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Book Review: Behavior – The Control Of Perception

[Epistemic status: I only partly understood this book and am trying to review it anyway as best I can]

I.

People complain that psychology is paradigmless; it never got its Darwin or Newton to tie everything together. Nowadays people are pretty relaxed about that; who needs paradigms when you can do n = 50 studies on a mildly interesting effect? (Or might we all be so cognitivist now that we don’t even think about it?) But historically, there were all of these larger-than-life figures who were sure they’d found the paradigm, geniuses who founded schools which flourished for a while, made big promises, then either fizzled out or toned down their claims enough to be accepted as slightly kooky parts of the mainstream. Sigmund Freud. BF Skinner. Carl Rogers. And those are just the big ones close to the mainstream. Everyone from Ayn Rand to Scientology tried their hand at the paradigm-inventing business for a while.

Will Powers (whose name turns out to be pretty appropriate) lands somewhere in the middle of this pack. He was an engineer/inventor who specialized in cybernetic systems but wandered into psychology sometime in the sixties. He argued that everything in the brain made perfect sense if you understood cybernetic principles, and came up with a very complicated but all-encompassing idea called Perceptual Control Theory which explained thought, sensation and behavior. A few people paid attention, and his work was described as paradigm-shifting by no less of an expert on paradigm shifts than Thomas Kuhn. But in the end it never really went anywhere, psychology moved on, and nowadays only a handful of people continue research in his tradition.

Somehow I kept running into this handful, and they kept telling me to read Powers’ book Behavior: The Control Of Perception, and I keep avoiding it. A few weeks ago I was driving down the road and I had a moment of introspection where I realized everything I was doing exactly fit Powers’ theory, so I decided to give it a chance.

Powers specializes in control systems. The classic control system is a thermostat, which controls temperature. It has a reference point, let’s say 70 degrees. If it gets much below 70 degrees, it turns on the heater until it’s 70 again; if it gets much above 70 degrees, it turns on the air conditioner until it’s 70 again. This is more complicated than it sounds, and there are other control systems that are even more complicated, but that’s the principle. Perceptual Control Theory says that this kind of system is the basic unit of the human brain.

While I was driving on the highway a few weeks ago, I realized how much of what I do is perceptual control. For example, I was effortlessly maintaining the right distance from the car in front of me. If the car sped up a tiny bit, I would speed up a tiny bit. If the car slowed down a little bit, I would slow down a little bit. Likewise, I was maintaining the right angle relative to the road: if I found myself veering right, I would turn slightly to the left; if I found myself veering left, I would turn slightly to the right.

The theory goes further: while I’m in the car, I’m also operating as my own thermostat. I have a desired temperature: if I go below it, I’ll turn on the heat, and if I go above it, I’ll turn on the AC. I have a desired level of satiety: if I’m hungry, I’ll stop and get something to eat; if I’m too full, there’s maybe not a huge amount I can do but I’ll at least stop eating. I have a desired level of light: if it’s too dark, I’ll turn on the lights; if it’s too bright I’ll put down the sun visor. I even have a desired angle to be sitting at: if I’m too far forward, I’ll relax and lean back a little bit; if I’m too far back, I’ll move forwards. All of this is so easy and automatic that I never think about it.

Powers’ theories go further. He agrees that my brain sets up a control system to keep my car the proper distance from the car in front of it. But how do I determine “the proper distance”? That quantity must be fed to the system by other parts of my brain. For example, suppose that the roads are icy and I know my brakes don’t work very well in the ice; I might keep a much further distance than usual. I’ll still be controlling the distance, I’ll just be controlling it differently. If the brain is control systems all the way down, we can imagine a higher-tier system controlling “accident risk” at some level (presumably low, or zero) feeding a distance level into a lower-tier system controlling car distance at whatever level it receives. We can even imagine higher systems than this. Suppose I’m depressed, I’ve become suicidal, I want to die in a car accident, but in order not to scandalize my family I have to let the accident happen sort of naturally. I have a top-level system controlling “desire to die” which tells a middle-level system controlling “accident risk” what level it should go at (high), which in turn tells a lower-tier system controlling “car distance” what level it should go at (very close).

It doesn’t even end there. My system controlling “car distance” is sending signals to a lower-tier system controlling muscle tension on my foot on the accelerator, giving it a new reference level (contracted muscles that push down on the accelerator really hard). Except this is an oversimplification, because everything that has to do with muscles is a million times more complicated than any reasonable person would think (at least until they play qwop) and so there’s actually a big hierarchy of control systems just going from “want to go faster” to “successfully tense accelerator-related muscles”.

II.

Actually, Powers is at his most convincing when he talks about these lower-level functions. At this point I think it’s pretty mainstream to say that muscle tension is set by a control system, with the Golgi tendon organs giving feedback and the spinal cord doing the calculations. Powers goes further (and I don’t know how mainstream this next part is, but I’m guessing at least somewhat), saying that this is a first-tier control system, which is itself controlled by a second-tier “direction” control system centered in the nuclei of the brainstem, which is itself controlled by a third-tier “position” control system centered in the cerebellum/thalamus/midbrain (a friendly amendment might add the basal ganglia, which Powers doesn’t seem to know much about).

If you stimulate certain parts of a cat’s midbrain, it will go into specific positions – for example, a position like it’s ready to pounce. So it seems like those areas “code for” position. But in order to have a neuron/area/whatever that codes for position, it needs to have hierarchical control over lots of lower-level things. For example, it needs to make sure the leg muscles are however tense they’re supposed to be in a pouncing position. So the third-tier position control system controls the second-tier direction control system at whatever level is necessary to make the second-tier direction control system control the first-tier muscle control system at whatever level is necessary to get the muscles in the right position.

The fourth- and fifth-tier systems, now well into the cortex (and maybe basal ganglia again) deal with sequences, eg “walking” or “playing a certain tune on the piano”. Once again, activating a fourth/fifth-tier system will activate this higher-level concept (“walking”), which alters the reference levels for a third-tier system (“getting into a certain position”), which alters a second-tier system (“moving in a certain direction”), which alterns a first-tier system (“tensing/relaxing muscles”).

Why do I like this theory so much? First, it correctly notes that (almost) the only thing the brain can actually do is change muscle tension. Yet we never think in terms of muscle tension. We don’t think “I am going to tense my thigh muscle, now untense it, now tense my ankle muscle, now…”, we just think “I’m going to walk”. Heck, half the time we don’t even think that, we think “I’m just going to go to the fridge” and the walking happens automatically. On the other hand, if we really want, we can consciously change our position, the level of tension in a certain muscle, etc. It’s just that usually we deal in higher-level abstractions that automatically carry all the lower ones along with them.

Second, it explains the structure of the brain in a way I haven’t seen other things do. I always hear neuroscientists talk about “this nucleus relays signals to that nucleus” or “this structure is a way station for this other structure”. Spend too much time reading that kind of stuff, and you start to think of the brain as a giant relay race, where the medulla passes signals onto the thalamus which passes it to the basal ganglia which passes it to the frontal lobe and then, suddenly, thought! The obvious question there is “why do you have so many structures that just relay things to other structures?” Sometimes neuroscientists will say “Well, some processing gets done here”, or even better “Well, this system modulates that system”, but they’re always very vague on what exactly that means. Powers’ hierarchy of fifth-tier systems passing their calculations on to fourth-tier systems and so on is exactly the sort of thing that would make sense of all this relaying. My guess is every theory of neuroscience has something at least this smart, but I’d never heard it explained this well before.

Third, it’s the clearest explanation of tremors I’ve ever heard. Consider the thermostat above. When the temperature gets below 65, it turns on the heat until the temperature gets above 70, then stops, then waits as the hot air leaks out through the window or whatever and it’s 65 again, then turns on the heat again. If we chart temperature in a room with a thermostat, it will look sort of like a sine wave or zigzag with regular up/down motions. This is a basic principle of anything being controlled by a less-than-perfect control system. Our body has microtremors all the time, but when we get brain damage or some other problem, a very common symptom is noticeable tremors. These come in many different varieties that give clues to the level of brain damage and which doctors are just told to memorize. Powers actually explains them:

When first-order systems become unstable, as when muscles exert too much effort), clonus oscillations are seen, at roughly ten cycles per second. Second-order instability, as in the tremors of Parkinsonism, involves groups of muscles and is of lower frequency, around three cycles per second or so. Third-order instability is slower stilll, slow enough that it can be characterized as “purpose tremor” or “over-correction”. Certain cerebellar damage due to injury or disease can result in over- and under-shooting the mark during actions such as reaching out to grasp something, either in a continuous self-sustained oscillation or a slowly decrasing series of alternating movements.

This isn’t perfect – for example, Parkinsonian tremor is usually caused by damage to the basal ganglia and the cortex, which is really hard to square with Powers’ claim that it’s caused by damage to second-tier systems in the medulla. But after reading this, it’s really hard not to think of tremors as failures in control systems, or of the different types of tremor as failures in different levels of control system. For example, athetoid tremors are weird, seemingly purposeful, constant twisting movements caused by problems in the thalamus or some related system; after reading Powers, it’s impossible for me not to think of them as failures in third-order control systems. This becomes especially clear if we compare to Powers’ constant foil/nemesis, the Behaviorists. Stick to a stimulus-response paradigm, and there’s no reason damaged brains should make weird twisting movements all the time. On a control-systems paradigm, it’s obvious that that would happen.

There are occasional claims that perceptual control theory can predict certain things about muscles and coordination better than other theories, sometimes with absurdly high accuracy of like r = 0.9 or something. Powers makes some of these claims in the book, but I can’t check them because I don’t have the original data he worked with and I don’t know how to calculate cybernetic control system outputs. But the last time I saw someone bring up one of these supposed experiments it was thoroughly shot down by people who knew more statistics. And I found a blog post where somebody who knows a lot about intricacies of muscle movement says PCT can predict some things but not much better than competing theories. In terms of predicting very specific things about human muscular movement its record seems to be kind of so-so.

III.

And I start to get very skeptical when Powers moves to higher-tier control systems. His sixth tier is “relationships”, seventh is “programs”, eighth is “principles”, and ninth is “systems”. Although these tiers receive just as many pages as the earlier ones, they start sounding very abstract and they correlate a lot less well with anatomy. I understand the urge to postulate them – if you’ve already decided that the fundamental unit of the brain is the control system, why not try to explain things with control systems all the way up? – but it becomes kind of a stretch. It’s easy to see what it means to control the distance between me and the car in front of me; it’s harder to see what it means to control for “communism” or “honesty” or things like that.

I think the way things are supposed to work is like this. A ninth-tier system controls a very abstract concept like “communism”. So suppose you are a communist; that means your internal communism-thermostat is set to maintain your communism at a high level. That propagates down to eighth-tier principles, which are slightly less abstract concepts like “greed”; maybe your ninth-tier communism-thermostat sets your eighth-tier greed thermostat to a very low temperature because communists aren’t supposed to be greedy. Your eighth-tier greed thermostat affects levels of seventh-tier logical programs like “going to work and earning money” and “giving to charity”. I’m not really sure how the sixth-tier fits into this example, but let’s suppose that your work is hammering things. Then the fifth-tier system moves your muscles in the right sequence to hammer things, and so on with all the lower tiers as above.

Sometimes these control systems come into contact with each other. For example, suppose that along with my ninth-tier system controlling “communism”, I also have a ninth-tier system controlling “family values”; I am both an avowed communist and a family man. My family values system thinks that it’s important that I earn enough to provide for my family, so while my communism-system is trying to input a low reference level for my greed-thermostat, my family-values-system is trying to input a high one. Powers gets into some really interesting examples of what happens in real industrial cybernetic systems when two opposing high-level control systems get in a fight, and thinks this is the source of all human neurosis and akrasia. I think he later wrote a self-help book based around this (hence the nominative determinism). I am not very convinced.

Am I strawmanning this picture? I’m not sure. I think one testable consequence of it is supposed to be that if we’re really controlling for communism, in the cybernetic control system sense, then we should be able to test for that. For example, hide Lenin’s pen and paper so that he can’t write communist pamphlets, and he should start doing some other communist thing more in order to make up for it and keep his level of communism constant. I think some perceptual control theory people believe this is literally true, and propose experimental tests (or at least thought experiment tests) of perceptual control theory along these lines. This seems sketchy to me, on the grounds that if Lenin didn’t start doing other stuff, we could just say that communism wasn’t truly what he was controlling.

That is, suppose I notice Lenin eating lots of chocolate every day. I theorize that he’s controlling for chocolate, and so if I disturb the control system by eg shutting down his local chocolate store, he’ll find a way to restore equilibrium, eg by walking further to a different store. But actually, when I shut down his local chocolate store, he just eats less chocolate. In reality, he was controlling his food intake (as we all do; that’s what an obesity set point is) and when he lost access to chocolate, maybe he ate cupcakes instead and did fine.

In the same way, maybe we only think Lenin is controlling for communism, but he’s actually controlling for social status, and being a communist revolutionary is a good way to gain social status. So if we make it too hard for him to be a communist revolutionary, eg by taking away his pen and paper, maybe he’ll become a rock star instead and end up with the same level of social status.

This sort of thing seems so universal that as far as I can tell it makes these ideas of higher-tier control systems unproveable and unfalsifiable.

If there’s any point to them at all, I think it’s the way they express the same interesting phenomenological truth as the muscle movement tiers: we switch effortlessly between concentrating on low-level concepts and high-level concepts that make the low-level ones automatic. For example, I think “driving” is a good example of Powers’ seventh tier, “programs” – it involves a predictable flowchart-like set of actions to achieve a simple goal. “The distance between me and the car in front of me” is a sixth-tier system, a “relationship”. When I’m driving (focusing on my seventh-tier system), I don’t consciously think at all about maintaining the right distance with the car in front of me. It just happens. This is really interesting in a philosophy of consciousness sense, and Powers actually gets into qualia a bit and says some things that seem a lot wiser and more moving-part-ful than most people on the subject.

It does seem like there’s something going on where my decision to drive activates a lot of carefully-trained subsystems that handle the rest of it automatically, and that there’s probably some neural correlate to it. But I don’t know whether control systems are the right way to think about this, and I definitely don’t know whether there’s a sense in which “communism” is a control system.

IV.

There are also some sections about things like learning and memory, which looks suspiciously like flowcharts of control systems with boxes marked “LEARNING” and “MEMORY” in them.

But I realized halfway through that I was being too harsh. Perceptual control theory wasn’t quite a proposal for a new paradigm out of nowhere. It was a reaction to Behaviorism, which was still the dominant paradigm when Powers was writing. His “everything is a control system” is an attempt to improve on “everything is stimulus-response”, and it really does.

For example, his theory of learning involves reward and punishment, where reward is reducing the error in a control system and punishment is increasing it. That is, suppose that you’re controlling temperature, and it’s too hot out. A refreshing cool glass of water would be an effective reward (since it brings you closer to your temperature reference level), and setting your hand on fire would be an effective punishment (since it brings you further from your temperature reference level). Powers notes that this explains many things Behaviorism can’t. For example, they like to talk about how sugar water is a reward. But eventually rats get tired of sugar water and stop drinking it. So it seems that sugar water isn’t a reward per se; it’s more like reducing error in your how-much-sugar-water-should-I-have-and-did-I-already-have-the-right-amount system is the reward. If your optimal level of sugar water per day is 10 ml, then anything up to 10 ml will be a reward, and after that it will stop being attractive / start being a punishment.

As a “theory of learning”, this is sort of crappy, in that I was expecting stuff about Hebb and connectionism and how memories are stored in the brain. But if you’re living in an era where everybody thinks “The response to a stimulus is predictable through patterns of reward and punishment” is an A+++ Nobel-Prize-worthy learning theory, then perceptual control-based theories of learning start sounding pretty good.

So I guess it’s important to see this as a product of its times. And I don’t understand those times – why Behaviorism ever seemed attractive is a mystery to me, maybe requiring more backwards-reading than I can manage right now.

How useful is this book? I guess that depends on how metaphorical you want to be. Is the brain a control system? I don’t know. Are local governments a control system trying to control housing growth and new development at a certain level? Are police a control system trying to control crime? (Related question: is crime a “stimulus” that provokes the “response” of policing?) I think it’s interesting and helpful to think of some psychological functions in control system metaphors. But I’m not sure where to go from there. I think maybe there are some obvious parallels, maybe even parallels that bear fruit in empirical results, in lower level systems like motor control. Once you get to high-level systems like communism or social desirability, I’m not sure we’re doing much better than the police-as-control-system metaphor. Still, I think that it’s potentially a useful concept to have.

Antidepressant Pharmacogenomics: Much More Than You Wanted To Know

[Epistemic status: very uncertain. Not to be taken as medical advice. Talk to your doctor before deciding whether or not to get any tests.]

I.

There are many antidepressants in common use. With a few exceptions, none are globally better than any others. The conventional wisdom says patients should keep trying antidepressants until they find one that works for them. If we knew beforehand which antidepressants would work for which patients, it would save everyone a lot of time, money, and misery. This is the allure of pharmacogenomics, the new field of genetically-guided medication prescription.

Everybody has various different types of cytochrome enzymes which metabolize medication. Some of them play major roles in metabolizing antidepressants; usually it’s really complicated and several different enzymes can affect the same antidepressant at different stages. But sometimes one or another dominates; for example, Prozac is mostly metabolized by one enzyme called CYP2D6, and Zoloft is mostly metabolized by a different enzyme called CYP2C19.

Suppose (say the pharmacogenomicists) that my individual genetics code for a normal CYP2D6, but a hyperactive CYP2C19 that works ten times faster than usual. Then maybe Prozac would work normally for me, but every drop of Zoloft would get shredded by my enzymes before it can even get to my brain. A genetic test could tell my psychiatrist this, and then she would know to give me Prozac and not Zoloft. Some tests like this are already commercially available. Preliminary results look encouraging. As always, the key words are “preliminary” and “look”, and did I mention that these results were mostly produced by pharma companies pushing their products?

But let me dream for a just a second. There’s been this uneasy tension in psychopharmacology. Clinical psychiatrists give their patients antidepressants and see them get better. Then research psychiatrists do studies and show that antidepressant effect sizes are so small as to be practically unnoticeable. The clinicians say “Something must be wrong with your studies, we see our patients on antidepressants get much better all the time”. The researchers counter with “The plural of anecdote isn’t ‘data’, your intuitions deceive you, antidepressant effects are almost imperceptibly weak.” At this point we prescribe antidepressants anyway, because – what else are you going to do when someone comes into your office in tears and begs for help? – but we feel kind of bad about it.

Pharmacogenomics offers a way out of this conundrum. Suppose half of the time patients get antidepressants, their enzymes shred the medicine before it can even get to the brain, and there’s no effect. In the other half, the patients have normal enzymes, the medications reach the brain, and the patient gets better. Researchers would average together all these patients and conclude “Antidepressants have an effect, but on average it’s very small”. Clinicians would keep the patients who get good effects, keep switching drugs for the patients who get bad effects until they find something that works, and say “Eventually, most of my patients seem to have good effects from antidepressants”.

There’s a little bit of support for this in studies. STAR*D found that only 33% of patients improved on their first antidepressant, but that if you kept changing antidepressants, about 66% of patients would eventually find one that helped them improve. Gueorguieva & Mallinckrodt (2011) find something similar by modelling “growth trajectories” of antidepressants in previous studies. If it were true, it would be a big relief for everybody.

It might also mean that pharmacogenomic testing would solve the whole problem forever and lets everyone be on an antidepressant that works well for them. Such is the dream.

But pharmacogenomics still very young. And due to a complicated series of legal loopholes, it isn’t regulated by the FDA. I’m mostly in favor of more things avoiding FDA regulation, but it means the rest of us have to be much more vigilant.

A few days ago I got to talk to a representative of the company that makes GeneSight, the biggest name in pharmacogenomic testing. They sell a $2000 test which analyzes seven genes, then produces a report on which psychotropic medications you might do best or worst on. It’s exactly the sort of thing that would be great if it worked – so let’s look at it in more depth.

II.

GeneSight tests seven genes. Five are cytochrome enzymes like the ones discussed above. The other two are HTR2A, a serotonin receptor, and SLC6A4, a serotonin transporter. These are obvious and reasonable targets if you’re worried about serotonergic drugs. But is there evidence that they predict medication response?

GeneSight looks at the rs6313 SNP in HTR2A, which they say determines “side effects”. I think they’re thinking of Murphy et al (2003), who found that patients with the (C,C) genotype had worse side effects on Paxil. The study followed 122 patients on Paxil, of whom 41 were (C,C) and 81 were something else. 46% of the (C,C) patients hated Paxil so much they stopped taking it, compared to only 16% of the others (p = 0.001). There was no similar effect on a nonserotonergic drug, Remeron. This study is interesting, but it’s small and it’s never been replicated. The closest thing to replication is this study which focused on nausea, the most common Paxil side effect; it found the gene had no effect. This study looked at Prozac and found that the gene didn’t affect Prozac response, but it didn’t look at side effects and didn’t explain how it handled dropouts from the study. I am really surprised they’re including a gene here based on a small study from fifteen years ago that was never replicated.

They also look at SLC6A4, specifically the difference between the “long” versus “short” allele. This has been studied ad nauseum – which isn’t to say anyone has come to any conclusions. According to Fabbri, Di Girolamo, & Serretti, there are 25 studies saying the long allele of the gene is better, 9 studies saying the short allele is better, and 20 studies showing no difference. Two meta-analyses (1 n = 1435, 2 n = 5479) come out in favor of the long allele; two others (1 n = 4309, 2, n = 1914) fail to find any effect. But even the people who find the effect admit it’s pretty small – the Italian group estimates 3.2%. This would both explain why so many people miss it, and relieve us of the burden of caring about it at all.

The Carlat Report has a conspiracy theory that GeneSight really only uses the liver enzyme genes, but they add in a few serotonin-related genes so they can look cool; presumably there’s more of a “wow” factor in directly understanding the target receptors in the brain than in mucking around with liver enzymes. I like this theory. Certainly the results on both these genes are small enough and weak enough that it would be weird to make a commercial test out of them. The liver enzymes seem to be where it’s at. Let’s move on to those.

The Italian group that did the pharmacogenomics review mentioned above are not sanguine about liver enzymes. They write (as of 2012, presumably based on Genetic Polymorphisms Of Cytochrome P450 Enzymes And Antidepressant Metabolism“>this previous review):

Available data do not support a correlation between antidepressant plasma levels and response for most antidepressants (with the exception of TCAs) and this is probably linked to the lack of association between response and CYP450 genetic polymorphisms found by the most part of previous studies. In all facts, the first CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 genotyping test (AmpliChip) approved by the Food and Drug Administration has not been recommended by guidelines because of lack of evidence linking this test to clinical outcomes and cost-effectiveness studies.

What does it even mean to say that there’s no relationship between SSRI plasma level and therapeutic effect? Doesn’t the drug only work when it’s in your body? And shouldn’t the amount in your body determine the effective dose? The only people I’ve found who even begin to answer this question are Papakostas & Fava, who say that there are complicated individual factors determining how much SSRI makes it from the plasma to the CNS, and how much of it binds to the serotonin transporter versus other stuff. This would be a lot more reassuring if amount of SSRI bound to the serotonin transporter correlated with clinical effects, which studies seem very uncertain about. I’m not really sure how to fit this together with SSRIs having a dose-dependent effect, and I worry that somebody must be very confused. But taking all of this at face value, it doesn’t really look good for using cytochrome enzymes predicting response.

I talked to the GeneSight rep about this, and he agreed; their internal tests don’t show strong effects for any of the candidate genes alone, because they all interact with each other in complicated ways. It’s only when you look at all of them together, using the proprietary algorithm based off of their proprietary panel, that everything starts to come together.

This is possible, but given the poor results of everyone else in the field I think we should take it with a grain of salt.

III.

We might also want to zoom out and take a broader picture: should we expect these genes to matter?

It’s much easier to find the total effect of genetics than it is to find the effect of any individual gene; this is the principle behind twin studies and GCTAs. Tansey et al do a GCTA on antidepressant response and find that all the genetic variants tested, combined, explain 42% of individual differences in antidepressant response. Their methodology allowed them to break it down chromosome-by-chromosome, and they found that genetic effects were pretty evenly distributed across chromosomes, with longer chromosomes counting more. This is consistent with massively polygenic structure where there are hundreds of thousands of genes, each of small effects – much like height or IQ. But typically even the strongest IQ or height genes only explain about 1% of the variance. So an antidepressant response test containing only seven genes isn’t likely to do very much even if those genes are correctly chosen and well-understood.

SLC6A4 is a great example of this. It’s on chromosome 17. According to Tansey, chromosome 17 explains less than 1% of variance in antidepressant effect. So unless Tansey is very wrong, SLC6A4 must also explain less than 1% of the variance, which means it’s clinically useless. The other six genes on the test aren’t looking great either.

Does this mean that the GeneSight panel must be useless? I’m not sure. For one thing, the genetic structure of which antidepressant you respond to might be different from the structure of antidepressant response generally (though the study found similar structures to any-antidepressant response and SSRI-only response). For another, for complicated reasons sometimes exploiting variance is easier than predicting variance; I don’t understand this enough to be sure that this isn’t one of these cases, though it doesn’t look that way to me.

I don’t think this is a knock-down argument against anything. But I think it means we should take any claims that a seven (or ten, or fifty) gene panel can predict very much with another grain of salt.

IV.

But assuming that there are relatively few genes, and we figure out what they are, then we’re basically good, right? Wrong.

Warfarin is a drug used to prevent blood clots. It’s notorious among doctors for being finicky, confusing, difficult to dose, and making people to bleed to death if you get it wrong. This made it a very promising candidate for pharmacogenomics: what if we could predict everyone’s individualized optimal warfarin dose and take out the guesswork?

Early efforts showed promise. Much of the variability was traced to two genes, VKORC1 and CYP2C9. Companies created pharmacogenomic panels that could predict warfarin levels pretty well based off of those genes. Doctors were urged to set warfarin doses based on the results. Some initial studies looked positive. Caraco et al and Primohamed et al both found in randomized controlled trials with decent sample sizes that warfarin patients did better on the genetically-guided algorithm, p < 0.001. A 2014 meta-analysis looked at nine studies of the algorithm, over 2812 patients, and found that it didn’t work. Whether you used the genetic test or not didn’t affect number of blood clots, percent chance of having your blood within normal clotting parameters, or likelihood of major bleeding. There wasn’t even a marginally significant trend. Another 2015 meta-analysis found the same thing. Confusingly, a Chinese group did a third meta-analysis that did find advantages in some areas, but Chinese studies tend to use shady research practices, and besides, it’s two to one.

UpToDate, the canonical medical evidence aggregation site for doctors, concludes:

We suggest not using pharmacogenomic testing (ie, genotyping for polymorphisms that affect metabolism of warfarin and vitamin K-dependent coagulation factors) to guide initial dosing of the vitamin K antagonists (VKAs). Two meta-analyses of randomized trials (both involving approximately 3000 patients) found that dosing incorporating hepatic cytochrome P-450 2C9 (CYP2C9) or vitamin K epoxide reductase complex (VKORC1) genotype did not reduce rates of bleeding or thromboembolism.

I mention this to add another grain of salt. Warfarin is the perfect candidate for pharmacogenomics. It’s got a lot of really complicated interpersonal variation that often leads to disaster. We know this is due to only a few genes, and we know exactly which genes they are. We understand pretty much every aspect of its chemistry perfectly. Preliminary studies showed amazing effects.

And yet pharmacogenomic testing for warfarin basically doesn’t work. There are a few special cases where it can be helpful, and I think the guidelines say something like “if you have your patient’s genotype already for some reason, you might as well use it”. But overall the promise has failed to pan out.

Antidepressants are in a worse place than warfarin. We have only a vague idea how they work, only a vague idea what genes are involved, and plasma levels don’t even consistently correlate with function. It would be very strange if antidepressant testing worked where warfarin testing failed. But, of course, it’s not impossible, so let’s keep our grains of salt and keep going.

V.

Why didn’t the warfarin pharmacogenomics work? They had the genes right, didn’t they?

I’m not too sure what’s going on, but maybe it just didn’t work better than doctors titrating the dose the old-fashioned way. Warfarin is a blood thinner. You can take blood and check how thin it is, usually measured with a number called INR. Most warfarin users are aiming for an INR between 2 and 3. So suppose (to oversimplify) you give your patient a dose of 3 mg, and find that the INR is 1.7. It seems like maybe the patient needs a little more warfarin, so you increase the dose to 4 mg. You take the INR later and it’s 2.3, so you declare victory and move on.

Maybe if you had a high-tech genetic test you could read the microscopic letters of the code of life itself, run the results through a supercomputer, and determine from the outset that 4 mg was the optimal dose. But all it would do is save you a little time.

There’s something similar going on with depression. Starting dose of Prozac is supposedly 20 mg, but I sometimes start it as low as 10 to make sure people won’t have side effects. And maximum dose is 80 mg. So there’s almost an order of magnitude between the highest and lowest Prozac doses. Most people stay on 20 to 40, and that dose seems to work pretty well.

Suppose I have a patient with a mutation that slows down their metabolism of Prozac; they effectively get three times the dose I would expect. I start them on 10 mg, which to them is 30 mg, and they seem to be doing well. I increase to 20, which to them is 60, and they get a lot of side effects, so I back down to 10 mg. Now they’re on their equivalent of the optimal dose. How is this worse than a genetic test which warns me against using Prozac because they have mutant Prozac metabolism?

Or suppose I have a patient with a mutation that dectuples Prozac levels; now there’s no safe dose. I start them on 10 mg, and they immediately report terrible side effects. I say “Yikes”, stop the Prozac, and put them on Zoloft, which works fine. How is this worse than a genetic test which says Prozac is bad for this patient but Zoloft is good?

Or suppose I have a patient with a mutation that makes them an ultrarapid metabolizer; no matter how much Prozac I give them, zero percent ever reaches their brain. I start them on Prozac 10 mg, nothing happens, go up to 20, then 40, then 60, then 80, nothing happens, finally I say “Screw this” and switch them to Zoloft. Once again, how is this worse than the genetic test?

(again, all of this is pretending that dose correlates with plasma levels correlates with efficacy in a way that’s hard to prove, but presumably necessary for any of this to be meaningful at all)

I expect the last two situations to be very rare; few people have orders-of-magnitude differences in metabolism compared to the general population. Mostly it’s going to be people who I would expect to need 20 of Prozac actually needing 40, or vice versa. But nobody has the slightest idea how to dose SSRIs anyway and we usually just try every possible dose and stick with the one that works. So I’m confused how genetic testing is supposed to make people do better or worse, as opposed to just needing a little more or less of a medication whose dosing is so mysterious that nobody ever knows how much anyone needs anyway.

As far as I can tell, this is why they need those pharmacodynamic genes like HTR2A and SLC6A4. Those represent real differences between antidepressants and not just changes in dose which we would get to anyway. I mean, you could still just switch antidepressants if your first one doesn’t work. But this would admittedly be hard and some people might not do it. Everyone titrates doses!

This is a fourth grain of salt and another reason why I’m wary about this idea.

VI.

Despite my skepticism, there are several studies showing impressive effects from pharmacogenomic antidepressant tests. Now that we’ve established some reasons to be doubtful, let’s look at them more closely.

GeneSight lists eight studies on its website here. Of note, all eight were conducted by GeneSight; as far as I know no external group has ever independently replicated any of their claims. The GeneSight rep I talked to said they’re trying to get other scientists to look at it but haven’t been able to so far. That’s fair, but it’s also fair for me to point out that studies by pharma companies are far more likely to find their products effective than studies by anyone else (OR = 4.05). I’m not going to start a whole other section for this, but let’s call it a fifth grain of salt.

First is the LaCrosse Clinical Study. 114 depressed patients being treated at a clinic in Wisconsin received the GeneSight test, and the results were given to their psychiatrists, who presumably changed medications in accordance with the tests. Another 113 depressed patients got normal treatment without any genetic testing. The results were:

Taken from here, where you’ll find much more along the same lines.

All of the combinations of letters and numbers are different depression tests. The blue bars are the people who got genotyped. The grey bars are the people who didn’t. So we see that on every test, the people who got genotyped saw much greater improvement than the people who didn’t. The difference in remission was similarly impressive; by 8 weeks, 26% of the genotyped group were depression-free as per QIDS-C16 compared to only 13% of the control group (p = 0.03)

How can we nitpick these results? A couple of things come to mind.

Number one, the study wasn’t blinded. Everyone who was genotyped knew they were genotyped. Everyone who wasn’t genotyped knew they weren’t genotyped. I’m still not sure whether there’s a significant placebo effect in depression (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche say no!), but it’s at least worth worrying about.

Number two, the groups weren’t randomized. I have no idea why they didn’t randomize the groups, but they didn’t. The first hundred-odd people to come in got put in the control group. The second hundred-off people got put in the genotype group. In accordance with the prophecy, there are various confusing and inexplicable differences between the two groups. The control group had more previous medication trials (4.7 vs. 3.6, p = 0.02). The intervention group had higher QIDS scores at baseline (16 vs. 17.5, p = 0.003). They even had different CYP2D6 phenotypes (p = 0.03). On their own these differences don’t seem so bad, but they raise the question of why these groups were different at all and what other differences might be lurking.

Number three, the groups had very different numbers of dropouts. 42 people dropped out of the genotyped group, compared to 20 people from the control group. Dropouts made up about a quarter of the entire study population. The authors theorize that people were more likely to drop out of the genotype group than the control group because they’d promised to give the control group their genotypes at the end of the study, so they were sticking around to get their reward. But this means that people who were failing treatment were likely to drop out of the genotype group (making them look better) but stay in the control group (making them look worse). The authors do an analysis and say that this didn’t affect things, but it’s another crack in the study.

All of these are bad, but intuitively I don’t feel like any of them should have been able to produce as dramatic an effect as they actually found. But I do have one theory about how this might have happened. Remember, these are all people who are on antidepressants already but aren’t getting better. The intervention group’s doctors get genetic testing results saying what antidepressant is best for them; the control group’s doctors get nothing. So the intervention group’s doctors will probably switch their patients’ medication to the one the test says will be best, and the control group’s doctors might just leave them on the antidepressant that’s already not working. Indeed, we find that 77% of intervention group patients switched medications, compared to 44% of control group patients. So imagine if the genetic test didn’t work at all. 77% of intervention group patients at least switch off their antidepressant that definitely doesn’t work and onto one that might work; meanwhile, the control group mostly stays on the same old failed drugs.

Someone (maybe Carlat again?) mentioned how they should have controlled this study: give everyone a genetic test. Give the intervention group their own test results, and give the control group someone else’s test results. If people do better on their own results than on random results, then we’re getting somewhere.

Second is the Hamm Study, which is so similar to the above I’m not going to treat it separately.

Third is the Pine Rest Study. This one is, at least, randomized and single-blind. Single-blind means that the patients don’t know which group they’re in, but their doctors do; this is considered worse than double-blind (where neither patients nor doctors know) because the doctors’ subtle expectations could unconsciously influence the patients. But at least it’s something.

Unfortunately, the sample size was only 51 people, and the p-value for the main outcome was 0.28. They tried to salvage this with some subgroup analyses, but f**k that.

Fourth and fifth are two different meta-analyses of the above three studies, which is the lowest study-to-meta-analysis ratio I’ve ever seen. They find big effects, but “garbage in, garbage out”.

Sixth, there’s the Medco Study by Winner et al; I assume his name is a Big Pharma plot to make us associate positive feelings with him. This study is an attempt to prove cost-effectiveness. The GeneSight test costs $2000, but it might be worth it to insurers/governments if it makes people so much healthier that they spend less money on health care later. And indeed, it finds that GeneSight users spend $1036 less per year on medication than matched controls.

The details: they search health insurance databases for patients who were taking an psychiatric medication and then got GeneSight tests. Then they search the same databases for control patients for each; the control patients take the same psych med, have the same gender, are similar in age, and have the same primary psychiatric diagnosis. They end up with 2000 GeneSight patients and 10000 matched controls, whom they prove are definitely similar (even as a group) on the traits mentioned above. Then they follow all these people for a year and see how their medication spending changes.

The year of the study, the GeneSight patients spent on average $689 more on medications than they did the year before – unfortunate, but not entirely unexpected since apparently they’re pretty sick. The control patients spent on average $1725 more. So their medication costs increased much more than the GeneSight patients. That presumably suggests GeneSight was doing a good job treating their depression, thus keeping costs down.

The problem is, this study wasn’t randomized and so I see no reason to expect these groups to be comparable in any way. The groups were matched for sex, age, diagnosis, and one drug, but not on any other basis. And we have reason to think that they’re not the same – after all, one group consists of people who ordered a little-known $2000 genetic test. To me, that means they’re probably 1) rich, and 2) have psychiatrists who are really cutting-edge and into this kind of stuff. To be fair, I would expect both of those to drive up their costs, whereas in fact their costs were lower. But consider the possibility that rich people with good psychiatrists probably have less severe disease and are more likely to recover.

Here’s some more evidence for this: of the ~$1000 cost savings, $300 was in psychiatric drugs and $700 was in non-psychiatric drugs. The article mentions that there’s a mind-body connection and so maybe treating depression effectively will make people’s non-psychiatric diseases get better too. This is true, but I think seeing that the effect of a psychiatric intervention is stronger on non-psychiatric than psychiatric conditions should at least raise our suspicion that we’re actually seeing some confounder.

I cannot find anywhere in the study a comparison of how much money each group spent the year before the study started. This is a very strange omission. If these numbers were very different, that would clinch this argument.

Seventh is the Union Health Service study. They genotype people at a health insurance company who have already been taking a psychotropic medication. The genetic test either says that their existing medication is good for them (“green bin”), okay for them (“yellow bin”) or bad for them (“red bin”). Then they compare how the green vs. yellow vs. red patients have been doing over the past year on their medications. They find green and yellow patients mostly doing the same, but red patients doing very badly; for example, green patients have about five sick days from work a year, but red patients have about twenty.

I don’t really see any obvious flaws in this study, but there are only nine red patients, which means their entire results depend on an n = 9 experimental group.

Eighth is a study that just seems to be a simulation of how QALYs might change if you enter some parameters; it doesn’t contain any new empirical data.

Overall these studies show very impressive effects. While it’s possible to nitpick all of them, we have to remind ourselves that we can nitpick anything, even the best of studies, and do we really want to be that much of a jerk when these people have tested their revolutionary new product in five different ways, and every time it’s passed with flying colors aside from a few minor quibbles?

And the answer is: yes, I want to be exactly that much of a jerk. The history of modern medicine is one of pharmaceutical companies having amazing studies supporting their product, and maybe if you squint you can just barely find one or two little flaws but it hardly seems worth worrying about, and then a few years later it comes out that the product had no benefits whatsoever and caused everyone who took it to bleed to death. The reason for all those grains of salt above was to suppress our natural instincts toward mercy and cultivate the proper instincts to use when faced with pharmaceutical company studies, ie Cartesian doubt mixed with smoldering hatred.

VII.

I am totally not above introducing arguments from authority, and I’ve seen two people with much more credibility than myself look into this. The first is Daniel Carlat, Tufts professor and editor of The Carlat Report, a well-respected newsletter/magazine for psychiatrists. He writes a skeptical review of their studies, and finishes:

If we were to hold the GeneSight test to the usual standards we require for making medication decisions, we’d conclude that there’s very little reliable evidence that it works.

The second is John Ioannidis, professor of health research at Stanford and universally recognized expert on clinical evidence. He doesn’t look at GeneSight in particular, but he writes of the whole pharmacogenomic project:

For at least 3 years now, the expectation has been that newer platforms using exome or full-genome sequencing may improve the genome coverage and identify far more variants that regulate phenotypes of interest, including pharmacogenomic ones. Despite an intensive research investment, these promises have not yet materialized as of early 2013. A PubMed search on May 12, 2013, with (pharmacogenomics* OR pharmacogenetc*) AND sequencing yielded an impressive number of 604 items. I scrutinized the 80 most recently indexed ones. The majority were either reviews/commentary articles with highly promising (if not zealot) titles or irrelevant articles. There was not a single paper that had shown robust statistical association between a newly discovered gene and some pharmacogenomics outcome, detected by sequencing. If anything, the few articles with real data, rather than promises, show that the task of detecting and validating statistically rigorous associations for rare variants is likely to be formidable. One comprehensive study sequencing 202 genes encoding drug targets in 14,002 individuals found an abundance of rare variants, with 1 rare variant appearing every 17 bases, and there was also geographic localization and heterogeneity. Although this is an embarrassment of riches, eventually finding which of these thousands of rare variants are most relevant to treatment response and treatment-related harm will be a tough puzzle to solve even with large sample sizes.

