Fact 2. Value production implies an effort to sustain life and further
well-being.  

Fact 3. Value destroyers sustain their life and further their
well-being by usurping the values created by value producers and in
the process hurt the effort of the value producers to sustain their
life and further their well-being.

Therefore,

4. Value producers who want to live and further their well-being ought
not tolerate value destroyers.

Here is an example of how "ought" statements can be objective truths,
i.e., facts.

泣┊？㈡

--Count Lithium von Chloride, ushering in the new era

E-mail: vonch...@yahoo.com

> Fact 1. Value production is ultimately the only way to sustain life.
>
> Fact 2. Value production implies an effort to sustain life and further
> well-being.  
>
> Fact 3. Value destroyers sustain their life and further their
> well-being by usurping the values created by value producers and in
> the process hurt the effort of the value producers to sustain their
> life and further their well-being.
>
> Therefore,
>
> 4. Value producers who want to live and further their well-being ought
> not tolerate value destroyers.
>
> Here is an example of how "ought" statements can be objective truths,
> i.e., facts.

Why not make it really simple:

Descriptive premise: I want to be able to know what time it is.
Normative conclusion: I ought to get a watch.

(I think this avoids all sorts of problems in understanding things like
"ultimately the only way", "sustain", "value destroyer", "usurping the
values", etc.  For example, someone can be both a "value producer" and a
"value destroyer", and a person might be able to survive just by eating
food that grows wild.)

Now, the question is, does this argument really address the "ought from
is" issue?

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

In that case procuring the food (by picking it or hunting it) it would
be the act of production.

>Now, the question is, does this argument really address the "ought from
>is" issue?

Yes.

ffb
ffb
ffb
ffb
ffb
ffb
ffb
ffb
ffb
ffb

>In article <3759dd36...@news.mco.bellsouth.net>, n...@home.com
>writes...
>> Fact 1. Value production is ultimately the only way to sustain life.
>>
>> Fact 2. Value production implies an effort to sustain life and further
>> well-being.  
>>
>> Fact 3. Value destroyers sustain their life and further their
>> well-being by usurping the values created by value producers and in
>> the process hurt the effort of the value producers to sustain their
>> life and further their well-being.
>>
>> Therefore,
>>
>> 4. Value producers who want to live and further their well-being ought
>> not tolerate value destroyers.
>>
>> Here is an example of how "ought" statements can be objective truths,
>> i.e., facts.

...

>Now, the question is, does this argument really address the "ought from
>is" issue?

No. That is deriving ought from ought. "...Who want to ..." translates as

"If you ought to live and further your well-being then you ought ...  ."
--
David Friedman
DDFr@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/

Nonsense, David. Notice I didn't address whether people ought to live.

Besides, I could just as well do away with the "who want to live . .
." and it would still hold as true. It is redundant--I simply used it
for clarity. Because as I pointed out in #2, value production implies

an effort to sustain life and further well-being.

So our condensed #4 would run thusly:

4. Value producers ought not tolerate value destroyers.

(As the effort of value production implies a desire to live and
further well-being.)

> >Why not make it really simple:
>
> >Descriptive premise: I want to be able to know what time it is.
> >Normative conclusion: I ought to get a watch.
>
> >(I think this avoids all sorts of problems in understanding things like
> >"ultimately the only way", "sustain", "value destroyer", "usurping the
> >values", etc.  For example, someone can be both a "value producer" and a
> >"value destroyer", and a person might be able to survive just by eating
> >food that grows wild.)
>
> In that case procuring the food (by picking it or hunting it) it would
> be the act of production.

This addresses only one of the problems, and it does so by moving in the
direction of insulating your initial premise from falsification by
definition.  What, then, /is/ "production"?  Can you specify it in
/advance/ with sufficient detail that your appeal to this definition does
not appear to be special pleading?  Please note that I am not saying that
you can not do this; I am only highlighting the problem of understanding
that I mentioned.

In any event, this is not the point I really want to argue.  Consider
another derivation of "ought" from "is":

Descriptive premise: I want to see you dead.
Normative conclusion: I ought to kill you.

How is the "ought" that you derive (with your longer argument) any
different from /this/ "ought"?  Is this really the "ought" that we ought
to have?  ;-)

BTW, I am sympathetic to the idea that pushing hard on the "ought/is"
distinction, as some do in order to completely separate "science" from
"ethics", is a mistake.  It is true that we do not seem to have any
/simple/, valid derivations of oughts from is-s, if we mean by that
straightforward proofs of what it is moral to do based upon a list of
facts (but see Dennett's discussion of this in /Darwin's Dangerous
Idea/).

However, many who use the "ought/is" distinction go on to claim that
there are exclusive categories of "fact statements" and "value
statements" that somehow match the very nature of reality.  This claim
strikes me as the same kind of metaphysical statement as its denial is.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

Gordon G. Sollars wrote:
>
> Why not make it really simple:
>
> Descriptive premise: I want to be able to know what time it is.
> Normative conclusion: I ought to get a watch.

