Dispatch Japan

Anatomy of an Open Letter: How 187 Japan scholars came together to push Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on history issues

On Tuesday, May 5, 187 Japan scholars mostly from English-speaking countries came together in an Open Letter to warn against what they see as a worrisome trend of intolerance in Japan toward journalists and scholars who express disagreement with the Abe government’s view of history issues, particularly “comfort women.”

Since publication of the Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan, the number of signatories has ballooned to close to 350, with the expanded list to be made public next week.

The co-coordinators of the Letter were Professor Alexis Dudden of the University of Connecticut, and Professor Jordan Sand of Georgetown University. Both argue that the purpose of the Letter was to encourage a renewed effort to resolve the comfort women issue, and for Japan to redouble efforts for reconciliation with China and South Korea. Both deny that their intent, and that of the other signatories, was to criticize Prime Minister Abe, but they acknowledge that those who interpret the Letter as a rebuke are “not incorrect.”

 We sat down with Professors Sand and Dudden for a joint interview, during which they described in detail the process that led to the writing and publication of the Open Letter with such a large list of signatories.

Jordan Sand is Professor of Japanese History at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. He teaches modern Japanese history and other topics in East Asian history, as well as urban history and the world history of food. He has a doctorate in history from Columbia University and an MA in architecture history from the University of Tokyo. His research and writing has focused on architecture, urbanism, material culture and the history of everyday life. From 2009 through 2011, he served as Chair of Georgetown's Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures. During academic year 2012-13, he was a visiting professor at the University of Tokyo Graduate School for Interdisciplinary Information Studies, where he taught a seminar on approaches to the modern city. 

Alexis Dudden is professor of history at the University of Connecticut, specializing in modern Japan, modern Korea, and international history. She has a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and a BA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University. She is perhaps best known for her book Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: I am hoping to explore with you both the substance of the Open Letter, and how the Letter came about, and then look a little bit at some criticisms that have emerged in the few days since the publication. I’ll direct a question to one of you, and the other can then respond. Professor Sand, let me put this question to you. The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times both characterized the Open Letter as a “rebuke” of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Is that an accurate description of the spirit of the Letter, and does it capture your intention?

SAND: The Letter addresses our colleagues in Japan, the public, the media, and the government. We expressed hopes for action from the government on the issue of “comfort women.” I believe, and I think most of the signatories believe, that there is a lot the prime minister could do. But I did not participate in order to rebuke the prime minister. I don’t think that’s our role. It is not mistaken to read it as a rebuke, but that does not capture the intent of the Letter.

DUDDEN:  I agree. The headlines on those stories, using the work “rebuke,” were not incorrect. But that is not why 187 historians and scholars became involved. The Letter is a collective reflection on a new environment in Japan that is often inhospitable to objective historical inquiry on certain topics. This is quite different from even the recent past. The signers of the letter have all made Japan the center of their professional lives. Something new has emerged in Japan in the last year or two to the extent that putting together a common reflection on this trend by such a divergent group of people turned out to be remarkably easy.

SAND: You could even say the Letter was intended more as an encouragement than a rebuke. The Letter is a collective expression of opinion, not a set of demands to the government. Japan is a democratic society, and the prime minister is an elected official. He can answer his own constituents. We didn’t presume to tell the prime minister what he “must” or “must not” do. But the government bears some responsibility for the climate in Japan around the “comfort women” issue. The Letter is a comment on this worrisome climate. The government has the power to change that.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Professor Sand, would you elaborate a bit on the “climate” you refer to?

SAND: Let me be specific. The timing of the release of the Letter gave the appearance that it was somehow responding to the prime minister’s recent visit to the US. But I started talking with colleagues about putting together some kind of statement last year. At the time, I had no idea Abe would be making a visit to the US. Many scholars here were disturbed by reports of intimidation of journalists, and we found colleagues of ours in Japan saying that because of receipt of government funding, they would not be able to work on certain issues. In the political sphere, it was becoming common to hear callous statements about the surviving victims of the comfort women system passing as everyday political speech. It struck me, and many others, as a strange turn in discourse. It felt like it was time to comment, as friends and colleagues. I should also say that I’ve found many friends in Japan who are not academics who are tired from so-called “apology fatigue.” These are good friends of mine. They just want the whole issue to go away. And I thought it was important to step back, and say that the issue has not gone away because it remains unresolved.

Those were my sentiments. So a few of us decided we would get a group together to discuss this at the March meeting in Chicago of the Association of Asian Studies annual conference. A few weeks before the conference, I visited Japan, still thinking about how to address these concerns at the AAS meeting. In Japan, I was astonished once again at the degree to which important and intelligent mainstream people were saying off-base things, such as: “This generation of American scholars are anti-Japan,” and ridiculing serious scholars and newspapers. And I thought: “Wow, Japan has become a hot-house for this kind of thinking.” Now, Japan is a very cosmopolitan place. So this deepened my conviction that we should try to blow some fresh air in from the outside, even if this ran the risk of appearing to be patronizing.

DUDDEN: We got 187 scholars with wildly divergent specializations to come together based on each of us noticing a troubling atmosphere. A lot of the recent presentation of the comfort women issue has been quite constricted. It is not full-on censorship from the highest level. Rather, there seems to be a narrowing of what is considered permissible speech. So a lot of people are losing sight of the fact that it is not all the fault of the “other side” – Team China, or Team Korea. The notion that Japan has “done enough” becomes pervasive, such that even the mildest of critiques of current Japanese policy defines one as “pro-China” or “pro-Korea.” And within the world of Japanese politics, those who want to really reach out to China and Korea, while still on the scene, are far from the councils setting the country’s policy agenda. That is a recent development, and it undercuts the notion of Japan being a regional leader. Much of the region looks to Japan as the open society. When the confines of “permissible” discussion in Japan become more narrow, Japan’s aspirations for regional leadership become more difficult to realize. Still, we tried to operate as quietly as possible.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: When you arrived in Chicago for the March AAS meeting, were there already discussions underway to initiate the writing of a Letter?

SAND: There were multiple conversations already underway. The issue of Foreign Ministry pressure on McGraw-Hill had sparked some conversations. There were conversations about the bashing of the Asahi Shimbun over articles that had long ago been retracted. The whole environment in Japan seemed to have taken a turn toward intolerance. By last December I concluded that some kind of statement would be appropriate, or at least possible. By February, Alexis and I were in email contact with old friends, and we discussed reserving a room in Chicago where those who shared our concerns and were attending the AAS meeting could get together for a discussion.

DUDDEN: We are not an organization of any kind, so we did not have a room of our own automatically available at the AAS meeting. We had to reserve one ourselves. The annual AAS meeting is really the only time that a good number of Japan specialists gather in one spot, so we were cognizant of the fact that if we were going to have momentum for the issuance of a Letter, we would have to have our act together going into the Chicago meeting.

SAND: I reserved a room for 11:30 pm, because that was the only time everyone was free. I was thinking that we would discuss whether as a group we could come up with a statement, what we have the right to say, and whether a statement would be constructive. The conversation was very constructive, but at that point still pretty inconclusive. Lots of good ideas were shared, but we did not resolve what exactly we wanted to say, and what would be the best way to say it. And to whom?

After the AAS meeting, Alexis and I played the role of on-line switchboard. About 30 people were present at the late-night meeting in Chicago, and they wanted to stay in the loop. They talked with other people, some of whom came on board. Drafts of a Letter started to circulate. It was all quite messy; organic. At a certain point, the content coalesced, and enough people had seen a draft that they thought was at least close to right.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Was there one person who wrote the initial draft?

DUDDEN: Nice try! 187 people wrote it!

SAND: I would call myself the secretary. I sketched out the main points of the first meeting and circulated them. Over a month-and-a-half, I kept putting in new commas, and taking out old semicolons, until everyone saw a final document that a large number of us could live with. At that point, the draft had circulated to so many people that we worried a bit that it might be released unfinished and we felt pressure to finalize the whole process. We gave everyone 24 hours to look at both the English and Japanese final versions, to recuse themselves if they decided the final version did not reflect their own opinion, and to otherwise make sure their respective names were spelled correctly.

We had to battle to keep the Letter from being too long. Every time someone suggested an addition, the Letter got longer and longer.

DUDDEN: Some people wanted footnotes. From the other side, there was a group from the Midwest that wanted to keep the Letter to 500 words, or they would not sign. It says a lot about the strong sentiments on the issues we raised that 187 academics were willing and able to come together behind the Letter.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: There were roughly 30 people in this core group that collectively put the Letter together?

DUDDEN: There is an exact list of 29 people who made up the core. And there were 5-6 people who were deeply involved in the drafting of the Letter, throwing back at Jordan every adjective, comma, and semicolon they did or didn’t like.

SAND: The whole process took over a month even though I think the Letter consists of rather common sense prose.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How did you go from the core of 30, to 187 signatories?

SAND: The final version was circulated by the original 30.

DUDDEN: To people they knew.

SAND: That’s right. This was meant as a statement from scholars of Japan based outside of Japan, so we circulated to colleagues in North America, Europe, and Australia. Some colleagues in Japan saw it, but we wanted this to be a message that came from outside of Japan.

DUDDEN: We are cognizant that the Letter might come across as a bunch of westerners telling Asians what to do. But we were influenced by the statement issued late last year by the Historical Science Society of Japan (Rekishigaku kenkyukai) that was sharply critical of the Abe administration’s stance toward the comfort women issue.

SAND: Many people read the Rekishigaku kenkyukai statement, and it really resonated. But we are not an organization of any kind. The Letter was issued by a group of people who were persuaded that “this much we can all agree on, this much we believe is common sense.” There are people involved in this who have never had their names printed on the same page, anywhere. Some of them may not be willing to appear in the same room with each other. But we all shared the statement.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Did you deliberately issue the Letter after Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the US?

SAND:  Yes. We had a draft that many people saw before the prime minister arrived. A number of people commented that we couldn’t very well issue the Letter until we’ve heard what he has to say. I felt that the Letter was not all about addressing Prime Minister Abe, but the point came through to me. We owed Abe the respect to let him come, address American audiences, and see what he says on the issues we raise. And the final version made reference to the more inspiring comments the prime minister made in his address to Congress. We did not want to rush the Letter out to have it somehow tied to the visit. It just so happened that the draft had already circulated far and wide so it was time to finalize.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about the paragraph on nationalism? I initially took it to mean that some people in the drafting process thought it would be important to reference nationalism in Korea and China so that the Letter not appear to be ganging up on Japan.

SAND: Everyone accepted that passage, though there were a few people who raised concerns that in some ways it is ahistorical. The roots of nationalism are profoundly different in different places, and of course in this case we are talking about the country of the perpetrator and the countries of the victims. To paint the nationalism we’ve seen in China, Korea, and Japan regarding comfort women with a single brush might appear to be very facile. But everyone agreed that at the present moment, on this issue, you can’t ignore that nationalism is a problem far from unique to Japan. The comfort women issue is made even more complicated than it already is by the nationalism surrounding the issue in all three countries.

DUDDEN:  Many of us who have published writings specifically on the comfort women issues have stated up front that nationalism in all three countries is an obstacle to resolution. The Letter, however, tries to return to what we do in the classroom, which is to focus on the substance of what happened: the brutality of this particular history. People who throw history around as a weapon tend to forget what actually happened on the ground, which transcends national boundaries.

SAND: The whole statement is about the ethics of doing history, and the responsibility of governments to protect and respect the work of historians.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Prime Minister Abe has already said that he does not plan to use the key language from the Murayama Statement when he issues his own statement on World War II in August. Are you concerned that the upcoming statement will not bring Japan and its neighbors any closer to reconciliation, and might even worsen relations?

SAND: Alexis and I come at this from different specialties, so the question is best put to her. The politics of war memory and apology is a central research issue for her and a topic about which she writes. For my part, I of course believe the Japanese government has the power to make changes toward reconciliation. But I am less engaged in the diplomatic issues. I wanted to play the role of “switchboard” in the compilation of the Letter partly because I am not heavily involved in the issue, and felt I could channel the common sense of colleagues and bring opinion together.

DUDDEN: In my view, the current government in Japan seems determined to play with words, to divert attention from what really happened, and what needs to be said to move forward. It is disheartening that in this very important anniversary year, a nation that has acted in peace and with respect for human rights over the past 70 years sees its top leaders objecting to rather common sense assessments of what occurred in Asia in World War II.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: In his Statement in 1995, Prime Minister Murayama stated that “Japan must eliminate “self-righteous nationalism.”

SAND: We were in touch with some very prominent political scientists who have influence in Japan. For the most part, they said they are working through other channels, and chose not to sign. But several said: “I hope you will convey to the Japanese government how bad it is for Japan that this type of nationalism is still kicking around.” It seems so obvious.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: At least one critic in Japan has gotten considerable attention by claiming there is a split between you two, with Professor Dudden interpreting the Letter with a decidedly anti-Japan twist, and Professor Sand remaining more objective.

DUDDEN: There is no division between us. Whoever says there is a split has a gross misunderstanding.

