全 131 件のコメント

[–]drinka40tonightethics, metaethics 18ポイント19ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

I think there are a number of answers here that address the question. I'll emphasize a few points:

One, note that Harris' assumption that "suffering is bad" is something that is shared by most people working in moral philosophy. It's something consequentalists, Kantians, virtue ethicists, and others will grant. The philosophers, though, will say more. They will, often, attempt to explain the badness of suffering and how it fits into a wider philosophical program. Moreover, there are lots of issues and objections that come up and have to be answered when one goes the consequentalist way. People like Shelly Kagan, Philip Pettit, and Derek Parfit are aware of such objections and try to respond to them. People like Harris don't really engage in the philosophy here. Harris, more or less, assumes that some version of utilitarianism is true, and then goes from there on to other issues. What do you think are the philosophical issues here that Harris discusses and argues for? Do his arguments advance the attractiveness of utilitarianism beyond the writings of Mill, or Sidgwick? Philosophers look at what Harris is doing and see old-hat. No new arguments, and essentially just rehashing and more basic versions of old arguments. So, think of it this way: let's say Joe Schmoe publishes a book all about how there could be an evil demon deceiving him, and then Joe tries to argue that there are some things that even the demon couldn't deceive him of. Well, we've already see that book in Descartes' Meditations. Parroting some philosophical arguments, or merely assuming the truth of certain contested positions, or relying upon old-hat philosophical arguments does not make a philosopher.

You also bring up Craig a few times. And here we should be clear. What gets Craig the title of "philosopher" is not the arguments he makes in popular debates. Those arguments are fairly basic. (Though, watching the Harris-Craig debate it's clear that Craig wins. Harris never offers a formal argument, and never responds to Craig's formal arguments.) Craig gets counted as a philosopher for his philosophical work, which is published in numerous peer-reviewed journals, and makes contributions to the field at large.

[–]Katallaxiscritical rationalism 13ポイント14ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

I sometimes cook, but I'm not a cook. Sam Harris sometimes philosophises, but that doesn't mean he's a philosopher. Of course, this fact alone does not discredit his philosophical views. Heck, neither am I a philosopher, but I'm still rather fond of my philosophical views. What discredits his views are all the fallacies and counter-arguments.

[–]ReallyNicoleethics, metaethics, decision theory 11ポイント12ポイント  (2子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

You might want to check out this recent thread on Harris. It was mostly his moral projects that were discussed, but it might give you some idea about why his work isn't regarded as philosophy.

[–]LickitySplit939[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Thank you - I hadn't realized this question has been asked already. I may be completely off base here, but most of those criticisms strike me as some kind of in-group vs out-group chest beating by people who think he is not profound enough to truly be a philosopher.

[–]ReallyNicoleethics, metaethics, decision theory 7ポイント8ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

I think /u/wokeupabug's answer covers this, but I'll say that I don't think it has anything to do with how 'profound' one is. If you're engaged in contemporary philosophy, you're a philosopher. If you're not, you'd better have a damn good reason why you ought to be called one. Harris isn't engaged in contemporary philosophy and has nothing to offer in support of his being called one, so he's not a philosopher.

[–]scdozer435 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Referring to the debate, I've seen it, and at first I thought Harris won. Upon reexamination, I found that Harris really didn't do a great job. I haven't seen it in a while, but I'll have to watch it again.

As I recall though, his arguments were generally about trying to find incoherencies in religion, particularly Christianity. The question they were debating, however, was whether there could be objective moral values in the absence of God. Even if Harris had proven Christianity wrong, he still wouldn't have won the debate, because it would just meant that Christianity's wrong, but not that moral values could exist in the absence of God. Basically, he was using a straw-man argument, attacking Christianity when that really wasn't the point of the debate. I'll watch it again though, maybe even today, and see if I perceived it wrong.

