This is an archived post. You won't be able to vote or comment.

156
157

Erwin Rommel and Stonewall Jackson: Common Perception versus Reality. Is it correct to say that these two really were the brilliant military leaders that history and popular culture portrays them as, or has history exaggerated their accomplishments. (self.AskHistorians)

hellabro360 が 投稿

I learned in US history last fall that both Stonewall Jackson and Erwin Rommel were among the greatest military commanders in history. Is this factual, or is it folklore rather than actual fact that these two were brilliant? Also a classmate stated that Rommel actually studied Jackson's tactics, is that any factual?

全 62 件のコメント
並べ替え:
ベスト
トップ新着論争中古い順Q&A

[–]panzerkampfwagen 140ポイント141ポイント  (36子コメント)

This is one of my previous posts to this question about Rommel.

I consider him over hyped.

Rommel was able to get a combat command due to his relationship with Hitler. Rommel had known Hitler for years and had asked Hitler for a combat command. In France his division became known as the Ghost Division. That's generally seen as praise. However, it was called that because no one in his own chain of command ever knew where it was because Rommel kept out running his own lines of communication and command. If his French opponents had been more on the ball they could have cut him off in a Kessel (surrounded) and destroyed him.

German military officers were trained to think for themselves. Today this is known as Mission Type Tactics. The commander was supposed to give an order which stated the resources available to be used (troops, tanks, etc) and the objective. It was up to the lower ranked officers to use their own initiative in how to obtain the objective.

Rommel however was quite an interfering General. He gave orders with specific instructions and expected them to be followed to the letter. He would also drive around the front and give orders to soldiers thus cutting their actual officers off (there's accounts of him issuing individual targets to anti tank guns rather than let their own officers decide and almost being killed by the return fire. In fact, Rommel lost quite a few aids while "touring" the front in this manner). This could lead to confusion and also resentment. Rommel was loved by the enlisted men under his command and quite detested by his officers as they considered him interfering and that he didn't trust them to do their actual jobs.

By going around the front Rommel also quite often cut himself off from everyone. No one knew where he was and it could be quite difficult to get in communication with him.

People also seem to cherry pick things Rommel did or said to prove he was great. They will point out that Rommel believed the Allies would invade Normandy but then leave out that he thought said invasion would be a feint which made him like every other German officer.

I also think that Rommel looked good in North Africa due to the Allies helping him with that image. Churchill "stole" quite a lot of troops from Wavell for the impossible task of defending Greece. Wavell was so worried about his job that he didn't say anything and thus made it easier for Rommel to attack him, which Rommel did against orders. Wavell also isn't considered one of Britain's finest. It is easier to look great if your opponent isn't.

A lot of people try to make North Africa look like this huge battle for the control of the Suez Canal, to block access to oil fields in the Middle East, etc and thus state that Rommel was sent there as he was the best of the best. In reality the years of war in North Africa were pretty much because Rommel disobeyed orders to not attack.

Which leads me to my next point that if Rommel was so great why wasn't he on the Eastern Front? Why was he never given what OKW thought was a prestigious and highly important command? In the West we like to "pretend" that North Africa and Western Europe were every bit as important as the Russian Front, but to the Germans the Russian Front was it. That's where they sent over 2/3 of their military and suffered 80% of their casualties. Rommel wasn't even privy to knowing that the invasion of the Soviet Union would be happening which is why he thought when he launched his attack across North Africa that he would quickly be given all the men and supplies he would need. Sadly for him this wouldn't be the case.

Rommel though was a gallant enemy. He didn't order his men to execute troops. He didn't set out to oppress Jewish populations. If he could have avoided this on the Eastern Front we'll never know, but we can credit him for it where he did fight. In fact, he is said to have ripped up an order from Hitler that ordered him to execute prisoners and then announced that the order wasn't clear to those around him.

