can only be one positive reality. Anticulturalists assure us that we are all the same, but we do not know it until we become mature and "psychically evolved" to the point of no longer being human or cultured. Then we achieve the absurdity of "clarity" (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 383) without distinction (even though hierarchy, the penultimate Western mode of distinction, is presumed throughout). No wonder Fukuyama (1993) would see fit to announce the end of history and the last Man.

DISENTANGLING EVOLUTION THEORY FROM POSITIVISM

It should be noted that being a natural scientist, Charles Darwin never posited an absolute goal to evolution. Nor did he apply it to human society, like his cousin Galton did. It also should be noted that in systems theory, equilibrium is possible only in a finite system. Therefore if teleology is not presumed, one cannot sensically postulate a hypothetical state of equilibrium. To Darwin, life is not going anywhere. There is no final perfect being, no transcultural meta-identity. Such a notion is, however, common to many ancient teleological systems, engineers, and also to Comte's positive religion, which Darwin wisely avoided. Life's abundance of forms is horizontal rather than vertical. It proliferates in a diversity of forms but with no preestablished final goal-species. Each life form is equally successful as long as it survives. But with the advent of the Enlightenment philosophies, compendia of hierarchical rankings proliferated, beginning with Vico's *Principe de scienza nuova d'intorno alla commune natura delle nazioni* (1725) and continuing through Montesquieu's *Observations on Roman Greatness and Decline* (1734) and Voltaire's *Experiment Concerning the Customs and Spirit of Nations* (1756). Comparisons of groups of people, which led to ever-greater efforts at anthropometry always seemed to prove that Europe was number one (Kramer & Johnson, 1997). As one might guess, Europe always fared well vis-à-vis its own values expressed as standard measures and relative to the primitive savages that populated the rest of the world.

The absolute conceptualization of positive progress to some final goal is a Hegelian invention, anticipated by Lessing's *Education of the Human Race* (1780) and Herder's *Ideas Toward a Philosophy of Human History* (1784). It is no mere coincidence that such ideas proliferated during the height of European colonialism.

Perhaps the first great postcolonial scholar, Gebser (1985), noted in the 1940s that "'progress' is not a positive concept, even when mindlessly construed to be one; progress is also a progression away, a distancing and withdrawal from something" (p. 41). But if that difference, that Other something, is ethnocentrically denigrated as primitive, then progress seems wholly positive. Positivism then presumes a negative critique of the actual in favor of a utopian vision, the future. Vision permits only one perspective; hence, the infinite narrowness of positivism. There can be only one truth, one future.

Make no mistake, whenever a grand *should* is implicated in purpose and goal orientation, when people are sure they are going somewhere, one is dealing with ideology, not science, with social engineering and hypothetical conjecture, not discovery and description. When that goal-oriented reality is absolutely exclusive, even singularly natural, then one is face to face with the dream of totalitarianism, what Greider (1997) calls the manic logic of "one world, ready or not."

Spencer's ideology has come back into fashion in the form of intercultural adaptation theory (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003). But despite this, life has no perspective, and without perspective there can be no backward or upward-forward to evolution. Perspective emerges with the ego, and most powerfully so with the modern I. After reflecting on the fascist (both Left and Right) Hegelian systems that were wreaking havoc in Europe, Gebser recognized the practical implications of this ideology of absolute justifications and historical destiny (fatalism). He observed that

the current situation manifests on the one hand an egocentric individualism exaggerated to extremes and desirous of possessing everything [endless progress], while on the other it manifests an equally extreme collectivism that promises the total fulfillment of man's being [modern mass conformity] ... These two conditions, isolation and aggregation, are in fact a clear indication that individualism and collectivism have now become deficient. (Gebser, 1985, p. 3)

Massification, which marks the modern world, supports status quo, and individual freedom, is also a hallmark of modernity. Individualism, like all -isms, looks astoundingly uniform. Despite private property, all are equal under the touch of Adam Smith's invisible hand, and the coveted property is identically mass-produced, from homes to bumper-sticker philosophies and clothes to furniture, music, and education.

To Gebser, *deficiency* means that a thing or process has qualities and characteristics that may have once been very vital but, in a changing context, are causing it to expire; it is failing to survive. This includes the hypertrophy of

egocentrism that was once so vital to Western civilization but increasingly shows indications of hypertrophism and as such is leading to the death of viable community, of reciprocity, and thus of authentic communication and mutual obligation. Most large cities, such as São Paulo, Mexico City, Istanbul, Cairo, Mumbai, and so forth, are barely functional. Such intensification of the modern ego gives rise to alienation in epidemic proportions, a massive experience that has been measured and studied by countless social scientists, urban planners, and human ecologists; a crisis that indeed helped call into existence these very disciplines as evinced in Töennies, Marx, Durkheim, Freud, Mumford, and Weber. Although the West harbors more individuals choosing to live alone because they want total control of everything and cannot tolerate any obstruction to their personal freedom, at the same time those isolated individuals constitute en masse unconscious movements, which are deficient because the participation in them is purely passive, reactionary, and adaptive. They prefer to consume whatever makes its way to their doors and screens but alone, without dialogue. The computer screen with a billion Internet channels is not made for group viewing. There is no need to fight over which channel to watch.

Gebser argues that there is an important qualitative and behavioral difference between community and a massive aggregate of individuals pursuing their disconnected yet standardized personal interests. The bourgeois pursuit of personal happiness has had major costs vis-à-vis community, the person (*anomie*), and the environment. Even morality has become personalized, so that what is good is good for me. But though moderns may try hard to create individual environments ruled by their individual moralities, the global environment remains a shared domain.

ONE UTOPIA FOR ALL

This positivistic notion of progress toward a single world cultural order (for it is impossible to have a totally decultured human being despite the rhetoric) has already demanded great sacrifices from the "primitive," "unenlightened," "less evolved" masses. Hundreds of cultures and linguistic communities have been systematically eliminated, exterminated, by the advance of progress (Diamond, 1993, 1997; Zinn, 1980). As John McWhorter (2002) observes, dying languages leave no fossil trace. Once a language is gone, so is its community. This is especially true for languages that have no written form (which begs the question of the cognitive complexity of traditional oral peoples who must memorize their entire cultural heritage). But even attempts at preservation, which involve the creation of dictionaries, are closer to the function of being a "cultural taxidermist" (Morris, 1969) than an active community member.

Preservation involves a confusion between the actual and the virtual. Although the actual community is disappearing, preservationists rush in to make a record (a fetish) of it. The record is not the same thing as what it mimics. For

instance, once dictionaries are compiled, a language is institutionalized; it becomes standardized, encouraging persistence of meaning and usage, what Algis Mickunas (forthcoming) calls permanence enhancement, which means that the vitality characteristic of a living language is lost even as it is preserved (also see Löwith, 1967). Preservation of culture in museums and dictionaries is like saving a bit of something in a jar. It becomes treasured tradition, rather than common practice. It ossifies and becomes quickly antiquated. Once a culture hits a crisis point that demands preservation efforts, it is usually already too weak to save except as a specimen in an archive of extinct worldviews. Within one or two generations its context vanishes and its meaning forgotten. What it meant becomes a synopsis on a card next to its case that encourages rote recitation at best.