SAND: Alexis and I were the two people who sent out the final version, which raised the question: what should we call ourselves? I suggested that we were two co-coordinators. We got the room at the AAS, we carried the whole thing forward on-line with the group of 30 or so. We decided on the deadline, and gave everyone involved their final say. And then we sent it out. But all of that is different from being the representatives, or spokespeople for the 187 signatories. Alexis has been on the public record on this topic many times. Her email inbox was filled with messages, many of them quite nasty. In many respects the Japanese language version of the Letter has turned out to be the more important one, because I expect more people are reading it. It was co-translated by me and Asano Toyomi of Waseda University. He is very devoted to the document, and he turned it into beautiful Japanese.

The Letter went all over the media. Sometimes it has been misrepresented in the media, and sometimes fairly represented. Lots of media have printed the whole document.

DUDDEN: We sent the Letter to the Cabinet Office, in both languages, out  of respect. We offered the Letter to Yomiuri Shimbun on an exclusive basis, but we never heard back from the paper. Then we gave the Letter to about 10 people for whom I had meishi on my desk. Most of them were Japanese reporters. I sent it to the New York Times and the Washington Post, and then to Bloomberg and the Korean news agency Yonhap. I had worked with a Yonhap reporter the week before at a conference. Subsequently, this turned into me being “pro-Korea,” and me “manipulating” Jordan. Frankly, it is absurd. Some critics in Japan cited a Yonhap dispatch that I asserted I was the leader of the push for the Letter. I never said that; the Yonhap reporter wrote that. As we explained, I was one of the leaders, but one among many. Somehow the notion emerged that I led the push for the Letter in an effort to damage Japan. But this plays into something that has been going on inside Japan for over a year. I’ve been labeled as “anti-Japan,” which of course I am not. But that label is very difficult to defend yourself against.

The Letter is not about me, or Jordan, or any other individual. This is 187 scholars, some of them very big names, who share a concern about a worrisome trend in Japan on history issues, in this case comfort women. That is a big deal.

Japan is an open society. We’d like to add to the debate in a productive manner. Unless there is discussion inside Japan, nothing else will matter.

SAND: We haven’t gotten caught up in any of the commentary. We know we live in the age of the 24-hour, second-by-second media world. And we issued the Letter during Golden Week, so a lot of people we sent it to were probably not paying attention. I expect this week could be ‘smear week.’ Kobayashi Yoshinori has already started in.

We wrote a statement that we all feel strongly about.  We are historians. We know that we can stand back, and it will either speak to people on its own terms, or it won’t. Any negative comments said around it are just part of that day’s news cycle.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nye: ‘The US rebalance to Asia is real’

Joseph S. Nye Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor and former Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. His latest book, Is the American Century Over?, is now available in paperback. On Monday, April 27, Professor Nye helped host Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan during a forum held at Harvard.

With Prime Minister Abe having recently been in Washington, with the US and Japan announcing new “guidelines” for the bilateral defense relationship, we turned to Nye to discuss Japan policy, the US “rebalance” toward Asia, and a range of other foreign policy issues. Starting in 1994, while serving as a senior Pentagon official, Nye led an initiative to upgrade the US-Japan defense relationship, culminating in the 1997 bilateral guidelines forged in large part to ensure a smooth US-Japan reaction to any potential crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The new guidelines announced last week are the first since those of 1997.

Professor Nye was an advisor to Hillary Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign, and remains an influential foreign policy voice within the Democratic Party.

 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: You argue in your new book that the US will remain the world’s main power for quite some time, but that the diffusion of power will make the US relatively less-able to control others.

NYE: Yes. Entropy may prove a greater challenge to the American role than China. This means there will be times when the US will actually have to work with China to get things done. For example, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is not the kind of thing we should oppose. We should be encouraged that China will pick up some of the role of providing global public goods. And having other countries participate in the AIIB means that instead of it becoming a Chinese political slush fund, it will have to have transparency and organization.

The AIIB case is an example of the type of decision the US will have to make. The US will remain the dominant power, but we will have to learn to work more with others, and not just China. It is not possible to solve global climate change with just two countries. You can’t have international monetary stability with just two countries.  We have to think of Europe, Japan, and others.

This requires an attitude about foreign policy that gets away from the kind of zero-sum way we have often approached it.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: As you wrote the book, were you thinking to encourage Americans to think in a new way about foreign policy, or were you trying to reassure our allies and potential adversaries that America is not a declining nation?

NYE: Both. I try to write in an academically-respectable way, with footnotes and suggested additional readings. I addressed this book to people who are concerned about America’s role in the world, whether they are in the United States or abroad.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the general trend in American foreign policy? The Bush administration was quite interventionist, and the Obama administration seems to have retrenched.

NYE: There are periods in American foreign policy in which we are “maximalist,” and others during which we retrench. But retrenchment is not the same things as “isolationism.” Retrenchment is an adjustment of strategic goals and means. Dwight Eisenhower followed a retrenchment policy, and Obama is in the tradition of Eisenhower. By contrast, George W. Bush was a maximalist. I argue that maximalists often get us into worse trouble than retrenchment. But too much retrenchment can be a problem, and I do worry about that.

For example, look at the role of Congress in not ratifying the Law of the Sea Treaty. Congress has refused to go forward with agreements reached to raise the quota for emerging countries in the International Monetary Fund. These are foolish decisions, and they hurt our position in the world.

In addition to this overview, it is important to look at specific regions. It would be foolish for the US to retrench in Asia or Europe, or even Latin America and Africa. But in the Middle East, we are going to see a period of revolutions of different types. Some will challenge state borders, as we are seeing now in the so-called Ottoman Provinces. We will also see increasing religious divisions. There will be popular discontent about delayed modernization, which occurred in the Arab Spring. These types of revolutions are not going to end quickly. It’s a bit like the French Revolution, which began in 1789, and it was not until 1815 – 25 years later – that the Congress of Vienna restored some semblance of stability to Europe. In circumstances like that, trying to control events through external intervention often makes the situation worse, not better. Prussia, Austria, and Britain found that out when they tried to control events in France.

In the Middle East, we are going to have to learn how to use shifting partners, try to nudge things when we can, but accept that controlling these revolutions will be beyond our capacity, or the capacity of any external actor.

In the Middle East, we will have to think of policy in terms of containment of the effects of these revolutions.

In East Asia, in contrast, there needs to be a major American presence, which is what the “rebalance” policy is all about. We are welcome in East Asia: Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, India, Australia. These countries want us there to help manage the rise of Chinese power.

This is not containment. It is to ensure that as China’s power increases there is a natural balance of power.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Some critics argue that President Obama looks weak.

NYE: In East Asia, the rebalance policy is correct. The administration has been challenged by so many problems that keep arising in the Middle East. So if you simply look at the travelogue of administration officials, you don’t seem to see much rebalancing. This is a case of the urgent driving out the important. In Europe, I think President Obama has been right to ensure that Vladimir Putin cannot divide the US from Europe, which has been a major Russian objective. Obama has been very smart to keep a close relationship of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Meanwhile, the opening to Cuba in Latin America was a good move. With Iran, we still do not know what is going to happen with the nuclear negotiations until next June. These are all steps in the right direction.

Overall, I would say President Obama is headed in the right direction.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Let’s look a bit more at the rebalance in East Asia.

NYE: One of the important questions is whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will get through. One can complain about the details of trade agreements, and I am not a trade expert. But if TPP fails, it will be seen as a major American setback for rebalance policy. There are indications that US and Japanese negotiators are getting close to an agreement, but it is not done until it is done.

We are also going to have to find ways to work with China on the key issues. Obama has tried. The statement on climate change reached while he was in China late last year was useful; not earth-shaking, but useful. We are going to have to think about a more subtle approach to the AIIB.

And the US-Japan defense relationship is the better than I have seen in years. When I was in the Pentagon 20 years ago, people were talking about the security treaty with Japan being a relic of the Cold War. People don’t think that anymore.

American relations with India have moved in a healthy direction. So the overall direction of the rebalance is good, but it is occurring at a slower pace than I would like to see.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:  How do you evaluate Prime Minister Abe, especially on history issues?

NYE: It really is time to put the history issues behind us. The 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II should be a time to now turn to the 21^st Century, and not get stuck in the details of the 20^th Century. At times, Prime Minister Abe has been pragmatic on the issues. I hope that pragmatic side will continue to come through. Abe is Kishi’s grandson, and that does have effect on how he thinks back over history. The visit to Yasukuni Shrine in late-2013 not only irritated Japan’s neighbors but also disappointed Washington. I hope he will see that those kinds of steps are more costly than they are worth.  He wants to create a legacy, including TPP, the upgraded defense guidelines, and repairing relations with South Korea so as to be prepared if something were to erupt with North Korea. These are the things to think about, not history.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Okinawa continues to be a source of unease. What do you think the US should do about the Futenma Replacement Facility project?

NYE: If there is enough political support on Okinawa to build the replacement facility at Henoko, I think we should carry it out. But I am not sure that is going to be possible. We’ll have to see. The more important issue is to think over a ten year period. How do we want to see American troops deployed? I have suggested that we ought to consider having US troops co-located on Japanese bases throughout the islands, which reduces their vulnerability, but also makes clear that these are Japanese bases, with Japanese flags, with the American presence rotating around these bases. Misawa Air base would be a case in point. If we think ahead 10 years and ask how we are going to ensure a continuing alliance, a continuing strong American presence, with US and Japanese forces capable of operating together, then we really have to get away from the idea of large, fixed bases on Okinawa as a long-term solution. We should be planning for that decade-long process, rather than letting everything sink or swim on the issue of relocating the Futenma operations to a new facility at Henoko.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this you forward-thinking, or are you aware of this approach being on anyone’s radar screen in Washington?

NYE: This is my personal view, but I have raised it with friends in Washington. I participate in the US-Japan commission coordinated by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and there is also an annual conference held jointly by CSIS and Nihon Keizai Shimbun. I have floated these ideas in these forums. But I am not a stalking horse for any Pentagon consideration of new approaches to Okinawa. To the contrary; a lot of people would say I am out on a limb.

Abe’s ‘Canberra Strategy’

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan will speak to a joint meeting of the US Congress on April 29, marking the first time Japan’s top political leader will address the full US national legislature. The speech will carry enormous symbolism; Abe will speak from the rostrum of the House of Representatives, from which Franklin Roosevelt declared war on Japan in 1941 in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of that year. The US and Japan have long been reconciled, of course, with a post-war bilateral security alliance that continues to form the bedrock of stability in East Asia. But Abe has a testy relationship with his leadership counterparts in China and South Korea, and both countries will be listening carefully to hear if and how he addresses lingering animosities about Japan’s historical role in the region.

Many analysts in Washington expect (and some have recommended) that Abe will model his upcoming address to Congress on the talk he delivered to the Australian parliament in capital-city Canberra in July of last year. Abe effectively referenced two incidents of severe mistreatment of Australian prisoners-of-war during World War II that had long been thorns-in-the-side of Japan-Australia relations. The Bataan ‘Death March’ of 1942, in which hundreds of American POWs died in Japan-occupied Philippines, conjures up similar emotions in the United States. In 2009, Japan officially apologized for that mistreatment of captured American soldiers. Japan’s prime minister at that time, Taro Aso, was under some pressure in part because his family’s lucrative coal mining business used US POWs as forced-laborers during World War II. (Aso is now Japan’s finance minister.)

Whether Abe really apologized to Australians on behalf of Japan, or merely commiserated about a shared bitter experience, remains a matter of contention. And his Canberra comments made no reference to China, Korea, or any other country in East Asia, leaving unanswered whether he really agrees with his predecessors Tomiichi Murayama and Junichiro Koizumi, who stated unambiguously in 1995 and 2005 respectively that Japan adopted a “mistaken national policy” that resulted in “aggression” and “colonial rule” in the first half of last century.

While stating that he agrees with his predecessors “on the whole,” Abe himself has never used the most important operative words from those past apologies that Chinese and Korean officials consider a litmus test of his views and intentions.

Unresolved history issues between Japan and Korea – key US allies – continue to complicate American diplomacy in East Asia, making Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming address to Congress, and his planned statement in August marking the 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II, particularly important.

To discuss Abe’s ‘Canberra Strategy,’ we turned to Tessa Morris-Suzuki, one of Australia’s top specialists on Japan. Morris-Suzuki is professor of Japanese history at Australian National University, and author of East Asia Beyond the History Wars. She is past president of the Asian Studies Association of Australia.

