It’s back! The Human Biodiversity Resource Takedown, Part 3

Prologue

10 months ago I posted a series of posts on a resource found on /r/coontown. The resource is a giant collection of sources to “aid those interested in human biodiversity” called the Human Biodiversity Resource (HBDR). Unfortunately, various complications prevented me from completing this at the time, not least of all the immensity and lack of organization of the section entitled “HBDR general” which I intended to tackle third. As such, for this post I will take on the section entitled “On the Biological Reality of Race.”

Part one

Part two & part 2.5

Now, some people may think that this is unnecessary. /r/Coontown is dead, and the Reddit right wing is more focused on the foolhardy musings of Donald Trump than on the biological reality of race. That being said, Reddit is still one of the largest recruitment grounds for groups like Stormfront, and there is still a vocal contingent of openly racist redditors participating in a variety of subs. As well as this, I haven’t been sleeping well lately and I like to practice my writing when I am awake late so I figured I would return to something I always intended to finish.

This write-up is a learning process, and I will be experimenting with a variety of formats. My first post was, at times, overly dismissive and rather than engage with the content of the sources it criticised the nature of the sources; whether they were academic, who wrote them, where they were published. While I will still examine the nature of the sources I will endeavour to analyse the content more, particularly for the larger sources (read: books).

I am also not yet sure on the best formatting for writing a post like this for Reddit. There are various challenges unique to this project. The nature of the HBDR, the medium of Reddit, and the difference this post has to other bad-x posts all mean that I am continuously learning while I write this. As such, I will be trailing different formats throughout these posts. Part 3 will be split into multiple posts. This first post will be a fairly in-depth review of Race, 1974, by John R. Baker, following that I will write shorter posts on each of the subsequent full books in this section. Following this will be another in-depth post, looking at the smaller texts of the section. I may also include a final post for part 3 which will be an overview of my criticisms from the first three posts, although this will depend on how long this part takes and on my other commitments. I make no promises to the regularity of these posts (although I hope there will be no more 10 month gaps). I am currently studying towards my masters, working an internship, as well as several voluntary commitments for a variety of projects, and then I have a social life on top of all that. For this reason, I would like to invite anybody who would like to help to PM me.

The HBDR takedown, Part 3.1

Race, by John R. Baker attempts to take a taxonomic, zoological approach to discern whether or not “there is reality behind the idea of race” (Baker, 1974, 4). Baker defines race as roughly synonymous with subspecies, and further differentiates human populations into “ethnic taxon” which can be considered sub-subspecies (Baker, 1974, 4). Baker declares that categories of race and ethnic taxon represent “a truth about the natural world.” (Baker, 1974, 5). The major criticism of this book is that it makes highly selective use of evidence, omitting not only bare-bones facts, but also entire academic disciplines and theories when they do not suit Baker’s narrative. The first half of this post will discuss the academic response to Baker’s book, and the next half will examine the first part of the book to give a more in-depth analysis of the ways in which Baker omits evidence which does not fit his narrative.

Baker’s conclusions could be considered ad-hoc. He uses a taxonomic approach to discern whether or not there is a real taxonomy of humans. Michael Banton shares my concerns, noting that “Baker assumes the importance of morphology and then investigates the ability of races to form civilizations” (Banton, 1974, 515). This is not a totally insuperable criticism for Baker, and he does seem to anticipate and respond to it in his introduction, noting that there is a coherence to his taxonomy while random alterations to it “produce nonsense” (Baker, 1974, 6). I mention this, however, because I believe that this is the major problem with most race-realist literature and is something I will mention again in this post.

