Does Lower Cognitive Ability Predict Greater Prejudice?
Abstract
Historically, leading scholars proposed a theoretical negative association between cognitive abilities and prejudice. Until recently, however, the field has been relatively silent on this topic, citing concerns with potential confounds (e.g., education levels). Instead, researchers focused on other individual-difference predictors of prejudice, including cognitive style, personality, negativity bias, and threat. Yet there exists a solid empirical paper trail demonstrating that lower cognitive abilities (e.g., abstract-reasoning skills and verbal, nonverbal, and general intelligence) predict greater prejudice. We discuss how the effects of lower cognitive ability on prejudice are explained (i.e., mediated) by greater endorsement of right-wing socially conservative attitudes. We conclude that the field will benefit from a recognition of, and open discussion about, differences in cognitive abilities between those lower versus higher in prejudice. To advance the scientific discussion, we propose the Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation model, which outlines the cognitive psychological underpinnings of ideological belief systems and prejudice.
Current Directions in Psychological
Science
2014, Vol. 23(6) 454 –459
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DOI: 10.1177/0963721414549750
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Intergroup prejudice is both complex and multifaceted.
Since the 1950s, psychologists have examined the psy-
chological and personal bases of prejudice and ethno-
centrism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, &
Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954). Sixty years of empirical
research has convincingly illustrated that individuals
expressing higher (vs. lower) prejudice are less agreeable
and less open to new ideas and experiences (Sibley &
Duckitt, 2008), exhibit stronger needs for simplicity and
order (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and demonstrate more
anxious reactivity to out-group members (Riek, Mania, &
Gaertner, 2006). These accounts converge with earlier
theorizing (Adorno etal., 1950; Allport, 1954) that tough-
mindedness and cognitive rigidity influence whether
social environments are considered threatening and char-
acterize prejudiced individuals. Notably, these constructs
involve personality traits, preferences for dealing with
information, and manifestations of emotional reactivity,
which in turn drive feelings of uncertainty, fear, and resis-
tance toward unfamiliar and unknown groups (Dhont,
Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).
But what about mental abilities, the psychological
resources needed to process and retain knowledge,
solve problems, and master challenging tasks? Theoretical
pioneers tentatively posited that prejudice and ethnocen-
trism may originate in lower mental abilities. For instance,
Adorno etal. (1950) observed that “the most ethnocentric
subjects are, on the average, less intelligent than the least
ethnocentric” (p. 284). At that time, however, few studies
addressed associations between mental ability and preju-
dice, and potential confounds limited firm conclusions.
Consequently, consideration of mental abilities is notice-
ably absent from contemporary accounts of prejudice,
with the field sidestepping this socially sensitive issue
(Hodson, 2014). Yet methodological and statistical
advances now permit a return to this lingering question:
Does low cognitive ability predict greater prejudice?
Empirical Evidence on the Relation
Between Mental Abilities and Prejudice
Early empirical evidence (Adorno etal., 1950) revealed
negative relations between scores on ethnocentrism
549750CDP
XXX10.1177/0963721414549750Dhont, HodsonCognitive Ability and Prejudice
research-article2014
Corresponding Author:
Kristof Dhont, School of Psychology, Keynes College, University of
Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NP, United Kingdom
E-mail: k.dhont@kent.ac.uk
Does Lower Cognitive Ability Predict
Greater Prejudice?
Kristof Dhont
1,2
and Gordon Hodson
3
1
Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology, Ghent University;
2
School of Psychology,
University of Kent; and
3
Department of Psychology, Brock University
Abstract
Historically, leading scholars proposed a theoretical negative association between cognitive abilities and prejudice.