To be modern demands the renouncing of local culture and tradition as anything other than antique. This includes the traditional self. One can progress upward-forward only insofar as one moves away from the past, abandoning ("unlearning" and "disintegrating") one's old premodern self and culture (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, pp. 379–83). The good minority, the model minority, is the one who is defined as being adaptable, which is a euphemism for being eager to disintegrate "cognitively, affectively, operationally," to be willing (for motivation, attitude, and commitment are essential to evolutionary success) to be decultured and psychically reorganized in the mold presented by the dominant culture (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, pp. 269–73, 360, 369–69). As we have seen more than once in the twentieth century, this line of argument has led to various reeducation programs, such as those in China, Cambodia, the Soviet gulag, and so on, and also the reprogramming efforts of some groups aimed at "deviants" like gays and lesbians (Dittmer, 1974; Koestler, 1946/1984; Lifton, 1999; Lind, 1985; Solzhenitsyn, 1974/1997; Wu-Ming, et al., 1999; Yang, 1986). Ostensibly this effort is for the good of the individual so that they may gain greater mental health, clarity, and self-control, through a "higher level of self-understanding" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, pp. 348, 351, 360, 362, 364). In 1807, Hegel made the same suggestions for the accomplishment of greater self-monitoring, adjustment, and evolution in Chapter Four of his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1979), "The Truth of Self-Certainty." Growth, which is "central to Y. Kim's theory of intercultural transformation," is not enrichment through gaining new repertoires of thinking and acting but a zero-sum destruction-reconstruction of the psyche.

This amounts to the absurd equation of learning with forgetting (unlearning), cumulative growth with either/or-ism, which is a vicious trap exemplified by a tiger pacing back and forth in a cage; a dilemma already exposed as such by Kierkegaard in 1843. According to Gudykunst and Kim, growth is *not* cumulative. It is noteworthy that a year later, and some 130 years before Charles Berger and R. Calabrese (1975) invented "uncertainty [and anxiety] reduction theory," Kierkegaard wrote *The Concept of Anxiety*. In this book he demonstrated that the greatest anxiety comes not from uncertainty (for therein lies potential, discovery, and hope), but from the perceived fatalism of certainties,

such as original sin, a single positive reality leading to a totally predictable future, death, and (one might add) taxes. Curiously, in the search for the inevitable (absolute certainty), if it were discoverable (which it is not, thankfully), humanity would face a crisis of all tomorrows being as today, a crisis of anxiety and finally nihilistic death. This is why Nietzsche regards positive knowledge (facticity) the height of intolerance and the end of growth/life, true negativism, the "mind of No."

If life accepted the world as it is, *then* evolution would stop. Not accepting the world as it is (positively known) is the source of potential, the birthplace of infinite futures: daybreak. The presence of each organism affects the environment, which in turn offers new opportunities for future forms. Thankfully, nature is not limited to human desires, interests, and imagination.

We must not constrain ourselves to asking only how, which is the mechanical question, but why. Why does the world have to be only this way? Although the mechanical/physical universe is highly uniform and governed by law, the why question is especially important in the human life-world, which exhibits freedom of choice and variance of behavior. Those who work day and night to establish the laws of human behavior, even to reduce culture to physiology, are unwittingly building a cage for themselves. How can such a culture dominate? Like all ideological systems that seek to change the world, it must appeal to base desires. The pseudo-scientific (actually religious) propaganda of positive surety, which claims to know the single best solution to every problem (including life itself), titillates greed and promises to maximize pleasure while minimizing pain. To achieve such salvation, the follower must conform to the creed, the single most efficient way, climbing to the summit where all vistas must converge (hyperperspectivism and ethnocentrism). The positive worldview bribes its adherents with promises of material wealth and happiness if only all variance will obediently converge on the mean, if only all peoples embrace its singular vision of the future. Those who do not will naturally face sanctions.

Following are "facts," but they are provisional, and thus it is hoped that we can yet avert a massive implosion of cultural diversity, drastically shrinking the human mind and life-world. What is offered is in the hope and spirit of the Latin proverb *utinam vates falsus sim*, that I were a false prophet.

URBAN COLONIZATION OF RURAL SURROUNDINGS: THE ABSURDITY OF SALVATION (SAVING) BY CONSUMING

People all over the world are rushing to the cities trying to better their lives and progress in all ways. The romantic dimension of cosmopolitan thinking and stimulation, however, quickly wears off once the realities of actual urban life are experienced personally. This occurs when the rural peasant arrives at the great city only to find him- or herself trapped in a squalid slum at the edge of

the urban center, like the *callampas* in Chile or the *favelas* in Brazil. The city cultivates tremendous gaps between the haves and the have-nots, which do not reflect traditional village life. Neither the existence of mobility nor the presence of a between or middle class eliminates the gap but only partially fills it. So the existence of an economic middle class and limited mobility is not a solution to the gap itself but merely makes it more tolerable and therefore more resistant to challenge. The existence of limited mobility and a middle class shifts responsibility for one's condition from the context to the self, and thus individualism is stressed in the urban world.

No city is self-sufficient, so all cities must colonize the surrounding territories to survive. Consequently, all cities are essentially imperialistic. Also, all cities consist of complex divisions of people and labor, from the first city of Ur in Asia Minor to the first great imperial metropolis of Rome (Morris, 1969; Mumford, 1961, 1964). Such divisions become institutionalized and normalized; with this process coalesce distinctive status differences and levels of participatory power and privilege. To integrate in the highly hierarchical modern society means to accept one's niche as though it is natural and logical and separate from the one who fills it (see Chapter One on the ideology of nichism).

As the planet urbanizes, such gaps are materializing on a global level. Increasingly, the well-educated and wealthy urban elite in countries like Pakistan and Russia share more in common with each other than they do with their poor countrymen just down the road. This is a common pattern around the world not only of wealth distribution but also of mental perspective.

For instance, in Africa's largest city, Cairo, hundreds of thousands of people live in the tombs of the notorious city of the dead, a huge cemetery on the edge of the city. They do so because they were attracted by a romantic vision of the urban lifestyle, but the reality is that the city does not offer them affordable housing, basic sanitation, educational opportunities, or livable wages. Meanwhile the urban elite, only a few miles away in the city center, live in a different world of transnational values, experiences, opportunities, and behaviors. The same gap can be observed all over the world, from Rio de Janeiro to New Delhi, Shanghai to Mexico City, and Istanbul to Manila.

Cosmopolitanism is an ethnocentric ideology that legitimates the growth of the global city. It is a cultural perspective and set of values that originated in the life experiences of a small minority of urbane and wealthy European elite. Today however, this ideology has spread worldwide as the wealthy elite of other countries seek to mimic their European and American role models. In turn they convey this cultural perspective through various means, including domestic mass media, which confers further status unto their image, to their poorer countrymen, thus creating a rising tide of unrealistic and frustrated expectations (Baudrillard, 1968). As rural populations are also striving to become cosmopolitan, the entire globe is urbanizing and becoming no longer self-sufficient. The problem is that unlike a typical city, the global city has no territories external to the

earth itself to colonize and exploit to maintain this ideal lifestyle. Instead, humans are taxing the ability of the planet to sustain the lifestyle of the global cosmopolis. Humanity is testing the carrying capacity of our world.

