Are progressive academics openly hostile and discriminatory towards their conservative colleagues? Could such hostility help explain the well-known discrepancy between progressive* and conservative faculty members on college campuses?
Initial research published by Yoel Inbar and Joris Lammers in 2012 suggested that the answer to these questions is yes – at least among social and personality psychologists. Specifically, a sample of social and personality psychologists reported a greater willingness to actively discriminate against conservative colleagues. The small number of conservative social and personality psychologists sampled also reported experiencing a more hostile climate within their department.
Yet, there are a number of plausible hypotheses that can explain the ideological discrepancy between progressives and conservatives within academia. These hypotheses include:
- The self-selection hypothesis: Conservatives may self-select out of academia (see Gross, 2013) because for a variety of reasons that include being less interested in new ideas or possessing a greater desire for higher levels of income.
- The “birds of a feather flock together” hypothesis: People in general may be more attracted to “birds of a feather” and more likely to join organizations made up of “people like them” (see Schneider, Goldstein, & Smith, 1995).
- The ideological-conflict hypothesis: People in general are prejudiced towards and intolerant of ideologically dissimilar others (see Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014).
Additionally, one important methodological criticism of Inbar and Lammers is that their survey assessed responses to conservatives and conservatively motivated research without assessing responses to progressives and progressively motivated research (see Skitka, 2012). New research by Nathan Honeycutt and Laura Freberg addressed this criticism in a sample not limited to social and personality psychologists. This research also allowed for an investigation of two of the hypotheses outlined above: The “birds of a feather flock together” hypothesis and the ideological-conflict hypothesis.
Briefly, the main findings reported by Honeycutt and Freberg were:
- Conservatives reported experiencing a more hostile climate than progressives or moderates.
- Both conservatives and progressives reported perceiving a more hostile climate for their colleagues who shared their political orientation.
- Progressive respondents reported greater willingness to discriminate against conservatives or conservatively motivated research when: reviewing papers for publication, reviewing grants for funding, considering who to invite for a symposium, and in hiring decisions. The willingness to discriminate against conservatives was strongest for hiring decisions.
- Conservative respondents reported greater willingness to discriminate against progressives or progressively motivated research when: reviewing papers for publication, reviewing grants for funding, considering who to invite for a symposium, and in hiring decisions. The willingness to discriminate against liberals was strongest for hiring decisions.
These findings replicate and extend those reported by Inbar and Lammers: Conservatives within academia reported experiencing a more hostile climate then their progressive and moderate counterparts. While progressives within academia may think conservative academics suffer from a “persecution complex” (see Honeycutt & Freberg, p. 7), the results of Honeycutt and Freberg suggest that a good number of progressive academics are willing to be discriminatory towards their more conservative colleagues. However, it is important to note that the results also indicate that conservatives within academia appear just as willing to be discriminatory towards their progressive colleagues, if given the opportunity:
“Both liberals and conservatives expressed a similar explicit willingness to discriminate against each other. These results support the ideological symmetry claims for prejudice and political bias and are inconsistent with social psychological research arguing that conservatives are more prejudiced and intolerant of others than are liberals (e.g., Amodio et al., 2007; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008)” (Honeycutt & Freberg, 2016, p. 6).
In other words, while progressives held prejudices towards conservatives, conservatives also held prejudices towards progressives. These findings support the ideological-conflict hypothesis (see Brandt et al., 2014). Within academia however, the ideological imbalance between progressives and conservatives makes it likely that progressive prejudice is more widespread within the academy than conservative prejudice.
Exposure to different viewpoints often results in increased tolerance (see Mutz, 2006). On the other hand, isolation from different viewpoints can lead to intolerance, group polarization and extremism (see Keating, Van Boven, & Judd, 2016; Sunstein, 2006; Sunstein, 2009). Although the academy may never achieve an equal balance of progressives and conservatives, the scholarship it produces will likely benefit from a greater diversity of viewpoints.
Suggested Readings:
- Political diversity in social and personality psychology.
- Multifaceted problems: Liberal bias and the need for scientific rigor in self-critical research.
- The ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and conservatives.