Despite these disappointing results, the prospect of applying pharmacogenomics in clinical care has not abided. If anything, it is pursued with continued enthusiasm among believers. But how much of that information is valid and is making any impact? […]

Before investing into expensive clinical trials for testing the new crop of mostly weak pharmacogenomic markers, a more radical decision is whether we should find some means to improve the yield of pharmacogenomics or just call it a day and largely abandon the field. The latter option sounds like a painfully radical solution, but on the other hand, we have already spent many thousands of papers and enormous funding, and the yield is so minimal. The utility yield seems to be even diminishing, if anything, as we develop more sophisticated genetic measurement techniques. Perhaps we should acknowledge that pharmacogenomics was a brilliant idea, we have learned some interesting facts to date, and we also found a handful of potentially useful markers, but industrial-level application of research funds may need to shift elsewhere.

I think the warning from respected authorities like these should add a sixth grain of salt to our rapidly-growing pile and make us feel a little bit better about rejecting the evidence above and deciding to wait.

VIII.

There’s a thing I always used to hate about the skeptic community. Some otherwise-responsible scientist would decide to study homeopathy for some reason, and to everyone’s surprise they would get positive results. And we would be uneasy, and turn to the skeptic community for advice. And they would say “Yeah, but homeopathy is stupid, so forget about this.” And they would be right, but – what’s the point of having evidence if you ignore it when it goes the wrong way? And what’s the point in having experts if all they can do is say “this evidence went the wrong way, so let’s ignore it”? Shouldn’t we demand experts so confident in their understanding that they can explain to us why the new “evidence” is wrong? And as a corollary, shouldn’t we demand experts who – if the world really was topsy-turvy and some crazy alternative medicine scheme did work – would be able to recognize that and tell us when to suspend our usual skepticism?

But at this point I’m starting to feel a deep kinship with skeptic bloggers. Sometimes we can figure out possible cracks in studies, and I think Part VI above did okay with that. But there will be cracks in even the best studies, and there will especially be cracks in studies done by small pharmaceutical companies who don’t have the resources to do a major multicenter trial, and it’s never clear when to use them as an excuse to reject the whole edifice versus when to let them pass as an unavoidable part of life. And because of how tough pharmacogenomics has proven so far, this is a case where I – after reading the warnings from Carlat and Ioannidis and the Italian team and everyone else – tentatively reject the edifice.

I hope later I kick myself over this. This might be the start of a revolutionary exciting new era in psychiatry. But I don’t think I can believe it until independent groups have evaluated the tests, until other independent groups have replicated the work of the first independent groups, until everyone involved has publicly released their data (GeneSight didn’t release any of the raw data for any of these studies!), and until our priors have been raised by equivalent success in other areas of pharmacogenomics.

Until then, I think it is a neat toy. I am glad some people are studying it. But I would not recommend spending your money on it if you don’t have $2000 to burn (though I understand most people find ways to make their insurance or the government pay).

But if you just want to have fun with this, you can get a cheap approximation from 23andMe. Use the procedure outlined here to get your raw data, then look up rs6313 for the HTR2A polymorphism; (G,G) supposedly means more Paxil side effects (and maybe SSRI side effects in general). 23andMe completely dropped the ball on SLC6A4 and I would not recommend trying to look that one up. The cytochromes are much more complicated, but you might be able to piece some of it together from this page’s links links to lists of alleles and related SNPs for each individual enzyme; also Promethease will do some of it for you automatically. Right now I think this process would produce pretty much 100% noise and be completely useless. But I’m not sure it would be more useless than the $2000 test. And if any of this pharmacogenomic stuff turns out to work, I hope some hobbyist automates the 23andMe-checking process and sells it as shareware for $5.

A Modern Myth

1. Eris

A middle-aged man, James, had come on stage believing it was an audition for American Idol. It wasn’t. Out ran his ex-lover, Terri. “You said you loved me!” she said. “And then when I got pregnant, you disappeared! Twenty years, and you never even sent me a letter!”

The crowd booed.

As James tried to sputter a response, his wife ran onto the stage. “You cheating jerk!” she shouted at James. “You lying, cheating jerk! Twenty-five years we’ve been married, and I never…” She picked up a folding chair, tried to swing it at James.

“Stop!” cried James’ teenage daughter Katie, joining in the fray. “Mom, Dad, stop it!”

“You stay out of this!” shouted James’ wife. “Maybe if you’d had a good male role model, you wouldn’t have become a lesbian.”

The crowd gasped.

Katie’s girlfriend Lisa came out of a side door. “You take that back!” she yelled. Then she saw Terri. “Wait? Mom? What are you doing here?”

“That’s right,” said Alice DiScorria, sidling onto the stage, effortlessly drawing the audience’s attention from the brawl taking shape in front of them. “Katie’s girlfriend is the daughter of the woman her father cheated with, so many years ago. And we’ve got the paternity test right here.” She theatrically opened a manilla envelope. “And…James! James is the father!”

“I’VE BEEN LESBIAN LOVERS WITH MY HALF-SISTER!” shrieked Katie.

“This is all your fault!” everyone shouted at everyone else in unison. Then the punching started.

In short, it had been another successful episode of The Alice Show.

Now Ms. DiScorria was in her dressing room, wiping off the night’s makeup, trying to decide where to go to dinner. Knock, knock. She opened the door wide.

There stood Katie and Lisa. Katie was holding a shotgun.

“Why would you do this to us?” screamed Katie. “We were a happy family!”

“I loved her!” added Lisa.

“Why?” Katie screamed at her, waving the gun. “WHY?”

“Oh, put it away,” said Alice. “We both know you’re not going to shoot me. And it wouldn’t hurt me if you did. I do this because I’m Eris, the Greek Goddess of Discord. I destroy peace. I set people against each other. Then, when their petty fights destroy everything they’ve worked for, I stand over the ruins and laugh. It’s my thing. Here. Have a golden apple.”

It appeared in Alice’s hand, shining with beauty that defied description. “FOR THE FAIREST” was writ on the front in letters of liquid light. Katie dropped her gun and stared. Lisa rubbed her eyes to see if she was dreaming. For a brief moment, no one moved.

Finally, Katie asked, “You’re…giving it to me?”

“Absolutely. To you and your girlfriend. Traditionally, I think it would go to whichever of you is prettier.”

Gently, she placed the golden apple on her dressing table, winked at the girls, and left the room. She closed the door behind her, so nobody would hear the screams.

2. Ares

“Look,” Tom told Ari, “you always seem to come out of this kind of thing okay. So if I don’t make it tomorrow, I want you to give this to my wife.” It was an envelope. There was no address, just ‘TO BE OPENED IN THE EVENT OF MY DEATH’.

“Stop talking like that, Tom,” said Ari, taking the envelope and putting it into his backpack. “You’ll make it. The Taliban’s gonna fold like a wet rag tomorrow, I promise.”

“Easy for you to say. In Helmand, half your squad dies, you just walk out with a big grin on your face. Kandahar, outnumbered eight to one, and not only do you win, you end up with two Medals of Honor. I didn’t even know you could get more than one Medal of Honor for a single battle. Yeah, sure, you’ll be fine tomorrow. The rest of us, we’re only mortal.”

“Yeah,” said Ari. “I can see how that would suck.”

“Look, you’re doing me a big favor, taking that envelope,” said Tom. “Anything I can do for you? You know, in case the worst happens?”

“Nah, don’t worry about it.”

“There’s nobody back home you care about? Wife? Girlfriend? Family?”

“Fuck all. No wife, no girlfriend, and a family dysfunctional like you wouldn’t believe.”

“Where are you even from, Ari? You never talk about it.”

“Who cares?”

“I care. Heck, half the squad thinks you’re some kind of government supersoldier, the other half thinks you should be in a loony bin. You’re interesting, Ari.”

“Well, fine. I’m Ares, Greek god of war. I’m the son of Zeus and his sister Hera, and let me tell you, marrying your sister works about as well as you’d expect. I used to be a big deal, shape the destiny of whole nations, rise of Rome and all that. Then my power crashed along with everyone else’s. Man, I don’t even remember the Dark Ages. The whole medieval era is a blur. By the time I start feeling like myself again, it’s the Renaissance and everybody’s fighting with muskets. Nowadays…man. I can fight better than you mortals, you gotta give me that. But in terms of god stuff…I remember when I could make all of fucking Persia flee in abject surrender. Now I’m stuck taking pot shots at Taliban assholes. Meanwhile, they’re all shouting about Allah, and you guys are all shouting about Jesus, and nobody even fucking believes in me anymore.”

“I believe you,” said Tom.

“Really?”

“Yeah,” said Tom. “In Kandahar, I saw a bullet pass right through you. How would a government super-soldier manage that? Sure. You’re Ares, god of war. I’ll worship you, if you want.”

“What fucking good would that be?”

“Think about it! You said that you and all the other gods lost your power back in Roman days. What happened in Roman days? Constantine! The start of Christianity! That must have been what did it! Gods’ power comes from people believing in them!”

“Why does every mortal always figure that gods’ power comes from people believing in them? Like you’re all some kind of god power experts? Do they teach that to baby mortals in their little mortal schools? Stupidest thing I ever heard. You think we ruled the world for a thousand years and didn’t check where our power came from? We figured that out a long time ago. Divine power comes from meat.”

“Meat?”

“Yeah. Like, you know, sacrifice a ram to Ares, pray for victory, then eat it in a big communal feast in the barracks. The more meat sacrificed in a god’s name, the stronger he got.”

“But then it’s still about belief. People stopped believing in you, so they stopped sacrificing rams to you.”

“You’ve got it ass-backwards. We were at the height of our power. People were sacrificing rams to us right and left. Then it stopped working. One year the meat started having a little less effect. The next year it was a little less than that. Eventually it was gone. And then when the gods became powerless, the cults collapsed, and then the Christians and Muslims and all the rest stepped in to fill the gap.”

“So what can I do? There’s some meat in the mess hall, I can sacrifice that for you if you want.”

“I’m telling you, it won’t work. The power’s gone. It’s been gone for two thousand years. Me – and all the rest – we’re stuck like this. Some kind of natural floor to our power, still more than mortal but forever less than divine. It’s fucking awful and I hate it. I hate not being able to smite whole nations when I’m angry. I hate having to take commands from ‘superior officers’ because I’m ‘just a grunt’. And most of all, I hate that people have forgotten about us. We used to be big, Tom!”

“People haven’t forgotten. They love you guys. There’s still, you know, Hermes handbags, and Athena mineral water, and, you know, Mars bars….”

“I am the lord over war, the manslaughtering one, the bloodstained one, he of many devices, bringer of much weeping, destroyer of men. I AM NOT A FUCKING CHOCOLATE BAR.”

“Sorry, man. I was just saying…”

“I know. You wanted to make me feel better. That’s what I’ve come to. Having to be consoled by mortals. You know what’s going to make me feel better, Tom? Killing some fucking Taliban tomorrow.”

“Yeah. Okay.”

“Look, I’m sorry, I didn’t meant to…”

“It’s not that. But, uh, Ari. We’ve got a big battle coming up tomorrow. And I know this probably sounds really crazy to you, but humans – praying makes us feel better. That’s why we do it all the time. To Jesus or Allah or whoever. And we don’t really expect it to work, so…um…”

“Out with it, Tom.”

“…is it okay if I pray to you tomorrow?”

“Knock yourself out, Tom.”

3. Apollo

Ianthe had always liked magic squares. They were one of the oldest forms of magic. A Sator square had been found scrawled on one of the walls of Pompeii. Since then the art had advanced, and she was its master. She would fill the word square with words relating to the sun, and Apollo would appear before her. Working with gold ink, she traced the letters carefully:

C I R C L E
I C A R U S
R A R E S T
C R E A T E
L U S T R E
E S T E E M

Apollo appeared before her, devilishly handsome, impeccably well-dressed, unfailingly polite. He’d told her once that in his other identity, he was a professor at some college somewhere. She could believe it.

“Ianthe, my daughter,” he said, his voice smooth and golden. He always called her that, even when he was doing very un-fatherly things to her. Though come to think of it, in his family that might not be such a jarring contradiction. She wondered if he’d known Oedipus.

“Lord Apollo,” she said. “I have called you here to request a boon.”

His face fell. He had explained the first time he met her that his powers were weak. That he couldn’t help her the way she might have wished. Couldn’t grant her wealth or wisdom or prophecy the way he might have in days of old. Since then she had never asked him for anything but himself.

“It’s…nothing too difficult,” she assured him. “Just…actually, I wanted to say good-bye.”

“Good-bye?” asked Apollo.

“There’s…someone’s hunting us. The neopagan community. I told you about Megan, right? The girl who used to run a traditionalist group up in Santa Cruz? They found her dead two weeks ago. There’s a Wiccan circle over in Oakland that deals with Greek themes sometimes; two of their leaders have been missing since January. And then Aristopsychus the Wise…that’s what he calls himself, seriously, one of the crazy sorts who attacks people drinking Athena Mineral Water and says they’re profaning the name of a goddess…I just got a call. His head was bashed in last night. I’m really afraid, Lord Apollo.”

He looked at her, his face infinitely wise and sorrowful, and she knew he could do nothing.

“That’s why I’m leaving here,” she said. “I haven’t told anybody, nobody else in the neopagan community, not even that weird girl Emily who thinks she’s my ‘acolyte’. I’m shutting down the temple and going somewhere really far away where nobody can find me, and I don’t know when I’ll be able to summon you again.”

“I understand,” said Apollo. “May good fortune go with you.”

“But I was asking you for a boon. I need you to take something from me.” She took out a paper bag and produced an apple, brilliant gold, shining with an unearthly radiance. Apollo stepped back as if someone had struck him, his calm manner broken for the first time Ianthe had seen.

“Where did you get that…that thing?” asked Apollo.

“A detective gave it to me! He was investigating a crime scene. These two girls murdered each other in a Hollywood studio dressing room…it was all over the news. And this guy was called in to investigate the crime scene, and all he could find was this golden apple that said “for the fairest”. And after all the legal things were closed he didn’t want to throw it out, because it looked so pretty, and he heard about our temple here, and he figured it looked like something a Greek pagan revivalist movement should own, so he gave it to me. And as soon as I saw it…this sounds so bad, but I didn’t tell any of the others, not even Emily. I brought it home and never told anyone about it. But I’m scared, Apollo. I’m scared it has something to do with the reason all this is happening. I don’t want to leave it here and I don’t want to take it with me, so…please, just take the apple. Before it makes me change my mind!” She wasn’t looking at it; she was carefully avoiding looking at it.

“I can’t,” said Apollo.

“You have to!” said Ianthe.

“No, I mean, literally, I can’t,” said Apollo. “The apple has to belong to a woman. Any woman who sees the apple, she wants it more than she’s ever wanted anything else. Any man who sees it, no effect. Even if a man gets it, he feels compelled to give it to a woman. That must have been what happened to your detective. I really, really do not want that apple. You have no idea how bad things get around one of these.”

With a grunt and an effort of will, Ianthe threw the golden apple at Apollo’s face. He caught it in his hand reflexively, involuntarily. “Take it!” she said, as he stared at his unwanted prize. “You’re a god! I’m sure you can think of a woman who can keep it safe for you!”

“Ohhhhh….this is not good,” Apollo said, through clenched teeth. “I hate these things, I hate these things, I hate these things, I hate these things…”

Ianthe erased a letter from the middle of the magic square, and Apollo disappeared. Then she picked up her suitcase, got in her car, and started driving, intent on putting as much distance as possible between herself and anywhere people would be looking for her.

4. Aphrodite

She stays by the sea shore. Shining shells and soft surf sounds surround her shelter. Cythera simmers with summer, and seals swim in the sun. Songbirds circle in the sapphire sky, and sea stars sit semi-submerged in the sand.

Ares wades out to the cliff where he knows he’ll find her, a cliff of soft pink rock that looks like any other on this side of the island. On a little depression in the rock which only he can see, he traces letters with his fingers:

M O A N
O N C E
A C M E
N E E D

The cliff opens around him, and he is in the bower of Aphrodite.

She is naked. Her body glistens with sea-foam. She is behind a glass shelf filled with seashells, and from where Ares is standing, two of them perfectly cover her breasts. On the near wall are pictures of her family: her husband, Hephaestus; her son, Eros; her parents, the sea and the blood of Uranus; her nth-great-grandson, Julius Caesar. On the far wall is a banner reading “UNDEFEATED GOLDEN APPLE WINNER, 1200 BC – PRESENT”, and several oak barrels overflowing with golden apples that cast an unearthly glow all over the room.

“Hello, sexy,” she says.

He tries to play it cool, act natural. “Hey Aph,” he says. “Just dropping by.”

There is no sign of her husband.

“Come on, Ares. You never ‘drop by’. What is it really?”

“Um,” says Ares. He is acutely aware of the god-sized erection he probably has right now. He keeps his eyes fixed on the barrels of golden apples, so as not to stare. “Um,” he says again.

“I heard about what happened in Kandahar,” she said. “That was very heroic of you.” She gently brushed her arm against his.

“Um,” said Ares. “That’s…kind of…look. This soldier guy I knew. He asked me if…if there was anyone back home I cared for. And I said no. Fuck everyone. You know. Mom, Dad, fuck them all. But then I started thinking. We had something good. A long time ago. And I was thinking, maybe…”

“But Ares,” she said, biting her lip, “you know I’m married.”

“You were married the last five times too,” Ares said, forcefully now. “It’s kind of a big part of having an affair.”

“But,” she said, running a hand through her golden hair, “what if people found out?”

“People found out the last five times too,” he said. “Nobody thought anything of it. You’re the goddess of love. Of lust. Love and lust. Of course you have affairs.”

“What if my parents knew? It would break their heart.”

“Your parents are the sea, and the blood that came out of a guy’s scrotum when my grandfather castrated him. I think they’ll be fine.”

“Oh, Ares. You know so much about me.”

She pulled him closer. She closed her eyes. His lips touched hers. Then –

“We can’t do this, Ares. We’re just too different, you and I. Love. War. It wouldn’t work.”

“We are not different. All’s fair in both of us, for one thing. We’re both, uh, relationships between two parties. Often involving fighting. More fun when you’re high testosterone. And when you’ve got a big spear.”

“I love it when you talk dirty to me, Ares,” said Aphrodite, and put her hand around his waist. He tried to kiss her a second time.

“No,” she said suddenly. “I can’t. What about the children?”

“Your child is Eros!” protested Ares. “How is that a problem?!”

“Show me you care,” said Aphrodite.

“I care!” said Ares. “I promise you, I care. Tom – this soldier I know – he was telling me all about his wife, and how much he loved her, and I was thinking, I need something like that, and then I remembered – I’ve got that. You’re the one for me. You’re the only one I want. I promise.”

“Show me,” said Aphrodite.

“How?” asked Ares. “What can I do to show you that I care?”

Aphrodite let her hand linger on his shoulder, then walked to the other side of the room. She picked up a golden apple.

“There’s another golden apple in the world now,” she said. “I can feel it, Ares. That apple is mine by right.” For a second, all the softness disappeared from her face, and he knew why one of her epithets was ‘the warlike one’. “I want that apple, Ares. Bring it to me.”

“But baby, you already have like a million golden apples. Look, you’ve got barrels full of them. You’re not even using – ” He picked up a golden apple that had fallen behind one the barrels.

“It’s the principle of the thing, Ares. It says ‘for the fairest’. Am I not the fairest? Have I not been the most beautiful of goddess and women since before Paris was a glimpse in his mother’s eye? Somebody else has my magic apple, Ares, and I am literally shaking here. You are my protector, the hero of Kandahar, the man who got two Medals of Honor in the same battle. Can you rescue me?” She knelt before him. There were tears coming out of her eyes. She hugged his leg.

“I’ll…I’ll get you your apple, Aph. I’ll find whoever’s got your golden apple, and if they don’t give it back, I’ll…” He took out his sword and swung it above him, so fast that it whistled in the air like the note of a lute.

“I’ll be waiting for you…” whispered Aphrodite.

Ares turned to go. The cliff face opened in front of him. The birds were still singing, and dolphins leapt for joy in the melodious waves. He was kind of a chump, but he knew this was the way of things, and it would never change.

“…I won’t be wearing any clothes.” Aphrodite called after him.

5. Hermes

He is called Herman. He runs a hedge fund. He lives in Manhattan. He wears nice suits.

Today he is in a nice suit, but he is not in Manhattan. He is in Memphis, Tennessee. Not even the nice part of Memphis, Tennessee. He’s in a poor, crime-ridden ghetto in Memphis Tennessee, and it has a bridge, and he is underneath it.

He spots a big man sleeping underneath the bridge, wrapped in a ratty blanket. His beard is unkempt, and even from far away, he smells like alcohol.

“Hi Dad”, said Hermes.

“Whaddyawant?” mumbled Zeus.

“It’s me, Dad,” said Hermes. “Hermes.”

With some effort, Zeus brought himself into a sitting position, brushed some of the more egregious twigs out of his beard. He rubbed his eyes.

“Yeah, so? Whaddyawant?”

Hermes inspected the King of Gods and Men. He was streaked with dirt. He was dressed in a fading white wife-beater, with reddish stains that Hermes hoped were wine.

“I’ve been looking all over for you, Dad. You look terrible. What happened to you?”

“Whaddyoucare?”

“You used to be King, Dad!”

“I’m still king. Iduncarewhatchy’all think.”

“But what happened to you? I talked to Ares the other day. He won two Medals of Honor, did you hear? Apollo’s got tenure at Oxford. I’m the god of commerce and crime, so of course I’ve got a hedge fund. But you? What happened to you?”

“Fucking child support payments!” said Zeus. “I was doin’ just fine for myself until cops from forty-seven different states came my front door calling me a deadbeat dad!”

“Oh dear,” said Hermes. “Forty-seven women?”

“Forty-seven states,” said Zeus. “Hundred ninety women. Two hundred five kids. Fucking mess.”

“A hundred ninety women,” mused Hermes. “Please tell me you didn’t turn all of them into animals.”

“Are you fucking kink-shaming me?” said Zeus. “If I get off on having kids with women and then turning ’em into animals, that’s my private business. Ain’t no weirder than Ganymede being gay or your kid who’s a futa or…BLAAAAAARGH”. He turned and vomited the morning’s meal into the river. “Besides, I don’t got power anymore. Can’t even turn a pretty girl into an ape these days, forgeddabout a cow or a bear.”

“Look, sorry for bringing up your fetish,” said Hermes. “I didn’t know it was a sore point. I wanted to talk about something important. Dad, I’ve figured it all out.”

“You figgered what out?”

“All of it. What happened to us. Why we lost our power. And how we’re going to get it back.”

“Yeah?” said Zeus. He sounded skeptical. “I’m listenin'”

“Look,” said Hermes. “How did we used to get power? Animal sacrifice. And which animal? Rams. What astrological age was it? The Age of Aries, the sign of The ram. 2000 BC to 1 AD, or thereabouts. Then the age changes. The sun is in Pisces. Sign of the fish. Boom. Sacrificing rams no longer works. Who comes out on top? Some Israeli whose followers are all fishermen. Talk about being in the right place at the right time.”

“So yer saying, we need to get the mortals to sacrifice fish to us now, and then we’re back in business?”

“No. Because the Age of Pisces ended last century. Now it’s the Age of Aquarius. The Water Bearer.”

“So sacrifice water?”

“Well, this is where we start to have a problem. I know you have trouble remembering all your children, but perhaps you recall that a few thousand years ago, you had a daughter who happened to become the Goddess Of Wisdom, Intelligence, and Cleverness?”

“Never gonna forget that one,” said Zeus, rubbing his head.

“It would seem that my lovely and not-at-all-incredibly-annoying sister Athena figured all of this out about ten years before I did,” said Hermes. He reached into his pocket and took out a bottle of Athena Mineral Water. “Behold! 91% market share. Aquafina? Bankrupt. Dasani? Out of business. And here’s the best part.” He held the label up very close, so Zeus could read it. “Athena Mineral Water Customer Reward Program,” it said in small font. “Every time you drink a refreshing bottle of Athena Mineral Water, say ‘Thanks, Athena!’ in front of a registered associate, and they’ll punch your card. Collect ten punches and get a liter bottle of Athena Mineral Water absolutely free.”

“Whaddya sayin’?” asked Zeus.

“I’m saying that every day, about a million mortals are going into supermarkets, drinking water, and saying ‘Thanks, Athena!’, and each one of them is giving my beloved-and-not-at-all-aneurysm-inducing sister an amount of divine power equal to an entire animal sacrifice. I had some of my quants crunch the numbers, and right now I’m guessing she’s about twenty times more powerful than you were at your prime. At your prime, Dad. She pretty much has a monopoly on divinity right now. We’re really really really screwed.”

“So you gonna take all that cash you got and open up your own water business?”

“I tried. They wouldn’t even let me register it. Said it was a trademark conflict with Hermes Handbags. I got my lawyers to look up who owns Hermes Handbags, and it’s a shell corporation belonging to a consortium belonging to a Chinese group belonging to a company registered in the Cayman Islands which was set up using money from…Athena Mineral Water. Mars Bars, same thing. Zeus Cameras, likewise. And it’s worse than that. I try to find some neopagan groups, see if maybe I can get them to sacrifice a few bottles of water to me just until I can think of a solution that scales. She murdered all of them. In cold blood. Every priest or priestess who ever worshipped another Olympian. She’s boxed us in, Dad.”

“And that’s why yer comin’ to me. You want….the power of lighning!

Zeus tried to stand in an imposing pose, but only succeeded in tripping on his blanket and crumpling back onto the ground.

“Dad, you can’t summon lightning anymore. You haven’t had that kind of strength for two millennia. And with the power Athena’s collected, it wouldn’t help. But there is something you can give me.”

“What?”

“I need to talk to Prometheus.”

Zeus managed to bring himself into an approximation of standing. “Now listen here, sonny. Maybe I ain’t much of a king of the gods anymore. I ain’t got the lightning and the thunder and all that. But lockin’ that bastard up was the best thing I ever did, and you know it, and yer not gonna take that away from me. You think yer so smart with your hedge fund, and yer money, and yer fancy East Coast suit, but I’m tellin’ you, Prometheus would eat you for breakfast and he wouldn’t even break out a sweat.”

“Right, Dad. That’s the thing. He’s the only one who’s smart enough to outmanuever Athena. I’m proud of my brains, but she’s the Goddess Of Wisdom, Intelligence, and Cleverness, plus now she’s stronger than us, and I’m not sure how to get one up on the Goddess of Wisdom, Intelligence, and Cleverness without help from someone who’s…uh…very very smart.”

“Prometheus ain’t just smart,” spat Zeus. “It’s not just that he has book-larning. He’s the God of Foresight. He sees every possible future laid out in fronna him as easily as you or I see that there blanket.” He pointed to the blanket, which was actually so dirt-covered that it was getting hard to see against the dirt below. “It took all of us together, and all the Giants, and all the Cyclopses to bring him down, and we wouldn’ta succeeded if the Fates themselves hadn’t gotten pissed with him for ruining their weaving and given us a hand. And it was Athena herself who told us that we had to bind him somewhere far away, couldn’t talk to him, couldn’t even go near him, or else he’d figure out some way to screw up all our futures just by sayin’ a couple a’ sentences to us. And all a’ you, and all the Giants, and all the Cyclopses, you all agreed, and you all gave me the key that lets you reach him, and I ain’t given that key to anyone in the past two thousand years and I ain’t givin’ it to you now and that’s final, you hear me, boy?”

“Then,” said Hermes, “I fear we are all doomed.”

“We’re fucking gods,” said Zeus. “We can’t die. We can’t even be contained, for long. Only gods we ever managed to lock up were the Titans in Tartarus and Prometheus in Elbrus, and that was only by all of us workin’ together, and by my power as King of Gods, and if you think I’m signin’ off to any of this, yer crazy.”

“Then we will wane,” said Hermes, “and become little better than bugs skittering beneath Athena’s feet.”

“I ain’t got much,” said Zeus, “but I beat Prometheus and no one ain’t ever going to take that away from me. Now get going, sonny boy.”

“If I do not beat Athena,” said Hermes, “you’ll never be able to turn any women into animals, ever again.”

Zeus paused, just a second, then spat. “I made my choice,” he told Hermes. “Now git!”

6. Pandora

He remembered the first time he had come here to see her. It had taken him months just to find the place. An Orthodox convent. Our Lady Of Sorrows, just outside Kiev.

He had knocked on her door. “Come in,” she’d said. She hadn’t opened the door. At the time, he hadn’t realized that was significant.

She was wearing a veil. “Dory?” he asked. She nodded slightly. “Dory, it’s Apollo.”

“You didn’t forget about me.” He couldn’t see her eyes, but she was smiling.

“Forget about you? Dory, I’ve been sending you care packages every month!”

“Oh.” A frown. “I’m sorry. I didn’t…I don’t open things.”

“Oh.”

“You understand, don’t you?”

“I can see how it would be traumatic. But…you didn’t get any of my letters?”

“They were in envelopes, Apollo. I told you, I don’t open things.”

“Oh,” he said. He lifted her veil, saw her face for the first time in years. “What, not even your eyes?”

Pandora nodded.

“The church is beautiful. It looks like a wedding cake. You haven’t even been a little curious what the convent you’re living in looks like?”

“I don’t do curiosity anymore, Apollo. Curiosity leads me to bad, bad places.”

“Dory.” It was worse than he’d thought. He was the god of healing, or had been. His powers were weak, but maybe he could at least do some therapy? “Dory, you did one bad thing.”

“I did all the bad things, Apollo. Literally. Every single one of them.”

“Okay. Be that as it may. You were tricked. Zeus played a horrible joke on you. Or he used you as a pawn to play a horrible joke on everybody. It doesn’t mean opening things is always bad, or that curiosity always gets punished. It means one stupid god played one stupid joke. Look, he could have put all the world’s evils in, I don’t know, his basement, and released them if and only if you didn’t open a box. Then the lesson would have been to always open things. Do you see how that makes just as much sense as what actually happened.”

“I’m sorry, Apollo,” said Pandora. “I appreciate what you’re trying to do. But it won’t help.”

“It might!” said Apollo. “Keep an open mind!”

I don’t do open.”

“Ah. Right.”

He sat down on the little cot. She sat down beside him.

“So now you’re a nun.”

“I just live here. I wandered by one day, and the sisters took me in. Said I looked like I needed help, which I guess I did. I’ve stayed here ever since. They say that I’m good luck to have around. Can you believe that? Me? Good luck?

“They like you,” said Apollo. “Anyone would.”

“It’s because I don’t age,” said Pandora. “And because I never leave my room. They assume I’m a saint or something. Praying all the time. I’m even starting to get pilgrims, if you can believe it.” She waved her hand towards a table full of little knickknacks. “Gifts. The pilgrims give me gifts.” She sighed.

Apollo went over to the table. A rosary. An icon, covered in gold leaf. Jesus, he assumed. A vial of holy water. “This is lovely,” he said, looking more closely at the icon. “Who gave it to you?”

“I didn’t ask,” said Pandora. “I don’t do curiosity.”

“Ah,” said Apollo. He took her hand again. “Come outside with me. I won’t make you open your eyes. I’ll lead the way. Just for a minute?”

They walked through the courtyard. A few nuns looked askance at them, but Apollo looked too poised to be anywhere other than where he was supposed to be, and they assumed he was a visiting priest or somebody and let him pass. They came to a meadow. Apollo gingerly guided Pandora to sit down on a rock, and sat beside her.

“We used to have a good thing going,” he told her.

“And now I’m like this,” she said.

“You might get better. With time.”

“I might not.”

“There’s always hope.”

“Yes, they say I closed the box just in time for that one. Strange how little I’ve gotten from it myself.”

“Kiss me,” said Apollo, on impulse.

“We had a good thing going once,” Pandora said. “That’s not me anymore.”

“It could be,” said Apollo. “Hope, and all that.”

“I don’t open things,” said Pandora. “Not even my heart.”

How many centuries ago had that been? Three? Four? They all blended together. The convent was no help either. Most places had the decency to change a little since the Renaissance. The convent looked exactly the same. Same meadow. Same courtyard. Same door. Apollo knocked. “It’s me, Dory.”

“Come in,” she said, without opening the door.

He came in, sat down on the cot. She looked the same, too. She was in a strange middle state; a human created before mortality, given all the divine gifts, to be the wife of a god. She wasn’t divine, not quite. But she wasn’t fully mortal either. A demigod, maybe.

“It’s been a while,” he said. “Five, ten years?”

“It’s been a while,” agreed Pandora.

The room hadn’t changed either, except for a few more pilgrim gifts. The rosary and Jesus-icon had been joined by enough little saints and angels to fill a heavenly choir, plus a good-sized marble statue of an woman in armor. He tried to remember if there was some female warrior-saint, but his mind came up blank. He wished he could ask Pandora, but he knew what she thought of curiosity.

“I brought you a present,” he said. “It’s a smartphone. Flip phones are on their way out. This one works without being opened.”

Pandora ran her hands along it. “It’s so smooth,” she said. “Now you can call me any time?”

“Yeah,” said Apollo. “You can call people too. If you ever feel, you know, the need to connect.”

Pandora gave him a little peck on the cheek, then slipped the phone under her bed.

“I wish I could say this was entirely a social call,” said the god, “but I’m here on business.”

There was a pause in the conversation before he realized she wasn’t going to ask what the business was.

“A friend gave me something dangerous. And I have to give it to a woman. But if the woman saw it, bad things would happen. Really, really bad things. And I asked myself, where can I find a woman who will listen when I warn her not to look at something? And, uh. I thought of you.”

“Sure,” said Pandora. “I’m happy to take your thing. Where shall I put it?”

“Uh,” said Apollo. “Somewhere where the pilgrims won’t see it. That’s important. Nobody can see it.”

“I’ll put it under my bed,” said Pandora.

Apollo handed it to her. It was heavy, and cold to the touch, and round, about the size of a baseball. She slipped it under the little cot.

“Thanks,” said Apollo.

“I’m glad I could help you with something,” said Pandora. “You’ve been so nice to me.”

“I haven’t been! I never visit!”

“You visit sometimes. The others never visit. They wish they could forget about me.”

“Um,” said Apollo. “I’m sure they meant to drop by and tell you how they’re doing.”

“It’s okay,” said Pandora. “It doesn’t matter whether I know how they’re doing or not.”

Apollo frowned. “Listen. I know you have your position in the pantheon, as Cautionary Tale Against The Dangers Of Excessive Curiosity. But I have my place too. Well, lots of places. The Sun. Healing. Music. Poetry. Being Very Handsome. But along with all those things, I’m the God Of Reason And Science. And maybe a long time ago, curiosity caused all the world’s problems. But now it’s the other way around. Curiosity’s solving problems, Pandora. All over the world, curiosity is solving famine, it’s solving poverty, it’s solving disease. They put smallpox back in the box, Pandora!”

“Wait,” said Pandora. “I never heard about that! They found a way to…?”

For a brief moment, Apollo thought Pandora was going to ask a question, but she caught herself. He answered anyway.

“Yes,” he said. “There’s a way to put things back in the box. Maybe. A little. Sometimes. It’s really hard. So hard I wouldn’t have been able to do it myself, and I’m the God of Healing. But they did it. Once. Maybe they’ll be able to do it again. And they did it because of curiosity. They wondered whether they could do it, and then they wondered how they could do it, and then they did it.”

“That’s…really interesting,” said Pandora.

“You’ll think about that?” asked Apollo.

“I will,” said Pandora.

“And maybe…call somebody sometime? Me? Someone else? Anybody? I know Artemis has been wanting to hear from you.”

“Um,” said Pandora. “Maybe? I don’t know.”

“That’s fine. Just…keep the option open.”

“Apollo, I don’t do open.

“Just keep it in mind.”

“Goodbye, Apollo.”

“Goodbye, Dory.”

7. Athena

“Hi. My name is Ari…Smith…and I’m here to see Ms…I don’t know, she probably goes by Tina or Minnie or something like that. Really smart and mysterious and probably in charge of everything?”

The security guard at the entrance to the Athena Mineral Water Tower looked at him skeptically. “Do you have an appointment?”

Ares reached into his pocket.

“I got my fucking appointment right here! Two Medals of Honor! While you guys were selling water to yuppies, I was risking my life for your freedom over in Afghanistan. Come on, man. Can’t a vet get any respect around here?”

The guard shook his head. “Can’t get in without an appointment,” he said.

“So,” said Ares, “it has come to this. Same as always.” A bronze spear appeared in his hand, and he rammed it right through the security guard. Didn’t even bother extracting it, there was more where that came from. Somebody screamed. An alarm sounded. Whistling, Ares walked through the lobby and into the elevator, pressed the button for the top floor. That was where important people had their offices, right?

Apparently it wasn’t. “Excuse me,” Ares asked some kind of secretary sitting at a desk. “Can you direct me to Ms…I don’t know, she probably goes by Tina or Minnie or something like that? Really smart and mysterious and probably in charge of everything?”

A few policemen ran up behind him and started to open fire. Without even looking at them, Ares chucked a spear backwards and somehow managed to impale all three of them at once. The secretary stared at him, eyes wide with horror.

“Damn. I didn’t mean to get you all frazzled. Uh, look. Two Medals of Honor! I’m a vet! Patriotic, trustworthy! Ms. Tina or Minnie or something? Really smart and important? Please?”

“Uh…” The secretary looked terrified, but at least it was the sort of terror that scared her into talking. “Uh, you mean the CEO? Ms. Athena?”

Really? She’s the fucking Goddess of Wisdom And Intelligence And Cleverness and she couldn’t get a better pseudonym than ‘Ms. Athena’? Whatever. Where is she?”

Another elevator ride and a few more cops later, Ares found himself breaking down the door of the CEO’s office.

“Hey,” said Ares. “Long time, no see.”

“Can’t imagine why,” said Athena.

“Look, I’ll be blunt,” said Ares. “I came here to get the golden apple. Give me that and we’re square. I’ll go away. I’ll even pay for the doors. And, uh…everything.”

“What golden apple?”

“Oh, come on. I talked to Aphrodite the other day. She said there’s a new golden apple about. She doesn’t have it. And I talked to Hera. She doesn’t have it. And I thought…who’s been gunning for a golden apple ever since that whole mess with Troy? Who’s the Goddess Of Wisdom And Intelligence And Cleverness and always gets everything she wants? And then I remembered my wonderful older sister who I definitely don’t think is the most annoying person ever, and who seems to be doing pretty well for herself. And I thought maybe I should come pay you a visit. Great water, by the way. I tried some on my way here.”

“Fact is,” said Athena, “I don’t have any golden apples.”

“Oh, lay off it, we both know you’ve got the damn apple. Give it to me or else I’ll smash this place up however much it takes to find it.”

About a dozen SWAT officers burst into the office. “Ms. Athena! There’s an intruder in the building!”

“It’s taken care of,” said Athena. “Go off and have a nice day.”

The SWAT team left.

“They believe you?” asked Ares, who was about seven feet tall, dressed in Trojan War vintage armor, carrying a huge bronze spear still covered in blood, and clearly visible.

“I’ve…put a glamour upon myself,” said Athena. “It helps a lot, working with mortals. As long as I’m around, nobody notices anything unusual.”

“And you didn’t even want their help?” asked Ares. “Even though you’re alone, with your younger brother, who happens to be unbeatable in combat?”

Athena laughed. “Unbeatable? Ares, you have no idea what you’ve just walked into. I understand Hermes has figured it out, which means I’ll have to take care of him sooner rather than later. But you? You waltz in here, expecting me to be a pushover? Let me show you the tiniest taste of what I can do.”

She opened the window. She stretched out her hand. A bolt of lightning arced from her fingers, struck the street below.