And I can't speak for anyone else, but he seems to be taken pretty seriously on sites like reddit and among college students where I'm going. However, I don't think that his works will go down in history as philosophically profound. Atheism has become incredibly popular in the last century or so, but people like Harris seem to be really just riding the waves. I consider myself religious, but I still try and take atheism as a serious viewpoint, but not by Harris. I think the best atheist philosopher out there would be Friedrich Nietzsche, who really poses a very serious challenge to religion that I think the church should definitely work harder to respond to. Whether you're a Christian or an atheist, I'd recommend reading Nietzsche. Whether you accept him or refute him, you'll come out a much stronger person.

[–]yakushi12345 22ポイント23ポイント  (48子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

His argument for objective morality is

Clearly, Utilitarianism is true; therefore, Utilitarianism is true. There's a little bit of rhetorical flourish, but if you analyze it that's all it breaks down to.

[–]LickitySplit939[S] 5ポイント6ポイント  (43子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Craig's argument seems to be if morality is objective, then god exists. I do not understand why this approach is 'better'. All of his arguments are circular, where objective morality requires a god, and god allows objective morality.

Harris said suffering = bad and the opposite of suffering is good. His 'objective morality' makes only this assumption. Why is this approach flawed? What other reasonable view could one hold on the subject?

[–]yakushi12345 6ポイント7ポイント  (32子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

  1. Why should I accept that suffering is bad?

  2. Harris jumps from suffering bad/pleasure good to Utilitarianism. How do you answer a hedonist or ethical egoist?

[–]LickitySplit939[S] 10ポイント11ポイント  (31子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

  1. Why should I accept that suffering is bad?

I understand this might be an interesting question to some philosophers, but I do not see the meaning in it. Suffering is by definition bad, that is the meaning assigned to the word. Why should I accept bad = bad? What else could it be?! Further, in the Context of the Harris/Craig debate or Harris' book, he is mostly trying to compete against dogmatic, religious sources of morality (ie no blended fabrics, no worshipping of graven idols, etc) which themselves are to some degree based on human intuitions about suffering etc. How can it be argued a utilitarian approach is worse than an arbitrary fantasy? Why do so many philosophers say Craig won that debate, and made fewer assumptions?

  1. Harris jumps from suffering bad/pleasure good to Utilitarianism. How do you answer a hedonist or ethical egoist?

Because hedonism or ethical egoism are unsustainable. People do not have omniscient information. People cannot know every long term consequence to all of their actions, or how interconnected they are with everyone else. A person cannot know, for example, that the pleasure extracted from a morning cigarette gave birth to a tumour that will kill them 40 years earlier than they would otherwise have died, reducing the total happiness in their lives considerably. If you do not know what your own best interests are (which we cannot), then it is in principle impossible to act in our own best interests.

[–]NotAnAutomatongeneral 13ポイント14ポイント  (4子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

"Why do so many philosophers say Craig won that debate, and made fewer assumptions?"

If you were to transcribe the debate and make a list of assumptions made by each philosopher, you would see that Craig made fewer assumptions. There is no philosophy conspiracy acting against Sam Harris, it is simply the case that he and you are confusing neuroscience with ethics and empirical data with objective truth. This is precisely why he is not considered a "real philosopher" by many, although I would be more charitable and simply say he is a "bad philosopher."

[–]yakushi12345 4ポイント5ポイント  (25子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

"suffering is by definition bad"

How so? Clearly, there are people who value things other then pleasure.

Utilitarianism faces (arguably greater) at least as great of measurement challenges; apply your objection to hedonism to your own system. That's besides the point though. You are falsely equating an ethical system being true with it being easy for humans to perfectly follow. No ethical egoist will argue that their theory is correct because they have an all knowing understanding of how to pursue their happiness.

[–]LickitySplit939[S] 1ポイント2ポイント  (24子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

How so? Clearly, there are people who value things other then pleasure.

I do not understand your argument. How is suffering anything except bad? How can people value anything that is not, in some way, tied to how it makes them feel?

Otherwise, you make good points. I still don't understand why the Bible matters in any of this though.

[–]yakushi12345 8ポイント9ポイント  (9子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Saying somethings feels pleasant or painful (happiness or suffering) is a description of your psychological response to them.

