From the Editor: Debunking Deathtraps Part 1

(Editors note: this originally appeared in my old blog – tankandavf.blogspot.com – on 2/26/2015.)

When it comes to the history of armored warfare in the Second World War, the US M4 Sherman tank is always sure to draw controversy and a good bit of discussion.  Invariably, when this topic is raised in an online forum, someone will bring up the book “Death Traps” by Belton Cooper.  With a forward by popular historian Stephen Ambrose and the backing of a major publisher, Death Traps has become quite well known amongst WW2 history aficionados.  Mr. Cooper has been featured in TV documentary specials as well, including the history channel series “Engineering Disasters“, which has further increased awareness of his book.

Death Traps is an unusual book.  It is written in the style of a memoir, but it also presents itself as a history of the 3rd Armored Division, the unit in which Cooper served as an ordnance Lieutenant.  The main theme of the book is that M4 Sherman was, as the title implies, a “death trap” to the men that operated them.  However, the book has several flaws.  As a memoir, it is  meandering and repetitive, far too often wandering away from the authors personal experiences into the realm of speculation.  As a history it is lacking, containing no end notes, foot notes or bibliography.  And finally, as an indictment of the M4 Sherman tank, the book is filled with so many factual errors and outright falsehoods, it cannot be taken seriously on this count either.

The most interesting and valuable parts of the book are where Cooper sticks to his personal experiences as an ordnance officer.  The insights he gives into the daily life of the 3rd Armored Division and its soldiers are intriguing, although they make up too little of the books three hundred pages.  Of particular interest to armor and tank enthusiasts is his writings concerning the “Super Pershing” project, with which he was personally involved.  The story concerning M4 crews who inadvertently stretched out the retaining clips for the main gun ammunition by stashing bottles of cognac inside them is amusing and no doubt of interest to people wanting to know more about the day to day life of Sherman crews.  However, there are not enough of these sorts of stories in the book. Instead, the reader is subjected to Mr. Cooper veering off into stories he had heard second hand or into broader topics only loosely related to his experiences.  For example, the reader is forced to endure Mr. Coopers opinion on everything from German V2 rockets and jet fighters to General George Patton’s (supposed) influence on US tank design.

Another aspect of the book that becomes rather frustrating is the authors frequent and persistent hyperbole.  Everything is overstated.  For example, when the author witnesses an aerial battle between US bombers and German fighters, it is described as “the most spectacular aerial battle of the war.”  His admiration for the German opponent seems to know no limits, referring to the German General staff as “brilliant” (for creating the Siegfried line!?)  He states that “Military historians have often agreed that until you’ve fought the German Army, you have never fought a real battle.”  This statement is of on its face absurd (and potentially insulting to his brothers in arms in the Pacific campaign.)  When the author relates how he was forced to take command of an armored column and assume a position outside of Mons, he feels it necessary to tell the reader “I have often reflected on the significance of our position at this road junction on the outcome of the battle of Mons.”  Seeing as the column the author was commanding did not encounter the enemy, the significance of the action would appear to most reasonable readers to be fairly minimal.

As to the M4 Sherman tank, his penchant for hyperbole extends fully into the opposite direction.  The M4 Sherman is not just inferior to German tanks, it is “tragically” and “vastly”  inferior.  According to the author, the decision to concentrate production on the M4 was “one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II, and its effect on the upcoming battle for Western Europe was catastrophic.”(page 28)  Later, he adds to this sentiment, stating that if US forces had been equipped with a better tank during the November 1944 offensive, “The battle of the Bulge may have never taken place, some 182,000 German and American casualties might have been averted, and the war could have ended five months earlier.” (page 155)

In regards to the main thesis of this book, that the M4 Sherman was a “death trap”, the author relies on a fairly narrow sets of figures and anecdotes, which he repeats multiple times throughout the book.  Unfortunately, his writings display a surprising level of ignorance about the weapon systems of which he speaks.  Names and designations are repeatedly misidentified, and basic information regarding the performance of various weapon systems are presented incorrectly.  Granted, in most soldier memoirs, errors on technical matters are bound to crop up.  This is expected and forgivable.  However, Death Traps is not just a soldiers memoir.  It is an intentional indictment by an ordnance officer concerning the primary piece of equipment he was charged with being responsible for.  Therefore, one would expect more care to be taken to ensure that the facts presented regarding the subject of the book would in fact be correct.

Below are a list of technical errors found in the book.  Some of these are relatively trivial, while others are far less forgivable and undermine the authors credibility on the topic.

