（原典英文）51. The Convention aims at meeting the need for a global response and at ensuring the effective criminalization of acts of participation in criminal groups. Article 5 of the Convention recognizes the two main approaches to such criminalization that are cited above as equivalent. The two alternative options of article 5, paragraph 1 (a) (i) and paragraph 1 (a) (ii) were thus created to reflect the fact that some countries have conspiracy laws, while others have criminal association (association de malfaiteurs) laws. The options allow for effective action against organized criminal groups, without requiring the introduction of either notion - conspiracy or criminal association - in States that do not have the relevant legal concept. Article 5 also covers persons who assist and facilitate serious offences committed by an organized criminal group in other ways.
51. The Convention aims at meeting the need for a global response and at ensuring the effective criminalization of acts of participation in criminal groups.
The two alternative options of article 5, paragraph 1 (a) (i) and paragraph 1 (a) (ii) were thus created to reflect the fact that some countries have conspiracy laws, while others have criminal association (association de malfaiteurs) laws.
The options allow for effective action against organized criminal groups, without requiring the introduction of either notion - conspiracy or criminal association - in States that do not have the relevant legal concept.
A political scandal threatens his hold on Japanese politics. 政治スキャンダルが安定政権を脅かす
March 30, 2017
2017年3月30日
英語原文①
Shinzo Abe has gone from invincible to vulnerable in a mere six weeks. Earlier this year the Japanese Prime Minister enjoyed an approval rating of 66% in a Yomiuri poll and faced no credible challenges from the opposition or within his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Now a scandal involving his ties to Japan’s ultranationalist fringe has hurt Mr. Abe’s popularity and unsettled markets.
Yasunori Kagoike is a member of the Japan Conference, a nationalist group to which Mr. Abe and more than half of his cabinet belong. Mr. Kagoike is also the head of an Osaka kindergarten that teaches its pupils absolute loyalty to the state. In 2015 Mr. Abe’s wife gave a speech at the school in which she praised its curriculum. According to Mr. Kagoike’s testimony to Parliament, she gave $9,000 on the Prime Minister’s behalf. Mr. and Mrs. Abe deny making the donation.
Mr. Abe denies any involvement in the land transaction and has offered to resign if implicated. But the scandal has also dragged in hardline Defense Minister Tomomi Inada, another Japan Conference member. After telling Parliament that she never represented Mr. Kagoike’s school as a lawyer, evidence that she had done so forced her to recant.
The Japanese public was alarmed to learn that Mr. Kagoike’s kindergarten makes children chant the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education, a pledge of obedience to the emperor that was a key part of pre-World War II militarism. He was also forced to apologize for derogatory comments about Koreans and Chinese.
While Mr. Abe is unlikely to lose his job as a result of the scandal, it hurts his ability to set the political agenda. The Prime Minister has delayed badly needed economic reforms such as deregulation and laws to give companies greater ability to hire and fire full-time employees. Now it’s doubtful he could pass them through Parliament if he wanted to.
The Abenomics program so far consists mostly of monetary stimulus, which boosted asset prices but failed to conquer deflation. Mr. Abe used his electoral mandates from the 2012 and 2014 elections to concentrate on security issues, such as a reinterpretion of Japan’s constitution to allow the military to fight alongside U.S. forces. Those changes were worthwhile, but prioritizing them over the economy was a mistake. The Japanese public is increasingly skeptical of Abenomics, but Mr. Abe remained popular because no credible alternative leader was available.
That may be changing.Yuriko Koike, who served Mr. Abe as Defense Minister in 2007, looks set to consolidate her power as Tokyo’s Governor in July’s Metropolitan Assembly election. Japanese commentators speculate that she plans to seek the leadership of the LDP.
Such a challenge could benefit Mr. Abe if he now distances himself from the Japan Conference and concentrates on fixing the economy. But the scandal is also a reminder that political power is fleeting and shouldn’t be squandered.
In this connection, I would like to bring to the attention of your Excellency’s Government information I have received concerning a proposed bill revising parts of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds, also known as the ‘anti-conspiracy’ bill which due to its broad scope may, if adopted into law, lead to undue restrictions to the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression.
A bill revising parts of the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds, also known as the 'anti-conspiracy’ bill was submitted by the Japanese Government to the Parliament last 21 March 2017.