But if someone says the sentence "I believe a world with much suffering but many great works of art is better then one with less of both" it's not a contradictory sentence. The notions of good and bad aren't by definition tied up with the notion of pleasant or painful. I think that ultimately good and evil have quite a lot to do with pain and pleasure, but you can't start out by defining moral qualities into words.

There are two errors Harris makes, that both involve begging the question.

  1. He needs everyone to agree that the only standard of moral measure is pleasure/pain. How do you answer someone who claims that a different scale of measure is correct? In my opinion, Harris is hoping that everyone feels intuitively that he is right; and noone questions the basis for this assumption

  2. He completely misses the fact that humans are individual beings. Supposing I accept that me being hurt is bad for me, on what basis must I accept that I should also care about you being hurt in itself*. Harris is presupposing a collective instead of agent relative+ standard of morality

The reason Harris isn't taken as a serious philosopher is that he's clearly ignoring all the work that has happened in relation to utilitarianism; and he presents this theory as if it is an original idea that doesn't date back to at least the enlightenment.

*That is to say, even if being hedonistic would require me to care about your well being; that doesn't replace the fact that the end I am pursuing is my own well being.

+and I don't mean something like moral relativism. I'm speaking in terms of the facts like how eating properly requires different volumes and particular foods for different people.

[–]abstrusities 2ポイント3ポイント  (3子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

1 Actually, Harris contends that the correct moral standard is wellbeing, a nebulous concept (analogous to and related to the medical and psychological concept of wellbeing). Pain and pleasure are a obviously a major part of this, but these terms are somewhat limiting in that they seem to impose a false dichotomy when the reality is that many actions involve both (studying hard for a final exam for example).

How do you answer someone who claims that a different scale of measure is correct?

The same way you answer someone who is unreasonably skeptical of logic, induction or other common assumptions; ask them for alternative models and weigh the arguments in support of those alternatives. Not all models of morality are equal. For example, I seriously doubt that any plausible arguments can be made that support the conception that morality is a consequentialist framework for valuing actions that pertains to the number of empty shoeboxes that result from any given action.

2 The whole point of the term "moral landscape" is that there are many peaks and valleys- not just one way of achieving wellbeing or one way of failing to achieve wellbeing. So no, he does not completely miss this fact.

he reason Harris isn't taken as a serious philosopher is that he's clearly ignoring all the work that has happened in relation to utilitarianism; and he presents this theory as if it is an original idea that doesn't date back to at least the enlightenment.

Actually, Harris explains in the notes of Moral Landscape that he consciously avoided overburdening his discussion with obscure (to the common reader) philosophical jargon and references). This approach is consistant with Harris' stated goals in writing and speaking about the moral landscape.

[–]Fuck_if_I_know 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Harris contends that the correct moral standard is wellbeing, a nebulous concept

This is also a problem with Harris. He does not even give a general outline of what well-being entails, even though it is a tremendously important part of this theory. All we know is that it isn't total suffering, and it has something to do with happiness.

Not all models of morality are equal.

Indeed not, which is why Harris needs to argue for his theory, and not simply assume it and dismiss anybody who disagrees.

Harris explains in the notes of Moral Landscape that he consciously avoided overburdening his discussion with obscure (to the common reader) philosophical jargon and references

This all seems fine, were it not for the fact that he presents this as a well thought-out and obviously true theory, without ever showing himself familiar with contemporary argument, not able to respond to it.
There is a difference between simplifying your theory to make it understandable and making a bad, bad theory that fails to anyone who knows what they're talking about.

[–]abstrusities 0ポイント1ポイント  (1子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

He does not even give a general outline of what well-being entails

All we know is that it isn't total suffering, and it has something to do with happiness.

Indeed not, which is why Harris needs to argue for his theory, and not simply assume it and dismiss anybody who disagrees.

This all seems fine, were it not for the fact that he presents this as a well thought-out and obviously true theory, without ever showing himself familiar with contemporary argument, not able to respond to it.

I don't know whether you are overstating the case against Harris for dramatic flourish or if you haven't actually read his book. Either way, stick to reasonable assertions if you don't want to instantly bore everyone you talk to.