WORLD CULTURE AND THE END OF FRONTIERS

The Western philosophy of positivism claims that every problem has just one best solution. As may be expected, positivists claim that the one best and most true, rational, and even natural solution to human social organization is positivism itself. The primary value of European bourgeois culture is the unending accumulation of wealth. Bourgeois positivists believe that greed is the most natural of all human instincts. This is an extremely ethnocentric prejudice but a widely and rapidly spreading one nonetheless. Many (if not most) cultures have not promoted the belief that greed is good or natural. For instance, the cultures of Japanese Bushido and the ancient Greek Spartans held other values, such as honor and courage, above being wealthy and even took pride in not needing much material luxury to be satisfied. Their ideals were simplicity, fraternity, honesty, and valor. Most traditional cultures, like the Spartans, are collectivistic, meaning that they devalue the importance of the individual. By contrast, modern bourgeois positivism values individualism and the accumulation of privacy in wealth, time, space. Only in the urban world does austerity become poverty and a shame, even a potential threat to the mass production/consumption system. New markets must be continually opened (as evinced by the histories of India, Japan, and China, even up to today).

When bourgeois positivists impose their cultural values and beliefs on other ways of organizing society as criteria for determining the best solution to the problem of human organization, it is not surprising that they conclude that positivism is the most natural, rational, and best solution. But of course this is a self-serving and a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nevertheless, the predominantly commercial mass media are very persuasive in spreading the values and beliefs of bourgeois positivism around the world. As the world embraces positivistic bourgeois culture, its values, and way of living, it is leading to what Paul Feyerabend (1987) has called world culture. Reflecting on this new, world culture, Feyerabend observes: "By now Western forms of life are found in the most remote corners of the world and have changed the habits of people who only a few decades ago were unaware of their existence. Cultural differences disappear, indigenous crafts, customs, and institutions are being replaced by Western objects, customs, organizational forms" (Feyerabend, 1987, pp. 2-3). Standardized modern artifacts and culture are replacing handcrafted local products and cultures. Local cultural products and arts are being replaced by cheap reproductions of the great masters who hail from the traditions of the G7 nations. Miniaturized recordings of mass-marketed Western rhythms and instrumental sounds are displacing folk music. Indigenous craftsmanship is also disappearing as mass-

produced modern plastic imitations of more expensive goods take their place. Why make music when you can buy "better" modern electronic music made by entertainment superstars? Art has become an industry. Likewise, counterfeiting high-priced designer products is a major industry in the third world.

Ironically, just as they are being driven into extinction, genuine folk arts (like sacred masks from Africa and ceremonial jewelry from Indonesia) are being commodified by collectors in the industrial centers of the new world order. Because the traditional ceremonies for which such art forms were produced are disappearing, such artifacts are increasingly being sold on the world market as investments. Meanwhile, "folklore societies have been rapidly formed to bewail and reverse this trend, but the damage has already been done. At best, all they can achieve is to act as folk-culture taxidermists" (Morris, 1969, p. 67).

Similarly, Diamond (1993) tells us that in 1979, when he worked on New Guinea's Rouffaer River, missionaries had found a tribe of four hundred nomads. In Brazil and Peru previously unknown small bands had also turned up in remote areas. He estimates that "at some point within the last decade of the twentieth century, we can expect the last first contacts, and the end of the last separate experiment at designing human society" (Diamond, 1993, p. 234). According to Diamond, this will mark the "end of a long phase of human history" when societies yet existed totally unaware of other humans in the world (p. 223). He observes, "While the last first contact won't mean the end of human cultural diversity ... it certainly does mean a drastic reduction" (Diamond, 1993, p. 234).

I call the situation of the last first contact the end of the concept of frontier. This is impacting the psyches of both colonized and colonizer. When all is explored and known, the wonder of adventure and the meaning of life are diminished. In the interest of positive efficiency, literally thousands of languages are becoming extinct in the wink of a historical eye; what is left is increasingly being reduced to an index of acronyms and logos. The last first contact represents a plunge in cultural diversity worldwide. This means a fantastic and abrupt decline of the semantic wealth bequeathed to us by our predecessors.

Though they were few, our ancestors, whom we like to see as hopelessly dim-witted, invented innumerable social experiments and ideologies, including bourgeois positivism itself. Meanwhile, our current modern culture is proving to be far more destructive than our ancestors ever were. In its totalitarian arrogance, it may be that modern positivistic culture cannot imagine any possible world beyond itself worthy of existing. According to positivism, there is only one best answer to each question, and positivism is it. Our medieval ancestors may have given birth to a sterile world that sees no need to give them grandchildren. Progress in the one modality has become absurd, for it has become an absolute virtue. Progress has become a permanent and the only conceivable pursuit.

Citing the introduction of mass media, trade, and tourism to every remote corner of the world and missions in the service of religious conversion and military operations, Diamond (1993) recounts a case of postcontact cultural homogenization: "When I visited an isolated tribelet of 578 people in Bomai [New

Guinea] in 1965, the missionary controlling the only store had just manipulated the people into burning all their art. Centuries of unique cultural development ("heathen artifacts," as the missionary put it) had thus been destroyed in one morning" (p. 231). The nihilistic trend toward global monoculture involves the extinction of "separate experiments at designing human society." Armand Mattelart reminds us that, already in 1874, Nietzsche had recognized that "beneath the grand celebration of universalisms [lurks] the morbidity of the European expansionist instinct" (Mattelart, 1994, 29). Exhibiting a profound understanding of the modern megacity and its first example in imperial Rome, Nietzsche warns that even the initial kaleidoscope of novelty that characterizes nascent cosmopolitanism can lead to a decline in the veracity of identity and the consequent collapse of the will due to a lack of meaning. The thrill of conquest soon leads to boredom as novelty is domesticated and made a commodity or eliminated altogether through the process of cultural streamlining, which constricts heterogeneity by creating a common symbolic environment by means of repetitive patterns of mass-produced images and products (Gerberner, 1990). What happens when we finally achieve the mountaintop from which we see with clarity is "that all paths below ultimately lead to the same summit" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 366)? Nietzsche notes that the novelty of overstimulation followed by extermination of diversity, and therefore meaning, affects the colonizer as much as or even more than the colonized:

The Roman of the Empire ceased to be a Roman through the contemplation of the world that lay at his feet; he lost himself in the crowd of foreigners that streamed into Rome, and degenerated amid the cosmopolitan carnival of arts, worships and moralities. It is the same with the modern man, who is continually having a world-panorama unrolled before his eyes by his historical artists. He is turned into a restless, dilettante spectator, and arrives at a condition when even great wars and revolutions cannot affect him beyond the moment. (Nietzsche, 1874/1984, p. 73)

In modern mass media studies this is called becoming overstimulated and desensitized. Other cultures come to be seen as either obstacles to economic growth and expansion or as merely entertainment to be consumed. This is the "tourist gaze" (Kramer, 1997). The world becomes either a toy or something in need of discipline.

THE URBAN WORLD

Not only is the world's population growing at an explosive rate, but at the same time people are being lured off the land and into urban centers by this cosmopolitan ego-hypertrophy by which the individual is "desirous of possessing everything" and presumes to be permitted everything, in the course of the fantasy of modernism and development (Gebser, 1985, p. 3). The force of this shift in worldview is impacting millions at the very basic level of personal iden-

tity. Mass communications has disseminated urban values to rural populations, convincing them that their modes of living are antiquated and deficient and enticing them to move to cities where true satisfaction and enrichment supposedly await them.