Reportedly, the amendments proposed significantly expand the scope covered by Article 6 (Preparation for organized homicide and o\her organized crimes) of the law. According to the translation made available to us the new article would read as:
“Article 6: 2(1)Two or more persons who plan, as part of activities of terrorist groups or other organised criminal groups, the commission of criminal acts listed in the following sections by such groups, are subject to the punishment prescribed in each of those sections, if any of them have arranged funds or goods or carried out preliminary inspections of relevant locations pursuant to the plan or other preparatory acts for the purpose of committing the planned criminal acts. An organized criminal group means a group of persons whose common purpose is to carry out the crimes enumerated in Appendix 3. However, those who surrender prior to executing the crime will have a reduced or exemption from that sentence. ”
Further to this amendment, 277 new types of crime would be added through the “Appendix 4”. Concerns were raised that such an important part of the law is part of an attachment to the law since it makes it much harder for citizens and experts to understand the actual scope of the provision.
Additionally, appendix 4 would permit the application of laws for crimes which appear to be totally unrelated with the scope of organized crime and terrorism, such as those related to Article 198 of the Forest Act which criminalizes theft of forestry products in reserved forests, Articles 193, 195 ,196 of the Cultural Properties Preservation Act which · prohibit, inter alia, exporting without permission and destroying important cultural properties, and Article 119 of the Copyright Act, which prohibits violations of copyrights.
Reportedly, the bill was submitted with the aim of adapting national legislation to the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, supporting the international community in its efforts to combat terrorism. Yet, questions were raised on the pertinence and necessity of this additional legislation.
Reportedly, the government alleged that the targets of investigations to be pursued because of the new bill would be restricted to crimes in which an “organized crime group including the terrorism group” is realistically expect to be involved.
しかし、「組織的犯罪集団」の定義は漠然としており、テロ組織に明らかに限定されているとはいえません。
Yet, the definition of what an “organized criminal group” is vague and not clearly limited to terrorist organizations.
It was further stressed that authorities when questioned on the’ broad scope of application of the new norm indicated that the new bill requires not only “planning” to conduct the activities listed but also taking “preparatory actions” to trigger investigations.
Nevertheless, there is no sufficient clarification on the specific definition of “plan” and “preparatory actions” are too vague to clarify the scope of the proscribed conducts.
Additional concerns indicate that in order to establish the existence and the extent of such “a planning” and “preparatory actions” it is logical to assume that those charged would have had to be subjected to a considerable level of surveillance beforehand.
This expectation of intensified surveillance calls into question the. safeguards and remedies existing in Japanese law with regard to privacy and surveillance.
Concerns were also raised on the potential impact of the legislation in the work of non-Governmental Organizations, especially those working in sensitive areas for national security. The government allegedly reiterated that the norm application would not affect this sector.
Yet, it was alleged that the vagueness in the definition of “organized criminal group” could still create the opportunity for legitimizing, for example the surveillance of NGOs considered to be acting against national interest.
Finally, reports underline the lack of transparency around the drafting of the original draft and the pressure of the Government for the rapid adoption of the law during the current month, undermining the promotion of adequate public debates.
Serious concern is expressed that the proposed bill, in its current form and in combination with other legislation, may affect the exercise of the right to privacy as well as other fundamental public freedoms given its potential broad application.
In particular I am concerned by the risks of arbitrary application of this legislation given the vague definition of what would constitute the “planning” and the “preparatory actions” and given the inclusion of an over broad range of crimes in the Appendix which are apparently unrelated to terrorism and organized crime.
The principle of legal certainty requires that criminal liability shall be limited to clear and precise provisions in the law, ensuring reasonable notice of what actions the law covers, without unduly broadening the scope of the proscribed conducts. The “anti-conspiracy bill” in its current form does not appear to conform to this principle given that its vague and subjective concepts could be interpreted very broadly and lead to legal uncertainty.
The right to privacy appears to be particularly affected by the possibility of broad application of this law. Further concern is expressed that the allegedly expedited process used to push draft law may have a detrimental impact on human rights since the fast tracking of legislative procedures. unduly limit broader public debate on this crucial matter.
マンデートは、特にプライバシー関連の保護と救済につき、以下の５点に着目します。
Five specific areas of my mandate’s concern focus on the absence of privacy relevant safeguards and remedies:
1. Our initial assessment of the current draft would suggest that the new law or accompanying measures would not introduce any new additional specific articles or provisions which would establish appropriate safeguards for privacy in an environment where increased surveillance would be required to establish the existence of an offence under the new proposed anti-terror law.
