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"With the hand (Montgomery) was dealt in North Africa it would have been very hard for him to lose, yet he came close to doing so." (self.badhistory)

KebabMaster が 投稿

https://np.reddit.com/r/todayilearned/comments/2maiuo/til_field_marshall_montgomery_once_made_a_bet/cm336z6

I think it's absurd to imply that Montgomery was handed an army in North Africa that was capable of beating back the German and Italian forced. Morale was down massively, the equipment of the army was severely lacking and they had just barely staved off an attack by Rommel where they suffered heavy casualties. Montgomery wasn't just appointed randomly when everything was going well, it was clear that a change was needed.

Montgomery introduced new training methods and placed great emphasis on training physically and his own appearance, adopting a common tank beret, meeting with his soldiers, and making frequent speeches; reviving British morale. Montgomery then meticulously re-supplied his troops, fixing the equipment disparity. For example the British army started the first battle of El Alamein (their last battle without Montgomery) with 179 tanks. It started the second battle (When Montgomery took over) with 1,029 tanks. Montgomery even defied direct orders from Churchill which insisted he should attack, waiting until he felt his troops had what they needed.

Then facing down a heavily entrenched German army with superior equipment, commanded by Rommel; having to navigate through an extensive minefield Montgomery handed Britain their first decisive victory over Germany (arguably the first decisive defeat Germany suffered in the war) all while suffering less casualties and coming close to destroying Rommel's entire army until a sand-storm prevented him from pursuing Rommel.

I know Montgomery is a rather unpopular figure. He was very slow and meticulous with his approach to battles, trying his utmost to minimise casualties after what he saw on the Western Front. This leads to battles which on paper don't seem very impressive as he only attacked when he had a clear advantage. He also had a very annoying personality, rubbing US generals the wrong way, particularly after taking credit for the battle of the bulge and guess who made war movies? But anyway I think it's astonishing how incompetent some people believe Montgomery was.

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[–]math792dThe Emperor would have won if only Creed were in charge 184ポイント185ポイント  (30子コメント)

This post has been submitted to the mods for blatant heresy against Saint Rommel. PRAISE BE.

[–]NickTM 83ポイント84ポイント  (3子コメント)

Excuse me sir, but do you have time to talk about our saviour Erwin? He was a good nazi, doncherknow.

[–]throwthetrash15 3ポイント4ポイント  (2子コメント)

He wasn't a nazi.

[–]InkshooterRussia OP, pls nerf 19ポイント20ポイント  (1子コメント)

He was very much a Nazi. Maybe he wasn't as bad as the other Nazis, and maybe given I'd choose him if given a choice between him and most other Nazis for who I'd rather stay with in a cabin in the Austrian Alps for a winter, but he was still a fucking Nazi.

[–]throwthetrash15 11ポイント12ポイント  (0子コメント)

He was very much a Nazi.

He was never a member of the Nazi party. He actively disobeyed Hitler's orders to kill Jews and captured soldiers, and even forced his soldiers to let commandos live, a rare thing. He paid all the workers he could in France despite orders to use slave labor. He was one of the co-conspirators in an attempt on Hitler's life.

Contrast this with an actual Nazi, Sepp Dietrich. This man was a member of the Nazi party and the SS, killed numerous people in the Night of the Long Knives, personally ordered and killed captured Allied soldiers and commandos. His membership of the SS means he probably knew of the atrocities against the Jews, and yet did nothing. And you want to put Rommel in the same camp as him?

Maybe he wasn't as bad as the other Nazis, and maybe given I'd choose him if given a choice between him and most other Nazis for who I'd rather stay with in a cabin in the Austrian Alps for a winter, but he was still a fucking Nazi.

That's like saying you'd rather live with a friend than a serial rapist, and then called your friend a serial rapist for no reason.

[–]Illogical_BloxChe Guavara was Socialist Jesus 24ポイント25ポイント  (25子コメント)

How good WAS Rommel as a leader?

[–]math792dThe Emperor would have won if only Creed were in charge 57ポイント58ポイント  (21子コメント)

I have no idea, just that him getting blown out of proportion is a running joke on the sub.

He was apparently really bad at logistics which tells me he wasn't that good at his job.

[–]PlayMp1The Horus Heresy was an inside job 72ポイント73ポイント  (3子コメント)

He was really good at tactics, not a good general, basically.

I think I heard something about him being the best colonel ever to lead an army corps or something like that.

[–]Naugrith 30ポイント31ポイント  (1子コメント)

Perhaps he was a victim of the Peter Principle which states that people in an organisation generally rise to the level of their incompetence. Rommel was good enough to be promoted to the top, but not good enough to do anything useful once he got there.

[–]saratogacv60 16ポイント17ポイント  (0子コメント)

Being a general and being a battlefield commander are two very different jobs. He was promoted very quickly and didn't have much time to become a great general.

[–]Sansa_Culotte_ 45ポイント46ポイント  (1子コメント)

He was apparently really bad at logistics which tells me he wasn't that good at his job.

To be fair, "really bad at logistics" accurately describes a fairly large portion of the Wehrmacht's top officers.

[–]CamNewtonJr 9ポイント10ポイント  (0子コメント)

I was literally about to post this lol

[–]concussedYmir 14ポイント15ポイント  (1子コメント)

Erwin always struck me as a man promoted out of superb competence.

[–]MDFificationMisanthropologist 15ポイント16ポイント  (0子コメント)

To think someone of his calibre was chosen to lead the Survey Corps...

[–]Nimonic 11ポイント12ポイント  (11子コメント)

He was apparently really bad at logistics which tells me he wasn't that good at his job.

I suspect this is /r/badhistory in itself, but I'm not an expert.

We do have a tendency of jerking in the other direction whenever we get assaulted by idiocy.

[–]Flaming_RejectionThe Assassination of Freedom by the Coward Abe Lincoln 14ポイント15ポイント  (10子コメント)

I wish I had some sources but apparently he had a very bad habit of moving faster than his supply lines could handle.

[–]Grubnar 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

To be fair, his biggest problems with logistics was that he had a German army, in North-Africa, while the British controlled the Mediterranean Sea.

[–]Sansa_Culotte_ 19ポイント20ポイント  (1子コメント)

Let's see...

  • He attacked the enemy in disregard of explicit orders to maintain a defensive position

  • He ventured so far that he outran his own supply lines

  • Ultimately, his camaign was futile, if not counterproductive to the overall Axis strategy in North Africa

[–]Illogical_BloxChe Guavara was Socialist Jesus 10ポイント11ポイント  (0子コメント)

I've read that he was a fine officer, and great at keeping morale up, but ultimately overpromoted.

[–]F-ingFranzBelgium was dressed provocatively 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Waaaayyy too late, but he was a pretty badass tactician. He was a First World War vet and was awarded the Frederician Pour le Mérite for valor, and wrote a book about it in the 1930s which still circulates among US military.

Edit: see u/kami 232's comment below

[–]princeimrahil 47ポイント48ポイント  (15子コメント)

This leads to battles which on paper don't seem very impressive as he only attacked when he had a clear advantage

The irony of this statement is staggering.

[–]CutterJon 50ポイント51ポイント  (14子コメント)

Pretty sure Sun Tzu (et al) would consider it highly complimentary to be called unimpressive in this sense...

[–]princeimrahil 32ポイント33ポイント  (7子コメント)

"Monty was such a loser. He only risked the lives of thousands of men and thr security of his nation when he thought he had a good chance of winning!"

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 13ポイント14ポイント  (4子コメント)

Yeah not like those German generals who when it looks like it's all over roll a dice

(1918 Offensive and 1944 Battle of the Bulge, history and bad strategy repeats)

[–]P-01SGod made men, but RSAF Enfield made them civilized. 7ポイント8ポイント  (3子コメント)

Battle of the Bulge

I'm not saying that it would have been a better idea to invite the Western Allies in rather than launch massive counter attacks and try to arm literally everyone with cheap shitty Volkswaffen... But they wouldn't have wound up dealing with the Red Army inside Germany.

Oh wait, I am saying it would have been a better idea.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 4ポイント5ポイント  (2子コメント)

the Battle of the Bulge was pure folly, the Allies had near complete airsuperiority and overally superiority in materiel.

It would have been better to continue with a defensive strategy and reinforce things like the Siegfried line which in the event was ineffective due to a lack of units defending it. The whole point of static defences is that they free up units, you completely undermine their point if you launch an offensive which was doomed to fail from its inception.

The Battle of the Bulge greatly diminished Germany's capacity to hold the Western Front, Germany suffered losses from which it would not recover.