Meanwhile, assimilation leads to standardized uniformity, the general-issue human and urban landscape. All cities increasingly look alike, indicating the emergence of a single urban culture that is displacing local identities and our sense of place and belonging, leading to a relentless search for home that is increasingly reflected in the arts of the global nomad such that "airport departure lounges and hotel rooms are the settings in more and more novels" (Iyer, 2000, p. 167). Some writers refer to this as the postmodern condition. It means that increasingly, no matter where one goes, everyone and everything is the same, including forms of social relations, from the family to the corporate structure. Families are becoming nuclear everywhere, dating is becoming common as a courtship ritual, and the same divisions of labor and job titles exist everywhere. Everyone attends educational institutions that are Western in style; everyone wears Western-style clothes, like blue jeans, T-shirts, and suits and ties. They all carry cell phones and briefcases, use electricity and internal combustion engines, wear wristwatches, eat hamburgers and French fries, listen to rock and roll and jazz. They drink cognac, soft drinks, and designer coffee and smoke cigarettes. They live in practically identical concrete and glass high-rises, litigate their disputes in courtrooms, and dream of becoming independently wealthy and famous. In short, to be cosmopolitan is to be urbanized in the Western cultural fashion. The very concepts of wealth and fame are urban inventions. If individuals infected by these foreign dreams are not already doing these things, they are striving to.

Three measures indicate rate of urbanization. A country becomes more urbanized as (1) the number of cities grows, (2) the size of the cities continually increases, and (3) the proportion of the country's population living in urban areas increases. This can be said of the planet as a whole. The entire human species is rapidly urbanizing. This involves a global homogenization of cultural norms, mores, and values. This homogenization process does not mean, as some writers claim, that people are transcending culture. That is quite impossible, and such a claim could only be made from a very idealistic perspective (Kramer, 2000a). Rather, it means that one form of urban culture is taking over and displacing all other kinds. This form is basically modern Western capitalism. It is a new monotheism marked by the invisible hand of market forces that are omniscient and inescapable in their logic of rewards and punishments. With its mystical, transcendental imperatives, this new monoculture is displacing the plurality of local cultures. I call it *cosmotopia*, which means that the cosmopolis is held up as a utopian ideal for which it is worth abandoning one's very self-identity.

Increasingly we see the emergence of megacities of 10 million people or more, most in poor countries that cannot support them. The city itself symbolizes wealth and power. Not surprisingly, the wealthiest countries are the most

urbanized. Industrialized transportation and communications have enabled urban sprawl, which spreads to connect once-separate cities into megacities of hundreds of miles of continuous urban landscape. Examples include the Tokyo–Yokohama–Kawasaki region in Japan, the Randstadt in The Netherlands, the Boston–New York–Washington, D.C. eastern corridor in the United States, and the Ruhr Valley in Germany.

Poor nations are attempting to mimic the city as a sign of economic wealth and cultural maturity—in a word, *development*. In fact, they are told that such development is evolutionary, meaning that it is to be expected (even inevitable) and that it should follow a systematic process of progress toward a fixed goal, not revolutionary, which is unpredictable and disruptive of markets.

Either way, being relatively poor, the results of urbanization in most countries, as will be discussed in further detail, are not what the development dream promised. Development means that the world's poor should strive to develop into Western-style consumers, for herein lies salvation. But mass consumption leads to many problems. The greatest issue facing the developing world today is whether or not an economy based on mass production and mass consumption is environmentally sustainable and even desirable in the long run.

As might be expected, the rate of urban population growth has leveled off in the most developed nations. Consequently, at the turn of the millennium, the greatest rates of urban growth are to be found in developing countries. For instance, the most urbanized country on Earth is The Netherlands, where 90 percent of the population lives in urban density, whereas only 13 percent of Ethiopians currently live in an urban center, although they are rushing to get there. According to the United Nations, the top ten countries in terms of rate of urbanization in descending order are: Liberia (ranked number one) followed by Rwanda, Afghanistan, Burundi, Botswana, Oman, Yemen, Laos, Nepal, and Bhutan. Meanwhile, out of 185 nations, Japan ranks 170th, the United Kingdom 178th, and the United States 147th. In 1900, 1 in 10 humans lived in population centers of 1,500 people or more. By 2000, half of all the people in the world lived in urban centers. It is estimated that by 2025, two-thirds of all people will live in cities.

This means that as the human population explodes, it is also imploding into increasingly concentrated centers of population density and homogenizing into a singular urban, modern, largely Westernized consumer culture. Before 1800, cities of over a million people were rare. In 1900, there were thirteen cities with populations of over a million. By 1968, there were sixty-eight such urban centers. By 2000, the number of cities of more than a million people was 255. Most are in Asia, specifically in India and China. By 2020, many large cities, like Bogotá, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro, are expected to exceed 20 million people.

THE FALSE URBAN UTOPIA

Such urban agglomerates create huge problems of air, noise, and water pollution. Transportation congestion is rising rapidly as the numbers of automo-

biles is increasing exponentially, while the production of food crops has declined due to the corrosive effects of acid rain produced by sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide exhausts from automobiles and coal- and oil-fired power plants that service the electric cities. For instance, Mexico City today suffers from severe housing shortages and transportation problems. Fully one-quarter of the 17.9 million inhabitants of Mexico City do not have access to running water. The air pollution in the valley where the city is situated is so bad that the city center is periodically closed to traffic. Acid rain and chemical runoff from highways, runways, and farms, combined with leakage from storage tanks and pipelines, are ruining both surface waters and subterranean aquifers.

Worldwide, the scarcity of potable water is becoming a major source of concern and increasingly international conflict. According to several organizations, currently more than 1 billion people lack access to safe drinking water and about 80 percent of the earth's urban dwellers do not have adequate supplies of potable water. However, most fresh water is not used for domestic consumption. About 70 percent of it goes to agriculture, with 23 percent used by industry and only 8 percent for domestic consumption. Demand for water is rapidly rising everywhere as efforts to expand agriculture through massive irrigation are increasing along with general industrialization. To make matters worse, chemicals used on crops, such as fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, often contaminate water used for irrigation.

Meanwhile, in an all-out effort to boost yields, farms increasingly use subterranean water to irrigate lands that otherwise could not sustain agriculture. It has been discovered that nature replenishes aquifers much more slowly than humans are using up the underground water supplies. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to clean it once leaching chemicals pollute aquifers and salt water fills the void where fresh water has been pumped out of the ground. For instance, in many metropolitan places like Jakarta, Indonesia, and Lima, Peru, sea water has rushed into aquifers to take the place of fresh water that has been pumped to the surface, thus contaminating what is left. Beyond this, 95 percent of human waste water in the developing world is discharged untreated into nearby rivers, killing fish, causing deleterious algae blooms in the oceans where the rivers empty out, and creating health problems by causing waterborne infectious diseases.

WHY ARE MILLIONS MOVING TO THE CITY?

So why are people rushing to the cities? Why is endless growth equated with progress and heralded as always good, especially in markets? The romantic or positive dream that is characteristic of the global cosmopolitan culture is the key. Over the twentieth century, global channels of mass communications purveyed values, expectations, motivations, and behaviors that originated from the urban centers of wealthy, industrial countries. These images and values have changed the expectations about the future for much of the world's inhabitants.

As we shall see, the difference between a global village and a global city has many profound implications.