The Australian General Morshead considered Rommel to be highly predictable in how he would initially attack. This is one of the reasons why he failed to take Tobruk from the mostly Australian garrison. Morshead was able to time and time again work out where Rommel would attack and would have the needed defences there to resist. Morshead said that if Rommel had shown a bit more unpredictability the "Fortress" would have fallen as the defenders did not have enough antitank guns, etc to defend everywhere.

I feel that a lot of people talk Rommel up because he's well known and he's the "Nazi" you can openly talk about respecting without people looking at you funny. However, I would say he was a mediocre general who was promoted above his means due to his relationship with Hitler. He was a captain trapped in the body of a General/Field Marshal. As a captain things he did wouldn't have been a problem, in fact they would have worked well. As a general though he acted as a captain. Rommel is quite often praised for his tactical abilities. Tactics though (the small scale stuff, what soldiers do in battle) wasn't supposed to be what a general worried about.

Books I have on my bookshelf about Rommel and areas he fought are as follows:

  • Tobruk 1941 by Chester Wilmot
  • The Longest Siege Tobruk by Robert Lyman
  • Alamein War without Hate by John Bierman and Colin Smith
  • Tobruk by Peter Fitzsimons
  • Anzac Fury by Peter Thompson (this books is about Crete which isn't about Rommel but it examines issues with Wavell, who was one of Rommel's opponents)

These are books that are currently sitting on my bookshelf. I have a few more laying around somewhere but their names escape me. Also watched quite a few docos over the years. Hope the list helps.

[–]ThisisJimmy3 15ポイント16ポイント  (3子コメント)

How does his book on Infantry Minor Tactics written after WW1 stack up? Was it a significant piece, or was it not much to write home about?

[–]rabid_rat 16ポイント17ポイント  (2子コメント)

It's very dry, but a wonderful way to gain some insight into Rommel's style and background. Everything Rommel did in WW2 makes more sense after reading that book. It affords a great understanding what he did in WWI and why he was so successful then.

[–]ThisisJimmy3 5ポイント6ポイント  (1子コメント)

Was it particularly revolutionary? If I understand right, it's based on his experiences as an officer in WW1. Was it basically a summary of the tactics that everyone knew, or was the anything particularly insightful in his tactics?

[–]rabid_rat 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

I don't think it was particularly revolutionary, though I have noticed it referenced in quite a few books regarding WWII. It was basically a detailed description of the action Rommel saw and lead durring WWI followed by observations on the lessons learned in those actions. Rommel was spectacular as a Captain in WWI, and I found it fascinating to read exactly how he achieved his success and why. The guy is both aggressive and intelligent, and was at his best commanding infantry on the front line.

[–]question_all_the_thi 10ポイント11ポイント  (7子コメント)

Something that should also be mentioned, Rommel suffered in El Alamein one of the first defeats the Germans had in WWII. The beginning of the end was right there and then.

[–]panzerkampfwagen 6ポイント7ポイント  (6子コメント)

He'd already previously lost his first siege of Tobruk which started in April, 1941.

[–]meesta_masa 7ポイント8ポイント  (5子コメント)

The first siege of Toburk was seen as a setback, rather than a complete defeat. Whereas the second battle of El Alamein was seen as an utter and complete failure, both in terms of objectives and casualties. The Afrika Korps was no longer a threat in means of offensive power after this. Also, the boost in terms of morale was exactly what the Allies needed.

Of note: One of reasons for the lack of supplies to Rommel was the treasonous nature of the Italian admirals who would slip convoy details to the Allies.

[–]panzerkampfwagen 8ポイント9ポイント  (1子コメント)

Rommel wasn't very good at logistics, which he admitted to, the distances between ports in North Africa and the whole Russian Front thing.

[–]meesta_masa 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Indeed! Which is why I mentioned that it was 'one of' the reasons. Apologies if I came across as saying that he wasn't to blame for the lack of supplies and reinforcements. And ofcourse, everything has something to do with the Red front once Barbarossa got going.