What kind of watch?

-- M. Ruff

X
X
X
X

> > Descriptive premise: I want to be able to know what time it is.
> > Normative conclusion: I ought to get a watch.
>
> What kind of watch?

A cheap one; today, cheap watches keep good time.  But other descriptive
premises might hold:

Descriptive premise: I want to know what time it is and impress
(some) people.
Normative conclusion: I ought to get a Rollex.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

>
> According to Objectivism, oughts are not derived from wants (your
> examples) but
> from facts (i.e., what is).

Well, this is a puzzle.  If "Jones wants X" is true, I would say that "It
is a fact that Jones wants X", that is, it /is/ the case that Jones wants
X.  Are you saying that there is no "fact of the matter" with regard to
wants?  That we can not know if something is wanted or not?  Is it not a
fact that you have one set of values rather than another?

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

> >Now, the question is, does this argument really address the "ought from
> >is" issue?
>
> No. That is deriving ought from ought. "...Who want to ..." translates as
>
> "If you ought to live and further your well-being then you ought ...  ."

As perhaps the form of my question indicates, I agree with your answer,
but I don't understand the rationale for your translation.  You seem to
be simply claiming that an ought is really being derived from another
ought.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

Yes.

The statement "if you want X then you ought to do Y" does not derive an
ought conclusion at all, since it is a conditional, not a declarative. The
only sense in which it can be said to derive an ought statement is the
sense I was pointing out--that it implies that an ought conclusion would
follow from a particular ought premise.

--
David Friedman
DDFr@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/

>So our condensed #4 would run thusly:
>
>4. Value producers ought not tolerate value destroyers.
>
>(As the effort of value production implies a desire to live and
>further well-being.)

I don't think so. To begin with, it is logically possible to produce value
by accident, as a side effect of doing other things. More fundamentally,
you need some ought statements such as "people ought to do what they
desire."

--
David Friedman
DDFr@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/

David Friedman wrote:

>
> Yes.
>
> The statement "if you want X then you ought to do Y" does not derive an
> ought conclusion at all, since it is a conditional, not a declarative. The
> only sense in which it can be said to derive an ought statement is the
> sense I was pointing out--that it implies that an ought conclusion would
> follow from a particular ought premise.

But if you truly want X, then you ought to do Y follows by
modus ponens.  We can get declarative propositions out of
an implications by Modus Ponens.

Bob Kolker

>
>>Now, the question is, does this argument really address the "ought from
>>is" issue?
>
>No. That is deriving ought from ought. "...Who want to ..." translates as
>
>"If you ought to live and further your well-being then you ought ...  ."

Here's a couple of objectivists trying to derive an ultimate descriptive
premise:

 "There is a close and instructive parallel between Aristotle's argument
that the denier of the principle of non-contradiction must accept the this
principal to deny it and our defense of this ultimate prescriptive premise.
Our argument does not attempt to demonstrate or prove the obligatory nature
of this ultimate prescriptive premise, but it does attempt to show by
"negative demonstration" that a person who challenges this ultimate
prescriptive premise actually accepts it. The person who asks why he should
live in accordance with the requirements of his nature has a value he is
trying to attain. He wants an answer to his question; he is seeking this
value. Yet wants and values are not metaphysically primary. Having an answer
to a question is a value only to a being for whom knowledge is a value or
for whom possessing knowledge as opposed to not opposing could make a
difference in its existence or functioning. Otherwise, there would be no
ultimate difference between possessing knowledge or not possessing knowledge
and thus no basis for knowledge being an object of pursuit for this being--'
Why should one live in accord with the requirements of one's nature?'
Someone could not, therefore, value the answer to this question-the answer
qua value and qua object of the choice would not exist-if it were not true
that one should live in accord with the requirements of one's nature. The
very fact that that the person values an answer to his question requires the
truth of the principle he is questioning--In this way, then, the obligatory
character of `one ought to live in accordance with the requirements of one's
nature' can be defended. It should be stressed, however, that this is
`negative demonstration' does not prove this ethical first-principle. Only
an understanding of how values arise and what the human good is will allow
one to grasp the obligatory character of this ultimate prescriptive
 premise."

 -Uyl & Rasmussen

> The statement "if you want X then you ought to do Y" does not derive an
> ought conclusion at all, since it is a conditional,

Not if the conditional is true, and I do want X; if so we get the ought
conclusion right away.  Do you believe that no conditional of that form
can be true?  It is true that in many cases wanting X, say, a fish
dinner, does not establish without question that I ought to do Y, say,
get a fishing pole.  Perhaps I ought to go to the fish market instead.  
Yet surely there are cases were getting a fishing pole is exactly what I
ought to do.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

>>So our condensed #4 would run thusly:
>>
>>4. Value producers ought not tolerate value destroyers.