“Lightning?” asked Ares. “But…only Dad could call lightning!”

“Not anymore,” said Athena. “Come on, Ares. You want to fight? Let’s fight.”

Ares threw his spear. It stopped in midair, like it had hit an invisible wall. Then it turned, flew back at him, coiled around like a snake, tied him down. “Hey!” he protested. “Hey! That’s not fair!”

“I’m so glad you came,” said Athena. “I needed a test subject. To see if my powers were really as strong as I hoped. What’s the hardest thing in the world, Ares? Binding a god. Only ever accomplished twice in history. The Titans. Prometheus. Both times, by the power of Zeus and all the other gods combined. Do I dare attempt such a thing alone? I believe I do.”

The lights darkened. The air began to stir. Lightning arced back and forth across the room. A secretary opened the door, saw the chaos, said “Oh, looks like you’re busy,” closed the door, and walked out. Time seemed to stop.

There was a rush, a whistle, and a thud, and then Ares wasn’t in the world anymore.

8. Prometheus

“Are we there yet?” asked Heracles.

“When we are there,” said Hermes, “I promise I will tell you.”

“It’s just that I was wondering,” said Heracles, “whether we were there.”

“There are,” said Hermes, “certain games mortals play, in which a necessary prerequisite is to create your own hero character. And in some of those games, you get a certain amount of points, which you are allowed to allocate either to intelligence or to strength, so that the smarter you are, the weaker you must be, and vice versa. And I notice, Heracles, that you are the strongest man who has ever existed. Do you know what that implies?”

“It implies that I’m very strong,” said Heracles. “But also, I was wondering – are we there yet?”

Hermes sighed. They were in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia driving down a dirt road in a narrow Caucasus mountain pass. It would have been unpleasant for several reasons even without his companion’s endless whining. Still, he was feeling just a little bit euphoric.

One week ago, Ares had attacked Athena, raving about golden apples, and then…nothing. He had disappeared. He’d asked his girlfriend Tyche to find him. Tyche was the goddess of luck – a nice catch, if you ran a hedge fund. She could find anything. But she couldn’t find Ares. He wasn’t in the world. There was only one other place he could be.

Tartarus. The Pit. The Abyss. The place beyond space where those removed from the world languished in darkness for eternity.

He’d gotten on the first flight to Memphis, shaken his father awake. Drunk as he was, Zeus had understood immediately. If Athena had gained enough power to open Tartarus, any one of them could be next. Their very souls were in danger.

And after a lot of arguing and screaming, Hermes had changed tactics and brought out some wine, and he had gotten Zeus very, very drunk. And whether it was one of those things, or another, or the combination of all of them, Zeus had divulged the key to Mt. Elbrus, the one that accessed the secret prison of Prometheus.

“We’re here,” Hermes told Heracles. He parked the car in a bed of gravel by the side of the road. They were in a narrow defile. Mt. Elbrus – the mortal one, the one visible to humans – loomed in front of them. In the rock face to their left, there was an opening just narrow enough to fit a single person at at time.

“Now remember,” he said, as he turned on his flashlight and squeezed into the cave, “You’re going to be wearing these ear plugs. You’ll stare straight ahead, at my back, nowhere else. You’ve got the bottle of magic water in your pocket, and…”

“Why do I have to wear the earplugs?” asked Heracles.

“We’ve gone over this a thousand times,” said Hermes. “You have to wear the earplugs because Prometheus knows literally everything. He knows what he has to say to scare you, or turn you against me, or make you kill yourself. So you’re just going to wear earplugs and not listen to him.”

“And why do I have to stare at your back?”

“Because if you stare at Prometheus, maybe he can influence you with some kind of facial expression or hand signal, and then you’ll still end up killing yourself. Or killing me. Or dethroning Zeus and returning the universe to primaeval chaos. Or something too horrible to even think about.”

“Hermes?”

“Yeah?”

“I don’t think there’s any hand signal that would make me dethrone Zeus and restore the universe to primaeval chaos.”

Hermes sighed.

“Heracles, do you remember when I told you to meet me in the Caucasus Mountains of Georgia, and I specifically said former Soviet Republic of, and I specifically made you repeat back to me ‘former Soviet Republic of’, and a few hours later I got a call from Atlanta International Airport asking me where I was?”

“Yeah.”

“So consider the possibility, however remote, that Prometheus might be smarter than you.”

“Oh,” said Heracles. “I guess I hadn’t thought of that.”

They pushed on through the cave, winding around huge stalagmites, stepping over pools with pale eyeless fish.

“That’s why,” Hermes continued, “when we open the secret gate, I am going to talk to Prometheus, and you are going to wear the earplugs and stare at my back.”

“But,” asked Heracles, “what if Prometheus tells you to dethrone primaeval chaos or whatever?”

“Excellent question,” said Hermes, “That’s why I brought you. I am going to go forth and talk to Prometheus. I have here a cell phone which is programmed to accept exactly one hundred characters of input. When Prometheus tells me how to defeat Athena, I will enter it into the cell phone. When I give you the signal, you will usher me back into this cave, away from Prometheus. And once we are in the cave, you will give me this vial of water from the River Lethe, which will cause me to forget everything that happened in the past eight hours.”

“So I’m just here to…give you the water?” asked Heracles, confused.

“It’s more complicated than that. If I show the slightest sign of not wanting to drink that vial of water, then it’s your job to overpower me and force it down my throat, all without allowing me to communicate with you in any way. I trust that you will be able to manage that?”

“I’m very strong,” said Heracles.

“And that,” said Hermes, “is why we love you. There is one more thing I’m going to ask of you. After I’ve drunk the water from Lethe, but before I wake up, you need to read the message on the cell phone yourself and confirm that it looks like a strategy for defeating Athena and not like some other kind of message from Prometheus to the outside world, and certainly not like any other terms Prometheus has added to our bargain. If you see something that looks like a message from Prometheus or an extra term, I need you to smash the cell phone and drink this second vial of water from the River Lethe.”

“Oh good,” said Heracles. “I like smashing things and I like water.”

“The only problem,” said Hermes, “is that you are a couple of filaments short of a light bulb. So what I’m going to do is ask you to swear on the River Styx that you’ll comply. You’re half-god; that kind of oath is self-enforcing. As long as even the tiniest part of you remembers what you’ve sworn to do, it will be literally impossible to do otherwise.”

“All right. I swear by river sticks that I’ll do what you say.”

“By the RIVER STYX!”

“I swear by the River Styx that I’ll do what you say.”

The cave briefly darkened, and there was a gust of icy wind that seemed to come from nowhere.

“Good. Now, put the earplugs in, and be quiet for just a second. I need to concentrate here.”

He searched for a part of the cave wall that was just a little too smooth.

“Hermes?” asked Heracles.

“Yes?” asked Hermes.

Heracles said nothing.

“YES?” asked Hermes.

Heracles still said nothing. Hermes saw that he was wearing the earplugs.

“Hermes, if I have the earplugs in, how will I know if I’m being quiet?”

Hermes gave what he hoped was a reassuring-looking shrug, then went back to scanning the cave wall.

There.

A little too smooth, a little too pale. Hermes served part-time as God Of Magic, and he could sense something off about that part of the cave. He put his hand on it. Unnatural warmth. The key went here.

With a harpy-feather quill, in ink of ichor, Hermes wrote:

D E T E R
E X I L E
T I T A N
E L A T E
R E N E W

The wall opened, and sunlight shown through.

They climbed out onto a rock promontory. The scene before them both was and wasn’t Mount Elbrus. The snow shone just a little bit brighter. The sunlight glittered just a little more. The shadows were a little bit darker.

And from under the mountain poked out a gigantic head, four titanic limbs, and bits of a huge torso. A giant, lying supine, pinned down by the peak. On the right half of the torso sat a great eagle, taking occasional bites of liver.

“Hello, Hermes,” said Prometheus.

Well, no turning back now, thought the god.

“Hello, Prometheus,” said Hermes. “With all due respect, I’m trying to minimize information flow with you, so I’d like you not to speak until I’ve finished explaining.” He paused, waiting for an objection, staring at Prometheus even though he knew he shouldn’t. He tried to read the Titan’s great bearded face. He looked surprisingly cheerful for a man pinned underneath a mountain having his liver eternally pecked out.

Finally, Prometheus nodded.

“We’ve got a problem, back in the world. Two thousand years ago, the animal sacrifices stopped working. Eventually we figured out it had to do with the precession of the zodiac. The source of power went from rams to fish and now to water. Athena figured it out first, and now she’s got a monopoly on the water industry. She’s taken all of the divine power and become strong enough to send gods to Tartarus. The rest of us have some residual abilities, but otherwise we’re barely beyond mortal level. We’re at a loss, and we were hoping that, um, your special abilities might be able to help us. So we’d like to offer you a deal. In exchange for information that helps us defeat Athena, we’ll, um, remove the eagle. There’s a key…I don’t have it here, but it can be used remotely. We’ll do that. And say we’re sorry about it. Really sorry.”

That they would never free Prometheus went without saying, so Hermes didn’t say it.

The Titan still looked alarmingly cheerful.

“You can, uh, talk now, if you want,” said Hermes. “Though, maybe try to keep it short.”

“I appreciate the apology,” said Prometheus. “Really, I do. And I think we can deal with each other. Removing the eagle would be great, of course. But there’s one more thing I’ve got to ask.”

This was what he’d been afraid of. He was desperate. Prometheus knew it. Each additional term was a malignant seed that could grow into anything at all. He would have to hold fast to his plan and pray it was enough.

“Alas,” said Hermes, “We predicted that you might say that, so we’ve taken some measures to precommit not to change any of our terms. In particular, I have sworn by the River Styx – an oath which it is literally impossible for gods to break – that I will not accept any terms other than the ones I just mentioned. Also, once you give me your strategic advice, I will be writing down a very short hundred-character summary on this phone, which is programmed to accept no more than a hundred characters and will physically melt if any attempt is made to interfere with that programming. Then I will give a pre-determined hand signal to Heracles, who will escort myself and the phone back into the cave and the ordinary world and force-feed me a vial of water from the River Lethe so that any memory of our conversation beyond those hundred characters will be lost forever. Heracles will then read the cell phone and confirm that no extra terms have been added to the bargain. If he sees any, he will smash the cell phone and drink water from Lethe himself. Heracles has himself sworn by the River Styx to comply with all of this.”

Prometheus looked thoughtful – and oh god, were there any three words in the English language scarier than those – and finally he said: “Let’s discuss my terms. After you agree to them, I’ll tell you how you are going to get around your oath, Heracles, Heracles’ oath, and the water of Lethe.”

Hermes sighed.

“My terms are: you’ll remove the eagle. And you’ll donate $1503.15 to a charity called ‘Against Malaria Foundation’.”

“Oh no,” said Hermes. “Oh no oh no oh no. That is exactly the kind of thing I’m not going to do. You want me to take an action in the world? A specific action? With multiple bits of information? Oh no oh no oh no oh no there is no way you are going to get me to do that.”

Prometheus still looked cheerful. “Well then, Hermes, it was nice to chat. I guess you’ll be on your way.”

“Now hold on. You don’t want to take an option, presented at zero cost to you, that will get that eagle out of your liver forever and ever?”

“It’s not that I don’t want to. It’s that bargaining is a game of give-and-take. We both have things we want out of this interaction. The question is how far we’re going to go to get them. It’s a game of bluffing and counterbluffing. And unfortunately for you, I am the God Of Foresight, and happen to be omniscient. You are going to walk out of here in fifty-one minutes having agreed to my terms. All I am doing is speaking the complicated dance of words that inevitably gets you to that point.”

“I hate everything about this place so much,” said Hermes.

“And I am deeply sorry,” said Prometheus, and he sounded sorry, “but I do insist.”

“Why?” asked Hermes. “What are you plotting?

“You know that I like humans. You remember, I gave them fire, so long ago. I still have a fond place in my heart for them, and malaria is a terrible disease, and I thought…”

“You’re omniscient, so you know I don’t believe that for a second. Try again! What are you doing? What’s next on your little list of plans? The humans live on Mount Olympus, and we have to worship them? The Fates accidentally snip their own fingers off and die of blood loss? I know you’re up to some kind of unspeakable horror, the only question is which one?”

“Hermes,” asked Prometheus, “has it ever occurred to you that I was out, in the world, for countless aeons before you imprisoned me here? If you’re so afraid of what I can do or say with a single sentence, what do you think happened when I had millennia to tailor everything just the way I wanted it? Things are going well for me, aren’t they? The gods have been brought low. Humans have never been doing better. Zeus thought he was so clever, giving them a box full of evils, but I selected every one of those evils eons beforehand. You know what was in that box, Hermes? Things to make humanity stronger. I gave them famine so they would invent agriculture. I gave them disease so they would invent medicine. I gave them war so they would smelt iron. And I left them hope, so that even in their darkest moments they would pull through and keep dreaming. Dream of putting all of those evils back in the box they came from and closing it forever. And they will. Do you know how many sentient species in the multiverse developed an industrial base, liberal democracy, and human rights without killing themselves or collapsing into barbarism, Hermes? The number is one. One sentient species. Mine.”

“Don’t tell me that getting stuck under Mt. Elbrus with an eagle eating your liver was all part of the plan.”

“You don’t think so? Hermes, I am vast. I comprise universes. In my mind is every branch of possibility-space that ever will be or could have been. What’s the point of going outside, when the outside is all inside of me? I set up the world how I wanted it, ensured it would go the right direction, and then retired somewhere quiet, somewhere with space to think.”

“But the eagle?

“Okay, I admit I kind of dropped the ball on that one. The Fates are petty little bitches.”

“So now what?”

“So now you remove the eagle, and I’m happy, and you’re happy.”

“Except for this malaria thing.”

“Think of that as my little joke.”

“Your joke. You expect me to believe that?”

“I expect you to realize you have no other option, accept my proposal, and leave this place in another forty-six minutes.”

“Fuck you.”

“Then I expect you to go back, defeat Athena, and restore the power of the gods. Except that you will find it doesn’t go quite as far as it used to. Lightning is a cheap trick compared to nuclear weapons. Flying chariots are a little underwhelming when they share the skies with supersonic jets. You will find that your accustomed roles within human society work well for you. You will find yourself using your power not to dominate human society, but to shepherd it along its path. They are entering a very dangerous time now. Very dangerous. They need divine intervention, but not from above. They need gods who live disguised among them, and need them as much as they need you, and shepherd them. Athena cannot do it alone, not properly, so I will give you what you need to stop her. I have foreseen your path, and I know you rise to the occasion. So go, with my blessing, and serve Man.”

“Fuck you, just tell me what message I’m sending.”

“A hundred characters? Hmmm. ATH CAN’T HOLD POWER IN BODY. NEEDS FOCUS, PROBABLY IDOL. DONATE $1503.15 TO AMF, THEN DESTROY IDOL.”

Hermes typed it onto his cell phone. “And how are we going to get around all of the oaths and precautions?

“Tell me, Hermes, when did you swear your oath by the River Styx?”

“Three days ago.”

“Good. If you don’t remember swearing the oath, you can’t be bound by it. So you need to overdose on Lethe-water, enough to erase three days from your mind. I imagine you’ve been planning this escapade for a while, so when you wake up in a cave in the Caucasus with a cell phone bearing a message, you’ll be able to piece together what happened. The message is framed such that the donation looks like part of the plan, so Heracles won’t notice anything amiss. You’ll probably figure it out, but you’re an honorable god and you’ll feel compelled to stick to the bargain that you must have made with me. None of this breaks your current oath, which only says you must not carry out any of my terms, not that you must not mention them in your message. Overdosing on Lethe-water is only a suggestion of mine, not itself a term necessary to procure my agreement, so it should not be prohibited.”

Hermes sighed with relief. “Your plan isn’t going to work, Prometheus. Heracles is going to force-feed me the Lethe water before taking out his earplugs, so I can’t communicate with him and ask him to change the dose. And even if I could, I only brought eight hours’ worth of Lethe water anyway. Sixteen if you count Heracles’ vial.”

“There are two ways to increase the effect of a drug,” said Prometheus. “You can increase the dose. Or you can decrease the rate at which metabolism eliminates it from the body. Since our dose of Lethe water is limited, we’re going to go with the second. Heracles will give you exactly the amount of Lethe water you told him, but your body will fail to process it as usual, and it will have ten times the expected effect, causing you to forget your oath and be able to accept my amended terms when you find them on your phone.”

“How are you going to change my metabolism?”

“Most drugs are metabolized by the liver. By manipulating liver size, we can tailor the metabolic rate to any level that we want.”

Manipulating liver size?” Hermes didn’t like the sound of this.

“Yes. Hepatectomy is a very safe, commonplace surgery. But even if it weren’t, you would have nothing to fear. Surgeons’ success rates correlate with their number of hours of experience. And we have the most experienced liver removal specialist in the multiverse right here on Mt. Elbrus.”

“Oh no,” said Hermes. “You’re not…oh no oh no oh no.”

The eagle gave a voracious shriek.

9. Everybody

The pantheon met in the Pantheon, as was tradition. Hermes and his girlfriend Tyche came first; the God Of Commerce took a seat in the center just below the oculus, as the Goddess Of Fortune ushered away confused tourists. Gradually the rest trickled in. Poseidon, tracking water wherever he stepped. Apollo, dapper as ever in a tweed coat and bowtie, and Artemis, dressed in camo. Nike, dressed like she had just come from the gym. And Dionysus, in his stained Sigma Alpha Epsilon sweatshirt. He caught Hermes’ eye. “HEEEEEEY, BRO!” he said. “HOW’S IT HANGING?” Hermes just ignored him.

Hades was over near the entrance, talking to Aphrodite. “Hey Aph,” he said affably. “Want a pomegranate?”

Aphrodite’s eyes narrowed. “Is it one of your magical pomegranates that makes anyone who eats it obligated to become your wife?”

“Uh…” said Hades, shifting his eyes back and forth. “It…might not be?”

“I’ll pass,” said Aphrodite.

The missing stood out by their absence. Ares was not with them, for obvious reasons. Athena had obviously not been invited to the conspiracy against her. And Zeus, King Of The Gods, was nowhere to be seen. Hermes had begged and cajoled, but to no effect; he was still angry at having given up Prometheus’ key when drunk. “This is our last chance,” said Hermes, “the most important thing you’ll ever do.” But Zeus was having none of it. He had (he said in a half-drunken stupor) just met with a Hollywood talent scout, who had told him that he was perfect to star in a movie about the Trojan War. He was going to strike it big and become a celebrity and then open up his own water company, and Athena would never know what hit her. That was his plan and he was sticking to it.

Well, he would work with what he had.

“My fellow gods!” he announced, and everyone turned to look at him.

“By now you’ve heard the news. Athena has used her bottled-water monopoly to seize divine power for herself. She has opened the gates to Tartarus; none of us are safe. If we ever want to be more than the second-rate has-beens we are now, we need to stop her. I know how we’re going to do it.”

Some gasps. Apollo looked thoughtful. “WOOOOOOOOOO!” shouted Dionysus. “YOU GO, HERMES!”

“Athena’s collected so much power that she can’t hold it all herself,” he said. He’d gone over all this with Apollo, a few days after waking up in the cave with a terrible headache; the two of them had managed to expand Prometheus’ cryptic message into an actionable plan. He was very suspicious that a seemingly unrelated order to donate a very specific sum of money was a command of Prometheus’ that had slipped past his security, but he wasn’t sure how, and he wasn’t going to take the risk. He’d made the donation – now the rest was up to them.

“She can’t hold it all herself,” he continued, “so she needs some kind of supplementary focus. Sympathetic magic. Like calls out to like. She needs an idol. And not just any idol. It would have to be something really special, an idol of Athena that generations of mortals have identified with the deepest secrets of her power. The history books list two such idols. One, the giant statue in the Parthenon. That’s destroyed. Two, the Palladium. It was there in Troy. It was there in Rome. Now we think it’s in the Athena Mineral Water headquarters. Why? Because that kind of power would stand out like a sore thumb unless it was outshone by the presence of another immortal. Athena sure wouldn’t trust anyone else with it, so she’s got it herself. It must be hollow. The divine energy must be stored inside of it. If we can find and destroy it, then Athena loses her power and it flows into alternate conduits. Like us. In other words, we get our magic back.”

“WOOOOOOOO!” shouted Dionysus.

“Please refrain from cheering until the entire speech is over,” said Hermes. “Anyway, here’s my plan. We’re going to split in two. One group is going to be the powerhouses. Apollo, Artemis, Hades, Poseidon, Aphrodite, Dionysus. You’re all strong, skilled with weapons, or both. You’re going to smash things, create a distraction. You’re going to avoid confronting Athena directly, because Ares already showed us how that turns out. While my sister is chasing after you, the second group slips in. That’s me and Tyche. Hades has given me his helm of invisibility, which should be enough power to hide both of us from view. Tyche’s the Goddess Of Fortune. She can find anything. And I’m the God Of Thieves. I can break into anywhere. She’ll lead me straight to the Palladium, I’ll nab it, break the thing in two, and then we’re home free. Any questions? Comments?”

“It’s a good plan,” said Apollo, nodding his head.

“WOOOOOOOOOO!” shouted Dionysus.

“Just do it!” agreed Nike.

And before they could change their mind, Hermes teleported the lot of them to the lobby of Athena Mineral Water.

They appeared in a flash of light. People stepped back, shocked. The teleportation was strange enough. But Poseidon was still holding his golden trident. Hades was surrounded by some kind of miasma. And Aphrodite was buck naked. They didn’t exactly blend in.

Distraction!” whispered Hermes, just before taking Tyche’s hand and vanishing from view.

“Uh,” said Dionysus. “IS EVERYONE HERE READY TO PAAAAAAAAARTY?”

“It’ll do,” muttered Hermes.

He and Tyche made their way up side staircases. Athena’s aura wouldn’t be able to hide the Palladium at any kind of a distance. It had to be really close to her office. They came to the CEO suite by a back entrance, then pressed themselves against a wall as they saw “Ms. Athena” walk by, talking on a cell phone. “Yeah,” she was saying unconvincingly, “that does sound weird. No, no idea what’s going on. I’ll be down to investigate. Thanks for the tip.”

When she was out of view, they snuck into her office. It looked very normal. A few potted plants. A Bosses’ Day card. Some gold-plated “Female Entrepreneur Visionary Leadership” awards. A wall full of framed news articles “ATHENA MINERAL WATER BOASTS GODLIKE PROFITS”, “BEHIND THE STARTUP CHANGING HOW THE WORLD DRINKS”. A bottle of product on her desk, either for display or hydration. No idols.

“Cold,” said Tyche.

“Cold?” asked Hermes.

“If it were here, I would know. It’s not here.”

“Well, let’s check nearby.”

They checked Athena’s secretary’s office. They checked Athena’s closet. They checked the office of the Assistant To The CEO, the Director Of The Office Of The CEO. They checked the executive bathroom. No idols.

“Super cold,” said Tyche. “Hermes, it’s nowhere near here.”

“Fuck,” said Hermes. “We’ve got to go. Find the others and tell them to disengage, before it’s too late.”

They ran down the stairs until they reached the lobby. It was in a state of disarray. Chairs and potted plants overturned. Three parallel lines on the the big LCD screen that looked like they had been scratched by a trident. There was a magic silver arrow sticking out of one wall. No gods.

“Okay,” said Tyche. “They’ve been here. They must be retreating.”

They ran outside. A trail of water on the sidewalk suggested the route taken by Poseidon. The parking garage. He could see flashes of lightning on the lower levels. He wouldn’t be able to get through that way. He channeled all his power into his winged sandals, and he and Tyche lurched into the air, coming to rest on the top floor of the structure. He ran down and almost bumped into Aphrodite.

“Hey, sexy,” she said. “What’s going on?”

He could see the others now. Hades and Poseidon were defending the road leading to the lower level. Athena was below, hurling lightning at them. They were in retreat. Artemis stood on the bed of a pickup truck, taking shots with her magic arrows. Nike was with her, pointing out targets. Dioynsus seemed to be passed out on the concrete, and Aphrodite and Apollo were holding up the rear.

“We’ve got to get out of here,” Hermes told the two of them. “I was wrong. The Palladium’s not in the building.”

A lightning bolt shattered one of the big concrete pillars. “You dare stand against me?” shouted Athena. “For too long, I’ve played second-fiddle to lesser deities like yourselves! When I awoke a few centuries ago, it removed the last doubt from my mind. Everything I predicted was true. Nowadays, who cares about agriculture? Who cares about the sea? Who even believes in the Underworld? The sun is a giant ball of gas. The moon is a giant ball of rock. There’s only one thing that matters today, and that’s intellect! And how better to enshrine the triumph of intellect over human affairs, then to have the Goddess Of Wisdom destroy the lesser gods and become a pantheon unto herself? People these days want monotheism, and I’m going to give it to them!”

“You’re wrong!” Apollo stepped into the fray. “Intellect is important, yes! You deserve to be honored, and nobody will take that away from you! But without Reason to guide it, intellect becomes monstrous. Without Art, and Music, and Poetry, intellect becomes sterile. And without Healing, intellect becomes divorced from compassion.”

“AND THE SEA IS REALLY GREAT TOO,” added Poseidon.

Athena rose into the air, crackling with energy. “For now,” she said. “For now, intellect runs on puny mortal minds that will get all sad if they don’t have their music and their beachfront houses. But that was a mistake, Apollo. We didn’t want humans. We wanted apes just barely smart enough to sacrifice some rams to us and be properly grateful. Then Prometheus got involved, and everything went wrong. I’m going to fix his mistake. Genetic engineering, robotics, so many different options. Create minds that don’t need art, that don’t waste their time with music or lolling at the beach.” She looked at Artemis. “Destroy the forests and pave them over with factories.” She looked at Dionysus. “Replace partying with study and productive work.” She looked at Aphrodite. “Replace the vagaries of love with rational breeding based on genetic potential.” She looked at Hades. “Machines, that were never alive and so can never die.” She looked at Poseidon. “Tame the sea for tidal power – ”

“YOU’RE TOUCHING THE SEA OVER MY DEAD BODY!” Poseidon shouted, and rushed at her with his trident.

“We’ve got to get out of here,” Hermes whispered to Apollo. “Get together as many as you can. We’re going to make a run for it.”

“She’s blocking the only exit,” Apollo said. “Where do we go?”

“To the roof! I can carry some of you with my wings. The rest will have to jump.”

A few other gods had gotten the gist of the conversation, started running to the top of the parking garage. There was a loud thud, then the sound of sparks. It didn’t sound good.

“I don’t understand,” said Apollo. “How could the Palladium not be in the tower?”

“I don’t know!” Hermes protested. “If it wasn’t disguised by a god’s aura…”

“Then ipso facto it must be with some other god,” said Apollo. “Who are we missing? Demeter?”

“Demeter? She hates Athena, thinks her bottled water is destroying the environment.”

There was another crash. Apollo, Tyche, and Hermes made it onto the roof of the parking structure. They couldn’t tell how many other gods were still following.

“Okay then, Hera?”

“I checked. There’s a court record of all of her property, after the divorce with Zeus. Nothing about any idols. And she doesn’t like Athena either, something something Trojan something. Nobody likes Athena. And seriously, who’s going to take a magic idol and just say ‘sure, I’ll hold on to this, no further questions’.”

“Wait,” said Apollo.

Hermes waited.

“Does it have to be a god god? What about a demigod? An immortal human?”

“Um. In theory it could work. But it would be such a small effect. They’d have to stay right by the idol, day in, day out, or it wouldn’t be disguised at all.”

Apollo was already taking out his cell phone. “Dory, Dory, please pick up.”

Nike ran onto the roof of the parking garage. There was a big gash down one of her arms. “She’s right behind us!” she told them. “We’ve got to go!”

“Wait,” said Apollo. “Dory, pick up the phone.”

There was another crash. The parking structure started to wobble.

Apollo heard a noise from the other side of the phone, but no greeting. Right. She wouldn’t open the conversation.

“Pandora?” he asked. “Are you there?”

“Hi Apollo,” came her voice.

“Dory,” said Apollo. “That statue on your desk, the one of the woman in armor. I need you to take it and smash it, really hard.”

“Okay,” said Pandora. There was a brief pause. “Done.”

“Done? Did you break the statue?”

“No, it’s very hard, it doesn’t seem to have broken.”

“Fuck fuck fuck fuck fuck,” said Apollo.

Of all people, Dionysus managed to crawl his way to the top of the structure. “It’s getting really gnarly down there,” he announced before collapsing back into unconsciousness.

“Okay. I need you to feel along the sides of the statue. Is there any kind of switch, anything that’s going to get it to release the power that it’s stored?”

A brief pause. “There’s…a knob and a hinge.”

“Okay, Pandora. I need you to turn the knob and open the statue.”

“Apollo, I don’t open things.”

“Look, Dory, I don’t ask you for much. I’ve known you for I can’t even remember how many centuries, and I know things are hard for you, I’ve respected that. But Dory, you need to open that statue.”

“You know I don’t open things!”

The last few gods ran onto the top of the parking structure. Just behind them floated Athena, her eyes jet black, her whole body crackling with electricity. “There’s nowhere left to run,” she taunted them. “You’re all going to Tartarus now. Any last words?”

“Uh,” said Hades, “want a pomegranate?”

Athena held her hands forth. The sky darkened. The air seemed to stir.

“Dory, you made a mistake once, and it was really bad, I’m not denying that, but you told me yourself, the one thing you did right was keep Hope. I need you to be hopeful now. I need you to hope that someday, somebody, us, humans, somebody we’re not even considering, might be able to reverse what you did. Might be able to put those evils back in the box. I need you to think that that’s possible. But not going to happen without our help. Please, Pandora, trust me on this. And what I need you to do right now is open that statue.”

Lightning arced back and forth across the heavens. Time seemed to stop.

Then there was a loud pop.

10. Zeus

Zeus had come onto stage believing it was an audition for a big-budget film about the Trojan War. It wasn’t. Out ran a young woman, her face streaked with tears. “You said you loved me!” she said. “We had a child together! And then you…you disappeared!”

“Hey now,” said Zeus. “What’s this now? Who are you? Whaddyatalkinabout?”

“Don’t you recognize me?” sobbed the woman. “I’m Sara! From Biloxi! We met in ’98! Oh god! You don’t even remember me. You’ve probably abandoned with so many women that you don’t even remember them! How many were there after me? Ten? A hundred?”

“Hang on now,” said Zeus. “I ain’t the kind of guy who hooks up with no hundred women.”

“In fact,” said Alice DiScorria, walking on to stage. “He is precisely that kind of guy. If you don’t believe me, believe Amy. And Bethany. And Billy Rae. And Caroline. And Connie.”

As she said each name, each woman came on to the stage.

“Dana. Daria. Dina…”

Some of them were crying. Some of them looked lost. Some of them had steely determination in their eyes.

“…Jackie. Jessica. Jennifer. Jun-Li…”

“Nah, yer just messin’ with me now. What is this, some kinda trap? I want a lawyer, lady. I got my rights!”

“…Samantha. Sara. Sarah. Shaniqua. Susan…”

The stage was almost full now.

“You sayin’ I slept with all these women? I didn’t sleep with none of em. I want my lawyer, right now.”

“Actually,” said Alice, “we’re not saying these are the women you slept with. We’re saying these are the women you slept with, had children with, and then abandoned without paying child support.

“That’s a goddanged lie,” said Zeus. “I ain’t even got no children.”

“Zeus is telling us that he ‘ain’t even got no children’,” Alice told her viewers. “Alas, we have two hundred and five people in our studio audience today who think otherwise. Would you please stand up? Aaron. Adam. Althea. Ava. Bethany Junior. Berenice.” She realized she was starting to lose her audience’s attention. “And all the rest.”

Two hundred five members of the studio audience, ranging fron toddlers to adults, stood up. They were all unusually large, and many of the men had big, flowing beards.

“This is goddanged lies, is what it is!” shouted Zeus. “None of these people ain’t my children, and that’s the truth!”

“Zeus says that none of these people are his children,” said Alice. “We ran paternity tests for every single one of them before the show. Let’s see what they say.” She took out a big stack of manila envelopes, opened the first one. “Aaron…Zeus is the father! Adam…Zeus is the father! Althea…Zeus is the father!”

One of the women on stage finally lost it, grabbed a folding chair, and swung at Zeus. He deflected the blow easily, then pushed her back, just a little too rough. Suddenly the stage had become a brawl, one hundred ninety enraged women against one underpowered god.

“Ava…Zeus is the father! Bethany Junior…Zeus is the father! Berenice…Zeus is the father! Chou-yang…Zeus is the father! Cleo…Zeus is the father!”

The brawl on stage was getting really bad now. A few women were down for the count. Zeus was bleeding all over his face. Some of the staff started to wonder whether they should override Alice and call security.

“Demetrius…Zeus is the father! Delia…Zeus is the father! Darragh…Zeus is the father! Dominique…Zeus is the father!”

One of the women had gotten hold of Zeus hair and was holding him, pinned, while another was slapping his face. Zeus tried to kick, but ended up losing his balance. Security guards were pushing through the crowd of women, who were resisting their efforts.

“Edna…Zeus is the father! Elena…Zeus is…”

Then there was a loud popping sound that seemed to come from everywhere and nowhere. And then Zeus effortlessly pushed the crowd of women away from him. For a second, he looked confused by his own strength. He stared at his newly-rippling muscles, looked down at the ground as if he couldn’t quite believe how tall he was. Nobody moved.

Then he shouted, “DAMN RIGHT I’M YOUR FATHER! I’M ALL YER FATHERS. I AM ZEUS OLYMPIOS, KING OF THE GODS, CLOUD-GATHERER, THUNDERER, MIGHTIEST OF IMMORTALS! AND IIIIII’M BAAAAAAAAAAAAACK.”

The crackle of lightning filled the halls, knocked over the security guards. The audience stampeded to the exits. Women started to run off the stage.

“I AM ZEUS, KING OF GODS AND MEN. AND I’M TURNING YOU ALL INTO ANIMALS!”

Amy became an anteater. Bethany became a duck. Billy Rae became a tree shrew. Caroline became an otter. He turned Connie into a rattlesnake and Dana into a panther, Daria into a Komodo dragon and Dina into a bat. It was over in minutes. Everyone had either escaped or been transformed, besides Zeus and the hostess.

“Yer still here,” said Zeus, surprised.

“I am everywhere,” said Eris Discordia.

“What happened?” asked Zeus.

“The same thing that happens everywhere, all the time” said Eris. “People had conflicting aims. They struggled for power. Some won, others lost. The winners will celebrate, thinking their victory irreversible, and the losers will mourn, plotting their vengeance. And around them, the world changes irreversibly, in ways none of them predicted.”

“Huh,” said Zeus.

“In a few hours, news will come that a sudden electrical storm struck the set of my show, unfortunately causing the cameras to stop recording. Some people will be missing, casualties of the disaster. Others will say all sorts of strange things and be ignored. There will be lots of fights about it, and they’ll all call each other things like ‘sheeple’ and ‘denialist’ and ‘moron’. It will be wonderful.”

“Huh,” said Zeus.

“In the meantime, the studio is ruined. I suppose I will have to find a new job. Can you believe it, Zeus? In the old days, I was barred from every city and temple, driven out into the wilderness as an enemy of mankind. Now they pay me to cause discord. What a world!”

“It’s…somethin’,” said Zeus

“And it’s all thanks to people like you,” said Eris. “So before we part ways again, before the poets end their songs and the next myth begins, please accept a token of appreciation. From me, to you.”

In her hand appeared a shining golden apple.

Epilogue: Trump

“Yeah,” real estate mogul Donald Trump said into the phone. “Look, I gotta go, Carl. I gotta be at a gala tonight – yeah, the one for the American Eagle Museum. Terrible stuff, Carl, just terrible. Gotta go.”

He hung up. It really was terrible stuff. Just a year ago, an anti-malaria charity had funded a grant that happened to precisely match its yearly budget surplus. The research had borne fruit – a new insecticide, kind of a super-DDT without the environmental damages. DDT, of course, was famous for killing endangered birds, but they thought they’d tested it properly this time, dozens of different bird species, no problems at all. So they’d deployed it worldwide, and malaria rates had plummeted. Only they hadn’t tested the environmental consequences as well as they’d thought. 99% of bird species escaped unscathed – but every eagle in the world had died an unimaginably agonizing death. The whole situation was so strange that the FBI launched an investigation – then closed it a few weeks later for absence of motive. Who could possibly hate eagles that much?

He put on his suit and tie, and was just about ready to head out when a beam of radiant light appeared in the middle of his room and coalesced into three women.

“Greetings to you, Mr. Trump,” said the oldest. “I am Hera, Queen of the Gods. These are my colleagues Aphrodite and Athena. You are the man who runs the Miss Universe beauty contest, yes?”

He took a step back, dazzled by her radiance. “Um…yes.”

“Zeus, God of Thunder, recently came into possession of a golden apple. Then a second golden apple, found when searching a convent in Ukraine that had become a center of, ah, certain recent events. There are three of us and only two apples, so we petitioned Zeus to determine how they might be divied up. He replied that traditionally they go to the fairest, and so urged us to seek the foremost mortal judge of female beauty and implore his assistance. If you truly run beauty pageants for the entire universe, then you are the judge that we seek.”

Then she spoke differently, directly into his mind. And as an added incentive, if you choose me, I swear by the River Styx that I will make you the most powerful man in the world.

He’d barely had time to process the thought when Aphrodite stared at him, and a voice like music touched his consciousness, saying Pick me, and I swear by the River Styx that I will give you any woman you desire. Models, supermodels, they can all be yours.

Then a third voice, lower, more dispassionate, and he heard Athena say Select me as most beautiful, and I swear by the River Styx that I will grant you wisdom, prudence, and the intelligence to make the right decision under any circumstance.

Donald Trump just stared.

“Well?” asked Hera.

“He’s not answering!” said Athena.

“Waaaaait a second,” said Aphrodite. “Athena, did you ever turn off that glamour you had, that made mortals around you unable to process the presence of gods?”

“How was I supposed to turn that off?” asked Athena. “It took the whole divine power of the universe to create that, and then you took that away from me. Now I’m just a goddess like anyone else, doing – ” she spat “community service to make up for past misdeeds. And it’s not even like I didn’t help you guys bring Ares back.”

“So what you’re saying,” interrupted Hera, “is that he can’t even see us?”

“He can see us,” said Athena. “He just can’t comprehend that anything unusual might be going on,” said Athena.

Finally, Donald Trump rubbed his eyes, and said “I got no idea who any of you are, or why you’re in my apartment, but – ” he pointed at Aphrodite and Hera “you and you are smokin’. You,” he said, pointing to Athena and frowning, “look like a dyke in that armor. Seriously, get a makeover.”

Then he walked out the door.

“Huh,” said Hera.

“Too bad,” Aphrodite told Athena. “Just goes to show that brains aren’t everything.”

“Yes, well,” said the Goddess of Wisdom, a little too haughtily to be anything but compensation, “I’m just glad we finally made it through one of those without causing any unfortunate side effects for world history.”

“Yes,” said Hera. “I suppose we did. There’s a first time for everything.”

[Acknowledgments: the idea of Zeus on a trashy TV show comes from this Tumblr post. Ideas for the Prometheus character came from AI boxing and The Wise Man’s Fear. The first two word squares come from here and here.]

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SSC Journal Club: Analytical Thinking Style And Religion

[Content warning: religious people might feel kind of like this objectifies them and treats them as weird phenomena to be explained away.]

A major theme of this blog is: why do people disagree so intractably? And what can we do about it? Yes, genetics is a big part of the answer, but how does that play out in real life? How do those genes exert their effects? Does it involve human-comprehensible ideas? And how do society’s beliefs shift over time?

Gervais and Norenzayan (from here on “G&N”) write about how Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief. They make some people take the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a set of questions designed so that intuition gives the wrong answer and careful thought gives the right one. Then they ask those people a couple of questions about their religious beliefs (most simply, “do you believe in God?”). They find that people who do better on the CRT (ie people more prone to logical rather than intuitive thinking styles) are slightly less likely to be religious. In other words, religion is associated with intuitive thinking styles, atheism with logical thinking styles. I assume Richard Dawkins has tweeted triumphantly about this at some point.