A traditional village population is small and culturally and ethnically very homogeneous, but a city is where most people are strangers to each other; physical, economic, and social mobility are encouraged; diversity is common; and trust and obligation are supplanted by competition and the more abstract rule of law. In the city, happiness is believed to come from material accumulation as a never-ending progressive process, whereas in traditional societies, status and value are marked more by one's role within family and the extended collective community.

Global Growth and Migration

Because this chapter sets out to discuss the role of global urban communications in the production of the current global condition, it is imperative that this condition be briefly outlined.

Around the beginning of the Common Era, it is estimated that there were about 200 million humans on the planet. This number was sustained for nearly two thousand years. It took the human race until around 1850 to reach the 1 billion population mark. In just eighty more years, another billion was added—by 1930, the population doubled to 2 billion. By 1975, it doubled again to 4 billion. According to the U.N. Population Fund, on October 12, 1999, the 6 billionth person was born somewhere in India.² On that Tuesday about 370,000 children were born, fully half in Asia. Thus, in the last 150 years the world's population has grown sixfold. The rate of growth is compounding. Currently about 90 million people are born every year and rising. That is the equivalent of adding another Germany to the world every twelve months. In 1950 the population was only 2.5 billion. It took only twelve years to add the last billion to the current total. The next billion will be added in about nine years. Every ninety-six hours another million people join the population.

Most of the growth has been in the poorest countries. In 1960, Europe had twice as many people as Africa. According to U.N. estimates, by 2050 there will be three times as many Africans as Europeans. Ninety percent of the increase in global population is occurring in the poorest countries, where already 80 percent of the world's population resides. For instance, countries like Mozambique and Nepal, which have 4 percent growth rates, will double their populations in about 17.5 years, whereas in France and Japan it will take about two hundred years with their current growth rates. In the next fifty years Pakistan and Nigeria will double and Ethiopia will triple, that is, unless the AIDS epidemic does not slow the growth.³ Furthermore, despite family planning and human rights advances (especially for women), which have lowered the average global birth-rate, the peak has not yet been reached because the poorer populations are also the youngest. In countries like Uganda and Niger, the median age is fifteen. There are a billion teenagers living today mostly in the third world. Thus, fer-

tility rates, though falling, will not offset the simple fact that so many people have not yet reached reproductive maturity.

In Africa, where many women still have six or seven children, half the population is under fifteen years of age. Meanwhile the median age in Italy and Japan is forty and the United Nations projects that by 2050 fully one-quarter of the developed world will be over age sixty-five. Ironically, given the global conditions, experts like Stephen Moore refer to Europe as a "demographic catastrophe" (quoted in Crenson, 1999). But what they really mean is that it is an economic problem. Simon and Moore decry the decrease in fertility for economic reasons, arguing that at current rates of decline, in five hundred years there will be eight Italians and three Irish left on the face of the Earth.⁴

This explosion in population is directly linked to the dissemination of ideas, notably medical knowledge and practices that have lengthened life spans and radically reduced infant mortality rates. But as it became increasingly evident that the world population was growing faster than our ability to feed, clothe, and shelter ourselves, the mass media was then recruited to spread family planning information and new agricultural techniques to boost crop yields (i.e., the infamous Green Revolution). Although some claim that new biotechnologies like genetically engineered crops will keep up with the growth, the fact is that yields have leveled off and even declined some since 1983 (U.N. Population Information Network at <http://www.undp.org>). Furthermore, although many of the crops engineered for the Green Revolution produced high yields, they required liberal amounts of petrochemicals. This has made many developing countries vulnerable to volatile petroleum prices. Countries that were once self-sustaining are now incurring great debt because they must borrow money to buy the chemicals necessary for their hybrid crops to produce. Furthermore, with increased exploitation and pollution of ground water faster than nature can replenish it, continued high yields look increasingly dubious.

Global Communication, Networking, and Positive Consumerism

The world is expanding quantitatively but shrinking qualitatively. By almost all measures, there are more people today, and they are living longer than ever before. They are also consuming more natural resources and creating more pollution than ever before, and these increases are accelerating. Meanwhile, biodiversity is shrinking. So, too, is cultural diversity. All of these massive and rapid changes can be linked to mobility.

Transportation moves people and things, including diseases. Communication moves ideas. Transportation and communication began to accelerate in unprecedented ways only about two hundred years ago, and the rate of acceleration continues to increase. Concurrent with this increase in the speed and scope of transportation and communication is an explosive growth in human population, resource consumption, and pollution.

The causes of European power and wealth were not due to inherent intellectual or physical superiority over all the rest of the world's inhabitants but rather to their coordinated and aggressive pursuit of exploitable resources. In a word, unbridled greed was their great motivator, and often relatively passive indigenous peoples were met with force of arms. As Diamond (1997) has argued, the aggressive use of steel, gunpowder, and germs conquered the world.⁵ Of course, history demonstrates that for many people, like the native peoples of the Americas, European progress meant not happiness for them but instead the destruction of their cultures and lands. European progress (wealth and happiness) came at great costs to others, including the abduction and slavery of thousands of black Africans and indentured servitude for thousands more Irish and Chinese.

Industrialization began in Europe and America with the application of scientific rationality to the extraction of raw materials, labor management, and the mass production of goods, which created enormous wealth for industrialists. There was one problem, however. Mass production requires mass consumption. Profit is realized only when sales occur. As a solution, mass media were developed as channels of advertising to generate a sense of inadequacy in people's minds and a demand for the new industrial products. Thus was born the commodity, which was a mass-produced object specifically manufactured for sale and the human as consumer. The mass media is largely a network for commercial enterprise. Initially it was developed to serve two basic purposes: (1) as a means to keep investors informed of various market conditions and (2) to advertise consumer products. *Consumerism* is the term used to describe this overall system of production and consumption.

Before this, most things that people made were not for sale but were created for immediate use in farming, hunting, or personal adornment. For example, if a farmer made a plow, it was for his own use and not as a commodity to be sold to another farmer. Prior to the Enlightenment most economic transactions were by barter, for money was not widely used among most of the world's inhabitants. Even where it would come to be, as in the United States prior to the 1860s, money was so easily counterfeited that it was practically worthless. But with growing urbanization, which means the migration of farmers to large towns and cities, the economy became more abstract and standardized, and people began to trade actual products for capital currency. This became the new norm.

The Cold War

The most vigorous development of global communications after World War II, which also marks the beginning of the greatest migratory wave of urbanization on the planet, cannot be understood outside the context of the cold war. The cold war was an ideological struggle between Soviet-style state-controlled economy and the private capitalist economies of the Western industrial powers. Capital

economy is not a rural village type of phenomenon but a new urban form of exchange. In many ways, Soviet-style socialism presumed a sort of mutual obligation typical of collectivistic rural societies. By contrast, the intensely individualistic tendencies of Western-style capitalism are essential qualities of modernism (both recent and ancient as in republican Rome). Neither is more natural or universal than the other. Both are cultural artifacts or organized modes of behavior. The Soviet system was in many ways "state capitalism" as it, too, sought to make a return on investment and colonial expansion to a global level.

Just like mechanical clock time, which synchronizes the movements of huge masses of people and is more standardized than natural time, capital is a form of minimalism. Minimalism simplifies things to formal rules. It ignores heterogeneous complexities as unimportant contingencies. This means that capital economies are much more formal, abstract, and standardized than are barter economies. Every yen is identical in value to every other yen, and it can be exchanged for an endless list of commodities, services, and even other currencies.