[–]P-01SGod made men, but RSAF Enfield made them civilized. 9ポイント10ポイント  (1子コメント)

Maybe you misunderstood... I meant literally let the Allies into Germany. As in surrrender.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

oh sorry ok

that was never really on the table though, particularly after the concentration camps were discovered, if the assassination on Hitler had been successful with the complete destruction of Nazism in a coup/revolution type thing it could have happened I guess

[–]CutterJon 10ポイント11ポイント  (1子コメント)

Real men just go for it no matter what. If you're not prepared to see the anguished faces of tens of thousands of soldiers you sacrificed in vain to a lost cause every time you close your eyes for the rest of your life, you're in the wrong business. Man up, son! Sometimes you just have to make the penultimate sacrifice.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

That's the spirit! If Hitler had listened to his defeatists generals, he never would have invaded other countries and Germany would have shamefully missed an awesome world war opportunity.

[–]Tonkarz 21ポイント22ポイント  (4子コメント)

Well, let's see what he had to say:

Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

  • Sun Tzu.

He also said this:

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

So... I guess the question is, just how clear an advantage did Montgomery really have? In warfare, often advantages are obvious in hindsight. But at the time, in the fog of war, how obvious was his advantage, really?

[–]CutterJon 13ポイント14ポイント  (3子コメント)

Yeah...it's definitely a Sun Tzu concept that the best generals will seem to be boring, as they win the battles they are 'supposed' to win, rather than pull off miracles when outnumbered with genius tactics -- because that's really the whole point, is to maneuver your army and position so that every battle looks like a foregone conclusion.

The second quote though is much closer to the complaint about Montgomery: that he only siezed the opportunities any idiot could have and missed a bunch of relatively easy ones that a better strategist would have taken advantage of, which cost lives in the long run. I don't know enough to opine on this but I do like your point that we are likely to grossly overestimate how obvious advantages were in hindsight.

I play a lot of games (poker, chess, board) where maintaining aggression is a well-established and important strategic principle but in the real world, I know I would find myself erring on the side of caution (which admittedly might make me a bad general) because the idea of getting actual people massacred through an overconfident mistake horrifies me.

[–]Tonkarz 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Well, as Sun Tzu said,

Rapidity is the essence of war

You gotta do it fast. Get that IRL APM up there.

[–]princeimrahil 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

I play a lot of games (poker, chess, board) where maintaining aggression is a well-established and important strategic principle but in the real world,

I think the key distinction is that (with the possible exception of poker) nothing is staked on the outcome. Aggression (and its attendant risks) are all well and good when the consequences are no greater than dealing with some smack-talk from your buddies, but when the lives of men and the fate of your country are on the line, you have to weigh the risks a lot more carefully. You still have to take some risks, of course, but you can't just run your army like you're playing... well, Risk.

And from my limited knowledge of poker, the best players are operating based on a solid knowledge of the hand probabilities and making calculations based upon strong likelihoods of success. There is bluffing and positioning, of course, but those are much less important that playing the odds properly.

[–]CutterJon 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

Right...that's why I insist on playing poker for money, even if it's only a buck. Consequences completely change the nature of competition. It's weird though -- to a certain extent, you probably should play the same way (as long as you play Risk highly competitively), taking calculated risks and being daring when there's enough to gain instead of always making the careful, cautious move. I just know I personally wouldn't be able to.

That's actually a bit of a myth about poker. The odds are pretty trivial to learn and there are very few strong likelihoods of success. In almost every format, it's much more psychological in the sense of learning how someone else plays, what their patterns are, and how best to manipulate them. When a pro is sitting there thinking and thinking, she's not doing math. She's going deeper and deeper into the what-does-he-think-I-think-he-thinks-I-think-he-thinks-I-have rabbit hole. I mean, you have to know the basics but people who get stuck on the odds of making a hand with their cards are incredibly easy for good players to play against -- even more than someone who has no absolutely idea what they're doing.

[–]AllNamesAreGoneENRICO DANDOLO DID NOTHING WRONG 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

...

What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

Couldn't find better words to describe the situation if God himself handed them to me.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 100ポイント101ポイント  (49子コメント)

Rommel decided to ignore all principles of rational logistics, accepted a battle of attrition, and predictably lost.

Montgomery handed Britain their first decisive victory over Germany (arguably the first decisive defeat Germany suffered in the war)

I'd say the battle of Moscow was far more important if not as conclusive, and of course Operation Uranus that started two weeks after El Alamein was far more decisive.

But really the whole North African theater was of dubious strategical value.

[–]alejeronAppealing to Authority 56ポイント57ポイント  (17子コメント)

the North African theater was a good proving ground, in my opinion. It also provided some good propaganda with the capture of 230,000 German and Italian troops, including a good chunk of the Afrika Korps as well as some general successes by the American and British forces. Although Kasserine Pass and some earlier missteps of Operation Torch could be argued to kind of overshadow the success of the campaign

[–]UnsinkableNippon 26ポイント27ポイント  (16子コメント)

Yes and no. Victories were welcomed, and combat experience was badly needed, and the enemy stupidly committing even more resources to a clearly hopeless cause is always good to take, and indeed where else to attack? Norway?

Militarily, Vichy France wasn't much of a player (for obvious reasons) and it's not like the Axis could afford to hold North Africa against moderate pressure, so the unfortunate temptation of attacking the so-badly-called "soft underbelly of Europe" (aka THE FUCKING ALPS) was sadly always going to be there.

So it's really about opportunity cost. Germany was wasting severely limited ~blitzkrieg~ resources (motorized units, air force, supply) on irrelevant side shows, while the Western Allies were endlessly delaying meaningful strategic moves -- but then what were the odds of a D-Day in France in 1943? And why accept those odds?

Really the Allies were not the ones under time pressure, and that was apparent for all players right in the immediate aftermath of the failed push for Moscow. That's the main reason for the frantic Axis offensives of 1942 -- increasing desperation.

[–]DoctorDanDrangusFurthering the Jewish conspiracy one thread at a time 25ポイント26ポイント  (6子コメント)

Yes and no. Victories were welcomed, and combat experience was badly needed...

I think you're failing to appreciate how important victories and morale are for countries fighting a war, especially a war like WWII. The "stupid" commitment of resources to the Afrika Corps aside -- consider how the Italian fighting capability quite literally collapsed as a result of the North African Campaign and how that spread to literally bring down the Italian government... Morale and popular support in wartime is easily as important - I think MORE important - than equipment, strategy, etc. Shoring up your own troops' morale and giving your home country some victories to be proud of keeps people fighting, determines how well they fight, how willing they are to be lead (and thus to conform to strategies) and keeps you in the war... It is absolutely necessary.

Lastly, and I won't harp too much on this -- Allied operations in the Mediterranean (ie: Greece, Malta) had a direct impact on German success on the southern front of the Eastern Campaign, for just one example of how Allied efforts were not just big wastes of time. To describe the "soft underbelly" idea and Allied sorties and harassment, including the larger African Campaign as "delaying meaningful strategic moves" and somehow a waste of time is simply incorrect.

[–]DefengarGilgamesh > Jesus 6ポイント7ポイント  (2子コメント)

The loss of North Africa was also the final straw for Spain in deciding whether to eventually join the Axis or not. After the losses at Stalingrad and in North Africa, Franco knew which way the wind was blowing, and seriously rolled back relations with Germany.

[–]DoctorDanDrangusFurthering the Jewish conspiracy one thread at a time 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

seriously rolled back relations with Germany.

Did he? How so? This is news to me. I seriously doubt Franco would have been of much military help to Hitler at all, but I know that he was an important source of resources -- did that end?

[–]DefengarGilgamesh > Jesus 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

The resources thing didn't end, but some of the token military support did, and he distanced himself more and more from the axis powers politically.

By 1943 the tide had turned in favour of the Allies and Franco began to change tack. To the delight of the Monarchists in his camp, he withdrew the Blue Division from the Russian front (it had suffered heavy casualties in the battle of Stalingrad), and for the first time announced Spain to be “neutral". Nevertheless, Spain continued to sell wolfram and other metals to help the German war machine, German radar installation still operated in the country, and German agents still operated on Spanish soil.

http://www.spainthenandnow.com/spanish-history/franco-s-spain--international-relations/default_177.aspx

Then throughout 1944 he was constantly making speeches and giving statements about how Spain was totally not really fascist and how he was a beacon of stability for Europe.

The biggest issue with Spain joining the war on the Axis side was they really didn't have access to oil because the US quite trading with them. This meant all their oil would have to come from German reserves, and Germany itself had issues with oil supply throughout the whole war. Where Spain might have made a difference was sending troops to occupy France, thus allowing Germany to pull most of its reserves in the West to be used in the East.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 0ポイント1ポイント  (2子コメント)

I said "stupid" and that's a lazy word, but in this campaign the amount of waste truly was surprising even by military standards. Let's replace "stupid" by "irrational".

I absolutely agree that victories and morale mattered a great deal and are easily underestimated. It certainly did massively influence decisions at the time, and the Axis forces were indeed hoping that the US and UK would eventually give up and negotiate an end to hostilities - that was their whole plan really . Or similarly, it's impossible to know how close the Soviet Union was from collapsing at the end of 1941: technically the fall of Moscow would not necessarily mean game over, but all states have a breaking point and you know where it is only when you reach it.