Then they go on to do a couple of interventions which they think promote logical thinking styles. After each intervention, they find that people are more likely to downplay their religious beliefs. In other words, priming logical thought moves people away from religion.

If this seems fishy to you, it seemed fishy to the Reproducibility Project too. They ordered a big replication experiment to see if they could confirm G&N’s study. The relevant paper was just published on PLoS yesterday, and we can all predict what happened next. Let’s all join together in the Failed Replication Song:

Actually, it’s a little more interesting than this. Let’s look at in in more depth.

G&N bundled five different experiments into their original paper. Study 1 was the one I described above; make people take the CRT, elicit their religious beliefs, and see if there’s a correlation.

Study 2 “primed” people (n = 57) by making them look at one of two sculptures; either Rodin’s The Thinker, or a classical Greek sculpture of an athlete. Their theory was that looking at The Thinker would prime analytic thought, and they “proved” it in a pilot study where it improved performance on a syllogistic reasoning test. Then they deployed it on the question at hand; people who saw a picture of The Thinker were less likely to admit belief in God than people who saw the athlete sculpture, p = 0.03, with a respectable effect size of d = 0.6. Therefore, priming analytical thought decreases belief in God. There is no YouTube video that can express my opinion of this study, and I am not even going to try to find one.

Study 3 tried something similar. They made people (n = 93) unscramble words, (the example they give is “high the flies plane” to “the plane flies high”). Some of these words were things about logical thinking, like “analyze” and “ponder”. Again, this was supposed to prime logical thought. Again, they did a pilot study to confirm that it worked (or maybe just because all those sentences about planes flying high had primed their brain to think about pilots). Again, when they made subjects do it and then assess their religious beliefs, they admitted slightly less belief in God, p = 0.04, d = 0.44.

Study 4 was a replication of Study 3 with a larger and more diverse sample (n = 148) and broadly similar results.

Study 5 was another variation on the same theme. Previous studies had shown that hard-to-read fonts prime analytical thinking, probably because they require lots of cognitive effort and time, so you’re already activating effortful parts of your brain instead of just making a snap judgment. So they asked people to rate their beliefs in God using two questionnaires; one in an easy-to-read font and one in a hard-to-read font. The people who got the hard-to-read questionnaire reported less religious faith (p = 0.04, d = 0.3)

Medieval Bibles looking like this probably caused the Enlightenment

The Reproducibility Project effort completed replications of Study 1 (the direct CRT/religion correlation), and Study 2 (the sculpture prime).

Their replication of Study 1 used 383 people (they were aiming for 2.5x the size of the original study for statistical reasons I don’t entirely understand, but fell very slightly short). It was essentially negative; on two out of their three measures of religion, there was no significant rationality/atheism correlation, and on the third it was much smaller than the original study, so small it might as well not exist. They nevertheless declined to publish these results for two reasons. First, because they were a “conceptual” rather than “direct” replication; they switched from the CRT to a slightly different test of reasoning ability because everyone on Mechanical Turk already knew the CRT (!) Second, because “subsequent direct replications of this correlation have pretty conclusively shown that a weak negative correlation does exist between these two constructs”.

I am really confused by this second point. Everyone else has found that there’s a relationship between rationality and atheism, your replication attempt finds that there isn’t, so you decide not to publish the replication attempt? Some might call this the whole point of doing replication attempts. I know that Reproducibility Project are good people, so I am just going to assume I am hopelessly confused about something.

Then they move on to their replication of Study 2, the one that they did publish. This is the one with Rodin’s The Thinker. Once again, they used a sample 2.5x the size of the original, in this case 411 people. This time it was a “direct replication” with everything done exactly the same way as G&N (they used college students to solve the MTurk saturation problem). They found no effect of sculpture-viewing on religion, p = 0.38, h^2 = 0.001. Of note, and really cool, they confirmed the quality of their study by simultaneously testing the same sample for an effect they knew existed, and finding it at the level it was known to exist. They did a bunch of subgroup analyses and adjustments for confounders, and none of them did anything to recover the effect found in the original study.

The Reproducibility Project doesn’t get around to replicating studies 3, 4, or 5. But Studies 3 and 4 have been investigated by a different group in a slightly different context (CRT on liberal/conservative) and they find that the prime doesn’t even work; people who do the rational word scramble task don’t do better on the CRT. And the effect used in study 5 has been spectacularly falsified by sixteen different replication attempts – that is, hard-to-read fonts don’t even make you more rational at all, let alone make you less religious because of that increased rationality. Maybe it’s time for another Traditional Social Psychology Song:

So, why is this interesting? Seven bajillion vaguely similar priming-related studies have failed replication before. Now it’s seven bajillion and one. Can’t we just sing the relevant snarky songs and move on?

Probably. But my problem is that I keep trying to maintain these lines between studies where I know where they went wrong, and studies that seem like the sort of thing that shouldn’t go wrong. And when I see studies that I think shouldn’t go wrong, go wrong, I like to take a moment to be suitably worried.

My usual understanding of why these sorts of studies go wrong is a combination of overly complicated statistical analysis with too many degrees of freedom, unblinded experimenters subtly influencing people, and publication bias.

These studies don’t have overly complicated statistical analysis. They’re really simple. Do a randomized experiment, check your one variable of interest, do a t-test, done.

And these studies don’t have a lot of opportunity for unblinded experiments to subtly influence people. The whole thing was done online. That seriously dampens the opportunity for weird Clever Hans-style emotional cues to leak through.

That leaves publication bias. I said the original paper contained five different studies, but for our purposes that isn’t true. If you count the pilot studies, it actually included seven. A brief description of the two pilots, summarized from the supplement:

Pilot 1: 40 people see either The Thinker or the athlete sculpture, then are asked to solve a series of syllogisms where the intuitively correct answer is wrong. The people who saw The Thinker got more answers right, p less than 0.01, d = 0.9.

Pilot 2: 79 people unscramble either words relating to reasoning, or words not relating to reasoning. They are then asked the trick question “According to the Bible, how many of each kind of animal did Moses take on the Ark?” (I didn’t know this was an Official Scientific Trick Question when I wrote about Erica using it in Chapter 5 of Unsong). The people who unscramble rationality-related words are more likely to get the correct answer, p = 0.01.

So how do you get publication bias on seven different but related experiments performed in the same lab?

That is, if there’s a 5% chance of each experiment coming out positive by coincidence, then the chance of all of them coming out positive by coincidence at the same time is 0.05^7 = about one in a billion.

Yet the alternative – that these people performed a hundred-forty different experiments and reported the seven that worked – isn’t very plausible either. In particular, consider the two studies that combined a pilot with a main experiment. Unless there wasn’t even a pretense of doing anything other than milking noise, this had to be a single pilot study, followed by a single main experiment, with both of them being positive. And again, the chances of this happening by coincidence are really low.

So what happened? A commenter brings up that they used different measures of religious belief in each study, for unclear reasons. Is it possible that they used all three of their measures for everyone, and took whichever worked?

I’m not sure. And this has cemented something I’ve been thinking a lot about lately – a move from “this study’s probably not flawed because X” to “I should always be concerned that studies may be flawed, until they replicate consistently”. Probably there are some people who know enough statistics that all of these patterns make sense to them. But if you’re at my level, I would recommend against trying to play along at home.

Or as someone on Twitter (sorry, I lost the link) put it recently: “Peer review is a spam filter. Replication is science.”

II.

There’s a loose end here which deserves some attention – the Reproducibility Project’s claim that “subsequent direct replications of this correlation have pretty conclusively shown that a weak negative correlation does exist between [reasoning ability and low religious belief]”.

I want to talk a little about these other studies. This is going to be kind of politically incorrect – it’s always sketchy to say science has proven that people only believe certain things because they’re irrational. So in order to keep tempers low and maintain the analytical frame of mind we need to deal with this logically, please stare at this picture of The Thinker for thirty seconds.

Done? Good. Pennycook et al (2016) does a meta-analysis of all the work in this area. He finds thirty-five different studies totaling over 15,000 subjects comparing CRT scores and religious beliefs. Thirty-one are positive. Two of the remaining four detected an effect of the same magnitude as everyone else, but didn’t have enough power to prove it significant.

The remaining two negative studies are delightful and deserve to be looked at separately.

McCutcheon et al’s is titled Is Analytic Thinking Related To Celebrity Worship And Disbelief In Religion?. Unsatisfied with just asserting that irrational people become religious, they expand the claim to add that they become the kind of person who’s really into celebrities. They do manage to find a modest link between irrationality and score on the “Celebrity Attitudes Scale”, but the previously-detected irrationality-religion link fails to show up. This is a little worrying because it’s a paper that got published on the strength of a separate finding (the celebrity one) and incidentally failed to find the religion link, which means it’s a rare example of something being publication-bias-proof.

The other one was Finley et al’s Revisiting the Relationship between Individual Differences in Analytic Thinking and Religious Belief: Evidence That Measurement Order Moderates Their Inverse Correlation. They find that if you measure rationality first and then ask about religion, more rational people are less religious, and theorize that doing well on rationality tests primes irreligion. But if you measure religion first and then ask about rationality, there’s no link. Among 410 people, those in the CRT-first condition produced a rationality-atheism correlation significant at p = 0.001; those in the religion-first condition got nothing, p = 0.60. I don’t see a direct comparison, and the difference between significant and nonsignificant isn’t necessarily itself significant, but just by eyeballing this is obviously a big deal. This is also worrying, because it’s another example of a study that found an exciting finding and so got published despite failure to replicate the result at issue.

But Pennycook responds by pointing out seven other studies in his meta-analysis that ask for religion before testing rationality yet still get the predicted effect. In fact, overall there is no noticeable difference between religion-first studies and rationality-first studies. Some others assess rationality and religion on different sittings, and still get the same results. Also, now it looks like priming doesn’t affect your religiosity or rationality. So Finley’s paper has to be wrong, which means it’s yet another example of strong p-values in a large sample size in the absence of any real effect.

At this point we’re left with 31 good studies finding an effect and 2 good studies not finding it. Most of them converge around an effect size of r = – 0.20. Pennycook does the usual tests for publication bias, and as usual doesn’t find it. I think at this point maybe we can conclude this is real?

A few other things worth looking at:

Is this effect true only in college students and mechanical Turkers? No. Browne et al look at 1053 elderly people’s CRT scores and religiosity, and find the effect at the same level as everyone else.

(they also find that women do much worse on the CRT than men. I looked to see whether this is a common finding, and indeed it is; in a sample of 3000 people taking a 3-question test, men average about 1.47 and women about 1.03, p < 0.0001. This remains true even when adjusting for intelligence and mathematical ability. I'm not sure why I've never seen any of the sex-differences crowd look into this seriously, but it sounds important. If you have a strong opinion about this, please stare at the above image of The Thinker for another thirty seconds before commenting)

Is this effect simply an artifact of IQ? After all, there’s some evidence that IQ increases irreligion, and CRT score correlates heavily with IQ (see eg this book review). This is the claim of Razmar & Reeve, who do a study that finds that indeed, it’s not that more rational people are less religious, it’s that smarter people are both more rational and less religious. But Pennycook responds with a boatload of research finding the opposite; the gist seems to be that both IQ and CRT are independently correlated with irreligion, but the CRT correlation is stronger than the IQ one. Trying to tease apart the effects of two quantities that are correlated at 0.7 sounds really hard and I am not surprised that people can’t figure this out very well.

(This paper brings up another interesting fact – on a lot of these tests, religious people take less time to solve problems, even when both sets of people get the right answer. This reminds us that high-CRT shouldn’t be considered strictly better than low-CRT in the same way that high-IQ is strictly better than low-IQ. It’s more like tradeoff between System 1 fast and heuristic-laden thinking, vs. System-2 slow and deliberative thinking. This tradeoff seems to exist, at different points in different people, regardless of their IQ.)

The paper says:

Importantly, the degree to which cognitive ability versus style are predictive of religiosity has theoretical consequences. As discussed by RR, a primary relation with cognitive ability is consistent with the idea that people naturally gravitate toward ideologies that match their level of cognitive complexity. Thus,according to this position, religious ideologies are less complex than secular ones, and, as a consequence, more likely to be held by less cognitively complex individuals. In contrast, a primary relation between cognitive style and religiosity is consistent with the idea that Type 2 processes are selectively activated by religious disbelievers to inhibit and override intuitive religious cognitions. Importantly, under this formulation, religious disbelief does not necessarily require a high level of cognitive ability

.

III.

Overall my takeaway from reading some of this stuff is:

1. “Analytical cognitive style”, ie the slow logical methods of thinking that help you do well on the CRT, probably increases likelihood of being an atheist and decrease the likelihood of being religious, even independent of IQ with which it is highly correlated. The effect size seems pretty small.

2. IQ probably also increases likelihood being an atheist and decreases likelihood of being religious, even independent of CRT with which it is highly correlated. The effect size seems very small.

3. Openness To Experience probably has complicated effects that make people less fundamentalist but more spiritual.

4. These are all long-term trait effects. There’s no good evidence that “priming” analytical thinking style can make you more or less religious in that exact moment. Probably the effect size here is zero.

5. Gender differences on the CRT are higher than gender differences on almost any other test and this seems to be underexplored.

6. Just because a paper has relatively simple statistics that are hard to fake, doesn’t mean it’s likely to replicate.

7. Even given (6), just because a paper is an online survey with little room for experimenter effects, doesn’t mean it’s likely to replicate.

8. Even given (6) and (7), just because a paper has many different studies that all confirm the same effect, doesn’t mean it’s likely to replicate.

Extra bonus takeaway: I was too quick in dismissing the CRT’s ability to convey extra interesting knowledge beyond IQ, and I should look into it more and maybe get Stanovich’s book. Also, there’s some similar research on CRT and politics which I should probably look into, although I don’t even know how long I’m going to have to stare at that Thinker picture for that one.

Extra extra bonus takeaway: I should include CRT on next year’s SSC survey.

OT70: Cyclopen Architecture

This is the bi-weekly visible open thread. There are hidden threads every few days here. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever.

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Some Groups Of People Who May Not 100% Deserve Our Eternal Scorn

Or “Contra A Convergence Of Lefty and Far-Right Twitter Making Fun Of The Same People”. I’ll mostly be using Current Affairs articles as foils, not because they’re especially bad, but because they’re especially good and well-written expressions of what many other people are saying. Sorry if this is a little snarky and maybe not 100% fair.

1. Celebrities Who Speak Out Against Donald Trump

No, celebrities are not going to single-handedly change the world. Yes, celebrities are often annoying, and almost by definition out-of-touch. Yes, a Democratic campaign needs to have some substance beyond “look, celebrities!”

But from the celebrities’ own point of view, they’re doing the best they can. If Kim Kardashian wants to help the cause, what do you expect her to do? Write policy white papers? Go door-to-door canvassing? Or would you rather she just stayed silent and didn’t do anything?

Also, I think the “out-of-touch” critique sort of misses the point. Unemployed high school dropouts aren’t going to read Paul Krugman editorials, and they might or might not go to Bernie Sanders rallies. But I guarantee they know who Kim Kardashian is. Now, maybe you don’t develop your opinions by listening to weird-looking people who seem to be famous for no reason, and maybe you’re proud of that fact. But judging by the amount of money people will pay celebrities to endorse their products, a lot of people do develop their opinions this way. And these people are probably the less-educated working-class folks whom the Democrats most need to reach.

Or maybe I’m just being classist and nobody listens to celebrities. Fine. I still think that a celebrity who speaks out about something they think is important is more virtuous than one who doesn’t. By all means criticize tone-deaf celebrities like Lena Dunham who “help” the cause by speaking up in offensive or counterproductive ways. But criticizing celebrities’ activism in general doesn’t seem like a good political strategy.

2. People Who Compare Political Events To Harry Potter

See eg here.

Comparing politics to your favorite legends is as old as politics and legends. Herodotus used an extended metaphor between the Persian invasions of his own time and the Trojan War. When King Edward IV took the English throne in 1461, all anybody could talk about was how it reminded them of King Arthur. John Dryden’s famous poem Absalom and Achitophel is a bizarrely complicated analogy of 17th-century English politics to an obscure Biblical story. Throughout American history people have compared King George to Pharaoh, Benedict Arnold to Judas, Abraham Lincoln to Moses, et cetera.

Well, how many people know who Achitophel is these days? Even Achilles is kind of pushing it. So we stick to what we know – and more important, what we expect everyone else will know too. And so we get Harry Potter.

“But a children’s book?” Look, guys, fantasy is what the masses actually like. They liked it in Classical Greece, where they had stories like Bellerophon riding a flying horse and fighting the Chimera. They liked it in medieval Britain, where they would talk about the Knights of the Round Table slaying dragons as they searched for the Holy Grail. The cultural norm where only kids are allowed to read fantasy guilt-free and everybody else has to read James Joyce is a weird blip in the literary record which is already being corrected. Besides, James Joyce makes for a much less interesting source of political metaphors (“The 2016 election was a lot like Finnegan’s Wake: I have no idea what just happened”)

Harry Potter is not the national mythology I would have chosen. Probably I would have gone for Lord of the Rings. I’m not sure we as a nation deserve The Silmarillion, but a man can dream.

But Harry Potter is at least better than some things (we could have ended out with our national consciousness being shaped by Twilight!), and the point is that comparing your politics to those of a more interesting fantasy world is a natural human urge and probably not indicative of some sort of horrible decay.

3. People Who Like Hamilton

See eg here.

Look. Hamilton was a pretty good Broadway play. It wasn’t the best thing that ever happened. It didn’t single-handedly reinvent America.

On the other hand, it’s also not the source of all evil. It’s not some sort of giant glowing tribute to national elitism where everyone gathers together and eats arugula and talks about how much they prefer symbolic gestures involving identity to actual systemic change. It’s just a pretty good Broadway play.

4. Vox

See eg here.

I think the main complaint is that “explaining the news” is fundamentally condescending. Real Americans personally read all 9,800 pages of Obamacare regulations before forming an opinion on health policy.

Or maybe the complaint is that they’re pretending to do it from an objective point of view instead of admitting that they have a liberal bias? I will take this complaint seriously when I meet any person anywhere in the world who is not aware that Vox has a liberal bias. The aboriginal people of the North Sentinel Islands have been completely isolated from the rest of civilization for thousands of years, yet every single child in their tribe knows that Vox has a liberal bias. SETI believes that if we contact aliens, we will have to determine their language through universally known truths like prime numbers or the digits of pi, but if for some reason the aliens have different mathematics than we do, we will still be able to communicate over a shared understanding that Vox has a liberal bias.

This is fine. All attempts to explain the news are going to end up with some bias, and I’m okay with this as long as they try to minimize it, present the truth as they understand it, and give more light than heat (though see here)

And that’s where my experience with Vox has been reassuring. I’ve occasionally argued with them, or made fun of them, or SHOUTED AT THEM THAT THEY ARE SPREADING DAMNABLE LIES. And every time, I’ve been impressed by their kindness, their openness to criticism, and their willingness to pay attention to me even though I can be very annoying.

Fredrik deBoer has a theory that everybody secretly hates Ezra Klein but publicly pretends to like him because he’s powerful. And I keep wanting to protest that I like Ezra Klein, before realizing that deBoer’s theory predicts I would say that. So I’ll just add that my interactions with Klein have consisted mostly of me yelling at him for being wrong about everything, and him politely listening to me. A few times he’s admitted he was wrong and promised to do better (and has). Other times he’s stuck to his position while continuing to give me way more of his time and energy than I would expect the head of a big media company to give a random and somewhat-confrontational blogger.

This has also been more or less my experience with Dylan Matthews, German Lopez, and Sarah Kliff, the other Vox people I’ve engaged with.

A year or so ago, the media got really interested in neoreaction and published a bunch of thinkpieces, all of which parroted an error-ridden Breitbart article without checking any of its claims. Dylan Matthews wanted to write one for Vox, and he actually took the trouble to contact me, an Internationally Known Expert On Neoreaction. I corrected a few of the worst Breitbart errors and gave him the email address of a couple of neoreactionaries; Matthews actually interviewed them and included their comments in his article instead of relying on third-hand speculation about who they might be. I have heard legends that ancient times there was an arcane art called Juru-Na-Lism which allowed its practitioners to gather information from the furthest reaches of the world, and although I understand it is mostly forgotten this gives me some glimmers of what it could have been like (and for an even clearer example of the same pattern, compare this and this).

Also, Stuart Ritchie is a scientist at the University of Edinburgh who studies intelligence and who makes fun of terrible articles about intelligence in the media. Vox actually worked with Dr. Ritchie to write a series of articles, and ended up with some of the only popular explanations online that someone with a psychology background can read without laughing hysterically.

I disagree with Vox about a lot of things, but they’ve generally impressed me in ways that some other news sources haven’t. Also, let’s be honest. Their competitors are places like Salon and Vice. My standards here are dirt-low, and Vox frequently meets them.

5. Matt Yglesias

Related; see eg here:

The worst of Yglesias’ mischievous endorsements of horrendous moral stances was his column on factory safety. Immediately after the 2013 collapse of the Bangladesh garment factory that killed over 1,000 people, Yglesias took to Slate to explain why workplace safety regulations actually inhibited the operation of free markets. Yglesias explained that high-risk jobs have high compensation, and just like people might choose to be lumberjacks, they might choose to work in highly dangerous garment factories for a premium. Thus “it’s good that different people are able to make different choices on the risk–reward spectrum.” The article was accompanied by a photograph of Bangladeshis loading dead bodies onto a truck.

The column was classic Yglesias, in managing to be both ignorant and appalling. Appalling since Yglesias published it the same day as the factory collapse, as the rubble was still being cleared. Ignorant because Yglesias adopted the most delusional Heritage Foundation economic myth, that somehow people in Bangladesh work in dangerous garment factories because working in dangerous garment factories is what they most want to do. As Mark Brendle summarized:

Yglesias champions one of the most horrifying and widespread implements of oppression and misery yet conceived—factories taking advantage of cheap labor, lack of environmental regulations, and a disregard for human life by those who profit most from having those factories in their countries—then pretends that it exists in a vacuum, where people in “those countries” are happy for these jobs, instead of acknowledging the closed system of the global economy, where those conditions are not only systemic, but inevitable and structural, in order for the wealth and prosperity of the “first world” to exist at all.

When confronted with this outrage, Yglesias simply wrote another explanation of why his original work was justified, admitting that his reaction to the criticism “as a writer and a human being” was annoyance. (It should go without saying that if one’s first reaction “as a human being” to being asked to show a little compassion for dead Bangladeshis is “annoyance,” then one is not a human being at all.) Here is Vox-ism in a nutshell: it is impossible to stop explaining and think, impossible to understand that there are more questions in heaven and earth than “What do the data say?” (Like perhaps, “Am I a good person?”)

One day soon, there’s going to be an Islamic terror attack in the United States, maybe committed by a refugee. The news is going to show pictures of mangled innocents, sobbing relatives, mothers who have lost their children. And maybe Current Affairs, as a good leftist publication, is going to want to say that this is terrible but doesn’t mean that we should ban all refugees or hate all Muslims.

And they won’t be able to, because they’ve already declared that if something tragic happens, then anyone who tries to put it in context, or say that some policies can have occasional awful results while still being beneficial on net, is a moral monster.

And if they try to protest that no, approximately 0% of refugees are terrorists, immigrant crime rates are lower than native crime rates, all of the fear-mongering you’ve heard is a lie, et cetera et cetera – then ah, that’s just worrying about “what the data say” – and how can you worry about something as bloodless as data when there are families literally sobbing over the deaths of their children right there?

Trump should be ultimate proof that the other side is better at the “my righteous indignation is more important than your puny data” game than you are. Don’t even try.

6. Pundits Who Failed To Predict Trump

See eg Michael Tracey in How Pundits Get Everything Wrong And Still Keep Their Jobs:

As the 2016 presidential campaign should have conclusively demonstrated, this pretense of expertise is a fabrication. Far from being especially prescient about matters of public affairs, members of the Pundit-Commentariat Industrial Complex are actually incredibly ill-suited to the task of accurately gauging the political sentiments of their own nation. By virtue of the various self-destructive pathologies that perpetually dull and distort their analytical acuity, it turns out that “pundits” are among the least qualified to accurately predict how far-off events will unfold. Surveying a random selection of Twitter trolls would probably yield one better information than scanning the output of the most revered professional prognosticators […]

For normal people, even the tiniest mistakes often result in drastic consequences. They don’t just get to ignore those failures and barrel forward as if nothing happened. And yet that’s how we permit the pundit class to operate. In the case of Bouie and Beutler, it wasn’t merely that they made erroneous predictions; anyone can mistakenly guess that something might pan out, when it does not. Rather, their entire analytical framework was drastically, catastrophically faulty. If any other American worker had performed his or her job so poorly, they could expect to receive severe sanction—docked pay, unfavorable scheduling, or termination. But in the world of punditry, there is no price to pay for failure. Instead, the American pundit class simply carries on as before, rattling off self-assured predictions about future events.

It would be really fun if I could dramatically reveal that (shock! horror!) Michael Tracey has himself been wrong about things. Alas, he admits it, saying in an earlier article, We Must Demand Pundit Accountability, that he’s made some predictive mistakes himself. For example, he wrote about Why Ted Cruz Could Win In 2016, how Chris Christie Isn’t Dead Yet and Why Jim Webb Poses The Biggest Threat To A Hillary Clinton Presidency. He asks to be judged not on these isolated mistakes, but based on his record as a whole. He provides a (self-curated) list of accurate predictions, which indeed seems very impressive.

Likewise, Current Affairs, which published Tracey’s article, has admitted that its article saying “good riddance” to Trump since he “will not be president” was a bit premature. But once again, they plead that instead of dismissing them the same way they recommend we dismiss other failed predictors like Paul Krugman and Matt Yglesias, we take into account that they also made a bunch of much better predictions, like this one in February predicting that Trump would win unless the Democrats nominated Sanders. I think it’s a good piece and proves that good punditry is indeed important; if people had listened to that maybe we’d be in a better place right now.

But there’s still a tension between their treatment of other pundits’ mistakes (proof that they’re incompetent and that the whole system must be burned to the ground) and that of their own mistakes (worth viewing in the context of a long-term record of good predictions). Might Paul Krugman and Matt Yglesias also believe they have a long-term record of good predictions? Don’t they deserve to be judged on this record instead of on a single event where they missed the mark by barely 1% of voters?

I don’t know much about Yglesias’ record, but I can speak up for Krugman. A team from Hamilton College analyzed the predictions of various pundits over sixteen months to evaluate relative performance; Krugman was judged most accurate of all twenty-six pundits studied.

The moral of the story is stop trying to draw sweeping conclusions from one data point. This also solves the problem where, having discredited everyone who predicted a Hillary victory, we determine the only trustworthy sources of political commentary to be PrisonPlanet.com, the Dilbert guy, and all 372,672 subscribers of r/the_donald.

If you’re really interested in well-founded judgments of your own accuracy relative to other people, there’s an established way to make that happen. Make specific predictions, which are clearly flagged as predictions and can’t be disavowed later. When possible, try to predict the same events as other pundits, so that you can compare accuracy. Assign a probabilistic confidence level to each. Keep track of whether each did or didn’t come true. Use some kind of scoring rule to evaluate your calibration. Then report on long-term aggregated statistics of how well you did.

I’ve been doing this for the past three years (2014, 2015, 2016). Last January, I predicted an 80% chance that Trump would lose. He didn’t. Does that mean I’m incompetent person who deserves to lose his job but won’t because he has “pundit tenure”? I don’t think so. Over the past three years I made 37 predictions that something would happen with 80% chance, and of those, thirty (81%) did happen. In other words, over the long run, the things I say have a 80% chance of happening, happen 81% of the time. I have pretty close to the exact right level of certainty in everything I say.

Of course, life would be even better if I could be 100% sure about everything and be right 100% of the time. And the great thing about this methodology is that if there’s someone else like that, they can prove that they’re better than I am. In fact, we’re trying this – over on Arbital, about a hundred people have entered predictions on the same set of sixty-one events that I did. At the end of the year we’ll check results. If other people do better than I do based on something like a Brier score, and if they can keep doing better than I do consistently, I’ll admit they’re a better “pundit” than I am and defer to their expertise.

If Robinson and Tracey want to demonstrate to the world that they are trustworthy pundits in a way that Yglesias and Krugman aren’t, I would invite all four of them to formally keep track of their predictions and see how they do relative to one another. I’m happy to help with this if they’re interested, and I bet Arbital would be too.

6.1. Pundits Who Failed To Predict Trump, Because They Are Out Of Touch With Real Americans

I think the argument is supposed to be that if they had ever left their comfortable Beltway offices and gone to talk to real people in the Midwest, they would have recognized the deep vein of anger in the American people and known that Trump was going to win.

Whoever you are, my “talking to real people in the Midwest” credentials are better than yours. I am a psychiatrist. I work in Michigan. My job is pretty much talking to former industrial workers about all the ways their lives have gone wrong, eight hours a day, every day. I am aware that these people are very angry.

But is it the level of anger where 46% of them will vote Trump? Or the level of anger where 48% of them will vote Trump? Because Hillary got about 47% of the vote in Michigan, so those two points are the difference between Trump winning the state and becoming President, versus losing the state and fading into ignominy. I do not think there is any level of deep connection to the collective consciousness of Michigan that allows you to distinguish between a 48%-Trump level of anger versus a 46%-Trump level of anger. Which means that even if you psychoanalyze Michiganders eight hours a day you still have to read the polls like everyone else. And the polls said that it was more like a 46% level of anger. And they were wrong.

But shouldn’t people who left their Beltway offices have at least realized that there was a significant amount of anger in the American people, and so Trump had a fighting chance? Yes. But all the polls also showed that there were a lot of Trump voters and that he had a fighting chance. If you were so confused that you didn’t realize that lots of people were angry and Trump had a fighting chance, I’m not sure that leaving your Beltway office would have helped much. In fact, I’m glad you didn’t. You probably would have wandered dazed into the street and gotten hit by a truck or something.

(or, if you made it to the Midwest, grain entrapment)

I guess there’s a version of this argument I endorse, which is that people who left their Beltway offices and talked to Real Americans might have realized that Trump voters were human beings with legitimate concerns and not just all alt-right Nazi KKK members. But again, if it takes a round-trip ticket to Peoria to convince our elites that people who disagree with them are not inscrutable hate-filled monsters, we have failed in a way more profound than not giving them that round-trip ticket.

7: People Who Are Worried That The Russians Hacked The Democrats To Influence The Elections

“Can you believe that the Democrats are trying to spin a narrative about foreign bogeymen out to get us?”

Okay, but did you look through the evidence that Russia was involved in the hacking? And don’t you agree it’s pretty strong?

“Yeah, but remember when the Republicans were the party of McCarthyism? And now this is totally the same thing!”

Okay, but did you look through the evidence that Russia was involved in the hacking? And don’t you agree it’s pretty strong?

“And just think, the CIA getting all upset about foreign powers interfering in an election! Pretty hypocritical, huh?”

Okay, but did you look through the evidence that Russia was involved in the hacking? And don’t you agree it’s pretty strong?

“And Hillary Clinton was such a terrible candidate, I bet it feels pretty good to be able to just blame everything on the Russians instead of admitting that you goofed by nominating her.”

Okay, but did you look through the evidence that Russia was involved in the hacking? And don’t you agree it’s pretty strong?

“There was that one guy on Twitter who posted a really cringeworthy rant about ‘game theory’. Can you believe that weirdo?”

Okay, but did you look through the evidence that Russia was involved in the hacking? And don’t you agree it’s pretty strong?

“Did I mention how funny it was that now the DEMOCRATS are the party of McCarthyism! Oooh, bogeyman Putin out to get you!”

Okay, but did you look through the evidence that Russia was involved in the hacking? And don’t you agree it’s pretty strong?

“Look, lay off, I’m not saying it’s false, I’m just saying we have more important things to talk about.”

And yet I checked your Twitter feed, and every tweet for the past two weeks has been you making fun of that game theory guy.

“I’m just saying that we’re focusing on Russia to the exclusion of everything else. Could there possibly be anything more pointlessly distracting from the real work that we’ve got to do?”

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[REPOST] The Non-Libertarian FAQ

[This is a repost of the Non-Libertarian FAQ (aka “Why I Hate Your Freedom”), which I wrote about five years ago and which used to be hosted on my website. It no longer completely reflects my current views. I don’t think I’ve switched to believing anything on here is outright false, but I’ve moved on to different ways of thinking about certain areas. I’m reposting it by popular request and for historical interest only. I’ve made some very small updates, mostly listing rebuttals that came out over the past few years. I haven’t updated the statistics and everything is accurate as of several years ago. I seem to have lost the sources of my images, and I’m sorry; if I’ve used an image of yours, please let me know and I’ll cite you.]

Contents

Economic Issues

1. Externalities
2. Coordination Problems
3. Irrational Choices
4. Lack of Information

Social Issues

5. Just Desserts and Social Mobility
6. Taxation

Political Issues

7. Competence of Government
8. Health Care
9. Prison Privatization
10. Gun Control
11. Education

D. Moral Issues

12. Moral Systems
13. Rights and Heuristics

E. Practical Issues

14. Slippery Slopes
15. Strategic Activism
16. Miscellaneous and Meta

Introduction

0.1: Are you a statist?

No.

Imagine a hypothetical country split between the “tallists”, who think only tall people should have political power, and the “shortists”, who believe such power should be reserved for the short.

If we met a tallist, we’d believe she was silly – but not because we favor the shortists instead. We’d oppose the tallists because we think the whole dichotomy is stupid – we should elect people based on qualities like their intelligence and leadership and morality. Knowing someone’s height isn’t enough to determine whether they’d be a good leader or not.

Declaring any non-libertarian to be a statist is as silly as declaring any non-tallist to be a shortist. Just as we can judge leaders on their merits and not on their height, so people can judge policies on their merits and not just on whether they increase or decrease the size of the state.

There are some people who legitimately believe that a policy’s effect on the size of the state is so closely linked to its effectiveness that these two things are not worth distinguishing, and so one can be certain of a policy’s greater effectiveness merely because it seems more libertarian and less statist than the alternative. Most of the rest of this FAQ will be an attempt to disprove this idea and assert that no, you really do have to judge the individual policy on its merits.

0.2: Do you hate libertarianism?

No.

To many people, libertarianism is a reaction against an over-regulated society, and an attempt to spread the word that some seemingly intractable problems can be solved by a hands-off approach. Many libertarians have made excellent arguments for why certain libertarian policies are the best options, and I agree with many of them. I think this kind of libertarianism is a valuable strain of political thought that deserves more attention, and I have no quarrel whatsoever with it and find myself leaning more and more in that direction myself.

However, there’s a certain more aggressive, very American strain of libertarianism with which I do have a quarrel. This is the strain which, rather than analyzing specific policies and often deciding a more laissez-faire approach is best, starts with the tenet that government can do no right and private industry can do no wrong and uses this faith in place of more careful analysis. This faction is not averse to discussing politics, but tends to trot out the same few arguments about why less regulation has to be better. I wish I could blame this all on Ayn Rand, but a lot of it seems to come from people who have never heard of her. I suppose I could just add it to the bottom of the list of things I blame Reagan for.

To the first type of libertarian, I apologize for writing a FAQ attacking a caricature of your philosophy, but unfortunately that caricature is alive and well and posting smug slogans on Facebook.

0.3: Will this FAQ prove that government intervention always works better than the free market?

No, of course not.

Actually, in most cases, you won’t find me trying to make a positive proof of anything. I believe that deciding on, for example, an optimal taxation policy takes very many numbers and statistical models and other things which are well beyond the scope of this FAQ, and may well have different answers at different levels and in different areas.

What I want to do in most cases is not prove that the government works better than the free market, or vice versa, but to disprove theories that say we can be absolutely certain free market always works better than government before we even investigate the issue. After that, we may still find that this is indeed one of the cases where the free market works better than the government, but we will have to prove it instead of viewing it as self-evident from first principles.

0.4: Why write a Non-Libertarian FAQ? Isn’t statism a bigger problem than libertarianism?

Yes. But you never run into Stalinists at parties. At least not serious Stalinists over the age of twenty-five, and not the interesting type of parties. If I did, I guess I’d try to convince them not to be so statist, but the issue’s never come up.

But the world seems positively full of libertarians nowadays. And I see very few attempts to provide a complete critique of libertarian philosophy. There are a bunch of ad hoc critiques of specific positions: people arguing for socialist health care, people in favor of gun control. But one of the things that draws people to libertarianism is that it is a unified, harmonious system. Unlike the mix-and-match philosophies of the Democratic and Republican parties, libertarianism is coherent and sometimes even derived from first principles. The only way to convincingly talk someone out of libertarianism is to launch a challenge on the entire system.

There are a few existing documents trying to do this (see Mike Huben’s Critiques of Libertarianism and Mark Rosenfelder’s What’s (Still) Wrong With Libertarianism for two of the better ones), but I’m not satisfied with any of them. Some of them are good but incomplete. Others use things like social contract theory, which I find nonsensical and libertarians find repulsive. Or they have an overly rosy view of how consensual taxation is, which I don’t fall for and which libertarians definitely don’t fall for.

The main reason I’m writing this is that I encounter many libertarians, and I need a single document I can point to explaining why I don’t agree with them. The existing anti-libertarian documentation makes too many arguments I don’t agree with for me to feel really comfortable with it, so I’m writing this one myself. I don’t encounter too many Stalinists,
so I don’t have this problem with them and I don’t see any need to write a rebuttal to their position.

If you really need a pro-libertarian FAQ to use on an overly statist friend, Google suggests The Libertarian FAQ.

0.5: How is this FAQ structured?

I’ve divided it into three main sections. The first addresses some very abstract principles of economics. They may not be directly relevant to politics, but since most libertarian philosophies start with abstract economic principles, a serious counterargument has to start there also. Fair warning: there are people who can discuss economics without it being INCREDIBLY MIND-NUMBINGLY BORING, but I am not one of them.

The second section deals with more concrete economic and political problems like the tax system, health care, and criminal justice.

The third section deals with moral issues, like whether it’s ever permissible to initiate force. Too often I find that if I can convince a libertarian that government regulation can be effective, they respond that it doesn’t matter because it’s morally repulsive, and then once I’ve finished convincing them it isn’t, they respond that it never works anyway. By having sections dedicated to both practical and moral issues, I hope to make that sort of bait-and-switch harder to achieve, and to allow libertarians to evaluate the moral and practical arguments against their position in whatever order they find appropriate.

Part A: Economic Issues

The Argument:

In a free market, all trade has to be voluntary, so you will never agree to a trade unless it benefits you.

Further, you won’t make a trade unless you think it’s the best possible trade you can make. If you knew you could make a better one, you’d hold out for that. So trades in a free market are not only better than nothing, they’re also the best possible transaction you could make at that time.

Labor is no different from any other commercial transaction in this respect. You won’t agree to a job unless it benefits you more than anything else you can do with your time, and your employer won’t hire you unless it benefits her more than anything else she can do with her money. So a voluntarily agreed labor contract must benefit both parties, and must do so more than any other alternative.

If every trade in a free market benefits both parties, then any time the government tries to restrict trade in some way, it must hurt both parties. Or, to put it another way, you can help someone by giving them more options, but you can’t help them by taking away options. And in a free market, where everyone starts with all options, all the government can do is take options away.

The Counterargument:

This treats the world as a series of producer-consumer dyads instead of as a system in which every transaction affects everyone else. Also, it treats consumers as coherent entities who have specific variables like “utility” and “demand” and know exactly what they are, which doesn’t always work.

In the remainder of this section, I’ll be going over several ways the free market can fail and several ways a regulated market can overcome those failures. I’ll focus on four main things: externalities, coordination problems, irrational choice, and lack of information.

I did warn you it would be mind-numbingly boring.

1. Externalities

1.1: What is an externality?

An externality is when I make a trade with you, but it has some accidental effect on other people who weren’t involved in the trade.

Suppose for example that I sell my house to an amateur wasp farmer. Only he’s not a very good wasp farmer, so his wasps usually get loose and sting people all over the neighborhood every couple of days.