1. Cooper lays the blame on the delay of getting the M26 Pershing into service in Western Europe on the influence and judgment of General George Patton.  As a field commander, Patton has little influence on such decisions.  Most books on this topic lay the blame at the feel of General Leslie McNair, commander of US Army Ground Forces, responsible for the organization, training and preparation of the U.S. Army for overseas service.
2. Cooper repeatedly misidentifies German cannons, referring to the PaK 40 anti-tank gun and the Kwk 40 tank gun as the Pak 41 and Kwk 41.  This is a rather small error and forgivable.  More egregious is his stating that the “Kwk41” was superior to the M1 76mm gun found on later models of the M4 Sherman.  The two guns were actually almost indistinguishable from each other in terms of armor piercing performance when using the most common AP rounds available at the time.
3. Cooper describes the Pz4 as a 22ton tank with four inches of frontal armor, and a wider track than the Sherman. The late war Pz4 was actually 28 tons, had a little more than three inches of frontal armor (not slopped) and had a relatively narrow track , necessitating the use of grousers, much like the M4. (page 24)
4. Cooper repeatedly refers to the 75mm gun that equipped the M4 Sherman as the “M2.”  The M2 75mm gun was a shorter version that was used in early versions of the M3 medium tank.  This gun was never used in any production version of the Sherman, they all had the longer M3 75mm gun.
5. He confuses the engines mounted in various models of the M4.  While he correctly states that the Continental R975 Radial engine powers the M4, he incorrectly identifies the engine in the M4A1 as the Ford GAA.  This error is rather odd since he also refers to the M4A1 as “essentially the same tank as the M4 but with an improved high-velocity 76mm gun and a different turret.” (page 24) Actually, the M4A1 came with either the 75 or 76mm guns, the difference between an M4 and a M4A1 was that the M4 had a welded hull, the M4A1 had a cast hull.  Both the M4 and the M4A1 had the R975 radial engine.
6. Cooper seems rather confused as to the details of the Ford GAA and GAF series of engines.  He repeatedly states their HP rating as 550.  This is incorrect, most sources list maximum gross HP at 500 and net HP at 450.  Cooper refers to the Ford engine as a V8 in reference to it in the Sherman (page 79), but in the Pershing it somehow becomes an inline 8 (page 213).  He also claims that “Ford Motor Company, under the direction of the ordnance department, had taken the British Rolls Royce Merlin engine and cut it down to eight cylinders.”  This is completely untrue.  The Ford design was similar to the Merlin, but it was not a copy.  It was an original Ford design, created as a 12 cylinder airplane engine.  Ford cut the engine down to 8 cylinders to adapt it for service in tanks.
7. Cooper states that “the power ratio of the M26 was approximately 12 horsepower per ton compared to 10 horsepower per ton on the M4” and that the M26 was “faster and more agile over rough terrain.”  (page 26) He has the power to weight figures all wrong.  According to Hunnicutts books “Sherman” and “Pershing”, the M4 and the M4A1 had a gross power to weight ratio of 12 HP per ton.  The Pershing had a gross power to weight ratio of 10.8 HP per ton.  When we throw the M4A3 into the mix, the numbers look even worse for Pershing, as the A3 had a gross power to weight ratio of 13.5 HP per ton.  The M26 was always regarded as an underpowered vehicle until it was upgraded to the M-46.
8. Cooper exaggerates the ground pressure advantage that the Pershing had over the Sherman models with the vertical volute spring suspension.  He states that “Although it (Pershing) was heavier than the Sherman, its longer and wider track gave it a ground bearing pressure of three to four pounds per square inch compared to seven pounds per square in for the Sherman.” (page 211.  According to Hunnicutt, the Ground pressure of an M4 is 13.7 psi.  Ground pressure for an M26 is 12.5 psi.  Also, this does not take into account that at the same time that the Pershing was being introduced, the HVSS suspension was introduced on the Sherman, giving it a wider track with an even better ground pressure rating of only 11psi
9. Cooper seems very confused on the topic of suspensions.  For example, he states: “The (Pershing) track was supported by large, overlapping bogey wheels suspended on torsion bar spring systems.  This was the old Christy (sic) system, which had been developed by the Americans some twenty years previously and had been adopted by the Germans and the Russians.  The Christy (sic) system allowed amuch wider track, and also the torsion bar syspension had a greater amplitude than the old coil spring system on the M4 Sherman.  This system permitted a much easier ride over rough terrain at higher speeds, and the increased amplitude gave the tank better traction going over rough ground or ascending rugged slopes.  All American tanks that came after the M-26 Pershing used the Christy (sic) system.” (page 211)   This paragraph is riddled with errors.  First, “Christy” is not the correct spelling, the proper spelling is “Christie” as in Walter J. Christie, the man you invented this form of suspension.  It should also be noted that the Christie suspension did not use torsion bars as Cooper states but rather coil springs.  Interestingly, Cooper does mention coil springs, but instead of doing so in reference to the Christie system, he does so in reference to the M4.  Of course, the M4 suspension used volute springs, not coil springs, so that is incorrect as well.  The Germans never used the Christie suspension, instead relying primarily on either leaf springs or torsion bars.  The only countries that actually used the Christie suspension were the Russians, as Cooper correctly states, and the British, who Cooper neglects to mention.  After WW2 both Russia and the UK abandoned the use of Christie style suspensions do to the fact that they were outdated.  The US army has never used the Christie suspension system in any of their WW2 or post war tank designs.
10. Cooper states that the “Sherman had to get within six hundred yards of the Panther and hope to catch it on the flank” in order to knock it out.  The side armor on a Panther was actually comparatively thin, being 45mm on the turret side and 40mm on the hull side.  This meant that the Panther could be penetrated through the side at normal battlefield ranges by both the 75 and 76 mm guns of the M4 Sherman.