But then again, I don't see how Montgomery failing to breach Axis defenses at El Alamein was going to have an impact on British will to fight. That first victory is always a great morale boost, but not getting it right then would simply have been business as usual. Disappointing, yes. But not that important, especially with Torch coming on the other flank anyway.

Also, Italy collapsing from lack of popular support is pretty much an exception in WWII. It seems most belligerents were somehow able to manage their opinion well enough to fight the war to its military end. So morale certainly mattered, but I wouldn't say it was more important than cold strategic facts -- it was one of the important factors each player had to manage.

As for it being a "waste of time", I don't think I said that -- it really was a matter of opportunity cost for both sides. Italy certainly mattered, but was it the best possible use of Allies resources? Was it the best way to waste Germany's resources? Churchill thought so. Roosevelt didn't. Me, I don't know.

[–]DoctorDanDrangusFurthering the Jewish conspiracy one thread at a time 6ポイント7ポイント  (1子コメント)

I'm more addressing (what I perceived to be) the notion that the Allies came in at the last second and stole all the glory from the Russians. That's not true... I suppose it's a valid conclusion of the average American that only knows what he learned in K-12 history class and is just now starting to dig deep into the war, but it's not accurate or fair.

Agreed on all of your points. Except Monty's failure to breach Axis defenses was still a moral/e victory for Britain because it showed the people back home that they were fighting and not hiding. Furthermore, it animated a lot of people to want to join the British cause and war effort. Morale is extremely important, but it's difficult to predict exactly how a nation will perceive one event or another. (For instance: the Germans should have lost morale wayyyyy before the Battle of Berlin, yet in many ways it was at its highest for the average Berliner during those last few months).

Also: the Italian Campaign was a hot mess. I don't think anyone actually expected it to work, but it did tie up valuable divisions in Italy at a very desperate time for Germany and I think the post-war excuse for so many dead for so little gain is "eh - we thought it would work" but I somehow doubt they actually thought it would. I feel like it was probably a blatant diversion and training theater for the larger invasion, but you can't just admit that you wasted tons of money, lives and an ancient monestary of massive cultural and historical significance and be like "yeah, we knew that would probably happen." -- y'know?

[–]UnsinkableNippon 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

the Allies came in at the last second and stole all the glory from the Russians.

Yeah, no. I see what you mean of course, but that wasn't what I meant. The giant battles on the Eastern front in 41-42 simply were more important, stating it isn't an offense to the Western Allies.

the Germans should have lost morale wayyyyy before the Battle of Berlin, yet in many ways it was at its highest for the average Berliner during those last few months

Exactly, because of the legitimate fear of what was going to happen to them after a defeat to the Reds. You could find similar explanations behind some of the Red Army soldiers willingly fighting to their death in the ruins of Stalingrad. Morale is complicated, but WWII propaganda was becoming pretty effective.

[–]moh_kohn 9ポイント10ポイント  (0子コメント)

German forces ended up spread out defending from the south of France to Sicily to Greece. Troops that might have seen off the invasion of Sicily were dispersed across an enormous naval front, and when Italy fell elite troops had to be diverted from the East. The African campaign mattered.

[–]jonewerThe library at Louvain fired on the Germans first 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

"soft underbelly of Europe"

Muh indirect approach

/Lidel-Fart

[–]derlethLiterally Hitler: Adolf's Evil Twin 9ポイント10ポイント  (5子コメント)

so-badly-called "soft underbelly of Europe" (aka THE FUCKING ALPS)

I, too, completely ignore Italy's contribution to the Second World War.

[–]InZaintJohn 8ポイント9ポイント  (4子コメント)

But even before the alps, isn't Italy relatively mountain filled and easy to defend? It sounds like a bad idea, as it would also mean you'd have to fight the italians in their homeland. (which might've increased their morale a bit)

[–]derlethLiterally Hitler: Adolf's Evil Twin 6ポイント7ポイント  (3子コメント)

Yes, Italy does tend towards the mountainous, and the Allied invasion of Italy was difficult to pull off, but the notion that the Alps run right down to the Mediterranean throughout Southern Europe was just too silly for me to not call attention to.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 4ポイント5ポイント  (2子コメント)

This was supposed to be humorous and I actually kinda know where the Alps are, but the points remain that:

1) yes Southern Europe's Mediterranean coast is pretty much made of mountains. I mean, come on:

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/montagne/mount4.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apennine_Mountains#/media/File:Italia_fisica_appennini.png

2) to go to Germany from there, you do need to cross the Alps -- that didn't happen, not even close

3) invading/threatening Sicily/Italy directly supported the Soviet counter-offensive in the immediate aftermath of Kursk. That mattered, but the decision to commit this way were hotly debated at the time, and Churchill hopes of a quick conquest were ultimately disappointed.

I'm certainly not arguing that launching Overlord in 1943 would have been a better idea, and I probably didn't make my points very clear, but it seems legitimate to question the choices that were made.

[–]jon_hendry 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

2) to go to Germany from there, you do need to cross the Alps -- that didn't happen, not even close

Was that ever the intention? I mean, you can't get to Germany via the Philippines either. Once Italy was secured, troops could probably be moved, without too much difficulty, to a staging area more appropriate for Germany. The Allies could probably just move the men and give them new gear and vehicles, since the stuff used in Italy would need repair or replacement anyway. (I was recently thinking about this, actually, realizing I had no idea exactly how troops moved from Africa or Italy to England or Normandy. This apparently did happen, as there were troops coming down with malaria which they had picked up down south.)

On the other hand, crossing the Alps could also be a bottleneck for the Germans even if they weren't doing so under fire. If Germany wanted to send a division to support the Italians, that division would have to cross the alps: probably not the fastest deployment route within European Axis territory. Climbing those mountains would burn a lot of gas and diesel.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Was that ever the intention?

The intention was to secure a quick victory and then strike Germany in a useful place. The quick victory didn't come and Italy wasn't a useful place to attack Germany.

German unconditional surrender (the stated war goal) was secured by the destruction of their armed forces, and the physical occupation of their urban and industrial centers. That came from large scale invasions from their Eastern and Western flanks -- definitely not from the South.

It did mostly neutralize Italy (that otherwise would have been defending France), and alleviate some of the military / political pressure re: East / West imbalance in the war effort. So it certainly wasn't useless. What's unclear is if it was the best possible option. To be fair the Balkans were another "underbelly" alternative (targeting Romanian oil production maybe?), and it could have worked better -- a huge what-if.

Anyway from a tactical point of view it did prove that Europe's Southern flank wasn't soft at all, as relatively small German forces were able to efficiently delay Allied troops until the end of the war (Sicily 43 being a notable exception, basically the only clear Allied victory).

Maybe Italy was the best possible compromise for the Allies in 1943. Yes it was a limited distraction for the Germans, but it really wasn't the Second Front, and everyone knew it.

On the plus side it gave us "Catch 22"... so all in all it probably was worth it!

crossing the Alps could also be a bottleneck for the Germans even if they weren't doing so under fire. If Germany wanted to send a division to support the Italians, that division would have to cross the alps: probably not the fastest deployment route within European Axis territory. Climbing those mountains would burn a lot of gas and diesel.

OK I'm sorry but it doesn't work like that :)

As a general principle, all strategic deployments along internal lines of communication were done by railways, that remained a very efficient transportation system basically all the war. Heavy air interdiction did have some success (mostly at tactical level), reducing supply flow and impairing troop movements, but didn't significantly prevent Germans from moving divisions in and out of theaters.

And specifically, crossing the Alps was actually a very efficient deployment route, through the double-track electrified Brenner Pass, that could all by itself very easily supply all German needs in Italy (there were alternative routes available of course). This railway wasn't seriously challenged until November 1944, and started to seriously break down (under considerable bombing pressure) only in February 1945 -- by then the Western Allies were close to cross the Rhine and the Red Army had already smashed through the main German defenses (Vistula-Oder)... At this point Italy simply didn't matter.

[–]P-01SGod made men, but RSAF Enfield made them civilized. 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Hey, the Commandos were in (and out) of Norway in what... 1942 was it?

[–]KebabMaster[S] 25ポイント26ポイント  (6子コメント)

I've always regarded Moscow as a stalemate since the Soviets never successfully counter-attacked and like you said Uranus was after El Alamein.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 48ポイント49ポイント  (4子コメント)

Even if Moscow is considered a tactical stalemate, the Germans failed to achieve their operational objective, lost the initiative, and had to retreat and assume a defensive stance against heavy (if ineffectual) soviet counter attack. The Germans themselves certainly saw it as a defeat.

[–]P-01SGod made men, but RSAF Enfield made them civilized. 5ポイント6ポイント  (3子コメント)

Is it badhistory to consider things on an operational level in the 1940s when talking about anyone but the Red Army?