[–]panzerkampfwagen 4ポイント5ポイント  (2子コメント)

Just got around to reading that link. Interesting read. Good to come across a historian who is willing to dissect the Rommel myth.

I will say in regards to Tobruk that Tobruk was a major propaganda tool for the Allies in 1941. While it seems largely forgotten outside of Australia today it was at the time big news all around the world. Here was the invincible Wehrmacht finally not looking all too invincible.

[–]meesta_masa 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

And Toburk's placement on such an important flank didn't help either. Rommel, after the initial attacks and counter attacks, decided to 'ring the fort with steel' and leave it at that. But the troops would, with impunity, exfiltrate the fort and attack convoys and supply chains, thus becoming a major problem.*

*Needs source or citation

[–]panzerkampfwagen 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

Tobruk's commander, the Australian General Morshead, decided that the best way to defend Tobruk was to attack. With that in mind the Australians on the wire were ordered to conduct nightly offensive patrols through no man's land. Morshead declared that No Man's Land belonged to Australia. While the German's too conducted offensive patrols at night they seemed to be outmatched at this type of warfare and captured diaries show that the German attackers weren't getting a good night's sleep, always worried that an Australian patrol would turn up and kill them in their sleep. One thing to remember is that the Germans were used to dishing it out, they weren't used to taking it and it badly sapped their morale.

Edit - Duh, just remembered Morshead was a Lt General.

[–]viridisNZ 9ポイント10ポイント  (19子コメント)

Which leads me to my next point that if Rommel was so great why wasn't he on the Eastern Front?

Could it be argued that he was on the Western front because the Western armies of France and Britain were seen as better trained, equipped, ect. than the East? Hitler believed the Russian army to be incredibly unskilled which was not a outrageous assumption due to their performance in the First World War. Is it possible he was sent West because the Western armies were the greater threat and required a highly skilled general?

[–]parlezmoose 13ポイント14ポイント  (0子コメント)

No, all the best generals were in the East. Officers such as Guderian and Manstein were (rightly) considered far more skilled than Rommel.

[–]HitlerHess33 7ポイント8ポイント  (1子コメント)

Rommel wasn't on the Eastern front because Halder in particular, and the OKH in general thought his use of modern armoured theory was crazy. Everyone they thought was good was being sent to the eastern front.

[–]viridisNZ 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Thanks, this what what I was looking for. Did Halder or the other General Staff specifically state this in a report? Basically asking for a source. I'm interested in their opinion on his armoured theory.

[–]panzerkampfwagen 11ポイント12ポイント  (13子コメント)

If they were the greater threat the vast majority of the Wehrmacht wouldn't have been on the Eastern Front.

[–]viridisNZ 1ポイント2ポイント  (11子コメント)

I would think that was more due to the large amount of land in the East that needed to be covered quickly using Blitzkreig, rather than the perceived threat from the Red Army.

[–]panzerkampfwagen 6ポイント7ポイント  (10子コメント)

There was actually no such thing as the Blitzkrieg. It's pretty much a media term to describe something they didn't understand.

[–]viridisNZ 18ポイント19ポイント  (8子コメント)

Can you provide some sources for that? I accept that it was a media term coined at the time and the term wasn't used by the Germans, but the specific strategy of mechanised warfare first used by the Germans that Blitzkrieg describes exists.

Doesn't really address the point either. Disregarding blitzkrieg, the East did have a lot more land that needed to be invaded.

[–]BernarditoModerator | Modern Guerrilla | Counterinsurgency 26ポイント27ポイント  (1子コメント)

Actually, I can back up panzerkampfwagen's claim and cite Robert Michael Citino's book The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich (released through University Press of Kansas). Citino argues that Blitzkrieg as a tactic is really nothing new in German operational methods except its use of mechanized forces. Rather, Citino argues that Blitzkrieg was a continuation of Prussian military traditions dating back to Fredrick the Great and was already evident in the Reichswehr under Hans von Seeckt.