 

Morris-Suzuki: ‘Prime Minister Abe

is deliberately ambiguous about apologies’

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Was Prime Minister Abe’s “Canberra” speech last year well-received in Australia?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: The prime minister’s speech made headline news and attracted some media debate at the time, but its long- term impact on Australian views of Japan appears to have been quite small. It is difficult to say whether this impact was positive or negative. A number of media, business, and political commentators praised Abe’s words of condolence for the Australian servicemen killed in World War II, but much of the discussion in letters-to-the-editor of major newspapers was critical. The event also attracted public criticism from Australia’s main veterans’ organization, the Returned and Services League. An interesting note is that much of the criticism focused on Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who replied by praising the skill and sense of honor shown by Japanese troops during the war. This was widely criticized by veterans and others, who argued that Japan’s wartime treatment of prisoners of war was not honorable. 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe referred specifically to the Sandakan wartime events on Borneo, and the Kokoda events in Papua New Guinea. Remind readers why Sandakan and Kokoda resonate with Australians.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Abe began his speech by referring to Sandakan and Kokoda. Sandakan in Borneo is the site of a death march during which some 1,000 Australian soldiers were killed or died of starvation, disease, and exhaustion. The Kokoda track over the mountains of Papua New Guinea was the site of crucial and fierce battles between Australian and Japanese forces, in which some 600 Australian soldiers were killed.

It is worth noting that although Abe mentioned the place name Sandakan, he did not use the term “death march”. These two sites, and particularly Kokoda, have become key symbols of the sufferings of Australian soldiers during the Pacific War. Monuments to the Kokoda track exist in many parts of Australia, and some Australians still visit the track to reenact the march over its rugged terrain.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Did Australians receive Abe’s comments as an apology? He seemed to speak somewhat in the passive tense – “regretting” that terrible things happened, but not acknowledging responsibility on the part of Japan.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Most commentators noted that Abe expressed condolences but not apology. In fact, Abe’s speech presented the war, not as an event for which Japan should apologize, but rather as a part of history which Australia and Japan share. He spoke of “our fathers and grandfathers” -- both Japanese and Australian -- experiencing the events of Sandakan and Kokoda, and went on to speak of the Japanese naval officers killed in an attempted midget submarine attack on Sydney harbor. He recalled how Australia had invited the mother of one of the dead to visit Sydney for a memorial ceremony, and then quoted the words of former Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies: “Hostility to Japan must go. It is better to hope than always to remember.” The clear message was, “We all suffered similarly during the war. We should let bygones be bygones.”

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe seemed perhaps more ready to reconcile with Australia than with China or Korea?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I look at this in strategic terms. Abe wishes as far as possible to avoid making any direct apologies or acknowledgments of wrongs committed by the Japanese military during the war. But at the same time his strategy is to deepen the military alliance with the United States and forge new and deep military and intelligence alliances with countries like Australia. In order to combine these two aims, he and his advisers choose words very carefully to try to smooth over concerns about memories of the war without directly addressing or apologizing for the events of the past.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Abe says he upholds the Murayama and Kono statements “as a whole.” To you, what does that mean?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: This is a phrase devised to confuse and blur the meaning of Abe’s stance on the issues of war responsibility and apology. It is a deliberately ambiguous phrase which enables him to avoid saying whether he accepts words such as “aggression” and “apology” contained in the Murayama statement, and to avoid reconfirming the Kono statement’s acknowledgment that “comfort women” were recruited by coercion.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you anticipate the prime minister will say in his August 15 statement, marking the 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I think it likely that he will use two verbal strategies in an effort to appease international (particularly US) opinion, while at the same time avoiding making a direct statement of apology about the war. First, he will express a personal sense of pain at the memory of the war. In many recent statements, including his Canberra speech, Abe has spoken of his sadness and heartache at this memory. These words present the prime minister to the world as being a compassionate and caring person, but at the same time avoid any notion of historical responsibility. The second strategy is to use the word “反省” [hansei - best translated as “reconsideration” or “self-questioning”] in his statement in Japanese, but to translate this into English as “remorse”. The word “remorse” in English has a much stronger meaning than “反省” in Japanese (and would most commonly be rendered in Japanese as 後悔 [kōkai]or 自責の念 [jiseki no nen]). In the Murayama and Koizumi statements, the word “反省” was also translated into English as “remorse”, but was followed by the words お詫びの気持ち[owabi no kimochi - a feeling of apology].  If Abe uses the word 反省 (translated as remorse) but not the word お詫び (apology), he will convey to English speaking audiences the impression that he is apologizing, but will make it clear to those who read his statement in Japanese, Korean or Chinese is that he is merely expressing 反省 and not お詫び.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How will Korea react if PM Abe omits the wording of the Murayama Statement – “aggression,” “colonial rule,” and “mistaken national policy”?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I am deeply concerned about the likely impact of Abe’s 70th anniversary statement. If he uses the verbal strategies I have mentioned, these will not only fail to ease the painful memories of many people in Korea, China and elsewhere, but also deepen misunderstandings between East Asian countries and the English-speaking world. Many Americans and others, hearing the word “remorse”, will think that Abe has issued an apology, and fail to understand why Chinese and Koreans are still dissatisfied. In short, I am concerned that Abe and his advisors may be planning to use verbal games to send one message to the English speaking world and another to East Asian countries, including Japan itself. The terrible events of the Pacific War should be recalled with sincerity, honesty and directness, not with word games.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you think Abe a transformational figure, leading and reflecting fundamental changes in Japan?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: The Abe administration has already changed Japan in important ways through alterations to military strategy, state control of information, educational guidelines, trade and energy policy and other matters. In this sense Abe is a transformational figure; but it still too early to say whether he will succeed in carrying out the further and even more fundamental transformations, including changes to the constitution, which remain on his policy agenda. 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why does the Abe Cabinet receive high marks in public opinion polls, but low marks for its major policies?

MORRIS-SUZUKI: Public opinion is still reacting to the sense of crisis and absence of leadership which followed the triple disaster of March, 2011. Many people in Japan feel a profound sense of insecurity because of the ongoing aftermath of the disaster, the continuing weakness of the Japanese economy and the rise of China. In this situation, Abe’s large and simple statements about Japan’s revival and national pride are reassuring. Many people also still pin hopes on the future effects of Abenomics, even though, after two-and-a-half years, no significant positive impact on economic fundamentals or on the lives of ordinary Japanese people has yet been seen.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a thought-out, realistic national strategy underlying “revisionism,” or is it more of a romantic whim about Japan.

MORRIS-SUZUKI: I believe that this is driven by emotion and ideology, not by political realism. A more realistic political strategy would positively and creatively address the concerns of China, Korea, and other Asian neighbors, since Japan’s long-term economic and security future rely on good relations with its neighbors. Revisionism is also creating deepening divisions within Japanese society itself. At a grassroots popular level, Japan has a fine history of efforts to seek reconciliation with neighboring countries and address problems of war responsibility. A more realistic national policy would build on these grassroots achievements, rather than ostracizing and marginalizing ordinary Japanese people who have worked so hard for reconciliation.

 

Cronin: ‘Next year might have been a better time for Prime Minister Abe to address Congress’

Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe will arrive in Washington two weeks from now, with the highlight of his visit to be an address to a joint meeting of the US Congress. The key issues on the agenda include an upgrade of the US-Japan security relationship, and the ongoing efforts to conclude an Asia-wide trade deal known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But Abe, Japan’s most politically-stable prime minister in years, is a polarizing figure in Northeast Asia, and could wind up receiving as much or more attention himself than the important issues at play.

Patrick Cronin directs the Asia program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), one of Washington’s more influential think tanks on defense and national security issues. He has been involved with US-Japan policy for over 20 years, going back to the “Nye Initiative” of the early 1990s, which resulted in the upgrade of bilateral defense “guidelines” in 1997. When the Liberal Democrats (LDP) temporarily lost power in 2009, Cronin was one of the few specialists in Washington who had good contact with the LDP, the defense bureaucracy, and the then-newcomers of the Democratic Party (DPJ). Cronin has held senior positions at the National Defense University, London’s IISS, and CSIS in Washington, and served several years as the third-ranking official at the US Agency for International Development (AID).

 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Before we get into Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming visit to Washington, let’s set some context. The US Congress is now considering the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). You’ve suggested to members of Congress that they view TPP as critical to US national security, that it would rebrand the US as more than a military power in the region.

CRONIN: That’s right. The Asia-Pacific region is driven mostly by trade and economics, and economic strategy. The United States has lost a lot of credibility; we used to be the dominant economic power, and the dominant trade power.

For the past few years, the US has pushed TPP as the leading framework for region.

My point to US policy makers is the intrinsic importance of reminding the region that the US is a great market power, interested first and foremost in open access to trade, and the global commons more broadly.

For better or worse, the US has made TPP the end-all and be-all of our whole approach to the region. So, without TPP, and without the trade promotion authority (TPA) that is a necessary precursor for TPP, the United States would be pushed onto our back feet for a number of years – well into the next administration. That is how long it would take to put together any new initiative that would have any hope of winning broad appeal, not just in the region, but with our Congress.

It is quite ironic that the US Trade Representative initially opposed bringing Japan into the TPP, on the theory that Japan would drag out an endless dialogue and negotiation. But now, in the 11^th hour of trying to bring the TPP negotiations to a successful conclusion, it doesn’t seem to be Prime Minister Abe who is dragging his heels. It is the US that can’t get its act together.

For Japan, TPP is clearly a vital strategic interest. Abe seems anxious to prevent Japan from slipping down the ladder of great power nations. He is trying to preserve Japan’s strong stature, especially as China rises so quickly. Abe’s third arrow of structural reform has been waiting for something like TPP, and if it is not forthcoming, then it will be a serious wound to Japan’s hopes of preserving its stature.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: You think Japan – the Abe government – sees TPP in such strategic terms?

CRONIN: Japan has been pushing to tighten our alliance, even while it has been seeking economic revival, including with the TPP. But Japan is not reassured. Look at the lack of reassurance that Japan apparently feels over the Senkaku Islands. Because of the growing contest with China in the South China Sea, Japan is very wary over whether the United States will be fully committed to Japan. Every ally worries about this kind of thing to some degree. But there are plenty of signs of deep concerns in Japan about this, which led President Obama last year to state very publicly that Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty we have with Japan would apply to the Senkakus. It showed that Japan is in need of greater reassurance today than ever before.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:  You have similar concerns about Australia.

CRONIN: Yes. The Australians want to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) proposed by China. I think the AIIB is a natural thing for the region to do. The US should have a clear message in support of any principled approach to multinational development programs. The British, the Germans, the Italians apparently want to join. The AIIB will likely be congruent with World Bank-type rules. Having Australia, Korea, and other allies inside the institution would be a welcome development.

Think back just two governments ago in Australia, to the Howard government, at the time of the financial crisis in the US in 2008. Australia was worried that by 2030 the US would no longer be the dominant power. China looked ascendant.  Other Australian leaders are on record saying that Australia needs a more balanced approach between China and the US.

Australia, like other powers, keep trying to balance their security interests with the United States on the one hand, and their trade interests with China.

That is both the real danger, and real opportunity for the US. If we rebrand ourselves as a balanced power, one that brings trade, and not simply security guarantees, we will be more palatable to all of our partners and other powers in the region, including new partners in Southeast Asia. If we just have a security agenda in the region, we’ll be thwarted because of a lack of political will when tensions rise with China. Even a strong China will be much more compelled by a strong, balanced US to modify the rules it would like to perpetuate, such as labor, property rights, and state enterprises. China might like to push its own rules in these and other areas, but will have to adjust if they are forced to comply with a high-standards trade agreement of the sort we are talking about with TPP. China will have to compromise. That is the aim: to negotiate the rules for the Asia-Pacific region, to which China would have to comply.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Just to clarify: US trade negotiators initially did not want Japan included in TPP?

CRONIN:  Lawyers inside USTR made it very clear that they did not want Japan an initial stakeholder, on the grounds that it would protract the negotiations, and potentially thwart a successful conclusion. The alternative idea was to have a smaller group in the initial round, and then invite Japan to join in the second round.

Things have changed with Prime Minister Abe, though Prime Minister Kan was also open to joining the TPP negotiating process as a lever to promote necessary domestic reforms in Japan.

But there certainly was a time when US officials harbored major doubts that Tokyo would be serious about the economic reforms needed for Japan to comply with TPP.

The irony now is that it does not appear to be Japan that is foot-dragging.

Systemically, it is the US Congress’s inability to come to grips with Trade Promotion Authority that makes the United States appear as the dysfunctional party.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you think the Obama Administration is really committed to TPA, and TPP?

CRONIN: The US faces a presidential race in 2016, and whichever party wins, the new president will start with either a huge gain, or a huge deficit, depending on whether TPP has been adopted.

TPP is not the end-all or be-all of civilization. But the US Government has made it our singular trade liberalization initiative. We won’t be able to get to our European initiative if we don’t succeed with TPP.

As a result, a lot rides on the success of TPP passing; for the US Government broadly, not just the Obama Administration’s legacy.

Without TPP, the US strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region will look very hollow.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why?

CRONIN: Thus far, the US military presence in the region has adjusted only on the margins of what we had before. If TPP were to fail, our diplomacy in the region will largely be forgotten, or dismissed. The US will look like a declining, one-dimensional power; big guns, but little sway or influence in the very important local disputes in the region.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the Obama administration doing enough?

