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[–][deleted] 124ポイント125ポイント  (49子コメント)

It sounds like Grey isn't really wanting to discuss history, so much as the philosophy of history and historiography.

While plenty of historians either specialize or will have researched these topics, many have not.

Grey is casting too wide of a net if he is approaching historians in general. It is like if you are going to ask a scientist a question about biology, you are better off speaking to a biologist than a geologist. I'm sure most geologists would give you an educated answer, but they will probably steer the conversation towards their speciality.

[–]Tarlbot 52ポイント53ポイント  (4子コメント)

I'm right on board that Grey is looking more for what I've heard called Economic Geography. If history is a science it is a science still at the Stamp Collecting stage. The paradigm ( Kuhn's definition ) of history doesn't imagine itself as a science, so talking to historians as if history is a science gets you into all the frustration and unhappiness of any people trying to communicate over a paradigm gulf. I haven't read GGS, but discussions about it with geographers might be more fruitful.

Brady mentioned Psychohistory and I think that is a good thing to bring up. If Psychohistory could be real it wouldn't have power at the micro level - it's a macro theory. You can't predict the specific events of a challenger disaster, or an assassination, but you could predict what happens over centuries and continents.

If you take enough snowflakes you get a drift, and you can model drifts as if snowflakes are fungible. Yes snowflakes are individual but in large enough groups those differences don't matter. People are also all different, but once you start looking at millions of us and looking at the whole of society the models can easily work as if people are all the same.

I'm a trainer - I train new groups of people every week, all of them want to imagine that all their problems are completely unique. To me after a while the problems all start looking the same. The same thing happens to teachers in schools. After a while if you defocus your eyes the students look less like magical individual snowflakes, and they start slotting into categories. Lots of people are uncomfortable being reminded that they aren't really that unique to people who don't know us. I think that is big part of why this book makes people grumpy.

Of course none of this is applicable post 1492 My biggest response to that is "whatever makes you sleep at night." I don't think it's anything that happened in 1492 that makes theories like this not useful to us while looking at events in the last 500 years. it's more that theories like this aren't useful at scales that short. In the year 5000 it will be completely reasonable to model history from 1000-2500 with models like this (or economic geography ones)

[–]fabio-mc 23ポイント24ポイント  (42子コメント)

To me sounded like Grey was trying to discuss history as one of the outcomes in a computer simulation, and discussing the basis, the code with which our history has run, which would be a valid thing if everything humans do was determined by trends and luck, not by humans with desire and unpredictable behaviour. The fact that one single man can kill a president or another politician and change the course of history invalidates this view on history, but using this Theory on History as a basis to start a discussion is a good thing IMO. If we managed to find a trend that surely will repeat it could be used to predict, for example, wars or economic crashes.

[–][deleted] 7ポイント8ポイント  (20子コメント)

I suppose there were several problems he encountered. As you've pointed out, there is this question of how valid is a particular theory and (hypothetically) how it could be tested.

Another seems to be his frustration with not finding the answers, or even the discussion he wants to have, and to this problem I would say he is looking in the wrong places. There are many researchers and scholars that for hundreds of years have attempted to develop a grand or critical theory of history, and it is this academic work that may have some answers for him.

[–]Eldorian91 21ポイント22ポイント  (17子コメント)

It'll take more than killing a president for America to colonize Europe.

Stop buying into the Great Man theory of history.

[–]Pedrinho21 27ポイント28ポイント  (1子コメント)

Holy shit what a straw man. I'm not a believer for The Great Man theory but what you just said is not at all the point which those who do believe that theory are not saying.

[–]iamnotafurry 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

The fact that one single man can kill a president or another politician and change the course of history invalidates this view on history

Is that not exactly what he said ?

[–]fabio-mc 9ポイント10ポイント  (14子コメント)

Wait wait, aren't we talking the same thing? I got curious, because my paragraph talks about how humans are unpredictable and history is defined by this. Or are you saying that for every great human in history there would be a substitute in case this person randomly died? There would be a substitute for Einstein, and for Washington, and for Genghis Khan? Because I have no idea what is this Great man theory that you're talking about.

[–]Eldorian91 11ポイント12ポイント  (13子コメント)

Substitutes for Einstein, Washington, and Genghis Khan are still Great Men. I'm not saying those men are replaceable, but that history is caused by more than just a line of Great Men. And at the large scales of continents and millennia, geography seems to be the deciding factor.

[–]Vallerius 67ポイント68ポイント  (3子コメント)

Grey, at several points you asked for a historian to present a cohesive alternative theory of history if we disagree with Diamond. I am not sure anyone can come out and simply present an alternative theory (If someone can please do). However, to me, it appears that academic history is less interested in developing a complete alternate theory of history that explains all historical phenomena than it is in talking about more particular parts of history to find deeper historical meaning. Currently, I think that the absence of a theory might actually be a beneficial part of historical discourse.

In the podcast you ask that if we viewed Diamond's ideas as geocentrism and conceed that at least it is a starting point that would be more preferable than simply not having a theory. I think you have a case to be argued there, but I disagree.

To give you an example, the study of history is in many ways built of off previous historical analysis. These previous generations of historians introduce ideas and argue concepts through presenting examples from points in our past. Younger generations then work off of that foundation (to either build on or criticize the work of the past).

However, this is not always the best method for discovering how things happened in the historical past, for a variety of reasons. Take the idea of Feudalism for example. To simplify a long story, historians in the past presented this picture of medieval Europe as functioning on a socio-political system called Feudalism and provided examples to support that claim. Historians have found the that idea extremely useful in understanding how political, economic, and social relations occurred in medieval europe. However, in constructing this idea of Feudalism, historians have ended up assuming its existence and with few exceptions it is still the model we use to talk about medieval history.

This is incredibly problematic. Elizabeth A. R. Brown in writing the Tyranny of a Construct demonstrated the immense flaws in how we understand feudalism to have existed and how it colors our view of medieval Europe. Indeed, some would go far enough to say that nothing in medieval Europe really looks like we think it does because all of our work is based off of this idea of Feudalism and our limited source material. Thus, we could be getting things profoundly wrong. Those errors effect not just history but affect how we understand philosophy, theology, social relations, politics, etc...

So you can see how simply taking something as a starting point can be a problematic stance. I am one of those people who would prefer to have no concrete starting point and taking events as they are. However, how does that help create an academic discipline and set of ideas and concepts we can adequately talk about and then teach to others.

I think you can see how all of us are at least somewhat dissatisfied with both options. Either we work off of faulty premises or we always have to work from the ground up and severely limit our conclusions about history.

[–]DocQuanta 13ポイント14ポイント  (1子コメント)

I get the impression you are arguing that having historical paradigms, like the idea of medieval Europe being a feudal society, results in distortions giving us a flawed view of history and therefore we should avoid paradigms.

This is a case of throwing the baby out with the bath water. What you are describing is a problem in all fields of study but in other fields the response isn't to get rid of paradigms it is to shift paradigms to one that better fits our current understanding, because without paradigms there is no consensus, there is no large picture understanding of historical events.

[–]Vallerius 9ポイント10ポイント  (0子コメント)

Correct on all counts. I indeed would argue that having paradigms is a better way forward that removing them entirely because we can't be sure they reflect historical reality. However, my main point is to communicate that with paradigms and in extention a larger theory of history, it is easy to spot exceptions to the conclusions we tend to draw. With feudalism we find so many exceptions and varieties of the system that some would argue that the idea has become utterly irrelevant.

That however leaves us without a firm starting point, and it's hard to see how we would go about teaching medieval history in secondary school or in public history settings without such a paradigm. In part some would argue that the problem is merely an academic one, but to me, if we are getting a significant chunk of the story profoundly wrong then the consequences are far reaching and have implications beyond historical study.

[–]Ricardian-tennisfan 7ポイント8ポイント  (0子コメント)

Hello that was really interesting, never knew that about feuadalism as when learning economic history I was always taught to use it as a lens to understand medival economic inequality etc so will research into that. Your point on faulty foundations also applies to Economics. Around the 1970s their was a revolution in economic thought with the increasing acceptance of the that the starting premise of all models should be treating people as completely rational agents and building all models on microfoundations;meaning a model about growth in aggregate in an economy should be built on simple relationships between saving and consumption etc for indiivudal agents. The offshoots of the increasing acceptanc eof this view were theories which said that markets were always efficient and prices of shares stocks were at their intrinsic values. This had two effects one where as all following models were built on these extremely shaky foundations(and economics was at this point increaisngly obsessed with finding a true theory of the economy explaining it all) whihc led to their being a very simplistic understanding of finance and its interactions with the rest of the economy. Also their was little to no attention given to financial bubbles as it's difficult to integrate them into a framework of rational agents and even when some people did ti was ignored. These along with overconficence in the economic profession- stemming from the belief they had 'hacked' the economy and eradicated booms and busts- led to the almost complete ignorance of the profession to the coming financial crisis in 2007. Also accepting ideas of Diamond as a starting base can really effect how you approach a lot of problems especially in development as a geographically deterministic argument which follows from the initial conditions thesisi gives very different policy conclusions on how to develop countries to the wisdom of the power of institutions and the markets..

[–]piwikiwi 145ポイント146ポイント  (79子コメント)

What do I hear? It is the sound of geologists, anthropologists and historians all sharpening their pencils:p

[–]mirozi 47ポイント48ポイント  (69子コメント)

people in /r/badhistory are sharpening their pitchforks from /r/pitchforkemporium. probably this will be badly perceived here, but... i'm with them, not with Grey, no matter what he said in the podcast. but i know that Grey doesn't care about one person that was dissapointed by his actions.

[–]PossibilityZero 143ポイント144ポイント  (32子コメント)

no matter what he said in the podcast

You posted this comment 4 minutes after the podcast is up. I find it absolutely ridiculous that some people are making their minds up without even listening. You don't even know his position!

[–]mmilosh 36ポイント37ポイント  (1子コメント)

This particular discussion has been going on since his Americapox video. It was pretty clear from it how much he took from the book at face value. The larger discussion has been going on since the book was published 18 years ago.

[–]mmilosh 35ポイント36ポイント  (34子コメント)

I'm not at all surprised that he likes it, it fits with his deterministic view of the world (see the discussion on free will for instance).

What did disappoint me is that for someone who does extensive research on his videos and contacts various experts he took that book at face value when making Americapox and lauded it as "history book to rule all history books".

Forget what /r/badhistory says, ask academics who are experts on the subjects, see what they will tell you. Research that was done in the last 10 years has not been kind to that book.

[–]Zagorath 25ポイント26ポイント  (33子コメント)

What did disappoint me is that for someone who does extensive research on his videos and contacts various experts he took that book at face value when making Americapox and lauded it as "history book to rule all history books".

He did that to deliberately troll people just like you. Sounds like it worked.

[–]mmilosh 38ポイント39ポイント  (30子コメント)

Was the 12 minutes of video preceding it also trolling? Because that's the bigger problem.

[–]knassar 27ポイント28ポイント  (21子コメント)

In the podcast he contends that nobody ever disproves or argues against the basic premise of the book, which is the fact that Eurasia had better "initial conditions" for civilisation to start, and, at the risk of sounding glib, the rest was basically history.

[–]model_railroad_alt 19ポイント20ポイント  (4子コメント)

which is the fact that Eurasia had better "initial conditions" for civilisation to start, and, at the risk of sounding glib, the rest was basically history.

While this is certainly entailed by GGS, this is hardly the central premise. GGS sets out to explain the mechanisms by which Eurasia was such a great start. I suspect that virtually all historians would agree that Eurasia succeeded largely due to good conditions, but what those conditions are is an entirely different story.

For analogy, suppose someone said "Karl Marx's central thesis is that capitalism will collapse". Sure, Marx thought that, but simply believing that capitalism will collapse does not make you a Marxist if you don't believe in the mechanics that Marx outlined, and it would be weird to make a video detailing Marx's specific mechanisms, if you only believe in the broader conclusion.

[–]paradocent 21ポイント22ポイント  (3子コメント)

That comment is basically a confession that you've failed to understand what Grey took from the book. You can't say "yes, yes, Grey is right about that, but that's really beside the point of the book"—well, no, books make many different points, and the only real question is whether the one that Grey took from it is right, not whether there are some other points in the book that are wrong and arguably closer to the heart of the author and the author's analysis. If the author of a book states one incredibly insightful, persuasive premise, and then goes on to fill two hundred pages with hogwash, you can't dissect the two hundred pages and show what total nonsense they are and then say (as if by some kind of transitive property) "therefore no one can derive value from that original insight."

One of the key insights that I've taken from Grey is that even terrible books can include useful information. You san't say GTD is pretty terrible, therefore it contains no useful insights; you can't say that E-Myth is pretty terrible, therefore it contains no useful insights; what Grey seems to counsel, and I think this is smart, is, read everything, retain whatever is useful, discard the chaff.

[–]model_railroad_alt 13ポイント14ポイント  (1子コメント)

and the only real question is whether the one that Grey took from it is right

Fair enough. I think it's a bit wrongheaded to say that the only (or even primary) point that Grey takes from GGS is geographical determinism. Why make a whole video about the zoogenesis of plagues (this is one of the things that r/badhistory criticizes GGS for) if that's not the part of the book that Grey found useful?

I would completely agree with you if the Americapox video had used GGS as merely a starting point, and then explained what geographical determinism is. But that isn't what the video was. The video defended not just the broad "initial conditions" thesis, but also the particularities of Diamond's argument.

read everything, retain whatever is useful, discard the chaff.

I don't disagree with this sentiment at all, I'm saying that Grey kept the chaff, but is backpedaling a bit by making it seem like the Americapox video was strictly about the broad initial conditions hypothesis when it wasn't.

[–]WearyTunes 6ポイント7ポイント  (8子コメント)

Check /r/badhistory, we have many specific takedowns of the basic premise of the book.

[–]ForegoneLyrics 10ポイント11ポイント  (7子コメント)

If you listened to the podcast - Grey did admit to deliberately wanting to troll historians with this video.