In his review of the book James C. King calls Race the “notes and comments” of an “academic cytologist with a strong amateur interest in physical anthropology” (King, 1975, 383). Wolf Roder is less kind, calling the book an example of “the entry into the fray [of debates on the reality of race by] scholars expert in one field but of questionable competence in another” (Roder, 1975, 519). In contrast, Owen, calls the book a “specialist approach” recognising Baker’s nine earlier works on biological themes (Owen, 1974, 271). I am inclined to agree with King’s and Roder’s assessment, however, over Owen’s. An expert in cytology is not necessarily an expert in physical anthropology, despite the fact that both disciplines could be broadly described as ‘biology.’ Similarly, I would not call a petrologist’s book on palaeontology a ‘specialist’ approach, despite the fact that both petrology and palaeontology can both be broadly described as geology.

Interestingly, Baker acknowledges that no “two authorities” will likely be in agreement about taxonomic categories of humans, however, he does believe that the general truth that humans can be divided into taxa is still meaningful (Baker, 1974, 5). The inability of human-taxonomists to generate consensus is, however, not something Baker should be allowed to just dismiss. This lack of consensus reflects the potentially ad-hoc nature of all race-realist thought. The basic contention is that if you split humans into categories and then look for differences based on those categories you will find differences, regardless of their importance or relevance, and regardless of similar differences between populations within the same category. Multiple studies have reflected this.

Jonathan Kaplan argued that populations corresponding to Western racial taxonomies could be identified through allele frequencies, however, these differences are of no more significance than the differences between any two populations (e.g. the differences between allele frequencies of Spaniards and Arabs is the same as the differences in allele frequencies between Spaniards and Portuguese) (Kaplan 2011). This also reflects the findings of Weiss and Fullerton, who noted that if you split humans into three groups; Maori, Icelanders and Mayans then all other populations will be genetic admixtures of Maori, Icelanders and Mayans (Weiss & Fullerton 2005). In short, if you start with categories and try to explain how people fit into them, no matter the categories, you will always generate results.

Baker explicitly challenges a variety of views which either outright reject, or dispute the value of, taxonomies of race. He splits these into two categories; those which reject race as discrete categories and those which assert the primacy of environmental factors over genetic factors (Baker, 1974, 5). While his thesis is totally incompatible with at least the first of these two challenges Baker is careful to not totally, explicitly reject either of them. Instead he claims that racial classification provides us with a degree of truth necessary for understanding humanity. This is a common tactic of even the basest race-realists, who claim that environmental factors may play some role, but ultimately that role emerges after the influence of genetics.

King asserts that this discussion of opposing theories is at best cursory, if not mere lip-service; “the entire ethno-logical, cultural social anthropology of the last hundred years is completely ignored” (King, 1975, 382). While E. B. Tylor and Ruth Benedict are mentioned in the bibliography they are not referenced in the text at all, and Durkheim, Maine, Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown are not mentioned in the bibliography or within the text. Banton asserts that Baker never makes “any direct attack on the understanding of race made possible by studies in population genetics” (Banton, 1974, 515). This is indicative of one of the major problems of the text, which is that it relies on historic scholarship which was already rejected by 1974, without examining contemporary scholarship or adequately discussing why the rejection of historic scholarship was mistaken.

Tattersall notes that roughly two-thirds of the references are from before the twentieth century, and 90 percent come from before 1950 (Tattersall, 1977, 249). Tattersall criticizes Baker’s writing on Africa for ignoring both modern ethnology, and modern physical anthropology by academics such Broca and Topinard, instead relying on 19th Century “travellers” such as Speke, Livingston and Stanley (Tattersall, 1977, 249). Banton repeats this criticism almost verbatim, complaining that Baker “displays no understanding of social anthropology’s relevance to his theme, preferring to rely on Victorian explorers for his mish-mash of miscellaneous information on Africans” (Banton, 1974, 514). King criticizes Baker for displaying “consistently not the assumptions and myopia of our own time, but instead, those of a century ago” (King, 1975, 382).