CRONIN: The Obama administration is definitely mobilizing. But when I was up on Capitol Hill recently, it was obvious that the White House needs to do more. Congressional staffers are still asking: When will the White House really reach out to us?

In fairness: The mood in Congress is not exactly open and friendly to the White House. But the White House needs to do a lot more.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Such as?

CRONIN: It really needs to be bipartisan. I think the White House should reach out to someone like Jon Huntsman, who may be the only Republican of note not running for president, and suggest that they work together to sell TPA and TPP to Congress. Huntsman knows the issues, and the politics. There needs to be some compromise, starting with the president.

There is a moral hazard for the president. He has become a very polarizing figure, and that will only increase as the 2016 presidential race heats up. If President Obama is the sole major advocate for TPP, that could make it even more difficult to pass. So the president has to be surrounded by strong bipartisan voices. Paul Ryan is another important Republican who could play that role very well, and there are other sitting members of Congress who could do it effectively.

The president should be looking to share the success of TPA and TPP because passage would only be the beginning of a new round of fierce competition and additional negotiations.

The US will have to follow through with new initiatives. But we can’t even think about that until we get to the finish line of TPA and TPP.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: In the context of the Obama administration’s initiative to rebalance our global policies toward East Asia, how is it that Washington so poorly managed the diplomacy surrounding China’s proposal for a regional infrastructure bank?

CRONIN:   For better or worse, the United States has been heavily focused on major security initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq. We created an economy that went into a downward spiral and deep recession. We are now trying to be restrained in our international security policy which, in general, was a prudent move, but did provide others with opportunities to try to fill the gaps. We have been cutting defense spending, especially with sequestration in place, and we have been cutting back on foreign assistance.

So, in a declining budgetary and economic environment, we were failing to initiate more comprehensive moves that could appeal to the Asia-Pacific region.

We put ourselves in the unwise position of telling Asian allies and friends to turn down money very much needed for infrastructure, unless the money came from us. And we said this even though we had no money to give them.

The US has to be on the side of progress, of problem-solving, and of rules that everyone can live by.  But other than TPP, which is a very important initiative, we have been failing to promote additional trade, investment, and development programs. We could have been working in a bipartisan fashion to rework the Bretton Woods institutions, such as reworking the distribution of voting rights in the Asian Development Bank. The existing institutions need to be more innovative and creative in tackling development issues in the region. And even if we had been doing those things, there would still have been a shortage of capital in Asia because the area is so dynamic economically.

So China’s capital is going to be important. We should have been trying to steer China’s initiative in a direction that is consistent with global rules that have worked so well in the region over the past 70 years. We certainly should not have been trying to block our friends and allies from joining the AIIB. In fact, the US ought to join. We should want a voice in the rules that will govern infrastructure investments. We would be in a position to help shape rules and regulations on labor, the environment, and other issues that are critical for the region.

Instead, the perception regarding China’s bank proposal is that the US is being defensive, and is trying to stop China. In fact, China’s track record on infrastructure investments is not very good. We should be on the inside, having influence.

That brings us back to the broader point that we have put all of our policy eggs in the TPP basket, which is why it is so important that Congress pass it.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: But who in the Administration dropped the ball on China’s AIIB idea?

CRONIN: Ultimately the White House is responsible. There are some excellent people who are trying to convey reasonable messages that then have to be implemented by various departments. But the messaging from this administration has at times been abysmal. That is not me being critical of the administration. This is what I hear from the region. Even if the administration wants to hedge on the AIIB more than I would, we should at least have had a clear message to deliver. For example, we could have been saying: “There are lots of questions about the AIIB. We don’t oppose it, and we won’t stand in the way of any of our friends and allies in the region from joining, but we hope they will raise the serious questions that need to be raised.” That would have been a reasonable position. But it is the kind of message that has to be made consistently, over time. Our principles only matter if it doesn’t appear that we are changing them from moment to moment. Right now, our friends find us unpredictable. We’ve put ourselves in a very unhealthy position.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Relations with Korea seem to be particularly up and down these days, with differences over the THAAD missile defense system, and the AIIB. How much are the Koreans hedging because of the troubles with Washington that you describe?

CRONIN: Every government has its domestic challenges. President Park certainly is facing a slew of them. She has seen a lot of opportunities in improving relations with China. There are economic incentives. Better ties with Beijing also give Seoul some leverage over North Korea. And finally, President Park is hedging against the US-Japan relationship. She wants to gain some leverage with Washington, to get the US to put pressure on Japan, both to atone for history, and to not move in a direction on defense issues that makes Seoul uncomfortable.

Our alliance with South Korea is strong, but our relationship with Seoul has certainly been better than it is right now. We do not have the kind of high-level, deep trust with Seoul that we should. This is partly attributable to President Park’s governing style of reliance on a very small inner circle, though Washington certainly shares part of the blame.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What explains Seoul’s reluctance about THAAD?

CRONIN: Missile defense is something that is very much in the national security interests of Korea, and in the interest of protecting US forces in Korea. It is an important factor in deterring North Korea, as Pyongyang grows its missile, and potentially nuclear weapons stockpile. We need missile defense systems. And as North Korea’s missile capabilities expand in both range and quantity, we need multi-layered missile defense. Ultimately that means something like the THAAD system, to provide defense at a higher altitude over a larger area than a system like the Patriot 3 batteries. This does not threaten China in any way, though Chinese perceptions may be a different matter. We need to consistently, vociferously, and relentlessly make the case that THAAD has nothing to do with China. The issue is deterring North Korea’s ability to threaten the South, to threaten US forces in the region, and to perhaps even threaten US territory.

As a matter of political reality, President Park, having moved closer to China for the reasons I mentioned, probably will not accept US deployment of THAAD until the next crisis. We have once again run into a messaging problem. We probably have been talking with the South Koreans about THAAD, but we then seek plausible deniability by saying that it has not formally been on the bilateral agenda so it has really not been talked about. The point of that is to have a guise to hide behind so we don’t have to acknowledge talking about a system that is so politically sensitive in South Korea. It is sensitive for President Park, because she doesn’t want to have to explain the situation every time she talks with Chinese officials.

The reality is that we ought to be preparing THAAD as a response to a serious North Korean provocation in the future, such as a fourth nuclear test, or more missile launches, including mobile missiles that would be very hard for us to strike. [North Korea fired some short-range missiles last week, shortly before US defense secretary Ashton Carter arrived in Seoul for scheduled consultations.]

All of this would justify the need for further beefing up of the missile defense network that we already have, beyond the Korean missile defense system that Seoul is committed to.

We could concentrate on interoperability, rather than an integrated regional system. That would be a bit of finesse, as it would help enable the Koreans to tell the Chinese that the system is not part of a larger, regional system aimed at China.

But it would mean that American, Korean, and Japanese forces, in a crisis, could start to network in response to an impending North Korean missile launch.

The whole issue has not been handled well. The Koreans don’t want to talk about it, and even want to deny that they are thinking about THAAD. The issue is very cumbersome to talk about.

 

 DISPATCH JAPAN: Meanwhile, it doesn’t seem very surprising that Seoul showed interest in the AIIB from the beginning.

CRONIN: The Koreans have criticized the US on this in much the same way the Australians and British did. They all perceived mixed or confused messages from Washington, and thus were put in the difficult position of having to consider whether their involvement in this important initiative would risk tension with the US. The message from us should have been an emphatic “sure, go ahead.” Of course, we still hope they will press for the kinds of institutional rules that have helped them grow into prosperous G20 economies.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: In the context of rocky ties right now with Seoul, what are the “pros” and “cons” of the invitation extended to Prime Minister Abe to address the Congress?

CRONIN: I think it is correct to invite the prime minister to address Congress, at the right time. Japan is our most important ally in the region. We could not have the kind of force presence that we do have in the region without Japan. Japan is a democracy, and the world’s third-largest economy. Prime Minister Abe is committed to making a contribution to peace, the way Japan has done over the past seven decades, not like the decades before that.

So an invitation to the prime minister is the right thing to do. The question is: Is this the right time? I think a case can be made that we should have waited until we have the Trans-Pacific Partnership in place. And it may not be the best idea to excessively highlight the announcement of the new US-Japan defense guidelines during the prime minister’s visit, since defense is not necessarily the message we want underscore at the time of the 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II.

Next year might have been the ideal time for Prime Minister Abe to address Congress.

During this year’s visit, we could have showered the prime minister with all sorts of attention, while putting pressure on Congress to pass TPA, followed by TPP. And we could have unveiled the new defense guidelines as the new framework for thinking through new roles and missions for this critical bilateral alliance.

In this way, we could have gotten past the May and August anniversaries of the end of the War. Remember, Prime Minister Abe will be back in Washington, probably repeatedly during his time in office. We could have ensured an arrangement for him to address Congress next year, hopefully with TPP having been adopted, and with the new defense guidelines operational.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do you expect the prime minister to deal with history issues?

CRONIN: Nobody knows for sure, except Prime Minister Abe himself. I think he is his own counsel on this matter. But clearly people like Professor Shinichi Kitaoka, who is acting chairman of the commission that is supposed to advise the prime minister on this, is fully aware of the sensitivity of the issue. I was in Japan recently, and Professor Kitaoka agreed with the three points I raised. First, the prime minister has to make sure that he atones with deep respect and remorse for the past. This wouldn’t have to be an endless part of a speech or statement, but the prime minister will have to be sincere and believable. Secondly, he could then go on and talk with quiet pride – but plenty of pride – about the contributions Japan has made to order and stability in the international system over the past 70 years. And third, I think he needs to put forth something that would be a positive, rules-based vision for all, for the future.  Sincere atonement for the past, quiet pride for Japan’s seven decades of contribution to international order, and a positive, inclusive vision for the future.

Those are the three ingredients I think are key, and I think Kitaoka Sensei understands this, and would recommend it.

I also think the prime minister understands this, but until he actually says these things, no one knows what political calculations may come into play, and change the perception of what he says.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: To be effective, do you think Prime Minister Abe would do best to use the precise language from the Murayama and Koizumi statements?

CRONIN: I don’t necessarily think there is only one way to convey sincerity and believability. But including the language from those earlier statements is the clearest way to signal continuity, and not to raise concerns. Conversely, deviating from the earlier statements does not gain Japan anything, but could cause lots of trouble. That would be the surest path to invite criticism at a time when Japan should be applauded for the contributions the country has made over the past 70 years.

 

US, Japan to release new defense guidelines before implementing legislation reaches the Diet

The United States and Japan will release new bilateral defense guidelines in late April, according to Japanese officials who briefed reporters on the plan. The timing is politically awkward, as new and revised legislation to authorize new roles and missions for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces envisioned in the new guidelines will not even be introduced in the Diet until May, and will likely be the subject of intense debate. But the US and Japan are anxious to release the new guidelines during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Washington later this month. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, together with coalition junior partner Komeito, holds a commanding majority in the Lower House, and the prime minister’s advisors are confident the implementing legislation will pass with ease. The pacifist Komeito has major reservations about many of the defense policies spearheaded by Abe, but has been unwilling to resign in protest from the ruling coalition. US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter is currently in Tokyo for consultations prior to the Abe visit.

Dispatch Japan continues to chronicle the evolution of Japan’s defense and security policies, and the implications of those changes for the US-Japan security alliance.

Jim Przystup is a senior fellow and research professor at the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Previously, he was Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, a staff member on the US House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, a staff member in the State Department’s office of policy planning, and director for Regional Security Strategies on the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He worked in the private sector at Itochu and IBM. Dr. Przystup graduated from the University of Detroit and holds an M.A. in International Relations and a Ph.D. in Diplomatic History from the University of Chicago. The views expressed below are those of Mr. Przystup alone.  They do not represent the views or policies of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

 

Przystup:  “Collective Self-Defense makes

Japan a more attractive alliance partner”

DISPATCH JAPAN: The public supported Prime Minister Abe’s handling of the recent hostage crisis, including opposition to ransom payment. But the public also seemed to be wary of any military-related response, or to see any policy implications much beyond renewed diplomatic efforts. Any surprise there?

PRZYSTUP: Not really, either in terms of public support for Abe’s handling of the crisis, or the government’s opposition to ransom payments.  Within Japan’s political leadership, there has been, and continues to be some discussion of a role for the Self-Defense Forces in a future hostage crisis. But there does not appear to be broad public support for an expanded SDF role.

The recent hostage crisis was definitely not a 9/11 “tipping point” for Japan with respect to security policy. However, over time and in the likely event of another incident, I would expect questions to be asked as to how the government, in the words of the 2013 National Security Strategy, will “ensure the safety of life, person and properties of its nationals.”

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Let’s look at the ongoing review of the bilateral US-Japan defense guidelines. Why was Japan anxious for the review?

PRZYSTUP: For several reasons, the Abe government wanted to anchor the US in the alliance, and in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan faces growing threats from North Korea, and faces increasing assertive Chinese conduct in the East and South China Seas.  At the same time, many in Japan were uncertain of the Obama administration’s commitment to back up words with actions. In particular, the disappearing “red lines” over Syria raised international eyebrows, and Japan was no different.