- Partisan underestimation of the polarizing influence of group discussion.
*Honeycutt and Freberg refer to those on the political left as liberals. This post refers to those on the political left as progressives.
Opinions expressed are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by Heterodox Academy or any of its members. We welcome your comments below. Feel free to challenge and disagree, but please try to model the sort of respectful and constructive criticism that makes viewpoint diversity most valuable. Comments that include obscenity or aggression are likely to be deleted.
In the case of social psychology part of it might be that the research is geared towards investigating marginalized groups, which may be, at least to the Left, historically seen as victims of the Right’s agenda.
In the social sciences, I feel the some of the investigations are so politically charged it may be hard for the Left majority to conceive of the Right as being capable of researching these issues, which obviously is in direct conflict with any claims of being scientific. Perhaps the social sciences needs to see that this not so much an issue of ideological inclusion/diversity, but a major confound to their ability to be scientific. That is, if the argument can be made that the science is confounded by the current situation, there will be a greater acceptance of different opinions.
I have long twizzled over the reasons why college campuses disproportionately incubate the pc/victimology/viewpoint-suppressing cult. While the question is far too complex to address here, I want to toss out one small idea.
Pope Benedict dwelt heavily on the “dictatorship of relativism.” He said: “We are moving toward a dictatorship of relativism which does not recognize anything as for certain and which has as its highest goal one’s own ego and one’s own desires.”
Relativism gains far more traction with knowledge, gains appeal with victimhood, and is more easily disseminated – perhaps even needed to reduce friction — in a collective environment.
Knowledge takes one beyond a simplistic black and white template. The more one knows, the harder it becomes to accept “simple.” Dismantling “truths,” then, becomes seductive insofar as it demonstrates one’s superior knowledge. Enter ego. Victimhood lessens – even removes – one’s sense of responsibility for choices. Enter desire.
Knowledge is the handmaiden of desire and ego. The ability to use high-brow rationalization to transform frailties into strengths is enormously seductive given the human condition. Knowledge hones victimhood with its sophisticated veneer [think intersectionality, etc.]. And, the more sophisticated the conceptualizing and the dissemination, the more likely others will swallow the ideas.
For the egoist who needs no exculpation or license, knowledge provides a sophisticated way to signal compassion and to highlight “tolerance” creds without sounding like a “low-brow” evangelical. Make anything high-brow cool or high-brow virtuous and “intellectuals” will flock.
Perhaps the ideological spectrum is a relativist scale with poles grounded in ego and desire.
Why can’t it simply be the purchasers of acedemic talent and research prefer a liberal result?
I’ve been following this research on-and-off for a little while. I’m not surprised that both ‘sides’, when given the chance, will discriminate against the other. And the disproportionate representation of people on the left in academia explains why people on the right often complain about perceived discrimination.
At the same time, the academic left has managed to build little enclaves where they insulate themselves from criticism by condemning anyone not toeing the party line. In my own field of philosophy, this is becoming more and more a problem.
I do not identify as a conservative, but I do have strong libertarian sensibilities when it comes to speech and debate. Over the last few years, professional in-groups have begun to shape the kinds of topics that philosophers feel comfortable debating. This is already having an effect on what gets said in philosophy. This is done by appropriating the language of harm, violence, identity, privilege, etc. to mobilize collective action toward the shaming and silencing of critics. The effect is to push the position to its extremes, with the use of political and institutional power more and more being wielded in ways that transgress the rights and professional welfare of those who do not comport themselves to the party line.
This was on display over the weekend at a prominent blog in the discipline. I’ll spare the gory details, so let it suffice to say that two recent conferences (one for the Society for Analytical Feminism, the other for the Society of Christian Philosophers) saw some audience members respond with outrage and moral indignation at speakers. With hardly any explanation of just what the outrage was supposed to be, this resulted in public and semi-public disavowals and self-abnegation by the presidents of these organizations. For an overview see:
http://dailynous.com/2016/09/25/tale-two-conferences/
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2016/09/tommie-shelby-harvard-suggests-that-moral-duties-apply-to-the-oppressed-too-and-the-society-for-anal.html
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2016/09/meanwhile-the-society-for-christian-philosophers.html
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2016/09/another-keynote-speaker-rebuked-not-as-badly-at-the-society-for-christian-philosophers-midwest-meeti.html
http://wisdomandfollyblog.com/swinburne-homosexuality-society-christian-philosophers/
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/michael-rea-owes-richard-swinburne.html
The fact that a continentally-trained philosopher steeped in the narrative of cultural Marxism would spout off at a Christian philosopher defending a classical position in Christianity, and then blog about it afterward, is not so surprising.