Until recently, however, the field has been relatively silent on this topic, citing concerns with potential confounds
(e.g., education levels). Instead, researchers focused on other individual-difference predictors of prejudice, including
cognitive style, personality, negativity bias, and threat. Yet there exists a solid empirical paper trail demonstrating that
lower cognitive abilities (e.g., abstract-reasoning skills and verbal, nonverbal, and general intelligence) predict greater
prejudice. We discuss how the effects of lower cognitive ability on prejudice are explained (i.e., mediated) by greater
endorsement of right-wing socially conservative attitudes. We conclude that the field will benefit from a recognition
of, and open discussion about, differences in cognitive abilities between those lower versus higher in prejudice. To
advance the scientific discussion, we propose the Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation model, which outlines the
cognitive psychological underpinnings of ideological belief systems and prejudice.
Keywords
cognitive abilities, prejudice, intelligence, intolerance, ideology
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Cognitive Ability and Prejudice 455
(tapping blatant prejudice toward different minority
groups) and mental abilities, across various adult samples
(including maritime-school students and veterans). These
relations were observed using various intelligence tests,
including reading, mechanical-comprehension, and
general- intelligence tests. Other researchers, using similar
ethnocentrism scales, confirmed such relations among
students (Rokeach, 1951) and young children (Kutner &
Gordon, 1964). Furthermore, Kutner and Gordon (1964)
reported that children who were highly prejudiced at age
7 remained more prejudiced 9 years later, scoring lower
on intelligence at both time points.
Early scholars were, however, concerned about possi-
ble confounds such as socioeconomic status (SES) and
educational experiences (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport,
1954; Christie, 1954). For instance, those with stronger
cognitive abilities may hold more tolerant attitudes
toward out-groups because of higher educational attain-
ment or greater cross-cultural exposure in family and
school contexts, factors associated with higher SES. Thus,
increased cultural sophistication and greater educational
experience, rather than mental abilities per se, could
explain why those with stronger cognitive skills are gen-
erally less prejudiced (e.g., Allport, 1954; Christie, 1954).
Historically, these factors were not convincingly elimi-
nated, with scholars conceptually and theoretically de-
emphasizing mental abilities in prejudice theories in the
decades following the 1950s. Nevertheless, empirical evi-
dence kept accruing, consistently revealing negative
associations of mental abilities, such as verbal and math-
ematical abilities, with ethnocentrism or prejudice (e.g.,
racial prejudice: Meeusen, de Vroome, & Hooghe, 2013;
Sidanius & Lau, 1989; homophobia: Keiller, 2010). For
example, Costello and Hodson (2014) demonstrated that
White children who were less able to recognize that a
short, wide glass holds the same amount of water as a
taller, thinner glass in a water-conservation task, or that
objects from different categories (cars, trucks) belong to
a shared superordinate category (vehicles), expressed
more negative evaluations of Black children and attrib-
uted fewer uniquely human characteristics to Black peo-
ple. Hence, cognitive ability also shows negative relations
with measures representing rather indirect forms of bias
and discrimination (e.g., subtle dehumanization), which
are generally less likely to be affected by social- desirability
tendencies (see Eyssel & Ribas, 2012).
Critically, Van Hiel, Onraet, and De Pauw (2010) con-
ducted a meta-analytic review and statistically aggregated
the findings from 92 studies (29,209 participants from 124
samples) reporting relations between cognitive styles and
abilities, on the one hand, and social-cultural ideological
attitudes, such as authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, on
the other. In a subset of participants (1,409 participants
from 12 samples) for whom data on indicators
of cognitive ability and measures of ethnocentrism or
prejudice were available, the authors uncovered a nega-
tive correlation (−.30).
Three important shortcomings inherent to most of the
studies reviewed above require discussion. First, most
used cross-sectional data and cannot address whether
lower cognitive abilities influence the subsequent devel-
opment of negative out-group attitudes. Second, few
examined population-representative samples. Third, most
failed to remove SES or education confounds. Two recent
studies compellingly addressed these issues. Deary, Batty,
and Gale (2008a) and Schoon, Cheng, Gale, Batty, and
Deary (2010) investigated the prospective association
between general intelligence in childhood (ages 10 and
11, respectively) and a combined social-attitude measure
of racism, social conservatism, and gender inequality in
adulthood (ages 30 and 33, respectively), using large rep-
resentative U.K. samples. Their results confirmed that
children higher in mental ability were less likely to
endorse socially conservative ideologies in adulthood. A
reanalysis by Hodson and Busseri (2012) tested the effect
of intelligence specifically on racial prejudice and found
that greater general intelligence in childhood predicted
less racism in adulthood (average correlation approxi-
mately −.22). Although cognitive ability conceptually and
statistically predicts lower SES and education (Deary
etal., 2008a; Schoon etal., 2010), direct predictive effects
of cognitive ability on social attitudes remain after con-
trolling for SES, education, and social background (see
also Hodson & Busseri, 2012), ruling out these potential
confounds.