2. As far as knowledge in the public domain permits us to establish, there are also no plans to either reinforce ex-ante warrants for the carrying out of surveillance;
3. There seem to be no plans to establish a statutory independent body in order to pre-authorise the carrying out of surveillance for national security purposes. This suggests that the establishment of such vital checks remains at the discretion of the specific agencies carrying out the operations.
4. Additionally, there are concerns about the oversight of the operations of law enforcement and security and intelligence services especially insofar as their activities are compliant or the extent to which they may interfere with the right to privacy through methods which are neither necessary nor proportionate in a democratic society. A sub-set of these concerns is the quality of judicial oversight and review when police request surveillance measures in order to carry out observations such as GPS detection or monitoring of activities on electronic devices.
5. Concerns are raised particularly with regard to the impact of the application of the new norms on the right to privacy given the broad opportunity the new norm would create for the Police to request for warrants to search for information on suspect individuals. According to information received; courts in Japan have to date demonstrated themselves to be extremely prone to accept warrant requests: practically all applications for wiretapping made by the police were reportedly accepted by courts in 2015 (figures made available to us suggest that approximately only 3% or less of all requests for warrants were rejected).
While I do not wish to prejudge the accuracy of the information on the proposed law reforms and their potential impact on the right to privacy in Japan, I would like to draw the attention of your Excellency’s Government to the obligations regarding the right to privacy, established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Japan ratified in 1978.
Article 17(1) of the ICCPR provides for the rights of individuals to be protected, inter alia, against arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy and correspondence and provides that everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference.
Furthermore, I would also like to call your Government attention to General Assembly resolution A/RES/71/199 where States note that “while concerns about public security may justify the gathering and protection of certain sensitive information, States must ensure full compliance with their obligations under international human rights law.”
As it is my responsibility, under the mandates provided to me by the Human Rights Council, to seek to clarify all cases brought to my attention, I would be grateful for your observations on the following matters:
１．上記の各主張の正確性に関して、追加情報および/または見解をお聞かせください。
1. Please provide any additional information and/or comment(s) you may have on the accuracy of the above-mentioned allegations.
4. Please provide details on the opportunities for public participation including whether civil society representatives, will have an opportunity to review the draft law and provide comments thereon.
If requested, I would be honored to provide any expertise and counsel on the matter to support the Japanese government in order to improve the pending legislative act as well as other existing legislation in Japan as appropriate and required by the international legal order.
Finally, in light of the advanced stages of the legislative process, in my view, these are matters warranting immediate public attention. Therefore, I would like to inform your Excellency’s Government that this communication will be made available to the public and posted on the website page for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy and I will prepare a press release explaining my concerns and indicating that we have been in contact with your Government to clarify the issues in question.
Your Excellency’s Government’s response will also be made available on the same website as well as in a report to be presented to the Human Rights Council for its consideration.
閣下に最大の敬意を表します。
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
ジョセフ・ケナタッチ プライバシーに関する権利の特別報告者
Joseph Cannataci Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy
“You cannot play with the animal in you without becoming wholly animal, play with falsehood without forfeiting your right to truth, play with cruelty without losing your sensitivity of mind. He who wants to keep his garden tidy doesn’t reserve a plot for weeds.”
“I promised to keep you apprised of changes as soon as we knew and when we are authorized to communicate them. Our deployment has been extended 30 days to provide a persistent presence in the Waters off the Korean Peninsula.”
“Our mission is to reassure allies and our partners of our steadfast commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. We will continue to be the centerpiece of visible maritime deterrence, providing our national command authority with flexible deterrent options, all domain access, and a visible forward presence.“
PM Abe tells the Diet to read Daily Yomiuri to understand his intent for Constitutional reform and is greeted with public uproar.
In the Daily Yomiuri interview published on the 70th anniversary of the 1947 Pacifist Constitution, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to amend Article 9 and to add a 3rd clause to represent JSDF as legitimate military that does not contravene existing provision prohibiting the retention of any ‘war potential’.
In direct defiance to his Constitutional duties as Minister of State, PM Abe effectively declared his intent to overhaul the Pacifist Constitution by 2020.
Article 99. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.
In the interview as well as in his video message to the nationalist convention of Nihon Kaigi or Japan Conference held a day before the 70the Anniversary date, PM Abe said that he intends to have the Constitution “enforced by 2020”. This means the new amended Constitution must be promulgated into law by 2019, and mandatory national referendum must take place before that, possibly as early as end of 2018 before the general election.