What if there are value destroyers who are only destroying your competators
products? Then a value producer may want to tolerate these value destroyers,
because they further his well-being. He may even want to provide them with a
small amount of food to make sure they continue to survive and harm his
competators.

-Jesus

On 6 Jun 1999 16:39:41 GMT, David Friedman <DD...@best.com> wrote:
> More fundamentally,
> you need some ought statements such as "people ought to do what they
> desire."

You are using Hume's definition of normative.  This does not appear to
correspond to either ordinary english usage, (see survey at the end of
this post) or to any meaningful definition of "ought" or "normative",
or to our ordinary understanding of what is a  normative statement, or
what is meant by "ought", or to the way that people use normative
language in practice.

For example consider such statements as  "You ought to take it easy
walking at high altitudes until you get used to the thin air", which
is obviously  not a normative statement.

In order to distinguish a normative "ought" from a non normative
"ought" we have to employ our pre existing intuitions about what is
normative, which makes it completely meaningless to define normative
in terms of "ought".

If someone says "Joe ought to do such and such", then that does not
constitute evidence that the speaker claims that Joe has a moral
obligation to do such and such, thus one cannot claim that "ought"
have a normative meaning from such usage, let alone define normative
in terms of such words.

If on the other hand, someone says "Joe's action was evil", then that
does constitute evidence that the speaker claims that Joe has a moral
obligation to refrain from doing such and such.  No other meaning is
possible.  Thus we can confidently recongnize normative uses of the
word "evil".  Thus examining the way people use this word will tell us
what the referent of this word is, and thus indicate the referents of
other normative words.

In http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230068619  the author is
soliciting advice of the form "In order to brew good beer, you ought
to bottle it while the fermentation is still in progress."

In http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229773852 the author is
offering advice of the form "The reason people are mad at you is
because certain behavior is universally disliked.  In order to avoid
people getting mad at you, you ought to abstain from this behavior."

Observe that in the non normative statement, the "ought" has the same
meaning, the same significance, as in the normative statement, thus it
would seem that there is nothing inherently normative about the word
"ought".

When Hume incorrectly defines normative in terms of "ought", he starts
from an obviously false definition, and his false conclusion follows
straightforwardly from his false premise.

His "is ought gap" is merely a restatement of a trivial fact about the
english language:  That a sentence containing "ought" does not contain
the reason for the "ought", which is as true, and as unimportant, when
one is discussing beer brewing technique as when one is discussing
offensive behavior or sexual infidelity.

Hume has mistaken an irrelevant and not very interesting fact about an
english word for an big important fact about limits on our ability to
reason about human conduct.

Survey on usage of "ought"

I did a Dejanews power search for "ought" for the period Apr 1 1997 to
Apr 2 1997

1380 hits
I classified the first 37 messages as follows.

4 normative
8 non normative
4 predictive
3 unclassifiable without further information
Other tweny are repeats, or false hits such as typos.

http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230086246  Non normative,
literally a prediction about people's desires, but in substance about
what is sensible to desire.
        "640K ought to be enough for anybody." (Bill Gates,
        1981)
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230106821  Non normative:
        Engines that ought to be in F-1  "
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230187851  Normative  
        The writer says that young people ought not to engage
        in sex lightly.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230388578  unclassifiable
        "This movie ought to be shot."
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229806300  unclassifiable
        "it's words ought to be branded on their foreheads
        with hot irons."
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229760187  Non normative
        Maybe you ought to keep an oxygen tank by your
        chair......just in case the excitement gets to be too
        much.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229770963  Normative
        "justice ought ..."
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229773852  Normative  
        Author appeals to "universal dislike" of certain
        behavior.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229808095  Normative
        "Perhaps you believe that I ought to be expunged from
        the face of the earth for daring to delve into the
        Talmud at all?"
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229870365  Non normative
        The organization fails to tell people what they
        "ought to know" in order to for the organization to
        get things done.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229879867  Non normative:
        "considering Colossians and John were written AFTER
        Jesus, I think you ought to read some Church
        history."  Presumably the person addressed needs to
        read church history so as to avoid displaying his
        alleged stupid ignorance,  rather than to improve his
        soul.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230005643  Non normative
        "maybe we ought to start carrying fanny packs in a
        shoulder holster manner".  The author says that he
        and those he addresses should use this tactic to
        achieve a specific goal.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230068619  Non normative
        "We have 5 gallons of mead with 13 pounds of honey
        that is currently bubbling every 2 minutes in a 6.5
        gal carboy.  At what interval between bubbles ought
        we bottle?"
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230081512  Non normative
         "they also ought to have case-insensitive
         searching."
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230092314  predictive
        "There are a few Middle English dictionaries.  Try a
        good library.  Any university ought to have one at
        least."  (The writer predicts you will find one at a
        good university, he does not moralize that a
        university is wicked if it does not have one.)
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230136305  predictive
        "I wonder what magic I ought to anticipate?"  (He is
        asking what magic is likely to happen)
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230139534  Non normative
        "the Holocaust ought to be put in a class by itself",
        which I presume means that it is correct to
        categorize the holocaust differently from other
        crimes.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=230139614  Unclassifiable
        "Goddamned that's original.  Maybe someone ought to
        put that on a t-shirt"  I conjecture, but cannot
        prove, that the slogan is alleged to be entertaining
        or ridiculous, rather than one that inspires virtue,
        hence should be put on a T shirt for pragmatic
        reasons.  But maybe it should be put on a T shirt
        because the cause is morally worthy.
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229896714  predictive
        "If the problem>were purely financial, we ought to
        have seen  confirmation of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
        bankruptcy filing by now, and that hasn't happened."
http://www.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?AN=229902357  predictive
        "I used to use Pine and the second, third, fourth, or
        any number of screens ought to show what a person
        writes.