[–]delta_baryon 20ポイント21ポイント  (1子コメント)

If /u/mmilosh is right and AmericaPox is full of misinformation, why would "trolling historians" make it OK?

[–]ForegoneLyrics 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

No - in fact I think trolling anyone is pointless. My comment was mostly relating to how people should listen to the podcast if we are to be on the same page when discussing it in the comments. Because many of people's concerns have already been addressed by Grey in the podcast - not to say he was completely right (I in fact disagree with a few aspects). But Greys whole point was to move the conversation along and not dwell on the same thing over and over.

[–]harrybenson_ 4ポイント5ポイント  (2子コメント)

Grey did admit to deliberately wanting to troll historians with this video

The problem is that such an action essentially invalidates his entire career as a creator of educational content. It puts into question everything he ever said, every source he's ever used, every recommendation he's ever made. Because if he outright lied just to troll people once (that's what he did, he said GGS is the best history book ever even though he doesn't think it is), he might have done it before and he's likely to do it again. This should be a career annihilating move.

[–]ForegoneLyrics 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

I agree it was a bad move. However I don't see it as severely as you do. Grey has always been open about how he sees himself as primarily an "entertainer" - above "educator." You, along with others, may see him as more than that - but many of us did not hold him to such high esteem in the first place.

In terms of losing his credibility and putting everything he ever did and ever will do into question - I also don't agree. For instance, there have been a few episodes of SciShow based on questionable research and later - Hank Green, host of SciShow admitted to those episodes being misleading and not well researched. While I was a bit disappointed, and will certainly watch SciShow with more of a grain of salt from now on - I don't think it invalidates everything they ever do because of a few mistakes in the past.

And that's the same way I feel about Grey - I will also take things he says (past and present) with more of a grain of salt now - but at the end of they day he's just an entertaining guy I like to listen to sometimes.

[–][deleted] 56ポイント57ポイント  (11子コメント)

Alright, finally signed up for thereddit because of Guns Germs and Steel.

I will preface by saying that I am not vehemently anti-GG&S, but there are certainly large-scale arguments to be made here, not just quibbling over historical minutia.

Regarding the issue of geographic determinism, this is an argument which feels and sounds good, but it has serious problems.

The first thing we need to tackle here is the issue of complexity theory (a.k.a. chaos theory). There is little doubt that the on-the-ground mechanisms in human development are highly complex, but without the ability to run a system multiple times with similar inputs, we can't really tell what sort of large-scale patterns this complexity creates. Some complex systems converge upon a very likely scenario while other complex systems are multi-polar or even non-polar in the distribution of outcomes.

These are ideas which Brady was touching on, but seemed to lack the energy to push very hard. One is how sensitive to or resilient against small changes to the scenario the large-scale patterns are. Historians argue about this sort of thing all the time when they ask how important was Franz Ferdinand's assassination to the way that WWI played out or whether WWII would have been substantively different had Hitler been killed in the army. A resilient system would still have had those wars play out in similar ways while a sensitive or divergent system would hinge on the details of the actions of these important people. This is one reason Historians start looking down in the weeds when they get upset at geographic determinism.

The other issue Brady brought up was how our view on the important aspects in history is dependent upon our understanding of how that history unfolded. It isn't at all clear that, had the people of Australia dominated humanity in a way similar to Europe that we would judge it as a fluke where everyone else had so many advantages. We very well could look upon Australia's isolation and relatively harsh environment with a relatively small population as being the key factors in Australian excellence. By maintaining small populations they were able to avoid the destructive conflicts which plagued the rest of the world. A lack of easy crops and animals required greater ingenuity as necessity is the mother of invention. Etc, etc. If human development is less convergent, then any perspective, including the perspective we have, will give us all sorts of non-causal correlations.

This last issue becomes particularly difficult if you try to explain why it was Europe and not India, China, Persia, or the Arabs who found themselves on top when it counted. To say that 'somebody in Eurasia' is most likely to do what Europe did overlooks the vast size, diversity, and complexity of Eurasia and the fact that over a rather short period of time, all sorts of different societies appeared to be culturally and technologically superior to others.

Take the Arabs, for instance. While the cultural stagnation of the European 'dark age' is certainly overblown, the Arab Caliphates was politically dominant and academically superior to their neighbors for generations despite having many disadvantages such as vast regions of low-productivity land for food and lumber production. It is difficult to explain why they achieved what they did and why they failed to sustain it under the rubric provided in GG&S.

This is a common pattern throughout history; a society will enter into a period of cultural and political expansion, sustain it for a bit, and then stagnate and decline. Is it that Europe had it easy, or that they were actually failing and stumbled into one of these expansions at the right moment? In many ways, the Bubonic Plague can be seen as causing a cultural expansion in Europe by causing just enough cultural and political disruption.

I find myself wandering, so I will get to the request. Grey wanted an alternate theory of history.

It isn't that the plants and animals that we have come to depend on for food were particularly plentiful in one place or another, it is that agricultural and pastoral traditions were developed during a surge of creativity in a particular place and radiated out. There is no reason that the agricultural revolution happened where it did, but because it happened to be there, different places were advantaged and disadvantaged.

Agriculture spread where these early domesticated plants would grow well, and since they didn't grow well in Africa, their cultures tended to reject intense agriculture. Where agriculture spread, agriculturalists invested in finding more local organisms to domesticate.

Cultural developments in the agricultural zone happened in fits and starts, but agriculturalists were first and just kept being first. Agriculturalist societies tended to interact with each other more compatibly than with Africa and Oceanea and the Americas were just too disconnected to get the memo in time.

This differs from Diamond's view in many ways. It suggests that there is no real problem to developing in the Americas, just that the population was relatively sparse and culturally isolated from the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa, similarly, was excluded, not because of some deep geographic problem dooming them to never do it, just that there was a cultural divergence which limited the spread of a crucial technology.

It does have some compatibilities with Diamond's approach, particularly the idea that the latitudinal orientation of Eurasia is what allowed agriculture to spread over that region more than others, but it doesn't require that there be magic crops and animals which are more likely to grow and live in those latitudes.

I find it wholly unconvincing that pre-domesticated work animals were particularly well-suited to domestication. It seems much more likely that domestication of these animals was possible due to relatively chance cultural developments and that these developments happened to occur with animals which we now think of as easier to domesticate. Could the North American bison have been domesticated given similar cultural pressures and time? I have no doubt. If this is the case, then there is no inherent geographic reason there was no sturdy American work animal other than the relative isolation of the Americas from the origins of humanity resulting in such a late settlement.

[–]Firesky7 8ポイント9ポイント  (6子コメント)

It seems like your position isn't as far removed from Diamond's theory as you portray.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems that your argument is this:

  • Agriculture developed in a specific region, then spread.

  • Agriculture gave some sort of advantage to cultures that utilized it

  • Cultures that didn't tend towards agriculture did so because of geographic and biologic reasons.

That seems pretty close to what Diamond posits. Mind you, I haven't read the book, but it seems like his general premise that agriculture set societies on a fairly similar path, and Europe/Asia were the two best spots for that given the starting conditions isn't too out of line.

I'd also like to put a little more focus on Grey's line that this theory falls apart when cultures collide. I think that that's a very needed point, as cultural mixing throws everything out the window, and the theory is causes you to get "lost in the weeds" because of it after then.

[–][deleted] 13ポイント14ポイント  (5子コメント)

There is a subtle distinction which I don't see reflected in your description.

Diamond's theory says that agriculture's discovery and adoption was driven by geographic and biological concerns completely separate from human culture. My argument is that this is a culturally driven process which interacts with geographic concerns in a complex way.

Diamond says that agriculture happened where it did because the biology of the region was particularly suited to agriculture. I am saying that it happened the way it did based largely on chance and the biology of agriculture is a human cultural artifact. The circumstances leading to the agricultural revolution were based, not on favorable geography, but on insights which could have occurred anywhere with similar probability for any similarly sized population in a minimally hospitable environment. The fact of the place that it happened and the biology which emerged favored certain climates over others and cultural proximity to its discovery over being farther away, but it could have happened, say, in Western Africa with not dissimilar probability and had it done so, we would have seen a completely different agricultural biology which would have been much less Eurasian friendly.

this theory falls apart when cultures collide

It really depends quite a bit on what you want the theory to accomplish and the complexity you attribute to the pre-colonial world. Diamond's theory is trying to claim that non-human geographic concerns make it most probable that a population in Europe would be in a cultural position to dominate the world at the point that we see European colonialism. By that measure, it doesn't matter what things look like once that contact occurs.

However, the theory that I am suggesting says that the only geographical preferences were based on the hunter-gatherer distribution of human populations prior to the agricultural revolution and that the complexity of this world is such that within those bounds, the outcomes are extremely noisy and thus uncertain. By that measure, the world-wide cultural expansion of Europe doesn't mark that dramatic of a change in the pattern of complex cultural interactions dictating the large-scale course of events pitting societies with different cultural traditions of food production intensity against each other.

[–]DocQuanta 4ポイント5ポイント  (1子コメント)

First, Grey at least doesn't believe Europe had an advantage, he believes Euraisa had an advantage. It could very well have been the Chinese or the Mughals or the Ottomans who ended up colonizing the world. But that it was far less likely for the Americans, Australians or the sub Saharan Africans would have done so because of severe geographic disadvantages. And the one I think is the biggest that you yourself briefly touch on is isolation.

The dissemination of ideas from disparate cultures has to be one of the great geographic advantages for Eurasia. Advances in agriculture, animal husbandry, metallurgy, philosophy ect spread throughout the continent, with each culture building on each others' progress and keeping the progress going even when one goes into temporary decline.

As for your final point on the domestication of bison, you are right, it isn't impossible. Elephants are at least as tricky to domesticate, probably more so, but they have been domesticated, somewhat. The point though is that it is very hard. Going from no prior concept of domestication to the domestication of bison is very unlikely. On the other hand, if you have already domesticated much more manageable animals and so already have a culture that understands the value of domestication it give the people an incentive to try to domesticate some of the less favorable animals. But even then, in the case of elephants the domestication has largely been a failure.

Sure things could have been different. Some Americans could have had the idea of animal husbandry earlier and domesticated horses in the Americas before they were wiped out. But if you start the scenario after the good domestication candidates have already gone extinct then the Americans have a real big disadvantage.

[–][deleted] 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

Grey at least doesn't believe Europe had an advantage, he believes Euraisa had an advantage. It could very well have been the Chinese or the Mughals or the Ottomans who ended up colonizing the world. But that it was far less likely for the Americans,

But the reasons for this difference are very different. Diamond's reasoning is that there is an inherent non-human advantage for Eurasian dominance provided by the suitability of biology and climate for agriculture. I am turning this on its head and saying that suitable agricultural biology is a product of culture. In this way, the only advantages that Eurasia had over, say, the Americas was ease of access to pre-agricultural humanity and thus more people to figure out agriculture earlier.

The dissemination of ideas from disparate cultures has to be one of the great geographic advantages for Eurasia.

This doesn't explain why Eastern Africa failed to be part of the story.

The point though is that it is very hard. Going from no prior concept of domestication to the domestication of bison is very unlikely.

This is my position, not Diamond's. Diamond says that Bison are inherently unsuitable for domestication. His general thesis is that wherever humans went, they were successful at domesticating the suitable animals and the Americas got the short end of the stick. The position I am making is that domestication from scratch is difficult and a bit of a cultural fluke, particularly for cultures without an established tradition of domestication. The disadvantages of the Americas were that they simply didn't generate the intense agriculture meme until much later and in a different form than in SW Asia.

[–]Pyromane_Wapusk 6ポイント7ポイント  (1子コメント)

I disagree about the bison. I think that whether domestication is possible or not depends on the species in question and its biology and less on the culture of the people at hand. Here's an /r/AskAnthropology thread handling that question though.

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskAnthropology/comments/3b65uf/why_was_the_american_bison_never_domesticated/

[–][deleted] 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

I am very aware of the arguments around this topic, but given the lack of strong experimental data, it is an extremely difficult area to make strong assertions. In particular, it isn't at all clear what the pre-human-interaction behavior of these populations were like. Humans have had extreme impacts on the makeup of wild animal populations based on the cultural demands of the humans involved. It very well could take several thousand years of a particular sort of management strategy available to pre-agricultural humans to manipulate a species to be susceptible to domestication. Bison just haven't been managed in this way, so their modern incarnation appears different today.

[–]icoup 25ポイント26ポイント  (4子コメント)

Re: Manufacturing a Murder

One of the more convincing theories that was posted online was that it was basically a double frame job. Someone who knew Steven killed her and knew that the police would look at him first, so put her remains/car on his property. Then the police framed him as well by planting more evidence when they found her remains to ensure a conviction.

Here's the thread on /r/MakingaMurderer.

Definitely makes the most sense to me. Thoughts /u/MindOfMetalAndWheels and /u/JeffDujon? This would almost satisfy both of your points of view.

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

That's a possibility I hadn't considered. Interesting.

[–]devotedpupa 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

Such a human possibility. I doesn't sound Machiavellian it sounds like human malice and incompetence piled up, which I can totally buy. Love conspiracy theories based on "Humans are dumb".

[–]Gnobel 92ポイント93ポイント  (4子コメント)

still waiting for the chickflick episode! :D

[–]renweard 45ポイント46ポイント  (13子コメント)

I think a better way of reading Diamond's argument in GGS is to think of climate vs. weather.

Weather is unpredictable in a similar way that political regimes and policies are unpredictable. There are too many interactions and unknown mechanisms to make precise measurements of future events.

Climate, however, is the emergent property of environmental factors flowing through known mechanisms over large expanses. Likewise, GGS should not be interpreted as a weather-level Farmer's Almanac, but a study in what makes up the "climate" of human history.

[–]piwikiwi 10ポイント11ポイント  (12子コメント)

Likewise, GGS should not be interpreted as a weather-level Farmer's Almanac, but a study in what makes up the "climate" of human history.

I think that this analogy fall apart in some ways because you can measure climate, but you can't really measure history.