Meanwhile, there has been growing recognition in Japan that if the country is to be able to count on the US, Japan would have to assume a larger role within the alliance, given financial and deployment strains on US forces.

The Japanese government’s reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense last July was in part aimed at making Japan a more attractive alliance partner.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why was the US initially reluctant to update the guidelines?

PRZYSTUP: The initial US reluctance stemmed from concerns of being drawn into a potential conflict with China over the Senkaku islands.  Since China’s late leader Deng Xiaoping opened the country to the world’s market economy, US policy toward Asia has run along  two tracks: one, to move China, in (former World Bank President) Bob Zoellick’s words, toward becoming a “Responsible Stakeholder”; the second has been to manage alliance relationships.

Over the past three decades, this has been a diplomatic and security policy success story.  But, China’s recent assertiveness in both the South China Sea and toward the Senkakus raised questions across the region with respect to US policy. What is the US going to do in response to China?   Even as Washington continued to issue a series of diplomatic statements, Chinese actions have continued to change facts on the grounds.

For the US, it has been increasingly difficult to manage a policy that straddles engagement with China and enhancement of alliance and security relationships with other countries in the region.

In January 2014, the Director of National Intelligence submitted his annual report to Congress that made two points with respect to China. First, China is engaged in advancing the notion of a New Major Power Relationship with the US, to smooth out bilateral ties with the US, and to create a win-win situation for the two countries. The second point was that China is actively engaged in undercutting US credibility with our allies and partners.

The confluence of these forces led to the October 2013 decision to review the US-Japan defense guidelines, and to President Obama’s affirmation in April of last year that Article V of the Security Treaty extends to the Senkakus.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What roles and capabilities is Japan likely to enhance?

PRZYSTUP: Japan’s National Security Strategy has identified several priorities: law enforcement capabilities via the Coast Guard; so-called C4ISR, which means “command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; and maritime surveillance and amphibious capabilities.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How do the guidelines review and the collective self-defense issue overlap? Will authorization of collective self-defense most affect Japan’s potential out-of-area roles, such as mine-sweeping in the Persian Gulf, or will the impact be greater on contingencies in areas around Japan?

PRZYSTUP: Concerning potential SDF deployments beyond the Asia-Pacific region, the most talked-about contingency involves minesweeping in the Persian Gulf.

The existing 1997 defense guidelines limit US-Japan security cooperation to rear area support in non-combat situations in “Areas Surrounding Japan” (SIASJ).  SIASJ is largely understood to relate to a Korean contingency.

Japan’s logistical support for US-led coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (in Afghanistan), starting in 2001, required Diet passage of a Special Measures Law.

Whether the SIASJ language will be retained in the guidelines now under review will shape the contours of future security cooperation.  Certainly in the event of a Korean contingency, the US will have access to UN-designated bases in Japan and rear area support under the 1997 defense guidelines.  But ROK political leaders have made it unmistakably clear that Japanese “boots on the ground” would not be welcomed in a Korean contingency.

As for future instances in which Japan could exercise the right of collective self-defense, the two reports of the Advisory Panel on the Legal Basis for National Security (the Yanai panel) presented a broad overview. The ruling coalition made up of the Liberal Democrats and Komeito are now debating legislation that will implement the July 2014 Cabinet decision on the exercise of collective self-defense. Legislation is likely to be introduced in the current Diet session.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: On a practical level, how will the new policy on collective self-defense most affect the US-Japan alliance?

PRZYSTUP: For the US and Japanese forces to operate effectively together, it will be crucial for them to integrate their respective C4ISR capabilities. This will be a major challenge. Joint planning, joint training, and joint use of bases will all serve to more closely integrate operations, strengthening both deterrence and defense.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: A US-Japan unified command seems far-fetched, but do you foresee collective self-defense paving the way for joint US-Japan task forces?

PRZYSTUP:  I agree that a unified command structure is somewhere over the rainbow, but over time, collective self-defense could result in a joint US-Japan task force.  For now, the next step is to see where the implementing legislation will take security cooperation.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What are the strategic factors underlying the recent revisions in Japan’s defense export policy?

PRZYSTUP: Shrinking defense budgets, economies of scale, access to a broader range of technologies and markets, and the importance of preserving a defense industry combined to produce the decision to relax the arms export ban.  In the UK and France, defense ministry officials and defense industry leaders welcomed Japan’s decision, and said they look forward to defense industry cooperation.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Notwithstanding these changes in Japan’s defense policies, strategic relations with South Korea remain troubled.

PRZYSTUP: Security in Northeast Asia would benefit immensely from improved relations between Japan and South Korea. Defense officials in both countries are, by and large, positive. The disconnect occurs at the political levels in Seoul and Tokyo. Intelligence sharing is now agreed to, but is limited to  North Korea’s nuclear and WMD programs. Further intelligence sharing will enhance the Northeast Asia security environment.

This would also be true of cooperation on THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense).  China is opposed to the US and the ROK cooperating on THAAD. But the fact is that THAAD, despite Chinese representations to the contrary, is focused on the threat to the ROK posed by North Korea’s missiles. I find it hypocritical for Beijing to argue that Seoul should not enhance its self-defense through the use of THADD, while Beijing continues to prop up the North Korean economy. By providing economic assistance, China is allowing Pyongyang to continue to develop its WMD and missile programs.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any prospect for improved Japan-ROK ties?

PRZYSTUP: In my view, the key to moving ahead in ROK-Japan relations is for leaders in both countries to get back to the October 1998, Kim Dae Jung-Obuchi Keizo agreement, known as A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century. (Kim “accepted with sincerity” Obuchi’s acknowledgement as “a fact of history” that Japan caused “tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule.”)

This will require real political leadership and statesmanship in both countries.  But, as demonstrated by the Kim-Obuchi agreement, it is not impossible.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Under these circumstances do you think it was a good idea for House Speaker John Boehner to invite Prime Minister Abe to address a joint session of Congress?

PRZYSTUP: Yes. Abe is the leader of our major ally in Asia. This is a no-brainer. President Park has twice addressed a joint session of the Congress.

 

Japan and ‘collective self-defense’

Japan is continuing to formulate a new legal framework that will govern the country’s security policy. Last summer, the Cabinet led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe issued a new interpretation of the country’s famed “peace clause” enshrined in Article 9 of the Constitution, which bars the country from maintaining armed forces that could be used to wage war or to settle international disputes by use of force.  The new interpretation, with a few important details still being debated by the country’s two ruling coalition parties, will expand the definition of “self-defense,” and allow for new roles and missions for the country’s Self-Defense Forces. But the ongoing discussion, while further along more quickly than many had anticipated, remains contentious on a number of fronts, as the dominant Liberal Democrats (LDP), especially Prime Minister Abe, favor a much more robust military for the country, while the coaltion’s junior partner, Komeito, is more in tune with the more liberal leanings of the general public, which is wary of the country wandering far from the core principle of Article 9. Today we continue with the latest in a series of interviews discussing the ongoing evolution of Japan’s security policy.

 

Tatsumi: ‘Japan is becoming serious

about defense responsibilites’

 

Yuki Tatsumi is a specialist in Japanese security policy, and US-Japan relations, at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC. She joined Stimson’s East Asia program in 2004 as a research fellow, and was appointed a senior fellow in 2008. Before joining Stimson, Ms. Tatsumi worked as a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and as the special assistant for political affairs at the Embassy of Japan in Washington. Among her numerous writings is Japan's New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities and Implications. A native of Tokyo, Ms. Tatsumi holds a B.A. in liberal arts from the International Christian University, Tokyo, and an M.A. in international economics and Asian studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington. 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: After the recent  hostage crisis, and the murder of Kenji Goto, approval ratings for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe went up, but support for diplomacy over any kind of military response has remained strong. Any surprise there?

TATSUMI: No surprise. On the one hand, the Japanese public is realistic that Japan playing a bigger role internationally does come with some risk, and it is important that Japan stand for certain principles. Abe said that Japan would not cave in to terrorist pressures. He refused to pay a ransom. The public supported Abe for taking a firm stance.

At the same time, by and large, the public remains very cautious about using the Self-Defense Forces abroad, including for hostage rescue operations.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: We saw a rash of stories in the Western media arguing or implying that the hostage crisis had brought Japan to a “tipping point,” with the country perhaps on the verge of turning against Article 9 of the Constitution. Do you believe there is any foundation for that kind of analysis?

TATSUMI: No. The hostage crisis has not brought Japan to a “tipping point,” in either direction. Japan is not going to accelerate, or be propelled, in a direction toward much greater involvement of the SDF abroad. Similarly, the crisis is not going to drag Japan back to the point of perhaps 10 years ago, when we tended to avoid any sense of responsibility for international security. Back then, policies like collective self-defense were far removed from serious official consideration, but now they are not.

The crisis will likely induce public demand for greater transparency and accountability from the government about how prospective changes to the country’s security legislation will actually affect SDF deployments. Prime Minister Abe has explained what he hopes to change in a broad policy sense. But even he has not clearly articulated to the public how the likely proposed legislative changes will translate concretely into what the SDF can, or cannot, do. The LDP and Komeito, as the ruling coalition parties, seem close to finishing their debate, and with their strong majority in the Diet, they should be able to get new legislation past, as well as changes to existing laws.

But there is a problem. Neither the general public, nor many people considered well-informed, have been able to digest and internalize the real implications of the legislative changes the government is on the verge of implementing.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: The Democratic Party (DPJ) and others have tried to argue that the prime minister may have unnecessarily gone too far in his January speech in Cairo, when he strongly aligned Japan with anti-ISIL efforts, knowing that ISIL was holding two Japanese hostages. Polls show the public does not blame Abe personally for the hostage murders. But does the criticism of his Cairo speech resonate at all with the public?

TATSUMI: I was a bit disappointed by some of the DPJ commentary. After having run the government for 3 years, some in the DPJ’s current leadership still seem too naïve in thinking that one speech in Cairo would trigger such a crisis. The DPJ completely overlooked preceding incidents, starting from last autumn, when American and British journalists were executed in a very public manner. Seen in this broader context, it is clear that ISIL was happy to exploit and manipulate anything available. It just happened to be Abe’s speech.

So the criticisms by some in the DPJ that blamed Abe’s Cairo speech were short-sighted. Such reaction probably backfired because the public was disappointed with  the DPJ’s reaction, further dragging down  the public’s confidence in the party that had been already pretty low.

It is clear from the Cairo speech that Abe was offering humanitarian assistance to people affected by the violence in the region. I don’t think the public buys the argument that the speech somehow provoked the crisis, or that Abe delivered the speech and played-up the speech with too much fanfare. The speech was really just an extension of what Japan has been doing in the Middle East for many years, assisting the Palestinians and others in the region at the grassroots level.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see much support for cultivating in Japan the capability for a military response to a hostage crisis, such as a hostage rescue force?

TATSUMI: I don’t see anything like that. A hostage rescue capability is highly-specialized, requiring other combined capabilities, such as intelligence gathering and evaluation, which Japan does not currently have. And even with modestly increasing defense budgets, there won’t be the resources available to develop that kind of overall capability.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So what will be the practical policy fallout in Japan from the hostage crisis, with respect to either diplomacy or defense?

TATSUMI: I see two scenarios. One: the crisis could be a catalyst to raise greater awareness among the Japanese public that the country really needs greater intelligence and other relevant capacities to deal with various security crises, including responding to hostage situations. That would require detailed study of the resources that would be required, and how the resources would be pulled together. There has been some talk, for example, of creating a Japanese version of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There could be increased support for the notion – though perhaps not yet proactive pursuit – of those types of greater security capabilities. The idea would be that in these uncertain times, Japan as an independent nation needs to invest more in these areas.

The other scenario is for Japanese to say that the hostage crisis, and the growing uncertainty of the times, is precisely why Japan needs to be very careful about any kind of talk of dispatching the SDF overseas. In this scenario, the public would side with even greater caution, and intensify defensive measures such as early closure of embassies at signs of trouble, and attempts at stricter enforcement of travel warnings.

It is too early to tell how this will play out.

We will get a good indication from the upcoming Diet debates over security legislation.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you think will be the main points of contention surrounding the security legislation?

TATSUMI: The Cabinet last July endorsed the exercise of collective self-defense in a limited way. Generally speaking, the debates will revolve around how to define “limited.” And the debate will not be so much between Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition DPJ. The debate will be inside the ruling coalition, between the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito. What kinds of SDF deployments will Komeito be comfortable with?

Some people mistakenly believe that with the  coalition's two-thirds majority in the Lower House, the LDP can simply run over the Komeito. But the coalition does not work that way. Many LDP members of the Diet are dependent on Komeito’s electoral support for their seats in the Diet. There is a point at which the Komeito can and will weigh-in on the collective self-defense issue. Komeito already stretched itself very far in first supporting Abe to pass the Secrecy Law in December 2013, and then supporting  the Cabinet decision of last July about collective self-defense. Abe and his team are going to have to spend a lot of time, trying to reach out to the Komeito leadership even further, if they hope to get what they apparently want.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN:  Where will Komeito and the LDP likely disagree the most?