  ------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because
of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this
right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.

http://www.jim.com/jamesd/      James A. Donald

In article <DDFr-06069...@ddfr.vip.best.com>, DD...@best.com
writes

> > The statement "if you want X then you ought to do Y" does
> > not derive an ought conclusion at all, since it is a
> > conditional,

On 6 Jun 1999 17:53:24 GMT, Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu>
wrote:

> Not if the conditional is true, and I do want X; if so we
> get the ought  conclusion right away.  Do you believe that
> no conditional of that form  can be true?  It is true that
> in many cases wanting X, say, a fish  dinner, does not
> establish without question that I ought to do Y, say,  get
> a fishing pole.  Perhaps I ought to go to the fish market
> instead.   Yet surely there are cases were getting a
> fishing pole is exactly what I  ought to do.

I think the problem is that David Friedman and yourself disagree on
the meaning of "ought".

You derive your meaning of "ought" from a particular authority, Ayn
Rand, and David Friedman derives his meaning of "ought" from another
particular authority, Hume.

Since you are appealing to different, and wildly contradictory
authorities, no resolution is possible.

I recommend determining meanings for words by looking for referents
that make sense of the way people usually use words, rather than
appeal to particular authorities, and on the basis of that survey I
have concluded that Ayn Rand's concept of "ought" is far closer to
common usage than Hume's, but that "ought" has little connection with
what is normative, and that it is more useful to examine referents for
"evil"

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     cPAj9tngalHJaf1k69hD0ZLm1EAWnvg8YQGdzLvz
     4JyIfSle6+dDWndZ6t7rzdj9ZhvNXV2qnCiPggXjd

  ------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because
of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this
right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.

>In article <DDFr-06069...@ddfr.vip.best.com>, DD...@best.com

>> The statement "if you want X then you ought to do Y" does not derive an
>> ought conclusion at all, since it is a conditional,
>

>Not if the conditional is true, and I do want X; if so we get the ought
>conclusion right away.  Do you believe that no conditional of that form
>can be true?  It is true that in many cases wanting X, say, a fish
>dinner, does not establish without question that I ought to do Y, say,
>get a fishing pole.  Perhaps I ought to go to the fish market instead.  
>Yet surely there are cases were getting a fishing pole is exactly what I
>ought to do.

What you ought to do in order to get what you want. But you need the added
"I ought to get what I want" to get the conclusion "I ought to get a
fishing pole" (or whatever).

--
David Friedman
DDFr@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/

..
If that's what you mean, then I agree with you.  
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..

>
> David Friedman writes:
>
>> The statement "if you want X then you ought to do Y" does not
>> derive an ought conclusion at all, since it is a conditional,
>
> Not if the conditional is true, and I do want X; if so we get
> the ought conclusion right away.  Do you believe that no conditional
> of that form can be true?  It is true that in many cases wanting X,
> say, a fish dinner, does not establish without question that I ought
> to do Y, say, get a fishing pole.  Perhaps I ought to go to the fish
> market instead.

I think David's point is that the "oughts" here are not normative oughts
unless you first demonstrate that you ought, morally, to get what you
want. What you've been saying, in effect (dropping the misleading
oughts), is: "The way to achieve goal X is to use means Y." This says
nothing about whether goal X *ought* to be achieved.

-- M. Ruff

In article <37682c6e...@nntp1.ba.best.com>, jam...@echeque.com
writes...
...

> I think the problem is that David Friedman and yourself disagree on
> the meaning of "ought".

More precisely, I think you will see on close reading that I have, since
my original response to "Count Chloride", been having fun with the
meaning of "ought".

> You derive your meaning of "ought" from a particular authority, Ayn
> Rand, and David Friedman derives his meaning of "ought" from another
> particular authority, Hume.