[–]jacob8015 3ポイント4ポイント  (9子コメント)

I believe that you can. You can generally say that the people of Europe were able to influence the world as a whole more than say, the peoples of Africa.

[–]Pyromane_Wapusk 7ポイント8ポイント  (8子コメント)

But you can't redo the 'experiment', I think considering historical models for long scales is a good exercise, but we only have a single datapoint to compare to. So it is not possible to really check any historical theory or model experimentally.

[–]JacksSmirknRevenge 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

But this applies to climate as well. You can't redo climate. You only have the single datapoint to compare to.

[–]Pyromane_Wapusk 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

Climate is based on repeated measurements and observations. It's essentially the 'average' weather. And it's partly based on the assumption that the weather today doesn't have much influence on the weather a month from now or a year from now. To oversimplify, each day is kinda like rolling a die where there isn't a uniform distribution in outcomes (meaning the die isn't fair) and the die's outcome is the weather for that day. You can figure out what the weather is likely to be in January of next year by looking all the Januaries of the past 100 years.

You maybe could make similar historical models that say predict times of warfare or economic upheaval etc. based on 'averaging' past wars and economic upheavals. For instance, by looking wars over the past 2000 years, you might be able to predict when times of conlfict were going to happen by knowing that something happens immediately before a war takes place. Let's suppose major economic upheavel in a particular precedes major warfare there by about 5-10 years. That's a model you could use history to test without doing the experiment since history provides hundreds if not thousands of examples of wars and economic upheavals.

But GG&S is talking about something a bit bigger and broader than that. History doesn't provided hundreds of examples of the world being conquered/dominated so it's hard to know what needs to be the same and what can be different and still give more or less the same outcome.

[–]NorwegianWood28 17ポイント18ポイント  (4子コメント)

Do you two talk differently in podcasts than you do in real life?

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 28ポイント29ポイント  (3子コメント)

I talk differently in my videos than real life. The podcast is how I sound (mostly) when I'm talking to people.

[–]NorwegianWood28 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

I noticed that, I think. Your voice in the UK video sounds a lot different than in your newer videos.

I feel that a lot of podcasters (Roman Mars for example) try to make their voice "radio" and it just doesn't turn out well.

Thanks for your reply.

[–]Zagorath 148ポイント149ポイント  (92子コメント)

Okay, to all those that are doubtless going to come and criticise Grey, including some who probably won't have listened to it, here is the crux of Grey's argument. Try to keep on topic rather than arguing about the book more generally.

The thing that I find interesting and valuable in Guns, Germs, and Steel, that I almost never see the critics argue against, is the theory that the book presents. Guns, Germs, and Steel gives to me gives a very simple but very basic theory of history. It's a theory that only operates on very long time scales, and over continent-sized human divisions, but it is still nonetheless a theory. Because I think it makes if not a testable prediction, a question that you can ask about the world where you can say look, if we were to rewind the clock and play history again, what would you expect would happen? And the Guns, Germs, and Steel answer is that, because Eurasia, the whole of Eurasia, is more susceptible to human technological flourishing, let's say you should expect 80% of the time that the first to colonial technology, that happens in Eurasia. And maybe 10% of the time it happens in Africa, and like 5% of the time it happens in North America, and like 1% of the time it happens in Australia. Not that it could never happen, but it is just extraordinarily unlikely. And so that to me is the interesting thing; it is this theory of history.

And so in many ways, like, I agree with tonnes of the criticism about the particulars in the book, and tonnes of the details that Jared Diamond gets wrong, because Jared Diamond is not a professional historian, he's an ecologist. That to me is the value of this book, and I think that is very interesting. But then this then trips in historians into an idea that you can not say geography is destiny. Historians are very, very, strongly against this idea, for reasons that I find difficult to understand. And every time that I get into an argument, or I see arguments that take place over the book, what usually happens is, just as so many of these things, different sides are arguing different things. Like, I want to have a conversation about what is the current state of the theory of history? Like, has much progress been made about the theory of history? But then a historian wants to argue with me about why was it Spain who was the first to Meso-America, and why did Spain lose their lead to the United Kingdom. And my view is always okay, but that's too small. We want to talk about continent levels here, not particular countries. This is not meant to tell you why a particular country came about. It's only here to give you an estimation that people on a particular continent will be the ones to colonise the world. That's my view of this book.

Fwiw, I say this as someone who has neither read the book nor its criticism. I don't have a personal opinion on the matter. I'm just presenting this to make a clear frame of reference to make sure people are arguing the right thing and not going on about irrelevant details. That bit about "different sides are arguing different things" is the main thing I'm trying to help us avoid this time around.

[–]mmilosh 75ポイント76ポイント  (80子コメント)

And the Guns, Germs, and Steel answer is that, because Eurasia, the whole of Eurasia, is more susceptible to human technological flourishing, let's say you should expect 80% of the time that the first to colonial technology, that happens in Eurasia. And maybe 10% of the time it happens in Africa, and like 5% of the time it happens in North America, and like 1% of the time it happens in Australia. Not that it could never happen, but it is just extraordinarily unlikely. And so that to me is the interesting thing; it is this theory of history.

This theory of geographical determinism is nothing new. It's been used in the 19th/20th century to justify imperialism and colonialism and fell out of academic discourse after the 1920s or so. Now that's not what JD is trying to do but the fundamental problem is that the arguments he makes for his particular brand of geographical determinism have been thoroughly debunked.

The way I understand it, culture and technology are understood to be (partly) the result of human decisions of how to overcome geographical limitations or take advantage of geographical advantages, not something that is determined by it.

For someone who essentially doesn't think people have free will (and thus they can't really make decisions), it's no small wonder that Grey doesn't get why historians are so very strongly against JD's idea.

There's absolutely nothing that tells us that if we started the whole thing all over again with the same geography, that things couldn't have been completely different.

And so in many ways, like, I agree with tonnes of the criticism about the particulars in the book, and tonnes of the details that Jared Diamond gets wrong, because Jared Diamond is not a professional historian, he's an ecologist.

I've seen this sort of response many times on the internet, usually when dealing with Dan Carlin and Jared Diamond fans. 'Well he's not a historian' is not really a defense if you're trying to present history. If I wrote a new theory of physics and got all the formulas wrong and none of my evidence held up to scrutiny you wouldn't say 'oh well he's not a physicist'. You'd say 'look at that crackpot'.

But then a historian wants to argue with me about why was it Spain who was the first to Meso-America, and why did Spain lose their lead to the United Kingdom. And my view is always okay, but that's too small. We want to talk about continent levels here, not particular countries. This is not meant to tell you why a particular country came about. It's only here to give you an estimation that people on a particular continent will be the ones to colonise the world. That's my view of this book.

If you're making an argument that the spread of plagues from the Old World to the New World was a huge deal in how the history of colonization of South America turned out, you can't then not want to get into the details of how it actually happened. It's the legs of the argument that Americapox stands on.

EDIT: clarification

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 81ポイント82ポイント  (60子コメント)

The way I understand it, culture and technology are understood to be (partly) the result of human decisions of how to overcome geographical limitations or take advantage of geographical advantages, not something that is determined by it. For someone who essentially doesn't think people have free will (and thus they can't really make decisions), it's no small wonder that Grey doesn't get why historians are so very strongly against JD's idea. There's absolutely nothing that tells us that if we started the whole thing all over again with the same geography, that things couldn't have been completely different.

I really wanted to bring up culture / free will on the podcast but the conversation didn't end up going that way. Your points are the next steps in the conversation whenever I talk with / see arguments about GG&S. Here are the questions I never get satisfying answers to:

  1. I don't believe in free will, but let's grant for the sake of argument that it exists. Humans don't have the ability to choose from unlimited options. Desert nomads can't decide to become an agrarian society unless the resources are available in their environment. Does the current stance of history concede that human decisions are constrained by environment?
  2. If so then doesn't it follow that some environments present more options for societies to choose a path of technological development? And thus humans living in those locations are more likely to end up in technological advancing societies with options for empire?
  3. If not the above, is the conclusion that a Theory of History is a fundamentally impossible task? (Some historians seem to say yes: that the best we can ever do is keep a detailed log book of everything that happened everywhere and there is zero predictability -- implying that there is nothing in the past that can predict the future better than random guessing.)
  4. If a Theory of History is impossible, is the current stance of history that if we rewind the clock to 10,000BC that Eskimos and Aborigines were just as likely to build world-conquering civilizations as Eurasians were they only to choose to?

[–]mmilosh 71ポイント72ポイント  (56子コメント)

I don't believe in free will, but let's grant for the sake of argument that it exists. Humans don't have the ability to choose from unlimited options. Desert nomads can't decide to become an agrarian society unless the resources are available in their environment. Does the current stance of history concede that human decisions are constrained by environment?

Affected by the environment - yes, determined by it - no. People living in the desert can't just decide to become an agrarian society, but it's not like this is the only way. This is an example I keep bringing up all the time, but Palmyra built a prosperous society with distinct art and architecture, and all the things that in Western imagination are typically associated with civilization - wealth, monuments, colonies. They were in the middle of the desert.

Or lets take the Mongols. They held the largest land empire in the world for a time, and the steppes are not what one normally thinks of when you say geographical advantage that leads to a development of an agrarian society.

If so then doesn't it follow that some environments present more options for societies to choose a path of technological development? And thus humans living in those locations are more likely to end up in technological advancing societies with options for empire?

There is no one path of technological development nor a 'tech tree'. Tenochtitlan was one of the biggest cities of the world at the time when the Spanish arrived, and they also had an empire of their own. In a general sense, people through history were perfectly capable of using gunpowder and rifles when they got hold of them. Gunpowder wasn't a European invention, after all.

The point is, conquest of the Americas by the Europeans was not in any way inevitable. Many conquistadors failed where Cortes succeeded. That conquest was a result of a very specific set of circumstances, not geographical determinism. That's why people are getting in all those very specific arguments rather than talking about the continental big picture.

If not the above, is the conclusion that a Theory of History is a fundamentally impossible task? (Some historians seem to say yes: that the best we can ever do is keep a detailed log book of everything that happened everywhere and there is zero predictability -- implying that there is nothing in the past that can predict the future better than random guessing.)

I don't know if it's impossible. I fell in love with the idea of psychohistory by Asimov way back in high school, but I have yet to see any sort of 'historical law' that holds up on a large scale and for a very long time. Human societies and interactions between them are complex and devising a system that could accurately predict human behavior might require a system that's even more complex than the system you're trying to describe.

If a Theory of History is impossible, is the current stance of history that if we rewind the clock to 10,000BC that Eskimos and Aborigines were just as likely to build world-conquering civilizations as Eurasians were they only to choose to?

Historians don't like what-ifs. :)

To your question, I don't see the Inuits building a world conquering empire, but I don't see that as a sort of measure of their success. They have adapted to their environment and survived for thousands of years in a place I wouldn't visit as a tourist.

They could have made very bad choices over the centuries and not survived, though.

EDIT: fixed error

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 74ポイント75ポイント  (28子コメント)

I don't believe in free will, but let's grant for the sake of argument that it exists. Humans don't have the ability to choose from unlimited options. Desert nomads can't decide to become an agrarian society unless the resources are available in their environment. Does the current stance of history concede that human decisions are constrained by environment?

Affected by the environment - yes, determined by it - no. People living in the desert can't just decide to become an agrarian society, but it's not like this is the only way. This is an example I keep bringing up all the time, but Palmyra built a prosperous society with distinct art and architecture, and all the things that in Western imagination are typically associated with civilization - wealth, monuments, colonies. They were in the middle of the desert.

Or lets take the Mongols. They held the largest land empire in the world for a time, and the steppes are not what one normally thinks of when you say geographical advantage that leads to a development of an agrarian society.

Just to be clear: no one, not Diamond, not me, not anyone I've seen defending Diamond is arguing for determinism. That is the infuriating self-constructed totem for historians in this argument.

If humans are affected by the environment then we can say that not all humans everywhere are equally likely to make the same decisions because the environment is different. So some groups of early humans are more likely to do things that will eventually lead to greater technological development than other groups of humans.

I feel like this argument is me trying to say: 'throwing a pair of six-sided dice is more likely to get a seven than a twelve. And historians reply by saying: "look at all these twelves I rolled!". Yes, but what percentage of the total are those twelves?

If so then doesn't it follow that some environments present more options for societies to choose a path of technological development? And thus humans living in those locations are more likely to end up in technological advancing societies with options for empire?

There is no one path of technological development nor a 'tech tree'. Tenochtitlan was one of the biggest cities of the world at the time when the Spanish arrived, and they also had an empire of their own. In a general sense, people through history were perfectly capable of using gunpowder and rifles when they got hold of them. Gunpowder wasn't a European invention, after all.

The point is, conquest of the Americas by the Europeans was not in any way inevitable. Many conquistadors failed where Cortes succeeded. That conquest was a result of a very specific set of circumstances, not geographical determinism. That's why people are getting in all those very specific arguments rather than talking about the continental big picture.

There is resistance to the tech tree metaphor from historical quarters that I have a hard time understanding. Perhaps a 'tech web' (like that awful one from Civilization: Beyond Earth is better, but the development of guns requires not only gunpowder (which is possible to make without a huge amount of tech) but also precision metal working which is much harder.

No matter how you slice it, no one jumps from stone tools to semi-conductors.

As for the conquest of the Americas being inevitable, I too would agree that is incorrect and too strong a claim. But if at the time of first contact, you had to wager your life on who would win that conflict I think you, and everyone else, in your heart of hearts would wager on the guys with the guns and the horses and the ocean-crossing ships and not on the very large, but still largely agrarian society, without war animals, iron armor, or wheels.

If not the above, is the conclusion that a Theory of History is a fundamentally impossible task? (Some historians seem to say yes: that the best we can ever do is keep a detailed log book of everything that happened everywhere and there is zero predictability -- implying that there is nothing in the past that can predict the future better than random guessing.)

I don't know if it's impossible. I fell in love with the idea of psychohistory by Asimov way back in high school, but I have yet to see any sort of 'historical law' that holds up on a large scale and for a very long time. Human societies and interactions between them are complex and devising a system that could accurately predict human behavior might require a system that's even more complex than the system you're trying to describe.