[–]viridisNZ 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Thank you for the explanation. Never thought that Blitzkrieg tactics would be up for debate seeing as it was so intrinsically linked to the Germans in the Second World War. Interesting stuff.

[–]panzerkampfwagen 11ポイント12ポイント  (4子コメント)

http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/Home/Robert-M-Citino.aspx

It's mentioned in this video. The author admits that his book has the word Blitzkrieg in it because that sells more books.

[–]viridisNZ 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

Thanks for the link. This subreddit never fails to teach me something new.

[–]willOTW 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

I disagree with your assessment. He says that it is an new outgrowth out of older German tactics and military thought. That sounds to me like a new tactic.

He also states they had their own term for it, and Blitzkrieg wasn't used because the High Command was 'too prosaic'.

The lecturer states that their was a problem around the turn of the century with moving large armies. He then goes on to say that 1940 was a turning point, and that 'blitzkreig' was the solution to the problem.

My takeaway was that their is a misconception in regards to 'blitzkreig', but it is definitely a break from old tactics (if not philosophy).

[–]panzerkampfwagen 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

He says it's not doctrinal. There is no doctrine you can point to and say, "That's Blitzkrieg," whether it was called Blitzkrieg or something else. That's because everyone did whatever they wanted. They had the autonomy to do that. And then those under them would do what they wanted due to their autonomy.

[–]willOTW 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

I don't disagree with that overarching sentiment. I think using the term Blitzkreig as a general tactics term certainly has merit and highlights the departure and usage of military units from WWI to WWII.

I do think that saying because it came from a previous method of war that it is not separate is incorrect.

[–]HitlerHess33 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

The germans in ww2 followed some concepts of modern armoured theory but didnt follow others. The high command wanted obedience to the tried and tested strategy of vernichtungsgedanke which was described by von Clausewitz' On War and was very similar to Frederick the Great's strategy. Some commanders (Guderian especially) wanted to follow modern armoured theory, but the German army mainly used new technology to conduct old tactics.

[–]bryan_sensei 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Can you clarify please?

[–]ferris501 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

Very true. I share Rommel's view of the Africa campaign that it was the most advanced stage of the war to that point, with two armies that were almost entirely mechanized duking it out in some of the most inhospitable conditions on Earth.

[–]FistOfFacepalm 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Maybe in light of the capabilities the Soviets demonstrated in the second half of the war we may have overestimated how much of a threat the Germans originally thought the Soviet Union was. I myself am of the opinion that the Eastern Front was the single most important part of WWII and that Hitler went into the war knowing that it would be. The Nazis were fundamentally opposed to Bolshevism and wanted to wage an absolute war to the death. This leads me to think they would have prioritized units that would be sent against the USSR.

[–][deleted] 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

I found this convincing. Can you suggest any military minds you do consider worth reading about / respecting from World War 2, regardless of their reputation?

[–]panzerkampfwagen 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

Any and all. They're all worth reading about. They all played a part, whether they were great generals, poor generals, ok generals.......

[–]ProbablyNotLying 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

I'm sorry to reply 2 months after your comment here, but there is something a little important I want to nitpick about. "Rommel though was a gallant enemy. He didn't order his men to execute troops." While that's much more true for Rommel than other German officers of the time, he did oversee the summary execution of black African soldiers in France (p.15).

[–]bug-hunter 33ポイント34ポイント  (6子コメント)

\u\panzerkampfwagen has covered Rommel...now for Jackson.

Stonewall Jackson's accomplishments are not as exaggerated, though he is a special case in a special war, where most of the Generals knew each other before and after the war. Moreover, after the Civil War, both side's generals tended to be complimentary of each other (unlike many other civil wars). That said, his actions in the Civil War are studied intensely, partially because the Civil War continues to be a popular war to study (especially in the US).

