A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis

Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, Thierry Tressel

NBER Working Paper No. 17076
Issued in May 2011
NBER Program(s):   ME   POL

Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions' lobbying and mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that lobbying was associated with more risk-taking during 2000-07 and with worse outcomes in 2008. In particular, lenders lobbying more intensively on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing originations of mortgages. Moreover, delinquency rates in 2008 were higher in areas where lobbying lenders' mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during the rescue of Bear Stearns and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but positive abnormal returns when the bailout was announced. Finally, we find a higher bailout probability for lobbying lenders. These findings suggest that lending by politically active lenders played a role in accumulation of risks and thus contributed to the financial crisis.

Acknowledgments

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17076

Published:

• Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195 - 230.
• A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis, Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, Thierry Tressel. in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2011, Volume 26, Acemoglu and Woodford. 2012

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