It is not, however, all doom and gloom for Baker. Eysenck praises Baker for his engagement with the work of his contemporary, Arthur Jensen. Noting that while Baker commenced work on the book long before Jensen had published his work on race-based differences in intelligence, Baker “quotes Jensen at times” (Eysenck, 1974, 668). Moreover, Bertram, in stark contrast to other critics, praises Baker for his reliance on historical sources, claiming that historic thinkers were “less blinkered” than contemporary thinkers. Bertram also claims that the “environmentalism” of Baker’s opposing contemporaries within the English speaking world is not shared by their Russian contemporaries, although which Russian contemporaries he does not mention (Bertram, 1974, 468).

On the criticism of Baker’s bibliography, I tend to side with the more negatively critical Banton, King and Tattersall for three reasons. The first, and simplest, is that their criticism of Baker’s sources is more rigorous and in-depth than the more positive criticism of Bertram and Eysenck. For example, Tattersall and King both mention the thinkers who they think Baker should have included, but didn’t, while Bertram does not mention by name the Russian scholars who he claims agree with Baker. Secondly, it is problematic that of all Baker’s contemporaries mentioned throughout these reviews he completely omits those who disagree with him, and quotes the one who agrees with him. This one who he does quote, Jensen, also wrote the blurb for the book. When you have a small group of people who only engage with each, refuse to discuss their contemporary dissenters, and endorse each other, then this is usually indicative of pseudo-science. Banton is not quite so slanderous in his criticism, claiming that who is or isn’t included is “governed by personal whim and happenstance” (Banton, 1974, 514), rather than out-right pseudo-scientific collaboration masquerading as academic peer-review.

The most important decider of this, for me, comes from looking at the writers of the reviews, and the journals they were contained in. Banton is a social scientist who primarily publishes on racial and ethnic relations, King is a micro-biologist, and Tattersall is a paleoanthropologist who has worked extensively on human evolution. Eysenck was a notable scholar, and at his death was the most commonly cited psychologist in peer-reviewed literature, Bertram, on the other hand, was a zoologist whose work primarily focused on the Arctic and Antarctic. Given that it was their field of expertise Banton and Tattersall are more likely to be knowledgeable on the relevant literature in the topic covered in Race than either Eysenck or Bertram who had distinguished careers in tangentially related fields.

Moreover, the negative reviews appear in journals dedicated specificlly to Sociology, Evolution and Zoology, while the positive reviews are in journals dedicated to Geography, and Technology and Culture. The journals of the negative reviews seem more immediately relevant to the disciplinary traditions with which Race should engage. Although this is perhaps a little harsh on Eysenck, I think it gives us fair reason to dismiss Bertram’s review as appearing in an irrelevant journal, written by a scholar with no relevant expertise. As well as this, Banton’s, King’s and Tattersall’s reviews are all published in journals with significantly higher impact factors (1.6, 4.6, 7.8 respectively) than Eysenck’s review (0.2). In short, Bertram is hardly an expert in a relevant discipline and Eysenck published his review in an insignificant journal, while Banton, King and Tattersall have relevant expertise and published in more significant journals.

In conclusion, while this book was not universally derided by scholars, the scholars who praise it seem to have less relevant expertise than those who wrote negative reviews, and the positive reviews were published in less reputable journals than the negative reviews. The major problems identified by the negative reviews were; Baker’s lack of expertise in the subject, Baker’s omission of contemporary thinkers in favour of historic scholarship and Baker’s failure to engage with a variety of relevant academic disciplines. The final part of this post will cover the first part of the book, and specifically look at the way Baker omits evidence which contradicts his thesis is order to construct a narrative.

There are a few reasons I have decided to look at only the first section of the book. I decided to look at just one section due to time restraints and a desire to keep this post relatively short. I picked the first section because it is the most praised section of the book. King refers to it as a “mine of information” of both well-known figures, and more obscure writers (King, 1975, 382). In his conclusion King, who is highly critical of the rest of the book, considers the first section to be the contribution Baker made to the “problem of race” (King, 1972, 383). Eysenck is quite positive in his assessment of this section, calling it “entertaining and instructive” (Eysenck, 1974, 666).