Our review suggests an affirmative answer to the ques-
tion “Does lower cognitive ability predict greater preju-
dice?” This negative association has been found
cross-sectionally, with various intelligence measures
across different age groups, and longitudinally, with rep-
resentative samples. Furthermore, cognitive ability exerts
an effect on prejudice independently of SES and educa-
tion. But why does lower mental ability predict greater
prejudice?
The Explanatory Role of Right-Wing
Socially Conservative Ideologies
Right-wing ideologies offer well-structured and ordered
views about society that preserve traditional societal con-
ventions and norms (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &
Sulloway, 2003). Such ideological belief systems are par-
ticularly attractive to individuals who are strongly moti-
vated to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity in preference
for simplicity and predictability (Jost etal., 2003; Roets &
Van Hiel, 2011). Theoretically, individuals with lower
mental abilities should be attracted by right-wing social-
cultural ideologies because they minimize complexity
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456 Dhont, Hodson
and increase perceived control (Heaven, Ciarrochi, &
Leeson, 2011; Stankov, 2009). Conversely, individuals
with greater cognitive skills are better positioned to
understand changing and dynamic societal contexts,
which should facilitate open-minded, relatively left-
leaning attitudes (Deary etal., 2008a; Heaven etal., 2011;
McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999).
Lower cognitive abilities therefore draw people to strate-
gies and ideologies that emphasize what is presently
known and considered acceptable to make sense and
impose order over their environment. Resistance to social
change and the preservation of the status quo regarding
societal traditions—key principles underpinning right-
wing social-cultural ideologies—should be particularly
appealing to those wishing to avoid uncertainty and
threat.
Indeed, the empirical literature reveals negative rela-
tions between cognitive abilities and right-wing social-
cultural attitudes, including right-wing authoritarian (e.g.,
Keiller, 2010; McCourt etal., 1999), socially conservative
(e.g., Stankov, 2009; Van Hiel etal., 2010), and religious
attitudes (e.g., Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013).
Although some studies have found that people on both
the far left and the far right ends of the political spectrum
possess greater cognitive abilities or sophistication
(Kemmelmeier, 2008; Sidanius & Lau, 1989), evidence for
such curvilinear relations have typically been found
when (a) cognitive-ability measures were themselves
political in nature or (b) researchers have measured par-
ticipants’ motivation to maintain a viewpoint with dog-
matic tenacity (vs. developing multidimensional views),
which taps motivated cognitive styles but not ability (e.g.,
Sidanius & Lau, 1989; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003).
Importantly, linear relations of the sort we emphasize,
in which lower scores on cognitive ability and complex-
ity are associated with right-leaning ideologies, persist
despite potential curvilinear trends (Kemmelmeier, 2008;
Van Hiel etal., 2010). Furthermore, Eidelman, Crandall,
Goodman, and Blanchar (2012) have provided experi-
mental support that low-effort thinking promotes politi-
cal conservatism. Linear relations have also been
confirmed longitudinally, with poorer mental abilities in
childhood predicting stronger endorsement of right-wing
authoritarianism and social conservatism (e.g., Deary
et al., 2008a; Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson & Busseri,
2012; Schoon etal., 2010) and right-leaning voting behav-
ior (Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008b) in adulthood. Together,
the findings from these studies demonstrate that those
with lower mental abilities are more likely to endorse
socially conservative, right-wing authoritarian, and reli-
gious belief systems (Deary etal., 2008a; McCourt etal.,
1999), as has been confirmed in meta-analytic syntheses
(Van Hiel etal., 2010; Zuckerman etal., 2013).