He was clearly a tactical genius, though his tactical genius was well served by being paired with Lee's political and strategic skill, and that he was set against McClellan (who was considered brilliant at the time, but whose faults played right into Jackson's strengths). Lee and Jackson understood each other intuitively, and Jackson's stature is raised precisely because Lee was clearly diminished after his death (such as at Gettysburg), and because he died at the point when Southern hopes were highest and their chances are universally considered the best.

Moreover, had Lee died and Jackson taken command, it's doubtful he could have filled Lee's shoes.

[–]SC2Eleazar 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Old Jack was an interesting case. He had brilliant successes in independent campaign. One of his greatest weaknesses turned out to be that he was too much of a good soldier. At one point while in the East directly under Lee, Lee was getting frustrated with Jackson's lack of action...turns out because Jackson was following his orders to the letter and Lee had anticipated a little more independent initiative.

An interesting study I've wanted to do or read someone else's conclusions on: some of my reading has indicated that in military theory, Jackson was a major student of Napoleon's early campaigns. McClellan was noted as being a major student of Napoleon's later campaigns. Did this influence the (rather stark) difference in their command styles?

[–]IrishfafnirU.S. Politics Revolution through Civil War 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

Moreover, had Lee died and Jackson taken command, it's doubtful he could have filled Lee's shoes

I'm not sure I agree with this, Jackson repeatedly showed that he was able to operate under independent command very successfully with large forces.

[–]TheWillbilly9 8ポイント9ポイント  (5子コメント)

There was a post similar to this within the last week that I cannot find. It was really interesting and touched on how Rommel wasn't that great of a commander, and was romanticized.

Something about him choosing to be on the front lines rather than using couriers to distribute orders, and him being in Africa which wasn't a major theater. Edit: Found it

[–]rabid_rat 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

That's post wasn't really fair. The real TL:DR, which I don't think that post accurately concludes, is that Rommel was a fantastic leader who was promoted against his own preference to a position he wasn't as suited for. He also was a professional soldier who conducted himself with honor, which earned him the respect of those under him and against him.

[–]Luxpreliator 3ポイント4ポイント  (3子コメント)

I dare you to find a general that wasn't romanticized and overblown. Custer is sometimes mentioned as being a hero even though he fucked up about as bad as a general can. Patton is pretty heavily overblown too. War stories are like fish stories, the enemy is always larger, the battles harder fought, the leaders had to make harder choices with fewer resources.

[–]bolanrox 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

Best summaries of Custer I have seen:

"He was reckless, flashy, brave, and a colorful leader of his unit of Union Troops. He made quite a name for himself during the Civil War...."

"At the time, most Americans thought of him as a hero... but he was, by all accounts, a vainglorious opportunist, who happened to be audacious and brave in battle, although often at the expense of his men. "

Source

Edit he also graduated last of his class of 34 at West Point, and was nearly expelled every year for his number of demerits.

[–]TheWillbilly9 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

I have never heard anyone call Custer a hero.... I think johnny Cash just mentioned that because the rhyme worked

[–]bug-hunter 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Clearly, you should have asked Custer. From all accounts, he may well have told you.

[–]soapdealer 8ポイント9ポイント  (2子コメント)

Unfortunately, I'd attribute a high degree of the contemporary popularity of both to the fact that they're a way for modern-day sympathizers of of the Confederates and Germans to express that without publicly endorsing the indefensible ideology these men's armies stood for. Because both were professional soldiers who held moderate political views, they can be admired for their prowess and skill without making one look like a Nazi or white supremacist, which leads some to exaggerate their importance or accomplishments.

Not coincidentally, reverence for Jackson is a pillar of the discredited "Lost Cause" interpretation of the US civil war.

[–]panzerkampfwagen 9ポイント10ポイント  (1子コメント)

Rommel, while not a Nazi in the sense that he held membership to the NSDAP, greatly admired Hitler. He strongly agreed with the policies of the Nazis. He was, without much doubt, a racist and a supporter of Germans being the master race. He just wasn't willing to murder people over it.