Moreover, the major criticism of Race seems to be its selective use of overly historic sources. When your book is attempting to redefine the contemporary scientific debate such criticism is damning. By not engaging with your contemporaries properly nobody has any reason to think you understand the contemporary debate, and therefore, they have no reason to consider your idle musings relevant, much less convincing. However, for an historic survey it is not quite as much of a problem. I will show that, despite the praise of King and Eysenck, the first part of the book is still terrible. My criticism is anticipated by Banton, who called Baker’s historical writing “unsystematic and unsatisfactory” (Banton, 1874, 514). Basically, the criticisms from the reviews do enough, in my opinion, to force us to be highly sceptical about whatever Baker has to say in the three parts which constitute his scientific scholarship, however, I think more needs to be done to address the problems of the first part.

The first part of the book is called “The Historic Background” and concerns itself with the “thoughts of man” not their actions (Baker, 1974, 9). This is not an analytic or critical analysis, rather it is a survey of different attitudes people have held towards morphological and behavioural differences between populations. The first chapter deals with the attitudes of people from Neanderthals to the eighteenth century. Baker notes that, due to the width of the period examined in this chapter, and the lack of sources available on some parts of its time frame, the chapter can hardly be comprehensive (Baker, 1974, 9). It would be nice, however, if at tried to incomprehensively present both sides of the debate rather than merely incomprehensively presenting one side.

It is important to note that Baker seems to believe that there are two competing theories on the nature and origin or racial difference; the environmentalist view, and the hereditary/genetic view. Baker himself endorses the second option. In this chapter he even goes so far as to call the 1691 theory of Ludolfus regarding differences in skin colour “clear recognition of genetic differences between ethnic taxa” (Baker, 1974, 16). This is despite the fact that Ludolfus was writing over a century before Charles Darwin or Gregor Mendel develop the theories which would birthed genetics.

Baker completely skips out the Roman and Greek views on morphological and behavioural difference between populations. It is odd that he would not include the views of groups which created large, multi-cultural empires. Some Greeks, including Hippocrates and Aristotle, held that environment was key to population differences. Aristotle, for example, relates perceived deficiencies in skill and intelligence among Northern Europeans to the cold places they inhabit (Aristotle, Politics, Book 7 Section 1327b). On the other hand, Roman emperor Julian the Apostate provides us with a view which does not quite fit into the nature v nurture debate, claiming population differences are a result of Divine Providence. Interestingly, Baker also fails to discuss one of the major theories of race from the medieval period, which is the view that races are determined by Aristotelian essences. This view is a precursor to the genetic account of race, as it presents race as a result of inherent qualities within a person (James, 2016).

Baker does include the views first expressed in the Talmud, that the descendents of Noah formed three peoples; Semetic, Hamitic and Japhetic. Such a view falls under the hereditary category, given its descent aspect. Baker does not, however, discuss the work of Islamic scholars, such as Al-Jahiz, or Ibn Khaldun, who endorsed environmentalist views. The omission of Ibn Khaldun is particularly notable given that he was explicitly responding to the explanation of population differences as expressed by the Talmud.

Another interesting omission from this chapter (and the next) is John Ray. John Ray is considered to be the first person to develop a definition of species, and while this is mentioned later in the book it is only done in relation to Blumenbach, and is not discussed at length (Baker, 1974, 73). Ray, along with Bernard Varen, also developed a classification system for groups of humans based on mostly physical characteristics (Smedley, 2007, 168). This is not mentioned at all. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find this classification table in the original so I cannot know if Ray and Varden offered opinions as to why these differences existed or if they merely created categories.

The final part of the chapter concerns itself with the views of early modern European thinkers on race. Again, those thinkers who endorsed views compatible with Baker’s are favoured. Eysenck praises Baker’s treatments of these thinkers, with a view that their beliefs on race have been hidden from history, due to the eminence derived from their other beliefs (Eysenck, 1974, 666-667). This comes across as an argument from authority. Baker is (admittedly, implicitly) claiming that these foundational European thinkers endorsed views of racial superiority or genetic-based race realism in order to make his views more palatable. Their views emerged before the modern discourse on race, however, and so there is no reason we should accept their opinions on this topic as valid today. They were all, for example, writing before anthropology or sociology had been develop as disciplines.