[–]LickitySplit939[S] 0ポイント1ポイント  (4子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

But if someone says the sentence "I believe a world with much suffering but many great works of art is better then one with less of both" it's not a contradictory sentence.

I do not understand this. A work of art is merely a subjective appreciation of an arbitrary arrangement of matter or energy. There is nothing 'good' about art except how we interact with it, and how it makes us feel. If someone says they would prefer a world full of art and suffering, they are merely saying art is what makes them 'happy'. (Maybe happy is a bad word, it is their sine qua non perhaps). That is all Sam Harris is arguing - morality should be the pursuit of those things in which people find meaning, aggregated over all humanity.

[–]soderkisphi. of lang., Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

How is art an arbitrary arrangement of matter? It seems to be the exact opposite. If anything is a non arbitrary arrangement of matter, then surely matter arranged in a very particular way by some craftsman should fit the bill.

There is nothing 'good' about art except how we interact with it, and how it makes us feel. If someone says they would prefer a world full of art and suffering, they are merely saying art is what makes them 'happy'.

OK. Now you have a claim. So you will need to support it. First you might want to look at what you opponents say. The first part of your claim seems a bit trivial; everybody recognizes that art makes people feel in a certain way. But how are you supposed to get from that claim to the claim that art is valuable/valued because it makes us feel in a particular way (i.e. happy)? I very rarely feel happiness when viewing Otto Dix illustrations of the first world war, yet I hold those paintings in high regard.

In addition, how are you supposed to support your semantic claim about what phrases of the sort: "a world with art and suffering is better than a world with no art and happiness". That sentence seems understandable enough. But you seem to claim that it is equivalent to the claim: "a world with happiness and suffering is better than a world with no happiness and happiness" or "I get happiness through art". A sentence that as far as I can see expresses a very different thought. Why is a person making a statement about the value of art making a statement about what makes him happy? Certainly that is not what the person speaking intended to mean, right?

After engaging and coming up with answers to these sort of questions, you can rightly say that you have an argument.

[–][deleted] 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

morality should be the pursuit of those things in which people find meaning

P1- morality should be the pursuit of those things in which people find meaning

P2- people find meaning in religion

P3- Sam Harris hates religion

C- Sam Harris doesn't think that morality should be the pursuit of those things in which people find meaning

[–]yakushi12345 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

makes me happy=/=is a state of affairs I would chose.

[–]abstrusities 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

That is all Sam Harris is arguing - morality should be the pursuit of those things in which people find meaning, aggregated over all humanity.

Where does he say this?

[–]EB116 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

We use bad in many different ways to the point that the word bad has may ambiguities. When people say suffering is bad they mean bad as in a thing which they do not like or enjoy. When ethicists use bad they mean morally wrong. We may consider suffering bad but our considering something bad does not entail it being intrinsically wrong.

[–][deleted] -2ポイント-1ポイント  (12子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

How is suffering anything except bad?

I have suffered in the pursuit of my degree. In fact, I do not believe I would have obtained my degree without a lot of suffering. I believe my degree to be one of the best things I have done in my life, therefore I believe that the suffering I underwent was good.

That's a rather simple example, but there are plenty of examples one could easily come up with where suffering is thought to be something other than "bad." Go interview a few people at a BDSM club sometime.

[–]abstrusities 2ポイント3ポイント  (9子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Attaining your degree involved suffering, but was it the suffering that was good? Or was the suffering just necessary in order to achieve a greater, longer-lasting state of wellbeing?

Show me an example of suffering being good in and of itself.

[–]soderkisphi. of lang., Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin 0ポイント1ポイント  (8子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

A person commits a horrible act (use your imagination). Later in life the person realizes that what he did was wrong. He is therefor plagued by remorse and regret. This remorse and regret might be described as suffering (let us assume that it is). Let us also assume that this regret has no large effect on any of his actions.

Is it totally unthinkable that it is also good (or morally right/appropriate) that he feels remorse and regret?