Particularly relevant to our discussion, socially conser-
vative ideologies are well-established predictors of eth-
nocentrism and prejudice against minority, disadvantaged,
or socially deviant groups (e.g., Everett, 2013; see meta-
analyses by Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Sibley & Duckitt,
2008). Indeed, adherents of socially conservative ideolo-
gies are more likely to perceive out-groups as threats to
traditional values and societal order, which results in
heightened prejudice (e.g., Dhont & Hodson, 2014;
Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009). Longitudinal studies,
using both student and representative adult samples,
have confirmed that right-wing attitudes significantly pre-
dict increased prejudice over time (Asbrock, Christ,
Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010).
Given the established relations between lower mental
ability and adherence to socially conservative right-wing
ideologies and between right-wing ideologies and preju-
dice, it is conceivable that mental abilities predict preju-
dice through socially conservative right-wing ideologies
(see Fig. 1). Hodson and Busseri (2012) explicitly tested
this mediation model, and their results confirmed that
lower childhood intelligence predicted greater prejudice
in adulthood through stronger endorsement of right-
wing social-cultural attitudes (independent of SES or
education).
In sum, meaningful differences in mental abilities exist
between those lower versus higher in right-wing social
conservatism and prejudice, despite being absent from
contemporary theoretical accounts of prejudice (Hodson,
2014). In response, we propose a conceptual framework,
the Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation (CASE)
–
+
–
Cognitive
Ability
Prejudicial
Attitudes
Right-Wing
Social-Cultural
Ideologies
Fig. 1. Mediation model showing the relation between cognitive ability and prejudice as mediated by
right-wing ideologies (see Hodson & Busseri, 2012). The dashed line reflects a weakened relation with
the mediator included.
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Cognitive Ability and Prejudice 457
model, which integrates empirical and theoretical litera-
tures to advance our collective discussion of, and inspire
future research on, the cognitive psychological underpin-
nings of ideological belief systems and prejudice.
An Integrative Model of Cognitive
Ability and Style to Evaluation
Building on Hodson (2014), we propose the CASE model
to explain the theoretical relations between cognitive
abilities and styles on the one hand and intergroup out-
comes (e.g., stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination) on
the other (see Fig. 2). It is worth bearing in mind that the
causes of prejudice are multifaceted, with cultural and
societal factors impinging on expressions of bias in ways
that lie outside the scope of our review. Here, we focus
on the predictive role of cognitive abilities or cognitive
styles, arguing that these cognitive predictors are rela-
tively distal to intergroup outcomes and that their effects
are thus indirect.
In the first stage, cognitive variables directly influ-
ence assessments of threat concerning the social and/or
physical world. Thus, possessing lower cognitive abili-
ties and having preferences for simple structure, order,
and predictability predispose individuals to perceive
changing and dynamic contexts as especially threaten-
ing. The immediate response to this threat involves pre-
vention (vs. promotion) reactions that emphasize what
is already known and familiar (i.e., the status quo), in
the interest of reducing uncertainty and anxiety and
minimizing potential harm or danger. As such, preven-
tion responses and “conservative” reactions are both
basic and normal (Eidelman etal., 2012), triggered by
an oversensitivity to the unfamiliar (or to perceived
threats) but also representing a reasonable response
based on a critical evaluation of threatening environ-
mental factors.
Over time, this prevention focus fuels more stable
forms of prevention-focused orientations toward the
social world (Janoff-Bulman, 2009), such as socially con-
servative and religious belief systems that emphasize
resistance to change and protection of the status quo (see
Jost etal., 2003). Indeed, when threatened, people gener-
ally shift to the ideological right (Hetherington & Suhay,
2011; Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014), which in turn
increases stereotypical thinking (Castelli & Carraro, 2011),
prejudicial attitudes (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), discrimina-
tion (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and out-group avoidance
(Hodson, 2011).
Importantly, endorsing socially conservative ideolo-
gies will also generally feed back into stronger threat
perceptions, motivating interpretations of the social
world as threatening, which further confirms and justifies
conservative beliefs (e.g., Onraet et al., 2014).
Furthermore, perceived threat from specific out-groups
can also directly enhance negative outcomes toward
those out-groups (Riek etal., 2006), which in turn may
promote right-wing political beliefs consistent with a
prevention-protection focus against out-group threat.
Threat perceptions, right-wing socially conservative atti-
tudes, and negative attitudes toward out-groups may thus
mutually reinforce each other. Overall, the CASE model
provides a framework that integrates related but distinct
literatures in a meaningful way, proposing mechanisms
through which cognitive variables (e.g., ability and style)
can impact more distal outcomes (e.g., intergroup rela-
tions) through threat perceptions and prevention- oriented
responses.
Current and Future Directions
Our review highlights limitations warranting further
inquiry. First, the studies reviewed have overwhelmingly
examined self-reported prejudice. Although individuals
Cognitive
Abilities
Cognitive
Styles
Threat
Perceptions
Prevention
(vs. Promotion)
Focus
ASSESSMENT
Performance
Preferences
Right-Wing
(vs. Left-Wing)
Social-Cultural
Ideologies
Stereotyping
Prejudice
Discrimination
Segregation
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE STABLE BELIEF SYSTEMS
Intergroup Outcomes
Psychological Process Mechanisms
Fig. 2. The Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation model of the effects of cognitive ability and style on intergroup outcomes via psychological
processes, controlling for factors such as education and socioeconomic status.
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458 Dhont, Hodson
with stronger cognitive skills might be better at masking
socially unacceptable attitudes, responses to straightfor-
ward questions about out-group attitudes are unlikely to
require elaborate cognitive skills of the sort that differen-
tiate those with lower versus higher mental abilities (for
a discussion, see Hodson & Busseri, 2012). Furthermore,
negative relations between mental abilities and prejudice
also occur among university students (e.g., Keiller, 2010)
and young children (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 2014), and
occur independently of education, rendering this account
unlikely. However, in more complex or nuanced contexts
(e.g., job-hiring decisions about candidates with ambigu-
ous qualifications), those lower in cognitive ability may
be less able to inhibit biases, failing to recognize and
execute socially appropriate responses. We therefore
urgently encourage the future use of nonreactive and
implicit measures of prejudice.
Second, extant research has examined only Westerners,
limiting the generalizability of its findings to other socio-
political contexts. Psychological characteristics typically
associated with right-wing socially conservative ideolo-
gies are also likely manifest among defenders of the sta-
tus quo in totalitarian communist regimes. More research
is needed to advance our understanding of social con-
servatism in non-Western societies and its relations with
cognitive ability, resistance to change, and out-group
attitudes. Finally, associations between cognitive abilities
and ideological attitudes in the economic-hierarchical
domain remain underinvestigated. Theoretically, eco-
nomic (vs. social) conservatism represents an unlikely
mediator (Heaven etal., 2011), but this remains untested.
In closing, we want to be clear that this review does not
inform the rationality, accuracy, or validity of right- or
left-wing ideologies, but rather helps to illuminate cogni-
tive factors contributing to ideological and intergroup
attitudes.
Recommended Reading
Hibbing, J. R., Smith, K. B., & Alford, J. R. (2014). Differences
in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology.
Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 37, 297–307. A comprehen-
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erals and conservatives in their physio- and psychological
responses to negative environmental stimuli.
Hodson, G., & Busseri, M. A. (2012). (See References). An
article presenting evidence that lower metal abilities in
childhood predict greater prejudice in adulthood through
right-wing ideologies.
Van Hiel, A., Onraet, E., & De Pauw, S. (2010). (See References).
A meta-analytic overview of research on the relation
between right-wing ideologies and behavioral measures of
cognitive style and ability.
Zuckerman, M., Silberman, J., & Hall, J. A. (2013). (See
References). A theoretical and meta-analytical overview of
research on the relation between intelligence and religiosity.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with
respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.
Funding
Part of this paper was prepared when K. Dhont was a postdoc-
toral fellow supported by the Research Foundation–Flanders
(Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, Belgium).
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Demographic, economic, and genetic factors related to national differences in ethnocentric attitudes
- "(4) Intelligence: NE negatively associated with intelligence (e.g. Dhont & Hodson, 2014). (5) Religiousness: NE is positively associated with religiousness (Shinert & Ford, 1958 ), which is in turn associated with holding nationalistic beliefs (Eisinga, Felling, & Peeters, 1990). "
[Show abstract] [Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: We conducted a review of factors associated with individual and group level differences in positive ethnocentrism (PE) and negative ethnocentrism (NE). We inter-correlated datasets on national differences in these factors with data from the World Values Survey with regard to national differences in measures of PE and NE. The two different survey items for each construct were strongly correlated, but the constructs themselves were not significantly associated. Multiple regression analyses indicated that NE was mainly related to high levels of cousin marriage and frequency of the DRD4-repeat gene, and that PE was mainly related to a young median population age. Cousin marriage may indicate low levels of trust, DRD4 implies a fast Life History strategy, and young median age is associated with many factors predicting PE.- "This pattern implies that there is something in particular about people with lower levels of cognitive ability that lead them to show an intergroup bias. There are multiple possible explanations for such a gap, including differences in perspective taking (Hodson & Busseri, 2012 ), cognitive style (Dhont & Hodson, 2014), or other cognitive processes that lead people with lower levels of cognitive ability to be more concerned about maintaining group boundaries compared to people with higher levels of cognitive ability. If people with lower cognitive ability are more concerned with group boundaries, then they should show larger intergroup biases than people with higher levels of cognitive ability. "
[Show abstract] [Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Previous research finds that lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice. We test two unresolved questions about this association using a heterogeneous set of target groups and data from a representative sample of the United States (N = 5,914). First, we test “who are the targets of prejudice?” We replicate prior negative associations between cognitive ability and prejudice for groups who are perceived as liberal, unconventional, and having lower levels of choice over group membership. We find the opposite (i.e., positive associations), however, for groups perceived as conservative, conventional, and having higher levels of choice over group membership. Second, we test “who shows intergroup bias?” and find that people with both relatively higher and lower levels of cognitive ability show approximately equal levels of intergroup bias but toward different sets of groups.- "Although both cognitive and affective variables have been studied separately, theoretical models and empirical studies have rarely examined these variables simultaneously. Re- cently, Dhont and Hodson (2014; see also Hodson, 2014 ) introduced the Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation (CASE) model, a conceptual model of ideology and prejudice , which holds that right-wing ideology and prejudice result from the interplay between cognitive, affective and motivational factors. Specifically, the CASE model proposes that individuals with lower cognitive abilities and preferences for simple structure, order and predictability are more inclined to perceive the surrounding societal context as threatening. "
[Show abstract] [Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: The cognitive functioning of individuals with stronger endorsement of right-wing and prejudiced attitudes has elicited much scholarly interest. Whereas many studies investigated cognitive styles, less attention has been directed towards cognitive ability. Studies investigating the latter topic generally reveal lower cognitive ability to be associated with stronger endorsement of right-wing ideological attitudes and greater prejudice. However, this relationship has remained widely unrecognized in literature. The present meta-analyses revealed an average effect size of r = −.20 [95% confidence interval (95% CI) [−0.23, −0.17]; based on 67 studies, N = 84 017] for the relationship between cognitive ability and right-wing ideological attitudes and an average effect size of r = −.19 (95% CI [−0.23, −0.16]; based on 23 studies, N = 27 011) for the relationship between cognitive ability and prejudice. Effect sizes did not vary significantly across different cognitive abilities and sample characteristics. The effect strongly depended on the measure used for ideological attitudes and prejudice, with the strongest effect sizes for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. We conclude that cognitive ability is an important factor in the genesis of ideological attitudes and prejudice and thus should become more central in theorizing and model building. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology
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