This trade between the wasp farmer and myself has benefitted both of us, but it’s harmed people who weren’t consulted; namely, my neighbors, who are now locked indoors clutching cans of industrial-strength insect repellent. Although the trade was voluntary for both the wasp farmer and myself, it wasn’t voluntary for my neighbors.

Another example of externalities would be a widget factory that spews carcinogenic chemicals into the air. When I trade with the widget factory I’m benefitting – I get widgets – and they’re benefitting – they get money. But the people who breathe in the carcinogenic chemicals weren’t consulted in the trade.

1.2: But aren’t there are libertarian ways to solve externalities that don’t involve the use of force?

To some degree, yes. You can, for example, refuse to move into any neighborhood unless everyone in town has signed a contract agreeing not to raise wasps on their property.

But getting every single person in a town of thousands of people to sign a contract every time you think of something else you want banned might be a little difficult. More likely, you would want everyone in town to unanimously agree to a contract saying that certain things, which could be decided by some procedure requiring less than unanimity, could be banned from the neighborhood – sort of like the existing concept of neighborhood associations.

But convincing every single person in a town of thousands to join the neighborhood association would be near impossible, and all it would take would be a single holdout who starts raising wasps and all your work is useless. Better, perhaps, to start a new town on your own land with a pre-existing agreement that before you’re allowed to move in you must belong to the association and follow its rules. You could even collect dues from the members of this agreement to help pay for the people you’d need to enforce it.

But in this case, you’re not coming up with a clever libertarian way around government, you’re just reinventing the concept of government. There’s no difference between a town where to live there you have to agree to follow certain terms decided by association members following some procedure, pay dues, and suffer the consequences if you break the rules – and a regular town with a regular civic government.

As far as I know there is no loophole-free way to protect a community against externalities besides government and things that are functionally identical to it.

1.3: Couldn’t consumers boycott any company that causes externalities?

Only a small proportion of the people buying from a company will live near the company’s factory, so this assumes a colossal amount of both knowledge and altruism on the part of most consumers. See also the general discussion of why boycotts almost never solve problems in the next session.

1.4: What is the significance of externalities?

They justify some environmental, zoning, and property use regulations.

2. Coordination Problems

2.1: What are coordination problems?

Coordination problems are cases in which everyone agrees that a certain action would be best, but the free market cannot coordinate them into taking that action.

As a thought experiment, let’s consider aquaculture (fish farming) in a lake. Imagine a lake with a thousand identical fish farms owned by a thousand competing companies. Each fish farm earns a profit of $1000/month. For a while, all is well.

But each fish farm produces waste, which fouls the water in the lake. Let’s say each fish farm produces enough pollution to lower productivity in the lake by $1/month.

A thousand fish farms produce enough waste to lower productivity by $1000/month, meaning none of the fish farms are making any money. Capitalism to the rescue: someone invents a complex filtering system that removes waste products. It costs $300/month to operate. All fish farms voluntarily install it, the pollution ends, and the fish farms are now making a profit of $700/month – still a respectable sum.

But one farmer (let’s call him Steve) gets tired of spending the money to operate his filter. Now one fish farm worth of waste is polluting the lake, lowering productivity by $1. Steve earns $999 profit, and everyone else earns $699 profit.

Everyone else sees Steve is much more profitable than they are, because he’s not spending the maintenance costs on his filter. They disconnect their filters too.

Once four hundred people disconnect their filters, Steve is earning $600/month – less than he would be if he and everyone else had kept their filters on! And the poor virtuous filter users are only making $300. Steve goes around to everyone, saying “Wait! We all need to make a voluntary pact to use filters! Otherwise, everyone’s productivity goes down.”

Everyone agrees with him, and they all sign the Filter Pact, except one person who is sort of a jerk. Let’s call him Mike. Now everyone is back using filters again, except Mike. Mike earns $999/month, and everyone else earns $699/month. Slowly, people start thinking they too should be getting big bucks like Mike, and disconnect their filter for $300 extra profit…

A self-interested person never has any incentive to use a filter. A self-interested person has some incentive to sign a pact to make everyone use a filter, but in many cases has a stronger incentive to wait for everyone else to sign such a pact but opt out himself. This can lead to an undesirable equilibrium in which no one will sign such a pact.

The most profitable solution to this problem is for Steve to declare himself King of the Lake and threaten to initiate force against anyone who doesn’t use a filter. This regulatory solution leads to greater total productivity for the thousand fish farms than a free market could.

The classic libertarian solution to this problem is to try to find a way to privatize the shared resource (in this case, the lake). I intentionally chose aquaculture for this example because privatization doesn’t work. Even after the entire lake has been divided into parcels and sold to private landowners (waterowners?) the problem remains, since waste will spread from one parcel to another regardless of property boundaries.

2.1.1: Even without anyone declaring himself King of the Lake, the fish farmers would voluntarily agree to abide by the pact that benefits everyone.

Empirically, no. This situation happens with wild fisheries all the time. There’s some population of cod or salmon or something which will be self-sustaining as long as it’s not overfished. Fishermen come in and catch as many fish as they can, overfishing it. Environmentalists warn that the fishery is going to collapse. Fishermen find this worrying, but none of them want to fish less because then their competitors will just take up the slack. Then the fishery collapses and everyone goes out of business. The most famous example is the Collapse of the Northern Cod Fishery, but there are many others in various oceans, lakes, and rivers.

If not for resistance to government regulation, the Canadian governments could have set strict fishing quotas, and companies could still be profitably fishing the area today. Other fisheries that do have government-imposed quotas are much more successful.

2.1.2: I bet [extremely complex privatization scheme that takes into account the ability of cod to move across property boundaries and the migration patterns of cod and so on] could have saved the Atlantic cod too.

Maybe, but left to their own devices, cod fishermen never implemented or recommended that scheme. If we ban all government regulation in the environment, that won’t make fishermen suddenly start implementing complex privatization schemes that they’ve never implemented before. It will just make fishermen keep doing what they’re doing while tying the hands of the one organization that has a track record of actually solving this sort of problem in the real world.

2.2: How do coordination problems justify environmental regulations?

Consider the process of trying to stop global warming. If everyone believes in global warming and wants to stop it, it’s still not in any one person’s self-interest to be more environmentally conscious. After all, that would make a major impact on her quality of life, but a negligible difference to overall worldwide temperatures. If everyone acts only in their self-interest, then no one will act against global warming, even though stopping global warming is in everyone’s self-interest. However, everyone would support the institution of a government that uses force to make everyone more environmentally conscious.

Notice how well this explains reality. The government of every major country has publicly declared that they think solving global warming is a high priority, but every time they meet in Kyoto or Copenhagen or Bangkok for one of their big conferences, the developed countries would rather the developing countries shoulder the burden, the developing countries would rather the developed countries do the hard work, and so nothing ever gets done.

The same applies mutans mutandis to other environmental issues like the ozone layer, recycling, and anything else where one person cannot make a major difference but many people acting together can.

2.3: How do coordination problems justify regulation of ethical business practices?

The normal libertarian belief is that it is unnecessary for government to regulate ethical business practices. After all, if people object to something a business is doing, they will boycott that business, either incentivizing the business to change its ways, or driving them into well-deserved bankruptcy. And if people don’t object, then there’s no problem and the government shouldn’t intervene.

A close consideration of coordination problems demolishes this argument. Let’s say Wanda’s Widgets has one million customers. Each customer pays it $100 per year, for a total income of $100 million. Each customer prefers Wanda to her competitor Wayland, who charges $150 for widgets of equal quality. Now let’s say Wanda’s Widgets does some unspeakably horrible act which makes it $10 million per year, but offends every one of its million customers.

There is no incentive for a single customer to boycott Wanda’s Widgets. After all, that customer’s boycott will cost the customer $50 (she will have to switch to Wayland) and make an insignificant difference to Wanda (who is still earning $99,999,900 of her original hundred million). The customer takes significant inconvenience, and Wanda neither cares nor stops doing her unspeakably horrible act (after all, it’s giving her $10 million per year, and only losing her $100).

The only reason it would be in a customer’s interests to boycott is if she believed over a hundred thousand other customers would join her. In that case, the boycott would be costing Wanda more than the $10 million she gains from her unspeakably horrible act, and it’s now in her self-interest to stop committing the act. However, unless each boycotter believes 99,999 others will join her, she is inconveniencing herself for no benefit.

Furthermore, if a customer offended by Wanda’s actions believes 100,000 others will boycott Wanda, then it’s in the customer’s self-interest to “defect” from the boycott and buy Wanda’s products. After all, the customer will lose money if she buys Wayland’s more expensive widgets, and this is unnecessary – the 100,000 other boycotters will change Wanda’s mind with or without her participation.

This suggests a “market failure” of boycotts, which seems confirmed by experience. We know that, despite many companies doing very controversial things, there have been very few successful boycotts. Indeed, few boycotts, successful or otherwise, ever make the news, and the number of successful boycotts seems much less than the amount of outrage expressed at companies’ actions.

The existence of government regulation solves this problem nicely. If >51% of people disagree with Wanda’s unspeakably horrible act, they don’t need to waste time and money guessing how many of them will join in a boycott, and they don’t need to worry about being unable to conscript enough defectors to reach critical mass. They simply vote to pass a law banning the action.

2.3.1: I’m not convinced that it’s really that hard to get a boycott going. If people really object to something, they’ll start a boycott regardless of all that coordination problem stuff.

So, you’re boycotting Coke because they’re hiring local death squads to kidnap, torture, and murder union members and organizers in their sweatshops in Colombia, right?

Not a lot of people to whom I have asked this question have ever answered “yes”. Most of them had never heard of the abuses before. A few of them vaguely remembered having heard something about it, but dismissed it as “you know, multinational corporations do a lot of sketchy things.” I’ve only met one person who’s ever gone so far as to walk twenty feet further to get to the Pepsi vending machine.

If you went up to a random guy on the street and said “Hey, does hiring death squads to torture and kill Colombians who protest about terrible working conditions bother you?” 99.9% of people would say yes. So why the disconnect between words and actions? People could just be lying – they could say they cared so they sounded compassionate, but in reality it doesn’t really bother them.

But maybe it’s something more complicated. Perhaps they don’t have the brainpower to keep track of every single corporation that’s doing bad things and just how bad they are. Perhaps they’ve compartmentalized their lives and after they leave their Amnesty meetings it just doesn’t register that they should change their behaviour in the supermarket. Or perhaps the Coke = evil connection is too tenuous and against the brain’s ingrained laws of thought to stay relevant without expending extraordinary amounts of willpower. Or perhaps there’s some part of the subconscious that really is worry about that game theory and figuring it has no personal incentive to join the boycott.

And God forbid that it’s something more complicated than that. Imagine if the company that made the mining equipment that was bought by the mining company that mined the aluminum that was bought by Coke to make their cans was doing something unethical. You think you could convince enough people to boycott Coke that Coke would boycott the mining company that the mining company would boycott the equipment company that the equipment company would stop behaving unethically?

If we can’t trust people to stay off Coke when it uses death squads and when Pepsi tastes exactly the same (don’t argue with me on that one!) how can we assume people’s purchasing decisions will always act as a general moral regulatory method for the market?

2.3.2: And you really think governments can do better?

Sure seems that way. Many laws currently exist banning businesses from engaging in unethical practices. Some of these laws were passed by direct ballot. Others were passed by representatives who have incentives to usually follow the will of their consitutents. So it seems fair to say that there are a lot of business practices that more than 51% of people thought should be banned.

But the very fact that a law was needed to ban them proves that those 51% of people weren’t able to organize a successful boycott. More than half of the population, sometimes much more, hated some practice so much they thought it should be illegal, yet that wasn’t enough to provide an incentive for the company to stop doing it until the law took effect.

To me, that confirms that boycotts are a very poor way of allowing people’s morals to influence corporate conduct.

2.4: How do coordination problems justify government spending on charitable causes?

Because failure to donate to a charitable cause might also be because of a coordination problem.

How many people want to end world hunger? I’ve never yet met someone who would answer with a “not me!”, but maybe some of those people are just trying to look good in front of other people, so let’s make a conservative estimate of 50%.

There’s a lot of dispute over what it would mean to “end world hunger”, all the way from “buy and ship food every day to everyone who is hungry that day” all the way to “create sustainable infrastructure and economic development such that everyone naturally produces enough food or money”. There are various estimates about how much these different definitions would cost, all the way from “about $15 billion a year” to “about $200 billion a year” – permanently in the case of shipping food, and for a decade or two in the case of promoting development.

Even if we take the highest possible estimate, it’s still well below what you would make if 50% of the population of the world donated $1/week to the cause. Now, certainly there are some very poor people in the world who couldn’t donate $1/week, but there are also some very rich people who could no doubt donate much, much more.

So we have two possibilities. Either the majority of people don’t care enough about world hunger to give a dollar a week to end it, or something else is going on.

That something else is a coordination problem. No one expects anyone else to donate a dollar a week, so they don’t either. And although somebody could shout very loudly “Hey, let’s all donate $1 a week to fight world hunger!” no one would expect anyone else to listen to that person, so they wouldn’t either.

When the government levies tax money on everyone in the country and then donates it to a charitable cause, it is often because everyone in the country supports that charitable cause but a private attempt to show that support would fall victim to coordination problems.

2.5: How do coordination problems justify labor unions and other labor regulation?

It is frequently proposed that workers and bosses are equal negotiating partners bargaining on equal terms, and only the excessive government intervention on the side of labor that makes the negotiating table unfair. After all, both need something from one another: the worker needs money, the boss labor. Both can end the deal if they don’t like the terms: the boss can fire the worker, or the worker can quit the boss. Both have other choices: the boss can choose a different employee, the worker can work for a different company. And yet, strange to behold, having proven the fundamental equality of workers and bosses, we find that everyone keeps acting as if bosses have the better end of the deal.

During interviews, the prospective employee is often nervous; the boss rarely is. The boss can ask all sorts of things like that the prospective pay for her own background check, or pee in a cup so the boss can test the urine for drugs; the prospective employee would think twice before daring make even so reasonable a request as a cup of coffee. Once the employee is hired, the boss may ask on a moment’s notice that she work a half hour longer or else she’s fired, and she may not dare to even complain. On the other hand, if she were to so much as ask to be allowed to start work thirty minutes later to get more sleep or else she’ll quit, she might well be laughed out of the company. A boss may, and very often does, yell at an employee who has made a minor mistake, telling her how stupid and worthless she is, but rarely could an employee get away with even politely mentioning the mistake of a boss, even if it is many times as unforgivable.

The naive economist who truly believes in the equal bargaining position of labor and capital would find all of these things very puzzling.

Let’s focus on the last issue; a boss berating an employee, versus an employee berating a boss. Maybe the boss has one hundred employees. Each of these employees only has one job. If the boss decides she dislikes an employee, she can drive her to quit and still be 99% as productive while she looks for a replacement; once the replacement is found, the company will go on exactly as smoothly as before.

But if the employee’s actions drive the boss to fire her, then she must be completely unemployed until such time as she finds a new job, suffering a long period of 0% productivity. Her new job may require a completely different life routine, including working different hours, learning different skills, or moving to an entirely new city. And because people often get promoted based on seniority, she probably won’t be as well paid or have as many opportunities as she did at her old company. And of course, there’s always the chance she won’t find another job at all, or will only find one in a much less tolerable field like fast food.

We previously proposed a symmetry between a boss firing a worker and a worker quitting a boss, but actually they could not be more different. For a boss to fire a worker is at most a minor inconvenience; for a worker to lose a job is a disaster. The Holmes-Rahe Stress Scale, a measure of the comparative stress level of different life events, puts being fired at 47 units, worse than the death of a close friend and nearly as bad as a jail term. Tellingly, “firing one of your employees” failed to make the scale.

This fundamental asymmetry gives capital the power to create more asymmetries in its favor. For example, bosses retain a level of control on workers even after they quit, because a worker may very well need a letter of reference from a previous boss to get a good job at a new company. On the other hand, a prospective employee who asked her prospective boss to produce letters of recommendation from her previous workers would be politely shown the door; we find even the image funny.

The proper level negotiating partner to a boss is not one worker, but all workers. If the boss lost all workers at once, then she would be at 0% productivity, the same as the worker who loses her job. Likewise, if all the workers approached the boss and said “We want to start a half hour later in the morning or we all quit”, they might receive the same attention as the boss who said “Work a half hour longer each day or you’re all fired”.

But getting all the workers together presents coordination problems. One worker has to be the first to speak up. But if one worker speaks up and doesn’t get immediate support from all the other workers, the boss can just fire that first worker as a troublemaker. Being the first worker to speak up has major costs – a good chance of being fired – but no benefits – all workers will benefit equally from revised policies no matter who the first worker to ask for them is.

Or, to look at it from the other angle, if only one worker sticks up for the boss, then intolerable conditions may well still get changed, but the boss will remember that one worker and maybe be more likely to promote her. So even someone who hates the boss’s policies has a strong selfish incentive to stick up for her.

The ability of workers to coordinate action without being threatened or fired for attempting to do so is the only thing that gives them any negotiating power at all, and is necessary for a healthy labor market. Although we can debate the specifics of exactly how much protection should be afforded each kind of coordination, the fundamental principle is sound.

2.5.1: But workers don’t need to coordinate. If working conditions are bad, people can just change jobs, and that would solve the bad conditions.

About three hundred Americans commit suicide for work-related reasons every year – this number doesn’t count those who attempt suicide but fail. The reasons cited by suicide notes, survivors and researchers investigating the phenomenon include on-the-job bullying, poor working conditions, unbearable hours, and fear of being fired.

I don’t claim to understand the thought processes that would drive someone to do this, but given the rarity and extremity of suicide, we can assume for every worker who goes ahead with suicide for work-related reasons, there are a hundred or a thousand who feel miserable but not quite suicidal.

If people are literally killing themselves because of bad working conditions, it’s safe to say that life is more complicated than the ideal world in which everyone who didn’t like their working conditions quits and get a better job elsewhere (see the next section, Irrationality).

I note in the same vein stories from the days before labor regulations when employers would ban workers from using the restroom on jobs with nine hour shifts, often ending in the workers wetting themselves. This seems like the sort of thing that provides so much humiliation to the workers, and so little benefit to the bosses, that a free market would eliminate it in a split second. But we know that it was a common policy in the 1910s and 1920s, and that factories with such policies never wanted for employees. The same is true of factories that literally locked their workers inside to prevent them from secretly using the restroom or going out for a smoking break, leading to disasters like the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire when hundreds of workers died when the building they were locked inside burnt down. And yet even after this fire, the practice of locking workers inside buildings only stopped when the government finally passed regulation against it.

3. Irrational Choices

3.1: What do you mean by “irrational choices”?

A company (Thaler, 2007, download study as .pdf) gives its employees the opportunity to sign up for a pension plan. They contribute a small amount of money each month, and the company will also contribute some money, and overall it ends up as a really good deal for the employees and gives them an excellent retirement fund. Only a small minority of the employees sign up.

The libertarian would answer that this is fine. Although some outsider might condescendingly declare it “a really good deal”, the employees are the most likely to understand their own unique financial situation. They may have a better pension plan somewhere else, or mistrust the company’s promises, or expect not to need much money in their own age. For some outsider to declare that they are wrong to avoid the pension plan, or worse to try to force them into it for their own good, would be the worst sort of arrogant paternalism, and an attack on the employees’ dignity as rational beings.

Then the company switches tactics. It automatically signs the employees up for the pension plan, but offers them the option to opt out. This time, only a small minority of the employees opt out.

That makes it very hard to spin the first condition as the employees rationally preferring not to participate in the pension plan, since the second condition reveals the opposite preference. It looks more like they just didn’t have the mental energy to think about it or go through the trouble of signing up. And in the latter condition, they didn’t have the mental energy to think about it or go through the trouble of opting out.

If the employees were rationally deciding whether or not to sign up, then some outsider regulating their decision would be a disaster. But if the employees are making demonstrably irrational choices because of a lack of mental energy, and if people do so consistently and predictably, then having someone else who has considered the issue in more depth regulate their choices could lead to a better outcome.

3.1.1: So what’s going on here?

Old-school economics assumed choice to be “revealed preference”: an individual’s choices will invariably correspond to their preferences, and imposing any other set of choices on them will result in fewer preferences being satisfied.

In some cases, economists have gone to absurd lengths to defend this model. For example, Bryan Caplan says that when drug addicts say they wish that they could quit drugs, they must be lying, since they haven’t done so. Seemingly unsuccessful attempts to quit must be elaborate theater, done to convince other people to continue supporting them, while they secretly enjoy their drugs as much as ever.

But the past fifty years of cognitive science have thoroughly demolished this “revealed preference” assumption, showing that people’s choices result from a complex mix of external compulsions, internal motivations, natural biases, and impulsive behaviors. These decisions usually approximate fulfilling preferences, but sometimes they fail in predictable and consistent ways.

The field built upon these insights is called “behavioral economics”, and you can find more information in books like Judgment Under Uncertainty, Cognitive Illusions, and Predictably Irrational, or on the website Less Wrong.

3.2: Why does this matter?

The gist of this research, as it relates to the current topic, is that people don’t always make the best choice according to their preferences. Sometimes they consistently make the easiest or the most superficially attractive choice instead. It may be best not to think of them as a “choice” at all, but as a reflexive reaction to certain circumstances, which often but not always conforms to rationality.

Such possibilities cast doubt on the principle that every trade that can be voluntarily made should be voluntarily made.

If people’s decisions are not randomly irrational, but systematically irrational in predictable ways, that raises the possibility that people who are aware of these irrationalities may be able to do better than the average person in particular fields where the irrationalities are more common, raising the possibility that paternalism can sometimes be justified.

3.2.1: Why should the government protect people from their own irrational choices?

By definition of “irrational”, people will be happier and have more of their preferences satisfied if they do not make irrational choices. By the principles of the free market, as people make more rational decisions the economy will also improve.

If you mean this question in a moral sense, more like “How dare the government presume to protect me from my own irrational choices!”, see the section on Moral Issues.

3.2.2: What is the significance of predictably irrational behavior?

It justifies government-mandated pensions, some consumer safety and labor regulations, advertising regulations, concern about addictive drugs, and public health promotion, among other things.

4. Lack of Information

4.1: What do you mean by “lack of information”?

Many economic theories start with the assumption that everyone has perfect information about everything. For example, if a company’s products are unsafe, these economic theories assume consumers know the product is unsafe, and so will buy less of it.

No economist literally believes consumers have perfect information, but there are still strong arguments for keeping the “perfect information” assumption. These revolve around the idea that consumers will be motivated to pursue information about things that are important to them. For example, if they care about product safety, they will fund investigations into product safety, or only buy products that have been certified safe by some credible third party. The only case in which a consumer would buy something without information on it is if the consumer had no interest in the information, or wasn’t willing to pay as much for the information as it would cost, in which case the consumer doesn’t care much about the information anyway, and it is a success rather than a failure of the market that it has not given it to her.

In nonlibertarian thought, people care so much about things like product safety and efficacy, or the ethics of how a product is produced, that the government needs to ensure them. In libertarian thought, if people really care about product safety, efficacy and ethics, the market will ensure them itself, and if they genuinely don’t care, that’s okay too.

4.1.1: And what’s wrong with the libertarian position here?

Section 5 describes how we can sometimes predict when people will make irrational choices. One of the most consistent irrational choices people make is buying products without spending as much effort to gather information as the amount they care about these things would suggest. So in fact, the nonlibertarians are right: if there were no government regulation, people who care a lot about things like safety and efficacy would consistently be stuck with unsafe and ineffective products, and the market would not correct these failures.

4.2: Is this really true? Surely people would investigate the safety, ethics, and efficacy of the products they buy.

Below follows a list of statements about products. Some are real, others are made up. Can you identify which are which?

1. Some processed food items, including most Kraft cheese products, contain methylarachinate, an additive which causes a dangerous anaphylactic reaction in 1/31000 people who consume it. They have been banned in Canada, but continue to be used in the United States after intense lobbying from food industry interests.

2. Commonly used US-manufactured wood products, including almost all plywood, contain formaldehyde, a compound known to cause cancer. This has been known in scientific circles for years, but was only officially reported a few months ago because of intense chemical industry lobbying to keep it secret. Formaldehyde-containing wood products are illegal in the EU and most other developed nations.

3. Total S.A., an oil company that owns fill-up stations around the world, sometimes uses slave labor in repressive third-world countries to build its pipelines and oil wells. Laborers are coerced to work for the company by juntas funded by the corporation, and are shot or tortured if they refuse. The company also helps pay for the military muscle needed to keep the juntas in power.

4. Microsoft has cooperated with the Chinese government by turning over records from the Chinese equivalents of its search engine “Bing” and its hotmail email service, despite knowing these records would be used to arrest dissidents. At least three dissidents were arrested based on the information and are currently believed to be in jail or “re-education” centers.

5. Wellpoint, the second largest US health care company, has a long record of refusing to provide expensive health care treatments promised in some of its plans by arguing that their customers have violated the “small print” of the terms of agreement; in fact they make it so technical that almost all customers violate them unknowingly, then only cite the ones who need expensive treatment. Although it has been sued for these practices at least twice, both times it has used its legal muscle to tie the cases up in court long enough that the patients settled for an undisclosed amount believed to be fraction of the original benefits promised.

6. Ultrasonic mosquito repellents like those made by GSI, which claim to mimic frequencies produced by the mosquito’s natural predator, the bat, do not actually repel mosquitoes. Studies have shown that exactly as many mosquitoes inhabit the vicinity of such a mosquito repellent as anywhere else.

7. Listerine (and related mouth washes) probably do not eliminate bad breath. Although it may be effective at first, in the long term it generally increases bad breath by drying out the mouth and inhibiting the salivary glands. This may also increase the population of dental bacteria. Most top dentists recommend avoiding mouth wash or using it very sparingly.

8. The most popular laundry detergents, including most varieties of Tide and Method, have minimal to zero ability to remove stains from clothing. They mostly just makes clothing smell better when removed from the laundry. Some of the more expensive alkylbenzenesulfonate detergents have genuine stain-removing action, but aside from the cost, these detergents have very strong smells and are unpopular.

4.2.1: Okay, I admit I’m not sure of most of these. What’s your point?

This is a complicated FAQ about complicated philosophical issues. Most likely its readers are in the top few percentiles in terms of intelligence and education.

And we live in a world where there are many organizations, both private and governmental, that exist to evaluate products and disseminate information about their safety.

And all of the companies and products above are popular ones that most American consumers have encountered and had to make purchasing decisions about. I tried to choose safety issues that were extremely serious and carried significant risks of death, and ethical issues involving slavery and communism, which would be of particular importance to libertarians.

If the test was challenging, it means that the smartest and best-educated people in a world full of consumer safety and education organizations don’t bother to look up important life-or-death facts specifically tailored to be relevant to them about the most popular products and companies they use every day.

And if that’s the case, why would you believe that less well-educated people in a world with less consumer safety information trying to draw finer distinctions between more obscure products will definitely seek out the consumer information necessary allows them to avoid unsafe, unethical, or ineffective products?

The above test is an attempt at experimental proof that people don’t seek out even the product information that is genuinely important to them, but instead take the easy choice of buying whatever’s convenient based on information they get from advertising campaigns and the like.

4.2.2: Fine, fine, what are the answers to the test?

Four of them are true and four of them are false, but I’m not saying which are which, in the hopes that people will observe their own thought processes when deciding whether or not it’s worth looking up.

4.2.3: Right, well of course people don’t look up product information now because the government regulates that for them. In a real libertarian society, they would be more proactive.

All of the four true items on the test above are true in spite of government regulation. Clearly, there are still significant issues even in a regulated environment.

If you honestly believe you have no incentive to look up product information because you trust the government to take care of that, then you’re about ten times more statist than I am, and I’m the guy writing the Non-Libertarian FAQ.

4.3: What other unexpected consequences might occur without consumer regulation?

It could destroy small business.

In the absence of government regulation, you would have to trust corporate self-interest to regulate quality. And to some degree you can do that. Wal-Mart and Target are both big enough and important enough that if they sold tainted products, it would make it into the newspaper, there would be a big outcry, and they would be forced to stop. One could feel quite safe shopping at Wal-Mart.

But suppose on the way to Wal-Mart, you see a random mom-and-pop store that looks interesting. What do you know about its safety standards? Nothing. If they sold tainted or defective products, it would be unlikely to make the news; if it were a small enough store, it might not even make the Internet. Although you expect the CEO of Wal-Mart to be a reasonable man who understands his own self-interest and who would enforce strict safety standards, you have no idea whether the owner of the mom-and-pop store is stupid, lazy, or just assumes (with some justification) that no one will ever notice his misdeeds. So you avoid the unknown quantity and head to Wal-Mart, which you know is safe.

Repeated across a million people in a thousand cities, big businesses get bigger and small businesses get unsustainable.

4.4: What is the significance of lack of information?

It justifies some consumer and safety regulations, and the taxes necessary to pay for them.

Part B: Social Issues

The Argument:

Those who work hardest (and smartest) should get the most money. Not only should we not begrudge them that money, but we should thank them for the good they must have done for the world in order to satisfy so many consumers.

People who do not work hard should not get as much money. If they want more money, they should work harder. Getting more money without working harder or smarter is unfair, and indicative of a false sense of entitlement.

Unfortunately, modern liberal society has internalized the opposite principle: that those who work hardest are greedy people who must have stolen from those who work less hard, and that we should distrust them at until they give most of their ill-gotten gains away to others. The “progressive” taxation system as it currently exists serves this purpose.

This way of thinking is not only morally wrong-headed, but economically catastrophic. Leaving wealth in the hands of the rich would “make the pie bigger”, allowing the extra wealth to “trickle down” to the poor naturally.

The Counterargument:

Hard work and intelligence are contributory factors to success, but depending on the way you phrase the question, you find you need other factors to explain between one-half and nine-tenths of the difference in success within the United States; within the world at large the numbers are much higher.

If we think factors other than hard work and intelligence determining success are “unfair”, then most of Americans’ life experiences are determined by “unfair” factors.

Although it would be overly ambitious to want to completely eliminate all unfairness, we know that most other developed countries have successfully eliminated many of the most glaring types of unfairness, and reaped benefits greater than the costs from doing so.

The progressive tax system is part of this policy of eliminating unfairness, but if you disagree with that, that’s okay, as more and more of the country’s wealth is staying in the hands of the super-rich. None of this wealth has trickled down to the poor and none of it ever will, as the past thirty years of economic history have repeatedly and decisively demolished the “trickle-down” concept.

None of this implies that any particular rich person is “greedy”, whatever that would mean.

5. Just Desserts and Social Mobility

5.1: Government is the recourse of “moochers”, who want to take the money of productive people and give it to the poor. But rich people earned their money, and poor people had the chance to earn money but did not. Therefore, the poor do not deserve rich people’s money.

The claim of many libertarians is that the wealthy earned their money by the sweat of their brow, and the poor are poor because they did not. The counterclaim of many liberals is that the wealthy gained their wealth by various unfair advantages, and that the poor never had a chance. These two conflicting worldviews have been the crux of many an Internet flamewar.

Luckily, this is an empirical question, and can be solved simply by collecting the relevant data. For example, we could examine whether the children of rich parents are more likely to be rich than poor parents, and, if so, how much more likely they are. This would give us a pretty good estimate of how much of rich people’s wealth comes from superior personal qualities, as opposed to starting with more advantages.

If we define “rich” as “income in the top 5%” and “poor” as “income in the bottom 5%” then children of rich parents are about twenty times more likely to become rich themselves than children of poor parents.

But maybe that’s an extreme case. Instead let’s talk about “upper class” (top 20%) and “lower class” (bottom 20%). A person born to a lower-class family only has a fifty-fifty chance of ever breaking out of the lower class (as opposed to 80% expected by chance), and only about a 3% chance of ending up in the upper class (as opposed to 20% expected by chance). The children of upper class parents are six times more likely to end up in the upper class than the lower class; the children of lower class families are four times more likely to end up in the lower class than the upper class.

The most precise way to measure this question is via a statistic called “intergenerational income mobility”, which studies have estimated at between .4 and .6. This means that around half the difference in people’s wealth, maybe more, can be explained solely by who their parents are.

Once you add in all the other factors besides how hard you work – like where you live (the average Delawarean earns $30000; the average Mississippian $15000) and the quality of your local school district, there doesn’t seem to be much room for hard work to determine more than about a third of the difference between income.

5.1.1: The conventional wisdom among libertarians is completely different. I’ve heard of a study saying that people in the lower class are more likely to end up in the upper class than stay in the lower class, even over a period as short as ten years!

First of all, note that this is insane. Since the total must add up to 100%, this would mean that starting off poor actually makes you more likely to end up rich than someone who didn’t start off poor. If this were true, we should all send our children to school in the ghetto to maximize their life chances. This should be a red flag.

And, in fact, it is false. Most of the claims of this sort come from a single discredited study. The study focused on a cohort with a median age of twenty-two, then watched them for ten years, then compared the (thirty-two year old) origins with twenty-two year olds, then claimed that the fact that young professionals make more than college students was a fact about social mobility. It was kind of weird.

Why would someone do this? Far be it from me to point fingers, but Glenn Hubbard, the guy who conducted the study, worked for a conservative think tank called the “American Enterprise Institute”. You can see a more complete criticism of the study here.

5.1.2: Okay, I acknowledge that at least half of the differences in wealth can be explained by parents. But that needn’t be rich parents leaving trust funds to their children. It could also be parents simply teaching their children better life habits. It could even be genes for intelligence and hard work.

This may explain a small part of the issue, but see 5.1.3 and 5.1.3.1, which show that under different socioeconomic conditions, this number markedly decreases. These socioeconomic changes would not be expected to affect things like genetics.

5.1.3: So maybe children of the rich do have better opportunities, but that’s life. Some people just start with advantages not available to others. There’s no point in trying to use Big Government to regulate away something that’s part of the human condition.

This lack of social mobility isn’t part of the human condition, it’s a uniquely American problem. Of eleven developed countries investigated in a recent study on income mobility, America came out tenth out of eleven. Their calculation of US intergenerational income elasticity (the number previously cited as probably between .4 and .6) was .47. But other countries in the study had income elasticity as low as .15 (Denmark), .16 (Australia), .17 (Norway), and .19 (Canada). In each of those countries, the overwhelming majority of wealth is earned by hard work rather than inherited.

The United States, is just particularly bad at this; the American Dream turns out to be the “nearly every developed country except America” Dream.

5.1.3.1: That’s depressing, but don’t try to turn it into a political narrative. Given the government’s incompetence and wastefulness, there’s no reason to think more government regulation and spending could possibly improve social mobility at all.

Studies show that increasing government spending significantly improves social mobility. States with higher government spending have about 33% more social mobility than states with lower spending.

This also helps explain why other First World countries have better social mobility than we do. Poor American children have very few chances to go to Harvard or Yale; poor Canadian children have a much better chance to go to to UToronto or McGill, where most of their tuition is government-subsidized.

5.2: Then perhaps it is true that rich children start out with a major unfair advantage. But this advantage can be overcome. Poor children may have to work harder than rich children to become rich adults, but this is still possible, and so it is still true, in the important sense, that if you are not rich it’s mostly your own fault.

Several years ago, I had an interesting discussion with an evangelical Christian on the ethics of justification by faith. I promise you this will be relevant eventually.

I argued that it is unfair for God to restrict entry to Heaven to Christians alone. After all, 99% of native-born Ecuadorans are Christian, but less than 1% of native born Saudis are same. It follows that the chance of any native-born Ecuadorian of becoming Christian is 99%, and that of any native born Saudi, 1%. So if God judges people by their religion, then within 1% He’s basically just decided it’s free entry for Ecuadorians, but people born in Saudi Arabia can go to hell (literally).

My Christian friend argued that is not so: that there is a great difference between 0% of Saudis and 1% of Saudis. I answered that no, there was a 1% difference. But he said this 1% proves that the Saudis had free will: that even though all the cards were stacked against them, a few rare Saudis could still choose Christianity.

But what does it mean to have free will, if external circumstances can make 99% of people with free will decide one way in Ecuador, and the opposite way in Saudi Arabia?

I do sort of believe in free will, or at least in “free will”. But where my friend’s free will was unidirectional, an arrow pointing from MIND to WORLD, my idea of free will is circular: MIND affects WORLD affects MIND affects WORLD and so on.

Yes, it is ultimately the mind and nothing else that decides whether to accept or reject Islam or Christianity. But it is the world that shapes the mind before it does its accepting or rejecting. A man raised in Saudi Arabia uses a mind forged by Saudi culture to make the decision, and chooses Islam. A woman raised in Ecuador uses a mind forged by Ecuador to make the decision, and chooses Christianity. And so there is no contradiction in the saying that the decision between Islam and Christianity is up entirely to the individual, yet that it is almost entirely culturally determined. For the mind is a box, filled with genes and ideas, and although it is a wonderful magical box that can take things and combine them and forge them into something quite different and unexpected, it is not infinitely magical, and it cannot create out of thin air.

Returning to the question at hand, every poor person has the opportunity to work hard and eventually become rich. Whether that poor person grasps the opportunity comes from that person’s own personality. And that person’s own personality derives eventually from factors outside that person’s control. A clear look at the matter proves it must be so, or else personality would be self-created, like the story of the young man who received a gift of a time machine from a mysterious aged stranger, spent his life exploring past and future, and, in his own age, goes back and gives his time machine to his younger self.

5.2.1: And why is this relevant to politics?

Earlier, I offered a number between .4 and .6 as the proportion of success attributable solely to one’s parents’ social class. This bears on, but does not wholly answer, a related question: what percentage of my success is my own, and what percentage is attributable to society? People have given answers to this question as diverse as (100%, 0%), (50%, 50%), (0%, 100%).

I boldly propose a different sort of answer: (80%, 100%). Most of my success comes from my own hard work, and all of my own hard work comes from external factors.

If all of our success comes from external factors, then it is reasonable to ask that we “pay it forward” by trying to improve the external factors of others, turning them into better people who will be better able to seize the opportunities to succeed. This is a good deal of the justification for the liberal program of redistribution of wealth and government aid to the poor.

5.2.2: This is all very philosophical. Can you give some concrete examples?

Lead poisoning, for example. It’s relatively common among children in poorer areas (about 7% US prevalence) and was even more common before lead paint and leaded gasoline was banned (still >30% in many developing contries).

For every extra ten millionths of a gram per deciliter concentration of lead in their blood, children permanently lose five IQ points; there’s a difference of about ten IQ points among children who grew up in areas with no lead at all, and those who grew up in areas with the highest level of lead currently considered “safe”. Although no studies have been done on severely lead poisoned children from the era of leaded gasoline, they may have lost twenty or more IQ points from chronic lead exposure.

Further, lead also decreases behavioral inhibition, attention, and self-control. For every ten ug/dl lead increase, children were 50% more likely to have recognized behavioral problems. People exposed to higher levels of blood lead as a child were almost 50% more likely to be arrested for criminal behavior as adults (adjusting for confounders).

Economic success requires self-control, intelligence, and attention. It is cruel to blame people for not seizing opportunities to rise above their background when that background has damaged the very organ responsible for seizing opportunities. And this is why government action, despite a chorus of complaints from libertarians, banned lead from most products, a decision which is (controversially) credited with the most significant global drop in crime rates in decades, but which has certainly contributed to social mobility and opportunity for children who would otherwise be too lead-poisoned to succeed.

Lead is an interesting case because it has obvious neurological effects preventing success. The ability of psychologically and socially toxic environments to prevent success is harder to measure but no less real.

If a poor person can’t keep a job solely because she was lead-poisoned from birth until age 16, is it still fair to blame her for her failure? And is it still so unthinkable to take a little bit of money from everyone who was lucky enough to grow up in an area without lead poisoning, and use it to help her and detoxify her neighborhood?

5.3: What is the significance of whether success is personally or environmentally determined?

It provides justification for redistribution of wealth, and for engineering an environment in which more people are able to succeed.

6. Taxation

6.1: Isn’t taxation, the act of taking other people’s money by force, inherently evil?

See the Moral Issues section for a more complete discussion of this point.

6.2: Isn’t progressive taxation, the tendency to tax the rich at higher rates than the poor, unfair?

The most important justification for progressive tax rates is the idea of marginal utility.