What’s amazing, to me, is the way Tommie Shelby seems to have been treated by the Society for Analytical Feminism. It really looks like the monster is beginning to eat itself, and the movers-and-shakers in the movement seem to be okay with it. Indeed, they almost appear as if they’re being pulled along by tidal forces they don’t understand the operations of.
Having said that, I don’t think the conservative/progressive distinction is all that useful in this particular case, and that makes me wonder whether the distinction might no longer be cutting at a joint more generally.
I say this because as these events have transpired over the last few years, Brian Leiter, a philosopher on the left with sympathies for Marx and (at least some versions of) Marxism, has resolutely been on the side in favor of unfettered debate. He has also roundly condemned the use of moral outrage, social stigmatization, and group mobilization by the advocates of these trials-by-public. That makes me wonder whether the old left/right, progressive/conservative, distinctions are adequately marking the divisions in play in American life today (this is to say nothing about the horrible state of the two primary American political parties, as the current election so powerfully depicts).
One of the things I look forward to as the heterodox academy goes forward, and one of the things that made it such a relief to see it come into existence a year ago, is the prospect it opens up for American men and women of good will from different political backgrounds to come to some better understanding of one another, and a more equitable treatment of those we disagree with. To do that, we may need to question some of the things Americans have taken for granted in framing our political and social lives, and I think the conservative/progressive distinction is one of them.
Preston,
I think you are spot on that the dichotomous ideological distinction of left/right (or progressive/conservative) is not as useful as it once was. Personally, I don’t see much value in lumping libertarians, social conservatives, localists, and the alt-right together under the banner conservative or the right. Likewise, I also don’t see much value in lumping liberals (by this I mean something like the Clinton New Democrat), progressives, social democrats, and social justice proponents together under the banner liberal or the left.
With that in mind, it is interesting to note that the authors of the study summarized above (Honeycutt and Freberg) briefly addressed this in the paper:
“A number of participants expressed frustration at the limitations of the political ideology scale, arguing that they weren’t comfortable with any of the choices they faced.”
I can also say we here at Heterodox Academy have also received this same complaint from a handful of professors who have submitted membership applications over the past few months.
That’s good to hear Sean, thanks. It’s reassuring to know there are more people who bristle at the way these positions are demarcated. And it’s great to finally have a sufficient number of academics publicly challenge the ideological orthodoxy of some segments of the academy.
The “left-right” or “conservative-progressive” poles have some emic significance because many people do classify themselves in this way and conform to their self-categorizations. They also serve as tribal identifications. I remember some years ago when I was applying for academic jobs, an interviewer from one department asked, “Are you politically liberal? We’re a liberal department and are looking for someone who will fit in.”
But you are right, I think, that while these categorizations may serve as tribal identities, they don’t describe the range of social and political views very well. A few years ago, in a blog (url given in the website space), I argued that a better way to conceive of political positions was as locations within a triangle of statism, traditionalism, and individualism.
One of the problems with ideological labels as tribal identities is that this not only reinforces viewpoint conformity, it does so in a way that oversimplifies and misrepresents sociopolitical perspectives.
Hi Carl–I agree that insofar as people self-identify as something, that category has a certain descriptive use. And I think you’re right that tribalism reinforces conformity and misrepresents other perspectives.
My own view is that persons are creatures whose identities are at least in part subject to self-determination, and so the problem here is the lack of viable alternatives through which to frame a sense of self and community. In another age I might have hoped philosophers would play a more prominent role in crafting those alternative conceptions of self and community, but contemporary philosophy looks to be overrun by the sort of identity politics that inhibits that categorical criticism in favor of an us-versus-them mentality. I’m working on a series of essays addressing this problem, and hopefully I’ll have them out soon.