I completely agree with the last sentence of your second paragraph given the phrase 'accurately predict'. I literally think the Theory of History in GG&S makes no stronger claim than: "Eurasia (all of freaking Eurasia) was more likely than other places to develop societies interested in, and able to execute, Empires." That's not a very precise claim, but it's still better than: all of history is unpredictable.

If a Theory of History is impossible, is the current stance of history that if we rewind the clock to 10,000BC that Eskimos and Aborigines were just as likely to build world-conquering civilizations as Eurasians were they only to choose to?

Historians don't like what-ifs. :)

To your question, I don't see the Inuits building a world conquering empire, but I don't see that as a sort of measure of their success. They have adapted to their environment and survived for thousands of years in a place I wouldn't visit as a tourist.

They could have made very bad choices over the centuries and not survived, though.

I understand that historians don't like what-ifs. By asking about people struggling to survive at the absolute ends of the Earth I'm trying to get to the heart of the matter: do you think it's less likely that people living on a sheet of ice in 10,000BC will be the ones that conquer the world?

If you'll concede that one group of humans anywhere on the face of the Earth is less likely to do something because of their environment then that's all we need to start Moneyballing history.

[–]mmilosh 68ポイント69ポイント  (13子コメント)

Just to be clear: no one, not Diamond, not me, not anyone I've seen defending Diamond is arguing for determinism. That is the infuriating self-constructed totem for historians in this argument.

You've argued in your Americapox video that (I'm paraphrasing): Domesticated animals in the Old World lead to bigger population density that lead to urbanization and plagues and the lack of domesticated animals in the New World lead to less domesticated animals and less population density and no plagues. Not to get into the specific problems with that argument (plagues coming from domestic animals, plagues wiping out the New World), your conclusion is very deterministic:

"The game of civilization has nothing to do with the players and everything to do with the map."

If humans are affected by the environment then we can say that not all humans everywhere are equally likely to make the same decisions because the environment is different. So some groups of early humans are more likely to do things that will eventually lead to greater technological development than other groups of humans.

I'm not arguing against the idea that geography has an effect on development of human societies.

Each society developed technologies to overcome their own specific geographical limitations. For instance, Incas dug terrace farms into the side of the mountain, and while they didn't have domesticated animals to pull their plows, they constructed tools like the human-powered foot plow and they built a road system to distribute crops. It's quite a complex agricultural system by any standard.

You could also look at the Maya and Yoruba. Yoruba used extensive iron implements including sharp machetes, and yet Maya were able to cultivate tropical forest environments far more intensively. Not to drag this point on much further but it doesn't automatically follow that the rise of early civilizations is closely linked with better quality of farming implements.

Once we get to development of smelting which allows mass production of farming tools then factors like iron and farm animals to pull the ploughs, come into play to a much larger extent to increase the agricultural output of societies that have access to them.

That doesn't really mean that these societies and cultures were doomed to fail and be destroyed by invasion. But we'll get to that in a minute.

I feel like this argument is me trying to say: 'throwing a pair of six-sided dice is more likely to get a seven than a twelve. And historians reply by saying: "look at all these twelves I rolled!". Yes, but what percentage of the total are those twelves?

If you're saying that certain geographical features give advantages to the people who live there, I'm not arguing against that.

There is resistance to the tech tree metaphor from historical quarters that I have a hard time understanding. Perhaps a 'tech web' (like that awful one from Civilization: Beyond Earth is better, but the development of guns requires not only gunpowder (which is possible to make without a huge amount of tech) but also precision metal working which is much harder.

Well, 'tech tree' is resisted because it isn't considered to be a good model for what happened in reality. History of technological development is not my expertise, so I'll have to leave it at that. I'm reluctant to give a half baked explanation because my inbox is already on fire for posting in this thread.

As for the conquest of the Americas being inevitable, I too would agree that is incorrect and too strong a claim. But if at the time of first contact, you had to wager your life on who would win that conflict I think you, and everyone else, in your heart of hearts would wager on the guys with the guns and the horses and the ocean-crossing ships and not on the very large, but still largely agrarian society, without war animals, iron armor, or wheels.

/u/anthropology_nerd did a much better job than I ever could do in his 'Myths of Conquest' series of posts on /r/badhistory. The relevant one for this is here. If you search that subreddit for 'Myths of Conquest', all of them should show up.

In short, Cortes arrived in the middle of a civil war. Many expeditions like his failed before, and his success wasn't a foregone conclusion (he was fortunate to cheat death many times) nor due to the technological advantage. The army that destroyed the Triple Alliance capital was mostly native.

In the long run, European conquest of the Americas wasn't a foregone conclusion. Launching a continental invasion against a united empire on their native terrain, supplying enough food, gunpowder, animal feed to supply it using sailboats, and dealing with all the tropical diseases? It took the Spanish centuries to accomplish what they did, things being as they are, I wouldn't be quick to jump to conclusions what would have happened otherwise. These guys were playing the game of Empires themselves, and the population didn't just roll over for the Spanish even after that initial enormous success.

In one alternate reality the Europeans might have figured that trading guns and metals and horses for all that gold was more profitable than launching one failed expedition after another. Who knows.

I completely agree with the last sentence of your second paragraph given the phrase 'accurately predict'. I literally think the Theory of History in GG&S makes no stronger claim than: "Eurasia (all of freaking Eurasia) was more likely than other places to develop societies interested in, and able to execute, Empires." That's not a very precise claim, but it's still better than: all of history is unpredictable. I completely agree with the last sentence of your second paragraph given the phrase 'accurately predict'. I literally think the Theory of History in GG&S makes no stronger claim than: "Eurasia (all of freaking Eurasia) was more likely than other places to develop societies interested in, and able to execute, Empires." That's not a very precise claim, but it's still better than: all of history is unpredictable.

It's hard to argue the what-ifs. We have no way of testing it one way or another.

Not knowing any history, if I gave you a full description of geography of villages in Europe in 700 BC, what would it take to predict which one would conquer Europe? Would that be even possible?

If I showed you the Mongol tribes living on the steppes, not knowing any history, what would make you say 'yes, these guys seem to be living in just the right sort of environment to conquer the largest contiguous empire in history. Look at all this potential.'

History just seems to be completely unpredictable and chaotic. Freak accidents happen all the time. Mongol armies get wiped out by typhoons while invading Japan, not once, but twice in eight years or so. Those types of freak accidents had a huge impact on history, and they happened all the freaking time.

When it comes to people changing their course of history, Japan completely overhauled their feudal system, threw out the 250 year old foreign policy book of isolation, and started industrializing in record time after the Americans showed up in gunboats. It was the most impressive overhaul of society in a short amount of time I know of, and relatively bloodless by the standards of European revolutions. There are many counter examples in history where people stuck to their own ways despite changing circumstances. Why did the Japanese choose this course of action and others throughout history didn't? It's complicated, and the more you get into it, the more it gets into the specifics of their particular situation and broad generalizations like 'X and Y have more chance of doing Z because geography' make less and less sense and like after-the-fact observations.

I understand that historians don't like what-ifs. By asking about people struggling to survive at the absolute ends of the Earth I'm trying to get to the heart of the matter: do you think it's less likely that people living on a sheet of ice in 10,000BC will be the ones that conquer the world?

Why is conquering the world a measure of one's historical success?

If you'll concede that one group of humans anywhere on the face of the Earth is less likely to do something because of their environment then that's all we need to start Moneyballing history.

This isn't something I've ever disputed. Geography has an effect on development of society. But there's too much general chaos to even call it a decisive factor. There's people everywhere making it messy with their free will and decisions. :>

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 27ポイント28ポイント  (7子コメント)

Apologies for not quoting all comments in full. Curse your character limit, reddit!

Just to be clear: no one, not Diamond, not me, not anyone I've seen defending Diamond is arguing for determinism. That is the infuriating self-constructed totem for historians in this argument.

You've argued in your Americapox video that [...] Domesticated animals in the Old World lead to bigger population density that lead to urbanization and plagues and the lack of domesticated animals in the New World lead to less domesticated animals and less population density and no plagues. [...] , your conclusion is very deterministic: "The game of civilization has nothing to do with the players and everything to do with the map."

Determinism is not a claim that statement makes. I think historians want to hear their opponents arguing for determinism because it's an easy claim to shoot down. I think you can make a statistical prediction about where empires will appear based on continents not people. That's why the game of civilization has everything to do with the map.

If humans are affected by the environment then we can say that not all humans everywhere are equally likely to make the same decisions because the environment is different. So some groups of early humans are more likely to do things that will eventually lead to greater technological development than other groups of humans.

I'm not arguing against the idea that geography has an effect on development of human societies.

Let's come back this below...

Each society developed technologies to overcome their own specific geographical limitations. For instance, Incas dug terrace farms into the side of the mountain, and while they didn't have domesticated animals to pull their plows, they constructed tools like the human-powered foot plow and they built a road system to distribute crops. It's quite a complex agricultural system by any standard.

Agreed. Different places have different problems to overcome.

You could also look at the Maya and Yoruba. Yoruba used extensive iron implements including sharp machetes, and yet Maya were able to cultivate tropical forest environments far more intensively. [...] it doesn't automatically follow that the rise of early civilizations is closely linked with better quality of farming implements.

Intensity of cultivation is not the same thing as efficiency of cultivation. But again, I agree: different societies make tools specific to their situation.

Once we get to development of smelting which allows mass production of farming tools then factors like iron and farm animals to pull the ploughs, come into play to a much larger extent to increase the agricultural output of societies that have access to them. That doesn't really mean that these societies and cultures were doomed to fail [...]

You don't need mass production and iron to make use of domesticated animals. An Ard (a pre-plow) can be made out of wood. Lots of animals can produce food without needing iron.

Again, please stop using worlds like 'doomed' that imply inevitability I don't claim.

I feel like this argument is me trying to say: 'throwing a pair of six-sided dice is more likely to get a seven than a twelve. And historians reply "look at all these twelves I rolled!". [...]

If you're saying that certain geographical features give advantages to the people who live there, I'm not arguing against that.

Good. Would you not also agree that certain advantages are in favor of developing Empire-like civilizations? Agrarian societies? That some features favor hunter gatherers? If you don't agree, then what do you mean by advantages?

Let's come back to this.

As for the conquest of the Americas being inevitable, I too would agree that is incorrect and too strong a claim. But if at the time of first contact, you had to wager your life on who would win that conflict I think you, and everyone else, in your heart of hearts would wager on the guys with the guns [...].

/u/anthropology_nerd did a much better job than I ever could do in his 'Myths of Conquest' series of posts on /r/badhistory.

In short, Cortes arrived in the middle of a civil war. Many expeditions like his failed before, and his success wasn't a foregone conclusion [...].

In the long run, European conquest of the Americas wasn't a foregone conclusion. Launching a continental invasion against a united empire on their native terrain, supplying enough food, gunpowder, animal feed to supply it using sailboats, and dealing with all the tropical diseases? It took the Spanish centuries to accomplish what they did, [...] I wouldn't be quick to jump to conclusions what would have happened otherwise. These guys were playing the game of Empires themselves, and the population didn't just roll over for the Spanish even after that initial enormous success.

In one alternate reality the Europeans might have figured that trading guns and metals and horses for all that gold was more profitable than launching one failed expedition after another. Who knows.

Please stop putting the words 'forgone conclusion' in my mouth. You and me and everyone else agrees that history could have gone differently! All I'm trying to argue for is that some paths are more likely and some paths are less likely. The fact that it took the new world centuries to dominate the old isn't a refutation of a theory that only works on long time scales.

I completely agree with the last sentence of your second paragraph given the phrase 'accurately predict'. I literally think the Theory of History in GG&S makes no stronger claim than: "Eurasia (all of freaking Eurasia) was more likely than other places to develop societies interested in, and able to execute, Empires." That's not a very precise claim, but it's still better than: all of history is unpredictable.

It's hard to argue the what-ifs. We have no way of testing it one way or another.

Not knowing any history, if I gave you a full description of geography of villages in Europe in 700 BC, what would it take to predict which one would conquer Europe? Would that be even possible?

I agree this would be an impossible task. On sub-continent, sub millennia scale I agree that the forces of randomness are probably too great to make predictions like this. But again, I think the valuable claim from GG&S opperates only on the grandest historical scale and only until continentally separated civilizations meet.

If I showed you the Mongol tribes living on the steppes, not knowing any history, what would make you say 'yes, these guys seem to be living in just the right sort of environment to conquer the largest contiguous empire in history. Look at all this potential.'

Again, the GG&S theory of history makes no sub-continental claims. I agree that picking conquering kingdoms as opposed to continents is mostly playing roulette.

History just seems to be completely unpredictable and chaotic. Freak accidents happen all the time. Mongol armies get wiped out by typhoons while invading Japan, not once, but twice in eight years or so. Those types of freak accidents had a huge impact on history, and they happened all the freaking time.

When it comes to people changing their course of history, Japan completely overhauled their feudal system, threw out the 250 year old foreign policy book of isolation, and started industrializing in record time after the Americans showed up in gunboats. [...] Why did the Japanese choose this course of action and others throughout history didn't? It's complicated, and the more you get into it, the more it gets into the specifics of their particular situation and broad generalizations like 'X and Y have more chance of doing Z because geography' make less and less sense and like after-the-fact observations.

AGAIN: The theory has no answers and makes no predictions about the particulars of Japanese history.

I understand that historians don't like what-ifs. By asking about people struggling to survive at the absolute ends of the Earth I'm trying to get to the heart of the matter: do you think it's less likely that people living on a sheet of ice in 10,000BC will be the ones that conquer the world?

Why is conquering the world a measure of one's historical success?

This point comes up out of the blue so much I'm beginning to think it's a diversionary tactic. This whole discussion is 'who conquered the world' so we are talking about what leads to empires.

If you'll concede that one group of humans anywhere on the face of the Earth is less likely to do something because of their environment then that's all we need to start Moneyballing history.