I will not say that I have never committed this error, but I am very
certain that Rand was not my authority if I did so.
...

> I recommend determining meanings for words by looking for referents
> that make sense of the way people usually use words, rather than
> appeal to particular authorities,

I recommend careful reading and not jumping to conclusions.  ;-)

> and on the basis of that survey I
> have concluded that Ayn Rand's concept of "ought" is far closer to
> common usage than Hume's, but that "ought" has little connection with
> what is normative, and that it is more useful to examine referents for
> "evil"

I saw your survey post, and I thought it was good work.  But you might
just as well leave the connection between "ought" and "normative" alone,
and say that the mistake is to equate "normative" with "ethical".  Why
not take "normative" as "relating to norms", and note that not all norms
are morally justified?

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

In article <DDFr-06069...@ddfr.vip.best.com>, DD...@best.com
writes...
...

> What you ought to do in order to get what you want. But you need the added
> "I ought to get what I want" to get the conclusion "I ought to get a
> fishing pole" (or whatever).

Certainly such an added premise is /sufficient/ to yield the conclusion,
but this does not show that it is necessary.  A true conditional of the
form I mentioned is also sufficient to yield an "ought" conclusion.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

> I think David's point is that the "oughts" here are not normative oughts
> unless you first demonstrate that you ought, morally, to get what you
> want. What you've been saying, in effect (dropping the misleading
> oughts), is: "The way to achieve goal X is to use means Y." This says
> nothing about whether goal X *ought* to be achieved.

I admit I've been having fun, Matt.  If you look at my reply to "Count
Lithium", where a make a modest modification to my "watch" argument, I
think you'll see I believe that the "ought" that Count Lithium has
derived in /his/ argument does not help in in the way in wants.

Nevertheless this is a valid "ought", and it is even a "normative" ought
- in the sense of "following a norm".  That norm may simply lack any
moral justification.  ;-)

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

But, then, what *does* "ought mean? What does the concept refer to?

Luka Yovetich

Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.

> The statement "if you want X then you ought to do Y" does not derive
an
> ought conclusion at all, since it is a conditional, not a declarative.
The
> only sense in which it can be said to derive an ought statement is the
> sense I was pointing out--that it implies that an ought conclusion
would
> follow from a particular ought premise.

But what if all "ought" means is "if you want x, then you must do Y"?

Another question is, what does the concept "ought" refer to in reality?
Or are you using a term that you believe has no referents in the real
world?

-Luka Yovetich

<Storyt...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> I think David's point is that the "oughts" here are not normative oughts

As soon as David acknowledges the existence of non normative oughts
and non ethical oughts, his argument runs into trouble.

Hence his statement:
        you need the added "I ought to get what I want" to
        get the conclusion "I ought to get a fishing pole"

Which to my ears sounded rather strange.

I interpret Friedman's statement as an assertion that Hume's
epistemology of moral knowlede is true.  However I have surveyed the
use of the word "ought" and the use of word "evil", and found that
Hume's epistemology is inconsistent with usual majority usage of these
words.

So either most people who use these words are using them incorrectly,
or Hume was using them incorrectly (in which case Friedman is also
using them incorrectly).

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     YvA0+DymBjNT3w/7MaFmLIXftbyysiwj/DPqaYNY
     4vibFEXXLZt4Wkz9DdxWJJT4fDYisKLhRKXiWsUXH
  ------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because
of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this
right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.

http://www.jim.com/jamesd/      James A. Donald

> As soon as David acknowledges the existence of non normative oughts
> and non ethical oughts, his argument runs into trouble.
>
> Hence his statement:
>         you need the added "I ought to get what I want" to
>         get the conclusion "I ought to get a fishing pole"
>
> Which to my ears sounded rather strange.

Perhaps you could elaborate on the nature of this trouble.  My "ear"
doesn't find this strange, even though I was the one who suggested the
example.  I don't see that usage is the major issue here.
...

> I interpret Friedman's statement as an assertion that Hume's
> epistemology of moral knowlede is true.  However I have surveyed the
> use of the word "ought" and the use of word "evil", and found that
> Hume's epistemology is inconsistent with usual majority usage of these
> words.

I believe you found that "ought" is used normatively.  But not all norms
are morally justified.  Hume's famous comment about "ought/is" occurs in
a book entitled /Of Morals/, so he is being reasonably clear about the
kind of "ought" he is talking about.

"Count Lithium's" post that started this thread used "ought" normatively,
but the whole issue is the matter of the ethical justification for this
norm.  I tried to bring this out with an example and a question; David
simply went directly to the issue, but he did so in a way that suggested
there is only the moral ought.  But that is true, as the Objectivists
like to say, only in context.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

In article <376b18a9...@nntp1.ba.best.com>, jam...@echeque.com
writes...