[–]LordHighBrewerPatton won Desert Storm 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

I would argue not really, We have primary sources like Monty's Notes from High Command at War (1944) and G.G. Simmond's Operational Policy (1944) all of which detail how corps, armies and army groups were to function. Historians like French, Buckley and Hart have examined these notes in detail, the correspondence that accompanied them between Monty, Dempsey et. al. as well as subsequent staff conferences such as that undertaken in late Nov. 1944 and make compelling arguments that one of Monty's great successes was the at times ruthless implementation and standardisation of an operational technique referred to as Colossal Cracks

This technique was based upon several features. Tactically he recognised that commonwealth strengths lay in air power, fire-support, combat engineering, medicine, logistics, etc., and not close combat, manoeuvre or decentralised command and control, and therefore any attempt based primarily upon engaging the enemy in high-intensity manoeuvre warfare placed commonwealth forces at a immediate disadvantage. Refusing to fight such a campaign would also, at a stroke, negate these advantages while allowing allied ones to shine- as commonwealth forces were fundamentally not required to defeat the enemy at their own game to achieve victory in the Second World War.

This was tied to a recognition of the strategic needs of a high profile campaign within a larger allied effort as directed by political leadership which has often been conflated with, and led to, an over-emphasis upon Montgomery's egotism, the maintaince of morale, casualty conservation and the industrial base.

All of these factors taken together resulted in an operational technique based upon five key principles- the master plan, concentration, firepower, caution and alterative thrusts to fight a series of materially attrictional set-piece battles in the pursuit of strategic aims. At all times seeking to wear down and destroy enemy manpower and material through the dextrous use of force and firepower in carefully planed, well-supported and aggressively executed operations until their tactical and operational capabilities were so degraded by material attrition that manoeuvre warfare upon the battlefield was no longer an unacceptable risk and the enemy's complete strategic collapse was achieved.

I would recommend Hart's Colossal Cracks, or Buckley's Monty's men for further reading if you fancy a bit of light reading, as they do a very capable job of expanding in depth on the arguments I have briefly outlined above.

[–]P-01SGod made men, but RSAF Enfield made them civilized. 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

Thanks for the info!

But I was responding to a comment about Operation Typhoon in Russia.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

I meant "operational" as the intermediary level between tactical and strategical, and because it still exists even when military planners don't give a specific name to it or aren't fully aware of what the concept implies.

Moscow was the stated objective of "Operation Typhoon" and as such speaking of "operational objective" sounds fair. Even if yes I'm aware of the actual doctrinal differences between the (mythical) "blitzkrieg" tactics, and the Soviet "deep battle" theory (that wasn't used in 1941 anyway).

Really, German generals were thinking in operational terms, or trying to. What they were not doing was using operational thinking to pursue deep battle objectives: extensive dislocation of the enemy's front on its entire depth, rather than focusing on juicy but ultimately shallow tactical objectives.

Basically, Germans tended to see encirclement as the mean to achieve their end, the physical destruction of the enemy forces. While Soviets could deliberately ignore promising cauldrons when sealing them would have meant compromising the momentum of the planned next stage of the offensive -- leading to vertical thrusts rather than concentric.

And certainly not allowing a Rommel to launch unplanned-for, uncoordinated large scale offensives.

[–]DavidlikesPeace 11ポイント12ポイント  (0子コメント)

since the Soviets never successfully counter-attacked

Despite eventually losing several of their own armies against Model and the Rzhev pocket when spring returned, it's fundamentally wrong to think that the Soviets never successfully counterattacked during the winter.

The Red Army pushed hard against the Germans and succeeded in pressuring the front back roughly 100 kilometers along a broad front, severely eviscerating a better-trained and, until then, undefeated German Army Group.

While it is true that there were no grand encirclements, due in part to the weather and mediocre Soviet tactics, at the battalion level many German units were lost. Heavy equipment had to be rehauled, and Army Group Center never truly regained its offensive capabilities.

[–]NewYorkerinGeorgia 3ポイント4ポイント  (3子コメント)

I think its main strategic value was in keeping the Soviets happy.

[–]mhl67 15ポイント16ポイント  (2子コメント)

It didn't keep the Soviets happy; they wanted an actual second front to be opened and not keep playing "run back and forth across Libya with a couple hundred-thousand soldiers for three years".

[–]NewYorkerinGeorgia 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

That's a good point. It did give the Allies at least the appearance of trying to help, but you are right it was not enough for the Soviets.

[–]ooburai 13ポイント14ポイント  (0子コメント)

This doesn't really contradict anything being said here, but it's important to draw focus to why the Soviets were so underwhelmed with the North Africa Campaign.

The USSR didn't especially care where the Western Allies attacked the Germans, what they needed desperately was for the Western Allies to tie up strategically significant German forces which otherwise would have been deployed against the Soviets. North Africa didn't accomplish this. North Africa is important in a peripheral sense and even reasonably strategic from the perspective of the British Empire, but the problem with it as a theatre from the Soviet perspective is that it only ever tied up German forces inasmuch as the Germans were interested and willing in supporting the Italians.

The Germans always had the option of cutting and running and even though Rommel did his best to suck in troops, supplies, equipment, and supporting forces, the authorities in Germany were never going to allow North Africa to draw in the forces necessary to truly damage the Eastern Front. If the British or Americans had managed to make this front a higher strategic priority for Germany, or if the Italians had been a more significant player on the Eastern Front, I don't see any reason to think that Stalin would have cared whether or not the Western Allies had invaded France or the Low Countries during this time frame. Say what you will about Stalin (and a lot could be said), he was a fairly pragmatic war leader who actually listened to the professional military advice he was given most of the time.

[–]InZaintJohn 1ポイント2ポイント  (2子コメント)

But really the whole North African theater was of dubious strategical value.

I've always heard that control of oil and the suez canal was very important. Though, I'm at a stage of history knowing were I actively reread what I learned in school to try and root out bad history (my teacher actually told me that the poles were so poor and technologically behind that they charged tanks with cavalry...) so I can't validate it at all.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

Yeah but normal convoy route at the time was around South Africa anyway since, you know, the Mediterranean was a hotly contested war zone.

Complete interdiction of the Suez Canal by the Afrika Corps would have been a big deal tactically for naval operations in the Mediterranean theater, but not for maintaining imperial communication lines with India and the Far East.

Iran was also jointly occupied by British and Soviet forces by September 1941, and a major logistical corridor, so it's not even like Egypt was the last line of defense before India.

As for oil... nearly all of it was coming from the US anyway. Not from the Middle East.

[–]InZaintJohn 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Thanks for the reply, got it:)

[–]Felinomancy 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Operation Uranus

*giggle*

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords -1ポイント0ポイント  (15子コメント)

The German war machine needed oil, if it couldn't get it from Russia it would have to have got it from the Middle East, which means going through North Africa

[–]DanDierdorf 1ポイント2ポイント  (14子コメント)

Nope, no oil there, esp during this timeframe. The issue at hand was control of the Med and Suez Canal.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 0ポイント1ポイント  (13子コメント)

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=59630

[–]DanDierdorf 1ポイント2ポイント  (4子コメント)

None of these are in North Africa.

Iran: 10,331,000 10,359,000 19,189,000 Iraq: 4,255,000 4,272,000 4,476,000 Bahrein: 1,062,000 n.a. n.a. Kuwait: oil has been found by an American company, but production had not yet started in 1939. Production of 1946: 800,000 t. Saudi Arabia: first drillings in the Hasa region; a port was under construction in 1939 in Ras Tanura (N-W of Bahrein) for the transport of the oil production of Hasa. Probable presence of oil in the Red Sea in front of Tihama (in Asir), islands Farsan, El Daba and Hueigh (both in Hejaz). Production of 1946: 8,200,000 t. Qatar: none. None of these are in North Africa:

Oman: none. Coast of Pirates (United Arab Emirates): none. Syria and Lebanon: none. Palestina: none. Transjordania: none.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 1ポイント2ポイント  (3子コメント)

I said the oil was in the Middle East, North Africa was between Germany and the Middle East

[–]UnsinkableNippon 1ポイント2ポイント  (2子コメント)

Occupying oil-producing places still doesn't mean that you can ship a material fraction of it to your industrial centers / armed forces.

See: Japan.

[–]themanwhoknowsnothinLeft Shark Approved ^TM 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

That was thr whole point of going for the Caucasus', wasn't it? It was oil the Germans could actually use and transport west if secured.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

Yes, that was the whole point. The effort made sense, was probably Germany's last chance, and fell (very) short despite very impressive early successes (basically their last successful strategic offensive).

... They couldn't even take Grozny. Baku was still 300 miles away, on the other side of the Caucasus. Red Army fanboys don't even brag about it, because the Caucasus battle literally didn't happen: in late 1942 the push died without needing serious direct opposition (sending reinforcements through the Caspian would have been trivial, but wasn't necessary).