TATSUMI: Right now the main sticking point seems to be that the LDP wants broad latitude for the SDF to act in what are called “gray zones,” which would require changes to specific laws authorizing new types of SDF operations.

Generally speaking, gray zones are areas of potential belligerence that had yet to take the form of a state-organized attack on Japan by another nation with military force. There are not precise definitions of gray zones, or what would trigger authorized SDF actions, and what those actions would be.

It seems pretty clear that the government mostly has in mind a scenario involving increased tensions around the Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea. Realistically, the escalation from relative peace, to a gray zone of growing hostility, and then to a real, live contingency, would likely occur quite rapidly.

The LDP and Komeito are likely to struggle to define SDF operations that would be allowable to deter a potential adversary from escalating a gray zone contingency, while making sure to not authorize excessive use of force by the SDF that would inadvertently escalate the hostilities. What kinds of SDF operations would make China think twice before escalating, while stopping short of full-scale SDF operations? And, how would this be managed in real time?

Keep in mind that it is not only the Chinese who would be watching Japan in these gray zone scenarios. The US, as Japan’s security ally, would have a great interest as well, which raises very complicated questions about how much information exchange, contingency planning, and coordinated operations between US and Japanese forces would be authorized under the new policy of limited exercising of the right of collective self-defense.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about mine-sweeping operations in the Persian Gulf, which the prime minister clearly states he wants authorized? Komeito is still reluctant.

TATSUMI:  When I first heard about mine-sweeping, I thought the prime minister had in mind the type of mine-sweeping that Japan engaged in after the first Gulf War in the early 1990s. All the fighting had stopped, but the mines still had to be cleared.  But apparently, this is a different case. 

This is a very important question, because this goes to the heart of the matter of what kind of situation allows Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense in a “limited” manner. The case like this is still triggering strong negative reaction from the opponents of the Prime Minister’s policy because to them, this would be a classic example of the government trying to expand the scope of SDF activities to areas that are distant from Japan’s vicinity. 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How does the security legislation debate overlap the US-Japan rewriting of bilateral defense guidelines?

TATSUMI: It all adds up to a lot for the alliance to absorb. In the beginning, I felt that Washington was reluctant to take up revisions to the guidelines, because American officials were not sure if Japan was really willing to take on bigger roles and responsibilities. Japan initiated the process, out of concern that the existing guidelines were not reflective of China’s rising capabilities and activities. But the US was not going to enter the talks just to make Tokyo happy. Washington took time to gauge the level of seriousness in Japan. There has to be something in this for the US, something more than the US assuring Japan of backing in the event of a conflict surrounding the Senkakus.

The US eventually became convinced that Japan was serious about pursuing legislative changes allowing for a broader scope and range of SDF operations, including limited exercising of the right of collective self-defense.  Of course, the escalation of Chinese activities not only in the  East China Sea but also in the South China Sea motivated Washington as well. 

The revision of the guidelines was supposed to have been wrapped up by the end of last year. But Japan suggested a delay until after the envisioned legislative changes are enacted, so that the revised guidelines can incorporate the expanded legal scope of SDF activities.

So much depends on the final legislative details. The US could wind up either pleasantly surprised, or disappointed.

Keep in mind that the Japanese government’s position on the new guidelines also has to be coordinated with Komeito. They have made progress, but disagreements remain.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: My sense is that the US, more than anything else, wants an integrated flow of battlefield information between the US and Japan, mostly involving North Korea. That means everything from missiles, to planes, to naval vessels, especially submarines that could pose a threat to US aircraft carriers and other battle ships.

TATSUMI: From the US perspective, the real end-game for a long time has been a combined operational command, which would break down the walls between US and Japanese forces by legally supplanting the existing interpretation of self-defense. But a combined command is now pretty far-fetched, so the fallback is integration in specific scenarios, such as missile defense. In the case of gray zones, such as a scenario around the Senkakus Islands, Japan cannot realistically expect the US to fully commit if Japan has to go through an enormously complex series of legal procedures for operational authorization every step of the way.

The US does not expect Japan’s SDF to be involved in front-line combat in war in distant places. But the US does think it should be able to expect Japan to provide the full range of rear area logistical support, and information flows, without getting bogged down in separate legal authorizations.

Ideally, this is where a combined command would come into play. But since that ideal is not even on the horizon, a more realistic idea is for a range of parallel US-Japan joint task forces suited to likely scenarios, including ballistic missile defense.

In the wake of the 3-11 triple disaster, the US and Japan established three bilateral coordination action teams (BCAT)—one in Ichigaya, one in Yokota, and one in Sendai—to work together on nuclear issues and humanitarian relief. This might offer the most realistic model for future planning and operational coordination between the two militaries.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Prime Minister Abe has been invited to speak to a joint session of Congress later this month. Given the tensions with South Korea, but the improving defense ties with the US,what are the "pros" and “cons” of the invitation?

 TATSUMI: If Abe can deliver a speech to a joint session of the US Congress with the consent of the White House, the biggest “pro” will be that it symbolizes the reconciliation between Japan and the United States.  It sends a clear message that the US government, both the executive and legislative branches, is supportive of Abe and his agenda, both in economic and security policy.  On the other side, it could remind many of the recent fallout between Speaker Boehner and the White House over Speaker Boehner’s invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu. Abe will want to make sure that Boehner's invitation is extended to him with the consent of the White House.  The current US administration has been frustrated with some of Prime Minister Abe’s “advisors,” who openly talk about how the US-Japan relationship would be in a better place had it been the Republications in charge of the White House. Mr. Abe has accepted the invitation from Mr. Boehner, but I think he would be smart to not want to aggravate such frustration by accepting an invitation from a Republican Speaker of the House extended without the consent of the White House.   

 

 

 

Kingston: ‘Prime Minister Abe is no stranger to controversy regarding Japan’s colonial and wartime history’

Emperor Akihito raised many an eyebrow in Japan and abroad recently when he used his New Year message to urge Japan’s citizens to learn from history in this, the 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II. He specifically referred to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as the start of the war, which many saw as a not-so-veiled swipe at Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and other advocates of a ‘revisionist’ view of history, who have tried to diminish Japan responsibility for the hostilities in the Pacific that ultimately led to Japan’s destruction and surrender in 1945. The Emperor’s comment was initially overshadowed by the New Year’s festivities in Japan, but subsequently provoked a subdued but charged debate in intellectual and policy circles.

Below is part two of our discussion about the controversy and its potential policy implications with Tokyo-based commentator Jeff Kingston.

Jeff Kingston is the director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan, where he teaches courses on modern Japanese history, contemporary Japan, and Japan’s relations with Asia. He has been a regular contributor to The Japan Times since 1988. Kingston’s most recent book, Contemporary Japan, was published in 2012. He has a B.S. degree in foreign service from Georgetown University, and a PhD. in history from Columbia University.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Could the Emperor’s comments influence how Japan observes the 70^th anniversary of the end of WWII?

KINGSTON: 2015 marks that anniversary. Due to Prime Minister Abe’s revisionist views on history, there is considerable speculation about the statement regarding Japan’s wartime responsibility he plans to issue later this year. He could raise regional hackles by downplaying or appearing to justify the tragedies that Imperial Japan inflicted throughout Asia. Abe absented himself from the Diet in June 1995 when it passed a resolution on the 50^th anniversary of the end of the war. He has never made a secret of his discomfort with the Murayama Statement, issued in August of that year by then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, which went much further in acknowledging Japan’s war responsibility and broadly apologizing for the horrific consequences of its aggression than the ’95 Diet resolution that Abe did not support.

Abe is no stranger to controversy regarding Japan’s colonial and wartime history. He offended Koreans by remarks he made in the Diet on March 1, 2007 that suggested he was quibbling about the level of coercion used in recruiting young women and girls to serve as sex slaves for the Imperial Armed Forces. March 1^st is the day Koreans commemorate the 1919 uprising against Japanese colonial rule, so the timing of his remarks was unfortunate.

In 2010, then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan made a poignant statement marking the centennial of the onset of Japanese colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula, acknowledging and expressing remorse that Japan had injured the dignity of the Korean people. Abe angrily dismissed the remarks as ignorant.

Abe has regularly meddled in history issues. When he was premier in 2006-07 he spearheaded legislation promoting ‘patriotic education’. The Education Ministry pressured textbook publishers to delete accounts of Japan’s soldiers instigating group suicides during the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, sparking an angry backlash by Okinawans. Last year, the Ministry of Education issued guidelines for textbook publishers on other controversial history issues. At the end of the year, consulate officials in New York requested that editors at McGraw Hill revise textbook entries concerning comfort women that the Japanese government deems inaccurate. McGraw-Hill declined, arguing that the Abe Cabinet’s view is at odds with the scholarly consensus, and that the Japanese government has no business dictating textbook content.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: The Abe Cabinet says it abides by past government apologies to comfort women, but seems to undercut its expressions of contrition.

KINGSTON: Abe’s comfort women problem, including the building of comfort women memorials in the United States, is a self-inflicted wound based on a disingenuous disregard for the facts. The 1993 Kono Statement, in which Japan apologized to comfort women, symbolizes the end of Japan’s collective amnesia about state responsibility for the comfort women system. The statement vastly improved Japan’s reputation. It’s no surprise then that Abe’s repeated acts of sabotage against the Kono Statement inflict considerable harm on Japan’s international standing, and raises questions about his judgment.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Did Asahi Shimbun’s acknowledgement last year of some mistaken reporting on the comfort women issue strengthen Abe’s argument?

KINGSTON: Asahi’s faulty reporting infected only a handful of articles two decades ago. The 2007 U.S. Congressional resolution H Res 121, which condemned Abe for his comfort women remarks, did not depend on the Asahi’s reporting. H Res 121 was based on the volumes of evidence amassed over the years that implicated Japan’s military and government in the comfort women system.

Ironically, it is Abe, not the Asahi, who incited the building of comfort women memorials in four towns in the United States. Korean-Americans lobbying to erect these memorials were reacting to his controversial 2007 statements. One of the key organizations promoting the memorials named itself “121″ in reference to the congressional resolution.

Abe’s recent grandstanding makes it look like Japan is trying to wriggle out of taking responsibility for the horrors it inflicted on comfort women. In the 21st century, violence against women in war is a significant international concern, one shared by civil society groups in Japan. Japan could gain so much by unequivocally accepting responsibility, officially apologizing, and legally atoning for ruining these women’s lives, while leading a global effort to address this contemporary scourge.

Instead, Abe has positioned Japan to get steamrollered by the international community on this issue, while making things awkward for Japan’s friends, who do not want to be associated with his dubious equivocations.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Will the Emperor’s comments have tangible implications or repercussions?

KINGSTON: Akihito speaks with great moral authority. This was demonstrated in Prime Minister Abe’s first news conference of 2015, held at the Ise Shrine on Jan. 5, when he seemingly responded to the emperor’s thoughts. Abe said he would express remorse in his 70^th year anniversary statement, and highlight the nation’s postwar pacifist contributions to peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific. He reiterated previous pledges to uphold the Murayama Statement.

At one level, Abe’s Ise remarks suggest he understands the importance of Akihito’s comments. But Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga has left the door open to the possibility of some revision of past statements.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What are the specific concerns?

KINGSTON: Worries about the 70^th anniversary statement are related to Abe’s 2013 statement on the August 15 anniversary of Japan’s surrender. He expressed no remorse about Japan’s aggression in Asia and did not pledge to renounce war.

These omissions marked significant deviations from the Murayama Statement, in which Murayama acknowledged that Japan caused “tremendous damage and suffering” to the people of Asia and other countries through its “colonial rule and aggression,” and he expressed “feelings of deep remorse” and a “heartfelt apology.” This statement has become the government’s official position on WWII, a mantra that has been frequently invoked since then.

We can see intensified scrutiny of Abe’s intentions. For example, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) just issued a report about the impending Abe Statement, highlighting the risk for stoking regional animosities over unresolved historical grievances if he deviates too far from the Murayama script. This would undermine US efforts to nurture more effective trilateral security relations with South Korea and Japan and needlessly provoke China.

The CRS noted Abe’s role in commissioning a government panel to investigate how the 1993 Kono Statement on comfort women was compiled, an apparent effort to discredit that statement. In addition, the CRS cited Abe’s comments in the Diet in 2013 when he suggested that the word ‘invasion’ is open to interpretation. Previously, in April 2013 remarks in the Diet, Abe was also equivocal about the term ‘aggression’ and said he did not uphold all of Murayama’s statement.  This sophistry has drawn criticism in the region because it smacks of Abe shirking Japanese wartime responsibility by fudging what Japan’s military did at that time.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So the Emperor’s explicit reference to the Manchuria Incident most likely was not made lightly, or without cognizance of the implications for policy debates today between nationalists and more mainstream political circles?