In the resumed Regular Diet session immediately following the long holidays, however, Abe in his testimony said that his remarks was made as President of LDP and not as Prime Minister. However, the Yomiuri article featured the interview as “Interview to Prime Minister” and he was referred in every part of the interview as Prime Minister and not as President of LDP.
His defiance was met with uproar both in the parliament as well as in the public.
Reviewing the “Three Misconceptions About the Japan Constitution”
According to his blog post, Prof. Law suggests that the LDP’s thrust for amending the arguably 'obsolete’ Constitution is based on three misconceptions, that (1) there are barriers to amendment, (2) that it is obsolete, and that (3) foreign (Allied Forces ) powers have imposed it.
The Japanese constitution is not too difficult to amend.
The Japanese constitution is not obsolete.
The Japanese Constitution was not “imposed” on the Japanese people.
(1) The Japanese constitution is not too difficult to amend.
On the outset Prof. Law concedes that “no existing constitution in the world has lasted longer without amendment than the Japanese constitution” for more than 70 years. But he finds the reason behind the long retention was due to the people’s preference:
“on the whole, the Japanese people have preferred not to tamper with a document that laid the foundation for decades of peace and prosperity”
Prof. Law instead states that it is the LDP’s own perspective to view so because it has been “unable to secure the amendments that it wants”. He says it plainly that it really depends on “whether the people are unable to secure the amendments that it wants”. In other words, if they don’t want it then that cannot be deemed a 'difficulty to amend’. It’s only a systemic barrier that the ruling LDP so far has not been able to overcome, even with its long reign in governing this nation.
Prof. Law admits that this has “never been the case in Japan” and that there have been “no reliable indications of majority support for amending the constitution”. He says that the popular ratification clause of Article 96 has justifiably 'stymied’ the LDP for decades, and that “it should be” in this convincing statement:
“Constitutional amendment should not be so easy that the government can push through unpopular changes.”
Article 96. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by
the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the
members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of
all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as
the Diet shall specify.
(2) The Japanese constitution is not obsolete.
“In embracing universal human rights and the nonviolent settlement of international disputes, the 1946 Constitution epitomizes the deep commitment to international norms and international law that has become the norm for respectable constitutions today.”
Prof. Law starts out by saying this, which should appeal to the drafters of the Constitution who have struggled hard to do exactly this.
The recent special program by NHK commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Constitution revealed for the first time on television that the Emperor, the Imperial Household, the Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry, as well as the Imperial Diet members were all committed in realizing a “New Japan” rooted in the spirit of international cooperation and abidance to the rule of law.
Even after 70 years, this has built the basis for today’s reborn Japan, and the utter lack of respect towards Western-originated universal human rights principles can only be viewed as “backwardness” instead of forward-minded.
As Prof. Law states, it is is only a bitter irony that the LDP’s argument that “the constitution is obsolete is that many of the constitutional changes sought by the LDP … would actually turn back the clock and go against the global mainstream of constitution-writing.”
(3) The Japanese Constitution was not “imposed” on the Japanese people.
On the more contentious issue of “imposition” of the Constitutional amendments, Prof. Law contends that such was not the case because the new Constitution was embraced with popular support, because the American drafters were “willing to give the Japanese people what they wanted in a constitution”.
“Polls conducted both before and after the adoption of the constitution showed popular support for constitutional reforms such as reduction of the emperor to a purely symbolic role, expansion of the powers of the Diet, abolition or reform of the House of Peers, greater government responsiveness to the will of the people, and greater protection for individual rights and freedoms. ”
The interesting part is that Prof. Law says these changes “found their way into the American draft” as if there were 'external’ inputs that encouraged these changes. But there was one line in his short work that kind of ticked me.
“When it came to writing a new constitution, American occupying forces proved more responsive to the wishes of the Japanese people than Japan’s own leaders. ”
I found this statement to be a bit arrogant coming from the descendant of an occupying force. But I must admit I remain grateful about the following argument:
“ And it is thanks to American insistence upon a popular ratification requirement for constitutional amendments that the Japanese people remain capable of preventing their leaders from turning back the clock.”
Indeed, we are in debt for your wisdom in this respect
“Past efforts have failed to halt North Korea’s unlawful weapons programs and nuclear and ballistic missile tests. With each provocation, North Korea jeopardizes stability in Northeast Asia and poses a growing threat to our Allies and the U.S. homeland.”