This isn't something I've ever disputed. Geography has an effect on development of society. But there's too much general chaos to even call it a decisive factor. [...]**

OK, this goes with the statement from above I said we'd get back to. So I see many historians say that 'Geography has an effect' but then immediately argue that the effect yields zero predicability. Which seems to me like a linguistic trick not be forced into making unreasonable claims (like: a tribe a starving desert nomads in the middle of nowhere is just as likely to conquer the world as this abundantly fed group of sea-faring people with leisure time) while still holding onto the claim that not even on the grandest of scales over the longest of time frames can any statistically valid predictions be made.

My hypothesis is that were we to have a million Earths there would be a probability distribution of continents where the empire builders show up.

Do you agree with, what I view as your counter claim: "All continents are equally as likely to produce empire-building civilizations. A million earths would yield a perfectly flat probability distribution of the continental location of the first appearance of world-spanning empires."

[–]anthropology_nerd 25ポイント26ポイント  (0子コメント)

Mr. Grey, what I see as a fundamental error in your line of questioning, and what we tried to show in the /r/badhistory theory thread on Wednesday, is that historians are not in the business of “Moneyballing” history.

Historians do not view the global story of our species as a video game, much less one with a restart button. We see little value in developing generalized probability models to create a positive predictive value for alternative timelines of human history. Our real timeline is fascinating enough. When we say “’Geography has an effect’ but then immediately argue that the effect yields zero predictability,” it isn’t a linguistic trick on our part, it is a failure on yours to understand the methods, theory, and purpose of our field of study.

If you want to develop your model, hit the reset button, and see the results of a thousand iterations of FakeEarth you can call such endeavors “Moneyballing”, or “What-ifing”, or “Grey and Brady discuss hypotheticals over a pint”. We don't call that history because it bears little resemblance to our methods of investigating the past.

[–]jormundgard 15ポイント16ポイント  (0子コメント)

No offense, but it seems you want the benefit of a statistical argument without the data to support it.

[–]mmilosh 22ポイント23ポイント  (3子コメント)

Determinism is not a claim that statement makes. I think historians want to hear their opponents arguing for determinism because it's an easy claim to shoot down.

It wasn't my intention to make a straw man argument, but determinism is an impression I got from watching your video. If you say that civilization has 'nothing to do with the players and everything to do with the map', it follows that everything is decided by the map and there shouldn't be major variations, the way I understood it.

I think you can make a statistical prediction about where empires will appear based on continents not people.

You can't make a statistical prediction with a sample size of one. It would be nice if we had a million Earths to test with so we could do something like this, but we don't.

As a consequence, you're looking at one and only map you have available. Separating what's correlation and what's causation is extremely difficult in those circumstances.

That's not saying that what you're saying isn't true but it's untestable in a statistical sense.

You don't need mass production and iron to make use of domesticated animals. An Ard (a pre-plow) can be made out of wood. Lots of animals can produce food without needing iron.

I'd rather drop this point than continue to argue it further because I don't think it's central to this conversation.

Good. Would you not also agree that certain advantages are in favor of developing Empire-like civilizations? ... If you don't agree, then what do you mean by advantages?

We have numerous examples throughout history and there aren't too many geographical similarities between, say, the Mongol Empire and the Roman Empire. They both qualify as an empire under the definition "multiple peoples ruled over by a single government", and yet there aren't that many geographical similarities.

To your question: I don't know how much environmental factors help you create an empire, and I don't think there's an easy answer to that question. It could be a million different things, from access to sea, ease of transporting goods, availability of resources, ability to trade for resources you lack, etc.

Again, please stop using worlds like 'doomed' that imply inevitability I don't claim.

You said: 'These germs decided the outcome of these battles long before the fighting started'.

Please stop putting the words 'forgone conclusion' in my mouth.

I didn't! See above.

You and me and everyone else agrees that history could have gone differently! All I'm trying to argue for is that some paths are more likely and some paths are less likely.

If that's your argument, how do you know that we're not living in the most unlikely of universes? What conclusions can you make if that's the case?

But again, I think the valuable claim from GG&S opperates only on the grandest historical scale and only until continentally separated civilizations meet.

Europeans came into contact with the New World at a very specific point in time under very specific circumstances for both sides. I find it hard to believe that environmental factors had a decisive effect on the outcome as opposed to cumulative effects of thousands of years of human agency (which you don't think is a thing, I know) and just pure randomness. I'd say there's quite a high burden of proof on anyone making such a claim, and that GGS doesn't deliver.

So I see many historians say that 'Geography has an effect' but then immediately argue that the effect yields zero predicability. Which seems to me like a linguistic trick...

If you want to make statistically valid predictions, you cannot do that with a sample size of one.

You can compare the development of different societies with regards to their environment, and people have done that. For instance, see "Understanding Early Civilizations: A Comparative Study" by Bruce G. Trigger.

Why is conquering the world a measure of one's historical success? This point comes up out of the blue so much I'm beginning to think it's a diversionary tactic. This whole discussion is 'who conquered the world' so we are talking about what leads to empires.

It wasn't intended as such, but it does seem that way in retrospect.

I found the whole question baffling; where a certain group of people lived in 10.000 bc might have nothing to do with where they live thousands of years later when complex societies start to appear. Historical success for those groups of people was surviving, empire is not on anyone's agenda for thousands of years.

EDIT: Your original question was whether Inuits would have built a world spanning empire. The crux of my answer was: I don't think it's likely, I'd say it's quite impressive that they adapted and survived, considering. I don't know what general conclusions you can draw from that, though.

Do you agree with, what I view as your counter claim:

I don't claim to know one way or another. I don't know if the outcome we got is the least or most likely of all. In any case, the whole thing about continents seems to be too much of a generalization. I wouldn't, for instance, draw any conclusions about how Egypt developed based that they are on the African continent.

EDIT: I've also noticed that you characterized this discussion as a "flame war" on Twitter. First of all, I don't see it as such, and if you do we shouldn't discuss this any further because this isn't the intention. I've also disabled inbox replies. I'll reply to you if you decide to continue this discussion but I can't argue with 100.000 of your Twitter followers.

[–]rawrgulmuffins 11ポイント12ポイント  (2子コメント)

Honest question here. I'm speaking as both an outsider of all the fields being discussed here and someone who doesn't know the right words to eloquently state what I want to state.

We have one Earth that's produced many different Flora and Fauna via Evolution. There's just one sample world and yet people have made (and continue to make) strong statements about the formation of the world and the path links creatures to one another historically.

Many of these paths are described via statistically likelihoods and ranges. What characteristics of the two fields lead to such drastically different ways of describing the world?

Or potentially they're not drastically different and I just don't see the commonality.

[–]zapolon2 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

I believe /u/mmilosh is saying, in essence, that: yes, geography has a role in history but it's so small in comparison to the randomness that takes place that it's almost negligible. Our current earth isn't the way it is because of geography, it's because of coincidences, and these coincidences are what drives history.

If you had a billion earths, sure a hundred more of them may be a Europe-dominated world, but with such large randomness, can you really make any "theories" at all?

[–]Ricardian-tennisfan 11ポイント12ポイント  (0子コメント)

Also the argument on the difficulty of predicting future historical events based on current geographical/technological advantages illustrated by the reversal of fortunes puzzles. 1500 years ago surveying society you would have found it very hard to accurately guess the major winners today. And as for substantial rejuvenation'a China's success in developing so fast and lifting so many people out of poverty over 3 decades would have been impossible to predicit as it was not only due to reforms they carried out but also due to other global factors which gave them a greater chance to succeed. The argument that you use Grey against looking at the micro examples and specific conditions and instead looking at the broader 1000yr+ horizon is problematic as it ignores that those large macro change are driven by chaotic idiosyncratic micro brushes of history. And even if you say that Eurasia had a higher conditional probability of succeeding compared to Americas given initial goecraphical factors the central question becomes by how much? Because if the probability differential is not that high and so many other factors(institutions, chance etc) influence who succeeds between those 2 large heterogeneous groups and even more factors explain the differential success of places within those groups then that argument fails to have any meaningful predictive power on the courses of history. And then the whole discussion of a grand theory of history becomes a meaningless exercise. I think history is /slightly/ more predicitable than /mmilosh as I think looking at say institutional factors etc you can make a guess at whether say stagnant growth in real income-in subsets of society which at one time were economically well off- an the higher inequality follwing that will give rise to populism of the Sanders, Trump, Corbyn, a lot of comtemporary LA tyep. But I mean increasing inequality in America has been a trend since the 70s so why the increased feeling of ebing 'left behind' now? No once could have predicted that. So history I think can tell us whether it's very likely something will happen(and even then randomness of civilization can wipe those chances out) but never give us any meaningful answer on when it will happen.

[–]TheMongols_ 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Mongol armies get wiped out by typhoons while invading Japan, not once, but twice in eight years or so.

IT IS REALLY FREAKING HARD TO SAIL IN BOATS IN TYPHOONS. THEY HAVE SOME SORT OF DIVINE WIND WORKING FOR THEM.

WE ARE A MULTI-FAITH SOCIETY. WE ALLOW PEOPLE TO BELIEVE WHATEVER THEY LIKE. THERE ARE EVEN SOME BOZOS WHO BELIEVE IN THE GOD OF LEMONADE. WE THINK THAT THAT'S FOR TAX PURPOSES.

[–]TacSponge 4ポイント5ポイント  (2子コメント)

As to Cortes arriving in the middle of a Civil war. It seems highly likely that if european powers kept trying to colonise Meso-America they would eventually arrive in a time that was convenient for them. EDIT: The Same applies to the region as a whole. The process matters not the people or the place. Honestly I dont think any of the particularitys of history matter past cultural memory.

[–]MattyG7 5ポイント6ポイント  (1子コメント)

if european powers kept trying to colonise Meso-America

If. If instead they gave up sending colonizers who keep getting destroyed and established trade relationships, history would look different. That's why deterministic theories of history are mostly useless. There are a lot of "ifs" that come down to freak-chance and complex human psychology.

[–]TacSponge 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

It's not really history but surely the If's stack up enough that we can see that statistical patterns emerge.

As interesting as important as History is it's down side is that it's only interested in what actually happened. I feel like the main problem with the conversation around GGS is that it's not really about history. EDIT: and that the meme of determinism has outshone probabilities.

As someone who was (and only was) an average Geography Major I see GGS as a geography book.

[–]baruu_and_me 7ポイント8ポイント  (2子コメント)

"Eurasia (all of freaking Eurasia) was more likely than other places to develop societies interested in, and able to execute, Empires."

Just going by relative size of the landmasses this is almost a certainty. Quickly grabbing area from wikipedia I get:

Eurasia: 54,759,000 km2 40%

Africa: 30,221,000km2 22%

N. America: 24,709,000 km2 18%

S. America: 17,840,000km2 13%

Australia: 8,600,000 km2 6%

Even combining North and South America into one landmass, Eurasia tops the charts... and if we extend it to Afro-Eurasia, that contiguous piece of land makes up more than 60% of all land on the Earth. So the null hypothesis is Eurasia should conquer the world 40% of the time. Now, limit the area to non-arid land and what happens? All continents lose landmass but which lose the most (as a percent of their area)? Africa and Australia. Take out the Sahara alone and Africa drops from the number two landmass. I haven't run those numbers but at that point I'm willing to place Eurasia at over 50% of the non-arid land. (I could go on excluding tundra or rain-forest or the like but the more you limit by climate, the closer you are to Diamond's theory) Any attempt to "Moneyball history" needs to say that Eurasia is more likely to be the dominant power than it's relative size not just that it is more likely than another continent.

I think this is part of the point that people (myself included) are trying to make when using examples like China or Persia. Is it really fair to take a continent that by itself 40% of all landmass and treat it as one unified area for these purposes? I agree asking why one of several western European countries with similar levels of technology was the strongest at any given time comes down to the vagaries of history. However, asking why countries with clear technological and resource superiority were supplanted by less advanced civilizations originating thousands of miles away is valid.

[–]JacksSmirknRevenge 3ポイント4ポイント  (1子コメント)

But Eurasia's size is part of the reason why it is more likely to develop faster! How are you not making the same argument as GGS but focusing on just one of the factors it brings up?

[–]baruu_and_me 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

The point is that a theory of history needs to go beyond population size to be more than trivial. And here I'm using "population size" in a statistical sense not meaning the number of people in a location.

Using an example that has nothing to do with history: I've got a jar with 100 ball bearings, 70 red and 30 blue. I give you a spoon and tell you to take out one. You have a theory that red ones are more likely to be picked because red paint might be magnetic and attract the ball bearings to the spoon, so you run an experiment taking out ball bearings and 70% of the time you get a red one. You can't say my theory is right because I got red ones more often than blue, you need to get red ones 80 or 90 % of the time to prove your theory. It needs to do better than the population size.

Similarly, Diamond can't just make a statement like "Eurasia is more likely to dominate the world than other continents" when it is already so much larger than the other continents. For his theory to be non-trivial it needs to be something like 2/3 of the time Eurasia would dominate the world (if we could re-run history repeatedly) despite Eurasia having only 40% of the landmass.

[–]AshuraSpeakman 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

that's all we need to start Moneyballing history.

Petition to have the book "Moneyballing History" written.

[–]MatthieuG7 15ポイント16ポイント  (10子コメント)

I think that's the argument made by the historian: "History is way to complicated to be simplified by only one theory"

[–]devotedpupa 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

Especially when that theory is presented as a Mighty Tower, and when you nitpick you realize it's a Jenga tower. It can have holes and stay up like Grey says but IMHO GG&S has one to many key jenga pieces missing.

[–]mmilosh 14ポイント15ポイント  (6子コメント)

It's also full of chaos and freak accidents that simply seems impossible to shoehorn into a comprehensive theory. Mongol army embarks to not be surrounded on Japanese soil, a storm comes and wipes them out. The Mongols invade again few years later and after some initial fighting another typhoon comes along and wipes out another fleet.

Maybe you can conclude that 'peoples living in areas struck by typhoons have a good chance to resist naval invasions if the attacker just so happens to invade when there's a big one coming'.