Securing not-thoroughly-blown-up oil wells proved impossible, let alone shipping anything back to Germany; ie despite the extreme emergency this strategic effort proved a complete failure. Durably denying oil access to the Soviets would have been a great victory (scorched earth strategy) -- yet even that very modest objective remained a pipe dream.

Stalingrad was the closer the Axis came to the Volga, and trying to secure it proved disastrous -- and at the same time kinda demonstrated why it can be useful to protect your overly extended flanks against carefully prepared armored thrusts~

Focusing more efforts toward the distant Caucasus, without fully neutralizing an obvious logistical node behind them... wasn't exactly going to help.

Also easily forgotten: the Soviets actually considered this sector as secondary, as they were simultaneously sending the bulk of there reinforcements to the Rzhev sector for Operations Mars and Jupiter. While Stalingrad ended up being the battle that they actually won, and a great reminder of how clumsy Stavka planning still was at the time, it also clearly means that they could have easily devoted MUCH MORE resources to whatever sector would have seemed vitally important. But the Caucasus clearly didn't look like it was seriously threatened -- more like, a direction you actually want the Germans to focus on, in order to cut them off and annihilate them.

Sounds far-fetched? Well that's literally what Saturn / Little Saturn were about, and their success arguably became the turning point of World War II.

Was the Red Army effective at the end of 1942? Fuck no, they were absolutely horrible. Yet the 6th Army was buried around Stalingrad with a good chunk of Army Group B, and Army Group A literally had to flee for its life.

That's how close the Germans came to Caucasus oil.

[–]DanDierdorf 0ポイント1ポイント  (7子コメント)

By the way, read your link again, it speaks against your idea. That, and as /u/UnsinkableNippon mentions, having the fields is a very different thing than being able to use it. From previous discussions on this, the existing transportation infrastructure would not benefit the Axis, who would have to build their own, the roads to where they would have needed were very primitive, and roads are not the way to transport oil, rail is, and there were no rails their way either. Read your own link again. Germans in North Africa for oil is really a non starter, usually based on current oil production and not on what was at the time.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 1ポイント2ポイント  (6子コメント)

1938 Oil Production was as follows

Iran: 10,359,000t Iraq: 4,272,000t

that is a significant amount of oil, its not enough to fuel the whole war machine but Germany always needed more oil. Yes the infrastructure was not there to move it very far, but victory in North Africa could have been followed up with a very easy Middle Eastern campaign, ending with the opportinity of being able to open a southern flank against the Soviet Union.

[–]DanDierdorf 0ポイント1ポイント  (3子コメント)

It's ironic that you are posting this bunch of handwaving on /r/badhistory .

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 1ポイント2ポイント  (2子コメント)

so your telling me if the Nazi's had successfully invaded North Africa they'd just pack up and leave, rather than carving up the lightly defended Middle East, which had oil in it, and bordered the Soviet Union.

[–]DanDierdorf 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

No, they would have controlled the Med, and very importantly, the Suez canal, very strategic goals, both of them. Why you are not aware and are dismissing this may be the issue here.
Now, go look at the distances involved and the landmass and lack of infrastucture and tell me again how the Germans are going to attack the Soviets from the south. It's a pipe dream. You know, opium pipe? You keep on insisting that the oil would have been useful for the Nazis when the very strong concensus is NO, as your own link states. Read your own link again, read all the posts. http://classroom.synonym.com/egypt-strategic-importance-during-wwii-10316.html

[–]UnsinkableNippon 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

The Middle East wasn't lightly defended. There was 3 Soviet armies occupying Iran, and the main ground forces of the British empire (forces that proved enough to rollback Rommel just by themselves, in Egypt).

You're telling me if the Nazis had successfully invaded North Africa, the Allies would just pack up and leave, rather than reinforcing even more the Middle East, which had oil in it, and bordered the Soviet Union?

[–]jon_hendry 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

Germany was already on their way to the Caucasus, which has oil, and from there could get to Iran (south of the Caucasus) and Iraq overland. Were they so inclined.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

No. They tried to conquer the Caucasus from the North (a failure), and Iran was actively defended by both the British and the Soviets. The Persian Corridor was one of the three routes for Lend-Lease supply, ie a Very Big Deal, and certainly not a soft target that Axis forces could take "were they so inclined".

Egypt was comparatively a far easier objective... and what happened there?

[–]AThrowawayAssholeKristallnacht was just subsidies for glaziers 32ポイント33ポイント  (0子コメント)

Monty is well known for his extensive preparations, but he also knew that he would have to hold all the ground he took from German forces and he was not going to take territory only to lose it in a counterattack due to lack of supplies. He learned this watching the Great German Army ravage parts of Russia, only to get its Kraut teeth kicked in once the Russians began counterattacking with the Germans having only Aryan pride in reserve.

[–]CaptainPyjamaSharkAdmiral Kolchak the Night Stalker 69ポイント70ポイント  (10子コメント)

Quite a lot of bad history in that thread, the usual "All British officers were incompetent upper-class twits while Rommel and Patton were geniuses."

Edit: Have I been shadowbanned? I can't vote on anything or see comment scores.

[–]NickTM 40ポイント41ポイント  (4子コメント)

I liked the one where someone accused Montgomery of 'willing to sacrifice his men'. I mean come on. You can accuse Monty of a lot of things, but wastefulness of his troops' lives was pretty clearly not one of them.

[–]jonewerThe library at Louvain fired on the Germans first 11ポイント12ポイント  (3子コメント)

Sacrificing the lives if your men is pretty much the job description if a general.

A general unwilling to sacrifice his men is going to win precisely no battles at all.

[–]nihil_novi_sub_soleW. T. Sherman burned the Library of Alexandria 12ポイント13ポイント  (1子コメント)

A general unwilling to sacrifice his men is going to win precisely no battles at all.

I'm having angry George McClellan-related flashbacks.

[–]Stellar_DuckJust another Spineless Chamberlain 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

150 years later, even being from a different country, Little Mac pisses me off no end.

[–]DavidlikesPeace 13ポイント14ポイント  (0子コメント)

In Civil War terms, there's a fine line between being a McClellan, a Sherman, a Grant, and a Hood. And of course, different weaponry leads to different tactics paying off.

[–]KebabMaster[S] 17ポイント18ポイント  (0子コメント)

I can see you

[–]DirishMelon Lord did nothing wrong 12ポイント13ポイント  (0子コメント)

Check to see if you're visiting us on a np link. There's something in the CSS that removes the up/downvote arrows if you do. I don't think you're shadowbanned.

[–]giantbfgGay Nazi Superman 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

I think it's because it's an archived post being around a year old.

[–]dorylinus 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

Rule 1. Are you trying to vote in the linked thread?

[–]Muffer-Nl 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

If you use Reddit Enhancement suite and you visit a NP.Reddit link you can not comment or vote.

[–]juden-shikker 20ポイント21ポイント  (28子コメント)

Technically true because he was facing off Against an over promoted officer who ignored minor issues like logistics

[–]frezikPrincess Anastasia's evil goateed twin 27ポイント28ポイント  (27子コメント)

Was there anyone among the Germans who knew how to keep an army supplied? Seems like even in their greatest successes (like the invasion of France), logistical issues are back there, very nearly derailing the whole effort.

[–]Dead_HumanCollection 34ポイント35ポイント  (21子コメント)

It seems like German blitzkrieg strategy as a whole was a bit of a glass cannon and maintaining supply lines were a major problem. It pushed forward and through enemy positions often times leaving sizable groups of enemies cut off behind the front lines. This means that the supply lines had to deal with keeping up with a rapidly moving front while dealing with guerilla operations at the same time.

Specifically in North Africa, I think Rommel got the short end of the stick in terms of resupply and fresh troops because the higher command viewed the Soviet Union as a more important war goal and funneled the lion's share of the resources to the East.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 37ポイント38ポイント  (18子コメント)

The problem is that it was physically impossible to deliver more supply, because the docking facilities of Tripoli and Benghazi were already at 100% capacity (and Tobruk's limited capacity, especially under air attack, didn't really add much).

Then any supply painfully delivered to the docks of Tripoli still needed to be hauled to the front line 1000 miles away, and since there was effectively no rail road, it had to be done by a giant fleet of thousands of trucks constantly doing a 2000 miles round trip in the desert, consuming a significant chunk of the precious gas and spare parts btw, when all the armies of the period (US Army included) found it very difficult to adequately supply fighting units operating more than 200 miles away from their supply head.

But OK, let's fantasize that the Fabulous Desert Fox actually wins decisively at El Alamein, the Eighth army is routed, and the Axis magically captures Alexandria with its port intact~ far-fetched but let's not underestimate Montgomery's genius.

... That means that Rommel can now supply himself from there and push further East, right? He'll soon link with the Japanese or whatever, and the war is nearly won? Well not exactly: the Italian navy now needs to somehow control an even greater area of the Mediterranean (good luck with that), while Operation Torch is simultaneously landing another army in his back in Morocco and Algeria, and he's now hopelessly out of position to defend Libya (the reason he was sent to Africa to begin with). Congrats, or something?