This is easier to explain with movie tickets than money. Suppose different people are alloted a different number of non-transferrable movie tickets for a year; some people get only one, other people get ten thousand.

A person with only two movie ticket might love to have one extra ticket. Perhaps she is a huge fan of X-Men, Batman and Superman, and with only two movie ticket she will only be able to see two of the three movies she’s super-excited about this year.

A person with ten movie tickets would get less value from an extra ticket. She can already see the ten movies that year she’s most interested in. If she got an eleventh, she’d use it for a movie she might find a bit enjoyable, but it wouldn’t be one of her favorites.

A person with a hundred movie tickets would get minimal value from an extra ticket. Even if your tickets are free, you’re not likely to go to the movies a hundred times a year. And even if you did, you’d start scraping the bottom of the barrel in terms of watchable films.

A person with a thousand tickets would get practically no value from an extra ticket. At this point,t here’s no way she can go to any more movies. The extra ticket might not have literally zero value – she could burn it for warmth, or write memos on the back of it – but it’s pretty worthless.

So although all movie tickets provide an equal service – seeing one movie – one extra movie ticket represents a different amount of value to the person with two tickets and the person with a thousand tickets. Furthermore, 50% of their movie ticket holdings represent a different value to the person with two tickets and the person with a thousand movie tickets. The person with two tickets loses the ability to watch the second-best film of the year. The person with a thousand tickets still has five hundred tickets left, more than enough to see all the year’s best films, and at worst will have to buy some real memo paper.

Money works similarly to movie tickets. Your first hundred dollars determine whether you live or starve to death. Your next five hundred dollars determine whether you have a roof over your head or you’re freezing out on the street. But by your ten billionth dollar, all you’re doing is buying a slightly larger yacht.

50% of what a person with $10,000 makes is more valuable to her than 50% of what a billionaire makes is to the billionaire.

Progressive taxation is an attempt to tax everyone equally, not by lump sum or by percentage, but by burden. Just as taking extra movie tickets away from the person with a thousand is more fair than taking some away from the person with only two, so we tax the rich at a higher rate because a proportionate amount of money has less marginal value to them.

6.2.1: But the progressive tax system is unfair and perverse. Imagine the tax rate on people making $100,000 or less is 30%, and the tax rate on people making more than $100,000 is 50%. You make $100,000, and end up with after tax income of $70,000. Then one day your boss tells you that you did a good job, and gives you a $1 bonus. Now you make $100,001, but end up with only $50,000.50 after tax income. How is that at all fair?

It’s not, but this isn’t how the tax system works.

What those figures mean is that your first $100,000, no matter how much you earn, is taxed at 30%. Then the money you make after that is taxed at 50%. So if you made $100,001, you would be taxed 30% on the first $100,000 (giving you $70,000), and 50% on the next $1 (giving you $.50), for an after-tax income of $70,000.50. The intuitive progression where someone who makes more money ends up with more after-tax income is preserved.

I know most libertarians don’t make this mistake, and that there are much stronger arguments against progressive taxation, but this has come up enough times that I thought it was worth mentioning, with apologies to those readers whose time it has wasted.

6.3: Taxes are too high.

Too high by what standard?

6.3.1: Too high by historical standards. Thanks to the unstoppable growth of big government, people have to pay more taxes now than ever before.

Actually, income tax rates for people on median income are around the lowest they’ve been in the past seventy-five years

6.3.1.1: I meant for the rich. It’s only tolerable for people on median income because “progressive” governments are squeezing every last dollar out of successful people.

Actually, income tax rates for the rich are around the lowest they’ve been in the past seventy-five years.

6.3.1.1.1: But I heard that the share of tax revenue coming from the rich is at its highest level ever.

This is true. As the rich get richer and the poor get poorer (see 3.4), more of the money concentrates in the hands of the rich, and so more of the taxes come from the rich as well. This doesn’t contradict the point that the tax rates on the rich are near historic lows.

6.3.1.2: I meant for corporations.

Actually, income tax rates for corporations are around the lowest they’ve been in the past seventy-five years.

6.3.2: I meant income taxes are too high compared to what’s best for the economy, and even best for the Treasury. With taxes as high as they are, people will stop producing, rather than see so much of each dollar they make go to the government. This will hurt the economy and lower tax revenue.

The Laffer curve certainly exists, but the consensus is that we’re still well on the left half of it.

Although it’s become a truism that high tax rates discourage production, studies have found this to be mostly false, with low elasticity of real income – see for example Gruber & Saez and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz.

What studies have found is a high elasticity of taxable income. That is, raising taxes encourages people to find more tax loopholes, decreasing revenue. However, although this effect means a 10% higher tax rate would lead to less than 10% higher government income, the change in government income would still be positive – even by this stricter criterion, we’re still on the left side of the Laffer curve. And of course, this effect could be eliminated by switching to a flat tax or closing tax loopholes.

6.4: Our current tax system is overzealous in its attempts to redistribute money from the rich to the poor. If instead we lowered taxes on the rich, this money would “trickle down” to the rest of the economy, driving growth. Instead of redistributing the pie, we’d make the pie larger for everyone.

If we’re in an overzealous campaign for “equality” intended to lower the rich to the level of the poor, we’re certainly not doing a very good job of it. Over the past thirty years, the rich have consistently gotten richer. None of this money has trickled down to the poor or middle-class, whose income has remained the same in real terms.

“Trickle-down” should be rejected as an interesting and plausible-sounding economic theory which empirical data have soundly disconfirmed.

6.5: Raising taxes would be useless for the important things like cutting the deficit. The deficit is $1.2 trillion. The most we could realistically raise from extra taxes on the rich would be maybe $200 billion. The most we could raise from insane levels of extra taxes on the rich and middle class would be about $500 billion – less than half the deficit. The real problem is spending.

Yes and no.

The deficit is, indeed, very, very large. It’s so large that no politically palatable option is likely to make more than a small dent in it. This is true of tax increases. It’s also true of spending cuts.

Cutting all redistributive government services for the poor including welfare, unemployment insurance, disability, food stamps, scholarships, you name it – would save about $200 billion. That’s less than 20% of the deficit. Cutting all health care, including Medicaid for senior citizens, would only eliminate $400 billion or so. Even eliminating the entire military down to the last Jeep would only get us $800 billion or so. The targets for cuts that have actually been raised are rounding errors: the Republicans trumpeted an end for government aid to NPR, but this is about $4 million – all of .000003% of the problem.

So “darnit, this one thing doesn’t completely solve the deficit” is not a good reason to reject a proposal. Solving the deficit will, if it’s possible at all, take a lot of different methods, including some unpalatable to liberals, some unpalatable to conservatives, and yes, some unpalatable to libertarians.

In particular, we need to avoid the “bee sting” fallacy, where we have so many problems that we just stop worrying. It would be irresponsible to say that since a few billion dollars doesn’t affect the deficit either way, we might as well just spend $5 billion on some random project we don’t need. For the same reason, it would be irresponsible to say we might as well just renew tax cuts on the rich that cost hundreds of billions of dollars each year.

6.6: Taxes are basically a racket where they take my money and then give it to foreign governments and poor people.

According to a CNN poll, on average Americans estimate that about 10% of our taxes go to foreign aid. The real number is about 0.6%.

And although people believe that food and housing for the poor take up about 20% of the federal budget, the real number is actually less than 5%.

So although people worry that 30% of the budget goes to help the less fortunate, the real number is about 6%.

(And this is actually sort of depressing, when you think about it.)

The majority of your taxes go to programs that benefit you and other middle-class Americans, such as Social Security and Medicare, and to programs that “benefit” you and other middle-class Americans, such as the military.

Part C: Political Issues

The Argument: Government can’t do anything right. Its forays into every field are tinged in failure. Whether it’s trying to create contradictory “state owned businesses”, funding pet projects that end up over budget and useless, or creating burdensome and ridiculous “consumer protection” rules, its heavy-handed actions are always detrimental and usually embarrassing.

With this track record, what sane person would want to involve government in even more industries? The push to get government deeper into health care is a disaster waiting to happen, and could give us a chronically broken system like those in Europe, where people die because of bureaucratic inefficiency.

Other places from which we can profitably eliminate government’s prying hands include our schools, our prisons, our gun dealerships, and the friendly neighborhood meth lab.

The Counterargument: Government sometimes, though by no means always, does things right, and some of its institutions and programs are justifiably considered models of efficiency and human ingenuity. There are various reasons why people are less likely to notice these.

Government-run health systems empirically produce better health outcomes for less money than privately-run health systems for reasons that include economies of scale. There are a mountain of statistics that prove this. Although not every proposal to introduce government into health will necessarily be successful, we would do well to consider emulating more successful systems.

We should think twice about exactly how much government we are willing to remove from our schools, gun dealerships, and meth labs, and run away screaming at the proposal to privatize prisons.

7. Competence of Government

7.1: Government never does anything right.

7.1.1: Okay, fine. But that’s a special case where, given an infinite budget, they were able to accomplish something that private industry had no incentive to try. And to their credit, they did pull it off, but do you have any examples of government succeeding at anything more practical?

Eradicating smallpox and polio globally, and cholera and malaria from their endemic areas in the US. Inventing the computer, mouse, digital camera, and email. Building the information superhighway and the regular superhighway. Delivering clean, practically-free water and cheap on-the-grid electricity across an entire continent. Forcing integration and leading the struggle for civil rights. Setting up the Global Positioning System. Ensuring accurate disaster forecasts for hurricanes, volcanos, and tidal waves. Zero life-savings-destroying bank runs in eighty years. Inventing nuclear power and the game theory necessary to avoid destroying the world with it.

7.1.1.1: All right… all right… but apart from better sanitation and medicine and education and irrigation and public health and roads and a freshwater system and baths and public order… what has the government done for us?

Brought peace. But see also Government Success Stories and The Forgotten Achievements of Government

7.2: Large government projects are always late and over-budget.

The only study on the subject I could find, “What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport Infrastructure Projects?” (download study as .pdf) by Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, finds no difference in cost overruns between comparable government and private projects, and in fact find one of their two classes of government project (those not associated with a state-owned enterprise) to have a trend toward being more efficient than comparable private projects. They conclude that “…one conclusion is clear…the conventional wisdom, which holds that public ownership is problematic whereas private ownership is a main source of efficiency in curbing cost escalation, is dubious.”

Further, when government cost overruns occur, they are not usually because of corrupt bureaucrats wasting the public’s money. Rather, they’re because politicians don’t believe voters will approve their projects unless they spin them as being much cheaper and faster than the likely reality, leading a predictable and sometimes commendable execution to be condemned as “late and over budget” (download study as .pdf) While it is admittedly a problem that government provides an environment in which politicians have to lie to voters to get a project built, the facts provide little justification for a narrative in which government is incompetent at construction projects.

7.3: State-run companies are always uncreative, unprofitable, and unpleasant to use.

Some of the greatest and most successful companies in the world are or have been state-run. Japan National Railways, which created the legendarily efficient bullet trains, and the BBC, which provides the most respected news coverage in the world as well as a host of popular shows like Doctor Who, both began as state-run corporations (JNR was later privatized).

In cases where state-run corporations are unprofitable, this is often not due to some negative effect of being state-run, but because the corporation was put under state control precisely because it was something so unprofitable no private company would touch it, but still important enough that it had to be done. For example, the US Post Office has a legal mandate to ship affordable mail in a timely fashion to every single god-forsaken town in the United States; obviously it will be out-competed by a private company that can focus on the easiest and most profitable routes, but this does not speak against it. Amtrak exists despite passenger rail travel in the United States being fundamentally unprofitable, but within its limitations it has done a relatively good job: on-time rates better than that of commercial airlines, 80% customer satisfaction rate, and double-digit year-on-year passenger growth every year for the past decade.

7.3.1: State-run companies may be able to paper-push with the best of them, but the government can never be truly innovative. Only the free market can do that. Look at Silicon Valley!

Advances invented either solely or partly by government institutions include, as mentioned before, the computer, mouse, Internet, digital camera, and email. Not to mention radar, the jet engine, satellites, fiber optics, artificial limbs, and nuclear energy. And that doesn’t the less recognizable inventions used mostly in industry, or the scores of other inventions from government-funded universities and hospitals.

Even those inventions that come from corporations often come not from startups exposed to the free market, but from de facto state-owned monopolies. For example, during its fifty years as a state-sanctioned monopoly, the infamous Ma Bell invented (via its Bell Labs division) transistors, modern cryptography, solar cells, the laser, the C programming language, and mobile phones; when the monopoly was broken up, Bell Labs was sold off to Alcatel-Lucent, which after a few years announced it was cutting all funding for basic research to focus on more immediately profitable applications.

Although the media celebrates private companies like Apple as centers of innovation, Apple’s expertise lies, at best, in consumer packaging. They did not invent the computer, the mp3 player, or the mobile phone, but they developed versions of these products that were attractive and easy to use. This is great and they deserve the acclaim and heaps of money they’ve gathered from their success, but let’s make sure to call a spade a spade: they are good at marketing and design, not at brilliant invention of totally new technologies.

That sort of de novo invention seems to come mostly from very large organizations that can afford basic research without an obsession on short-term profitability. Although sometimes large companies like Ma Bell, invention-rich IBM and Xerox can fulfill this role, such organizations are disproportionately governments and state-sponsored companies, explaining their impressive track record in this area.

7.4: Most government programs are expensive failures.

I think this may be a form of media bias – not in the sense that some sinister figure in the media is going through and censoring all the stories that support one side, but in the sense that “Government Program Goes More Or Less As Planned” doesn’t make headlines and so you never hear about it.

Let’s say the government wants to spent $1 million to give food to poor children. If there are bureaucratic squabbles over where the money’s supposed to come from, that’s a headline. If they buy the food at above-market prices, that’s a headline. If some corrupt official manages to give the contract to provide the food to a campaign donor along the way, that’s a big headline.

But what if none of these things happen, and poor children get a million dollars worth of food, and eat it, and it makes them healthier? I don’t know about you, but I’ve never seen a headline about this. “Remember that time last year when Congress voted to give food to poor children. Well, they got it.” What newspaper would ever publish something like that?

This is in addition to newspapers’ desire to outrage people, their desire to sound “edgy” by pointing out the failures of the status quo rather than sounding like they’re “pandering”, and honestly that they’re caught up in the same “government can never do anything right” narrative as everyone else.

Since every single time you ever hear about a government project it is always because that government project is going wrong, of course you feel like all government projects go wrong.

7.4.1: But a specific initiative to get money to the poor is one thing. What about a whole federal agency? We would know if it were failing, but we’d also be able to appreciate it when it succeeds, too.

Federal agencies that are successful sink into background noise, so that we don’t think to thank them or celebrate them any more than we would celebrate that we have clean water (four billion people worldwide don’t; thank the EPA and your local water board)

For example, the Federal Aviation Administration helps keep plane crashes at less than one per 21,000 years of flight time; you never think about this when you get on a plane. The National Crime Information Center collects and processes information about criminals from every police department in the country; you never think about this when you go out without being mugged. Zoning regulations, building codes, and the fire department all help prevent fires from starting and keep them limited when they do; you never think of this when you go the day without your house burning down.

One of government’s major jobs is preventing things, and it’s very hard to notice how many bad things aren’t happening, until someone comes out with a report like e. coli poisoning has dropped by half in the past fifteen years. Even if you do hear the statistics, you may never think to connect them to the stricter food safety laws you wrote a letter to the editor opposing fifteen years ago.

7.4.2: You list cases where government regulation exists at the same time as a happy outcome, like the FAA and the lack of plane crashes, but that doesn’t prove it was the regulation that caused the happy outcome.

No, it doesn’t. For example, although workplace accidents have been cut in half since OSHA was founded, CATO wrote a very credible takedown in which they argue that was only a continuation of trends that have been going on since before OSHA existed.

Sometimes there are things we can do to identify cause. For example, as in the CATO study, we can compare trends before and after changes in government regulation; if there is a discontinuity, it may suggest the government was responsible. Second, we can compare trends in a country where a new regulation was introduced to trends in a country where it was not introduced; if the trend only changes in one country, that suggests an effect of the regulation. For example, after the FAA mandated “terrain awareness systems” in airplanes, the terrain-related accident rate sharply dropped to zero in the United States but was not affected in countries without similar rules.

But the important thing is that we apply our skepticism fairly and evenly: that we do not require mountains of evidence that a government regulation caused a positive result, while accepting that a regulation caused a negative result without a shred of proof.

It is very tempting for libertarians, when faced with anything going well even in a tightly regulated area, to say “Well, that just shows even this tight regulations can’t hide how great private industry is!” and when anything goes wrong even in a very loosely regulated area, to say “Well, that just shows how awful regulation is, that even a little of it can screw things up!” But this is unfair, and ignores that we do have some ways to disentangle cause and effect.

And in any case, there is still the difference between “Government destroys everything it touches” and “Everything government touches is doing pretty well, but you can’t prove that it’s directly caused by government action.”

7.4.3: A lot of what government trumpets as “successful regulation” is just obvious stuff anyway that any individual in a free market would do of her own accord.

Very often, yesterday’s regulation is today’s obvious good idea that no one would dream of ignoring even if there were no regulation demanding it. But that neglects the role of government regulation in establishing social norms. Very often these are the regulations which those being regulated fought tooth and nail against at the time.

Many cars did not even include seatbelts until the government mandated that they do so. In 1983, the seat belt use rate in the United States was 14%. It was very clearly the government sponsored awareness campaigns and, later, mandatory seat belt laws that began being implemented around that era that raised seat belt rates; we know because we can watch the statistics state in different states as their legislation either led the campaign or lagged behind it.

After almost three decades of intense government pressure on automakers to allow and promote seatbelts, and on motorists to use them, seatbelt rates are now as high as 85%.

According to estimates, seatbelts save about 11,000 lives a year in the US. Different studies estimate between 80,000 and 100,000 lives saved in the last decade alone. For some perspective that’s the number of American deaths from 9/11 + the Vietnam War + both Iraq Wars + the Afghanistan War + Hurricane Katrina.

I completely acknowledge that if the government completely dropped all seatbelt regulations tomorrow, automakers would continue putting seatbelts in cars, and drivers would keep wearing them. That doesn’t mean government is useless, that means government, the only entity big enough to effect a nationwide change not just in behaviors but in social norms, did its job very very well.

8. Health Care

8.1: Government would do a terrible job in health care. We should avoid government-run “socialized” medicine unless we want cost overruns, long waiting times, and death panels.

Government-run health systems empirically do better than private health systems, while also costing much less money.

Let’s compare, for example, Sweden, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The first four all have single-payer health care (a version of government-run health system); the last has a mostly private health system (although it shouldn’t matter, we’ll use statistics from before Obamacare took effect). We’ll look at three representative statistics commonly used to measure quality of health care: infant mortality, life expectancy, anc cancer death rate.

Infant mortality is the percent of babies who die in the first few weeks of life, usually a good measure of pediatric and neonatal care. Of the five countries, Sweden has the lowest infant mortality at 2.56 per 1,000 births, followed by France at 3.54, followed by the UK at 4.91, followed by Canada at 5.22, with the United States last at 6.81. (source)

Life expectancy, the average age a person born today can expect to live, is a good measurement of lifelong and geriatric care. Here Sweden is again first at 80.9, France and Canada tied for second at 80.7, the UK next at 79.4, and the United States once again last at 78.3. (source)

Taking cancer deaths per 100,000 people per year as representative of deaths from serious disease, here we find the UK doing best at 253.5 deaths, Sweden second at 268.2, France in third at 286.1, and the United States again in last place at 321.9 deaths (source: OECD statistics; data for Canada not available).

So we notice that the United States does worse than all four countries with single-payer health systems, even though America is wealthier per capita than any of them. This is not statistical cherry-picking: any way you look at it, the United States has one of the least effective health systems in the developed world.

8.2: Government-run health care would be bloated, bureaucratic, and unnecessarily expensive, as opposed to the sleek, efficient service we get from the free market.

Actually, government-run health care is empirically more efficient than market health care. For example, Blue Cross New England employs more people to administer health insurance for its 2.5 million customers than the Canadian health system employs to administer health insurance for 27 million Canadians. Health care spending per person (public + private) in Canada is half what it is in America, yet Canadians have longer life expectancy, lower infant mortality, and are healthier by every objective standard.

Remember those five countries from the last question?
The UK spends $1,675 per person per year on health care. Canada spends $1,939. Sweden, which you’ll remember did best on most of the statistics, spends $2,125. France spends $2,288. Americans spend on average $4,271 – almost three times as much as Britain, a country which delivers better health care.

When this argument gets put in graph form, it becomes even clearer that US health inefficiency is literally off the chart.

If these were companies in the free market, the company that charges three times as much to provide a worse service would have gone bankrupt long ago. That company is American-style private health care.

8.3: In government-run health care, people are relegated to “waiting lists”, where they have to wait months or even years for doctor visits, surgeries, and other procedures. Sometimes people die on these waiting lists. Obviously, this is unacceptable and a knock-down argument against government-run health care.

The laws of supply and demand apply in health care as much as anywhere else: people would like to see doctors as quickly as possible, but doctors are a scarce resource that must be allocated somehow.

In a private system, doctor access is allocated based on money; this has the advantage of incentivizing the production of more doctors and of ensuring that people with enough money can see doctors quickly. These are also its disadvantages: assuming more people want to see a doctor than need to do so, costs will spiral out of control and poor people will have limited or no access.

In a public system, doctor access is allocated based on medical need. Although no one will be turned away from a doctor in an emergency situation, people may have to wait a long amount of time for elective surgeries in order that other sicker people, including poor people who would not be seen at all in a private system, can be seen first.

The relative effectiveness of the two systems can once again be seen in the infant mortality, life expectancy, and cancer survival rate statistics.

8.4: Government-run health care inevitably includes “death panels” who kill off expensive patients in order to save money on health care costs.

The private system as it exists now in America also has bodies that make these kinds of rationing decisions. Health care rationing is not some sinister conspiracy but a reasonable response to limited resources. The complete argument is here, but I can sum up the basics:

Insurance providers, whether they are a government agency or a private corporation, have a finite amount of money; they can only spend money they have. In one insurance company, customers might pay hundred million dollars in fees each year, so the total amount of money the insurance company can spend on all its customers that year is a hundred million dollars. In reality, since it is a business, it wants to make a profit. Let’s say it wants a profit of ten percent. That means the total amount of money it has to spend is ninety million dollars.

But as a simplified example, let’s reduce this to an insurance company with one hundred customers, each of whom pays $1. This insurance company wants 10% profit, so it has $90 to spend (instead of our real company’s $90 million). Seven people on the company’s plan are sick, with seven different diseases, each of which is fatal. Each disease has a cure. The cures cost, in order, $90, $50, $40, $20, $15, $10, and $5.

We are far too nice to ration health care with death panels; therefore, we have decided to give everyone every possible treatment. So when the first person, the one with the $90 disease, comes to us, we gladly spend $90 on their treatment; it would be inhuman to just turn them away. Now we have no money left for anyone else. Six out of seven people die.

The fault here isn’t with the insurance company wanting to make a profit. Even if the insurance company gave up its ten percent profit, it would only have $10 more; enough to save the person with the $10 disease, but five out of seven would still die.

A better tactic would be to turn down the person with the $90 disease. Instead, treat the people with $5, $10, $15, $20, and $40 diseases. You still use only $90, but only two out of seven die. By refusing treatment to the $90 case, you save four lives. This solution can be described as more cost-effective; by spending the same amount of money, you save more people. Even though “cost-effectiveness” is derided in the media as being opposed to the goal of saving lives, it’s actually all about saving lives.

If you don’t know how many people will get sick next year with what diseases, but you assume it will be pretty close to the amount of people who get sick this year, you might make a rule for next year: Treat everyone with diseases that cost $40 or less, but refuse treatment to anyone with diseases that cost $50 or more.

This rule remains true in the case of the $90 million insurance company. In their case, no one patient can use up all the money, but they still run the risk of spending money in a way that is not cost-effective, causing many people to die. Like the small insurance company, they can increase cost-effectiveness by creating a rule that they won’t treat people with diseases that cost more than a certain amount.

So, as one commentator pointed out, “death panels” should be called “life panels”: they aim to maximize the total number of lives that can be saved with a certain limited amount of resources.

8.5: Why is government-run health care so much more effective?.

A lot of it is economies of scale: if the government is ensuring the entire population of a country, it can get much better deals than a couple of small insurance companies. But a lot of it is more complicated, and involves people’s status as irrational consumers of health products. A person sick with cancer doesn’t want to hear a cost-benefit analysis suggesting that the latest cancer treatment is probably not effective. He wants that treatment right now, and the most successful insurance companies and hospitals are the ones that will give it to him. Here’s a good article explaining some of the systematic flaws in the economics of health care under the American system.

It could also be that really good health care and the profit motive don’t mix: studies show that for-profit hospitals are more expensive, and have poorer care (as measured in death rates) than not-for-profit hospitals.

9. Prison Privatization

9.1: Privatized, for-profit prisons would be a great way to save money.

No one likes criminals very much. Even so, most of us agree that even criminals deserve humane conditions. We reject cruel and unusual punishment, and try to keep prisoners relatively warm, clean, and well-fed. This is not only a moral issue, but a practical one: we don’t want prisoners to go insane or suffer breakdowns, because we want them to be able to re-adjust into normal society after they are released.

For-profit prisons have all of the flaws of for-profit companies with none of the advantages. Normal companies want to cut costs wherever possible, but this is balanced by customer satisfaction: if they treat their customers poorly or create a low-quality product, they won’t make money. In prisons, the ability to get new “customers” comes completely uncoupled from the quality of the product they provide. If the government pays them a certain fixed amount per prisoner, the prison’s only way to increase profits is by treating prisoners as shabbily as possible without killing them. Indeed, statistics show that prisoners in private prisons have worse medical care, terrible living conditions, and rates of in-prison violence 150% greater than those in public prisons. Private prisons refuse to collect data on recidivism rates, but a moment’s thought reveals that they have an economic incentive to keep them as high as possible.

But the real dangers lie in the corruptibility of the political process, something with which libertarians are already familiar. Private prisons have been active in lobbying for stricter sentencing guidelines like the Three Strikes Law, which encourages governments to imprison criminals for life. In a country that already imprisons more of its population than any other country in the world, it is extremely dangerous to create a powerful political force whose self-interest lies in imprisoning as many people as possible.

But the most striking example of the danger of private prisons is the case of two judges who received bribes from private prisons to jail innocent people.

If this is the alternative, I’m willing to bite the bullet and accept the overpaid prison guards with annoying unions who dominate the public prisons.

9.2: What? Libertarians don’t actually believe in private prisons!

Fair enough; I got this complaint a few times on the first version and I acknowledge it’s not an integral component of libertarian philosophy. I included it because it seems to stem from the same “government can never do anything right and we should privatize everything” idea that drives a lot of libertarian thinking, and because I really, really don’t like private prisons.

10. Gun Control

10.1: Gun control laws only help criminals, who are not known for following laws in any case, make sure that their victims are unarmed and unable to resist; as such, they increase crime.

The statistics supporting this view seem relatively solid and I agree that attempts to ban or restrict access to guns are a bad idea.

On the other hand, many of the issues surrounding gun control are much less restrictive. For example, some involve restrictions on sales to criminals, “cooldown periods” before purchase, mandatory safety training, et cetera.

Although I haven’t seen any evidence either way on whether these laws are beneficial, they should be evaluated on their own merits rather than as part of a narrative in which all gun laws must be opposed because gun control is bad.

11. Education

11.1: Government sponsored public education is a horrible failure.

Compared to what?

Compared to the period when there wasn’t government-sponsored public education…well, that’s hard to say because of poor statistic-keeping at that time, and how one counts minorities and women, who usually weren’t educated at all back then. The most official statistics (eg NOT the ones you find without citation on libertarian blogs that say literacy was 100% way back when and became abysmal as soon as public schooling started) say that white illiteracy declined from about 11.5% in the mid-1800s to about 0.5% in 1980, and black illiteracy from about 80% to 1.5% over the same period.

Compared to other countries, the US does relatively poorly considering its wealth, but all the other countries that do better than the US also have government-sponsored public education, sometimes to a much greater degree than we do.

Compared to private schools, public schools actually do better once confounders like race, class, and income have been adjusted out of the analysis.

(Yes, without such adjustment private schools do better – but considering that private schools cater towards wealthy students – who usually do better in school – and often have selective admission policies in which they only take students who are already pretty smart – whereas public schools have to take everyone including dumb kids, kids with learning disabilities, and kids from broken families in ghettos – such unadjusted data is meaningless. It’s the equivalent of noting that the doctor who specializes in acne has fewer patients die than the doctor who specializes in cancer: it’s not that she’s a better doctor, just that she only takes cases who are pretty healthy already.)

Our educational system certainly has immense room for improvement. But the country that consistently tops world education rankings, Finland, has zero private schools (even all the universities are public) and no “school choice”. What it does have is extremely well-credentialed, highly paid teachers (and, unfortunately, an ethnically homogenous population without any dire poverty or broken families, which probably counts for a heck of a lot more than anything else). So whatever America’s specific failures or successes, the mere existence of public education is not a credible scapegoat.

11.2: Why not dismantle the public education system and have a voucher system that offers parents free choice over where to send their kids?

I think this idea has merit, and that we should at least experiment with it and see if it works. That having been said, I do see one huge caveat.

Libertarians tend not to believe in equality of results – they think it’s okay if more skilled people are more successful – but one of the qualities I most admire about them is that they usually do believe in equality of opportunity: that everyone gets an equal chance at life. I mentioned before how inheriting money from your parents can complicate that, but it would be ethically complicated to try and “solve” that problem, so it might be the sort of thing we just have to live with.

But imagine if your parents chose where to send you for school. Even if we somehow eliminated the cost issue by making everyone accept a school voucher of equal value, clever parents would compare the pros and cons of various schools and send their child to the best one. Not-so-clever parents would get fooled by TV commercials with sexy celebrities and send their kids to terrible schools. Super religious parents would send their kids to schools that taught only religious education and shunned math and science and history as the evil trappings of the secular world. Muslim parents would send their kids to madrassas. Immigrant parents might send their kids to Spanish-only schools so that they didn’t drift too far away from their families. Parents with strong political beliefs could send their kids to schools that did their best to brainwash their kids into having the same beliefs as them.

And there would be kids who succeeded in spite of all this, who made it through twelve years of constant brainwashing and ignorance, and somehow managed to become intelligent adults who could learn all the education they missed during their free time. But statistically, there wouldn’t be very many of them, any more than there were a bunch of Christians in Saudi Arabia in the example a few pages back.

Right now, parents can screw up lots of facets of a kid’s life, but they can only do so much to screw up their education. And I have this vague hope that maybe a kid with horrible parents, if she was exposed to decent people and a free exchange of ideas in school might be able to use that brief period of respite to gain a foothold on sanity.

So what I’m saying is, if there were school choice, if we wanted to protect equality of opportunity and childrens’ rights, we’d probably have to regulate the heck out of them, which to some degree would defeat the point.

11.3: I don’t believe the government should be in the business of “protecting” children from their parents.

You should. It’s a pretty important business, even if you subscribe to libertarian assumptions. Even libertarians tend to agree that the government should generally be protecting people from slavery and from the use of force.

Children are basically slaves to their parents for the first ten to fifteen years of their lives, and parents have a special social permission to use force against their children.

In the best possible case, this is an incredibly silly metaphor and one no one would ever even think about. In the worst possible case, it’s completely and literally true.

I have met people with horrible parents. The first eighteen years (or less, if they were able to get themselves legally emancipated early) of their lives were a living hell. These are people who literally have control of every single thing you do, from whether you can eat dinner to who you are allowed to make friends with to what church you go to to what opinions you can express to whether you’re allowed to sleep at night. They are people who can torture and beat you to within an inch of your life, and maybe a social worker will take you away for a few months, and then that social worker will probably return you right back to them. And if it’s just emotional torture, you can forget about even getting the social worker.

And obviously the parent-child relationship is a healthy one in 99% of cases, and child-rearing has been around since deep prehistoric time, and we would be idiots to mess with it, and no one wants a dystopia where the government takes kids from their parents and raises them in a commune or whatever.

But unless you think rights and morality only start existing on someone’s eighteenth birthday, if if there were one form of government intervention that even libertarians should be able to get behind, it would be protecting children from their parents, in the rare few cases where this is necessary.

Part D: Moral Issues

The Argument: Moral actions are those which do not initiate force and which respect people’s natural rights. Government is entirely on force, making it fundamentally immoral. Taxation is essentially theft, and dictating the conditions under which people may work (or not work) via regulation is essentially slavery. Many government programs violate people’s rights, especially their right to property, and so should be opposed as fundamentally immoral regardless of whether or not they “work”.

The Counterargument: Moral systems based only on avoiding force and respecting rights are incomplete, inelegant, counterintuitive, and usually riddled with logical fallacies. A more sophisticated moral system, consequentialism, generates the principles of natural rights and non-initiation of violence as heuristics that can be used to solve coordination problems, but also details under what situations such heuristics no longer apply. Many cases of government intervention are such situations, and so may be moral.

12. Moral Systems

12.1: Freedom is incredibly important to human happiness, a precondition for human virtue, and a value almost everyone holds dear. People who have it die to protect it, and people who don’t have it cross oceans or lead revolutions in order to gain it. But government policies all infringe upon freedom. How can you possibly support this?

Freedom is one good among many, albeit an especially important one.

In addition to freedom, we value things like happiness, health, prosperity, friends, family, love, knowledge, art, and justice. Sometimes we have to trade off one of these goods against another. For example, a witness who has seen her brother commit a crime may have to decide between family and justice when deciding whether to testify. A student who likes both music and biology may have to decide between art and knowledge when choosing a career. A food-lover who becomes overweight may have to decide between happiness and health when deciding whether to start a diet.

People sometimes act as if there is some hierarchy to these goods, such that Good A always trumps Good B. But in practice people don’t act this way. For example, someone might say “Friendship is worth more than any amount of money to me.” But she might continue working a job to gain money, instead of quitting in order to spend more time with her friends. And if you offered her $10 million to miss a friend’s birthday party, it’s a rare person indeed who would say no.

In reality, people value these goods the same way they value every good in a market economy: in comparison with other goods. If you get the option to spend more time with your friends at the cost of some amount of money, you’ll either take it or leave it. We can then work backward from your choice to determine how much you really value friendship relative to money. Just as we can learn how much you value steel by learning how many tons of steel we can trade for how many barrels of oil, how many heads of cabbages, or (most commonly) how many dollars, so we can learn how much you value friendship by seeing when you prefer it to opportunities to make money, or see great works of art, or stay healthy, or become famous.

Freedom is a good much like these other goods. Because it is so important to human happiness and virtue, we can expect people to value it very highly.

But they do not value it infinitely highly. Anyone who valued freedom from government regulation infinitely highly would move to whichever state has the most lax regulations (Montana? New Hampshire?), or go live on a platform in the middle of the ocean where there is no government, or donate literally all their money to libertarian charities or candidates on the tiny chance that it would effect a change.

Most people do not do so, and we understand why. People do not move to Montana because they value aspects of their life in non-Montana places – like their friends and families and nice high paying jobs and not getting eaten by bears – more than they value the small amount of extra freedom they could gain in Montana. Most people do not live on a platform in the middle of the ocean because they value aspects of living on land – like being around other people and being safe – more than they value the rather large amount of extra freedom the platform would give them. And most people do not donate literally all their money to libertarian charities because they like having money for other things.

So we value freedom a finite amount. There are trade-offs of a certain amount of freedom for a certain amount of other goods that we already accept. It may be that there are other such trade-offs we would also accept, if we were offered them.

For example, suppose the government is considering a regulation to ban dumping mercury into the local river. This is a trade-off: I lose a certain amount of freedom in exchange for a certain amount of health. In particular, I lose the freedom to dump mercury into the river in exchange for the health benefits of not drinking poisoned water.

But I don’t really care that much about the freedom to dump mercury into the river, and I care a lot about the health benefits of not drinking poisoned water. So this seems like a pretty good trade-off.

And this generalizes to an answer to the original question. I completely agree freedom is an extremely important good, maybe the most important. I don’t agree it’s an infinitely important good, so I’m willing to consider trade-offs that sacrifice a small amount of freedom for a large amount of something else I consider valuable. Even the simplest laws, like laws against stealing, are of this nature (I trade my “freedom” to steal, which I don’t care much about, in exchange for all the advantages of an economic system based on private property).

The arguments above are all attempts to show that some of the trade-offs proposed in modern politics are worthwhile: they give us enough other goods to justify losing a relatively insignificant “freedom” like the freedom to dump mercury into the river.

12.1.1: But didn’t Benjamin Franklin say that those who would trade freedom for security deserve neither?

No, he said that those who would trade essential liberty for temporary security deserved neither. Dumping mercury into the river hardly seems like essential liberty. And when Franklin was at the Constitutional Convention he agreed to replace the minimal government of the Articles of Confederation with a much stronger centralized government just like everyone else.

12.2: Taxation is theft. And when the government forces you to work under their rules, for the amount of money they say you can earn, that’s slavery. Surely you’re not in favor of theft and slavery.

Consider the argument “How can we have a holiday celebrating Martin Luther King? After all, he was a criminal!”

Technically, Martin Luther King was a criminal, in that he broke some laws against public protests that the racist South had quickly enacted to get rid of him. It’s why he famously spent time in Birmingham Jail.

And although “criminal” is a very negative-sounding and emotionally charged word, in this case we have to step back from our immediate emotional reaction and notice that the ways in which Martin Luther King was a criminal don’t make him a worse person.

A philosopher might say we’re equivocating between two meanings of “criminal”, one meaning of “person who breaks the law”, and another meaning of “horrible evil person.” Just because King satisfies the first meaning (he broke the law) doesn’t mean he has to satisfy the second (be horrible and evil).

Or consider the similar argument: “Ayn Rand fled the totalitarian Soviet Union to look for freedom in America. That makes her a traitor!” Should we go around shouting at Objectivists “How can you admire Ayn Rand when she was a dirty rotten traitor“?

No. Once again, although “traitor” normally has an automatic negative connotation, we should avoid instantly judging things by the words we can apply to them, and start looking at whether the negative feelings are deserved.

Or once again the philosopher would say we should avoid equivocating between “traitor” meaning “someone who switches sides from one country to an opposing country” and “horrible evil untrustworthy person.”

Our language contains a lot of words like these which package a description with a moral judgment. For example, “murderer” (think of pacifists screaming it at soldiers, who do fit the technical definition “someone who kills someone else”), “greedy” (all corporations are “greedy” if you mean they would very much like to have more money, but politicians talking about “greedy corporations” manage to transform it into something else entirely) and of course that old stand-by “infidel”, which sounds like sufficient reason to hate a member of another religion, when in fact it simply means a member of another religion. It’s a stupid, cheap trick unworthy of anyone interested in serious rational discussion.

And calling taxation “theft” is exactly the same sort of trick. What’s theft? It’s taking something without permission. So it’s true that taxation is theft, but if you just mean it involves taking without permission, then everyone from Lew Rockwell up to the head of the IRS already accepts that as a given.

This only sounds like an argument because the person who uses it is hoping people will let their automatic negative reaction to theft override their emotions, hoping they will equivocate from theft as “taking without permission” to “theft as a terrible act worthy only of criminals”.

Real arguments aren’t about what words you can apply to things and how nasty they sound, real arguments about what good or bad consequences those things produce.

12.3: Government actions tend to involve the initiation of force against innocent people. Isn’t that morally wrong?

Why should it be morally wrong?

12.3.1: Because the initiation of force always has bad consequences, like ruining the economy or making people unhappy.

Sometimes it does. Other times it has good consequences.

Take cases like the fish farming, boycott, and charity scenarios above. There the use of force to solve the coordination problem meets an extraordinarily strict set of criteria: not only does it benefit the group as a whole, not only does it benefit every single individual in the group, but every single individual in the group knows that it benefits them and endorses that benefit (eg would vote for it).

In other cases, such as the retirement savings example above, the use of force meets only a less strict set of criteria: it benefits the group as a whole, it benefits every single individual in the group, but not every individual in the group necessarily knows that it benefits them or endorses that benefit. These are the cases libertarians might call “paternalism”.

