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[–]NothingImpersonal 7ポイント8ポイント  (8子コメント)

LOL. classic appeal to authority. Just because a field exists doesn't mean it serves any useful purpose. Just look at the hundreds of economists employed by the Fed. It's all just government rent-seeking.

Interesting strawman. I'd wager there are more health economists in academia and industry than there are in the government sector, and outside of the U.S.

It's just a theoretical construct that has little to do with the real world. To model the real world you need a much more complex model, so complex even that no economist or computer would be able to solve it.

I am not certain you understand the purpose of modelling in the first place.

In any case, let us evaluate the properties of medical care as an economic commodity:

  • Demand for medical care is a derived demand for health: It is uncontroversial to state that medical care on its own is a disutility; surgical procedures are painful and prescription medications run the risk of unwanted side effects, for example. However, conditional on facing health issues, medical care is beneficial if it is able to alleviate the issue and restore individuals to a healthier state. To borrow from Evans (1984), the marginal utility of medical care can be represented in the following way:

(effect of medical care on utility) + (effect of medical care on health)*(effect of health on utility)

As implied, the effect of medical care on utility itself is negative (surgeries are not a fun and painless experience). However, the second composite term brings us to the first issue with a "free market" provision. In general, the effect of medical care on health is positive, as well as the effect of health utility. However, in a practical sense medical care providers will only have knowledge of the first part, while individual patients the second part (and the effect of medical care on utility itself). This introduces two violations of the standard normative assumptions behind the application behind the standard application of economic analysis: Individual sovereignty, which assumes that individuals themselves know best; and information asymmetry, which in this case means providers themselves have a greater knowledge of both the available options of medical treatments as well as (expected) outcomes of each. The informational advantage of providers in this case also provides them with significant market power that makes phenomenons such as supplier-induced demand (i.e., the ability of supply side to directly influence demand, an agency issue that stems from another violation of conditions for a perfectly competitive market) plausible.

  • Externalities: Aside from the obvious physical externalities (e.g., herd immunity), empirical evidence (e.g., Jacobsson et al. (2007)) also suggests that individuals may exhibit a form of caring/paternalistic externality when it comes to medical care. Of course, it is an open question as to whether or not Americans collectively shares that sentiment but even in the negative case the existence of physical externalities on its own already precludes a perfectly competitive market of medical care.

    • Information asymmetry: Aside from the case in the health production relationship I mentioned above, there are a few other important distinctions here. For many standard economic commodities, the issue of information asymmetry may be alleviated through experience/learning/trial and error (e.g., auto repair) and costs are not permanently irreversible. That is not the case with medical care. If a particular treatment does not work, one is at best left at the same level of illness as prior to the treatment, and at worst faces the consequences (e.g., side effects) that stem from the treatment itself.

This is all without questioning the most central (and normative) assumption of them all: willingness-to-pay as the measure of benefit versus an actual notion of need itself.

As for the video:

  • Chargemasters: An issue related to medical care funding mechanisms, something that privatizing medical care (which, again, does not lead to a perfectly competitive market) does not necessarily solve.

  • Medical care insurance: Regarding medical care financing and medical care insurance, they dismiss access as a valid motivation for medical insurance design when in fact that is a deliberate choice by its architects in modern times. They understand the concept of risk reduction, but immediately sweeps it aside when discussing their own services. Of course, if individuals knew for certain they only had to set aside enough funds for that one surgery in that year and knew for certain that there will be no other unforeseeable major medical expenses, then that would really defeat the purpose of insurance.

Aside from the ad hominems (who knew there can be so many ways of referring to the PPACA), fear-mongering, lying (e.g., the bit about the NEJM and Lancet editors), and things bordering on conspiracy theories (e.g., discussion about the FDA) in the video, it does not really offer a justification for the notion that a free market will be optimal and be free of all the issues I discuss above. I do not believe I have to point out which way the bias goes for the discussants.

There are other issues with the video, but given my time constraint my priors tell me that the effort I can put in to discuss them will not be rewarded with an equally thoughtful response.

[–][削除されました]  (7子コメント)

[deleted]

    [–]NothingImpersonal 3ポイント4ポイント  (6子コメント)

    So what? Information asymmetry does not mean that people can't find solutions by educating themselves or deferring to voluntary trusted third parties, as they do in other markets.