Capital, like clock time, is a scale of measurement that is widely generalized. Such massifying scalar phenomena are the products of a prejudice that favors simplicity and efficiency (standardization, including standard time zones) over complexity and variance.

A truly globalizing, universally generalizing mentality started to emerge during World War I. But even before that, in 1864, the first modern international organization, the International Telegraph Union (ITU; today the International Telecommunications Union) was formed with the expressed goal of standardizing electronic communications technologies around the world. This involved transcending national sovereignty to establish global standards and doing so even before the concept of nationhood itself existed for many of the world's inhabitants. In fact, during the 1950s and 1960s, domestic mass communications were widely used in many postcolonial, newly independent countries to help foster a sense of national identity among the people living within newly drawn borders. The irony is that even before nationalism had completely solidified in the minds of most humans, transnationalism was already being promoted by Western powers. Corporate globalism used the rhetoric of transnationalism to circumvent national sovereignty issues. Commercial interests want direct access to the people in every land.

Globalism means the establishment of international governing bodies that surpass and subsume national governments in regulatory reach. Thus, concerns about communications led the way in expressing the first sense of international and transnational, global thinking, governance, and uniformity.

The objective of the ITU is expressed in their official charter thus:

The objectives of the ITU are to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds; to promote the development and efficient operation of technical facilities in order to improve telecommunication services, increase their usefulness, and make them generally available to the public; and to coordinate the actions of nations so they may attain these goals.⁶

Thus, the longest continually operating extragovernmental regulatory agency, the ITU, was expressly formed to organize and manage technical standards around the world, in effect transcending local governments and their sovereign rights to self-determination and regulation.

This change in thinking from local to global purview is paralleled in transportation. Initially the United States had over eighty time zones. Each little town administered and regulated its own time. Consequently, it was possible to take a train and arrive somewhere before you left. Train schedules were in chaos. So a system of just four time zones was initiated by the transportation industry and became the norm for the entire United States (Mattelart, 1991/1994).

Global thinking became galvanized as the predominant perspective of political and economic leaders between the "world" wars. The idea of global markets became not only thinkable but the major motive for big business. After World War II, a concerted effort was made to create a global communications system that would promote and support mass production/mass consumption industrialism. Growth and expansion are the most essential of all positive postulates. Colonialism is not only good but also divinely mandated as manifest destiny. The linear direction of positive growth is singularly exclusive of all alternative futures.

In 1952, Rostow explained in a book subtitled *A Non-Communist Manifesto* how electronic mass media should be used as a proselytizing tool in poor countries to introduce and foster the adoption of a consumer culture. The most positive use of mass communications was said to be in creating orderly and ever-expanding commodity markets. Later, in 1958, in his famous book *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Daniel Lerner, an expert in psychological warfare and the author of an earlier book entitled *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany*, explained how the mass media should be used to promote modern Western concepts of happiness, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and desire based on relative material consumption.

The theory of development communications postulated that advertising, radio and TV shows, and movies depicting wealthy people being happy would create demand and increase expectations among poor populations. To be smart came to be equated with being materially wealthy, and so to learn, to evolve means to become an ever more mature and developed consumer. Consumption became equated with human progress and human progress became unquestionably positive (good). Years before Baudrillard made similar claims, the anthropologist Jules Henry (1963) referred to the modern world as an obsessively acquisitive civilization that proclaimed that truth is what sells. Rostow and Lerner equated modernization with development, which in turn meant capitalist forms of mass production and consumption. This was legitimized by Spencerian social Darwinists as a natural evolution in human development. It was held up as the normal way to live, as the model all should strive to mimic. Manufactured dissatisfaction would then motivate the world's poor to begin to

develop, evolve, and modernize into normal mass consumers for Western-made products. This is how markets and consumers are created. They are not naturally occurring phenomena, even though many positivists claim that mass marketing is the most natural of all laws of human nature. Very few cultures exhibit this mode of economic organization.

Thus, mass economies could be developed by creating dissatisfaction, heightened expectations (or positivistic optimism), and demand for greater material accumulation. Rural countries, rich in natural resources but poor in capital currencies, were encouraged—sometimes violently, as in South Africa, Chile, China, India, Venezuela, Liberia, and Nigeria—to efficiently exploit their natural treasures on an industrial scale for sale to industrial powers. The development of poor countries' natural resources would thus enable them to begin to accumulate Western-style hard currency and credit (and debt, of course) for the purchase of imported Western products like TVs and radios that would in turn purvey even more images that would manufacture greater discontent and demand for modernization, defined as the accumulation of material wealth and massive exploitation of natural resources.

Following Lerner's lead, several writers actively promoted the use of mass media as catalysts for capitalistic economic and political development around the world. They include David McLellan, who wrote two influential books in the early 1960s, *The Achieving Society* (1961) and *Communications and Political Development* (1963), and Wilbur Schramm, who wrote *Mass Media and National Development* in 1964. Everett Rogers became famous promoting Rostow's ideas and traveling the world teaching his own theory of the diffusion of innovations.⁷

Rogers's diffusion of innovations basically meant that poor countries should first develop communication infrastructures that then could be used to diffuse modern, rational ideas and ways of thinking. This Rogers and others have called development communications. To be rational means to establish a network for systematically propagating bourgeois values as progressive.

Big-City Lights

The primary assumption behind development communications is that the rural hamlet or village is backward, underdeveloped, and deficient. Wealth is not a natural resource but must be created in an orderly fashion beginning with the refining of natural resources. The manipulation of basically worthless resources, making them into consumable products, is a process economists call value-added operations. Mass marketing, as developed by the new science of psychology, is crucial to the creation of demand. According to this way of thinking, wheat is worthless until it is turned into bread, forests are worthless until they are timbered, diamonds are worthless until they are mined, and so on. This is, however, an ethnocentric and species-centric way of thinking. It means that value is defined on how exploitable and profitable somebody or something

is to somebody else. In other words, nothing has value unless it lends itself to exploitation and profit taking.

The coordination of large-scale extraction takes place not in rural agricultural villages but in urban centers, which cannot support themselves. Great cities can survive only by constantly importing vast quantities of basic needs, such as food, fuel, and water from rural areas. Thus the ideology, in fact the new morality of interdependence among component parts, was promoted to supplant the ancient ideal of self-sufficiency and primitive socialism as it exists among highly homogeneous organic collectives. Subsistence farming came to be seen as practically a degenerate if not evil mode of life. But the feudal farmer and the Mesolithic-style hamlet had survived for millennia. Such socioeconomic arrangements do not need the city. Rather, the city needs them. The positive-sounding ideology of interdependence is actually an expression of urban need.

Cities are concentrations of culture, which is in many ways the antithesis of nature. Cities are the origins of modern mass-mediated dreams and aspirations. They are the cores of exploitation and therefore value. Although the concept of diffusion itself was spread through Western educational materials as a panacea for world poverty, vast numbers of the world's inhabitants began to long for a better life, for mobility, growth, and progress. They began to look for ways to be exploited. They moved to the cities looking for work. The rural poor became convinced that material accumulation was more important and practical than traditional indigenous lifestyles. But as Baudrillard wrote already in 1969 about fantasies of consumption and the "revolution of rising frustrations," it was becoming clear to more observers that unrealistic expectations of endless progress and democracy-by-consumption would lead to a global crisis, not a content little global village.