> >         you need the added "I ought to get what I want" to
> >         get the conclusion "I ought to get a fishing pole"
> >
> > Which to my ears sounded rather strange.

On 9 Jun 1999 11:57:03 GMT, Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu>
wrote:

> Perhaps you could elaborate on the nature of this trouble.

As I understand the word "ought", the proposition "I want to fish, so
I ought to get a fishing pole" does not require or presuppose the
additional proposition "I ought to get what I want".

The proposition "I want to fish, so I ought to have a fishing pole"
does presuppose some additional proposition such as "I ought to get
what I want".

Because of usages such as this, that studying the referents of "ought"
is unlikely to shed light on the epistemology of ethics.

> I believe you found that "ought" is used normatively.

I believe I do not understand your usage of the word normative.   If
we define "normative" broadly enough, then the proposition, "this
battery ought to fix it" is normative, but the category "normative" is
then so broad as to not be very useful for the questions at issue.

> But not all norms
> are morally justified.  Hume's famous comment about "ought/is" occurs in
> a book entitled /Of Morals/, so he is being reasonably clear about the
> kind of "ought" he is talking about.

This presupposes that it is clear what ethics is.

As I said earlier, we have no way of telling the kind of "ought" that
Hume is talking about from some other "ought", except by reference to
some other unstated criterion, therefore Hume's reasoning is circular.
He has to reason from this other unstated criterion, not from the
grammatical nature of the word "ought".

Ethical propositions are not "oughts": They are the kind of things
covered by this unstated criterion, a criterion which covers only some
"oughts" and a great deal more than "oughts".  Thus to reason about
the limits of our ability to know ethical questions from the grammar
of "ought" is a non sequitur.

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG

  ------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because
of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this
right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.

> On 9 Jun 1999 11:57:03 GMT, Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu>
> wrote:
> > Perhaps you could elaborate on the nature of this trouble.
>
> As I understand the word "ought", the proposition "I want to fish, so
> I ought to get a fishing pole" does not require or presuppose the
> additional proposition "I ought to get what I want".
>
> The proposition "I want to fish, so I ought to have a fishing pole"
> does presuppose some additional proposition such as "I ought to get
> what I want".

Thanks, but this doesn't help me.  I understand the word "ought" in a
variety of ways, but I don't see your two propositions as different in
their presuppositions.  If I do get a fishing pole, then I have one; if I
have one, then I must have gotten it at some time.
...

> I believe I do not understand your usage of the word normative.

I will try an example.  We can have a certain norm for, say, beer, which
we call "good beer".  If I want to make good beer, then I ought to follow
the recipe for making good beer.

>   If
> we define "normative" broadly enough, then the proposition, "this
> battery ought to fix it" is normative, but the category "normative" is
> then so broad as to not be very useful for the questions at issue.

What questions are those?  My point all along has been that there is a
sense of "ought" that is related to norms, but that not all norms are
morally justified.  That is what I found wrong with "Count Lithium's"
argument.  Why is the norm to which value producers must conform morally
justified?

If you wish to restrict "normative" to morally correct norms (which is a
very common thing to do), then the Count still has to show that his use
of "ought" was normative.

> > But not all norms
> > are morally justified.  Hume's famous comment about "ought/is" occurs in
> > a book entitled /Of Morals/, so he is being reasonably clear about the
> > kind of "ought" he is talking about.
>
> This presupposes that it is clear what ethics is.

Isn't it clear what ethics is?  Or do you mean that we have to know
everything about ethics to be clear about this?

> As I said earlier, we have no way of telling the kind of "ought" that
> Hume is talking about from some other "ought", except by reference to
> some other unstated criterion, therefore Hume's reasoning is circular.

Hume's criterion is what he finds in "systems of morality" that have
been put forward.  Perhaps these are false systems, but that is another
matter.  In particular, Hume says:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
way of reasoning... when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, /is/, and /is not/, I
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an /ought/, or an
/ought not/... For as this /ought/, or /ought not/, expresses some new
relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and
explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction
from others, which are entirely different from it."

Now by "copulations", Hume of course means nothing X-rated but simply the
verbs that connect subject and predicate.  His use of "reasoning"
indicates that he is thinking not of grammatical usage but of logical
relations, as one would find in a syllogism.  Unless you think that "is"
and "ought" connect subject and predicate in exactly the same way, then I
think that Hume escapes the charge of circularity.  Also, note that Hume
does not say that a reason can not be given or that the new relation can
not be "explain'd", only that he has not seen it done.  The tone of the
passage might be taken to suggest that he does not expect to see it, but
too is another matter.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu

Now, a natural and proper question is *what kind* of descriptive
statement is an ought statement?  Or, as Objectivism puts it, "what
are the facts of reality that give rise to thise concept?"  What do
ought statements _mean_?  To what in reality do they _refer_?