Re: “I don’t think the conservative/progressive distinction is all that useful in this particular case.”
I agree.
The more I study the political divide the more it seems to be a divide of cognitive style from which ideologies follow rather than of ideology per se.
See the book “The Cave and the Light: Plato versus Aristotle and the Struggle for the Soul of Western Civilization” by Arthur Herman, in which Plato and Aristotle are metaphors for a larger concept.
Just as there are different physical body types (ectomorph, endomorph, mesomorph) so too, it seems, are there different physical brain types; different algorithms, like PC vs Mac, that differently connect the dots of the information received from the senses.
Plato thought real-world objects, including individual people, families, societies, are but a pale imitation of their ideal self, and it is the moral obligation of the “enlightened” among us to use their superior powers of reason to bend the moral arc toward that ideal; toward the “good society” and the “new man.”
Aristotle thought it’s all well and good to continually strive to improve our situation, but certain realities of human nature, both at the individual level and at the group level, make the achievement of an imaginary Platonic ideal doubtful at best and probably impossible. Human clay is not infinitely malleable.
Herman traces these to visions, the Platonic “unconstrained” algorithm and the Aristotelian “constrained” vision through 2400 years of human history.
The phenomena we currently call liberalism and conservatism, and/or the one-foundation and the all-foundation moral matrices, seem to follow from these two basic brain types.
A good example of what I’m getting at re: Cognitive style is Preston Stoval’s Brian Leiter example.
While I do believe the one-foundation moral matrix TENDS to follow from, or at least correlate with, the WEIRD Platonic cognitive style, it’s not a hard and fast rule.
It’s possible for people who lean toward the one-foundation matrix to ALSO lean toward holistic Aristotelian cognition. Examples of this, IMHO, include Jon Haidt, Jon Rauch (author of Kindly Inquisitors), and maybe Brian Leiter.
This would explain Leiter’s propensity for open debate and his condemnation of moral outrage in spite of his predilection for Marxism.
I think moral foundations alone are insufficient for a complete understanding of the political divide. They describe WHAT each side looks like but not HOW they got that way.
I think cognitive style is the intellectual “missing link” that answers that question.
I suggest that the adaptive pressure(s) that caused the split are the Gemeinschaft -> Gesellschaft process societies seem to follow as they grow, mature, and prosper.
Haidt has described this process in more detail in his writing and talks about Globalism and Nationalism.
Here’s an example (link at end):
“As nations grow prosperous, their values change in predictable ways. The most detailed longitudinal research on these changes comes from the World Values Survey, which asks representative samples of people in dozens of countries about their values and beliefs. The WVS has now collected and published data in six “waves” since the early 1980s; the most recent survey included sixty countries. Nearly all of the countries are now far wealthier than they were in the 1980s, and many made a transition from communism to capitalism and from dictatorship to democracy in the interim. How did these momentous changes affect their values?
Each country has followed a unique trajectory, but if we zoom out far enough some general trends emerge from the WVS data. Countries seem to move in two directions, along two axes: first, as they industrialize, they move away from “traditional values” in which religion, ritual, and deference to authorities are important, and toward “secular rational” values that are more open to change, progress, and social engineering based on rational considerations. Second, as they grow wealthier and more citizens move into the service sector, nations move away from “survival values” emphasizing the economic and physical security found in one’s family, tribe, and other parochial groups, toward “self-expression” or “emancipative values” that emphasize individual rights and protections—not just for oneself, but as a matter of principle, for everyone.”
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beats-globalism/
It’d be so interesting to see if conservative and liberal biases cancel one another out. Maybe a vignette experiment. Group A is all self identified conservatives. Group B is all self identified liberals. Group C is evenly mixed. Everyone wears a badge with their political affiliation on it. Subjects read vignettes, constant across treatments, and rank some vectors of quality. And then we see if having a self identified, publicly visible mix of ideologies produce less extreme evaluations. It looks like this has been studied, but I don’t know if that’s been done in the context of evaluating research specifically.