[–]eggswithcheese 4ポイント5ポイント  (5子コメント)

This is all micro-scale stuff, comparatively. We're talking continent and civilization-level scale stuff here. Sure, the Mongol invasions would have disrupted Japan severely for generations if successful, but would it have destroyed technological and societal progress completely in all of Asian civilization? It wouldn't, and didn't do that.

All these sorts of things are minor blips on the geographical and historical scales we're trying to discuss.

[–]mmilosh 8ポイント9ポイント  (4子コメント)

This is all micro-scale stuff, comparatively. We're talking continent and civilization-level scale stuff here. Sure, the Mongol invasions would have disrupted Japan severely for generations if successful, but would it have destroyed technological and societal progress completely in all of Asian civilization? It wouldn't, and didn't do that.

If you want to talk about the effects of their invasions, look at siege of Bagdhad which was one of the intellectual capitals of the world at that time. They destroyed the entire city, killed most inhabitants, destroyed all the accumulated books and documents from its library, and destroyed the canal system which might have led to the agricultural decline of the region.

You tell me you're looking at it from such a larger scale where these types of things don't matter for the history of the world, and I'll tell you you're way out of the solar system.

[–]eggswithcheese 4ポイント5ポイント  (3子コメント)

The area was devastated, sure. Baghdad never recovered, sure. It was a huge setback for the people of the area, sure. But it's not like Mespotamian civilization was dealt a mortal blow. They didn't forget how to farm or build walls or forge weapons or write things down. Even Baghdad doesn't matter on the long scale of human history. No single city matters. No single event matters

You want to talk about loss of life, look at the An Lushan rebellion. It is believed it killed a bigger percentage of the world population than any other conflict in history. (~15 percent of the world population died) Or look at the Taiping rebellion, which is the third deadliest war ever. They both devastated China. But China didn't stop existing. Chinese civilization didn't end. Their dominance in Asia lessened, but didn't disappear in either case. And if you look at Eurasia? Over the course of all of history? Neither war makes a lick of difference.

[–]mmilosh 11ポイント12ポイント  (2子コメント)

Thousands of these specific incidents in human history is what shaped it into what it turned out to be. We don't know what would have happened if Bagdhad wasn't razed when it was. It's like saying that completely wiping out Athens off the face of the Earth in 700 BC wouldn't have had any effect on the history of the world. The ideas of Greek philosophers dominated various European cultures for centuries after they were dead, and we feel the echoes of that even to this day. Development of human societies is more than just knowing how to build a wall.

[–]wilhelms[🍰] 18ポイント19ポイント  (4子コメント)

Why do you use words like "determinism" and "inevitable" to represent the opposing view when it was represented as a list of probabilistic outcomes?

[–]Gen_McMuster 11ポイント12ポイント  (1子コメント)

Yeah most of the arguments against this possible "theory of history" assume it would be absolutist. Sociology and economics based predictions use lots of "may"s and "possibly"s. You'll rarely see a "definitely" in studies that are making predictions

[–]wilhelms[🍰] 9ポイント10ポイント  (0子コメント)

Yeah, I think that might be why people point out he's not a historian. Social (and some biological) sciences are almost always speaking in probabilities.

[–]infinitepairofducks 14ポイント15ポイント  (2子コメント)

Affected by the environment - yes, determined by it - no. People living in the desert can't just decide to become an agrarian society, but it's not like this is the only way. This is an example I keep bringing up all the time, but Palmyra built a prosperous society with distinct art and architecture, and all the things that in Western imagination are typically associated with civilization - wealth, monuments, colonies. They were in the middle of the desert... There is no one path of technological development nor a 'tech tree'. Tenochtitlan was one of the biggest cities of the world at the time when the Spanish arrived, and they also had an empire of their own.

The argument was, in Grey's words, constrained by the environment. This to me is the crux of his probabilistic argument. The probability of an event, say developing technology, is the number of possible routes to technology divided by all routes to technology. If there is no tech tree, then this model is moot. If there is a tech tree in some sense, then people who are constrained by the environment reduce the number of routes possible (i.e. the numerator), and so the probability of developing tech is reduced. Therefore, ceteris paribus, people in resource rich environments are more likely to develop technology in some period of time. That's my understanding of Grey's point at least.

This does not mean that a society in a resource rich environment will create tech quicker, nor that resource poor people won't. Think of it as the resource rich folks are rolling a die with 5/6 tech faces and 1/6 non-tech while the resource poor are the reverse. Since so few developed civilizations started in resource poor areas when compared to resource rich areas, the probabilistic argument is consistent with this evidence. History is not testable, so this doesn't leave much room for falsification unfortunately...

I don't have a dog in this fight, so I'll put up my counter-argument: Grey's probabilistic argument is biased. I'd imagine people settle more in resource rich areas than not. So more groups that produce tech will be in resource rich areas and hence it will appear that resource rich areas are the cause. But it is really putting the cart before the horse!

About the tech-tree: there might actually be one, in a probabilistic sense. Check out (when you have the time, it's long-ish) The Atlas of Economic Complexity out of MIT.

Anyways it seems reasonable that there is a tech tree in some sense. Between two groups, one with a river and a horse & the other with just a horse, who is more likely to produce a mill? Group one, they have two options. This is super simplistic for sure, but clearly shows environment can inhibit growth by limiting options for technological advancement, hence making it more difficult (therefore less likely) to advance a society in general.

EDIT: grammar

EDIT 2: last paragraph

[–]Sungolf 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Well, I don't know what Grey's argument is but Jared Diamond's argument is that technological development is dependent upon

  1. Individual innovator birth rate. I.E. The population.

  2. The society's acceptance of innovation.. Which can be reduced to a random variable given a fair diversity of cultures in a region.

  3. The degree to which the region allows societies to be connected with a large number of other societies that can preserve knowledge when one society abandons a technology.

The last part is particularly important given that societies in isolation tend to relinquish technologies one by one if they aren't under any competitive pressure to retain them. The example of the aborigines of Tasmania is used which had regressed to the most primitive state imaginable as a result of their long isolation. (I don't recall specifics.. Sorry)

Diamond argues that societies tend to abandon technogies over time because of fashion and taboos that randomly crop up.

[–]TheMongols_ 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Or lets take the Mongols. They held the largest land empire in the world for a time, and the steppes are not what one normally thinks of when you say geographical advantage that leads to a development of an agrarian society.

UNLESS YOU ARE... WAIT FOR IT... THE MONGOLS!

WE'RE THE EXCEPTION!

[–]Eldorian91 12ポイント13ポイント  (10子コメント)

For someone who essentially doesn't think people have free will (and thus they can't really make decisions)

You don't understand what Grey means that free will is an illusion. Robots can make decisions, they just make them based on prior causes or perhaps randomness. Here's one of Grey's favorite thinkers explaining how free will doesn't make sense.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FanhvXO9Pk

[–]Chickenfrend 4ポイント5ポイント  (3子コメント)

Just out of curiosity, how do you know Sam Harris is one of Grey's favorite thinkers?

[–]Eldorian91 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

His free will argument was almost exactly Sam Harris', and he follows Sam on Twitter.

[–]Chickenfrend 13ポイント14ポイント  (1子コメント)

Hm, philosophers seem to hate Sam Harris as much as historians hate Guns Germs and Steel.

[–]aresman71 6ポイント7ポイント  (3子コメント)

If you're making an argument that the spread of plagues from the Old World to the New World was a huge deal in how the history of colonization of South America turned out, you can't then not want to get into the details of how it actually happened. It's the legs of the argument that Americapox stands on.

I don't see how this is important to the Americapox argument at all. Regardless of whether it's accurate or not, it only relies on some European nation going to America -- there's nothing in the argument that's particular to Spain, so of course the Americapox video says nothing about "why Spain, not Great Britain".

[–]PossibilityZero 39ポイント40ポイント  (0子コメント)

Judging by the early votes, most people doing the criticising haven't listened to the podcast.

[–]Scipio202x 14ポイント15ポイント  (5子コメント)

I agree we should be engaging with Grey's real argument. I haven't read the book, but I liked the video and at a high level the Diamond's arguments seem reasonable. Additionally, I agree with Grey that having a high level "theory of history" is worthwhile. One quibble I have is that if Diamond's argument boils down to "Eurasia as a whole had a big advantage" - that is a bit unsatisfying in taking it to such a high geographic level. Eurasia includes such a wide swath: western and eastern europe, northern tundra, central steppes, the middle east, Chine and South East Asia. Saying that whole region has a leg up isn't pushing the argument forward much. The really interesting questions to me is why Europe and not China? Here I don't know that the geographic factors can explain as much. My understanding is that it seems to be more of a cultural difference, but I'm not sure.

[–]draw_it_now 12ポイント13ポイント  (3子コメント)

I think it's a mixture of geography, luck, and human intervention - both China and Europe were at about the same technology level to allow them to cross oceans and discover the new world in the 1400s-1500s - that the Europeans did it first was just a fluke of policy that China decided to be more protectionist (although one could argue that the geography of China allows it to be a large unified country, which makes the need to compete for trade routes lower and stopped them from needing to expand)

So, in that case where it seems like a situation was neck-and-neck, luck and human choice made one culture stronger than another. However, one thing that stopped the Chinese from discovering steam power before Europe was that China simply doesn't have as much coal as Britain does - so you could argue that geography (or geology?) allowed the British to jump ahead technologically before anybody else.

[–]model_railroad_alt 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

And so in many ways, like, I agree with tonnes of the criticism about the particulars in the book, and tonnes of the details that Jared Diamond gets wrong... But then this then trips in historians into an idea that you can not say geography is destiny. Historians are very, very, strongly against this idea, for reasons that I find difficult to understand.

I'll try and dig out my old textbooks, but there are historians who think that geography is destiny (or at least, geography strongly predicts development on continent-wide divisions of humans, as Grey alludes to).

If Grey recognizes the weakness of the particulars of GGS, why make a video detailing the particulars of GGS and presenting them as fact? Why not just make a video arguing for geographical determinism more generally (he could still mention GGS, and still have the trolling about it being the history book to end all history books, just without presenting the particulars of GGS as fact throughout the middle of the video)?

Maybe I'm being cynical, but I suspect that Grey did believe in the particulars of GGS when making the Americapox video, and is backpedaling a bit here.

[–]dsdeboer 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

At a very meta level it's worth asking why we need a theory of history?

Like, if we view things from a "deterministic systems" approach where we think one of the biggest determining factors is simply geography... Well, I guess having a theory of history is something we'd want, right? Because the backbone of that is geography.

But if you think history is much more a chaotic system and geography is only one of the inputs (maybe even a big input), you don't need a "theory of history". Maybe you can't even have a grand unified theory of history per se.

Or put differently history isn't like physics. You can't boil it down to some kind of equation where you get the same output ever time.

If we think that history is like physics and if we rewound the world back 2k years and ran the whole thing again we'd get exactly the same thing... I guess that's more a philosophical disagreement rather than a scientific theory.

[–]3rik1sbit 41ポイント42ポイント  (2子コメント)

Is this the real Hello Internet? With no follow up?

[–]Diarrhea_Jonez 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

They haven't had proper follow up since episode 52. I miss it.

[–]3rik1sbit 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Somehow I feel that proclaiming it makes it worse :/

[–]jeffbarrington 11ポイント12ポイント  (0子コメント)

I think a lot of Grey's frustration about historians and their 'theory of history' is due to the fact that he is talking to the wrong people - the idea of a 'big picture' of history is more a question of Geography than anything else, whilst history is almost by definition about the 'atoms'.

[–]sparkplug49 9ポイント10ポイント  (1子コメント)

I'm surprised no one has yet mentioned crash course's big history mini series. My big takeaway from that was that the history of humanity could be summed up in our ability to harness energy more efficiently. That to me was a way of thinking about a "theory of history" that I'd not encountered before. Thats not at all to suggest its incongruent with Grey's portrayal of Diamond's theory, just getting at it from another angle perhaps.

[–]paradocent 10ポイント11ポイント  (3子コメント)

I very much sympathize with Grey's frustration at, essentially, "I'm trying to engage you in a debate about X, but you keep wanting to talk about Y, and I don't know if you it's because you're stupid and you conflate those issues or because you don't want to talk about X and you think I'm stupid enough to conflate them." I have that problem all the time—this isn't the discussion you're looking for.

[–]MatthieuG7 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

It's almost a shame that the Manufacturing a Murder discussion was in this podcast, it was really interesting, but there isn't much comments about it, because it's eclipsed by GGS.

[–]yolandaunzueta[🍰] 28ポイント29ポイント  (6子コメント)

At 6:55 is that a glitch in editing or am I hearing things?

[–]JohnCalvinCoolidge 5ポイント6ポイント  (0子コメント)

Definitely an editing glitch. Rewound it twice just to make .

[–]SWFK 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

I heard it too. I thought it was my bluetooth speakers losing signal.

[–]Caleb_M 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

I also think there was one earlier, since Brady didn't answer the question of what he was sick with

[–]ehsteve23 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

I heard 2 or 3 glitches throughout the episode, I wasn't sure if it was just my Bluetooth headphones messing up

[–]Gavel_with_Nails 36ポイント37ポイント  (13子コメント)

The correct response to "What would you like us to do" = "Sorry, I don't negotiate against myself." www.possiblycorrect.com

[–]NorwegianWood28 7ポイント8ポイント  (0子コメント)

I'm confused. What does this podcast have to do with anything?

[–]CaptCoe 8ポイント9ポイント  (3子コメント)

Also, Brady, as someone who has frequently been in such situations on the other side (food service), it is much safer to ask the customer "What would you like us to do?" than to suggest something that they might think isn't good enough, and make the situation worse. There's no way to judge whether a customer is a reasonable person or not, so letting them set the terms of a reimbursement is almost always better than risking the ire of an upset customer.