Speaking in shorthand, to say that someone ought to do something, is
only to say that it will further their life as man-qua-man.  There's
a lot to be said about that, of course, but that's a different topic.

--Jimbo

> > I do not understand your usage of the word normative.

On 10 Jun 1999 02:17:26 GMT, Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu>
wrote:

> I will try an example.  We can have a certain norm for,
> say, beer, which  we call "good beer".  If I want to make
> good beer, then I ought to follow  the recipe for making
> good beer.

Agreed.  But this seems inconsistent with David Friedman's
epistemology of "ought", which would require you to say that if you
ought to make good beer, then you ought to follow the recipe, a usage
of "ought" that I said was unintelligible to my ears, and you that
said was intelligible to your ears.

Thus you clarification of normative fails to answer my question, why
do you find Friedman's claim intelligible and plausible, whereas I
find it unintelligible.

I have engaged in this discussion many times before, and the outcome
(irrelevant and confusing fog) has invariably been consistent with my
claim that analysing the referents of "ought" is unlikely to shed much
light on the nature of ethics, because there is no simple connection
between "ought" and "evil".

It seems to me you have defined "normative" in such a way as to create
some simple connection between "ought" and "normative", which is close
to the usual meaning of normative, but not close enough for clarity,
and sufficiently far away from the usual meaning of ethics as to shed
no light on the subject.

For example we do not just have "norms" for good beer.  Some beer
really is good, and some really is not, and with some beer it is a
matter of opinion, and to talk about norms for beer clouds the issue,
both the issue of what is good beer, and the issue of what is good
conduct.

> > If we define "normative" broadly enough, then the
> > proposition, "this battery ought to fix it" is normative,
> > but the category "normative" is then so broad as to not
> > be very useful for the questions at issue.

> What questions are those?

The is-ought gap, which Hume, and perhaps David Friedman, identified
with an is-ethics gap.

My argument is that there generally is no is-ought gap, and if there
was, it would shed little light on an alleged is-ethics gap.

For example there is no is-ought gap in your usage above, since
obviously we do want to make good beer.

> > As I said earlier, we have no way of telling the kind of
> > "ought" that Hume is talking about from some other
> > "ought", except by reference to some other unstated
> > criterion, therefore Hume's reasoning is circular.

> Hume's criterion is what he finds in "systems of morality"
> that have  been put forward.

Indeed he "finds" it, but the question in dispute is whether what he
finds is in fact actually present, whether it is meaningful, indeed
whether it is intelligible, to describe systems of morality wholly in
terms of "oughts"

Let us look at a typical usage of "ought" by Locke, justifying
marriage in humans:

        For the end of conjunction between male and female
        being not barely procreation, but the continuation of
        the species, this conjunction betwixt male and female
        ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is
        necessary to the nourishment and support of the young
        ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them
        till they are able to shift and provide for
        themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise Maker
        hath set to the works of His hands, we find the
        inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous
        animals which feed on grass the conjunction between
        male and female lasts no longer than the very act of
        copulation, because the teat of the dam being
        sufficient to nourish the young till it be able to
        feed on grass. the male only begets, but concerns not
        himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance
        he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the
        conjunction lasts longer because the dam, not being
        able well to subsist herself and nourish her numerous
        offspring by her own prey alone (a more laborious as
        well as more dangerous way of living than by feeding
        on grass), the assistance of the male is necessary to
        the maintenance of their common family, which cannot
        subsist till they are able to prey for themselves,
        but by the joint care of male and female. The same is
        observed in all birds (except some domestic ones,
        where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding
        and taking care of the young brood), whose young,
        needing food in the nest, the cock  and hen continue
        mates till the young are able to use their wings and
        provide for themselves.

To go from an "end" to an "ought" as Locke does above, is standard
usage of ought, and makes perfect sense, and is logically correct.

It is far from clear that the proposition that nature ought to shape
humankind so that they are disinclined to have children out of wedlock
is sufficient to justify the proposition that it is morally wrong to
have children out wedlock, but there is nothing wrong with Locke's use
of "ought".   If there is any fallacy here, it is not the fallacy that
Hume complains of, but a different fallacy.

> His use of "reasoning"  indicates that he is thinking not
> of grammatical usage but of logical  relations, as one
> would find in a syllogism.  Unless you think that "is"  and
> "ought" connect subject and predicate in exactly the same
> way, then I  think that Hume escapes the charge of
> circularity.

The circularity lies in Hume's interpretation of systems of morality
as "oughts".  The people he criticizes do not explicitly reason in the
manner that he accuses them of reasoning.  Perhaps they implicitly
reason in this manner, but that is what is to be proved.   His
conclusion follows from the way in which he interprets them, and the
way in which he interprets them follows from his conclusion.

