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Gavin Wood calls for hardfork (cryptocoinsnews.com)
rfikki が 6時間前 投稿
[–]CJentzsch 43ポイント44ポイント45ポイント 4時間前 (11子コメント)
A hard fork is necessary to improve the pricing of the opcodes. And since this will not be a controversial hard fork such as the last one, I think it will go trough very smoothly. From a technically perspective the last hard fork went very well and we gained experience.
I think the real question is not if but when to do it. Should it be rather soon, or should it be combined with Metropolis?
I think this depends on how good client improvements can mitigate the attacks.
Another topic which has not received enough attention is the almost non-functional market for transaction gasPrices. Miners currently just run the defaults, but because of this there is no real functioning market as it should be. The high demand in gas, should lead to an increased price until supply and demand are balanced. Miners need to actively adjust the price.
Another technically more involved method would be to benchmark contracts and give them individual gasPrices. This could be done by each miner, and would lead to different gasPrices per contract. This would not involve a hard fork. The challenge would be to handle CALL's. But here miners could charge a relatively high gasPrice for dynamic calls where the recipient can only be known by executing the code, and only do real benchmarking and fair pricing for static CALLs, where the recipient is known at compile time through a static code analysis. Additionally the cost for the benchmarking could come from increasing the gasPrice for a transaction in the case it includes a CREATE (including transactions which lead to the creation of contracts) operation.
TL;DR: I think we need a hard fork to adjust pricing of opcodes, but improving the code of the miners by benchmarking contracts and deriving individual priced contracts and actively adjusting gasPrices in general according to supply and demand combined with client performance improvements will mitigate most of the attacks without a quick hard fork.
[–]koeppelmann 11ポイント12ポイント13ポイント 4時間前 (1子コメント)
very good suggestion to have contract specific gas prices. That could naturally evolve into something where you can add new "precompiles" - just by submitting a contract and every miner would agree that the gas costs for this contract should be quite low because over all it is easy to compute.
[–]HandyNumber 9ポイント10ポイント11ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
I'm glad that we're not afraid to avoid "hard forks" for fear of upsetting anyone. If that's the remedy, then let's do it. This team have a proven track-record in fixing things.
[–]vbuterinJust some guy 11ポイント12ポイント13ポイント 3時間前 (3子コメント)
This could be done by each miner, and would lead to different gasPrices per contract.
How would you handle this situation? Contract A has a gasprice of 5 shannon, contract B has a gasprice of 200 shannon. A transaction calls A, and after 4 million gas of execution unexpectedly A contains some edge condition that causes it to call B. The transaction's gasprice was 5 shannon. Do you accept or reject? Reject = DoS vuln, accept = possibly circumvents the entire scheme.
[–]CJentzsch 6ポイント7ポイント8ポイント 3時間前* (2子コメント)
Accept, but use a higher gasPrice after a static code analysis finds that dynamic calls are possbile.
This would be a dynamic call (see my comment here: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/150). And as described I would increase my gasPrice to defined maximal value. CALL's are a challenge in this miner strategy, but although it can not be solved perfectly, IMO it can be solved. Basically doing a static code analysis. If there is a static call, the gasPrice can be calculated, if there is a dynamic call, the gasPrice for this transaction will be set to a maximum according to the miners setting.
The costs for the benchmarking and code analysis could be covered by increasing the gasPrice for any transaction that create a contract.
[–]HodlDwon 1ポイント2ポイント3ポイント 1時間前 (0子コメント)
Isn't this the Piracy Problem? Whereby an attacker is always going to try to hide their calls / exploits, whereas honest users may or may not statically analyzable, but will be annoyed / priced out of the market by this DRM type scheme?
Also, I didn't know you could change the gas price half-way through a block? Is that what your're suggesting?
[–]DoUHearThePeopleSing 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 43分前 (0子コメント)
Even without CALLs you have a halting problem - you cannot compute the requirements of a contract without executing it first. The same problem caused the rollback of the first TheDAO soft-fork.
[–]ledgerwatch 8ポイント9ポイント10ポイント 4時間前 (3子コメント)
I think some miner have already gone ahead and set the gasPrice so high that they end up mining empty blocks, which seems to be a profitable thing to do at the moment. They are not necessarily malicious, but it is not very useful either.
Perhaps, spent gas need to give a discount on proof of work, so that the miners who execute transactions, do not get disadvantaged by doing so.