[–]CileTheSane 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

I was going to post the same thing. As someone who has worked in customer service I have been in situations where I legitimately did not know how to fix it for the customer and asked them "What can I do to make this right for you?" With the honest intent of following through as best as I could with what they ask for, not as a trick to try to get them to ask for less. (If a customer wants something I'm not willing to give I am quite willing to just say no.) We've even been trained that if you're not sure what you can do to make the customer happy just ask them, the customer will tell you.

In Brady's case it seems offering a free massage would have been the easiest method though. Failing that, depending on how long he'll be around offering a discounted message, a free short one (15-20 min to help him relax again?), or a partial refund. Yes, the fire alarm was not their fault, but neither was it the customer's and you want them to leave happy.

[–]eggswithcheese 3ポイント4ポイント  (1子コメント)

wwww.possiblycorrect.com

What is this link? Why does it have four "w"s? What is going on??

[–]jayrot 7ポイント8ポイント  (0子コメント)

The universal rule of thumb for an explanation of any of the strange things you encounter out in the world:

Drugs or advertising.

[–]colorcafe 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

Did Brady ever say what he actually replied? Or what the end result was?

[–]csccosecant 25ポイント26ポイント  (5子コメント)

The effect you were talking about at the end of the episode—when something you've recently learned about seems to pop up again and again—is called the Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon (also known as the frequency illusion).

[–]Oracle_of_Knowledge 22ポイント23ポイント  (3子コメント)

"Ah, Baader-Meinhof. I think I heard about that recently."

[–]JusticeBeak 9ポイント10ポイント  (1子コメント)

That would be known as the Baader-Meinhof Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon.

[–]jurassicmars 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

I literally had a conversation about it earlier today.

[–]paradocent 6ポイント7ポイント  (4子コメント)

I find it stunning that a doctor would say "you've only got ten minutes and I'm already running late." Like she's doing you a favor by being there or something. And maybe that's predictable given a nationalized medical system, which I grew up with in Britain, but I've lived in America for a decade now and I suppose that the NHS has faded from memory; if my doctor ever said that to me, he wouldn't be my doctor for much longer.

[Edit: fixed erroneous conjunction.]

[–]alpha__lyrae 37ポイント38ポイント  (12子コメント)

I have some major gripes with Grey's arguments about his version of the theory (I have not read GG&S and I am commenting only about the arguments Grey made in the podcast).

 

Arguing about how Eurasian continent is better geographically to Australia or America or Africa is not really 'to the scale'. Europe and Asia have to be considered separate entities, because geographically they are very different. (Mind you, Indo-China is as big in scale as European continent, if not bigger). Let me explain. The Gangetic Plain and the Chinese river systems are the best places to live with very suitable climate, great river systems to support large agrarian societies and land filled with several resources. In comparison with Indo-China, Europe as a whole is a much poorer in all these aspects, it's not good in terms of climate (esp north-western Europe), its winters and not suitable for great agrarian societies, and it's not particularly rich in pre-modern resources. That is why till the Europeans started colonising the rest of the world, they were very poor compared to their Indo-Chinese counterparts. That is why until late 17-18th century, world GDP was dominated by Indo-China, and not by Europe. That is where world's majority population used to live, and still lives. That is why world's economics Center of Mass was somewhere in central Asia, not anywhere close to Europe.

 

The question then a theory has to answer is why did Europeans colonise the world and not the Indo-Chinese, and the answer is simple. The Indo-Chinese region was self-sufficient in most aspects of a pre-modern society in ways Europe wasn't. The Indo-Chinese were mainly exporting societies while Europe was mainly importing society, even in the Greco-Roman times.

 

As Grey mentions, many of us never asked the question, why was there never an Americapox. Have you asked yourself, why were the Spanish, the Portuguese looking for a sea-route to India & Indo-China when they eventually discovered America? Because once you answer that question that question, you also answer the question as to why it was the Europeans who ended up being the colonizers and not the Indo-Chinese.

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 36ポイント37ポイント  (8子コメント)

Also what didn't make it into the podcast: I think we might be living in the second-most probable world -- Asia might be the most likely to rule the world. (I think Diamond over sells Europe a bit because that's our universe)

[–]Eldorian91 62ポイント63ポイント  (3子コメント)

One could argue that Europe is in a Goldilocks zone of "rich enough to conquer the world" and "poor enough to want to". Namely, China's problem is that for most of history no one else had anything they wanted.

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 33ポイント34ポイント  (2子コメント)

Good counter point.

[–]Vallerius 12ポイント13ポイント  (0子コメント)

I would caution that it isn't as if nothing of value existed outside of China for them to go get. In fact, the Chinese invested vast resources in exploring parts Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and parts of Africa. To simplify a very complicated answer, the Chinese philosophy of geography and of cosmological importance placed China as the "Middle Kingdom" the center of everything in the cosmological order. That prevailing notion and how it changed over time and affected Imperial policy can help explain why China did not go a-conquering around the globe.

Additionally, by the time technology existed for China to begin exploring and potentially colonizing or interacting with other parts of the world, the Chinese were under several dynasties that were not made up of Han peoples but rather Mongols and Manchus, which also may have played a role in the outcome.

Its also important to note, China is just huge. The scale of some the Chinese empire at several points just outclasses anything Europeans experienced. Thus, a different set of pressures may have made it prohibitive for China to expand father. Additionally, that allows the possibility that Europe faced a series of pressures that drove exploration and colonization that were distinct from other civilizations.

[–]CJ_Jones 27ポイント28ポイント  (4子コメント)

/r/badhistory on Guns, Germans, and Steel.

I haven't had my coffee yet.

[–]JohnnieTalker 10ポイント11ポイント  (3子コメント)

I read Germs as Germans all the time. And I'm German...

[–]yolandaunzueta[🍰] 23ポイント24ポイント  (8子コメント)

1:19:25 "Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good" #speak

[–]lalaland4711 17ポイント18ポイント  (0子コメント)

Very sloppy editing this time. Full of half words and abrupt momentum changes.

[–]colorcafe 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

This comment section had taught me that people comment without actually listening

[–]j0nthegreat 16ポイント17ポイント  (14子コメント)

[–]CaptCoe 8ポイント9ポイント  (1子コメント)

What if, at HI #1000, we discover that Grey has left us a message in the statistics?

[–]j0nthegreat 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

the duration is a waveform perhaps?

[–]TheIndianUser 9ポイント10ポイント  (7子コメント)

29-35 was the Golden Age of Hello Internet.

I long for a time when we can return to a regular release schedule, but I fear it may never return. sigh

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 24ポイント25ポイント  (2子コメント)

That was a probability fluke. Wait long enough and it can't not happen again.

[–]ignamv 22ポイント23ポイント  (0子コメント)

Immortal Grey confirmed.

[–]FancyFoxFive 10ポイント11ポイント  (0子コメント)

So you're saying you'll never stop making them?

[–]K5cents 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

Gimme dat 5 day wait time until 57

[–]Kastnerd 14ポイント15ポイント  (3子コメント)

[–]JusticeBeak 3ポイント4ポイント  (2子コメント)

Does not watch youtube or listen to podcasts

I think I remember him saying he does?

[–]pikminguy 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

He used to more. Recently he has cut out almost all YouTube and several podcasts.

[–]rose_des_vents 7ポイント8ポイント  (1子コメント)

Came for discussions of ethnology, stayed for Brady's husky voice.

[–]spacepaulZ 7ポイント8ポイント  (0子コメント)

I think Brady's version of Guns, Germs, and Steel is best.
Chapter 1: Because someone had to be first! The End

[–]thechamois 20ポイント21ポイント  (3子コメント)

It seems like the heart of the book and the theory that Grey finds compelling is a scale analysis that is often used in the sciences.

When using Navier-Stokes and fundamental thermodynamic equations in Atmospheric science, one must constantly analyzes "forces" (used generally for anything that has a tendency to push a process in one direction or another) and their total possible effects in a process. For example the Coriolis force can have a visible effect, a small effect, almost zero effect, completely zero effect or anywhere in between depending on the process being looked at.

These analyses are used to disregard variables and simplify equations used in weather prediction models (in order to lessen computer power needed). This is the same thought process people use when talking about sport.

Person A: "I think they'll win because of the home field advantage and crowd."

Person B: "Home field advantage doesn't matter when you star player _________ on your team. He's too good to beat."

This scale analysis can also be used when looking in the past at what most likely caused an event which is exactly what is being done in the book and podcast. I would argue the same analysis and principles for understand the causes of progress and more specifically growth can still be done past 1492 of whenever Grey said the theory might not apply any longer.

Time X: Way Back Geography and Climate = large effect Ease of dealing with animals = large effect Individual intelligence exceeding several SD= small effect

Time X + Y: Renaissance Geography and Climate = moderate Ease of dealing with animals = Moderate Individual intelligence exceeding several SD= large effect (due to leisure and population density)

Time X + Y + Z : Now Geography and Climate = small (transportation and shelter advances) Ease of dealing with animals = small effect (transportation and shelter advances) Individual intelligence exceeding several SD= moderate effect (knowledge is now more easily accessible, efforts aren't as focused on growth except for space)

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 9ポイント10ポイント  (2子コメント)

Great comment -- I totally agree with changing influences over time which I tried to express with my far worse remark that 'Guns, Germs, and Steel stops being useful at 1492'.

[–][deleted] 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

I really thoguht Brady was gonna say that something happened.

[–]TableLampOttoman 4ポイント5ポイント  (1子コメント)

/u/JeffDujon

Supposedly, the term for learning a new word and seeing it everywhere is sometimes called the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon and sometimes called frequency illusion.

http://www.damninteresting.com/the-baader-meinhof-phenomenon/

[–]PM_ME_UR_HOTSTOPPERS 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Dammmit late again...

[–]danperegrine 3ポイント4ポイント  (1子コメント)

Re: 'What if the Black Death had killed many more / most of the people in Europe?'

"The Years of Rice and Salt" by Kim Stanley Robinson is an alternate history that follows this premise from the time of the black death through the modern age.

[–]jonhydude 12ポイント13ポイント  (8子コメント)

Posh as cushions is an expression I hadn't heard of yet.

[–]Astronelson 18ポイント19ポイント  (0子コメント)

Brady came up with it a few episodes back.

[–]herooftime94 7ポイント8ポイント  (6子コメント)

It's the antonym of "hard as nails"

[–]Gen_McMuster 11ポイント12ポイント  (5子コメント)

And only perfect beings can be described using both.

Like Brady

[–]KnightOfGreystonia 8ポイント9ポイント  (4子コメント)

Brady Haran, hard as nails, posh as cushions, adaptable as a swiss army knife

[–]Kitworks 9ポイント10ポイント  (4子コメント)

The thing that most drove me up a wall about Making a Murderer was not how appalling the interrogations were (though they were terrible), but that the victim's family would say 100% the confession was valid... without every watching it. Don't they care about actually finding their sister's murderer?

[–]fabio-mc 8ポイント9ポイント  (3子コメント)

Why would they? They want to be done with it and feel better about the situation. The faster the better. If they can believe someone is a murderer without putting too much thought on it they will do it because the relief they get from this state-sponsored revenge is enough to soothe the pain.

[–]Simon_the_Cannibal 10ポイント11ポイント  (5子コメント)

I suppose it's been a while since I made a shameless plug...

More information about the New Zealand Flag Referendum on the latest Vexillogicast Episode. Though, to put it in perspective, you should listen to Changing Canada's Flag first.

I look forward to hearing Grey & Brady's opinions!

[–]razies 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

It feels like Grey is looking at history more like a physics simulation and is asking:
What parameters influence the success a race/society might have on a very huge scale (in terms of time and space)?

I think most of us agree, that how history plays out isn't predetermined, but things like the environment (heavily) influence the probability distribution of this "simulation". This is not arguing against the "traditional" way of looking at history, as chains of events leading up to our present times. More like an extension, that acknowledges the unpredictability of this chain, but tries to find the probability of this chain taking another route.

I really disagree, that there is nothing to "learn" by looking at history from this - for the lack of a better word - STEM-esque point of view.

For example: While its quite a futuristic perspective, it might help us understand how we can improve these parameters, when populating other planets. The question will be: How can an independent society on a different planet be created, so that it will be stable and able rule the planet, while creating its own history.

Or it can help us understand be circumstances under which alien life is not just possible exist, but also able advance as a race and reach a certain level of importance to us. (This all seems very closely related to things like the Fermi paradox and the "Great Filter")

[–]b_k_ 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Baader-Meinhof - At the very end of the episode Brady wondered if there was a name for the effect of never hearing a word before and then you start noticing it in other places

[–]draw_it_now 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

Hey Grey! You said in this podcast that you were interested to hear alternate theories of history, so there's this - some anthropologists threw a bunch of algorithms into a computer and managed to calculate the spread of settled civilisation to an accuracy of 65%. Not perfect by far, but definitely impressive.

The data they used and abused can be found here.
I'm currently using it to build my own simulation program for a worldbuilding project. From this, I've gleaned that the core of the theory is that every culture gets a "score" based on their "ultrasocial traits" (unified cultural structures, such as language, religion, or state hierarchies) and horse-based technology (domestication of the horse, the saddle, the chariot etc.).
Steppe nomads were also usually the first to invent these technologies, which they passed onto the settled peoples through trade and conquest. This means that settled cultures are most likely to spring up and evolve fastest in Temperate areas bordering Steppes.

[–]bhbr 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

The effect of repeatedly encountering a newly learned word is called the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon.

[–]siprus 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

One thing about this idea that europe dominating the world scene. It's seems to be forgotten that Arabs used to be pretty advanced and strong. (they also did a lot of trading) And china has always been very strong and advanced civilization. The europe hasn't always been the power house of industry and technology like was 100-200 years ago.

Also I don't think many of the domesticated animals in Europe actually were from Europe. For example horses and cow, sheep, chiken and goats definitely weren't unique to Europe. (most of them were originally domesticated somewhere in Asia)

[–]simplebricks 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

When discussing what was worse, letting a guilty man free vs sending an innocent to jail I think it was framed incorrectly. If you think about it whenever an innocent man is "caught" a guilty man is implicitly let go. Political arrests are another thing (being charged of a non-existing crime, one without perpetrator or demonizing a way of thinking). A system built to keep people off the streets, where everyone starts off innocent, as it should be, is the better way to run a juicial system.