[–]abstrusities 1ポイント2ポイント  (7子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Is it totally unthinkable that it is also good (or morally right/appropriate) that he feels remorse and regret?

No, it is not unthinkable. Suffering can lead to positive outcomes, just as the stress and negative emotion involved with its_your_their obtaining a degree led to a positive outcome. In both these cases though, it doesn't seem like the suffering itself is good; rather, it seems that suffering within the context of a greater wellbeing can be good.

[–]LickitySplit939[S] 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

I assume the suffering was not the good part. Perhaps what you learned through suffering is good; perhaps the outcome of your degree has allowed you more options; etc. Unless you are some kind of sadist, the suffering was a necessary hardship which may have had many positive effects, but was not itself good. If you suffer to arrive at a place of greater self-fulfilment/happiness/whatever than where you started, then that's great - too bad you had to suffer along the way.

Go interview a few people at a BDSM club sometime.

If pain feels good, then its is not suffering, but definition.

[–]YaviMayan 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Go interview a few people at a BDSM club sometime.

Pain =/= Suffering.

Just wanted to clear this up.

I believe my degree to be one of the best things I have done in my life, therefore I believe that the suffering I underwent was good.

This degree would be absolutely meaningless to you if you didn't suffer as much while getting it?

[–]NotAnAutomatongeneral 4ポイント5ポイント  (9子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

Craig's argument was not "If Objective Morality, then God" it was "If No God, Then No Objective Morality."

Nowhere in his argument did he attempt to use the existence of an objective morality to prove the existence of God.

What he did was make a hypothetical contention that if God does not exist, then there can be no objective morality, leaving the burden proof on Harris to explain how an objective morality can exist without God.

This a subtle distinction but one that is very important, logically speaking.

"suffering = bad" is simply an arbitrary assertion. I could just as easily make the claim that "suffering is good" and build a valid argument from that premise.

However, a valid argument is not the same as a sound argument. There is no support for the claim that "suffering is bad" in any objective or moral sense.

[–][削除されました]  (4子コメント)

ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

[deleted]

    [–]clearguard -1ポイント0ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    "If no God, then no Objective morality," could be more easily affirmed by an atheist. That's why he debated with that formulation instead of the contrapositive; it's a rhetorical choice.

    [–]NotAnAutomatongeneral -1ポイント0ポイント  (2子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    One is an argument for god based on objective morality, the other is an argument against objective morality is there is no god.

    They don't imply the same things in logical form.

    "If X then Y" is not equivalent to "If -Y then -X".

    [–]clearguard 2ポイント3ポイント  (1子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.

    If one of those arguments is true, the other is necessarily true. In other words, if you accept "If no God, then no objective morality," then you logically must accept "If objective morality, then God." That's why I see Craig's choice as rhetorical.

    If you asked most atheists, "If objective morality was proved to exist, would you begin believing in God?", most would say no. However, if you really were committed to "If no God, then no objective morality," you would have to say yes logically. It's deceptively agreeable because it starts out with "If no God..."

    My guess is most atheists would actually agree with "If no objective morality, then no God," which is different, in that it leaves open the possibility of objective morality without God.

    [–]NotAnAutomatongeneral -1ポイント0ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    http://i.imgur.com/bwjSE9z.jpg

    The two statements are, indeed, equivalent. You're right.

    Edit: Oh wait, I did the 2nd one backwards, sorry lol. Edit 2: I redid the truth table.

    I stand corrected on that point.

    Nonetheless, this doesn't mean that Craig's argument is circular.

    [–]LickitySplit939[S] -1ポイント0ポイント  (3子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Nowhere in his argument did he attempt to use the existence of an objective morality to prove the existence of God.

    He said God was where objective morality came from. He then assumes God is by definition moral. This is circular.

    What he did was make a hypothetical contention that if God does not exist, then there can be no objective morality, leaving the burden proof on Harris to explain how an objective morality can exist without God.

    Harris said there can't be, so why not base it on something that makes sense (ie human flourishing/suffering). This seems a humble and reasonable statement to me.