Still more cases satisfy an even looser criterion. They benefit the group as a whole, but they might not benefit every single individual in the group, and might harm some of them. These are the cases that libertarians might call “robbing Peter to pay Paul”.

All three of these sets of cases belie the idea that the use of force must on net have bad consequences.

12.3.2: Okay, maybe it’s wrong because some moral theory that’s not about consequences tells me it’s wrong.

If your moral theory doesn’t involve any consequences, why follow it? It seems sort of like an arbitrary collection of rules you like.

The Jews believe that God has commanded them not to murder. They also believe God has commanded them not to start fires on Saturdays. Jews who lose their belief in God usually continue not to murder, but stop worrying about whether or not they light fires on Saturdays. Likewise, evangelical Christians believe stealing is a sin, and that homosexuality is also a sin. If they de-convert and become atheists, most of them will still oppose stealing, but most will stop worrying about homosexuality. Why?

Killing and stealing both have bad consequences; in fact, that seems to be the essence of why they’re wrong. Fires on Saturday and homosexuality don’t hurt anybody else, but killing and stealing do.

Why are consequences to other people seems such a specially relevant category? The argument is actually itself pretty libertarian. I can do whatever I want with my own life, which includes following religious or personal taboos. Other people can do whatever they want with their own lives too. The stuff that matters – the stuff where we have to draw a line in the sand and say “Nope, this is moral and this is immoral, doesn’t matter what you think” is because it has some consequence in the real world like hurting other people.

12.3.2.1: I was always taught that the essence of morality was the Principle of Non-Aggression: no one should ever initiate force, except in self-defense. What exactly is wrong with this theory?

At least two things. First, once you disentangle it from the respect it gets as the Traditional Culturally Approved Ground Of Morality, the actual rational arguments for it as a principle are surprisingly weak. Second, in order to do anything practical with it you need such a mass of exceptions and counter-exceptions and stretches that one starts to wonder whether it’s doing any philosophical work at all; it becomes a convenient hook upon which to hang our pre-existing prejudices rather than a useful principle for solving novel moral dilemmas.

12.3.2.1.1: What do you mean by saying that the rational arguments for the Principle of Non-Aggression are weak?

There are dozens of slightly different versions of these arguments, and I don’t want to get into all of them here, so I’ll concentrate on the most common.

Some people try to derive the Principle of Non-Aggression from self-ownership. But this is circular reasoning: the form of “private property” you need to own anything, including your self/body, is a very complicated concept and one that requires some form of morality in order to justify; you can’t use your idea of private property as a justification for morality. Although it’s obvious that in some sense you are your body, there’s no way to go from here to “And therefore the proper philosophical relationship between you and your body is the concept of property exactly as it existed in the 17th century British legal system.”

This also falls afoul of the famous is-ought dichotomy, the insight that just because something is true doesn’t mean it should be true. Just because we notice some factual relationship between yourself and your body doesn’t mean that relationship between yourself and your body is good or important or needs to be protected in laws. We might eventually decide it should be (and hopefully we will!) but we need to have other values in order to come to that decision; we can’t use the decision as a basis for our values.

The self-ownership argument then goes from this questionable assumption to other even more questionable ones. If you use your body to pick fruit, that fruit becomes yours, even though you didn’t make it. If you use your body to land on Tristan de Cunha and plant a flag there and maybe pick some coconuts, that makes Tristan de Cunha and everything on your property and that of your heirs forever, even though you definitely didn’t make the island. And if someone else lands on Tristan de Cunha the day after you, you by right control every facet of their life on the island and they have to do whatever you say or else leave. There are good arguments for why some of these things make economic sense, but they’re all practical arguments, not moral ones positing a necessary relationship.

Oddly enough, although apparently your having a body does license you to declare yourself Duke of Tristan de Cunha, it doesn’t license you to use your fist to punch your enemy in the gut, or use your legs to walk across a forest someone else has said they claim, even though your ability to move your hand rapidly in the direction of your enemy’s abdomen, or your feet along a forest path, seems like a much more fundamental application of your body than taking over an island.

All of these rules about claiming islands and not punching people you don’t like and so on are potentially good rules, but trying to derive them just from the fact that you have a body starts to seem a bit hokey.

12.3.2.1.2: What do you mean by saying that the Non-Aggression Principle requires so many exceptions and counter-exceptions that it becomes useless except as a hook upon which to hang prejudices we from other sources?

First, the principle only even slightly makes sense by defining “force” in a weird way. The NAP’s definition of “force” includes walking into your neighbor’s unlocked garden when your neighbor isn’t home and picking one of her apples. It includes signing a contract promising to deliver a barrel of potatoes, but then not delivering the potatoes when the time comes. Once again, I agree these are bad things that we need rules against. But it takes quite an imagination to classify them under “force”, or as deriving from the fact that you have a body. This is a good start to explaining what I mean when I say that people claim that they’re using the very simple-sounding “no initiation of force” principle but are actually following a more complicated and less justified “no things that seem bad to me even though I can’t explain why”.

Second, even most libertarians agree it can be moral to initiate force in certain settings. For example, if the country is under threat from a foreign invader or from internal criminals, most libertarians agree that it is moral to levy a small amount of taxation to support an army or police force that restores order. Again, this is a very good idea – but also a blatant violation of the Non-Aggression Principle. When libertarians accept the initiation of force to levy taxes for the police, but protest that initiating force is always wrong when someone tries to levy taxes for welfare programs, it reinforces my worry that the Non-Aggression Principle is something people claim to follow while actually following their own “no things that seem bad to me even though I can’t explain why, but things that seem good to me are okay” principle.

(I acknowledge that some libertarians take a stand against taxes for the military and the police. I admire their consistency even while I think their proposed policies would be a disaster.)

Third, when push comes to shove the Non-Aggression Principle just isn’t strong enough to solve hard problems. It usually results in a bunch of people claiming conflicting rights and judges just having to go with whatever seems intuitively best to them.

For example, a person has the right to live where he or she wants, because he or she has “a right to personal self-determination”. Unless that person is a child, in which case the child has to live where his or her parents say, because…um…the parents have “a right to their child” that trumps the child’s “right to personal self-determination”. But what if the parents are evil and abusive and lock the child in a fetid closet with no food for two weeks? Then maybe the authorities can take the child away because…um…the child’s “right to decent conditions” trumps the parents’ “right to their child” even though the latter trumps the child’s “right to personal self-determination”? Or maybe they can’t, because there shouldn’t even be authorities of that sort? Hard to tell.

Another example. I can build an ugly shed on my property, because I have a “right to control my property”, even though the sight of the shed leaves my property and irritates my neighbor; my neighbor has no “right not to be irritated”. Maybe I can build a ten million decibel noise-making machine on my property, but maybe not, because the noise will leave my property and disturbs neighbor; my “right to control my property” might or might not trump my neighbor’s “right not to be disturbed”, even though disturbed and irritated are synonyms. I definitely can’t detonate a nuclear warhead on my property, because the blast wave will leave my property and incinerates my neighbor, and my neighbor apparently does have a “right not to be incinerated”.

If you’ve ever seen people working within our current moral system trying to solve issues like these, you quickly realize that not only are they making it up as they go along based on a series of ad hoc rules, but they’re so used to doing so that they no longer realize that this is undesirable or a shoddy way to handle ethics.

12.4: Is there a better option than the Non-Aggression Principle?

Yes. It’s consequentialism, the principle that it is moral to do whatever has, on net, the best consequences. This is about equivalent to saying “to do whatever makes the world a better place”. It’s the principle we’ve been using implicitly throughout this FAQ and the principle most people use implicitly throughout their lives.

It’s also the principle that drives capitalism, where people are able to create incredible businesses and innovations because they are trying to do whatever has the best financial consequences for themselves. Consequentialism just takes that insight and says that instead of just doing it with money, let’s do it with everything we value.

12.4.1: Best consequences according to whom?

Well, if you’re the one making the moral decision, then best consequences according to you. All it’s saying is that your morality should be a reflection of your value system and your belief in a better world. Your job as a moral agent is to try to make the world a better place by whatever your definition of “better place” might be.

Sticking to the capitalism analogy, consumerism “tells you” (not that you need to be told) to get whatever goods you value most. Consequentialism does the same, but tells you to try to get the collection of abstract moral goods you value the most.

But remember our discussion of trade-offs above. Most people value many different moral goods, and you are no exception. If you’re trying to make the world a better place, you should be thinking about your relative valuation of all these goods and what trade-offs you are willing to make.

12.4.2: Best consequences for me, or best consequences for everyone?

Again, this is your decision. If you’re completely selfish, then consequentialism tells you to seek out the best consequences for yourself. This probably wouldn’t mean being a libertarian – thankless activism for an unpopular political position is really a terrible way to go about looking out for Number One. It would probably mean cheating off the government – either in the form of welfare abuse if you’re poor and lazy, or in the form of crony capitalism if you’re rich and ambitious. As icing on the cake, make sure to become a sanctimonious and hypocritical liberal, as it’s a great way to become popular and get invited to all the fancy parties.

But if you care about people other than yourself, consequentialism tells you to seek out the best consequences for the people you care about (which could be anything from your family to your country to the world). This could involve political activism, and it could even involve political activism in favor of libertarianism if you think it’s the best system of government.

Alternately, it could justify trying to start a government, if there’s no government yet and you think a world with government would be better for the people you care about than one without it.

Most of the rest of this section will be assuming you do in fact care for other people at least a little.

12.4.3: Since many people probably want different things and care about different people, don’t we end out in a huge war of all against all until either everyone is dead or one guy is dictator?

Would that be a good consequence? If not, people who try to promote good consequences and make the world a better place would try to avoid it.

Because this world of violence and competition is so obviously a bad consequence, any consequentialist who gives it a moment’s thought agrees not to start a huge war of all against all that ends with everyone dead or one guy as dictator by binding themselves by moral rules whenever binding themselves by those moral rules seems like it would have good consequences or make the world a better place; see Section 13 for more.

12.4.4: Doesn’t that sound a lot like “the ends justify the means”? Wouldn’t it lead to decadence, slavery, or some other dystopia?

Once again, if you consider dictatorship, slavery, and dystopia to be bad consequences, then by definition following this rule is the best way to avoid doing that.

The rule isn’t “do whatever sounds like it would have the best consequences if you have an IQ of 20 and refuse to think about it for even five seconds”, it’s “do what would actually have the best consequences. Sometimes this involves admitting human ignorance and fallibility and not pursuing every hare-brained idea that comes into your head.

12.4.5: Okay, okay, I understand that if people did what actually had good consequences it would have good consequences, but I worry that if people do what they think has good consequences, it will lead to violence and dictatorship and dystopia and all those other things you mentioned above.

Yes, I agree this is an important distinction. There are two uses for a moral system. The first is to define what morality is. The second is to give people a useful tool for choosing what to do in moral dilemmas. I am arguing that consequentialism does the first. I don’t think it does the second right out of the box.

To try a metaphor, doctors sometimes have two ways of defining disease; the gold standard and the clinical standard. The gold standard is the “perfect” test for the disease; for example, in Alzheimers disease, it’s to autopsy the brain after the person has died and see if it has certain features under the microscope. Obviously you can’t autopsy a person who’s still alive, so when doctors are actually trying to diagnose Alzheimers they use a more practical method, like how well the person does on a memory test.

Right now I’m arguing that consequentialism is the gold standard for morality: it’s the purest, most sophisticated explanation of what morality actually is. At the same time, it might be a terrible idea to make your everyday decisions based on it, just as it’s a terrible idea to diagnose Alzheimers with an autopsy in someone who’s still alive.

However, once we know that consequentialism is the gold standard for morality, we can start designing our clinical standards by trying to figure out which “clinical standard” for morality will produce the best consequences. See Section 13 for more.

12.4.6: I still am not completely on board with consequentialism, or I’m not sure I understand it.

For more information on consequentialism, see the sister document to this FAQ, the Consequentialism FAQ.

13. Rights and Heuristics

13.1: Is there a moral justification for rights, like the right to free speech or the right to property?

Yes. Rights are the “clinical standard” for morality, the one we use to make our everyday decisions after we acknowledge that pure consequentialism might not lead to the best consequences when used by fallible humans.

In this conception, rights are conclusions rather than premises. They are heuristics (heuristic = a rule-of-thumb that usually but not always works) for remembering what sorts of things usually have good or bad consequences, a distillation of moral wisdom that is often more trustworthy than morally fallible humans.

For example, trying to tell people what religions they can or can’t follow almost always has bad consequences. At best, people are miserable because they’re being forced to follow a faith they don’t believe in. At worst, they resist and then you get Inquisitions and Holy Wars and everyone ends up dead. Restriction of religion causing bad consequences is sufficiently predictable that we generalize it into a hard and fast rule, and call that rule something like the “right to freedom of religion”.

Other things like banning criticism of the government, trying to prevent people from owning guns, and seizing people’s property willy-nilly also work like this, so we call those “rights” too.

13.2: So if you think that violating rights will have good consequences, then it’s totally okay, right?

It’s not quite so simple. Rights are not just codifications of the insight that certain actions lead to bad consequences, they’re codifications of the insight that certain actions lead to bad consequences in ways that people consistently fail to predict or appreciate.

All throughout history, various despots and princes have thought “You know, the last hundred times someone tried to restrict freedom of religion, it went badly. Luckily, my religion happens to be the One True Religion, and I’m totally sure of this, and everyone else will eventually realize this and fall in line, so my plan to restrict freedom of religion will work great!”

Every revolution starts with an optimist who says “All previous attempts to kill a bunch of people and seize control of the state have failed to produce a utopia, but luckily my plan is much better and we’re totally going to get to utopia this time.” Or, as Huxley put it: “Only one more indispensable massacre of Capitalists or Communists or Fascists and there we are – there we are – in the Golden Future.”

So another way to put it is that rights don’t just say “Doing X has been observed to have bad consequences”, but also “Doing X has been observed to have bad consequences, even when smart people are quite certain it will have good consequences.”

13.3: Then even though you got to rights by a different route than the libertarians, it sounds like you agree with them that they’re inalienable.

It’s not as simple as that either. Every so often, the conventional wisdom is wrong. So many lunatics and crackpots spent their lives trying to turn lead into gold that it became a classic metaphor for a foolish wild goose chase. The rule “stop trying to transmute elements into each other, it never works” was no doubt a good and wise rule. If more would-be alchemists had trusted this conventional wisdom, and fewer had thought “No, even though everyone else has failed, I will be the one to discover transmutation”, it would have prevented a lot of wasted lives.

…and then we discovered nuclear physics, which is all about transmuting elements into one another, and which works very well and is a vital source of power. And yes, nuclear physicists at Berkeley successfully used a giant particle accelerator to turn lead into gold, although it only works a few atoms at a time and isn’t commercially viable.

The point is, the heuristic that you shouldn’t waste your life studying transmutation was a good one and very well-justified at the time, but if we had elevated it into a timeless and unbreakable principle, we never would have been able to abandon it after we learned more about nuclear physics and trying to transmute things was no longer so foolish.

Rights are a warning sign that we should not naively expect breaking them to have good consequences. In order to claim even the possibility of good consequences from violating a right, we need to be at least as far away from the actions they were meant to prevent as nuclear physics is to alchemy.

13.3.1: Can you give an example of a chain of reasoning where some government violation of a right is so radically different from the situation that led the right to exist in the first place?

Let’s take for example the right that probably dominates discussions between libertarians and non-libertarians: the right to property. On the individual scale, taking someone else’s property makes them very unhappy, as you know if you’ve ever had your bike stolen. On the larger scale, abandoning belief in private property has disastrous results for an entire society, as the experiences of China and the Soviet Union proved so conclusively. So it’s safe to say there’s a right to private property.

Is it ever acceptable to violate that right? In the classic novel Les Miserables, Jean Valjean’s family is trapped in bitter poverty in 19th century France, and his nephew is slowly starving to death. Jean steals a loaf of bread from a rich man who has more than enough, in order to save his nephew’s life. This is a classic moral dilemma: is theft acceptable in this instance?

We can argue both sides. A proponent might say that the good consequences to Jean and his family were very great – his nephew’s life was saved – and the bad consequences to the rich man were comparatively small – he probably has so much food that he didn’t even miss it, and if he did he could just send his servant to the bakery to get another one. So on net the theft led to good consequences.

The other side would be that once we let people decide whether or not to steal things, we are on a slippery slope. What if we move from 19th century France to 21st century America, and I’m not exactly starving to death but I really want a PlayStation? And my rich neighbor owns like five PlayStations and there’s no reason he couldn’t just go to the store and buy another. Is it morally acceptable for me to steal one of his PlayStations? The same argument that applied in Jean Valjean’s case above seems to suggest that it is – but it’s easy to see how we go from there to everyone stealing everyone’s stuff, private property becoming impossible, and civilization collapsing. That doesn’t sound like a very good consequence at all.

If everyone violates moral heuristics whenever they personally think it’s a good idea, civilization collapses. If no one ever violates moral heuristics, Jean Valjean’s nephew starves to death for the sake of a piece of bread the rich man never would have missed.

We need to bind society by moral heuristics, but also have some procedure in place so that we can suspend them in cases where we’re exceptionally sure of ourselves without civilization instantly collapsing. Ideally, this procedure should include lots of checks and balances, to make sure no one person can act on her own accord. It should reflect the opinions of the majority of people in society, either directly or indirectly. It should have access to the best minds available, who can predict whether violating a heuristic will be worth the risk in this particular case.

Thus far, the human race’s best solution to this problem has been governments. Governments provide a method to systematically violate heuristics in a particular area where it is necessary to do so without leading to the complete collapse of civilization.

If there was no government, I, in Jean Valjean’s situation, absolutely would steal that loaf of bread to save my nephew’s life. Since there is a government, the government can set a certain constant amount of theft per year, distribute the theft fairly among people whom it knows can bear the burden, and then feed starving children and do other nice things. The ethical question of “is it ethical for me to steal/kill/stab in this instance?” goes away, and society can be peaceful and stable.

13.3.2: So you’re saying that you think in this case violating the right will have good consequences. But you just agreed that even when people think this, violating the right usually has bad consequences.

Yes, I admit it’s complicated. But we have to have some procedures for violating moral heuristics, or else we can’t tax to support a police force, we can’t fight wars, we can’t lie to a murderer who asks us where our friend is so he can go kill her when he finds her, and so on.

The standard I find most reasonable is when it’s universalizable and it avoids the issue that caused us to develop the heuristic in the first place.

By universalizable, I mean that it’s more complicated than me just deciding “Okay, I’m going to steal from this guy now”. There has to be an agreed-upon procedure where everyone gets input, and we need to have verified empirically that this procedure usually leads to good results.

And is has to avoid the issue that caused us to develop the heuristic. In the case of stealing, this is that theft makes property impossible or at least impractical, no one bothers doing work because it will all be stolen from them anyway, and so civilization collapses.

In the case of theft, taxation requires authorization by a process that most of us endorse (the government set up by the Constitution) and into which we all get some input via representative democracy. It doesn’t cause civilization to collapse because it only takes a small and extremely predictable amount from each person. And it’s been empirically verified to work: as I argued above, countries with higher tax rates like Scandinavia actually are nicer places to live than countries with lower tax rates like the United States. So we’ve successfully side-stepped the insight that stealing usually has bad consequences, even though we recognize that the insight remains true.

13.4: Governments will inevitably make mistakes when deciding when to violate moral heuristics. Those mistakes will cost money and even lives.

And the policy of never, ever doing anything will never be a mistake?

It’s very easy for governments to make devastating mistakes. For example, many people believe the US government’s War in Iraq did little more than devastate the country, kill hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, and replace Saddam with a weak government unable to stand up to extremist ayatollahs.

But the other solution – never intervening in a foreign country at all – didn’t work so well either. Just look at Holocaust-era Germany, or 1990s Rwanda.

Why, exactly, should moral questions be simple?

There is a certain tradition that the moral course of action is something anyone, from the high priest unto the youngest child, can find simply by looking deep in his heart. Anyone who does not find it in his heart is welcome to check the nearest Giant Stone Tablet, upon which are written infallible rules that can guide him through any situation. Intelligence has nothing to do with it. It should be blindingly obvious, and anyone who claims it has a smidgen of difficulty or vagueness is probably an agent of the Dark Lord, trying to seduce you from the True Path with his lies.

And so it is tempting to want to have some really easy principle like “Never get involved in a foreign war” and say it can never lead you wrong. It makes you feel all good and warm and fuzzy and moral and not at all like those evil people who don’t have strong principles. But real life isn’t that simple. If you get involved in the wrong foreign war, millions of people die. And if you don’t get involved in the right foreign war, millions of people also die.

So you need to have good judgment if you want to save lives and do the right thing. You can’t get a perfect score in morality simply by abdicating all responsibility. Part of the difficult questions that all of us non-libertarians have been working on is how to get a government that’s good at answering those sorts of questions correctly.

13.5: No, there’s a difference. When you enter a foreign war, you’re killing lots of people. When you don’t enter a foreign war, people may die, but it’s not your job to save them. The government’s job is only to protect people and property from force, not to protect people from the general unfairness of life.

Who died and made you the guy who decides what the government’s job is? Or, less facetiously: on what rational grounds are you making that decision?

Currently, several trillion dollars are being spent to prevent terrorism. This seems to fall within the area of what libertarians would consider a legitimate duty of government, since terrorists are people who initiate force and threaten our safety and the government needs to stop this. However, terrorists only kill an average of a few dozen Americans per year.

Much less money is being spent on preventing cardiovascular disease, even though cardiovascular disease kills 800,000 Americans per year.

Let us say, as seems plausible, that the government can choose to spend its money either on fighting terrorists, or on fighting CVD. And let us say that by spending its money on fighting terrorists, it saves 40 lives, and by spending the same amount of money on fighting CVD, it saves 40,000 lives.

All of these lives, presumably, are equally valuable. So there is literally no benefit to spending the money on fighting terrorism rather than CVD. All you are doing is throwing away 39,960 lives on an obscure matter of principle. It’s not even a good principle – it’s the principle of wanting to always use heuristics even when they clearly don’t apply because it sounds more elegant.

There’s a reason this is so tempting. It’s called the Bad Guy Bias, and it’s an evolutionarily programmed flaw in human thinking. People care much more about the same amount of pain when it’s inflicted by humans than when it’s inflicted by nature. Psychologists can and have replicated this in the lab, along with a bunch of other little irrationalities in human cognition. It’s not anything to be ashamed of; everyone’s got it. But it’s not something to celebrate and raise to the level of a philosophical principle either.

13.6: Stop calling principles like “don’t initiate force” heuristics! These aren’t some kind of good idea that works in a few cases. These are the very principles of government and morality , and it’s literally impossible for them to guide you wrong!

Let me give you a sketch of one possible way that a libertarian perfect world that followed all of the appropriate rules to the letter could end up as a horrible dystopia. There are others, but this one seems most black-and-white.

Imagine a terrible pandemic, the Amazon Death Flu, strikes the world. The Death Flu is 100% fatal. Luckily, one guy, Bob, comes up with a medicine that suppresses (but does not outright cure) the Death Flu. It’s a bit difficult to get the manufacturing process right, but cheap enough once you know how to do it. Anyone who takes the medicine at least once a month will be fine. Go more than a month without the medicine, and you die.

In a previous version of this FAQ, Bob patented the medicine, and then I got a constant stream of emails saying (some) libertarians don’t believe in patents. Okay. Let’s say that Bob doesn’t patent the medicine, but it’s complicated to reverse engineer, and it would definitely take more than a month. This will become important later.

Right now Bob is the sole producer of this medicine, and everyone in the world needs to have a dose within a month or they’ll die. Bob knows he can charge whatever he wants for the medicine, so he goes all out. He makes anyone who wants the cure pay one hundred percent of their current net worth, plus agree to serve him and do anything he says. He also makes them sign a contract promising that while they are receiving the medicine, they will not attempt to discover their own cure for the Death Flu, or go into business against him. Because this is a libertarian perfect world, everyone keeps their contracts.

A few people don’t want to sign their lives away to slavery, and refuse to sign the contract. These people receive no medicine and die. Some people try to invent a competing medicine. Bob, who by now has made a huge amount of money, makes life difficult for them and bribes biologists not to work with them. They’re unable to make a competing medicine within a month, and die. The rest of the world promises to do whatever Bob says. They end up working as peons for a new ruling class dominated by Bob and his friends.

If anyone speaks a word against Bob, they are told that Bob’s company no longer wants to do business with them, and denied the medicine. People are encouraged to inform on their friends and families, with the promise of otherwise unavailable luxury goods as a reward. To further cement his power, Bob restricts education to the children of his friends and strongest supporters, and bans the media, which he now controls, from reporting on any stories that cast him in a negative light.

When Bob dies, he hands over control of the medicine factory to his son, who continues his policies. The world is plunged into a Dark Age where no one except Bob and a few of his friends have any rights, material goods, or freedom. Depending on how sadistic Bob’s and his descendants are, you may make this world arbitrarily hellish while still keeping perfect adherence to libertarian principles.

Compare this to a similar world that followed a less libertarian model. Once again, the Amazon Death Flu strikes. Once again, Bob invents a cure. The government thanks him, pays him a princely sum as compensation for putting his cure into the public domain, opens up a medicine factory, and distributes free medicine to everyone. Bob has become rich, the Amazon Death Flu has been conquered, and everyone is free and happy.

13.6.1: This is a ridiculously unlikely story with no relevance to the real world.

I admit this particular situation is more a reductio ad absurdum than something I expect to actually occur the moment people start taking libertarianism seriously, but I disagree that it isn’t relevant.

The arguments that libertarianism will protect our values and not collapse into an oppressive plutocracy require certain assumptions: there are lots of competing companies, zero transaction costs, zero start-up costs, everyone has complete information, everyone has free choice whether or not to buy any particular good, everyone behaves rationally, et cetera. The Amazon Death Flu starts by assuming the opposite of all of these assumptions: there is only one company, there are prohibitive start-up costs, a particular good absolutely has to be bought, et cetera.

The Amazon Death Flu world, with its assumptions, is not the world we live in. But neither is the libertarian world. Reality lies somewhere between the “capitalism is perfect” of the one, and the “capitalism leads to hellish misery” of the other.

There’s no Amazon Death Flu, but there are things like hunger, thirst, unemployment, normal diseases, and homelessness. In order to escape these problems, we need things provided by other people or corporations. This is fine and as it should be, and as long as there’s a healthy free market with lots of alternatives, in most cases these other people or corporations will serve our needs and society’s needs while getting rich themselves, just like libertarians hope.

But this is a contingent fact about the world, and one that can sometimes be wrong. We can’t just assume that the heuristic “never initiate force” will always turn out well.

13.7: The government doesn’t need to violate moral heuristics. In the absence of government programs, private charity would make up the difference.

Find some poor people in a country without government-funded welfare, and ask how that’s working out for them.

Private charity from the First World hasn’t prevented the Rwandans, Ethiopians, or Haitians from dying of malnutrition or easily preventable disease.

It’s possible that this is just because we First Worlders place more importance on our own countrymen than on foreigners, and if Americans were dying of malnutrition or easily preventable disease, patriotism would make us help them.

The US government currently spends about $800 billion on welfare-type programs for US citizens. Americans give a total of $300 billion to charity per year.

Let’s assume that private charity is twice as efficient as the government (in reality, it’s probably much less, since the government has economies of scale, but libertarians like assumptions like this and I might as well indulge them).

Let’s also assume that only half of charity goes to meaningful efforts to help poor American citizens. The other half would be things like churches, the arts, and foreign countries.

Nowadays, a total of $550 billion (adjusted, govt+private) goes to real charity (800b*1/2+300b*1/2). If the government were to stop all welfare programs, this number would fall to $150 billion (adjusted). Private citizens would need to make up the shortfall of $400 billion to keep charity at its current (woefully low) level. Let’s assume that people, realizing this, start donating a greater proportion (66%) of their charity to the American poor instead of to other causes. That means people need to increase their charity to about $830 billion ([400b + 150b]/.66).

Right now, 25% is a normal middle-class tax rate. Let’s assume the government stopped all welfare programs and limited itself to defense, policing, and overhead. There are a lot of different opinions about what is and isn’t in the federal budget, but my research suggests that would cut it by about half, to lower tax rates to 12.5%.

So, we’re in the unhappy situation of needing people to almost triple the amount they give to charity even though they have only 12.5% more money. The real situation is much worse than this, because if the government stopped all programs except military and police, people would need to pay for education, road maintenance, and so on out of their own pocket.

My calculations are full of assumptions, of course. But the important thing is, I’ve never seen libertarians even try to do calculations. They just assume that private citizens would make up the shortfall. This is the difference between millions of people leading decent lives or starving to death, and people just figure it will work out without checking, because the free market is always a Good Thing.

That’s not reason, even if you read it on www.reason.com. That’s faith.

13.8: People stupid enough to make bad decisions deserve the consequences of their actions. If government bans them from making stupid decisions, it’s just preventing them from getting what they deserve.

One of my favorite essays, Policy Debates Should Not Appear One-Sided, provides a much better critique of this argument than I could. It starts by discussing a hypothetical in which the government stopped regulating the safety of medicines. Some quack markets sulfuric acid as medicine, and a “poor, honest, not overwhelmingly educated mother of five children” falls for it, drinks it, and dies.

If you were really in that situation, would you really laugh, say “Haha, serves her right” and go back to what you were doing? Or would it be a tragedy even though she “got what she deserved”?

The article ends by saying:

Saying ‘People who buy dangerous products deserve to get hurt!’ is not tough-minded. It is a way of refusing to live in an unfair universe. Real tough-mindedness is saying, ‘Yes, sulfuric acid is a horrible painful death, and no, that mother of 5 children didn’t deserve it, but we’re going to keep the shops open anyway because we did this cost-benefit calculation.’…I don’t think that when someone makes a stupid choice and dies, this is a cause for celebration. I count it as a tragedy. It is not always helping people, to save them from the consequences of their own actions; but I draw a moral line at capital punishment. If you’re dead, you can’t learn from your mistakes.

Read also about the just-world fallacy. “Making a virtue out of necessity” shouldn’t go as far as celebrating deaths if it makes your political beliefs more tenable.

Part E: Practical Issues

The Argument: Allowing any power to government is a slippery slope toward tyranny. No matter what the costs or benefits of any particular proposal, libertarians should oppose all government intrusion as a matter of principle.

The Counterargument: This fundamentally misunderstands the ways that nations collapse into tyranny. It also ignores political reality, and it doesn’t work. Libertarians should cooperate with people from across the ideological spectrum to oppose regulations that doesn’t work and keep an open mind to regulation that might.

14. Slippery Slopes

14.1: I’m on board with doing things that have the best consequences. And I’m on board with the idea that some government interventions may have good consequences. But allowing any power to government is a slippery slope. It will inevitably lead to tyranny, in which do-gooder government officials take away all of our most sacred rights in order to “protect us” from ourselves.

History has never shown a country sinking into dictatorship in the way libertarians assume is the “natural progression” of a big-government society. No one seriously expects Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, or Canada to become a totalitarian state, even though all four have gone much further down the big-government road than America ever will.

Those countries that have collapsed into tyranny have done so by having so weak a social safety net and so uncaring a government that the masses felt they had nothing to lose in instituting Communism or some similar ideology. Even Hitler gained his early successes by pretending to be a champion of the populace against the ineffective Weimar regime.

Czar Nicholas was not known for his support of free universal health care for the Russian peasantry, nor was it Chiang Kai-Shek’s attempts to raise minimum wage that inspired Mao Zedong. It has generally been among weak governments and a lack of protection for the poor where dictators have found the soil most fertile for tyranny.

14.1.1: But still, if we let down our guard, bureaucrats and politicians will have free rein to try to institute such a collapse into dictatorship.

I have always found the libertarian conviction that all politicians are secretly trying to build up their own power base to 1984-ish levels a bit weird.

All the time, I am hearing things like “No one really believes in global warming. It’s just a plot by the government to expand control over more areas of your life.” Or “since private charity is a threat to government’s domination of social welfare, once government gets powerful enough it will try to ban all private charity.”

Sure, people really do like power. But usually it’s the sort of power that comes with riches, fame, and beautiful women willing to attend to your every need. Just sitting in your office, knowing in an abstract way that because of you a lot of people who might otherwise be doing useful industry are fretting about their carbon emissions – that’s not the kind of power people sell their souls for. The path to ultimate domination of all humanity does not lead through the Dietary Fiber Levels in Food Act of 2006.

Most folk like to think of themselves as good people. Sure, they may take a bribe or two here, and have an affair or two there, and lie about this and that, “but only for the right reasons.” The thought process “Let me try to expand this unnecessary program so I can bathe in the feeling of screwing American taxpayers out of more of their hard-earned money” is not the kind that comes naturally, especially in a society where it leads to minimal personal gain. A politician who raises your taxes can’t use the money to buy himself a new Ferrari. At least, he can’t do it directly, and if he really wants that Ferrari there have got to be much easier ways to get it.

Human beings find it hard to get angry at a complicated system, and prefer to process things in terms of evil people doing evil things. Eliezer Yudkowsky of Less Wrong writes:

Suppose that someone says “Mexican-Americans are plotting to remove all the oxygen in Earth’s atmosphere.” You’d probably ask, “Why would they do that? Don’t Mexican-Americans have to breathe too? Do Mexican-Americans even function as a unified conspiracy?” If you don’t ask these obvious next questions when someone says, “Corporations are plotting to remove Earth’s oxygen,” then “Corporations!” functions for you as a semantic stopsign.

And if you don’t ask some of these same questions when someone says “Government wants to take away freedom!,” then you’re not thinking of government as a normal human institution that acts in normal human ways.

15. Strategic Activism

15.1: All you’ve argued so far is that it’s possible, in theory, for an ideal government making some very clever regulations to do a little more good than harm. But that doesn’t prove that the real government does more good than harm, and in fact it’s probably the opposite. So shouldn’t we admit that in a hypothetical perfect world government might do some good, while still being libertarians in reality?

I think if you’ve got enough intelligence and energy to be a libertarian, a better use of that intelligence and energy would be to help enact a properly working system.

15.2: It’s impossible to improve government; because power corrupts, all conceivable forms of government will be ineffective, wasteful, and dishonest.

“Impossible” is a really strong word.

Economist Robin Hanson has a proposal for a market-based open-source form of government called “futarchy”, in which government policies are decided entirely by a prediction market. Prediction markets operate similarly to stock markets and allow participants to buy or sell shares in predictions – for example, a share that pays out $100 if the economy improves this year, but $0 if the economy deteriorates. If it settles around a price of $60, this means the investing public predicts as 60% chance that the economy will go up.

A prediction market could be used to set policy by predicting its effects: for example, by comparing the prices of “we will institute the president’s economic plan, and the economy will improve” , “we will not institute the president’s economic plan, and the economy will improve” and “we will institute the president’s economic plan”, we can determine the public’s confidence that the president’s plan will improve the economy. There are some nifty theorems of economics that prove that such a market would produce a more accurate estimate of the plan’s chances than any other conceivable method (including consulting experts), and that it would be very difficult to corrupt. You can read more about it here.

My point isn’t that futarchy would definitely work. It’s that it’s an example of some of the best ideas that smart people trying to improve government can come up with. And unless you’re creative enough to develop futarchy on your own, or well-read enough to be sure you’ve heard of it and everything else like it, you’re being premature in calling improvements in government “impossible”.

15.3: Even if there are ways to improve government, they are impractical because they’re too politically unpopular.

Let’s be totally honest here. The US Libertarian Party currently has a grand total of zero state legislators, zero state governors, zero representatives, and zero senators. It’s never gotten much above one percent in any presidential election. Nor have any successful or nationally known major-party candidates endorsed genuinely libertarian ideals except maybe Ron Paul, who just suffered his third landslide defeat.

The libertarian vision of minimal government is politically impossible to enact. This is not itself an argument against it – most good ideas are – but it does mean you can’t condemn the alternatives for being politically impossible to enact.

Incremental attempts to improve government have a much better track record, both in terms of political palatability and success rate, than libertarian efforts to dismantle government whole-cloth. If you want to focus on something that might work, you should concentrate your efforts there.

15.4: Isn’t it better to draw a line in the sand and say no government intervention at all? This keeps us off the slippery slope to the kind of awful, huge government we have today.

Empirically, no. Again I point out that libertarianism has been completely ineffective as a political movement. The line-in-the-sand idea is an interesting one but obviously hasn’t worked.

And there are some serious advantages to erasing it. If non-libertarians see libertarians as ideologues who hate all government programs including the ones that could work, then they will dismiss any particular libertarian objection as meaningless: why pay attention to the fact that a libertarian hates this particular bill, when she hates every bill?

But if libertarians took a principled stand in favor of some government regulation that might work, they could credibly say “Look, it’s not that we have a knee-jerk hatred for all possible regulations, it’s just that this particular regulation is a horrible idea.” And people might listen.

It might also help arrest the polarization of society into factions who apply ideological “litmus tests” to all proposals before even hearing them out (eg pretty much all self-described “progressives” will automatically support any proposal to be tougher on pollution without even looking at what the economic costs versus health benefits will be, and most self-described libertarians will automatically oppose it just as quickly.) This sort of thing needs to stop, libertarians are one of the at least two groups who need to stop it, and the more people who stop, the more people on both sides will notice what they’re doing and think about it a little harder.

16. Miscellaneous and Meta

16.1: I still disagree with you. How should I best debate you and other non-libertarians in a way that is most likely to change your mind?

The most important advice I could give you is don’t come on too strong. Words like “thievery” and “enslave” are emotional button pressers, not rational arguments. Attempts to insult your opponents by calling them tyrants or suggesting they want to rule over the rest of humanity as slaves and cattle (yes, I’ve gotten that) is more likely to annoy than convince. And please, stop the “1984” references, especially when you’re talking about a modern liberal democracy. Seriously. It’s like those fundamentalists who have websites about how not having prayer in school is equivalent to the Holocaust.

Many non-libertarians aren’t going to be operating from within the same moral system you are. Sometimes the libertarians I debate don’t realize this and this causes confusion when they try to argue that something’s morally wrong. If you want to convince your opponent on moral grounds, you’re either going to have to show how their theories fail even by their own moral standards, or else prove your standards are right by deriving them from first principles (warning: this might be impossible).

Don’t immediately assume that just because we are not libertarians, we must worship Stalin, love communism, think government should be allowed to control every facet of people’s lives, or even support things like gun control or the War on Drugs. Non-libertarianism is a lot like non-Hinduism: it’s a pretty diverse collection of viewpoints with everything from full-on fascists to people who are totally libertarian except about one tiny thing.

Finally, you may have better luck convincing us of specific points, like “Government should not set a minimum wage” than broad slogans, like “Government can never do anything right.” It’s really hard to prove a universal negative.

16.2: Where can I go to see a rebuttal to this FAQ?

David Friedman wrote a short response here

Bryan Caplan wrote a response to some of the points about labor here.

Sarah wrote a longer rebuttal here: Why You Shouldn’t Hate My Freedom.

And Nintil wrote another long rebuttal here: The Non-Non Libertarian FAQ

If you’ve written another rebuttal or you know of one, email me and I’ll add it here.

16.3: Where can I go to find more non-libertarian information?

Mike Huben has a terrifyingly large collection of non-libertarian and anti-libertarian material of wildly varying quality and tone at his website.

Highlights From The Comments On Cost Disease

I got many good responses to my Considerations On Cost Disease post, both in the comments and elsewhere. A lot of people thought the explanation was obvious; unfortunately, they all disagreed on what the obvious explanation was. Below are some of the responses I found most interesting.

John Cochrane:

So, what is really happening? I think Scott nearly gets there. Things cost 10 times as much, 10 times more than they used to and 10 times more than in other countries. It’s not going to wages. It’s not going to profits. So where is it going?

The unavoidable answer: The number of people it takes to produce these goods is skyrocketing. Labor productivity — number of people per quality adjusted output — declined by a factor of 10 in these areas. It pretty much has to be that: if the money is not going to profits, to to each employee, it must be going to the number of employees.

How can that happen? Our machines are better than ever, as Scott points out. Well, we (and especially we economists) pay too much attention to snazzy gadgets. Productivity depends on organizations not just on gadgets. Southwest figured out how to turn an airplane around in 20 minutes, and it still takes United an hour.

