全 40 件のコメント

[–]nullcGreg Maxwell - Bitcoin Expert 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

BIP 000 has not been assigned. Please don't self assign numbers-- when people do that they end up taking the same numbers--, take your proposal to the mailing list, and get a number assigned via the ordinary BIP01 process please!

[–]maaku7Mark Friedenbach - Bitcoin Expert 4ポイント5ポイント  (6子コメント)

I want to revisit once fees become more important than the block reward.

The interesting aspect of the flexcap proposal is that it enforces exactly this: the block size can grow, but only when fees > subsidy.

[–]blazes816 1ポイント2ポイント  (2子コメント)

[–]maaku7Mark Friedenbach - Bitcoin Expert 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

Yes. Also see my own email that u/nullc was replying to there for context.

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (2子コメント)

That's all nice and dandy, but also easily gamed

[–]maaku7Mark Friedenbach - Bitcoin Expert 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

How?

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

A miner can trivially pay himself a lot in fees...

[–]worstkeptsecrets 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

What is with all the downvoting?

[–]chriswheeler 2ポイント3ポイント  (5子コメント)

I want to revisit once fees become more important than the block reward.

Bitcoin was designed so that the block reward would diminish over time, and as that happens fees would gradually replace it. Keeping the 1MB limit in place (assuming continued adoption) will artificially force fees to increase well before the block reward reduces.

Why not allow block sizes to increase and then fees to organically take over as the reward reduces? Bigger blocks = more transactions per block = lower fees per transaction for the same amount of compensation per block for the miners. Miners can control the block sizes they are willing to process with the soft limits they can set themselves - they don't need developers to force limits upon them.

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (4子コメント)

will artificially force fees to increase well before the block reward reduces

You don't know that, and neither do I. Let's find out experimentally.

Miners can control the block sizes they are willing to process with the soft limits they can set themselves

Yes, individually, but not collectively, that's called the prisoner's dilemma.

[–]chriswheeler 2ポイント3ポイント  (3子コメント)

You don't know that, and neither do I. Let's find out experimentally.

We've seen from the recent 'stress tests' that when blocks are full, users have to increase their fees to get transactions processed in a timely manor...

Yes, individually, but not collectively, that's called the prisoner's dilemma.

I'd call it a free market.

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (2子コメント)

We've seen from the recent 'stress tests' that when blocks are full, users have to increase their fees to get transactions processed in a timely manor...

I've not witnessed any of this. And I send a few transactions to my clients every day.

I'd call it a free market.

Yeah, cool story, but the point was that it suggest your statement won't hold true, which was "Miners can control the block sizes they are willing to process with the soft limits they can set themselves"

[–]chriswheeler 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

I've not witnessed any of this. And I send a few transactions to my clients every day.

There is an analysis from Peter Todd here if you are not familiar with the situation: https://gist.github.com/petertodd/8e87c782bdf342ef18fb

I think we'll have to agree to disagree regarding miners setting their soft limits. The point of the prisoner's dilemma is that each prisoner cannot communicate with each other when making their choice. This is not true of miners as they can, and do, communicate with each other.

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

There is an analysis

Cool analysis bro, I'm speaking about experimental results, and experience shows nobody cares about coinwallet throwing some money at some miners.

I think we'll have to agree to disagree regarding miners setting their soft limits. The point of the prisoner's dilemma is that each prisoner cannot communicate with each other when making their choice. This is not true of miners as they can, and do, communicate with each other.

Ok, so basically what's usually referred to as a 'cartel'.

[–]rini17 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

Yes, let the freeloaders have their zerofee altcoin!

[–]pb1x 1ポイント2ポイント  (1子コメント)

The whole debate reminds me of alt-coins where people are claiming that Bitcoin is just the v1 and some other versions will be much better because they solve this flaw or that flaw.

Bitcoin has other characteristics than transactions per second or what hash algorithm or confirmation time were chosen. It has universality: the most number of merchants. It has history: a Bitcoin 5 years ago is still a valid Bitcoin today. It has great dev contributions on a constant basis delivering major improvements every six months. It has stability: no cult of personality or ddos attack or bankruptcy has ever given the network true pause, it has stood firm while all else fell around it. Those aren't software features, but they are insanely important features for electronic cash none the less.

If those hard won characteristics are to be risked, there better be a rock solid and obvious reason, and every alternative avenue that does not risk them should be explored first. If Bitcoin switches to new-coke, there may be no going back to coke classic

[–]BTCisGod 1ポイント2ポイント  (3子コメント)

Sorry, your BIP000 changes a temporary anti-spam measure into an unacceptable permanent one.

You are among a much smaller few that doesn't want ANY increase in the block size even if technological progress allows an increase without additional stress? I believe all them core devs agree the block size can/will increase under proper, as of yet undefined, conditions.

[–]davout-bc[S] 4ポイント5ポイント  (0子コメント)

I want to revisit once fees become more important than the block reward

So no, I'm not a religious zealot.

[–]oleganza 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

There is a difference between changing things being informed by academic theories that are impossible to test in a sandbox and changing things being informed by actual market forces.

[–]pokertravis 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3i4sva/a_proposal_for_1mb_blocks/

A little different take, basically I'm not convinced there can be consensus for change. Also I suspect "satoshi" likes this bip too!

[–]jzcjca00 1ポイント2ポイント  (3子コメント)

I believe bitcoin was great before they added the temporary 1MB cap. Remove that cap, and we're good!

[–]kantchoose 1ポイント2ポイント  (2子コメント)

It was great because you get to have other people pay for your transactions instead of taking personal responsibility to pay for them yourself.

[–]recz255 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

There are other ways to prevent free riding. Make transactions never free, is one, for example.

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

So fees should not be used to pay for transactions?

[–]d4d5c4e5 -1ポイント0ポイント  (0子コメント)

I could not possibly disagree more, because I don't think it's desirable at all to make the blocksize cap an economic parameter. The position expressed in the OP is not equivalent to keeping Bitcoin the same, it's a risky and radical reimagining of the economics.

[–]ppciskindofabigdeal -4ポイント-3ポイント  (0子コメント)

This.

Only thing i slightly disagree on is that we should have a plan for scaling up in a hurry if a bunch of new users show up, pay legit fees, and fill blocks. If our fee market gets out of control and basically no reasonable fee will yield the new users a fast confirm we have problems.

In the case of a legit bubble that could happen, especially if we see Bitcoin used for capital flight in China for example, which may be getting very real very soon.

I do not really buy into this whole notion of increasing the block size to whatever and letting what little fee pressure we have dwindle. This network is very expensive to run and it needs to start paying it's own bills, the sooner the better.

[–]cipher_gnome -2ポイント-1ポイント  (3子コメント)

blocks must necessarily be full for the Bitcoin network to be able to pay for its own security.

This makes 0 conf transactions impossible.

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (2子コメント)

Every transaction is a 0-conf before getting a confirmation.

[–]cipher_gnome 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

I know that. But if blocks are always full there will be zero confidence that a zero confirmation transaction will ever get confirmed. Therefore your proposal prevents all 0-conf transactions, and therefore all in-store/in-person transactions.

[–]davout-bc[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

My proposal does not prevent 0-conf transactions in any way, they can still exist, and any party can independently assess the chances that it eventually makes it into a block given the transaction's fee.

In other words, this proposal makes it impossible to stupidly assume that no matter what junk you throw at the blockchain, it'll eventually get included and confirmed. And that's a goddamn feature.

Not that relying on zero-confs was a smart thing to do in the first place anyway...