[–]techczech 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

People seem not to be giving the critique of Diamond a fair shake. It comes from CGPG not being able to answer BH's question - what's the point (other than a few hints).

Diamond's argument is important because it undermines the essentialist determinism which most people operate under. They think there was something special about Europeans themselves (their essence) and therefore they think Europeans have deserved all they got and the rest of the world can only get the handme downs. This is pretty much the 'white man's' burden argument that is still what many people believe (although they are loath to say it in public for fear of sounding 'racist'). But the current policies of global power elites (e.g. World Bank) reflect much of that belief. So Diamond giving a plausible alternative is a force to the good. It can give you more ammunition to fight the essentialist determinists.

However, the vociferous critique of Diamond comes from people who still see his 'geographic determinism' as far too crude and allowing too many people to wash their hands of actual responsibilities for the current unequal state. It also completely whitewashes the actual involvement of the peoples without the guns, steel and the right germs. Guns didn't matter a whole lot until about the 17th-18th century. Most coastal African kingdoms were completely sovereign and didn't let the Portuguese, Spanish and later English get away with much. Cortez did not defeat the Aztecs on his own but in collaboration with many allied tribes (the Aztecs were relatively recent invaders themselves), etc. Sure, the diseases and accidents of geography played a role but Cortez and his like didn't have to be genocidal maniacs. When you look at enough data points, Diamond's argument starts to break down. All his ideas are incredibly relevant and many can even be explanatory but he is far too deterministic.

His treatment of China is a great example. He compares it to Europe for its supposed lack of diversity. But China was the clear economic leader for longer than Europe has been since the industrial revolution. Their decisions to stop exploration (which was possibly what propelled Europe) was perfectly sensible and led to 300 years of peace and flourishing (with a few bloody downturns) while Europe was in a constant state of war. It then makes it seem as if history somehow stopped now (paging Fukuyama) but it's entirely possible that we're simply experiencing one of China's periodic downswings and in a 100 years, they will be the ones wondering why the Europeans are so backward. Or maybe the Arabs. Or maybe things will remain stable for 100 years and we're just experiencing the start of a period of great flourishing like the Rome did around AD1 and the Arab world did at the start of the Abbasid period. But many of these periods were based on growth based on extraction (killing lots of people, stealing their resources and overtaxing those left). So maybe we're in for a lot of war - because there are fewer places to do that to now. Or maybe something entirely different. Diamond's way of looking at things can be very helpful - we should not ignore the exigencies of geography and things like that. But it could too easily be used to justify very dangerous policies, as well (it was interesting to see him describe the Rwandan genocide in Collapse).

Unfortunately, the critique of Diamond can read as so much nitpicking, but it is very important in understanding people's part in all that has happened. Because this is our part. We are (simply by silent support or explicit vote) creating environments which may produce people like Cortez and his like (are producing them if you look around the world) and looking away simply because it was all preordained by geography should not be our go to option.

[–]tjohn24 2ポイント3ポイント  (3子コメント)

Ok so as someone who is a currently working historian, let me try to answer Grey's question.

I think Grey's issue is that he has a fundamentally different view of the world than a historian. He is approaching the field like a scientist, and with the lack of time machines history cannot be done as a scientist. History as a field is about rising to the challenge of finding things out without experimentation. There has been attempts to make grand theories of history but they have been met with controversy.

The most famous one is that Marx set out to explain history as human relationships with the means of production, or how we get the things we need. Another was the rise and fall of civilizations having discrete steps.

Because of these attempts, and other developments, Historians tend to be very VERY wary of reductionism (attempting to reduce complexity in order to make theoretical models) and have moved to what we'd call 'Thick Description'

Now, this was the field in about the 90s, but there was a historical transition called the cultural turn, where historians have been including theory from disciplines such as sociology, political science, gender studies, race studies, literary theory, etc. It has been a long and hard back and forth, with many historians still holding out against theory. But even those who use theory in their work tend to be very careful about scope, and the field is still in general suspicious when someone tries to make one theory to apply to all of humanity, or at the scale of continents and centuries. The Humanities in general is a very competitive, nit picky, and argumentative field, so that doesn't help either.

TL;DR: Grey is trying to approach a field like a scientist, when history is not a science, and historians like most disciplines do not like when someone from another field shows up and tells them they have everything figured out without any deference to the discipline.

[–]gophergun 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

I honestly think Grey is looking for a theory where there can't be one. There can be no tests and no repetition, no isolation of circumstances, nothing that could possibly get us any closer to the truth of the matter. We can have conjecture all we want for the fun of it, but I think making assumptions of the world based on any of these hypotheses is a folly.

[–]Rainbow-dandelion 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

If somehow the Australians took over the world in an alternate timeline he would argue that due the limited resources, humans were forced to be more creative and use them efficiently and Europe was ultimately doomed because of the abundance of materials in turn making the people lazy.

[–]Andrew_Anthony 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

I think a good physics analogy for what Grey wants is provided by cosmology. I also think by making a comparison to cosmology we can see some fundamental roadblocks to getting a 'theory of history' type understanding.

The goal of cosmology is to provide a broad strokes history of the universe. This is achieved through Standard FLRW cosmology+ inflation (aka the Big Bang Theory).

Now there are many many details that cosmology cannot account for. For example, it's useless to try to predict the exact arrangements of galaxies that we observe today. There are too many historical accidents that it's just not worth modelling (and are probably too complicated to get right even if we wanted to).

But, there are broad statistical patterns. A great example of this is the cosmic microwave background (CMB) radiation. There is no theory about why we see * that specific * pattern of seemingly random splotches. But there is a very well tested theory of the * statistical distribution * of splotches we see, and what we observe (mostly) fits with what one expects from a 'typical' realization drawn from that distribution.

So to me it seems like the question is, can we have a 'cosmology for human history?' In other words can there be a theory of human history that predicts broad strokes of what we observe--maybe in a statistical sense--but might not reproduce every single detail of history that rely on special, small scale accidents as opposed to the broad underlying statistical, universal trends.

Well, I'm an expert on cosmology not on human history, but since it's the internet I'll give my two cents anyway. There's a few problems I see to building a cosmology-like theory of history.

Problem # 1: To me it seems like a main advantage we have in cosmology that we lack in human history is that in cosmology we can build on a very good understanding of the basic science. For example, we know the processes involved in forming the CMB because we know a lot about atomic physics and thermodynamics. Even inflation--which is very speculative but meant to provide a theory of the initial conditions, similar to what Grey wants for history--is built on a well understood structure of quantum field theory. This rigorous understanding is crucial for understanding what processes are the most important, and for showing which effects are small and can be ignored.

In building a cosmology-like theory for history it seems like a major problem is that we don't have such a rigorous understanding of 'the basic processes of history' (whatever that means) that we can cleanly separate the driving, fundamental forces from accidental details of our particular realization of human history. This seems to be reflected in the comments I've read from history buffs about GG&S where it is emphasized, for example, that geography may be a factor in determining how history played out but it is not the only factor. It sounds like Grey would say that the basic large scale trends of human history should be determined by the geography and local wildlife. OK, those sounds like big factors. But how do we make the split between what's important and what's a detail when calculating the probability a given culture will succeed? Let's say we want to calculate (or at least estimate) the percentage of the time that Europe will 'dominate the world'. Well what goes into that percentage? Let's just consider diseases as one small example of this (so we can ignore questions about free will, although I think the human factors like Brady was mentioning open up a whole other can of worms). When calculating the probabilities of success, do we want to allow for every possible disease mutation that could have happened? Or do we want to assume that diseases will 'look like' the ones we observed? Or something in the middle? Or is the probability of success insensitive to our model of disease? Does history change if the Black Death happened 100 years earlier or later? Do we want to include the timing of events like that in our probability, or do we want to hold certain events fixed? You might say that these details of things shouldn't affect the probabilities of success of a society by that much in the end, but how do we know that? In cosmology there are plenty of examples where seemingly trivial facts--such as the fact that there no stable nuclei with 5 nucleons--actually has an enormous impact on the distribution of nuclei in our current universe, and there's no way to know in advance how big an effect that kind of thing will have without being able to do a detailed calculation.

Problem # 2: Another question that seems very tricky to me is, how do we determine what trends are significant? We want to calculate the probability that Europe will successfully invade America, say. But how do we know that that event is actually significant and not itself just an accidental transient phenomena, that a full 'theory of history' should more or less ignore? In other words, how do we know we want to compute the probability that Europe invaded America? What if in 1000 years Europeans are totally wiped out, would we still find it significant that Europeans invaded America? Maybe in 1000 years if there are many more cultural revolutions and rises/falls of empires the fact that Europeans invaded America will seem like an inconsequential historical accident.

Problem # 3: There's also a major observational problem that we only get to observe one copy of human history. In cosmology this effect is called cosmic variance. When we observe the CMB on small angular scales we can see many independent repetitions of the same pattern over the whole sky and make statistical statements about how likely those patterns are given a particular cosmological model. But when we observe the CMB on large angular scales (ie, if we try to look for patterns that are only defined on a patch of sky that is say the size of a whole hemisphere) then we may be able to say something like 'this half of the sky is warmer than that half of the sky,' but with only 2 data points it's hard to do statistics to determine if this is notably unusual or just an expected fluke (people try to make sense of questions like this anyway and there's interesting work but it is hard). I think the broad, large scale history Grey is interested in has a similar 'historical variance' problem. When talking about historical trends that are only defined over entire continents or over the entire course of pre colonial history, we are sadly limited in what we can say because we only ever get to see how one copy of human history played out.

Having said all of that I am definitely being negative. I think it's worth trying to answer questions like this and it's worth seeing what progress we can make. But, I do think that Grey is being a bit too glib that such a theory is possible and that historians are simply 'missing the point' by focusing on details he claims are irrelevant.

Tl;dr: Constructing a 'cosmology for human history' is very hard because humans are much messier than atoms, and it is not as easy to separate out underlying fundamental processes from accidental features of our particular state of the universe.

[–]BigKev47 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

People who have ascribed to a comprehensive self-consistent "Theory of History":

-Marxists

-Nazis

-Neoconservatives

-Grey?

There's no goddamn Tech Tree for humanity. We're far too complicated and interesting for such reductive STEM-kid analysis.

[–]Ressha 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

The Hello Internet Podcast.

Grey: I have a point that I already made that I want to expand upon.

Brady: Okay, but I have a point I haven't said before I'd like to say.

Grey: I'll give you half a sentence to do so.

[–]PossibilityZero 10ポイント11ポイント  (7子コメント)

Grey, 1:02:47

Such brilliant trolling.

[–]Ghost_Of_JamesMuliz 4ポイント5ポイント  (1子コメント)

Slightly irresponsible, I think. The majority of his audience probably doesn't have any awareness of the arguments surrounding the book, and may assume that he's being serious and presenting undisputed facts.

In the grand scheme of things, it's not a huge deal, but it'd be nice if he put in an annotation or something to let viewers know that he was being facetious and there is debate about the book.

[–]CileTheSane 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

He was trolling mostly by recommending the book. Those that care about the subject enough to take him up on the recommendation would either know about the arguments already or would find out about them digging into the subject.

[–]Niso_BR 7ポイント8ポイント  (1子コメント)

"The history book to rule all history book!" CGP Grey

Trolling with great finesse.

[–]devotedpupa 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

I ate the bait so hard. I honestly loved the vid even if I can nitpick Diamond to hell and back, but that remark just mmmmmm.

I almost sent a naughty vote consisting of just whining about that.

[–]MatthieuG7 8ポイント9ポイント  (3子コメント)

The problem with your video is not that you discuss the general theory of GGS, but that you present the facts in GGS as right, tricking a lot of people into believing all plagues really only come from animal, which, you admitted, is not really that right. And I don't think the trolling was worth spreading false facts. The video would have been a 100 time better and less controversial if it just discussed that interesting idea of the influence of starting conditions.

[–]MindOfMetalAndWheels[GREY][S] 16ポイント17ポイント  (2子コメント)

I agree that it's incorrect to say that 'all plagues only come from animals' which is why I never did.

[–]MatthieuG7 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

But that is the impression that, at least I, got from americapox. I know my impression could be wrong, however, seeing all the negative reaction around the video, I don't think I was alone.

[–]Offence_But 7ポイント8ポイント  (4子コメント)

Oh, thanks Grey! Just in time for my birthday!!

[–]VanDykeParks 5ポイント6ポイント  (2子コメント)

Wow, mine too! I mean, what the odds? Crazy.

[–]ijhnv 6ポイント7ポイント  (1子コメント)

The odds are actually very big. Right now this post has 206 upvotes. The Birthday Problem states that if you take 70 people and place them in the same room, there is a 99.9% probability that two out of these people have the same birthday. 50% probability is reached only with 23 people.

[–]VanDykeParks 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

Sorry, I guess my sarcasm didn't translate well enough. They've discussed the odds thing on the podcast before

[–]impossible4 3ポイント4ポイント  (6子コメント)

And it was freezing cold.

Looks up record low in bristol for January.
looks up record low for hometown of Winnipeg, Ca in January.
Not even cold, /u/jeffdujon not even cold...

[–]dr_volberg 3ポイント4ポイント  (1子コメント)

So according to Grey's summary the actual game Civilization 5 is accurate, in terms of your starting location determining the course of your game in a big way.

[–]TheDeityRyan 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

When he said that the tiny advantage i the beginning leads to someone having a big advantage later basically describes why Babylon is OP.

[–]4Spinor 8ポイント9ポイント  (0子コメント)

Finally, since that YouTube teaser I've been updating podcasts in my app every two minutes

[–]1nsaneMfB 5ポイント6ポイント  (5子コメント)

Grey, i've seen you use a plethora of gifs in your interaction with the internet. Do you have a personal collection of these gifs and if you do, how do you manage it?

[–]Omni314 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

So I'm having to wait until my monday commute to listen to this, but do you find that releasing on a friday/weekend draws a bigger crowd? Or is it just released when it's done?