KINGSTON: Not likely. The Manchurian Incident is seen as a turning point where Japan renounced working within the international system and decided to pursue its interests in China through military aggression. Many argue that the Kwantung Army hijacked Japan and defied official government policy by instigating hostilities and subjugating Manchuria. This open defiance of civilian control signaled the military’s willingness to take matters into its own hands, and precipitated Japan’s slide towards authoritarianism at home and aggression overseas.

The 1930s is often called the valley of darkness by scholars, a time of rightwing extremist violence targeting liberals, notably Prime Minister Inukai in 1932 for supporting the London Naval Treaty, trying to cut the military budget, and for initially withholding formal diplomatic recognition of the puppet state of Manchukuo sponsored by the Kwantung Army.

The Manchurian Incident thus marks the beginning of Japan’s rampage in Asia, a self-inflicted catastrophe that lead to all the suffering Akihito detailed in his New Year thoughts.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How would you characterize the reaction to the Emperor’s message? It seemed to take a while for people to really take notice.

KINGSTON: The reaction has been muted in the media, and I am not sure how many people took notice. This is not unusual. But Akihito is called the “people’s emperor” because he has an exemplary record of offering consolation and compassion to those in need. He attended the sumo tournament for the first time in four years on Jan. 18, and as he bid farewell the entire crowd, unprompted, stood and cheered as he and the Empress waved. This sign of deep affection says something about his stature.

Akihito’s thoughts voice the anxieties of many Japanese about Abe steering Japan rightward, and where that might lead. The LDP’s victory in the December 2014 lower house elections was more an indictment of the opposition than an endorsement of Abe and his non-economic agenda, but now he is in a position to realize his ideological bucket list. In this sense, I think the Emperor was speaking truth to power.

One strength of the Japanese media is the willingness to debate historical controversies, even if the results are not always edifying. The past still divides Japan from its neighbors 70 years later. Many Japanese are suffering from perpetrator’s fatigue, and are dismayed that Beijing and Seoul relentlessly hammer Japan on the anvil of history. Efforts in Japan to hastily bury the unexamined past are certainly a factor stoking nationalist passions, but it is also clear that the neighbors cynically play the history card for political and diplomatic advantage.

In the current anti-liberal climate, many writers are reluctant to make themselves into a target of scary groups that intimidate, harass and sometimes resort to violence to silence discordant voices. It is disconcerting that conservative mainstream politicians have links to extremist and criminal groups that contribute to the atmosphere of intimidation.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why has the Democratic Party of Japan not been more vocal on history issues, and the policy implications for national security, including ties with South Korea and China?

KINGSTON: The DPJ is in shambles following its disastrous setback in the 2012 elections and its mediocre performance last December.

The DPJ remains a party looking for an identity, deeply divided over policy, with members representing much of the ideological spectrum from left to right. Hammering out a unified position on any issue has been difficult, as we can see in the party leader elections narrowly won recently by Katsuya Okada in a runoff.

I think members from the left of the party would prefer the DPJ to stake out a more liberal view on history controversies, but under current circumstances that might spark a harmful backlash for a party that is on the ropes.

Recall that former premier Yukio Hatoyama was roundly criticized by the media for his comments about China having a point in its assertion that there is a bilateral dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and was even labeled a traitor by Itsunori Onodera, the defense minister appointed by Abe in 2012. Hatoyama’s gesture of reconciliation toward China at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial also did not go over well in Japan.

The DPJ did try to resolve one of the thorniest issues dividing Tokyo and Seoul, nearly finalizing a deal on the comfort women, but it unraveled in December 2012. Under the terms of this agreement, the Japanese Ambassador to South Korea would have visited the home of each surviving comfort woman and delivered a letter of apology from the prime minister, in addition to monetary compensation.

The hitch was whether Japan would accept legal responsibility for the colonial era abuses. The Japanese side was willing to accept moral responsibility in making this humanitarian gesture of atonement and reconciliation, but was adamant that it would not accept legal responsibility.

This last minute failure has sparked recriminations and a sense of betrayal on both sides.

Off the record, Japanese diplomats complain that the South Korean government moved the goalposts at the last moment, requiring an admission of legal responsibility, when the deal was nearly finalized. Korean diplomats, also requesting anonymity, argue that a carefully calibrated agreement shirking legal responsibility falls short of the grand gesture required to restore dignity to the comfort women and the nation, and therefore could not compromise on this point.

And then Abe was elected. All bets were off.

 

Kingston: ‘Emperor Akihito favors an honest and long-overdue reckoning with Japan’s wartime past’

Emperor Akihito raised many an eyebrow in Japan and abroad recently when he used his New Year message to urge Japan’s citizens to learn from history in this, the 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II. He specifically referred to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as the start of the war, which many saw as a not-so-veiled swipe at Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and other advocates of a ‘revisonist’ view of history, who have tried to diminish Japan's responsibility for the hostilities in the Pacific that ultimately led to Japan’s destruction and surrender in 1945. The key passage in the Emperor’s message was: “This year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which cost many people their lives. Those who died on the battlefields, those who died in the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those who died in the air raids on Tokyo and other cities-so many people lost their lives in this war. I think it is most important for us to take this opportunity to study and learn from the history of this war, starting with the Manchurian Incident of 1931, as we consider the future direction of our country.”The Emperor’s comment was initially overshadowed by the New Year’s festivities in Japan, but subsequently provoked a subdued but charged debate in intellectual and policy circles.

Below is the first of a two-part discussion about the controversy with Tokyo-based commentator Jeff Kingston.

Jeff Kingston is the director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan, where he teaches courses on modern Japanese history, contemporary Japan, and Japan’s relations with Asia. He has been a regular contributor to The Japan Times since 1988. Kingston’s most recent book, Contemporary Japan, was published in 2012. He has a B.S. degree in foreign service from Georgetown University, and a PhD. in history from Columbia University.

 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Emperor Akihito referred to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 in several of his past birthday greetings, but never in a New Year’s message. Why do you think it is notable that he brought this up in his most recent New Year’s message?

KINGSTON: It is impossible to know what exactly Emperor Akihito intended with his 2015 New Year Thoughts. His comments were sufficiently vague to avoid giving the impression that he was infringing on constitutional limits that prevent him from weighing in on political issues.

The Imperial Household Agency carefully vets his remarks, so one can only speculate about the message he is trying to convey. In my opinion, the choice of topics is indicative, and must be considered in the context of Akihito’s track record on war responsibility. He has relentlessly crisscrossed the region over the past quarter of a century to express remorse to nations victimized by Japanese aggression.

Akihito has done more than all of Japan’s politicians combined to demonstrate that Japan is not in denial, and is contrite about the horrors it inflicted. Although revisionist politicians and the jingoistic press have worked hard to undermine the emperor’s reconciliation diplomacy, Akihito regards this as the unfinished business of the Showa Emperor (Akihito's father, Emperor Hirohito, who died in 1989), and persists in doing what he can in his circumscribed role.

His record suggests he favors an honest and long overdue reckoning. He has maintained his father’s post-1978 boycott of Yasukuni Shrine that was prompted by the enshrinement of 14 Class A war criminals at that time.

He also rebuked a Tokyo government official who explained to the monarch at an autumn 2004 garden party that he was in charge of enforcing a directive to teachers to stand and sing the national anthem (kimigayo) facing the national flag (Hinomaru). Akihito replied that this is not desirable, and should be left up to individual choice, comments he repeated in the Spring 2005 garden party. The Imperial Household Agency went into damage control mode, arguing that Akihito’s remarks held no political implications, even though they had clearly offered moral support to teachers who complained that their constitutional rights were being infringed on.

So when Akihito refers to the Manchurian Incident, he is weighing in on contemporary history controversies. Prime Minister Abe and like-minded revisionists seek to legitimize Japanese aggression, asserting that it was a war of Pan Asian liberation aimed at lifting the yoke of western subjugation. In addition, revisionists argue that it was a defensive war against escalating pressures from the western powers, the so-called ABCD (American, British, Chinese and Dutch) encirclement thesis.

But by pegging the war’s onset to 1931, Akihito inconveniently focused attention on the Kwantung Army’s plot in Mukden, which blamed ‘Chinese terrorists’ for a staged attack on Japan’s South Manchurian Railway, and used this as a pretext to launch a full-scale invasion and pacification of Manchuria.

This interpretation meshes with what scholars call the Fifteen Year War (1931-45), a reference to escalating Japanese aggression in China and a decision in 1940 to widen the war to Southeast Asia in order to secure the resources needed to subjugate China.

This narrative dismisses the Pan Asian liberation thesis as a fig-leaf for Japanese imperialism. Moreover, in 1931 Japan was not being encircled, but rather was carving off part of China to promote autarchy and prepare for the coming war with the US for hegemony in the Pacific. Ishiwara Kanji, the man who planned the Mukden Incident, was Japan’s foremost military strategist, and someone who had carefully studied the lessons of WWI. Total war meant a no-holds barred approach to winning, meaning that civilians were fair game and that economic sanctions were a weapon of war.

Ishiwara believed that Germany lost the war owing to economic sanctions that starved its war machine of what was required to wage war and thus became an advocate of economic autarchy. Manchuria had many of the resources Japan lacked that were crucial for its war machine, so taking it over was aimed at promoting autarchy and getting ready for the coming conflict. The Pan Asian thesis is more appealing to contemporary conservatives because it positions Japan as selfless and sacrificing for the benefit of others.

By contrast, the Manchurian thesis makes Japan look like a greedy predator, invading nations to secure resources and markets just like other imperial nations.

So Akihito’s apparently bland remarks actually resonate loudly in the arena of historiography. They position him in the camp critical of Japanese aggression, and critical of contemporary revisionists like Abe, who seek to rehabilitate Japan’s wartime past and assert a valorizing and vindicating narrative.

Akihito’s view represents the longstanding mainstream consensus in Japan (and elsewhere), but revisionists have bristled at this ‘masochistic’ history that singles Japan out for blame while overlooking Allied war crimes. They argue that the mainstream consensus is based on the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE), a biased ‘victor’s justice’ narrative.

Judicial process at the IMFTE was indeed very flawed, and the guilty verdicts were preordained, but this doesn't mean that Japan’s military forces, or the architects of war called the Class A war criminals, were innocent. Revisionists often cite the dissenting opinion of Radhabinod Pal as exonerating Japan from the war crimes charges. A memorial to him is even located just outside the Yushukan Museum adjacent to Yasukuni Shrine, the talismanic ground zero for an unrepentant view of Japanese military aggression. In fact, Pal argued no such thing. He dismissed the IMFTE as lacking legal standing in international law, and for the baseless retroactive application of laws it allowed. But Pal readily acknowledged that Japan committed war crimes, and he lamented the fact that the Allies were not in the dock alongside the Japanese, sensibly pointing out that they should also be held accountable.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why is this relevant to contemporary Japanese politics, and Japan’s national security policy?

KINGSTON: The judgments of the IMFTE, deeply flawed as they may be, are intrinsic to the Treaty of San Francisco that Japan signed to end the US occupation and make peace with the other signatories. In signing the treaty, Japan committed itself to accepting these judgments. Prime Minister Abe often talks about overthrowing the ‘postwar system’, one that most Japanese are rightly proud of. He is unhappy with the denunciatory view of wartime Japan and the US penned constitution, both essential elements of the postwar order that he believes humiliates Japan and keeps it subordinate.

In contrast, Akihito and most Japanese feel that Japan’s exemplary record in the second half of the 20^th century brought redemption, and serves as the basis for the nation regaining its dignity. While Abe rails against the Peace Constitution, most Japanese see it as a reassuring touchstone of national identity. That is why his efforts to chip away at Article 9 are so unpopular. Hardly anyone in Japan supports Abe’s reinterpretation of Article. 9 to allow for collective self-defense, because they worry that Washington will drag them into war, and they understand that the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines will facilitate that scenario. Both governments keep postponing formal adoption of the guidelines precisely so they don’t become a liability to the LDP in elections.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: So the political right finds itself in the interesting position of opposing the views of an Emperor in whose honor they claim to speak?

KINGSTON: The Emperor’s remarks highlight the horrors of war and send a strong anti-militarism, pro-peace message. He has enjoined Japanese citizens to reflect on the lessons of the past, perhaps because he has witnessed the culture wars since Abe came to power. Many Japanese and long-time Japan observers have expressed dismay about the recrudescence of self-righteous nationalism under Mr. Abe, who has emboldened right-wing extremists.

They have aggressively attacked liberal targets, such as the Asahi, and downplayed some of the more egregious examples of wartime Japan’s depredations, including the comfort women. Akihito is surely aware that Abe did nothing to repudiate colleagues in the Diet who worked to undermine the 1993 Kono Statement, in which Japan accepts responsibility and promises to atone for the sordid system of sexual slavery that involved tens of thousands of young women throughout Asia between 1932-1945. They were recruited through deception and/or coercion, both direct and indirect.

