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Yesterday a big story was broken about Lenovo selling computers with malware, called Superfish, preinstalled. Most people are familiar with the typical crap that comes preloaded on a new computer. They are usually low quality “trial” programs that you’ll need to upgrade if you want to use them. Your computer manufacturer puts them on their computers because they are paid by the people who make these programs. But these programs aren’t usually malware. They may be crap, wastes of space, or just plain annoying, but rarely are they malware.
Superfish is a step beyond your typical preinstalled “crapware”. It’s a program that listens in on your web browsing, analyzes the images that are being downloaded, and inserts advertisements for products that are visually similar. The technology (visual search) is pretty cool, but it’s not OK to listen into web browsing without telling a user. Unfortunately, the problem with Superfish isn’t just the privacy concerns, it’s the fact that it opens a gaping security hole in Lenovo computers.
In this post I’m going to explain the security vulnerability that Superfish creates, in plain English. I want this to be accessible to readers of all levels of computer understanding. I’ll explain how it works so you can understand why you should care about it. In order to do that, let me start with some small explanations.
In order for the internet to work, computers need to know how to talk to each other. Protocols are like sets of instructions for how computers behave when they interact with each other. For instance, humans know that when they walk into a restaurant, they wait to be seated, read their menus, order food, wait, eat, pay, and tip their waiter or waitress. This is a protocol for eating out.
Computers have protocols for things like browsing the Web. That protocol is called HTTP. When you decide you want to go to Google, your computer starts speaking HTTP with one of Google’s computers. It asks for the home page, and the website sends it back. One problem with HTTP is that it’s not private. I could listen into your conversation with a website and know every page you asked for, and all the pages the website sent back to you.
That’s why we have another protocol called TLS. It makes your conversations private by doing three things:
When you take HTTP, the web protocol, and put it inside TLS, the privacy protocol, you get HTTPS, the secure web browsing protocol. When you have a green lock displayed in your browser, you know you’re using HTTPS.
If we lived in a perfect world, TLS could do its job perfectly, without any help. But we don’t, so it doesn’t. In order to verify that a website is who it says it is, TLS needs to know whether or not it can trust the website. It does that using a rather complicated system of private keys and certificates. The basic ideas are like this:
The root certificate authorities will sell signed certificates, usually for a hefty fee and some stringent requirements of proving your identity. The result is that, if I wanted to create a certificate that said I was “google.com”, I couldn’t verify it with the root certificate authorities. They wouldn’t sign my certificate, and so, your computer wouldn’t trust that I was Google. If I could somehow get a fake certificate signed by a trusted root, then I would be able to pretend to be a website that I wasn’t.
So, now we get to the meat of the issue. Superfish, as explained above, likes to listen into your web browsing so it can look at the images you see, and then advertise similar looking products. But when you use HTTPS, Superfish can’t intercept, read, or change your conversation with websites – just as intended. Lenovo and Superfish, however, got their heads together and came up with a crafty way around this.
Since Lenovo makes the computers, it gets to do whatever it wants to them before it sells them. So, it had Superfish create its own certificate and private key. It adds the Superfish certificate into the computer’s list of trusted root certificate authorities. Now, any certificate signed by Superfish’s certificate will be trusted unconditionally be Lenovo computers.
Now, every time a Lenovo computer starts connecting to a HTTPS website, the Superfish program running on the computer generates a fake certificate for that website, and signs it with the Superfish root certificate (using the private key). Then, it intercepts the conversation, pretending to be that website. From there, it can do exactly what it’s supposed to – look at images and insert advertisements.
The problem (which I put in bold above) is that in order for a root certificate to sign a website certificate, you need to have the root’s private key. These are usually kept very, very secret. But in order for Superfish to work as I just described, every copy of the program (and every Lenovo computer) needs to have a copy of the private key. If someone were to find that private key, they would be able to pretend to be any website they’d like, and any Lenovo computer with the Superfish root certificate would believe them.
And guess what? That’s exactly what happened. In this article, you can read the details of how someone was able to extract the private key from the Superfish program and crack the password.
Armed with this private key, a hacker could pretend to be your bank, or your email provider, or anyone else. They could steal your passwords, money, and other intimate knowledge about you, if you own a Lenovo computer. And all because Lenovo wanted to get a few extra advertising dollars from your private web browsing.
This is a situation where the ethics of a company’s decision making comes into question. Somewhere down the line, someone at Lenovo had to make the call and say: “yeah, I think we should put this snooping program with the private key on our computers!” Anybody who knew what that meant knew the dangers, but was willing to sacrifice their customers’ security in order to earn a few extra dollars. And that seems like something worth knowing.