Baker completely omits environmentalist views from this chapter. He also presents historic hereditary views on race in manipulative, highly rhetorical, fallacious ways. I would not recommend this chapter to anyone wanting to understand the history of beliefs about race. There are much better sources for this (such as the SEP article on race), which are more comprehensive and less verbose.

The next chapter is called ‘Blumenbach and his Contemporaries’ and details the history of thought on race in the eighteenth century, stressing the fact that these thinkers writing before the theory of evolution by means of natural selection had been developed. Blumenbach is the central figure, which makes sense given that his classification of humans into seven types became the standard categories of human diversity for a substantial period of time.

Baker stresses the fact that Blumenbach was attempting to show the “unity of man and to correct the common belief in the marked inferiority of other races” (Baker, 1974, 6). This seems like something of a rhetorical trick, a way of announcing that even someone looking to study the similarities of races cannot ignore their differences, and that acknowledgement of those differences does not mean an argument toward inferiority. This is a trick because once you get out of the first section Baker does in fact make an argument towards inferiority. Moreover, the contemporary argument against race-realism is not an attempt to describe the “unity of man”, rather it generally claims that environment is the cause of such difference, or that differences between races are not meaningful.

Some of the praise Baker gives to thinkers seems slightly strange; for example, he declares of Sommerring, a theoritican who wrote extensively on the inferiority of black people to white people, that “whatever mistakes he may have made in points of detail through lack of adequate anatomical material, he was guided solely by desire to establish the truth (Baker, 1974, 27).” This is typical of race-realist literature, and reflected in the HBDR which heads itself with the George Orwell quote "In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act." The point the race-realist is making is that they are just seeking the truth, and criticisms of their work for racism are not fair, because their search for the truth comes before any biases or belies they held before the study.

I believe that criticism of this rhetorical technique is justified, particularly given Bertram’s comments about the value of Victorian traveller’s views on African as people free of the “blinkers” of contemporary society (Bertram,1974, 468). This book is written within a wider ideological debate. It is characteristic of one side of this debate, the side Baker is on, to use their ‘search for the truth’ to deflect ideological criticism. If their research is riddled with mistakes, as Sommerring’s was, and just so happens to reflect the biases they held before the research, then their search or the truth is perhaps not as legitimate as their ideological allies may claim.

He also praises Peter Camper for providing the starting point for craniology (Baker, 1974, 28). Baker may be forgiven for this praise, the debate on the integrity of the findings of history’s most prominent craniologist Samuel Morton did not begin until 1981. Whatever your opinion on the outcome of this debate it is clear craniology is not nearly as popular today as it was in the nineteenth century, mostly only being used by race-realists now. The most major recent work utilizing craniology came out in 1995: J Phillipe Rushton’s Race, Evolution and Behaviour.

Rushton splits race into three groups, and argues that skull sizes for “’Mongoloid’ samples averaged 1,451 cm^{3…Caucasoid} samples averaged 1,421 cm^3…and Negorid samples averaged 1,295cm^3” (Rushton, 1995, 119). Rushton’s study, of course, came after Race, so there is no way Baker could have known about it, however, it is clear from the criticisms of Rushton’s book, as well as claims by other post-Race academics who have made use of craniology, that the method suffers from similar issues as other methods used to justify race-realism.

