It is an ever increasing phenomenon of increasing government interference and regulation. The ad-hoc judgments of policymakers increase risk and volatility thus leading to inefficient outcomes (Milton, 1969).

What we are going to R1 here is the intervention by a particular central planning agent who I will not name here who banned a user who I will neither name here for posting a particular country's 2 dimensional animation, which is also known in many parts of the world as a "cartoon".

That person may have had non malicious, perhaps even benevolent—it has yet to be ascertained—intentions to maximize the user agent welfare via an ad-hoc judgment against the aforementioned.

But that fails to recognize that this is a crude measure lacking depth and discretion for there are some content that does increase consumer surplus.

Consider a simple Gaussian-distributed variable model of the expected value of the viewer's surplus welfare: let the variables be θ (humour), Θ (satisfaction of intellectual curiosity), and ζ (intrinsic vicarious pleasure due to the sophistication of fellow agents).

Let the utility be a simple weighing of these statistical quantities.

So, η, ρ, and τ are the implied mean weights and henceforth, the increase in utility function for an individual agent is rather trivial to express in a form using matrices, which can be written in a rather concise manner as dU = N·V✘W where V and W are the variable and weight matrices and N is the number of people; and U is of course the utility.

Due to the law of large numbers, this model is accurate as the mean weights times the number of people approximates the total net weight.

Using the error function, we find that one of the values in V are outside 2 SD with probability 1-(erf(2/sqrt(2)))³ ~ 13%.

Thus, the judgment lacks sufficient balances and inefficiently restricts 13% of such posts which may likely be meritorious and which will maximize the geometric mean of viewer utility.

There is also the calculation problem that it is difficult to determine the net weightings of the user population. Anecdotal sampling is subject to various well-known biases such as reporting and survivor bias—many people may simply just desert the state for implementing such measures.

Thus, it can be said with some confidence that centralized crude banning of a product simply is too indelicate and lacks discretion.

If it need be necessary and determined with statistical analysis that viewers do not like such products, a more efficient method is a Pigouvian tax on such content which will filter out the poor-quality lowest quartile that is the cause of substantial negative externalities. Indeed, it may even be possible to compensate the viewers via a cash transfer mechanism through the government exchequer (Sumner, 1998).

The conclusion is of high importance to the modernizing Internet. Administrators should take care when "banning" [which is to disable the means of production] a content-creator agent and instead preferably use more efficient methods including, but not exhaustively, the above mentioned and well known and studied Pigovian tax that effectively ensure only the highest quality content in a proportionate amount to maximize viewer welfare.