    "suffering = bad" is simply an arbitrary assertion. I could just as easily make the claim that "suffering is good" and build a valid argument from that premise.

    How? Both are subjective claims along the same spectrum. Suffering is typically defined using bad (or some analogue like terrible) in its description. Suffering might as well be 'a state of existence which humans avoid if possible'. How can suffering (not outcomes resulting from temporary suffering) be good?

    However, a valid argument is not the same as a sound argument. There is no support for the claim that "suffering is bad" in any objective or moral sense.

    There is no objective bad, so obviously you are right. However, suffering is an undesirable subjective state - if what we understand as suffering was desirable (ie you are a masochist or sadist or something) then it is no longer suffering!

    [–]NotAnAutomatongeneral 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    "He said God was where objective morality came from. He then assumes God is by definition moral. This is circular."

    This is, strictly speaking, not an accurate assessment of what he said. He argued that IF God exists, then God is a perfect being, which includes a wholly complete and perfected morality. As such, if God exists, it provides a basis for objective morality.

    This is not circular.

    "'...Harris to explain how an objective morality can exist without God.'

    'Harris said there can't be, so why not base it on something that makes sense (ie human flourishing/suffering). This seems a humble and reasonable statement to me.'"

    Am I wrong in believing that Harris is attempting to establish an objective moral standard? If he is not attempting to argue for an objective moral standard, then what is he doing? Is he arguing for a subjective moral standard? If so, then he is simply describing what he believes to be a good human life and prescribing that everyone else should agree with him.

    "suffering = bad" is simply an arbitrary assertion. I could just as easily make the claim that "suffering is good" and build a valid argument from that premise. How? Both are subjective claims along the same spectrum. Suffering is typically defined using bad (or some analogue like terrible) in its description. Suffering might as well be 'a state of existence which humans avoid if possible'. How can suffering (not outcomes resulting from temporary suffering) be good?"

    How suffering is typically defined in a dictionary is not relevant to the philosophical issue of whether or not it is "good" or "bad." Semantics will not save you from addressing this issue in a truly philosophical way, it will only back you into a corner.

    One very quick way I could see to argue that "suffering is good" would be as follows: Premise 1: 'Humans avoid suffering.' Premise 2: 'In order to avoid suffering, humans must solve problems.' Premise 3: 'If humans did not experience suffering, humans would not solve problems.' Premise 4: 'Solving problems is good.' Conclusion: 'Suffering is a necessary condition for the good of problem solving.'

    Note, I don't necessarily think this is a sound argument, but you asked how one might argue that suffering is good. It's not as crazy as you think it is that one might do something like this.

    "There is no objective bad, so obviously you are right" -Assumption.

    [–]Gudahtt 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    He said God was where objective morality came from. He then assumes God is by definition moral. This is circular.

    Completely wrong.

    He said that theism provides a solid foundation for objective morality. He also defined God as being moral. Defined, not assumed.

    Remember, the argument he is making is "If there is no God, there is no objective morality". The 'God' in that argument is defined as being good. The only assumption made here is that there can be no alternative logical foundation for objective morality.

    [–]KingBearington 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Claim: suffering (which we should define as distinct from pain, as I would argue they're not necessarily the same) is inherently undesirable.

    Therefore: If a kind of pain or discomfort which is often considered suffering, is also considered desirable, than it can no longer be suffering. Suffering and desire are therefore mutually exclusive.

    Counterclaim: There are times when suffering is in fact desirable, to both the individual and the group. Using the suffering-as-pain dynamic, there are a number of times when suffering would be considered desirable. Consider suffering for love ("Love in the Time of Cholera), hunger strikes, manual labor performed out of pride (a recent example would be the "God Made a Farmer speech). Using the suffering-as-distinct-from-pain claim, the challenge then becomes determining whether or not one can desire suffering or whether or not one can merely desire pain. Here however the direct correlation drawn prior between pleasure/pain & good/evil breaks down, and likely cannot apply any longer.

    [–]perpetual_motion 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    He loves to say "as soon as you grant insert essentially his conclusion, then it becomes clear....."