    I see that you skimmed to read two words. To reiterate what I mentioned above, informational asymmetry leads to the counterfactual problem. While it is fairly straightforward to resolve in other "standard" economic cases through experience/learning/trial and error, for medical care this is not so: We have only one body and one life (abstracting from individuals' beliefs for this discussion) with which I am certain we are not particularly privy to the idea of "trial and error" when it comes to medical care, side effects and all.

    Furthermore, in the discussion above I mention that providers possess an informational advantage in knowing the available options of treatments as well as expected outcomes of those options. Even for the most informed individuals, clinical research can only provide us with information for the "average" case. Individual idiosyncrasies stemming from heterogeneities in genetics, biochemical, physiological, and psychological makeup introduces further uncertainty in actual outcomes of undertaking any medical treatment. In that case, even an informed patient faces additional uncertainties regarding whether a failure to treat was due to inappropriate care, quality of care, or perhaps simply due to the variation of effectiveness in the treatment itself for which we only have knowledge of the "average" outcomes. This throws another wrench into the assumption of individual sovereignty.

    Also, the existence of information asymmetry is actually a stronger argument against government coercion, since people are far more ignorant as voters than as consumers.

    "Coercion" is an interesting choice of word. If you are unaware, there is already a form of government-sanctioned intervention (though not perfect by any means) against the type of information asymmetry you have in mind, even in the United States: physician licensure, which also influences physician supply. Unless you believe that the United States should also do away with this in your hypothetical "free market" scenario....

    Lastly also know that many of the problems with health care market today are the result of regulation, not the free market. We haven't had a free market in health care since at least WW2.

    This is a moot point to the discussion. As a reminder, let us come back to the statement under debate:

    [Medical care] should just be privatized and then the free market will allocate it efficiently and costs will come down through competition and choice.

    You have yet to demonstrate, whether through using theoretical or empirical evidence, that this is a logical conclusion.

    [–][削除されました]  (5子コメント)

    [deleted]

      [–]NothingImpersonal 3ポイント4ポイント  (4子コメント)

      aaaaand, government can choose better? hahahaha

      Yes, because of the agency issue: Unlike the canonical example between a firm and an employee, patients do not have the expertise nor the ability to design and enforce even simple contracts with providers. Interventions include physician licensure (which you misguidedly believe should be abolished) is one method of tackling the issue, as is the continued development of methods to promote informed patient choice. Furthermore, because providers hold considerable market power due to their informational advantage, supplier-induced demand is a plausible phenomenon, which already precludes efficient allocations stemming from a "free market." Simply repeating the term as mantra does not lead to the "free market" solving its own issues.

      As a casual observation, all development on decision aids to promote informed patient choice have been public efforts thus far.

      yep

      I am beginning to believe your knowledge on the issue is fairly limited.

      This comes from years of studying economics. It's not something I can explain simply here. In a free market, the best solution will emerge spontaneously. Governments can only use coercion to make people worse off, and the power of government will be captured by special interests to the detriment of most people.

      Not to worry, my field of research is also in economics, so feel free to provide any reference you have for your claims, no matter how complex they may be. There is no need to appeal to any authority with me.

      [–][削除されました]  (3子コメント)

      [deleted]

        [–]NothingImpersonal 5ポイント6ポイント  (2子コメント)

        Your bias is certainly showing, and the literature you cite are not relevant in supporting your conclusion. As a reminder once more, your original comment states that a "free market" for medical care will lead to efficient allocations and that medical care costs will fall as a result of competition (abstracting from any considerations regarding health outcomes for the moment). Once more, do you have references relevant to this particular statement? Your implication that the current system of governance in the United States may not be in the best interest of its constituents is not support for the notion that the "free market" works in this particular context.

        Also, as you mentioned yourself, the United States is hardly a "free market" when it comes to medical care so it would be credulous to believe that anyone actually does so within the nation (e.g., licensing, for starters, which already reduces competitive pressure, and for a good reason).

        [–]MrDannyOcean 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

        well, you owned him hard enough that he deleted all his comments in shame.

        I think you win?