Cranial capacity and intelligence only have a correlation coefficient of 0.18, too low to support the link between head size and intelligence. Moreover, Rushton was criticized for including grouping people from a single continent together, regardless of the climate they live in. People who live in hotter climates often have slightly smaller cranial capacities than those from colder climates (Cernovsky, 1997). In fact, an earlier Rushton study showed that North American ‘blacks’ have similar cranial capacities as North American ‘whites’ from similar climate zones (Rushton, 1990), yet this information is curiously omitted from Rushton’s latter book. Finally, Beale et all. discovered, in a study of 20,000 skulls, found the same pattern of cranial capacities as Rushton, however, Beale advises against using cranial capacity as indicative of racial traits “If one merely lists such means by geographical region or race, causes of similarity by genogroup and ecotype are hopelessly confounded” and that for anything meaningful results to emerge from craniology environment needs to be controlled for (Beale, 1984, 306).

The reason I include such a thorough dismissal of such a minor aspect of the chapter is because craniology is a pseudo-science; Cernovsky calls it an “incompetent methodology” (Cernovsky, 1997). Even the most contemporary uses of craniology have been shown to be deficient and psueo-scientific. Baker is prepared to include, and even praise those, who engage in pseudo-science when their conclusions agree with his. He does not include people utilizing more rigorous, better defended methodologies when their conclusions disagree with him. Baker himself engages in this “incompetent methodology” in the final part of his book, when discussing the superiority or inferiority of certain ‘taxa’ (Baker, 1974, 429). If this does not show that Baker’s conclusions are ad-hoc, and his selection of evidence driven by bias, then I do not know what will.

After his discussions of other Craniologists Baker turns to the excitement the anthropoid apes brought to eighteenth century thinkers. There was a possibly considered by these thinkers that these apes were men. He notes the conclusion of these thinkers was to maintain the separation of the species and man, however, he does not remark at all about what these debates meant for contemporary thinkers, or why he included this debate.

The second chapter continues the problems of the first. Rather than focus on what it excludes as I did in the first chapter, I have decided to problematize what it includes. This shows that it is not merely a case of Baker not knowing, or missing out, on contrarian research. If he is prepared to not only include, but praise, people using thoroughly rejected methodologies when they agree with him, while omitting everyone who disagrees with him, then the bias with which Race was written becomes palpable.

The third chapter is entitled ‘From Gobineau to Houston Chamberlain’ and deals specifically with theories that “favoured a belief in the inequality of ethnic taxa.” This is due to the prevalence of beliefs in racial equality among Baker’s contemporaries. Baker believes the belief in equality emerged from the actions of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. This chapter begins with Gobineau as it is believed that Hitler’s beliefs began with his Gobineau’s work (Baker, 1974, 33).

Gobineau’s work seems extremely germane to the modern discourse of race, in light of the rhetoric of certain Europeans and a particular American presidential candidate, regarding the current migrant crisis. Gobineau wanted to discover why great civilizations collapsed, and turned to racial differences to explain this. His argument was that superior civilizations would begin empires, and eventually members of inferior races would come to live within it. The hybridization of races was what caused a civilization to decline. Gobineau is clearly an influence on Baker, who later in the book tries to evaluate races based on their ability to form great civilizations (Baker, 1974, 506). In fact, Baker refers to one of Gobineau’s books as being the most important book entioned in the theird and fourth chapters (Baker, 1974, 59). What Baker does not include is the aristocratic Gobineau’s views on social class, in which he argued for the genetic superiority of the aristocratic classes who had more Aryan blood than the race mixed commoners.

Given that he is writing a survey Baker doesn’t need to counter this assertion himself, although it would be nice if he included the views of those who have challenge his thought. Instead, Baker repeats a common view of the alt-right. That the belief in racial equality is a response to the atrocities of the holocaust, and not a response to scientific evidence (Baker, 1974, 33). Rather than even look for academic, peer reviewed assessments of one of his major influences, Baker basically asserts that the falling out of fashion of race-realist views is due to feels, but he does not even try to find the reals. This view goes in tandem with the legitimization of race realist theories through the “search for truth” justification. The idea is that the holocaust was so insidious that the beliefs which motivated need to be rejected out of hand, regardless of their truth, because of their potential consequences

At this point, what strikes me is how little race-realist views change. Even in a several-hundred-page book, with an almost encyclopaedic bibliography, Baker is making claims which would not be out of place in a Reddit post, particularly those on /r/coontown or /r/European. He has the same intentional ignorance, and refusal to actually engage with literature which criticizes his views. Not only do his views mirror those of 18th and 19th century thinkers, but his views are mimicked by racists today. If it wasn’t true when Gobineau wrote it, and it wasn’t true when Baker wrote it, then why do they think it is true when they write it on a Reddit post? Likely because they live in an isolated bubble, where they avoid any dissent with head-in-the-sand, intentional ignorance.