The above list is some, but not all, of the demonstrably incorrect facts presented in the book.  Next I want to look at claims made in the book that just seem odd.  I cannot prove these to be incorrect, but they don’t pass the smell test.

Cooper claims that on July 11 the German Panzer Lehr division attacked US forces near St. Lo using Jagdpanthers.  It is extremely unlikely that Jagdpanthers were used in this attack.  Most likely Cooper has confused Jagdpanther with the more general term Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer).  Cooper presents this attack as “one of the most critical in the battle of Normandy.  The Germans launched a massive counterattack along the Saint-Lo-Saint Jean de Daye highway in an attempt to capture Carentan and Isigny and split the First Army in two.”  This description is a gross exaggeration on the part of Cooper.  The July 11 counter attack is generally considered a relatively minor event in the overall Normandy campaign.  The Panzer Lehr division lost 20 tanks in this attack while inflicting only light casualties on US forces.

Cooper seems to have a fixation with M12 self propelled guns destroying German tanks.  In the book, he only gives a few examples of actual tank on tank duels.  Oddly enough, two of these involve the M12.

“At one point, a German tank came through an opening in a hedgerow and encountered an M12 with its 155mm GPF zeroed in on the gap.  The 155 let go and struck the tank at the base of the turret, completely decapitating it.  The turret and gun were blown off, and the tank stopped in its tracks.” (Page 38-39)
Later in the book when discussing the battle of the Bulge, he has this story:
” In one incident, and M12 gun carriage with its 155mm GPF rifle loaded came around a bend in the road and suddenly found itself face to face with a King Tiger.  Fortunately, the 155 was pointed directly at the base of the King Tiger’s turret.  The gun commander gave the order to fire. The 155 struck the King Tiger at the base of the gun mantlet where the turret joins the deck.  The explosion ruptured the thin top deck armor and blew the turret off the tank, instantly killing the entire crew.  Had the shell struck a few inches lower on the front glacis plate, it would have exploded harmlessly, and the King Tiger would have been able to drill the M12 from end to end with its high-velocity 88.  Such are the fortunes of war.” (Page 171)

Without a way to confirm or disprove these claims, I will simply let the reader make their own judgment on the plausibility of these stories.

Cooper concludes his book by stating that “The German tanks had a qualitative superiority of as much as five to one of our M4 Sherman.”   (page 308)  The “five to one” myth has been repeated in many books and documentaries over the years.  However, it is a myth that does not stand up to scrutiny.  To quote noted tank expert Steven Zaloga from his book “Osprey Duel 13 Panther Vs Sherman”

“The popular myths that Panthers enjoyed a 5-to-1 kill ratio against Shermans or that it took five Shermans to knock out a Panther have no basis at all in the historical records. ”

For the sake of my own sanity, I am going to leave my review of “Death Traps” here for the moment.  Consider this “Part 1.”  At some point I’ll pick this up again with a more detailed explanation of why the armor and firepower advantages of German Armor which Cooper mentions continuously in his book did not actually translate into German armored units being more combat effective than US armored units.

Also, just to make this perfectly clear, I am not criticizing Mr. Cooper’s service to his country or his character.  I am criticizing his book, not him.