Contrariwise, I think we know where the extra people are. The ratio of teachers to students hasn’t gone down a lot — but the ratio of administrators to students has shot up. Most large public school systems spend more than half their budget on administrators. Similarly, class sizes at most colleges and universities haven’t changed that much — but administrative staff have exploded. There are 2.5 people handling insurance claims for every doctor. Construction sites have always had a lot of people standing around for every one actually working the machine. But now for every person operating the machine there is an army of planners, regulators, lawyers, administrative staff, consultants and so on. (I welcome pointers to good graphs and numbers on this sort of thing.)

So, my bottom line: administrative bloat.

Well, how does bloat come about? Regulations and law are, as Scott mentions, part of the problem. These are all areas either run by the government or with large government involvement. But the real key is, I think lack of competition. These are above all areas with not much competition. In turn, however, they are not by a long shot “natural monopolies” or failure of some free market. The main effect of our regulatory and legal system is not so much to directly raise costs, as it is to lessen competition (that is often its purpose). The lack of competition leads to the cost disease.

Though textbooks teach that monopoly leads to profits, it doesn’t “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life” said Hicks. Everywhere we see businesses protected from competition, especially highly regulated businesses, we see the cost disease spreading. And it spreads largely by forcing companies to hire loads of useless people.

Yes, technical regress can happen. Productivity depends as much on the functioning of large organizations, and the overall legal and regulatory system in which they operate, as it does on gadgets. We can indeed “forget” how those work. Like our ancestors peer at the buildings, aqueducts, dams, roads, and bridges put up by our ancestors, whether Roman or American, and wonder just how they did it.

David Manheim:

I think there is another dynamic that’s being ignored — and I would be surprised if an economist ignored it, but I’ll blame Scott’s eclectic ad-hoc education for why he doesn’t discuss the elephant in the room — Superior goods.

For those who don’t remember their Economics classes, imagine a guy who makes $40,000/year and eats chicken for dinner 3 nights a week. He gets a huge 50% raise, to $60,000/year, and suddenly has extra money to spend — his disposable income probably tripled or quadrupled. Before the hedonic treadmill kicks in, and he decides to waste all the money on higher rent and nicer cars, he changes his diet. But he won’t start eating chicken 10 times a week — he’ll start eating steak. When people get more money, they replace cheap “inferior” goods with expensive “superior” goods. And steak is a superior good.

But how many times a week will people eat steak? Two? Five? Americans as a whole got really rich in the 1940s and 1950s, and needed someplace to start spending their newfound wealth. What do people spend extra money on? Entertainment is now pretty cheap, and there are only so many nights a week you see a movie, and only so many $20/month MMORPGs you’re going to pay for. You aren’t going to pay 5 times as much for a slightly better video game or movie — and although you might pay double for 3D-Imax, there’s not much room for growth in that 5%.

The Atlantic had a piece on this several years ago, with the following chart:

Food, including rising steak consumption, decreased to a negligible part of people’s budgets, as housing started rising.In this chart, the reason healthcare hasn’t really shot up to the extent Scott discussed, as the article notes, is because most of the cost is via pre-tax employer spending. The other big change the article discusses is that after 1950 or so, everyone got cars, and commuted from their more expensive suburban houses — which is effectively an implicit increase in housing cost.

And at some point, bigger houses and nicer cars begin to saturate; a Tesla is nicer than my Hyundai, and I’d love one, but not enough to upgrade for 3x the cost. I know how much better a Tesla is — I’ve seen them.
Limitless Demand, Invisible Supply

There are only a few things that we have a limitless demand for, but very limited ability to judge the impact of our spending. What are they?

I think this is one big missing piece of the puzzle; in both healthcare and education, we want improvements, and they are worth a ton, but we can’t figure out how much the marginal spending improves things. So we pour money into these sectors.

Scott thinks this means that teachers’ and doctors’ wages should rise, but they don’t. I think it’s obvious why; they supply isn’t very limited. And the marginal impact of two teachers versus one, or a team of doctors versus one, isn’t huge. (Class size matters, but we have tons of teachers — with no shortage in sight, there is no price pressure.)

What sucks up the increased money? Dollars, both public and private, chasing hard to find benefits.

I’d spend money to improve my health, both mental and physical, but how? Extra medical diagnostics to catch problems, pricier but marginally more effective drugs, chiropractors, probably useless supplements — all are exploding in popularity. How much do they improve health? I don’t really know — not much, but I’d probably try something if it might be useful.

I’m spending a ton of money on preschool for my kids. Why? Because it helps, according to the studies. How much better is the $15,000/year daycare versus the $8,000 a year program a friend of mine runs in her house? Unclear, but I’m certainly not the only one spending big bucks. Why spend less, if education is the most superior good around?

How much better is Harvard than a subsidized in-state school, or four years of that school versus 2 years of cheap community college before transferring in? The studies seem to suggest that most of the benefit is really because the kids who get into the better schools. And Scott knows that this is happening.

We pour money into schools and medicine in order to improve things, but where does the money go? Into efforts to improve things, of course. But I’ve argued at length before that bureaucracy is bad at incentivizing things, especially when goals are unclear. So the money goes to sinkholes like more bureaucrats and clever manipulation of the metrics that are used to allocate the money.

As long as we’re incentivized to improve things that we’re unsure how to improve, the incentives to pour money into them unwisely will continue, and costs will rise. That’s not the entire answer, but it’s a central dynamic that leads to many of the things Scott is talking about — so hopefully that reduces Scott’s fears a bit.

A reader who wishes to remain anonymous emails me, saying:

In the business I know – hedge funds – I am aware of tiny operators running perfectly functional one-person shops on a shoestring, who take advantage of workarounds for legal and regulatory costs (like http://www.riainabox.com/). Then there are folks like me who are trying to “be legit” and hope to attract the big money from pensions and big banks. Those folks’ decisions are all made across major principal/agent divides where agents are incentivized not to take risks. So, they force hedge funds into an arms race of insanely paranoid “best practices” to compete for their money. So… my set up costs (which so far seem to have been too little rather than too much) were more than 10x what they could have been.

I guess this supports the “institutional risk tolerance” angle. There must be similar massive unseen frictions probably in many industries that go into “checking boxes”.

Relatedly, a pet theory of mine is that “organizational complexity” imposes enormous and not fully appreciated costs, which probably grow quadratically with organization size. I’d predict, without Googling, that the the US military, just as a function of being so large, has >75% of its personal doing effectively administrative/logistical things, and that you could probably find funny examples of organizational-overhead-proliferation like an HR department so big it needed its own (meta-)HR department.

Noah Smith:

That could be one force behind rising costs; it definitely seems important for K-12 education. But it doesn’t explain why the U.S. is so much worse than countries such as France, Germany or Japan. Those countries are about as productive as the U.S., so their cost disease should be comparable. Something else must be afoot.

Another usual suspect is government intervention. The government subsidizes college through cheap loans, purchases infrastructure, restricts housing supply, and intervenes heavily in the health-care market. It’s probably part of the problem in these areas, especially in urban housing markets.

But again, government intervention struggles to explain the difference between the U.S. and other rich nations. In most countries, health care is mainly paid for by the government — many countries have nationalized the industry outright. Yet their health outcomes are broadly similar to those in the U.S., or even a little bit better. Other countries have strong unions and high land acquisition costs — often stronger and higher than the U.S. — but their infrastructure is much cheaper. And there is no law or regulation propping up high wealth-management fees or real-estate commissions. In general, lower-cost places like Japan and Europe have more regulation and more interventionism than the U.S.

So if cost disease and government can at most be only part of the story, what’s going on? One possibility Alexander raises is that “markets might just not work.” In other words, there might be large market failures going on.

The health-care market naturally has a lot of adverse selection — people with poor health are more inclined to buy insurance. That means insurance companies, knowing its customers tend to be those with poorer health, charge higher prices. Also, hospitals could be local monopolies. And college education could be costly in part because of asymmetric information — if Americans tend to vary more than people in other countries with respect to work ethnic and natural ability, they might have to spend more on college to prove themselves. This is known as signaling.

When high costs are due to market failures, interventionist government can be the solution instead of the problem — provided the intervention is done right. So the more active governments of countries like Europe and Japan might be successfully holding down costs that would otherwise balloon to inefficient levels.

But there’s one more possibility — one that gets taught in few economics classes. There is almost certainly some level of pure trickery in the economy — people paying more than they should, because they don’t have the time or knowledge to look for better prices, or because they trust people they shouldn’t trust.

This is the thesis of the book “Phishing for Phools,” by Nobel-winning economists George Akerlof and Robert Shiller. The authors advance the disturbing thesis that sellers will continually look for ways to dupe customers into paying more than they should, and that these efforts will always be partially successful. In Akerlof and Shiller’s reckoning, markets don’t just sometimes fail — they are inherently subject to both deceit and mistakes.

That could explain a number of unsettling empirical results in the economics literature. For example, transparency reduces prices substantially in health-care equipment markets. More complex and opaque mortgage-backed securities failed at higher rates in the financial crisis. In these and other cases, buyers paid too much because they didn’t know what they were buying. Whether that’s due to trickery, or to the difficulty of gathering accurate information, it’s not good — in an efficient economy, everyone will know what they’re buying.

So it’s possible that many of those anomalously high U.S. costs are due to the natural informational problems of markets.

Megan McArdle:

It’s pretty easy to tell a libertarian story where markets work fine, but government intrusions into these markets have rendered them so unfree that they no longer function the way they’re supposed to. And I think that is at least part of the story here. Yes, these things are often procured from private parties. But everywhere you look you see the government: blocking new entry (through accreditation standards, “certificate of need” laws, and zoning and building codes), while simultaneously subsidizing the purchases through artificially cheap loans and often, direct price subsidies. It would be sort of shocking if restricted supply combined with stimulated demand didn’t produce rapidly rising prices. Meanwhile, in areas that the government largely leaves alone (such as Lasik), we pretty much see what you’d expect: falling prices and improving consumer service.

But that’s perhaps a little simplistic. Agriculture is also the focus of a great deal of government intervention, as are sundry things such as air travel, and we don’t see the same phenomenon there. So we need to dig a little deeper and describe what’s special about these three sectors (we’ll leave public transportation out of it, because there, the answer is pretty much “union featherbedding combined with increasingly dysfunctional procurement and regulatory processes”).

First, and most obviously, they involve vital purchases made on long time horizons, and with considerable uncertainty. Food is more vital than health care to our well-being, but its price and quality are really easy to assess: if you buy a piece of fruit, you know pretty quickly whether you liked it or not. This is a robust market, and it’s going to take communist-level intervention to fundamentally mess it up so that food is both scarce and not very good.

Homes, schooling and health care, on the other hand, are more complicated products. You don’t know when you buy them how much value they will be to you, and it is often difficult for a lay person to assess the quality of the product. You can read hospital rankings and pay a home inspector, but these things only go so far.

The fact that these are expensive purchases that can go terribly wrong creates a great deal of pressure for the government to intervene. As ours has, over and over, in all sorts of ways.

And at the risk of giving up a little bit of my libertarian cred, I’ll say that government intervention in these markets did not have to be as expensive-making as it has turned out to be in America. Other countries have these sorts of problems too, but they’re nowhere near as large as ours.

Part of that is just that we’re richer than most of those other countries. We were going to spend the portion of our budgets no longer needed for food somewhere, and health care, education and housing are pretty good candidates. But that’s only part of the story. A big part of the story is that America just isn’t very good at regulation. When you talk to people who live elsewhere about what their government does, one thing that really strikes you about those conversations is how much more competent other rich industrial governments seem to be at regulating things and delivering services. Their bureaucracies are not perfect, but they are better than ours.

That’s not to say that America could have an awesome big government. Our regulatory state has been incompetent compared to others for decades, since long before the Reagan Revolution that Democrats like to blame. There are many, many factors in this, from our immigration history (vital to understanding how modern urban bureaucracies work in this country), to the fact that we have many competing centers of power instead of a single unified government providing over a single bureaucratic hierarchy. There is no way to fix this on a national level, and even at the level of local bureaucratic reform, it’s darned near impossible.

In other words, this is probably what we’re stuck with. It may not be Baumol’s cost disease — but it’s potentially even more serious, and it’s going to be a lingering condition.

Scott Sumner:

I certainly don’t claim to have all the answers, but I do feel that much of the problem reflects the fact that governments often cover the cost of services in those three areas. This leads producers to spend more than the socially optimal amount on these products. I’m going to provide some examples, but before doing so recall that economic theory predicts that costs in those areas should be wildly excessive. If the government paid 90% of the cost of any car you bought, and that didn’t lead to lots more people buying Porsches and Ferraris, then we’d have a major puzzle on our hands.

Scott mentions that private for-profit hospitals are also quite expensive. But even there, costs are largely paid for by the government. Close to half of all health care spending is directly paid for by the government (Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans, government employees, etc.) and a large share of the rest is indirectly paid for by taxpayers because health insurance is not just income tax free, but also payroll tax free. I’d be stunned if health care spending had not soared in recent decades.

A sizable share of my health care spending has been unneeded, and I’m fairly healthy. I met one person in their 80s who had a normal cold and went to see the doctor. They said it was probably just a normal cold, but let’s put you in the hospital overnight and do some tests, just in case. There was nothing wrong, and the bill the next day was something in the $5000 to $10,000 range, I forget the exact amount. This must happen all the time. No way would they have opted for those services if Medicare weren’t picking up the tab.

Just to be clear, I don’t think any monocausal explanation is enough. Governments also pay for health care in other countries, and the costs are far lower. It’s likely the interaction of the US government picking up much of the tab, plus insurance regulations, plus American-style litigation, plus powerful provider lobbies that prevent European-style cost controls, etc., etc., lead to our unusually high cost structure. So don’t take this as a screed against “socialized medicine.” I’m making a narrower point, that a country where the government picks up most of the costs, and doesn’t have effective regulations to hold down spending, is likely to end up with very expensive medicine.

To be fair, there is evidence from veterinary medicine that demand for pet care has also soared, and that suggests people are becoming more risk averse, even for their pets. But there is also evidence cutting the other way. Plastic surgery has not seen costs skyrocket. (Both are medical fields where people tend to pay out of pocket.)

I started working at Bentley in 1982, teaching 4 courses a semester. When I retired in 2015, I was making 7 times as much in nominal terms (nearly 3 times as much in real terms), and I was teaching 2 courses per semester. Thus I was being paid 14 times more per class (nearly 6 times as much in real terms). No wonder higher education costs have soared! (Even salaries for new hires have risen sharply in real terms.) Interestingly, the size of the student body at Bentley didn’t change noticeably over that period (about 4000 undergrads.) But the physical size of the school rose dramatically, with many new buildings full of much fancier equipment. Right now they are building a new hockey arena. There are more non-teaching employees. You can debate whether living standards for Americans have risen over time, but there’s no doubt that living standards for Americans age 18-22 have risen over time—by a lot.

As far as elementary school, my daughter had 2, 3, and once even 4 teachers in her classroom, with about 18 students. We had one teacher for 30 students when I was young. (I’m told classes are even bigger in Japan, and they don’t have janitors in their schools. The students must mop the floors. I love Japan!)

There are also lots more rules and regulations. By the end of my career, I felt almost like I was spending as much time teaching 2 classes as I used to spend teaching 4. Many of these rules were well intentioned, but in the end I really don’t think they led to students learning any more than back in 1982. I wonder if Dodd/Frank is now making small town banking a frustrating profession in the way that earlier regs made medicine and teaching increasing frustrating professions.

People say this is a disease of the service sector. But I don’t see skyrocketing prices in restaurants, dry clearers, barbers and lots of other service industries where people pay out of pocket.

The same is true of construction. Scott estimates that NYC subways cost 20 times as much as in 1900, even adjusting for inflation. The real cost of other types of construction (such as new homes), has risen far less. Again, people pay for homes out of pocket, but government pays for subways. Do I even need to mention the cost of weapons system like the F-35?

To summarize, the case of pet medicine shows that costs can rise rapidly even when people pay out of pocket. But the biggest and most important examples of cost inflation are in precisely those industries where government picks up a major part of the tab–health, education, and government procurement of complex products. And excessive cost inflation is exactly what economic theory predicts will happen when governments heavily subsidize an activity, without adequate cost regulations. Just as excessive risk taking is exactly what economic theory predicts will happen if government insures bank deposits, without adequate risk regulations. Let’s not be surprised if the things that happen, are exactly what the textbooks predict would happen. Even FDR predicted that deposit insurance would lead to reckless behavior by banks, and he (reluctantly) signed the bill into law.

Sohois:

I’ve seen some evidence that corporations can be equally vulnerable to cost disease as public institutions.

For example, since the 1980s CEO pay has quintupled despite the lack of any growth in profits or otherwise to justify this. Now this is probably going to result in far smaller effects on overall cost, but it still stands as a demonstration of how market failure can occur and result in large cost increases in these firms.

I would venture that many firms have seen huge increases in both revenues and costs so that when you adjust profit for inflation it hasn’t really changed at all, on average.

Andrew Swift

What you observe is fifty years of optimization of wealth extraction. Price outcomes depend on the contributions of hundreds of participants. Every participant optimizes his/her earnings, exerting a constant upward pressure on price. Participants become ever more expert at getting rich. Wealth-extraction schemes (scams) are refined and optimized (in all markets), and price increases are pushed downstream (in markets where buyers can’t push back). Radical price increases reflect markets where consumers have reduced ability to push back:

– complex markets (can’t understand)
– opaque markets (can’t see)
– entrenched/highly-regulated markets (can’t modify)
– necessary-to-keep-living markets (can’t avoid)
– limited-quantity markets (really want)
– intermediated markets where the end buyer doesn’t decide how things are purchased (don’t choose)

Some systems are resistant to contributors’ efforts to extract wealth and some systems are not. There’s an equilibrium between cost and readiness to pay. To reduce the costs in expensive domains, willingness to pay the high costs has to be reduced. As long as the buyer won’t or can’t say no, costs will increase through the entire production process. There won’t necessarily be one big obvious rip-off, but every participant will optimize the heck out of his contribution and the overall pressure will push costs up.

Could one provide a cheaper alternative in these domains? Sure for a little while, but if the bottom line is that people are willing to pay more for the service the prices will creep back up.

The only exception would be where the new, lower-priced, alternative sets a new standard and buyers refuse to continue paying the old prices. See https://stratechery.com/2016/dollar-shave-club-and-the-disruption-of-everything/ for a great article about this.

Habu71:

My favorite example of ridiculous order-of-magnitude type cost increases is nuclear power plant construction costs. The plots from this paper illustrate it nicely.
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/292964046_fig6_Overnight-Construction-Cost-and-Construction-Duration-of-US-Nuclear-Reactors-Color

Except, in the case of power plant costs, the causes – at least, for the increasing US costs – are quite a bit more apparent. Pre TMI, US costs were in line with the rest of the world’s cost. Post TMI, not so much. New regulatory burdens all by themselves increased the cost of new plants by a factor of ten. Now, this is of course not proof that any of the other problems that Scott mentioned are entirely – or even mostly – caused by increasing regulatory burdens. It does however, show that government institutions as awful as the NRC do exist, and that their effects can raise costs by the amounts seen health care, education, etc…”

John Schilling:

[Fear of lawsuits] is well understood as the cause of the substantial rise in light airplane prices since 1970. A single-engine, four-seat Cessna 172 cost an inflation-adjusted $77,000 in 1970. A substantially identical airplane cost $163,000 in 1986. And went out of production the next year, because people weren’t willing to pay that price. When congress passed laws relaxing the manufacturer’s liability for older airplanes, Cessna was able to reinstate production in 1996 at an inflation-adjusted $190,000. Today, the price seems to literally be “if you have to ask, you can’t afford it”; the manufacturer only advertises fleet sales, but I’d estimate about $400,000 (of which ~$100K is fancy electronics that didn’t exist in 1986 and weren’t standard in 1996).

In this case it is particularly easy to pull out the lawsuit/liability effect because there aren’t many cofounders. The 1986 Cessna is so little changed from the 1970 model that they sell at about the same price on the used market when controlled for condition and total flight time. And fear of lawsuits didn’t manifest as safety enhancements of inscrutable cost and value, because light airplane crashes are almost always due to Stupid Pilot Tricks and almost everything that a manufacturer could do to mitigate that (e.g. tricycle landing gear) was standard in 1970. But the manufacturers still get sued, and have to pay millions, so there’s nothing to be done but pay for liability insurance. And, second-order effect, cut production when your customers start balking at the increased prices, so you have to amortize the fixed costs of actually building airplanes over a smaller sales volume.

So, a doubling in price over fifteen or so years, a quadrupling over fifty years in spite of Congress noticing the problem and trying to mitigate it, attributable to safety/liability concerns but not resulting in actual safety improvements. I have no trouble believing something similar is happening in other industries but is harder to discern because too many other things are happening at the same time.

Alex Zavoluk

Wikipedia suggests that almost all of those other countries have litigation rules that make weak civil cases more costly, which seems like evidence in favor of the litigation hypothesis. It also means that there’s a relatively straightforward solution.

Doug on Marginal Revolution, in response to a lot of people asking whether maybe we were just calculating the CPI wrong:

That’s a plausible hypothesis, but viewed through that frame of reference, median wages have also gone down tremendously. It’s still the case that the median person spends at least six times more of their paycheck on healthcare. If healthcare is a closer metric to “true prices” then manufactured good, then that means median wages have fallen by around 80%. It also means that overall GDP has crashed since 1970, since the price deflator now averages 6-7%, and nominal GDP has only averaged around 4%. It would mean that the economy has literally been in recession 90% of the past 40 years.

The only reason we’re not all starving in the street is from the miraculous gains in manufacturing productivity and automation. But again, in this framework, that process is largely exogenous to the terrible macroeconomic situation. If those gains slow down even a little, and the macro trends continue, we’re probably facing imminent economic collapse. So maybe this is a plausible hypothesis, but it certainly comes with a whole lot of extreme implications. I think medicine/education specific cost disease is a much more likely explanation.

bkearns123:

One commonality in the examples cited is disintermediation/subsidies. College is paid for by a third party, and financed by generous government loans. Generous in the sense that they are easy to get, not easy to get out of. Health care has massive tax subsidies, and for a good period of time felt “free” to employees. Public schooling is paid for indirectly.

Regarding the section on risk aversion, I happen to be in the playground business. The most common injury is broken bones from a fall. Consequently, our industry has ended up with poured in place surfacing, which costs 10x as much as mulch or pea gravel. It is wonderful stuff, but really increases the cost of the playground. Again, no one pays directly for their playground, and the paying party cannot risk not being in tune with the regulations.

Markets cannot function if the risk reward relationship is not direct.

fc123::

In all of these problem sectors it seems the resources consumed in each industry has shifted to servicing and extending the definition of the marginal ‘customer’. This can explain I think some of the above

E.g.. 40 years ago hospitals received 100 customers. Ranked, patients 1-20 died. And no one really tried to save them (some comfort but that was it). Today they are trying (are obliged) to try to save patients no 5-15 (the 85 year old with triple bypass, 20 week premie). The total no of staff needed for this task swamps increases in individual productivity. You just need more people, even if they each are more productive or trained than in the pasts. So salaries for each does not go up that much, there are just more of them, total cost go up, and outcomes over the patients treated are somewhat but not much better (some now make it but some fraction still die). Hence medical curve shows some improvement but not 1:1 with cost.

In education, in the 1950-1970s we could afford to socially promote non-academically inclined students, not really expend effort on them as long as they kept quiet in class, then have them leave at age 16 to go work at Ford. Universities could count on getting the higher performing students. Today, we have to deliver much weaker students all the way to the end of high school, also force many into college. And ALL the extra resources go to get this new lower end close to what used to be the minimal university student performance. The top cohort gets little extra resources and has not really improved. Hence, the scores across the new ‘extended’ student population stays flat.

I base this partly on what I have seen from my wife (engineering professor at top university), resources are heavily consumed by the lower performing students, top students have better opportunities than 20 years ago but in general the resources are much less focused on them than on the marginal students.

So if you assume these industries for whatever reason shifted focus to servicing deeper into the tail of the population aptitude/effort over the years (I am not saying this is good/bad, was for social reasons, for humanistic reasons or making any comment), this would very much explain the overall cost rise, coupled with the lack of desired improvement in statistics measured across the population that now gets services as a whole.

In short, in the US we define policies that drive costs based on the tail of the population, but we experience performance on the average. As an immigrant from a third world country I think this is a big difference often invisible to the US-born citizens I talk to. Maybe why this is a great country and I am here. All I can say is that it is a world view that is not common world wide. Where I grew up, No Child Left Behind law would have been designed as 1 Child Left Behind. There just were not the resources, but more important, it was just more socially acceptable to just halve the no of slots halfway through an academic program, for example.

So I guess the question is why are we so focused on pushing services into the tails and will we continue to do so? Does society really benefit from having a larger fraction of the population capable of doing crappy algebra? Clearly there will be some point where the cost becomes prohibitive and it will stop: maybe that is what we are seeing now. But it is stunning that this was a 50 year process — if the dynamics in social policy “markets” are that slow it is going to be really difficult to manage.

CatCube::

I can’t help but wonder if part of the ever-expanding expenses isn’t that we mediate our interactions through the legal system more than we used to.

What got me thinking about it was what I’m working on this week. To answer Incurian’s question above about why I was posting during the workday, I was avoiding working on a report for selecting a contractor for a project I’m working on. (I owe the taxpayer about three hours this weekend, since I spent time on Friday here and reading about the Oroville Dam spillway.)

We had contractors submit proposals, and we had two structural engineers and a construction quality assurance rep sit in a room for three days, writing our individual reports about each proposal, then coming to agreement about how we rate them. Then I have to write a report summarizing all of our individual reports, which gets fed into the arcane machine that will eventually spit out an award. This process costs about $10,000, and had zero value for evaluating the proposals. However, it has to be done this way or we’ll get dragged around in court by an offeror’s lawyer if they choose to make a case of their rejection. I think that in years past they’d use a simple low-bid process, which has its own problems, or the rejected contractors would bitch to their Congressmen or something but wouldn’t literally make a federal case of it.

LukHamilton:

I think you gave short shrift to libertarian explanations of this phenomena. In particular, the Kling Theory of Public Choice may explain a significant fraction of cost disease: public policy will always choose to subsidize demand and restrict supply. If you restrict supply holding everything else equal, prices will go up. If you subsidize demand holding everything else equal, prices will go up. If you do both, prices will really go up.

(1) Healthcare: The government restricts the supply of all healthcare professionals (for example, doctors, nurses, CNAs, pharmacists, dentists, LPNs, etc.) via occupational licensing. (I should note that maybe everyone can get behind the simple idea that the number of doctors per 10,000 people in the US should at least remain constant over time and not go down, as it has.) It restricts the supply of healthcare organizations (for example, hospitals, surgery centers, etc.) via onerous regulations, like the very ridiculous “certificate-of-need“. You have already explained in previous posts how things like the FDA restrict the supply of generic drugs. In terms of demand, the government subsidizes health insurance via the corporate income tax code, CHIP, the Obamacare marketplace, Medicaid, Medicare, etc.

(2) Education: I have done less investigation into this sector’s regulations. You mentioned Title IX. David Friedman has some nice blog posts on how the American Bar Association’s regulations on law schools make cheap law schools impossible. (This same concept also applies to healthcare-related professional schools, by the way.) If Bryan Caplan is right about signaling, a lot of education involves negative externalities, so it should be taxed or limited by the government. Instead, it subsidizes demand via loans. K-12 education, meanwhile, receives massive subsidies from the government; everyone can enjoy a totally free K-12 education.

(3) Real estate: Land-use regulations restrict the supply of housing. (Explanations of this can be found by googling “Matt Yglesias housing”.) It also subsidizes housing via Section 8, various other HUD programs, Freddie Mac, the mortgage-interest tax deduction, etc.

In short, any industry that the United States government has a heavy hand in has/will experience cost disease.

BenWave:

Scott, help me out here because I’ve read a long article about the mysterious nature of rising costs in certain sectors as well as hundreds of bemused comments, and the article had no more than a throwaway paragraph saying that maybe rising inequality is a sign that the ‘missing’ money is ending up in the pockets of the super-wealthy elite.

I come from a left-wing perspective, so I hope you can see that to me ex nihilo, “the super wealthy are becoming much richer than was historically the case, also all of these important services are becoming way more expensive than they used to be, but the one does not explain the other” looks like an extraordinary claim. I would like to see more evidence presented that this is not the case before updating in this direction!

In particular, I can see that a large majority of the odd features you have picked out about these services are acting exactly as predicted in Das Kapital volume 2, where Marx studies the process of realisation of invested capital (ie, money spent on labour, materials, tools etc) as the principal plus surplus value in money form. In particular, some of his predictions were:

1. Gains made by workers through collective action in sites of production can be taken away again by the landlord, the grocer, the financier etc.

2. The difficulty in the realisation of capital will incentivise businesses to strive for monopoly positions (whether by government mandate, mutual cooperations, quasi-monopolies such as real estate, branding and advertising).

3. The tensions between the production of surplus value and the realisation of surplus value will tend to set certain sectors of capital against one another – for example landlords would prefer if workers were well paid, but had to spend larger amounts of money on rent whereas factory owners would prefer to pay workers as little as possible, and that includes low housing costs.

Later analysis in the tradition of Marx have noticed that financial capital these days is doing very very well compared to workers, but also compared to traditional industrialists. And four out of the five of your examples are fields in which debt and financing plays a very large role. It’s pretty easy to see that financial capital would be incentivised to make these things more expensive so that they can extract more money through larger loans and financing. (I’m not certain about subways. Are they typically debt-financed?).

Financial capital certainly has the economic and political power to push for this, and they don’t particularly care if they squeeze other holders of capital along they way. They are debt-financed fields in which large monopoly powers exist for one reason or another. And while I acknowledge that bureacratic bloat is certainly playing its role, I’m baffled by the relative lack of consideration of normal capitalist tendencies on this thread. As far as I can see it is the single most important factor driving up the costs of these services. Please present me with evidence that I am wrong about this!

Some additional links less-directly related or less easy to excerpt:

National Center for Policy Analysis: Should All Medicine Work Like Cosmetic Surgery? Because plastic surgery isn’t a life-or-death need, it’s not covered by insurance. Costs in the sector have risen 30% since 1992, compared to 118% for other types of health care. Does this mean that being sheltered from the insurance system has sheltered it from cost disease?

The American Interest: Why Can’t We Have Nice Things? A breakdown of exactly why infrastructure and transportation projects cost so much more in the US than elsewhere, with an eye for Trump’s promise of $1 trillion extra infrastructure spending.

Arnold Kling: What I Believe About Education. I have to include one “it’s all the teachers’ unions fault” post for completeness here.

Neerav Kingsland on education spending and the role of charter schools

The comment thread on Marginal Revolution contains some insight

The Incidental Economist: What Makes The US Health Care System So Expensive FAQ. From July 2011. Includes links to a lot of other things.

And some additional comments of my own:

I think any explanation that starts with “well, we have so much money now that we have to spend it on something…” ignores that many people do not have so much money, and in fact are really poor, but they get the same education and health care as the rest of us. If the problem were just “rich people looking for places to throw their money away”, there would be other options for poor people who don’t want to do that, the same way rich people have fancy restaurants where they can throw their money away and poor people have McDonalds.

Any explanation of the form “evil capitalists are scamming the rest of us for profit” has to explain why the cost increases are in the industries least exposed to evil capitalists. K-12 education is entirely nonprofit. Colleges are a mix but generally not owned by a single rich guy who gets all the money. My hospital is owned by an order of nuns; studies show that government hospitals have higher costs than for-profit ones. Meanwhile, the industries with the actual evil capitalists – tech, retail, restaurants, natural resources – seem mostly immune to the cost disease. This is not promising. Also, this wouldn’t explain why so much of the money seems to be going to administrators/bells-and-whistles. If prices increase by $100,000, and the money goes to hiring two extra $50,000/year administrators, how does this help the capitalist profiting off it all?

Any explanation of the form “administrative bloat” or “inefficiency” has to explain why non-bloated alternatives don’t pop up or become popular. I’m sure the CEO of Ford would love to just stop doing his job and approve every single funding request that passes his desk and pay for it by jacking up the price of cars, but at some point if he did that too much we’d all just buy Toyotas instead. Although there are some barriers to competition in the hospital market, there are fewer such barriers in the college, private school, and ambulatory clinic market. Why hasn’t competition discouraged administrative bloat here the same way it does in other industries?

Maybe a good time to reread the post How Likely Are Multifactorial Trends?

Links 2/17: Site Your Sources

A while ago when we discussed drug tolerance here, some people taught me about receptors that activated two different second messenger chains, and how you could modulate the balance of effects by finding agonists that disproportionately activated one or the other. Now it looks like this principle has born fruit in oliceride, a new opioid which may be far safer than eg morphine. Just remember that heroin was also originally advertised as a safer and less addictive version of morphine.

Something I’d never heard before but which fits with a lot of people’s observation: Wellbutrin works really well the first few days, but true evaluation of its effects has to wait for a “second wind” later on. Does this fit with the experiences of Wellbutrin users here? (h/t Brienne)

The United States not only does poorly on education benchmark PISA, but each decile of wealth also does poorly compared to equivalent deciles in other countries. I find this surprising. Does this torpedo the theory that each US ethnic group does as well as its foreign counterparts, and US underperformance is a Simpson’s Paradox on ethnic distribution?

Twitter: @EveryoneIsDril. EG:

Some followup to the “Fetlife bans offensive fetishes to satisfy payment processors” story from last month: the official announcement, Jadagul’s analysis.

New Study Finds Performance-Enhancing Drugs For Chess. Okay, fine, just modafinil, which we already knew about, but the exact pattern is interesting. Modafinil makes people take longer to make their moves, but the moves are ultimately better. That suggests that its advantage is not increasing IQ per se, but in giving people the increased attention span/concentration to work harder on finding good moves. I think this elegantly ties together a lot of stuff into a good explanation of modafinil’s cognitive-enhancing properties.

New Zealand Wants To Know How Peter Thiel Became A Secret Citizen. Give up, New Zealand; Peter Thiel is a citizen of any country he wants to be a citizen of. Also: Peter Thiel Denies California Governor Run Despite Mysterious Group’s Backing.

I was going to link to the paper Physics Envy May Be Hazardous To Your Wealth, but the part that actually interested me is small enough that I’m just going to include it here as a jpg (h/t Julia Galef):

Nature: Prevalence And Architecture Of De Novo Mutations In Developmental Disorders. There’s been a lot of debate over paternal age effects, and this paper helps clarify that by actually counting people’s de novo mutations and finding that children of older fathers (and to a lesser degree older mothers) have more of them. I am not sure to what degree this answers the objection that fathers with worse genes will tend to get married later; my impression is that it’s circumstantial evidence against (de novo mutations are more specific to paternal age than just bad genes) but not complete disproof.

Psssst, kid, wanna buy a parasitic worm? Key quote: “Those who experience the ‘hookworm bounce’ tend to describe it as ‘feeling as if they are teenagers again'” (h/t pistachi0n)

New moth species neopalpa donaldtrumpi (cf List Of Organisms Named After Famous People)

Topher Brennan on obstructing everything. “Our system of government requires compromise, but Democrats shouldn’t be worrying about that right now because Democrats don’t control Congress. Force Trump to compromise with the dozen Republican Senators who were still saying #NeverTrump on election day. Force him to compromise with the Republican Senators who endorsed him but have spoken out against him on specific issues.”

Donald Trump to slash funding for United Nations. What could possibly go wrong?

Koch brothers plan to help lead conservative resistance to Trump.

QZ’s profile of Steve Bannon. I keep on hearing about this guy as some kind of esoteric conservative mastermind with unpredictable goals and visions, but his positions don’t look that different from what you’d expect to hear on Rush Limbaugh or something. Related: Fox News makes a very unconvincing case that Bannon is not so bad. Also related: the pro-Trump intellectuals (1, 2)

Are companies buying ads on shows Donald Trump watches in order to influence policy?

Okay, enough Trump links. Moving on to history, check out the Twitter account of 10th century English king Donaeld The Unready, who wants to “make Mercia great again!” and fight off enemies like fake chroniclers, people who didn’t attend his coronation, and Grendel:

New paper in Crime And Delinquency: “We find no evidence that the number of fatal police shootings either increased or decreased post-Ferguson. Claims to the contrary are based on weak analyses of short-term trends.” This is especially surprising in light of claims that increased inner-city crime is caused by police withdrawing in order to prevent further fatal shootings; if that’s the police’s plan, it doesn’t seem to be working very well.

Intranasal ghrelin vaccine prevents obesity in mice.

Gene drive testing thwarted when organisms quickly develop resistance. There goes that idea.

News.com.au joins in the probabilistic prediction for 2017 movement.

Slate: The Most Dangerous Terrorists Are From North Carolina…”They talk about building walls and vetting refugees. If we were serious…we would seal our borders against North Carolina.” DEAR WILLIAM SALETAN, PLEASE READ ALBION’S SEED. YOURS, SLATE STAR CODEX.

It is the grim cyberpunk future of 2017, and hackers are plotting to exploit insecurities in your virtual blowjobs.

New poll: Majority of Europeans support banning Muslim immigration. It’s an Internet-based poll, which is always cause for suspicion, but they seem to be a reputable organization and not the sort of group whose results are 100% due to trolling by 4chan, plus it’s consistent with some other results. Still pretty shocking and an existential-terror-level reminder of partisan bubbles. Also: Rasmussen finds most Americans support Trump’s refugee ban order.

Closely related: M.G. Miles makes the case for banning Muslim immigration. Maybe the first person I have seen make this case in a principled way; everyone else just seems to be screaming about stuff and demanding their readers reinterpret it into argument form. Also, he uses the word “terrorism” zero times, which seems like the correct number of times for a case of this sort. This is what people should be debating and responding to. Rebuttals by Americans would probably want to start with the differences between Muslim immigrants to Europe and Muslim immigrants to the US – Miles discusses the European case, but by my understanding these are very different populations with very different outcomes).

Second Enumerations podcast: Grognor reading interesting essays.

SSRN: Extreme Protest Tactics Reduce Popular Support For Social Movements: “We find across three experiments that extreme protest tactics decreased popular support for a given cause because they reduced feelings of identification with the movement. Though this effect obtained in tests of popular responses to extreme tactics used by animal rights, Black Lives Matter, and anti-Trump protests (Studies 1-3), we found that self-identified political activists were willing to use extreme tactics because they believed them to be effective for recruiting popular support.” Cf. The Toxoplasma Of Rage. (h/t Dain)

Major accountancy firm Ernst & Young announces its intention to recruit earnest young people by removing the requirement for employees to have a college degree, “saying there is ‘no evidence’ success at university correlates with achievement in later life.” While they’re wrong about the specific correlational claim, they’re right about the implicit causal claim, so congratulations to them and here’s hoping they’re the first of many. Cf. Against Tulip Subsidies.

The Cagots were an underclass of people in medieval France whom everyone hated, with various purity laws around how decent people weren’t allowed to associate with/marry/touch/go near them. In the 1500s, the Pope personally intervened to tell the French to stop persecuting them, but the French ignored him and persecuted them more than ever. As far as anyone can tell, they looked, spoke, and acted just like everyone else, and exactly how they became so despised is one of the minor mysteries of medieval history.

New ultra-anonymous cryptocurrency Monero takes off. Distantly related: are Republicans and tax-prep companies in a Baptists-and-bootleggers coalition to make paying taxes as difficult and annoying as possible?

Scientists discover new phase of matter: time crystals. Studies suggest that if researchers were to find all seven of them and place them in the slots on the Altar Of Eternity, they could gain +5 Holy damage to all attacks.

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OT69: The Open Of Akhnai

This is the bi-weekly visible open thread. There are hidden threads every few days here. Post about anything you want, ask random questions, whatever. Also:

1. This might be your last chance to take the SSC Survey before I close it. Thanks to everyone who has already responded.

2. Comment of the week is Douglas Knight’s commentary on the American genetic clustering post. I still haven’t looked through most of the cost disease comment thread.

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