[–]CJentzsch 9ポイント10ポイント11ポイント 4時間前 (0子コメント)
I think the only long term solution is to let natural market forces solve the issue. Client improvements bring down the actual costs of the attacker transactions, and miners need to set a fair price. The actual cost of normal transaction is still very low, so individual pricing based on some benchmarking would solve that problem. But without that, miners setting a higher gasPrice are acting rational and economical. As long as the attacks continues, and with it the high demand in gas, normal users should set a much higher gasPrice for there transactions, since it costs more to use the network in its current state.
[–]WhySoS3rious 4ポイント5ポイント6ポイント 4時間前 (1子コメント)
yes I think more than 20% of the network's hashrate is devoted to such selfish mining.
They mine only empty blocks
F2Pool and another address : f2pool https://etherscan.io/address/0x61c808d82a3ac53231750dadc13c777b59310bd9#mine bw ? https://etherscan.io/address/0xc0ea08a2d404d3172d2add29a45be56da40e2949#mine
[–]ledgerwatch 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 3時間前 (0子コメント)
Another interesting thing is that f2pool only started this strategy 1 and something day ago, whereas the second address you are pointing to, it started this strategy 9 days ago, i.e. on the 26th of September.
[–]HermanSchoenfeld 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 3時間前 (0子コメント)
What about a Transaction Spam Service that miners can subscribe to in order to quickly discriminate against spam contracts, spam transactions and spammer IP's?
Miners can then optionally choose to integrate their mining rigs to the spam transaction service.
Miners can pay the Spam Service a fee for the service.
This opens up an interesting question about miner/staker collusion. What happens in Casper if a bunch of stakers collude to block another stakers forged blocks?
[–]silkblueberry 31ポイント32ポイント33ポイント 5時間前 (4子コメント)
Go for it.
[–]Fuyuki_Wataru 17ポイント18ポイント19ポイント 4時間前 (3子コメント)
Agree. We've been warned after the first hard fork that there will be a chance for more hard forks in the future. Which is completely fine with me, as long as it benefits the greater good of Ethereum.
That being said, it wouldn't surprise me if this was the motive for the attacker. To try and disrupt our community by getting us to hardfork. They'll be surprised to see how well we will handle it.
[–]tooManyCoins- 7ポイント8ポイント9ポイント 2時間前 (1子コメント)
They'll be surprised to see how well we will handle it.
Seriously. TheDAO hard-fork was a freakin' emotional roller coaster. This will just be another day in Ethereum.
[–]HandyNumber 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 1時間前 (0子コメント)
Forks happen all the time for perfectly valid reasons.
The emotive crap spewed about "forks" over the last couple of months really is quite tiring at this stage. I'd hazard a guess that "fork" chicken likens wouldn't know the difference between a knife and a fork, never mind a spoon.
[–]hodlor 20ポイント21ポイント22ポイント 5時間前 (1子コメント)
I don't think there are a lot of emotions about this. We have the time to think about it and discuss and come to a strong consensus, if this is what the developers are behind.
I won't mind either way, personally.
[–]cyounessi 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 4時間前 (0子コメント)
Yeah, as another non-technical user, there was zero difference between downloading the Homestead client and hitting "run" and downloading any new Mist version and hitting "run."
Protocol upgrade hard forks don't really elicit much of a reaction, other than bringing back bad memories of TheDAO.
[–]Savage_X 9ポイント10ポイント11ポイント 5時間前 (6子コメント)
Talk about your loaded headline.
This is the Metropolis release planned since forever.
[–]soylient 14ポイント15ポイント16ポイント 5時間前 (0子コメント)
I think he's suggesting a minor hard fork before Metropolis, based on what the article says
"The upcoming release has more or less the ultimate in that series of optimisations, by actually journalling all the state changes, so we can play back the journal if we need to revert, rather than having to copy anything at all.” Wood, however, states that the Dos attacks will “most certainly continue for months” until metropolis when the network is to undergo an upgrade. Wood states: “The attacker seems happy testing the protocol thoroughly, so they’ll probably continue. A hard fork will fix many of the most grievous problems we know of, though others may be lurking. "I have been calling for a fast hard fork since day 1."
"The upcoming release has more or less the ultimate in that series of optimisations, by actually journalling all the state changes, so we can play back the journal if we need to revert, rather than having to copy anything at all.”
Wood, however, states that the Dos attacks will “most certainly continue for months” until metropolis when the network is to undergo an upgrade. Wood states:
“The attacker seems happy testing the protocol thoroughly, so they’ll probably continue. A hard fork will fix many of the most grievous problems we know of, though others may be lurking.