TWIN CRISES AND THE NEW MONOTHEISM

The global expansion of positivism has brought with it two crises. One is environmental. The other is cultural. As mentioned, both biodiversity and cultural diversity are being drastically reduced in the interest of efficient profit taking. According to the ideology of social Darwinism, if a cultural or biological form cannot adapt to the emergent global city and its definition of valuable—meaning exploitable, functional—then it deserves to disappear. This is cast in the rhetoric of both fatalism and minimalism. The success or failure of a cultural form is based on the simple laws of the market.

"The market" has become the new god. It has a life of its own that dictates how the rest of us live. It is transcendental and impersonal, indeed Olympian. It is a pure logic that sees all and knows all. It has forces. Sometimes it is said to be fickle, nervous, jittery, weak, strong, even relieved. One can fool the market only so long before its imperatives deflate all fantasies or bubbles. One should have no false gods before the market. A bubble economy is a false market. If

someone or something breaks its laws, they are punished without mercy. This is what the economist Adam Smith called the invisible hand of the market, an idea later taken up from the "spirit of ages" by Hegel and Thomas Malthus.

Thus we have the unseen guiding force applied as both an explanation and a justification of economic development, population control, and evolution. The message is simple and religious in conviction: The rules are supply and demand, those who conform are rewarded, those sinners who do not conform die. The market is simple yet shrouded in mystery, and so priestly well-paid experts and soothsayers abound. As Karl Polanyi in his classic work *The Great Transformation* noted, the market has risen to be the first and final cause over all other value systems only in the last two hundred years. Thus we speak of "market forces," and the "will of the market." This new system with iron-clad rules has convinced the world's countries that they must conform or be ostracized and left behind. Thus the world is taught a new global religion, and we are taught that it is inescapable.⁸ The only path to happiness is to conform. All resistance indicates irrationality if not outright mental illness.

To convince people that the current trend is good, positive ideology has dubbed the emerging system a global village. But the Mesolithic hamlet, which still exists in rural parts of the world, is self-sustaining and in equilibrium with its surrounding physical environment and also acts as a stable place where identities and other cultural forms have endured for countless generations. By contrast, the modern city is very much out of balance with its physical environment and not at all self-sustaining; its overriding drive for capital gains either co-opts traditional cultural forms like Christmas for exploitation or eliminates traditional cultural forms as worthless if they do not lend themselves to exploitation.

THE GLOBAL VILLAGE?

The positive-sounding global village, popularized by McLuhan, is a misnomer. It is a myth propagated to promote the information age as a millenarian promise of salvation. As Mumford noted in 1964, "What McLuhan understands has long been familiar to students of technics: it is his singular gift for misunderstanding both technology and man that marks his truly original contributions" (p. 456).

So what did McLuhan claim? According to McLuhan, the world is becoming a global village. Beyond the fact that he lifted this phrase from Wyndham Lewis's 1948 book *America and Cosmic Man*, in which Lewis writes, "The earth has become one big village, with telephones laid on from one end to the other, and air transport, both speedy and safe," it is wrong (p. 21). But before we rush on, we must pause to also note that McLuhan liberally borrowed the sense of the emerging telesphere from Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's (1955/1965) concept of the noosphere and practically all else of any explanatory value, from

Sigfried Giedion (1955) (one of Gebser's students), to Mumford (1934) and Harold Innis (1950).

According to J. Carey and J. Quirk (1970), a clear expression of the redemptive promise of communication had already been promoted in *The Silent Revolution* by Michel Angelo Garvey (published in 1852), which was criticized by Thoreau in 1854 as he commented on the first transatlantic cable carrying information of dubious value about the queen of England's colic to titillate and divert Americans from other immediate pursuits. Included in the millenarian promise of communication is the assurance of a new social harmony that should be created, thanks to "a perfect network of electric filaments" (quoted in Carey & Quirk, 1970, p. 227). For others, like Thoreau, social harmony is in no way dependent on technology and social engineering. In fact, many, like Emerson, agree with Thoreau on this matter.

However, the basis of this technotronic dream, with its promise of being a source of profits, was identified by Charles Cooley in his book *Social Organization* (1901), which had been inspired by Saint-Simon's 1821 book *Le système industriel* (The industrial system). According to Cooley, the utopian hope for global communication is found in its "enlargement of mental perspective," "mental animation" resulting from "frequent exposure to novelty" (p. 63).

But Cooley failed to understand that what was driving the attainment of technologies that would defeat location (space) and duration (time) was colonial conquest and the extermination of novelty. Comte had plainly and repeatedly argued in his various works, such as his *Catechisme positiviste* (*The Catechism of Positive Religion*), that "progress is the development of order," and that this is the greatest mission of civilization in its attempt to help peoples not yet capable of governing themselves. Positivism is said to be synonymous with civilization, and in *A General View of Positivism* (1848), Comte sought nothing less than the reorganization of production and the moral order of society on a global level.

COMTE'S DREAM COME TRUE: COSMOTOPIA AND THE REORGANIZATION OF MINDS AND SOCIETIES

"Village" is a reassuring bit of rhetoric, but it is a very misleading metaphor, one that belies what is occurring on the globe today. Today vast migrations of our species are moving from an agrarian lifestyle that has sustained the human race for millennia to an industrially inspired cosmopolitan way of being. The process of cosmopolity leads from urban center to empire, and on to regional convergences of interests, as in interimperial allegiances like the European Union, and finally on to global government (Zolo et al., 1997; Toulmin, 1992, 1998). Today, our cities are growing at alarming rates, and they are increasingly alike. A migration of the human herd from the land to an urban centralized environment in the hope of gaining modern forms of wealth and status is under

way. This is an expression of what has been called Westernaholism. It has been resisted in few places.

The consequences have been profound. Population density is rising at the same time that the sheer number of humans is exploding. Cities are witness to an urban implosion of masses of people. Infrastructures are being sorely overtaxed. The entire migration is fueled by emotional desires for happiness in the form of more wealth and power, phenomena often confused with freedom. In fact, the most successful capitalist economies, like Singapore, Communist China, South Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan, range from starkly repressive to only marginally democratic, especially in terms of free union activities and environmental protection (Greider, 1997). Thus the claim that capitalism and positive economic structures are inherently democratic is false. What we are witness to at the turn of the twenty-first century is the instituting of a whole new way of interacting: cybernetics. We live, as Zbigniew Brzezinski (1970) argues, not in a global village but a global city (Kramer, 1997, 2000a, 2000b).

So what is the difference? The modern systemized urban milieu is very different from the Mesolithic hamlet (Mumford, 1961). We must hasten to remind ourselves that much of humanity still lives such a premodern lifestyle, but it is vanishing before our eyes. Extending the work of Patrick Geddes and Mumford, Brzezinski's description of our technotronic society is more correct than McLuhan's (1967) erroneous claim that the world is retribalizing.

The technotronic society is characterized by technocracy (expert knowledge), fragmentation, isolation, ego-hypertrophy, competition, and other qualities that remind one of Töennies's (1887/1957) conceptualization of instrumental *Gesellschaft* culture, not organic *Gemeinschaft* culture. The older *Gemeinschaft* culture emerges out of common needs, not competing interests. Brzezinski's work, when combined with Mumford (1934), Chardin (1955/1965), and Gebser (1949/1985), goes far in explaining the qualitative difference between living in a village among intimate acquaintances (probably kin) and living in a modern city. The latter is characterized by the existence of the stranger. The city is a high-density settlement with vast populations of people one sees every day who are complete strangers or even more dissociated, disembodied netizens.

