Nibras Kazimi

38. But this all sets the stage for the most important battle to come: the direction and character of the revolutionary regime in Tehran. So far, it’s been generally going in Soleimani’s favor, he being the revolution’s last lion, or so he sees himself.

37. But Soleimani being so visible during a state visit is every indication to someone like Zarif that the fight, at least when it comes to regional strategy, is over, to his detriment. The wider world is but an echo of regionality for Iran’s foreign policy.

36. I think Zarif went to Iraq following Shahroudi’s death (in Dec) to sell Khamen’i on another path for Iran to follow in Iraq, one different from what Soleimani has in store (I speculate on that in the essay), and to give ‘Supreme Leader’ options after his pet project had died.

35. This could have been a ‘final straw’ moment for a frustrated Zarif, whose regional writ was being subsumed under Soleimani’s shadow. Zarif spent about a week in Iraq last month, trying to stake out relevance for him and his camp, to no avail. Resignation signals defeat.

34. There’s lots going on that may’ve motivated Zarif to resign. However, Soleimani chaperoning Asad to meetings with Khamen’i and Rouhani, and being this visible while at it, may have signaled to Zarif et al that the old way of doing things shall give way to the ‘Soleimani era’.

What’s this?https://twitter.com/jacksanders1965/status/1100012184774545408 …

33. If it were up to me, I’d refract every American decision about downsizing in the region through the prism of this contest in Saudi Arabia. Sadly, it may only serve to bolster the general inclination to leave, for it seems that the new Washington can live with a broken MENA.

32. What’s more is that there’s hardly an acknowledgement in DC and elsewhere that a contest of narratives with important ramifications is gathering force in Saudi Arabia, one that will not be contained within its borders and one that can turn existential/violent for either side.

31. I’ve no clue which narrative shall carry the day. But Bin Salman in indeed mad, the folks around him amateurish, while the other side can draw on vast organizational talent pools. All this is happening in the wake of a widening American disinterest in the region’s trajectory.

30. In the essay, I sketch out the Salafist counter narrative as constructed by Safar al Hawali in his new book, where he goes as far as downgrading the House of Saud’s role in the Salafist revival of the last two centuries. It is smart, imaginative and compelling.

29. Bin Salman is constructing a new narrative for this constituency he may even succeed in giving it form (resembles M Kamel’s xenophobic Egyptian nationalism early 20th). However, the old, entrenched Salafist networks still command respect and a devoted constituency too.

28. Bin Salman is hugely popular among Saudi youth, or at least the middle class and upper class urban segments. He is the focus of an intense, undisciplined nationalism emerging there. Khashogchi is a non-issue for most of them. More would justify rather than condemn.

27. "Why focus on Saudis so much?" is a legitimate question, given so much is happening all around. But it's not just morbid fascination: the Middle East watchers crowd can be divided into two: is Saudi Arabia the region's next big decade-long story or not? I tend to think it is.

26. This choice may kindle nostalgia for the good times of the Bandar era, they may assume. However, Bandar's DC is dead or dying; Trump is both the symptom and the driver of its demise. It's very different now, and once they've lost Trump--and they have--difficult to reverse.

25. We are way, way beyond mitigating the effects of Qatari lobbying, MB info-ops, and activist WaPo editors. That the Saudis don't understand this, that they think they are being clever with a choice of ambassador only highlights their disconnect from their new reality here.

24. The Saudi dilemma in Washington is that most have lost confidence in the judgment of Saudi Arabia's top decision-makers, and have lost confidence in the ability and viability of the Saudi ruling family to mend this problem. Everything is starkly different beyond Khashogchi.

23. The appointment of a new Saudi ambassador reveals a number of things. The Saudis have not realized the depth of their problem in DC. It is something beyond a PR fix, however interesting and talented the new ambassador is, and however deep her family's diplomatic legacy goes.

22. What this portends to me is that if a new crisis zone emerges in the region, the reaction from this president would be further disengagement. And there won’t be much that can be done about it.

21. The backdrop was that Trump began to question Bin Salman’s judgement even before Khashogchi (...Qatari lobbying worked, for eg).So this reinforced Trump’s sense that the experts and seasoned hands around him may not have a firm handle on this, trusting his own instincts more.

20. One implication is that it makes it much harder for those who talk to the president about the Middle East to sell him on new courses of action, not after getting their assessments of Bin Salman so fundamentally wrong. This especially goes for the Israelis.