The Asahi’s admission that a handful of their reports on the comfort women over twenty years ago were based on the discredited testimony of Yoshida Seiji has been disingenuously used as a pretext to try to cast doubts on the nature and extent of this system and thereby promote a narrative of minimization and denial. Naturally, Team Abe is manipulating the Asahi affair for political advantage. This saga is, after all, more about politics than journalism, part of a larger culture war being waged by conservatives to redefine Japanese identity on their terms. The Asahi has long been the right’s main media adversary in this culture war and thus a prime target.

There is also the case of Net Uyoku (ultra-nationalists on the Internet) harassing former Asahi reporters and their university employers, threatening to harm students by deploying nail bombs if these former journalists’ contracts are not terminated. And the hate speech campaign promoted by the Zaitokukai (an organization devoted to denying rights to non-citizens – mostly Koreans – residing in Japan), harassing Japan’s zainichi (mostly Korean) community, again threatening death. Abe has tolerated this intolerance, and indeed has acted as cheerleader in chief for the anti-Asahi campaign.   This is not the Japan that most Japanese feel comfortable with, and is not consistent with their national identity.

This is the context in which Akihito’s comments can be interpreted as a rebuke and warning.

 

 

Abe: suddenly looking ordinary

Not even Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s sharpest critics can easily dismiss the results of his astute political decision to dissolve the Diet and hold a snap Lower House election on December 14. It is no small accomplishment to retain the top position in a coalition government with a two-thirds parliamentary majority.

Still, it is hard to escape the feeling that Abe emerged from the election with a somewhat diminished stature. Aside from Abe buying himself some extra political power, what else came from a $700 million election that left the ruling coalition with a virtually unchanged governing majority?

Fully half of the Japanese electorate simply stayed home, choosing instead to sit out the race. Some of this was due, no doubt, to a sense in the country that the outcome of the election was set in stone, obviating for many any sense of urgency to vote. But for many others, the decision to stay home seemed to be driven more by a frustrating sense that there simply were not any particularly good options.

Abe himself campaigned on the less-than-inspiring slogan “There is no alternative.” The LDP barely got 50 percent of the 50 percent of voters who bothered to cast ballots.

The low voter turnout – the lowest in postwar history -- undercuts any notion that the election result marked an endorsement of Abe, or either his foreign policies or much bally-hooed economic program dubbed “Abenomics.”

Indeed, postelection polls by Asahi Shimbun found that 60 percent of respondents believe the two-thirds majority held by the LDP-Komeito coalition is “excessive.” A full 50 percent of LDP voters agree with that assessment, while 76 percent attributed the big LDP victory to the lack of any attractive political party. Ironically, in a sense, voters seemed to agree with the LDP slogan about the lack of an alternative.

Despite considerable speculation that the dominant Liberal Democrats would pick up a good number of seats, the LDP actually lost two, putting its ideological rival but coalition partner Komeito in a marginally stronger position to moderate Abe’s hawkish proclivities.

Parallel to Keimoto’s success was the surprisingly strong showing of the Communist Party, which has been Abe’s most vociferous critic on foreign policy and history issues. Having doubled its seats in the Diet, the JCP will now be able to introduce legislation, and will surely play a more vocal role in parliamentary debates.

The flip-side of the same political coin was the virtual elimination from the Diet (from 20 seats down to 2) of the arch-nationalist Party for Future Generations, headlined by former Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara and former Air Force chief of staff Toshio Tamogami. The latter, who heatedly denies that Japan invaded China or colonized Korea, has long benefited from the perception that Abe supports him. Before his return to office, Abe regularly appeared at political events with Tamogami. Another prominent ultra-rightist to bite the dust was Hiroshi Yamada of Tokyo’s 19^th district. Yamada, also a leader of the PFG, was known for his public exhortations for Abe to revoke the Kono Statement regarding wartime “comfort women.”

Abe has probably managed to forestall any challenge to his leadership next September, when his three-year term as LDP president (and thus prime minister) is up for renewal. But a good number of veteran political journalists in Tokyo say that even that, while likely, is far from assured.

Moreover, the election did nothing to alter the fundamentals underlying pre-election trends of rising unhappiness with Abenomics, and noticeable erosion in the support rate for both Abe and his Cabinet. Abe’s hold on power depends almost entirely on his ability to deliver improvements in the economy that voters can tangibly feel in their everyday lives. On that front, Abenomics up to now has left voters feeling very disappointed. Many eyes will be on the prime minister’s election night promise to continue to jawbone private sector leaders on the need to raise wages.

And the policy agenda facing Abe only looks tougher. He’ll soon have to compile a stimulus package for a sclerotic economy shoved into recession by his decision earlier this year to go ahead with a rise in the national consumption tax. Then comes the need to compile a national budget, which will have to deal with larger-than-expected revenue shortfalls made inevitable by Abe’s more recent decision to postpone until 2017 the second half of what was supposed to be a two-part consumption tax increase.

Abe will also have to decide whether to push for politically controversial reforms in the agricultural sector, which the US wants as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations, but which the LDP essentially promised its rural supporters it would not do. There is considerable speculation that Abe will choose to accommodate the powerful agricultural lobby at least until after the Upper House elections scheduled for the summer of 2016, so as to politically advance the prospects for revision of the Constitution, the goal closest to Abe’s heart.

And then lurking not too far behind is important but controversial national security legislation, about which LDP partner Komeito greatly disagrees with Abe. It was not too long ago that Abe supporters openly talked about scuttling the alliance with Komeito in favor of alignment with rightists like those in the PFG, so as to give the prime minister a freer hand to broadly reinterpret Article 9 of the Constitution, and pave the way for only limited restrictions on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense (CSD). Those days appear gone, now that voters have wiped away the LDP’s right flank in the Diet. Abe and the LDP need Komeito more than ever, a fact that Komeito leaders know very well, and will likely use to their advantage when national security issues (especially CSD) reappear for debate next year.

Perhaps most irksome for Abe is the situation on Okinawa, where voters once again strongly rejected the proposed construction of a new US Marine air station in the Henoko district of the prefecture. All four LDP candidates from Okinawa were soundly defeated on Sunday, which follows the November election of Takeshi Onaga, a fierce opponent of the base project, as governor. One of Abe’s signature accomplishments since his 2012 return to office was appearing to have resolved the vexing Henoko issue. It turns out that Tokyo only coerced and cajoled LDP stalwarts on Okinawa, such as former governor HirokazuNakaima, to go along, while Okinawa residents remain largely opposed. It is becoming harder to say that the projected Henoko base will meet the US criteria that overseas facilities be “politically viable.” It remains to be seen how much political capital Abe is willing to spend to push the project forward.

Many postelection headlines implied that the coalition’s victory on Sunday assures Abe of four more years in office. While it is technically true that another Lower House election is not legally required before 2018, the odds seem rather long that the prime minister will be able to successfully traverse Japan’s treacherous political-policy landscape that long.

Far from the seemingly-invincible, transformative political heavyweight  many analysts sized-up Abe to be shortly after his 2012 return to office, the prime minister more and more has the look of a quite ordinary LDP politician. Stronger than most, no doubt, but a far cry from the charismatic figures that former prime ministers Yasuhiro Nakasone and Junichiro Koizumi proved to be, and an even further cry from the historical figure Abe often seems to view himself to be.

 

Klingner: ‘Abe should not go back to Yasukuni’

Bruce Klingner is the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia in The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center. He joined Heritage in 2007, and has become well-known in Washington as a commentator and analyst on regional affairs. He recently helped coordinate a Heritage conference on history disputes in Northeast Asia.

Before joining Heritage, Klingner spent 20 years in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, analyzing North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. From 1996 to 2001, Klingner was the CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea, responsible for the analysis of political, military, economic and leadership issues. During 1993-1994, he analyzed military developments during the nuclear crisis with North Korea.

 

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is at the root of the current diplomatic freeze in Northeast Asia? And why have history issues become so prominent?

KLINGNER: From the US perspective, the present day security threat environment is separate from issues of history. But in Asia, the two seem much more integrated. That is certainly the case from the South Korean point of view.

The US looks at Asia and sees vital national interests, which include strong relations with fellow democracies and fellow free market economies. That certainly includes South Korea and Japan.

The threats to those come particularly from North Korea, and then the uncertainty about China’s intentions.

We see the need for Japan, South Korea, and the US to be working closely together, shoulder-to-shoulder, to address these threats to our common interests. In that sense, the US is very disturbed about the poor relations between our two critical allies in Northeast Asia.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Should the US try to mediate?

KLINGNER: The US had tried to remain aloof from a fight between our two close friends, until about a year ago, when both outside experts and the government realized the US had to get involved. There was uncertainty as to what role the US should take, but I think the Obama Administration had done the right thing in sending very private, but very strong messages to both of our allies.

There is frustration in Washington with both Korea and Japan. I have been critical of both. I have found especially over the last year that the media, legislators, and executive branch officials from both countries have come to Washington and essentially asked the US to take its side 100 percent.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What do you suggest be done?

KLINGNER: I have a two-part message that starts with Japan. I don’t think Japan has suitably atoned for its past. The Kono and Murayama statements are minimalist. They seem designed to evade rather embrace responsibility. It would be far better for Japan, if it wants to move forward and put the past behind it, to initiate or reinvigorate a reconciliation process with South Korea.

I am less concerned about China, because Beijing seems determined to use history for its own ends.

Korea has a more sincere, heart-felt reaction to history. China is much more calculating for political purposes.

Japan needs to more firmly embrace the Kono and Murayama statements, with repeated, unequivocal affirmations. Perhaps Japan should even issue a new statement that goes beyond the components of those two statements.

Tokyo should reach out to Seoul, as it recently has been doing a bit more. A lot of things could be resolved quietly, out of the spot light of the media and elected officials.

Some people look at the drafting process of the Kono Statement, where Korean and Japanese diplomats interacted with each other, and see fundamental flaws. I think they are mistaken.   I think it actually could be a model of what should be going on now.

South Korea made requests. Japan acceded to some – not all. There was give-and-take over the wording, over the concepts of the Kono Statement. But in the recent review of the drafting process, the investigating panel very clearly stated that Japan, based on its own evidence, was going to issue a statement around 1993 even before Japan had interacted with Korean counterparts, or had conducted interviews with comfort women.

Had I been South Korean, I would have declared victory over the recent process report, rather than seeing it as an effort to undermine the Kono Statement of 1993.

Seoul needs to find ways to curtail the emotional nationalism that is impeding better security ties with Japan.

It would be good for Seoul to articulate a framework for resolving the contentious issues by defining specific steps or language that would allow the two countries to move forward, rather than expressing amorphous demands for “sincerity.” These demands for “sincerity” are often used as an excuse to reject any positive steps Japan may take. Seoul needs to privately assure Tokyo that it will respond positively to helpful steps from Japan.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about “revisionism” in Japan?

KLINGNER: Tokyo needs to distance itself from any revisionist statements made by any elected officials.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is your message to Seoul?

KLINGNER: South Korea needs to stop looking at every current event through the lens of history, and needs to compartmentalize and prioritize its foreign policy. When polls show that South Koreans see Japan as a larger military threat than North Korea, we know there is a real big problem. Those sentiments clearly show a flawed perception of the security environment, and clearly show a skewed perception of the realities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: But President Park and Prime Minister Abe have personal backgrounds that seem to exacerbate the situation.

KLINGNER: It is important to point that the current tensions predate the current administrations in Tokyo and Seoul. There are a number of misperceptions, or deliberate mischaracterizations by the Korean media. One is that the current problems started with Abe, and reflect his right-of-center views. Anyone who follows events in Northeast Asia clearly remembers the earlier downturns in relations. In 2002 there were disputes over the World Cup. In 2005-2006 there were difficult issues under President Roh. And there have been more recent tensions. These are long-standing issues. At times, significant progress has occurred, and then something happens to undue it.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: How should the comfort women issue be approached?

KLINGNER: I think Tokyo needs to go beyond a minimalist, legalistic approach, and work out with Seoul a mutually-agreed upon method of compensation. It is clearly an issue of great concern to the Korean government and the Korean people. There needs to be compensation for the women if bilateral relations are going to move forward. It would need to be done in a way that would indemnify Japan against lawsuits from descendents of victims of Japanese oppression from 1910-1945.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: What about Yasukuni Shrine?

KLINGNER: I would favor a pledge by the prime minister to not visit Yasukuni. I think this is important. Abe’s statement issued after his visit to Yasukuni late last year was actually quite good. But Yasukuni has become so controversial that no matter what is said after a visit, or how a visit is couched, the consequences of the negative symbolism clearly outweigh any benefits that might accrue to any prime minister. So I think there needs to be a pledge to not visit Yasukuni, and instead go to another shrine.

 

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you foresee Park and Abe meeting any time soon.

KLINGNER: I think it would be helpful if President Park were to make clear that she would agree to a bilateral summit if Abe were to take positive initial steps. In essence, I think she should adopt a “trustpolitik” approach to Tokyo of the sort she has adopted toward North Korea: step-by-step reciprocal actions.