[–]soapdealer 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

Totally. Unfortunately, by the standards of Nazi Germany, refusing to mass-murder civilians qualifies him as a "moderate."

[–]finitedesign 7ポイント8ポイント  (8子コメント)

From what I have read on this thread so far, it seems that people have a tendency to think of Rommel as romanticized and Jackson as appropriately revered.

I am going to take the devils advocate approach here. Because I personally think that Jackson is at least equally over romanticized, if not more in the US.

On the onset of The American Civil War, Jackson was a fighter up against a Union leadership bench mostly populated with bureaucrats who were not prepared for a total war. Keep in mind, a victory for the Confederacy during The Civil War was gaining Union recognition as an independent nation (it is really only called the Civil War because the south lost, if they won it would probably be called The Confederate Revolutionary War.) On the other side of that same coin, a victory as viewed by early union military leadership was anything resulting in restoration of the union, which many of them thought was inevitable (it was), at minimal cost of union lives.

However as a result of this attitude by Union military leadership, Jackson distinguishes himself as a fearless brawler and proficient tactician. What I mean by this is, textbook wise, Jackson was probably no more brilliant than any of his northern opponents. He simply enforced meticulous discipline (which is the sound choice if you want to win at ANYTHING) chose sound tactics for the weaponry available, and did not change them in the face of carnage, even to the point of blatant disregard for the well being of his men.

To illustrate the point:

In April 1862 Confederate congress approved pikes for 20 brigades be made for deployment in battle. To his credit, he had the foresight to know early on that if you weren't comfortable with bayonet combat you were going to have a bad time, but to his detriment, almost every celebrated officer also figured this out.

Upon surveying the dead at Antietam, a battle at which confederate forces lost over a quarter of their men, Jackson said, "God has been very kind to us this day." I am not trying to take this out of context, but illustrate that he probably believed that if they fought hard enough The Confederacy would gain its independence, or at least, autonomy and slavery rights. In addition to being hip to the idea of bayonet tactics early, he also conceptualized and even forced reluctant northern generals into a total war early. He knew they didn't want that, and hoped it would demoralize them into giving up. This tactic ended up backfiring and costing the South very dearly later in the war.

I mean just look up a page of quotes from the guy, he said crazy things, like when you go to war take out your sword and throw away the scabbard (paraphrased). Clearly he thought that the fierceness would win the war for the South. Which would be brilliant, except that it would only win them escalation to total war that would take decades to recover from.

These tactics were great, until the North found itself some leaders who were comfortable with the same tactics, which while commendable were not spectacularly complicated. My argument is that even if Jackson had not died in 1863, he would have still been beaten by Grant, Sherman and generally overwhelming Northern advantages.

Edit: I realize that I am oversimplifying by calling these tactics, and there were a whole host of tactics that a commander needed to know to wage successful battle, for which Jackson was also proficient, again, I contest that while he knew these and could execute, what made him superior at first was he lengths at which he was willing to go with them to outmatch unenthusiastic adversaries.

Jackson died in 1863. The Northern drunks (Grant and Sherman) didn't come to substantial power until around or after his death, and I think it wouldn't have taken long for Jackson to be defeated.

He is over romanticized for being on the losing team, being a larger than life figure in discipline and speech, and for perishing before he had a chance to be truly defeated.

tl;dr He gets Kurt Cobain love from historians for being an average commander pulling out early wins against northern bureaucrats who were not ready to stomach total war.

[–]samuelbt 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

The Antietam quote is taken grossly out of context. He wasn't talking about how great the loss of life was or commenting on fierceness. Instead he was talking about how the Union didn't crush the Confederate army that day. The union had a 2 to 1 advantage and knew the Confederate plans before battle. Had McClellan shown the slightest bit of aggressiveness and deployed his reserves the Confederate army would have been annihilated. Thomas Jackson knew this and being the religious man he was, attributed the army's survival to God's mercy.