If Hume critiqued actual examples of moral reasoning, did a little
survey, then his claim "In every system of morality, which I have
hitherto met with ..." would be plausible, but he does not do this.
He does not attempt to demonstrate that people are in fact using the
epistemology of ethics that he attributes to them.

Most people, most of the time, do not explicitly reason about ethics
in terms of Hume's epistemology, and my interpretation of their words,
is that in a large proportion of actual cases, they are not implicitly
reasoning about ethics in terms of Hume's epistemology.  Hume would
doubtless interpret them as *implicitly* reasoning in terms of his
epistemology, but because it is implicit, he is not reporting an
observation, but a deduction, a deduction that rests on his
conclusion.

I did a survey of the use of the word "evil" in the bible, and a
survey of the use of the word "evil" by US government spokescritters
arguing in defence of the Kosovo war, and in none of those cases was
Hume's epistemology plausible to me, except for one ambiguous usage in
the bible.

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG

  ------
We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because
of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this
right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.

  Jimbo- Wales <jwales@Mcs.Net> wrote:
> Normative statements are merely one kind of descriptive statement.
> The whole idea of "deriving" ought-statements from is-statements
> is based on a presupposition that they are not.

I think that is a very good way of stating what the assumption is
behind the notion of "deriving" ought-statements from is-statements.
It is an assumption that often seems to go unquestioned or unexamined
in these debates.  One way of responding to the whole fact-value
distinction is not to try to show how values can be derived from facts
but to deny that there is a genuine distinction between the two to
begin with.

Consider this possibility: all statements (whether "is" or "ought"
ones) contain in them some sort of normativity, even if only
an "epistemic" normativity.  Maybe Peikoff was right after all;
every "is" implies an "ought." ;-)

--
Chris Cathcart

> On 10 Jun 1999 02:17:26 GMT, Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu>
> wrote:
> > I will try an example.  We can have a certain norm for,
> > say, beer, which  we call "good beer".  If I want to make
> > good beer, then I ought to follow  the recipe for making
> > good beer.
>
> Agreed.  But this seems inconsistent with David Friedman's
> epistemology of "ought", which would require you to say that if you
> ought to make good beer, then you ought to follow the recipe, a usage
> of "ought" that I said was unintelligible to my ears, and you that
> said was intelligible to your ears.

"If you ought to make good beer, then you ought to follow the recipe"
does sound strange to me, but I thought you were labeling "strange
sounding" the pair "If you want good beer, you ought to follow the
recipe" and "You ought to get what you want".

This pair is not strange to my "ear", and of course David is correct to
say that it /does/ lead to the normative conclusion.  My point was that
it was not the /only/ way to get to a normative conclusion (or, at
least, it has not been shown to be the only way).

 
> Thus you clarification of normative fails to answer my question, why
> do you find Friedman's claim intelligible and plausible, whereas I
> find it unintelligible.

Apparently we had different claims in mind.
...

>
> It seems to me you have defined "normative" in such a way as to create
> some simple connection between "ought" and "normative", which is close
> to the usual meaning of normative, but not close enough for clarity,
> and sufficiently far away from the usual meaning of ethics as to shed
> no light on the subject.

I thought I was following a common usage, not "creating" anything.

 
> For example we do not just have "norms" for good beer.  Some beer
> really is good, and some really is not, and with some beer it is a
> matter of opinion,

And I would say that that is because there is a norm for beer which is
justified, and which some beer clearly meets and other beer does not.
...

> My argument is that there generally is no is-ought gap, and if there
> was, it would shed little light on an alleged is-ethics gap.

I think that we can, without violence to Hume's point, re-label the
controversy as an "is-ethics" gap.  He was discussing morality, and so
was assuming an "ought" restricted to an ethical sense.  Perhaps he was
unwise to adopt this usage, but the argument is more important than the
usage (which, for all I know, was different 250 years ago).
...

> Let us look at a typical usage of "ought" by Locke, justifying
> marriage in humans:
>
>         For the end of conjunction between male and female
>         being not barely procreation, but the continuation of
>         the species,

> To go from an "end" to an "ought" as Locke does above, is standard
> usage of ought, and makes perfect sense, and is logically correct.

Yes.  And it raises the issue of /why/ we should consider the
continuation of the species as an end.  This is precisely Hume's point,
regardless of what language it is dressed up in.

 
> It is far from clear that the proposition that nature ought to shape
> humankind so that they are disinclined to have children out of wedlock
> is sufficient to justify the proposition that it is morally wrong to
> have children out wedlock, but there is nothing wrong with Locke's use
> of "ought".   If there is any fallacy here, it is not the fallacy that
> Hume complains of, but a different fallacy.

On the contrary, I think is is exactly the fallacy that Hume had in mind,
regardless of your (and mine for that matter) differences with him over
the usage of "ought".  The argument only works as a justification when
the end "continuation of the species" is accepted, and for this latter we
are given no reason.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu