Pep Guardiola wins tactical battle with José Mourinho in Manchester derby

A blunder by José Mourinho enabled a fluid City to dominate the first half, with Kevin De Bruyne and David Silva being allowed far too much space by Manchester United
David Silva Marouane Fellaini
David Silva of Manchester City, right, is one step ahead of United’s Marouane Fellaini, who was too often left isolated in front of the defence. Photograph: Oli Scarff/AFP/Getty Images

José Mourinho was quick to criticise his players after Saturday’s 2-1 defeat by Manchester City. “A few players were below the level,” he complained. “Sometimes players disappoint managers.” But Mourinho’s tactical blunder was equally to blame for Manchester United’s poor first-half performance and their improvement after the break owed much to his change of formation.

City’s most dangerous players in Pep Guardiola’s 4-3-3 system are the two advanced central midfielders, David Silva and Kevin De Bruyne. Although both are more accustomed to higher positions, they have adjusted excellently to their new roles, driving forward and combining swiftly between the lines. Without the threat of Sergio Agüero, usually City’s obvious dangerman, Mourinho’s primary task was protecting the zone where Silva and De Bruyne operate.

Instead, Mourinho made no obvious plans. He continued with a midfield duo of Marouane Fellaini and Paul Pogba, a combination that was repeatedly exposed throughout the first half. Pogba, in particular, gave an incredibly indisciplined midfield display, positioning himself as if he were playing in a midfield trio, the system he is accustomed to. He was often caught ahead of the ball at turnovers, which left Fellaini isolated in front of the defence. The Belgian has generally been impressive this season but was inevitably incapable of shutting down both Silva and De Bruyne.

United’s problem was exacerbated by their full-backs, Antonio Valencia and Luke Shaw, being dragged out towards the touchlines as City stretched the play determinedly through the left-sided Nolito and right-sided Raheem Sterling. Therefore, huge gaps opened up in the channels, most obviously in City’s inside-left position. De Bruyne put himself between Eric Bailly, Valencia and Fellaini. No one knew who was supposed to be stopping him.

De Bruyne ran the show, repeatedly collecting long passes into that inside‑left channel. City generally built play down the left, then switched balls to Sterling, as if Shaw had been identified as United’s weak link. But none of the home defence looked comfortable, with the usually reliable Daley Blind caught out badly for the opener, scored by De Bruyne. That goal, from a long ball, and the second, by Kelechi Iheanacho from a rebound, did not do justice to City’s slick passing football, but this was a hugely impressive all-round performance.

After Zlatan Ibrahimovic had offered United a lifeline shortly before half-time, Mourinho’s tactical switch changed the game dramatically. The two wide players, Henrikh Mkhitaryan and Jesse Lingard, were sacrificed, with Ander Herrera introduced as a third central midfielder, Marcus Rashford brought on down the left, and Wayne Rooney moving to the right. It was now 4-3-3, with three outright forwards.

The difference was immediate. Herrera won a tackle within the first minute of the second half, and provided more discipline in front of the back four. Pogba and Fellaini pushed forward, the latter acting as a target for long balls, and United started to dominate. In particular, their pressing improved significantly: the goalkeeper Claudio Bravo, who made a nervous start to his City career, suddenly found himself without passing options. United’s attackers pushed forward on to City’s defenders and everyone else backed up, tracking individuals closely when they dropped into deep positions. City were under pressure.

Therefore, Guardiola changed things decisively just eight minutes into the second half, with the holding midfielder Fernando replacing the centre-forward Iheanacho, and Fernandinho and De Bruyne, City’s two outstanding players on the day, pushed forward to maintain the 4-3-3 system. The extra defensive qualities, and the added midfield discipline, worked excellently, as City stabilised the game and regained control. They should have capitalised more on their counterattacking chances, particularly after Leroy Sané replaced Sterling down the right, but United’s best spell had arrived before Guardiola’s change.

Mourinho waited until 10 minutes from time before using his final change, Anthony Martial for Shaw. United now in effect played four up front in the closing stages, and Guardiola – always keen to maintain a spare man in defence – switched to a 5-4-1, with the ultra-versatile Fernandinho playing his third position of the day as City were forced to defend long balls.

Guardiola won this tactical battle: his starting system outfoxed Mourinho, and when the United manager changed things intelligently to chase the game, City’s head coach responded to every move quickly and effectively. Tactical battles are not simply about defensive, cagey football – this was fascinating strategically, and also a brilliantly entertaining game.