While I would agree that TJ sometimes does get too much credit, he was a very competent general and his aggressive attacking wasn't just the wild swings of a mad man. His initial reputation was gained at Bull Run where he excelled on the defense (nickname is somewhat ironic as he had such an aggressive career.) His Shenandoah campaign was won not on by battlefield tactics but by masterful campaign strategy. In the 48 days of his campaign, his men marched 646 miles, fought several major battles and defeated/tied up about three times their number. While very aggressive, he won because he was constantly in a better position. I could go on, but he wasn't simply just so aggressive that the union couldn't handle him.

Also what do you mean by Jackson conceptualizing total war? I don't have any memory of him going after civilian targets and production.

[–]finitedesign -2ポイント-1ポイント  (1子コメント)

Well now, grossly out of context? Mea Culpa brother, but don't blame me... blame Shelby Foote.

But in the end we are saying the same thing. Meaning, if your claim is true:

Had McClellan shown the slightest bit of aggressiveness and

deployed his reserves the Confederate army would have been

annihilated. Thomas Jackson knew this and being the religious man he

was, attributed the army's survival to God's mercy.

That still makes Jackson a bad general. If Jesus had to save you in a fight where you were certain to lose, and Jackson was willing to sacrifice all of his men in that battle, and was razor close to actually doing so, that makes him an idiot. He should not have been thanking God, he should have thanked McClellan's weak backbone.

"Thank God my opponents are incompetent, or else I would look really stupid," Does not make a great general. I can just picture him in his head thinking, 'no big deal; it is not like we have a significant limited resource problem.'

Riddle me this, if Lee had been in McClellan's place (as Lincoln had asked), and Jackson in Lee's place, how long do you think the Confederacy would have fared? Be honest? Not long at all. Jackson wasn't great, he was just outside of the weight class of early northern commanders. This would ware off as leadership in the north adapted for victory.

In any case, what I mean by Jackson conceptualizing total war is exactly what I said. March men fast and fight them hard, harder than your opponent. Resupply off the land if need be, keep the campaign going, take the textbook tactical position and don't give it up because of carnage. These were not paradigms shared by most sane people at the time, no less wimpy northern command.

15+ miles a day is impressive, but keep in mind that Sherman's march to the sea was 10+ miles a day, and they had less resupply and reeked far more destruction. The lesson learned from Jackson and subsequent Southern leaders was: these people are willing to sacrifice a irresponsibly large amount... oblige them quickly.

Jackson isn't total war. Jackson is escalation. McClellan was a tiptoe general, if the southerners had been the same, the war would not have been near as costly. But the end result probably would have been the same.

To address a lower comment, Jackson at Gettysburg means a Confederate independence? Doubtful, just because the Northern victory would not have been as crushing, doesn't mean that the anaconda plan would not have still resulted in ultimate surrender.

tl;dr If northern generals were not so bashful Jackson probably would have died well before '63.

[–]samuelbt 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

That still makes Jackson a bad general. If Jesus had to save you in a fight where you were certain to lose, and Jackson was willing to sacrifice all of his men in that battle, and was razor close to actually doing so, that makes him an idiot. He should not have been thanking God, he should have thanked McClellan's weak backbone.

Lee was the one who made the call to make battle, TJ was just following orders. They had a good defensive position and despite being outnumbered two to one (And even though McClellan didn't send everything he still sent enough to grossly outnumber) were able to force what was functionally a tactical draw. TJ's performance in that battle was a staunch defense filled with both resilience in taking attacks and even devastating counterattacks. While McClellan was a poor general, the general he was mainly fighting was Joe Hooker who gets a bad rap for Chancellorsville but overall was a fairly decent commander, especially on the attack.

Riddle me this, if Lee had been in McClellan's place (as Lincoln had asked), and Jackson in Lee's place, how long do you think the Confederacy would have fared? Be honest? Not long at all. Jackson wasn't great, he was just outside of the weight class of early northern commanders. This would ware off as leadership in the north adapted for victory.