Considering that Rommel's main contribution to World War 2 was diverting considerable amounts of invaluable motor-transport capacity away from Barbarossa / Typhoon / Case Blue and into strategic backwaters, he genuinely deserves to be celebrated as a hero of the Allied cause. A great general indeed!

[–]hobblingcontractorTaking Advantage of Rome's Single Payer Healthcare System 9ポイント10ポイント  (11子コメント)

TIL Italy had a navy in WW2.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 15ポイント16ポイント  (6子コメント)

Reddit so clearly needs a "that's the joke, right?" button...

[–]hobblingcontractorTaking Advantage of Rome's Single Payer Healthcare System 9ポイント10ポイント  (5子コメント)

Pretty much. Actually reading up about it (wiki), they seem moderately more competent than the Italian army in WW2. Might just be that they didn't have the fuel capabilities to do anything exceedingly stupid :D

[–]PlayMp1The Horus Heresy was an inside job 5ポイント6ポイント  (4子コメント)

They were a sight better than the German navy.

[–]Ninjawombat111 7ポイント8ポイント  (2子コメント)

Their navy was better than the German navy

[–]Stellar_DuckJust another Spineless Chamberlain 7ポイント8ポイント  (0子コメント)

Now That's a backhanded compliment.

[–]hobblingcontractorTaking Advantage of Rome's Single Payer Healthcare System 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

Only because they didn't have enough fuel to get out of port and make their own disaster.

[–]TheAlmightySnarkFoodtrucks are like Caligula, only then with less fornication 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

They were mostly in a port getting attacked by swordfish bi-planes though...

[–]DavidlikesPeace 8ポイント9ポイント  (3子コメント)

because the docking facilities of Tripoli and Benghazi were already at 100% capacity

However, the Axis war effort also lost plenty of logistics at sea or along long desert coastal routes too. The German-Italian effort seems to have failed because of thorns like Malta, which allowed severe naval and air interdiction.

[–]Rodrommel 4ポイント5ポイント  (2子コメント)

Not to mention British subs. Not a campaign that gets a lot of attention

[–]DavidlikesPeace 5ポイント6ポイント  (1子コメント)

I included subs under naval interdiction :P

It's actually amazing how little people know about Anglo-American submarines, which were vital to winning both the fronts in the Mediterranean and Japan.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

You won't hear me saying Allied submarines were not an important factor, and running convoys from Italy to Libya was indeed incredibly draining for Italian naval resources, and yet this is still a bad excuse for Rommel's failure: Axis ports in North Africa literally couldn't process more than what they did, and a considerable fraction of those supplies couldn't move from the ports to the front line fast enough anyway. Malta was painful but the real bottleneck wasn't here.

[–]Kattzalosthe romans won because the greeks were gay 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

soooooo what you're saying is Rommel did nothing wrong?

[–]UnsinkableNippon 9ポイント10ポイント  (0子コメント)

After totally failing to win the war for Hitler, he totally failed to kill Hitler. Woah.

Quick: give the dead fucker a "Walter Model was all I couldn't be" golden cardboard badge or something, and immediately proceed to glare at von Braun.

[–]P-01SGod made men, but RSAF Enfield made them civilized. 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

Germany was literally tying sets of three heavy fighters together to tow gigantic transport planes into the air in an attempt to get supplies to North Africa. Literally. Tying planes. Together.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_323

[–]AtomicKaiserT-34 slurped ermer is stronk'r than Abrams tonk. 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

The He-111 was not a heavy fighter.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 12ポイント13ポイント  (0子コメント)

When even the OKH says your plan is logistically impossible, you're probably trying something very, very dumb.

[–]PearlClawFort Sumter was asking for it 1ポイント2ポイント  (3子コメント)

They knew how, they just lacked the resources to keep their supply lines efficient. Insufficient motorization meant everything moved at the speed of the horse, which is a hell of a way to run a logistics train for a modern army.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 10ポイント11ポイント  (2子コメント)

... and then they decided to do something crazy, after consciously deciding to operate with an organically undersized supply train, and they kept it operating at an absurd pace, again deciding to ignore its rapidly unsustainable rate of attrition -- then they blamed their failure to the utter collapse of logistics. Again and again and again.

Convenient.

[–]graphictruth 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

"You go to war with the army you have..."

[–]UnsinkableNippon 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

... yeah and Donald Rumsfeld still looks sane compared to Rommel.

Think about that~ ;)

[–]Malzair 15ポイント16ポイント  (16子コメント)

The whole Market Garden thing surely didn't help his reputation and from there everything he ever did gets called into doubt.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 15ポイント16ポイント  (15子コメント)

Yeah but around the same time the battle of Hurtgen forest was going on....

The historical narrative is basically this:

"quick shift attention to Monty's fuck up, we can't have people talking about a US led disaster"

[–]whatismooElders of Zion 2, Jewgalectric JewgaJew: Part I, The Jewening 5ポイント6ポイント  (11子コメント)

I really need to learn more about hurtgen forest. Do you know any good books on it?

[–]InZaintJohn 6ポイント7ポイント  (8子コメント)

cod 3 by Treyarch Studios

[–]whatismooElders of Zion 2, Jewgalectric JewgaJew: Part I, The Jewening 1ポイント2ポイント  (4子コメント)

Ewwww treyarch

[–]InZaintJohn 2ポイント3ポイント  (3子コメント)

cod 3 was alright though.

Cod 5 on the other hand...

[–]whatismooElders of Zion 2, Jewgalectric JewgaJew: Part I, The Jewening 3ポイント4ポイント  (2子コメント)

Ehh, I prefer IW's call of duty's. Not just because I'm not a fan of zombies

[–]KayakAndTonic 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

WaW was the pinnacle of COD, after that its been an almost 10-year downfall.

[–]whatismooElders of Zion 2, Jewgalectric JewgaJew: Part I, The Jewening 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Fair. I'm not a particular connoisseur of CoD (CoDnoisseur?), Halo has always been my game. Well, until 4 happened, but anyway I digress.

[–]CaptainPyjamaSharkAdmiral Kolchak the Night Stalker 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

or Forgotten Hope 2. Hurtgen is a meatgrinder of a map in that game.

[–]KeyboardChap 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

Cod 3 is about the Battle of Normandy though, not Hurtgen.

[–]InZaintJohn 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Oh, you're right. It's about the Falaise Pocket specifically, and I thought Hurtgen Forest was a part of that (One map is even named "The Forest", I figured that was it) didn't even know that the Falaise Pocket was a part of the Battle of Normandy.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

I can't really think of any, I haven't really read anything specific about it

Hopefully someone else will know

[–]Grubnar 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

There is a pretty good film about it: When Trumpets Fade (1998)

[–]kami232 0ポイント1ポイント  (2子コメント)

... Among armchair historians, perhaps.

Few beyond the dedicated historians remember Hürtgen Forest because of The Bulge. Monty's op is infamous because of the scope of the failure, but that operation ended three months before The Bulge even began. Meanwhile, Hürtgen was still a current event (though bogged down by winter).

Sometimes I dunno what's worse. Bad History or /r/BadHistory. I have to ask for citations on your assertion that there's a historical conspiracy to slam Monty as a distraction for Hürtgen. Every analysis of Hürtgen I've read boils down to a lack of planning coupled with poor situational analysis by commanders led to a long, drawn out fight for Hürtgenwald.

example from usacac.army.mil & Historynet.com

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 5ポイント6ポイント  (1子コメント)

It's not a conspiracy, it's just the sheer amount of literature and popular awareness Market Garden gets compared to how much Hurtgen gets which is much less.

[–]kami232 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

popular awareness Market Garden gets compared to how much Hurtgen gets which is much less.

Yes, because of The Bulge.

Why remember a cog in the machine when somebody breaks into your house and kicks your dog? Hürtgen was a brutal meat-grinder, but The Bulge captivated popular attention because of how sudden it was. The Western Allies had been toning down their operations for winter; nobody expected the Germans to drive through the Ardenne (again).

Your word that there's a historical conspiracy doesn't add up. Historians criticize the American commanders for their actions at Hurtgen (I even linked you a military analysis of General Norman Cota). So it's not popular with the public. Who cares? Monty is still famous as hell for harassing Rommel across North Africa; he's infamous for Caen; he's extremely foolish for Market Garden's failings. That's what happens when you're a big name too! It draws attention. Compare Market Garden with Bastogne, we've also got General Patton executing a hard left turn to relieve the beleaguered defenders, the romanticized "Battered Bastards of Bastogne". Market Garden and Wacht am Rhein have three famous Allied commanders involved (McAuliffe being the third for "Nuts!"). Contrast that with Hurtgen and who do you have? Nobody, really... Bradley was the overall commander, but Cota is the guy that gets criticized the most.

[–]Wobbly_ 15ポイント16ポイント  (1子コメント)

More from that shitty thread

Patton was a brilliant logistician and could quickly adapt to dynamic situations. Montgomery was good at set-piece battles and not much else.

