Here's my comment on it

http://www.reddit.com/r/fullmoviesonyoutube/comments/37u4v6/predator_dark_ages_2015_720p/crud0j3

I don't think it's controversial to say that the US and UK had far more extreme war arms (at the end of the war unconditional surrender of their opponents versus merely forcing them to accept a new status quo with limits on their influence) than Japan and Germany. They were more willing to use more force earlier in the war to achieve those aims (particularly the UK which had a doctrine that 'the bomber will always get through' that was predicated on carpet bombing being used. The US objected to carpet bombing early in the war but adopted it enthusiastically later on to the point comparable numbers of people died in the conventional bombing of Tokyo to those that died in the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The US and UK also sneered at the German and Japanese attempts to imitate ancient codes of the honourable warrior - the Japanese tried to resurrect the Bushido code and the Germans tried to invent a code of honourable warriors at places like Wewelsburg

I.e. the US and UK regarded war as being something which is won by the industrial application of violence to destroy industry after which the losers would be low level formatted with the society of the winners. The Japanese and Germans thought if they defeated the US and UK honourably they would be allowed to keep their new empires where they'd treat conquered people like slaves.

As far as Shermans being bad compared to Panzers I think it's well documented.

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/lovesick-cyborg/2014/10/16/good-enough-us-tanks-won-wwii/

The technical superiority of German tanks also did not necessarily guarantee easy victories for the Germans in tank duels. U.S. and British military studies in the later years of the war found that the single most important factor in tank duels was which side spotted the other first, engaged first and landed the first hits. Such scenarios tended to favor defenders, which is why German tanks on the attack suffered about as heavily as Sherman tanks on the attack. But such situations also favored well-trained and experienced tank crews who knew how to ambush or surprise enemy tanks. Even Panther and Tiger tanks could easily fall prey to Sherman tanks striking from the side or rear. (Zaloga also observes that the myth of the U.S. Army needing five Sherman tanks to knock out a single Panther or Tiger tank appears to have no basis in World War II combat records.)

In the end, Zaloga concludes that the Sherman’s good qualities of being mechanically reliable and easy to mass produce outweighed the tank’s disadvantages on the battlefield against the elite German tanks. He also points out that the Sherman tanks represented just one part of a well-honed U.S. war machine that included the hard-fighting infantry, excellent artillery support, and close air support from the U.S. Army Air Force. In fact, the U.S. Army spent almost six times as much on aircraft as tanks from 1941 to 1945 — $36 billion versus just $6 billion — in a successful effort to dominate the skies and cripple Germany’s wartime industry through strategic bombing raids.

However the US could turn out many more Shermans than the Germans could produce technically superior tanks.

In general the Allies vastly outproduced the Axis

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II#Major_weapons_groups

US and UK carpet bombing helped, but the fact is that the technically superior German tanks would have been hard to produce in volume even without it.

The point about Lancaster being low tech consider

http://forums.ubi.com/showthread.php/652900-Lancaster-and-Halifax-Bombers-Daylight-Bombing?s=c5eb4a1fa1bd38f06321478fc27fd14a&p=6992664&viewfull=1#post6992664

Bomber Command tried daylight operations with mediums and heavies repeatedly throughout the war. Shortly after the declaration of war in 1939 Wellingtons tried to hit German warships in port in daylight and took a drubbing. All that fall various experiments in using the Wellingtons and Hampdens in daylight resulted in unacceptable losses. Once again in the Norwegian Campaign in April 1940 British bombers were tried in daylight with no success. Sensibly, they were not thrown away in futile attacks on German army columns in France 1940, like the junior members, the Battles and Blenheims. With the introduction of the Stirling in early 1941, attempts were made to use the heavies in daylight once again. This time surrounded by dozens of Spitfires in short-range "Circus" missions over France. Stirlings, Manchesters, and Halifaxes were thrown into the campaign to destroy SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU in Brest in 1941 and flew many unpleasant daylight missions. The brand new Lancaster was believed by some to be a super bomber. Soon after its introduction in 1942 daylight deep penetration raids were flown to try to knock out pin-point targets in Danzig and southern Germany. At this time Lancs had heavy armor available and crews could choose how much they wanted to carry (see STRIKE HARD, STRIKE SURE by Ralph Barker). Unfortunately, their .303 rifle-caliber machine guns were grossly out-ranged by the MG151s on German fighters. Harris wanted to upgun the heavies immediately and, instead, found himself in a bureaucratic war with the Air Ministry (see BOMBER COMMAND by Sir Arthur Harris). Finally, in 1944 the RAF heavies started to get .50 caliber turrets---some official mounts, some privately made to Harris's specification when he was fed up with Ministry stonewalling. By 1943, the heavies were only being used at night. This changed in 1944 with the pre-D-Day requirements. The heavies were used in the daylight several times during the Normandy campaign. The equipment of RAF fighter squadrons with long-range Mustangs allowed the heavies to be used in daylight under escort in late 1944 and 1945. Actually, Bomber Command's precision target marking tactics, perfected in mid-1944, worked better at night than during the day. Single Mosquitoes could mark individual buildings for saturation bombardment by placing markers right on the roofs. This would have been suicide in the day. Bomber Command was hitting more accurately at night than the AAF Air Forces were in daylight by 1944-45, and, in fact, contrary to popular belief, the Americans used area bombing frequently because they had no means to bomb accurately in overcast weather (see the excellent BLANKETS OF FIRE by Werrell).

I.e. area bombing a target at night was a hell of lot safer than precision bombing during the day, mostly because the Lancaster didn't have enough firepower to protect itself during daylight. US bombers could protect themselves better but even the US decided to switch from precision bombing in the day to area bombing at night

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II#Conventional_bombing

USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim of "precision bombing" of military targets for much of the war, and dismissed claims they were simply bombing cities. However the American Eighth Air Force received the first H2X radar sets in December 1943. Within two weeks of the arrival of these first six sets, the Eighth command gave permission for them to area bomb a city using H2X and would continue to authorize, on average, about one such attack a week until the end of the war in Europe.[158]

In reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard. Conventionally, the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1,000 feet around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, overall, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area.[159] In the fall of 1944, only seven percent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point.

Nevertheless, the sheer tonnage of explosive delivered by day and by night was eventually sufficient to cause widespread damage, and, more importantly from a military point of view, forced Germany to divert resources to counter it. This was to be the real significance of the Allied strategic bombing campaign—resource allocation.

...

As in Europe, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) tried daylight precision bombing. However, it proved to be impossible due to the weather around Japan, "during the best month for bombing in Japan, visual bombing was possible for [just] seven days. The worst had only one good day."[179] Further, bombs dropped from a great height were tossed about by high winds.

It's worth pointing out that US doctrine did originally specify daylight precision bombing and US bombers were better suited for it than British bombers. However the losses in doing it were too great and they switched to carpet bombing instead.

I.e. you can see a contrast between the way the US and UK viewed war. They tended to mass produce 'good enough' designs instead of going for wonder weapons like Germany. They didn't see a future where they coexisted with Germany and Japan in their current forms but one where they occupied Germany and Japan and imposed democracy by force. They regarded war as being something which was fought between the industrial bases of countries rather than purely by warriors. Hence the carpet bombing of German and Japanese industry.