With the city comes dissociation, abstraction, and alienation. The stranger is a consequence of cosmopolity; that is, the superordination of masses of city dwellers. Several scholars, including Mumford (1961, 1964) and Morris (1969), note that the extreme super-status differentials that are conveniently naturalized by central urban authorities do not exist among hunter-gatherers or among the inhabitants of the Mesolithic hamlet. Huge inequalities in status do not emerge until the Other is a stranger. Then and only then do super-high-and-mighty divine rulers and super-low-and-weak slaves appear. This occurs only with the emergence of the city as centralized imperial authority. It is only with the rise of the first true metropolises like ancient Rome that labor becomes fragmented and specialized, as do markets. Here we find the inception of the

human as commodity. Slave markets are organized. To be sure, capturing one's enemies is an ancient practice. But typically captives became integrated eventually into the community. But with the formation of systematic slave markets and permanent caste systems, slave status plummets below human status. Slaves are not seen as human.

True to the cosmopolitan tendency to have huge discrepancies in wealth and power, today the digital divide, or information gap, is growing. Nearly a billion people in the world are illiterate, two-thirds of them women. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that as educational opportunities become available to women, birth rates decline and standards of living increase.

Only 17 percent of homes in the developing world have a phone. Ninety percent in the wealthy industrial nations have a phone. The gap is even wider for Internet access. The United States has the greatest number of Internet users, at around 76 million. Second place is Japan, which is not even close, with 10 million users. In the United States, one in four has access to the Internet; in China, for instance, one in eight hundred and in India one in twenty-one hundred have access. In Africa, access to the Internet is only one in every four thousand people.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Currently, about 1.3 billion people are impoverished, living on the equivalent of less than US\$1 a day, and the gap between rich and poor is increasing. About 60 percent of the 4.8 billion living in developing countries lack basic sanitation, and nearly one-third have no access to clean water. People are becoming more concentrated in urban areas. The number of cities with more than a million inhabitants will increase to about 370 by 2010, up from 173 in 1990. In 1960, only two cities had more than 10 million people, New York and Tokyo. By 2015 there will be at least twenty-six such megacities, twenty-two of them in less developed areas. According to the United Nations, in 2000, some 841 million people were "chronically malnourished," and there were 88 "food-deficit" countries. *Food deficit* means they can neither feed themselves nor afford the imports they need.

Meanwhile, population distribution and migration trends are clear and becoming more solidified with each passing year. The rural world of the village and hamlet, which concerns itself with agriculture and animal husbandry, is becoming devalued as backward, while the urban world with its capital economy is seen as progressive and modern. Thus billions are abandoning the village lifestyle and migrating to urban centers creating ever-greater population densities with all the attendant problems.

Culture is a qualitative phenomenon. Culture may be defined as the values, expectations, motivations, beliefs, and behavior patterns of a group of people. The number of cultures in the world is declining at the same time that human population, migration, and international and intercultural communication are

increasing. The number of cultures, cultural diversity or life-worlds, or semantic systems is shrinking. The vast diversity of different kinds of cultural manifolds, different kinds of time and space, is collapsing at an astounding rate as Western-style mechanical clock time and digital measurement are displacing traditional ways of making sense of the world.

The quality of life is changing. Around the world people are rapidly (by historical standards almost instantaneously) abandoning rural ways of living to adopt urban, mostly Western forms of culture. Why and how this is happening is complex. This change is largely self-legitimizing and self-promoted. Western European civilization, beginning with Christopher Columbus and the age of European colonialism and greatly accelerating after the end of World War I, is conquering the globe. It is the major issue of international communication, and it increasingly impacts intercultural communication because it promotes intercultural exchange while making it increasingly impossible because of cultural homogenization around the world.

The nihilistic tendency of monoculture is real and problematic. Because positivistic modernism leads people to believe that each problem has only one correct answer it tends to lead people to ask what may be the wrong question. They ask what is the meaning of life, rather than how to make life meaningful. The first question belies a Western goal-oriented bias that presumes just one correct answer. The second, perhaps more interesting question exhibits a presumption that the value of life is in the living and that there are many ways (perhaps, as Nietzsche suggests, an infinite number of ways) to live. If just one drives all others into extinction, then the world is much impoverished, and human freedom is greatly constricted.

NOTES

1. Which is to say that late in his career McLuhan came to agree with the likes of Lewis Mumford and to be less and less optimistic about the effects of world communications patterns on social and individual happiness.

2. This was as much a public relations stunt by the U.N. Population Fund to raise public pressure to force its member signatories to pay their allotted dues as anything else. Meanwhile the U.S. Census Bureau calculated that the 6 billionth person had already been born about three months earlier, on July 19. But the point is not lost that in any case, sometime during 1999, somewhere on earth the 6 billion population mark was passed.

3. Currently, in some sub-Saharan countries, one in four adults is infected with HIV (Worldwatch Institute).

4. As quoted by Matt Crenson of the Associated Press in his article, "Six Billion Strong," found at <http://www.ABCNEWS.com>.

5. Also see Diamond's 1994 book *The Third Chimpanzee*, which chronicles the extinction of most of the world's languages before the linguistic steamroller of English.

6. International Telecommunication Union Web site, online at <http://www.itu.int/home/index.html>.
7. It is important to note that belatedly, but in response to critiques in the third world and critical theorists in the first world, Rogers proposed to abandon this highly ethnocentric perspective in the late 1970s.
8. See the wonderful article by Cox (1999).

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APPENDIX

For the most up-to-date demographic and development data available online see:

- <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook> (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency fact books)
- <http://www.itu.int/home> (International Telecommunication Union)
- <http://www.iwmi.org> (International Water Management Institute)
- <http://www.prb.org> (Population Reference Bureau)
- <http://www.unfpa.org> (UN Population Fund)
- <http://www.undp.org> (UN Population Information Network)
- <http://www.worldbank.org> (World Bank Regional and National Development Information)
- <http://www2.wcmc.org.uk> (World Conservation Monitoring Centre)

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I dedicate this book to two people I know and admire for their courage to change society rather than passively "adapt" to it just for personal security and comfort, and who have generously spent many hours teaching me about the true and revolutionary essence of the ongoing American experiment: Professors George Henderson and Melvin Tolson. This is also dedicated to Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher, who sued for her right to attend the University of Oklahoma law school in 1946, a case that went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. It is also important to remember the white students, professors, and administrators who supported these people in the face of majority indignation. These three, who were willing to "die to make a difference," as Professor Henderson has conveyed to me, made it possible for women and people of color to attend and teach at the University of Oklahoma.

During hours of conversation with Henderson, he relayed to me many truths, some very personal. With his permission I share a few: In 1967, the Henderson family became the first black family to own a house in Norman, Oklahoma. One of their neighbors at the time asked his minister why God hated him so much that He allowed a black family to move in next door. The family's windows were broken, racial slurs were endured, and Professor Henderson suffered doubt from what he had asked his family to endure by moving to Norman. Today, he is one of the most celebrated faculty members at the University of Oklahoma, having a wall full of awards, including being named a Regent's Professor. His conviction of presence changed the state and the university.

Ms. Fisher later became a member of the board of regents to the university that once denied her admission.