“North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is an urgent national security threat and top foreign policy priority … The President’s approach aims to pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear, ballistic missile, and proliferation programs by tightening economic sanctions and pursuing diplomatic measures with our Allies and regional partners.”
“We are engaging responsible members of the international community to increase pressure on the D.P.R.K. in order to convince the regime to de-escalate and return to the path of dialogue … The United States seeks stability and the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”
Nearly every US senator attended an unusual all-hands meeting on North Korea at the White House Wednesday, though afterward few said any new information emerged about the increasingly tense US standoff with Pyongyang.
“That meeting is a Senate meeting led by Leader McConnell, just utilizing our space,” White House press secretary Sean Spicer said. “So that is their meeting. So we’re not there to talk strategy.”
Senators are regularly briefed by the administration on national security issues, particularly those lawmakers who sit on committees with oversight of intelligence and national security agencies. But typically those briefings occur on Capitol Hill, where rooms are specially designed for that type of sensitive discussion.
“I, frankly, don’t understand why it’s not easier to bring four people here than it is to take 100 there,” said Sen. Angus King, a Maine independent who caucuses with Democrats, on Capitol Hill Tuesday … Sen. Jeff Merkley, a Oregon Democrat … said he believed the White House’s decision to have the meeting was for “optics.”
“I didn’t hear anything new because I have been heavily briefed before,” said Sen. John McCain, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “It’s a very serious situation, just as I had (thought) before I went there … “We learned nothing you couldn’t read in the newspaper,” Merkley said.
“It was a sobering briefing, and an important opportunity for the entire Senate to hear the emerging plans of the Trump administration to confront what is a very real threat to our security,” said Sen. Chris Coons, a Democrat from Delaware … “I’m fine coming here,” he said. “Frankly if the President and his entire national security leadership team wants to provide a thorough, detailed consultation with the Senate, I think that’s constructive.”
A spokesman for McConnell said Tuesday that Trump himself offered the White House as a venue for the briefing after McConnell requested an administration update on North Korea. “The President offered to host the meeting and the Majority Leader agreed,” said McConnell’s spokesman, David Popp … “This is just like any other all-senators briefing. Just a different location,” Popp said.
“Of the five global challenges that currently drive U.S. defense planning and budgeting - ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), North Korea, China, Russia and Iran - four are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.”
“Rising from the ashes of World War II, the rules-based international order, or what I sometimes call, “the Global Operating System,” has kept the Indo-Asia-Pacific largely peaceful and created the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the U.S. and countries throughout the region.”
“In my opinion, they have been made possible by a security order underwritten by seven decades of robust and persistent U.S. military presence and credible combat power. This security order has been reinforced by America’s five bilateral security alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand. This order is further bolstered by our growing partnerships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, and Vietnam.”
“This Global Operating System upholds critical principles - the rule of law, adherence to standards, peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation for all civilian and military vessels and aircraft, and open access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains.”
“The Indian and Pacific Oceans are the economic lifeblood linking the Indian Subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australia, Northeast Asia, Oceania and the U.S. Oceans that once were physical and psychological barriers that kept us apart are now maritime superhighways that bring us together.”
"As former Secretary of Defense William Perry once said, we must deal with North Korea “as it is, not as we wish it to be.” Kim Jong-Un has stated repeatedly that denuclearization is not an option.”
"But an aggressive weapons test schedule, as demonstrated by yet another ballistic missile launch this April, moves North Korea closer to its stated goals.”
“USPACOM must be prepared to fight tonight, so I take him at his word. That means we must consider every possible step to defend the U.S. Homeland and our allies.”
“That’s why the ROK-U.S. alliance has decided to deploy THAAD - the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system - in South Korea as soon as possible. That’s why the United States continues to call on China - North Korea’s principal ally - to exert its considerable influence to stop Pyongyang’s unprecedented campaign of nuclear weapons ballistic missile tests.”
“North Korea vigorously pursued a strategic strike capability in 2016. We assess that the progress made in several areas will encourage Kim Jong-Un to continue down this reckless and dangerous path … Just as Thomas Edison is believed to have failed 1000 times before successfully inventing the electric light bulb, so too, Kim Jong-Un will keep trying. One of these days soon, he will succeed … Those successes advance North Korea’s technical and operational base and allow continued development. Aggressive rhetoric since the New Year strongly suggests North Korea will not only continue to test these proscribed systems, but is also likely to attempt a first launch of a similarly prohibited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). ”
“Kim’s strategic capabilities are not yet an existential threat to the U.S., but if left unchecked, he will gain the capability to match his rhetoric.”