He sure could! By throwing his men into the meat grinder. Patton didn't give a flying fuck about his troops.

Patton wasn't much better, both were ego maniacs willing to sacrifice their men to booster their ego, prestige and glory.

Not even nearly true.

[–]EvanHarperDon't Robespierre that joint, man. 17ポイント18ポイント  (0子コメント)

Patton was a brilliant logistician

Jesus Christ this is the dumbest thing I've ever heard, Patton made a point of theatrically humiliating his logistics guys by asking who they ever killed, he was at best an uneven general who didn't pay enough attention to logistics, and, IMO, basically a pompous fraud & overpromoted battalion commander like Rommel

[–][deleted] 25ポイント26ポイント  (0子コメント)

Nah, the only way Rommel could have lost was if his opponent had literally every single advantage possible in the world.

[–]TheDarkLordOfViacomLincoln did nothing wrong. 11ポイント12ポイント  (2子コメント)

Also, wasn't Rommel at a logistical disadvantage, as a lot of supplies were diverted to the eastern front?

[–]ForgedIronMadeIt 17ポイント18ポイント  (1子コメント)

Yes, but also the Mediterranean was increasingly hostile to Axis shipments of supplies. Over time they were being more and more cut off.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

And the Eastern front was, like, their war goal... Hitler couldn't give a fuck about North Africa, the whole thing was only about protecting Italy's meager assets there -- and they were certainly not the ones pushing to invade Egypt, that was Rommel's personal obsession.

His efforts to seem relevant proved an incredibly inefficient disaster for the Axis while providing a surrogate second front to the Western Allies, so it probably qualifies as a form of success?

[–]IsNotACleverMan 8ポイント9ポイント  (3子コメント)

So you're saying he's the George McClellan of WWII?

[–]MBarry829God bless you T-Rex 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

Well, Montgomery managed to attack win victories...

[–]GobtheCyberPunkJeb Stuart and George Pickett did the Gettysburg Screwjob 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

Nah, he didn't run as the Labour candidate for PM later.

[–]NewYorkerinGeorgia 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

Username does not check out.

[–]hobblingcontractorTaking Advantage of Rome's Single Payer Healthcare System 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

But . . . Patton!

[–]NickTM 21ポイント22ポイント  (1子コメント)

The Patton worship is absolutely one of my personal bugbears. The way people bang on about him, you'd think he was a cross between the God-Emperor of Mankind and Alexander the Great.

[–]hobblingcontractorTaking Advantage of Rome's Single Payer Healthcare System 15ポイント16ポイント  (0子コメント)

Yep. I know Ike always had an issue with Patton outrunning logistics so had to play catch-up quite a bit. I'd say it's only through Ike's logistical planning flexibility that Patton didn't run into some serious issues.

I forget where I was (IRL) that I started to get a bit frothy when someone brought up Patton's plan vs the Soviets post WW2, how he was right, and how good "Killing Patton" was. Nyyyrgh aneurysm.

[–]Jurassic_Parke 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

Montgomery wasn't just appointed randomly when everything was going well, it was clear that a change was needed

Although one should remember that Montgomery was at the time of his appointment was plan B for Eighth Army. Auchinleck's successor was intended to be Lt Gen. William Gott, but he was killed when his plane was shot down while travelling to take up the command.

[–]TheZizekiest 15ポイント16ポイント  (5子コメント)

Could you, like, post some sources for this?

[–]HumboldtBlue 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

This is worth a watch

[–]KebabMaster[S] 7ポイント8ポイント  (3子コメント)

I don't know how well respected this source will be but mainly this documentary analysing Montgomery and Rommel's approaches to El Alamein: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qj0sr4CUEE8

And Wikipedia for the tank numbers

[–]Virginianus_sumRobert E. Leesus 6ポイント7ポイント  (2子コメント)

Would you mind editing your original post with these? (And others, if you've got them.) Not trying to come off as a ball-buster, it's just that we like having our stuff properly sourced around here.

[–]Nimonic 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

it's just that we like having our stuff properly sourced around here.

Eh, in an ideal world. It doesn't happen often enough by far IMO.

[–]Virginianus_sumRobert E. Leesus 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

I'd say we have adequately-sourced posts more times than not, and in cases like these I see no harm in politely requesting edits to include citations. (Tracking down newer citations and clarifications in the comments is a pain.)

[–]Leather_Boots 9ポイント10ポイント  (7子コメント)

While I agree with you on most points and in particular on Monty being a legend, I'm not sure of what superior equipment the Axis forces had you are referring to.

Although I will admit that the British tanks initially were not well suited for the desert, having been designed for a European campaign. But from El Alamein on the influx of Sherman tanks out gunned anything the Axis could field until the arrival of the few Tigers in Tunisia.

The Italian tanks were very outdated and most German tanks were Panzer I, II's (20mm) and III's (50mm). Toss in a bunch of armoured cars (20mm) and generally the Axis were outgunned in most engagements in tank v tank against the British 2pdr (40mm) 6pdr (57mm) and 75mm main guns.

German 88mm and British 25pdr guns were both used in anti tank roles effectively in various battles, but in a campaign dictated by manoeuvre their numbers were simply too few on both sides.

The Allies taking control of the skies, along with often very effective LRDG & SAS raids on German airfields meant that the stretched Axis supply columns were often "easy targets".

The entire African campaign for the Germans was a side show due to the failure of the Italians and poorly supported overall. Toss in the Allied Mediterranean strangle hold and many Axis supplies were lost at sea.

[–]jonewerThe library at Louvain fired on the Germans first 10ポイント11ポイント  (2子コメント)

The Italian tanks were very outdated and most German tanks were Panzer I, II's (20mm) and III's (50mm). Toss in a bunch of armoured cars (20mm) and generally the Axis were outgunned in most engagements in tank v tank against the British 2pdr (40mm) 6pdr (57mm) and 75mm main guns.

German 88mm and British 25pdr guns were both used in anti tank roles effectively in various battles, but in a campaign dictated by manoeuvre their numbers were simply too few on both sides.

Pretty sure there were some PzIV's there also, but the crucial thing was that, bar a limited number of M3's and M4's, the 8th Army was almost entirely dependent on 2pdrs for their tank armament (the 6pdr was only just making its appearance on the battlefield by 2nd Alamein).

And while the 2pdr could slice open a PzI or II or any Italian tank like a hammer and nail through a tin of sardines, they were less useful against the up-gunned III's and IV's which could out-range them and, being solid shot shells, near totally useless against German anti-tank screens (a 2pdr equipped tank would have to literally shoot the actual gun itself, not just splash a shell close by). Thus Rommel's trick of throwing up an anti-tank screen to decimate British armour - the British would have no choice but to charge the German guns, Balaclava style, until they got within machine gun range - at which point Rommel could send in his armour to mop-up the survivors.

It was a very real and very serious qualitative handicap for the British and it wasn't solved until 75mm equipped American tanks became available in large numbers.

LRDG & SAS raids

Much daring. Very nuisance for the Germans. But of little strategic value.

Allied Mediterranean strangle hold

Considering how badly the Op Pedestal convoy got mauled in August of 1942, I'd say that's a bit of an overstatement.

[–]Leather_Boots 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

There were PzIV's, but very few and most of them were equipped with the short barrel 75mm low velocity cannon designed to destroy fortifications rather than enemy tanks. The number of PzIV's with the long barreled 75mm was even more limited.

The Pz III's and IV's (I also forgot the 35t's and 38t's) had additional face harden plate added to their frontal armour, which made the 2pdr's solid shot essentially bounce off. You made a good point about the 2pdr solid shot being next to useless to take out anything non tank.

But we also have to keep this discussion relevant to the time when Monty took over in Aug '42, as the discussion was about Monty.

By this stage the new 6pdr anti tank guns had started arriving since Jun/Jul '42, larger numbers of M3 Grants with 37mm and 75mm had arrived around the same period, some 250 M4A1 Sherman's were on the line by Oct '42 and the Churchill III with the 6pdr was introduced (admittedly only 6 for El Alamein 2).

So my point was and still is that the Axis didn't have superior equipment by the time Monty took over, as the Allied supply lines were bringing in improved replacements constantly. where the Axis supply lines struggled to replace much of anything as most things were destined for the Russian campaign.

LRDG & SAS, they provided a lot of valuable intel on road traffic, as well as destroyed/ damaged over 200 aircraft, so a bit better than mere nuisance value.

Fair call on my Med strangle hold comment.

[–]thepioneeringlemmingbenevolent colonial overlords 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Yeah I constantly have to tell people, British tanks didn't charge the enemy because they wanted too, they had to charge yk make up for the deficiencies in the 2pdr (lots of people call this 'cavalry' tactics, but they want to make out everyone was incompetent and wanted to die. If anything it was a naval tactic, ships with less powerful armament had to close the gap or pull back, it's exactly the same with tanks.)