"I have been calling for a fast hard fork since day 1."
[–]FaceDeer 7ポイント8ポイント9ポイント 5時間前* (0子コメント)
Yeah, nobody who had the remotest grasp of Ethereum was opposed to protocol upgrade forks. The constant attempts to conflate that with the DAO hard fork was one of the most annoying rhetorical ploys of the great schism.
Maybe we can summon PitchforkEmporium if a hard fork was proposed to take away whatever profits the DoSer might have earned already as a result of his actions, that would be something more controversial.
Though I can see reasonable resistance to this one too, since so far IMO it's better to optimize the implementations rather than boost opcode gas cost (optimization is good in its own right).
[–]Sunny_McJoyride 4ポイント5ポイント6ポイント 5時間前 (1子コメント)
I have been calling for a fast hard fork since day 1. It would be around 4 minor changes to the yellow paper and each implementation, yet there has been little movement on it. I just hope the foundation doesn’t hope to bundle these hotfixes in with all the most substantial metropolis feature additions. If they do, then these attacks will almost certainly continue for months.
[–]FaceDeer 1ポイント2ポイント3ポイント 5時間前 (0子コメント)
Assuming the DoSer continues to find suboptimal implementation details to attack for months and months.
[–]Wbe4ever -1ポイント0ポイント1ポイント 5時間前 (0子コメント)
Well said
[–]Critical_Faculty 7ポイント8ポイント9ポイント 5時間前* (2子コメント)
Bit of a loaded headline...
To be clear Gavin was calling for these implemented changes: https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/150
And all of those quotes from Emin, Nick, Jeff Gavin etc... are cherry picked from social media and/or IRC Development channels
[–]AQuentson 1ポイント2ポイント3ポイント 3時間前 (0子コメント)
Except for Gavin Wood's statements, which were made publicly in response to my questions, none of the other statements were publicly made, nor "cherry picked" as the article doesn't really make a case for or against a dos fix hardfork.
This is a protocol upgrade suggestion so I'm not really placed to have an opinion either way since it's clearly solely a technical matter as far as I can see.
[–]the_bob -3ポイント-2ポイント-1ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
The author is Andrew Quentson, known faux-journalist and troll. I would paste some of the homophobic and crude things he has said before (in less public channels) but he would complain to reddit for "bullying". An example is him getting the subreddit r/shitaquentsays banned.
[–]gustav_simonssonEthereum - Gustav Simonsson 8ポイント9ポイント10ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
IMO the best course of action would be a quick HF only adjusting gas cost of the relevant op codes, as per https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/150 version (2a) but without the logical changes. That is, only change the constants.
This would be the minimal change needed to render the current DoS attacks moot and very easy to have full test coverage for and 100% consensus across clients. It's important to stay focused and not see this HF as an opportunity to cram in a bunch of other features -- those can be added later in Metropolis.
[–]roberto3t 7ポイント8ポイント9ポイント 5時間前 (1子コメント)
If we don't do it asap we risk mining centralization.
[–]crypt0freak 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
Isn't mining going away with PoS?
[–]sorryjustsaying 6ポイント7ポイント8ポイント 4時間前 (0子コメント)
while we're at it, can we toss in protection against replay attacks as well?
[–]schizowo 4ポイント5ポイント6ポイント 5時間前 (0子コメント)
I agree, parity is best working client now and they see a problem, don't need more arguments.
[–]5mincoffee 3ポイント4ポイント5ポイント 4時間前 (0子コメント)
I would like to see them continue with coding optimizations first. Then increase gas for the expensive attack vectors. So far the attack has strengthened the code and this is a good thing.
[–]ceo-of-bitcoin 3ポイント4ポイント5ポイント 3時間前 (4子コメント)
We should fork if it's needed. But please don't assume that the Bitcoin Maximalists won't use this as another opportunity to make a point.
[–]tooManyCoins- 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 2時間前 (2子コメント)
What point do you think they'd try to make?
[–]ceo-of-bitcoin 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 2時間前 (1子コメント)
The same useless point they tried to make with ETC.
[–]tooManyCoins- 1ポイント2ポイント3ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
That was largely concerning blockchain immutability. Since we're now talking protocol upgrades, those concerns shouldn't apply.
I'm sure some people will find a way to spin another hard-fork like it's the end of the world, but we're in a totally different situation than TheDAO.