“North Korea fields the fourth largest conventional military in the world. Despite a number of noteworthy shortfalls in training and equipment, we must take seriously the substantial inventory of long-range rockets, artillery, close-range ballistic missiles, and expansive chemical weaponry aimed across the Demilitarized Zone at the Republic of Korea and U.S. forces stationed there.”
“In confronting the North Korean threat, it is critical that the U.S. be guided by a strong sense of resolve both publicly and privately in order to bring Kim Jong-Un to his senses, not his knees.”
A leading weapons academic has claimed that the Khan Sheikhoun nerve agent attack in Syria was staged, raising questions about who was responsible.
He concluded that the US government’s report does not provide any “concrete” evidence that Assad was responsible, adding it was more likely that the attack was perpetrated by players on the ground.
“I have reviewed the [White House’s] document carefully, and I believe it can be shown, without doubt, that the document does not provide any evidence whatsoever that the US government has concrete knowledge that the government of Syria was the source of the chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun, Syria at roughly 6am to 7am on 4 April, 2017.”
“In fact, a main piece of evidence that is cited in the document point to an attack that was executed by individuals on the ground, not from an aircraft, on the morning of 4 April.”
The image Postol refers to is that of a crater containing a shell inside, which is said to have contained the sarin gas. His analysis of the shell suggests that it could not have been dropped from an airplane as the damage of the casing is inconsistent from an aerial explosion. Instead, Postol said it was more likely that an explosive charge was laid upon the shell containing sarin, before being detonated.
The implication of Postol’s analysis is that it was carried out by anti-government insurgents as Khan Sheikhoun is in militant-controlled territory of Syria.
Postol, formerly a scientific advisor at the Department of Defense (DoD), has previously outlined similar inconsistencies with US intelligence reports. Following the 2013 chemical weapons attack in eastern Ghouta, Postol again said the evidence did not suggest Assad was responsible – a finding that was later corroborated by the United Nations.
Postol said: “No competent analyst would miss the fact that the alleged sarin canister was forcefully crushed from above, rather than exploded by a munition within it.
"All of these highly amateurish mistakes indicate that this White House report, like the earlier Obama White House Report [from Ghouta in 2013], was not properly vetted by the intelligence community as claimed.
"I have worked with the intelligence community in the past, and I have grave concerns about the politicisation of intelligence that seems to be occurring with more frequency in recent times – but I know that the intelligence community has highly capable analysts in it.
"And if those analysts were properly consulted about the claims in the White House document they would have not approved the document going forward.”
Child
prostitution is illegal, with a penalty of imprisonment with labor for up to
five years or a fine of up to three million yen ($27,600) for adult offenders
and penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment and fines
of up to 10 million yen ($92,000) for traffickers.
The
continued practice of enjo kosai (compensated dating) and the existence of
websites for online dating, social networking, and “delivery
health” (a euphemism for call-girl or escort services)
facilitated the sex trafficking of children and other commercial sex
industries.
A
trend known as “JK Business”
continued to grow; these businesses include cafes that feature underage female
servers and massage parlors staffed by high-school-age girls. NGOs helping
girls in “JK Business” reported a
link between these activities and the exploitation of children in prostitution.
Statutory
rape laws criminalize sexual intercourse with a girl younger than 13,
notwithstanding her consent. The penalty for statutory rape is not less than
three years’ imprisonment with mandatory labor, and the
law was enforced. Additionally, national law and local ordinances
comprehensively address sexual abuse of minors, including boy victims.
The
country was a site for the production of child pornography and the exploitation
of children by traffickers.
日本は、児童ポルノの製造および人身取引犯による子どもの搾取の現場であった。
By
law since 2014, the possession of child pornography is a crime;
法律により、2014年以降、児童ポルノの単純所持は犯罪である。
Enforcement began on July 15.
法の施行は2015年7月15日に開始された。
The
commercialization of child pornography is illegal; the penalty is imprisonment
with labor for not more than three years or a fine not exceeding three million
yen ($27,600),
and
police continued to crack down on this crime. Police reported a record-high 1,938
child pornography investigations involving 905 child victims in 2015.
No
law addresses the unfettered availability of sexually explicit cartoons,
comics, and video games, some of which depicted scenes of violent sexual abuse
and the rape of children.