[–]DavidlikesPeace 7ポイント8ポイント  (3子コメント)

Interesting is how different tactics actually were from how we perceive them to be in retrospect.

Books like The Desert War about El Alemein emphasize how German tactics earlier in the war made up for deficiencies in their Panzer IIIs and IVs by blunting Allied attacks against their 88mm artillery. Similar tactics appear to have negated much of the effectiveness of the T-34 on the Ostfront too. Apparently British tankers were also often former cavalry, with an instinctive desire to close in and 'dogfight' enemy armor.

A major part of the Allied victory came not only through the influx of Shermans, but also a more cautious usage of artillery and air power to shield the British offensive tank capabilities.

[–]Leather_Boots 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

You raise a very valid point on tactics.

The entire philosophy for the French (Char 1B), British (Matilda) and Soviet (T35) armoured forces pre war was for slow heavily armoured infantry support tanks to take out strong points, while the faster lighter tanks fulfilled the Calvary role of exploiting the break through and create mayhem in the rear.

The German Blitzkrieg tactic was to bypass strong points with the armoured forces and to leave them to the artillery, Infantry and some of the assault guns. Allowing the tanks to push deeper, or encircle.

Anti tank guns across both Axis and Allies were supposed to blunt any armoured attack, but the main anti tank guns pre war and therefore at the outbreak of WW2 were 37mm, or 2pdr (40mm) and they were essentially already obsolete against any medium tank. Most interwar tank designs were also equipped with 37mm or 2pdr, as that was all that was needed to knock out most tanks. Toss in some anti tank rifles for the infantry to round off the defensive capabilities

It took the British, Russian's and American's several years of hard fighting to be in a position for combined arms to become a norm.

[–]DavidlikesPeace 3ポイント4ポイント  (1子コメント)

Thanks so much for commenting!

It's also remarkable how the development of the flak 88 and the eventual rise of the Panzerfaust, RPG and ground to ground missiles have likely changed what tactics would be best suited in modern war. The ubiquity of the Tiger being so deadly at Kursk and other 1942-43 fights also overshadows the eventual success of artillery and self-propelled guns in giving defenders a powerful counterpunch by 1944-45.

In early WWII, infantry detachments really were very vulnerable to tanks, which is part of the reason why 'panzer fright' and blitzkrieg worked. Anti-tank artillery was an understudied field. Airplanes moreover were not quite strong enough for tank killing, though they could and did deliver hell against logistics. Given a few years of different development, the German tactics of 1939 might have either failed completely or worked even better.

[–]UnsinkableNippon 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

Ubiquity of the Tigers??...

Anyway, it's a problem of concentration of forces. If you need to defend against an armored thrust, the enemy is going to send 80% of his tanks against 5% of your front - and by nature AT guns can't redeploy fast enough to effectively react, so they need to already be there. And therefore nearly by definition, at the schwerpunkt, AT defenses will always be facing overwhelming odds (which of course was precisely the attacker's intent).

You can try to counter that by having so much AT firepower lying around everywhere that local forces always have a significant AT backbone... That's very wasteful, and that usually didn't really work so well when that meant having to rely primarily on heavy AT guns (this is where Rommel was actually good). Later, cheap and effective RPGs changed that quite a bit.

(Of course it helps if you can predict where the enemy is going to strike and preemptively mass your AT guns -- see Kursk, Seelow...)

You should also try to have fast mobile reserve (... tanks?) ready for fast counter attacks (this could include air support). Ideally you'd have a mix of both, and it's interesting to see how different armies designed their weapons and doctrines to try to efficiently cover the need (balancing resources and local speed / density between organic infantry weapons, self-propelled guns, medium tanks, heavy tanks). That's also where air to gound firepower can prove the most useful, from direct interdiction of AT reserves movement.

Spoiler alert: late-war German designs were unconvincing.

[–]Thirtyk94WWII was a Zionist conspriacy! 3ポイント4ポイント  (2子コメント)

This leads to battles which on paper don't seem very impressive as he only attacked when he had a clear advantage.

But... That's basic a military tactic that's been around for millenia. Sun Tzu talks about exactly this in The Art of War, and I can say with a good amount of certainty that he wasn't the first to come up with the idea.

[–]KebabMaster[S] 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Obviously. I just mean the average person looking back on Monty's victories might write him off in their mind as they see he has more men while they'd be impressed with German victories

[–]dandan_noodles1453 WAS AN INSIDE JOB OTTOMAN CANNON CAN'T BREAK ROMAN WALLS 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

I think people find Monty unimpressive because the availability of superior forces for his victories was something out of his hands; he wasn't running the production planning office or keeping the mediterranean supply line open, he just accumulated forces at a higher rate than his counterpart, which naturally tends toward a relaxed pace of operations.

[–]missch4nandlerbong 11ポイント12ポイント  (1子コメント)

/r/shitwehraboossay

[–]dorylinus 7ポイント8ポイント  (0子コメント)

I thought that too... but disparaging the Allies isn't quite the same as worshipping the Axis, really.

[–]killswitch247Lincoln did nothing wrong. 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

Then facing down a heavily entrenched German army with superior equipment,

i'm pretty sure that the allied forces had significant numerial superiority in manpower, tanks, aircraft, artillery and at guns over the axis forces at the time of the second battle of el alamain

(arguably the first decisive defeat Germany suffered in the war)

battle of moscow don't real

I know Montgomery is a rather unpopular figure. He was very slow and meticulous with his approach to battles, trying his utmost to minimise casualties after what he saw on the Western Front. This leads to battles which on paper don't seem very impressive as he only attacked when he had a clear advantage.

considering that the british (correctly) assumed that they would win any long war as long as they could keep naval and air superiority and keep their casuality number low, monty's strategic approach was exactly what was necessary at that time.

i think montgomerys reputation got a noticable dent with the delayed closing of the falaise pocket and operation market garden, both were operations which failed to advance fast enough.

[–]P-01SGod made men, but RSAF Enfield made them civilized. 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Only fighting winning battles? What a loser!

[–]StreetCane 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

I dont quite get this thread?

Wasn't the Axis in a really shitty position after their offensive was halted?

I was under the impression the British had vastly superior supply lines and by the time of the second battle had a vastly superior army in almost every way? Did the Axis even have sufficient supplies for maintainance?

If I read the OP correct it is pretty much the other way around - really?

Edit: I find this a bit cringeworthy: Montgomery then meticulously re-supplied his troops, fixing the equipment disparity.

How on earth can re-supplying be attributed to Montgomery? Did he carry munitions across the ocean?

[–]mwjk13 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

I know Montgomery is a rather unpopular figure.

Huh, in the UK Monty is very popular. Never knew American's didn't like him.

[–]misko91 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Unrelated: I hold a soft-spot for Field Marshal Montgomery because his forces liberated my grandfather.

[–]antaran 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

I think it's absurd to imply that Montgomery was handed an army in North Africa that was capable of beating back the German and Italian forced. Morale was down massively, the equipment of the army was severely lacking and they had just barely staved off an attack by Rommel where they suffered heavy casualties. Montgomery wasn't just appointed randomly when everything was going well, it was clear that a change was needed.

Monty's legacy of beeing "incompentent" stems mostly from the British operations after D-Day. The British had heavy problems to take over Caen which took much much longer than anticipated and costed a lot of casualties. The same was for the follow-up break-out operations (Operation Goodwood) during which the British also incurred heavy losses. Ultimately the failed Market Garden Operation (for which he lobbied heavily) as well as his posturing during the Battle of the Bulge were most damaging to him in the eyes of the people who criticise Montgomery.

Regarding El Alamain you should also mention that in both battles the Allies had massive superiority in man and arms. Pitted against those 179 tanks in the First battle of El Alamain you speak of were 70 Axis tanks. In the 2nd battle of El Alamain about 200,000 Allies men faced off 116,000 Axis soldiers and 547 Axis tanks against 1,029 Allied tanks.

I dont think Montgomery was a bad general, he finished the African theatre flawlessly - but the first part of the title statement ("With the hand (Montgomery) was dealt in North Africa it would have been very hard for him to lose") is probably indeed true. There was no way any general could loose the battle for Africa at this point when he took over with the massive superiority in arms the Allies had.

Small addition: Rommel wasn't even present for the first part of the 2nd Battle of El Alamain, he was sick in Germany, and was flown only when half of the Battle was already over.

[–]KeyboardChap 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

The British had heavy problems to take over Caen which took much much longer than anticipated and costed a lot of casualties.

This may have had something to do with the 7 German Panzer divisions fighting Commonwealth forces around Caen.

[–]thrawn7979Baby Seal club or Club? 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

Well, seeing as the top 20 battles of WW2 each occurred on the Eastern Front, its baffling why we spend any time debating minor characters like Rommel, Montgomery or Patton?

[–]Askarn 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

That's a misconception as well. For instance Normandy was bloodier than Kursk.