    [–]yakushi12345 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    if A then A therefore A

    [–]abstrusities 0ポイント1ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    That isn't a very charitable interpretation at all, and its a shame this comment was up voted to the top of this thread.

    [–]wokeupabughistory of philosophy 19ポイント20ポイント  (20子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Why isn't Sam Harris a philosopher?

    What would make someone a philosopher in your view?

    Candidates for philosopher-making properties which seem obvious to me are (i) being trained as a philosopher, (ii) being employed as a philosopher, and (iii) making contributions to philosophy.

    Since Harris doesn't have any of these properties, it seems natural enough to me that he wouldn't be regarded as a philosopher.

    What do you think?

    [–]LickitySplit939[S] 11ポイント12ポイント  (12子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    i) He has a BA in philosophy from Stanford, and a PhD in cognitive neuroscience from UCLA (which is heavily philosophical)

    ii) Nearly all of his writing is philosophical in nature - is there a God, what is morality, is free will real, etc. How would you classify his career, if not as a philosopher?

    iii) I am not sure if he has made any significant contributions besides evangelising some aspects of philosophy to the general public. However, I think he has probably done more to make people think and question than most career philosophers who operate in an academic echo chamber, which I think is a very useful contribution.

    [–]wokeupabughistory of philosophy 19ポイント20ポイント  (10子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    He has a BA in philosophy from Stanford, and a PhD in cognitive neuroscience from UCLA

    Having a BA in a subject is not typically considered professional training in that subject, and philosophy is not an exception to this general rule. For example, a BA does not make someone a candidate for regular membership in the American Philosophical Association.

    Having a PhD in neuroscience is presumably a good basis for claiming to be a neuroscientist, but neuroscience and philosophy are two different disciplines: being a professional in one does not make someone a professional in the other.

    Nearly all of his writing is philosophical in nature

    Is it? Well, what would make a written work count as philosophical?

    Candidates for philosophical-making properties which seem obvious to me are when a written work (i) engages significantly with other philosophical work, (ii) is published in the context where philosophical work is carried out (e.g. in major philosophical journals), or (iii) contributes significantly to clarifying or solving philosophical problems.

    Since Harris' work doesn't have any of these properties, it seems natural enough to me that it wouldn't be regarded as philosophical.

    How would you classify his career...?

    My understanding is that he is employed as a writer and has until recently been employed as a graduate student.

    [–]LickitySplit939[S] -1ポイント0ポイント  (9子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Having a PhD in neuroscience is presumably a good basis for claiming to be a neuroscientist, but neuroscience and philosophy are two different disciplines: being a professional in one does not make someone a professional in the other.

    Some subjects have so much overlap, expertise in one can mean expertise in another. I am a PhD in biomedical engineering - many graduate students in imaging who look at the brain have a BA or graduate degree in philosophy. A person who enters cognitive neuroscience with a philosophical bent tends to do philosophy using fMRI to help them. I consider these people (and they consider themselves) philosophers and they often do experiments on things like consciousness, morality, ethics etc.

    engages significantly with other philosophical work; is published in the context where philosophical work is carried out; contributes significantly to clarifying or solving philosophical problems.

    He debates philosophers and public intellectuals routinely. His citation lists are filled with the work of philosophers. He as published in peer reviewed journals on topics like belief and religious cognition, which while neuroscientific, have a clear philosophical foundation. He seems particularly interested in free will and morality, which I classify as within the domain of philosophy, and to which he contributes.

    My understanding is that he is employed as a writer and has until recently been employed as a graduate student.

    So anyone not employed by a university's philosophy department is not a philosopher?

    [–]wokeupabughistory of philosophy 11ポイント12ポイント  (8子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Some subjects have so much overlap, expertise in one can mean expertise in another.

    But this tends not to be regarded as one of those cases.

    I consider these people (and they consider themselves) philosophers...

    Then I think we've come up with at least part of an answer to your initial question. The reason you think that Harris is a philosopher and people involved in philosophy tend not to is that you think having a PhD in neuroscience makes someone a philosopher, whereas people involved in philosophy tend not to think this.

