so it’s pretty well-understood that the belief that IQ differences are objective, significant, highly gene-dependent etc is associated moreso with the political right than left
and this recognition seems to usually either taken for granted (if endorsed) or rejected (if consciously considered,) after all people are not responsible for their innate intelligence if things exist, &c &c. (often this seems to partake of a kind of rhetoric that comes close to denying contingent circumstances should affect our politics at all, which is absurd, though of course not all species of the claim go that far.) but I think the basic association is rational, beyond even the associations with the politics of race and so on, regardless of what one’s estimate of how important iq etc *actually* is, and of what other considerations might override this
like, suppose for a moment that there are very very large differences in people’s ability to reason. some people are just way way smarter than you and some people are just way way dumber
for beings way way smarter than you, at the limit you basically either need to blindly obey them or not trust a goddamn thing they say, based on your priors of how friendly they are
for beings way way dumber than you, at the limit you can either benevolently administer to their needs, or blithely ignore their interests entirely
in either case there are options, but the options aren’t rational negotiation, debate, and deliberation among equals, but an instinctive Schmittian discrimination between friend and foe, in which friends are teams of peons obeying their natural better, whom they love and ought to love
now you of course might think that iq is real (for whatever relevant value of real) and even highly innate or whatever, or even believe some hbd whatever about how it corresponds to different demographics innately etc, but still think that the difference between an iq 70 person and an iq 130 person or whatever isn’t actually all that great in the grand scheme of things, that they’re both rational animals and can assert their own interests and so on, and that the former isn’t in a position of total epistemic learned helplessness and the latter often has reason to listen to the former, in which case I suspect “profound” political consequences don’t follow. but to the extent that the limit case becomes plausible, we exit the world of social contracts and general wills and marketplaces of ideas and enter into the endless night of blind reptilian Schmittian struggle
(yes, there’s a leftist version of cheering on blind reptilian struggle against all that social contract mystification, and I’m normally All About That, but it addresses orthogonal questions and for the moment we can ignore it)
In theory this seems like it should be correct, but it’s surprisingly difficult for me to come up with a concrete example of a situation where one would need to do that. Do you have any in mind?
The people I believe to be much smarter than me are not necessarily (in fact, generally not) the people who can actually exercise power over me in some way. So what I would give them is not actually obedience but deference, and if there are conflicting opinions (as is usually the case outside math and the physical sciences) I’ll defer to whoever I believe shares my values, and who has the least apparent reason to present their values falsely. And if that still leaves me with conflicting opinions, I can’t blindly defer to anyone whether I want to or not.