Poorly. But that speaks far more to the talent of Lee. TJ was a fantastic Corps commander and he complimented Lee very well as the two understood each other. Lee would simply give TJ the grand idea for the battle and TJ easily understood the importance. (This later came to bite Lee in the rear when at Gettysburg he told Ewell, TJs replacement, to cahrge a position "if practicable." Ewell didn't which may have lost battle.) Jackson had a tactical mind that as you implied definitely outshined the Union generals ranging from the blustering McClellan to "Fighting" Joe Hooker. However, surely at some point when you are consistently winning against highly unfavorable odds you can be called a great general.

In any case, what I mean by Jackson conceptualizing total war is exactly what I said. March men fast and fight them hard, harder than your opponent. Resupply off the land if need be, keep the campaign going, take the textbook tactical position and don't give it up because of carnage. These were not paradigms shared by most sane people at the time, no less wimpy northern command.

Total war is the concept that in war there is no real distinction between attacking combatants or civilians. Sheridan burning the Shenandoah valley as it was a major food source for the South or Sherman dismantling and destroying the (relatively) industrial Georgia would be examples. Total war is not simply taking from a farm so that your men can eat, it is taking from a farm so that your enemy can't eat. I am not aware of TJ promoting or leading to this.

15+ miles a day is impressive, but keep in mind that Sherman's march to the sea was 10+ miles a day, and they had less resupply and reeked far more destruction. The lesson learned from Jackson and subsequent Southern leaders was: these people are willing to sacrifice a irresponsibly large amount... oblige them quickly.

Apples and helicopters. TJ was defending the Shenandoah valley, he wasn't destroying it. That would come later when Sheridan rolled in. The Valley campaign. Stonewall had 17,000 men with which he fought six battles against three Union armies totaling 52,000. Sherman on the other hand 62,000 men whereas the Confederates never raised more than 13,000 many of whom were militia. They were also fighting on vastly different terrain. How are the two comparable?

To address a lower comment, Jackson at Gettysburg means a Confederate independence? Doubtful, just because the Northern victory would not have been as crushing, doesn't mean that the anaconda plan would not have still resulted in ultimate surrender.

True, by Gettysburg the only thing that could have saved the CSA would have been a decisive win at Gettysburg and a prayer that the Union will would break

[–]toastymow 1ポイント2ポイント  (4子コメント)

I've always been told that if Jackson had been alive for Gettsyburg, the North would have lost that battle and that would have likely allowed the South to negotiate acceptable terms for independence. But you do make an interesting point.

[–]samuelbt 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

A little here and a little there, depends on what day he would have arrived. Had he been in command of his old troops who arrived on the first day then there very well may not have been a battle of Gettysburg as his old corps was the first on the scene and TJ probably would have charged Buford far more aggressively, probably taken the high ground, which probably would have deterred the Union from making battle there. Note the large amounts of "probably's" as this is speculative and a little insulting to the resilience of Buford's cavalry.

Had there not been an initial breakthrough the rest would be some conjecture based on where he was placed. Lee was trying to emulate Jackson and he fought quite aggressively that day, much to the consternation of Longstreet. Whether TJ would have been better than Lee is very speculative. However, I don't think there would have been too much different though I do think TJ would not have ordered that final charge.

[–]bolanrox 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

Would that be going back to the "..if convenient" part of Lee's order?

[–]toastymow 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

I suppose. In general Lee was rather vague with his orders, I understand, and while this was okay for Jackson, who had a tendency to do what Lee wanted without being told, for Longstreet it meant he gave up on Pickett's Charge "too early."

[–]bug-hunter 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Anything short of a crushing victory at Gettysburg would not have changed the South's underlying problem of having largely lost the West, a shattered economy, and massive supply and manpower shortages.

Lee's genius in the East was offset greatly by incompetence in the West.