    He debates philosophers and public intellectuals routinely. His citation lists are filled with the work of philosophers. He as published in peer reviewed journals on topics like belief and religious cognition, which while neuroscientific, have a clear philosophical foundation. He seems particularly interested in free will and morality, which I classify as within the domain of philosophy, and to which he contributes.

    Could you direct me to some of his academic publications in the field of philosophy?

    So anyone not employed by a university's philosophy department is not a philosopher?

    I believe I suggested some criteria different than this one.

    [–][deleted] 6ポイント7ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Titles and academic achievements don't matter much if you can't argue your case. To be a philosopher you must use the tools of a philosopher, rational thought and logical reasoning.

    The problem with Sam Harris is that he rationalizes and is very sloppy in his thinking. He is more of evangelist and writer of opinion pieces than philosopher. He may appear rational thinker for those who just casually read trough his texts and don't analyze his argumentation, but when he is put against some real philosopher or expert in subject matter, the weakness of his arguments are easily revealed and he gets intellectual ass whooping.

    I would like to give you easy to follow example outside philosophy. Read the "To Profile or Not to Profile? A Debate between Sam Harris and Bruce Schneier" from his site: http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/to-profile-or-not-to-profile

    Sam Harris gets into debate with cryptographer and security expert Bruce Schneier about racial profiling in airports. It turns out that he had nothing but gut feeling and he tried to rationalize it.

    [–]meta-ape 1ポイント2ポイント  (3子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Regarding point (i), for instance Thomas Kuhn does not have a formal training (BAs or PhDs) for philosophy. He did get the professorship in Princeton, though. Do correct me if I'm wrong.

    Source

    [–]raeboyzmetaphysics 3ポイント4ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    I believe that's intended as a list of sufficient conditions, not a list of necessary conditions.

    [–]Naejardjurisprudence, civil and common law 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    He does not have (i), but he definitely fills (iii), with his training in physics most helpful when it comes to contributions to the philosophy of science, I would imagine.

    [–]ADefiniteDescriptionlogic, truth, moral phil. 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    As /u/reaboyz notes, /u/wokeupabug probably intended it to be a list of sufficient conditions. Note that Kripke also lacks a philosophy degree.

    [–]NotAnAutomatongeneral 11ポイント12ポイント  (22子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Dr. Craig offered clear premises and conclusions in valid arguments. Dr. Harris offered conjecture and fallacious arguments.

    Any Logic 101 course will prove this to you, if you do not want to take my word for it.

    [–]skeetertheman -3ポイント-2ポイント  (4子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    I can see how Craig's argument is valid; if morality did not come from Odin, where then did it come?

    [–]NotAnAutomatongeneral 8ポイント9ポイント  (3子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Valid just means that IF the premises are true, then the conclusion can not be false.

    It doesn't mean that the premises ARE true.

    [–]iflyboats 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    He is a philosopher, just not a very good one.

    For the record, I like some of what he has to say, just not on philosophucal issues.

    [–]o0oCyberiao0o 1ポイント2ポイント  (3子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    I have seen him in the same context as Ayn Rand, for example.

    Question: do you think Ayn Rand is a philosopher?

    [–]LickitySplit939[S] 2ポイント3ポイント  (2子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Nope.

    [–]zukros 2ポイント3ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Why not? Are there any reasons that Ayn Rand is not a philosopher that could not be used against Sam Harris?

    [–]o0oCyberiao0o 1ポイント2ポイント  (0子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    You do realize that they have a lot in common, and it is these qualities that lead them to not be considered philosophers, right?

    [–][deleted] 1ポイント2ポイント  (3子コメント)

    ごめんなさい。これは既にアーカイブしてあり、もう投票はできません。

    Are you talking about his atheist stuff? I am not a philosopher but I found them far from devastating, more infuriatingly spurious. I read about a third of one of his books and gave up after getting extremely bored of his rewriting of history to blame theists for everything. I thought it was an appalling attempt to argue actually.