He also discusses the work of Charles-Henri-Georges Pouchet. Pouchet argued that there was no fundamental difference between humans and apes, and stressed the differences in intellectual capabilities between different groups of humans, claiming the “Negro…clearly inferior to others in intellectual attainments.” Once again Baker takes care to note that Pouchet “pleaded objective study of [the problem of race]” and held a strong belief that “humanitarian motives” were supressing this objective study (Baker, 1874, 38).

The next part of the chapter deals with the debate of polygenists against monogenists. Polygenists believed that the races had separate origins, while monogenists believed that they had a single origin. He specifically points out that the polygenist view was not entirely defeated by Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, as multiple human groups could have arisen due to convergent evolution, although he does not explain how it is that human groups could produce children (Baker, 1974, 39). When discussing the difference between humans and other primates earlier in the chapter he also fails to mention the inability of humans and other primates to produce fertile offspring. This provides legitimacy to historic views which are not taken seriously in modern academia.

The chapter then examines the effect On the Origin of Species had on the discourse surrounding race, with particular attention given to Francis Galton. He describes Galton as a genius, because of his contributions to meteorology and genetics, his work as an explorer and his role as the “founder of eugenics.” He attributes Galton’s work to his time as an explorer in Africa, claiming that his view toward their inferiority was not “inhibited by any egalitarian feelings” (Baker, 1974, 40). This is Baker’s response to the predicted criticism of his preference for Victorian thinkers over contemporary physical anthropologists, as eventually articulated by Banton and King. He attributes the major disciplinary change to politics, rather than the failings of racial theory.

Baker seem to think that the political nature of a theory does not give us reason to reject it. There are various epistemologies I could invoke to counter this, but the one I will use is instrumentalism, which holds that scientific theories are merely “instruments for prediction of observable phenomena.” Essentially, if all scientific theories are instruments then we must evaluate them as instruments, which involves establishing what they are instruments for. If somebody asks you “Is this hammer good?” the response requires you to consider what a hammer is used for, and working out if the hammer in questions can effectively do it. When investigating scientific theories, we must work out what the predictive power of these theories is useful for before evaluating whether or not it can effectively make accurate predictions. If the theory is only useful for things that we do not want to do, then we have reason to reject it. This is only one of many reasons why the political nature of a theory can give us reason to reject it, and I do not actually endorse unrestricted instrumentalism, merely I hold that it provides a useful framework for explaining this particular argument.

The final three thinkers discussed in the chapter are Nietzsche, Lapouge and Houston. Nietzsche and Lapouge are included because of the Nazi fascination of them, although Baker does well to acknowledge the ways in which the Nazis misunderstood Nietzsche’s work (Baker, 1974, 46). He is very praiseworthy of Lapouge, despite his acknowledgement that Lapouge used his theories of race to justify anti-Semitism and slavery (Baker, 1974, 48). This is congenial to the previously mentioned perception race-realists; that their work is rejected due to social, rather than scientific factors, today expressed as “feels over reals.”

The work of Chamberlain is included because of its focus on German superiority over other European groups, and its anti-Semitism (Baker, 1974, 50). Part of what Baker is trying to do is go back to before the Nazis, and try and salvage all of the pre-Nazi race-realist thought. Reflective of his belief that the atrocities of the Nazis caused an emotional rejection of race-realism which is the proper, scientific view to hold. The final chapter focuses on the middle of the twentieth century; ‘From Kossinna to Hitler.’