Isn't Bitcoin in desperate need of a hard fork?
[–]fangolo 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
Sure thing. It's a non-contentious protocol improvement.
[–]paulpaschos 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 3時間前* (1子コメント)
The real issue is that the pricing of opcodes are fixed and do not variably fluctuate based with demand. As long as the pricing is fixed, there will be vectors for attack.
[–]tooManyCoins- 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
If the opcodes charge the correct amount of gas relative to the actual computation involved, why would the pricing need to fluctuate? There's really no 'demand' for particular opcodes on the network, but only a demand for gas.
[–]orb-bro 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 2時間前* (0子コメント)
Go for it - this hard fork could serve a dual purpose, as it could alleviate some of the fear/tension around hardforks which resulted amongst the uninformed as a result of the DAO. This is an opportunity to prove that hard forks are, in most cases, a good thing. Since this is such a small fix, would be better to have this succeed, and prove hard forks can be good, than to wait until Metropolis which introduces a plethora of changes and may result in dissension.
My only request is that some rich folks prop the price of the non-forked chain up so we can dump our coins this time too.
[–]jmiehau 1ポイント2ポイント3ポイント 2時間前 (0子コメント)
I'm worried that if we don't develop a way to update/metering/vote/add new opcodes through on-chain consensus. We could have the same block-size bitcoin limit discussion issues with dozens of opcodes on Ethereum.
block-size bitcoin limit
[–]carloscarlson 1ポイント2ポイント3ポイント 41分前 (0子コメント)
As someone who was strongly opposed to the last HF, this seems fine. Do it.
[–]OX3 -1ポイント0ポイント1ポイント 5時間前* (7子コメント)
I find it weird that he couldn't seem to think of how an attacker might be able to profit off this, instead suggesting it was sponsored. Similarly surprising as how he and so many others fell at least partially for the DAO. edit: I missed attribution of profit quote to Emin, who was critical of DAO.
[–]Critical_Faculty 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 5時間前 (3子コメント)
How did Emin Gun Sirer 'fall for the DAO' - he was very critical and was picking apart its weaknesses from day one?
[–]OX3 1ポイント2ポイント3ポイント 4時間前 (2子コメント)
I didn't mention him?
[–]Critical_Faculty 3ポイント4ポイント5ポイント 4時間前 (1子コメント)
Re-read the article....
Emin Gün Sirer, Cornell professor, who has recently been traveling and has not looked at specific proposals to address the dos, stated: “My guess is that they are sponsored attacks. There’s nothing to gain by launching [those] attacks, yet some people are spending substantial amounts of time on them.”
Emin Gün Sirer, Cornell professor, who has recently been traveling and has not looked at specific proposals to address the dos, stated:
“My guess is that they are sponsored attacks. There’s nothing to gain by launching [those] attacks, yet some people are spending substantial amounts of time on them.”
[–]OX3 3ポイント4ポイント5ポイント 4時間前 (0子コメント)
Sorry, right. Missed that specific attribution.
[–]Jusdem 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 4時間前 (2子コメント)
Can you suggest how an attacker would profit from this?
[–]symeof 4ポイント5ポイント6ポイント 4時間前 (0子コメント)
By mining zero-transactions blocks. This is already documented on this reddit.
[–]OX3 2ポイント3ポイント4ポイント 4時間前 (0子コメント)
Shorting, various mining strategies.
[–]capnal 0ポイント1ポイント2ポイント 1時間前 (0子コメント)
Stay calm and fork on, baby!
[–]duffys2 -1ポイント0ポイント1ポイント 3時間前 (2子コメント)
Why not let this asshole blow a ton of $$ ?
[–]Mr_Yukon_C 3ポイント4ポイント5ポイント 2時間前 (1子コメント)
Well, he/they are not really blowing a ton. It has only cost between ~5k - $10k so far, which isn't a whole lot.
On the other hand it's definitely having semi-adverse effects on the network and honest miners. However, it's mostly just annoying for end users.
[–]duffys2 -2ポイント-1ポイント0ポイント 1時間前 (0子コメント)
This is childish and the best way to deal with attention seeking behavior is to ignore it if possible
[–]helpergodd -1ポイント0ポイント1ポイント 8分前 (0子コメント)
LOL ethereum-fork-coin
π Rendered by PID 6102 on app-310 at 2016-10-06 02:38:34.923601+00:00 running fbd9a1f country code: JP.
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