• Commentary
• By
• Karl Friedhoff

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s speech to a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress went about as expected. He buttressed his credentials as America’s most reliable ally in the Asia-Pacific region, touted the benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, emphasized his intention to continue to reform and open Japan’s economy, and offered “eternal condolences” to the souls of Americans lost during World War II.

On the issues that continue to roil South Korea-Japan relations, he did the bare minimum. But his deft diplomacy with the U.S. will now increase pressure on South Korean President Park Geun-hye to improve strained ties.

The controversy over women, many of them Korean, used as forced prostitutes before and during World War II followed Mr. Abe to the United States, with reports of small protests at each of his stops. Before Congress, speaking in English, Mr. Abe said he recognized Japan’s actions had “brought suffering to peoples in Asia.” He then dealt with the so-called “comfort women” issue in a single line, stating the he “will uphold the views expressed by previous prime ministers.”

This is far cry from what many in South Korea had hoped for. Seoul has repeatedly called on Mr. Abe to offer a “sincere” apology, a move Mr. Abe does not see the need for. Having now been spurned in front of a Joint Session of Congress, expect a quick and harsh reaction from South Korea.

South Korea will also be none too pleased with Mr. Abe’s treatment of territorial disputes as the two countries continue to spar over the sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks. In saying that “states should make claims based on international law,” Mr. Abe followed closely the statement that appears on Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website dedicated to Takeshima—as the islets are known in Japan. South Korea calls them Dokdo.

Mr. Abe saved the biggest dig at South Korea for near the end of his speech. In one of his only explicit references to South Korea, he mentioned it as an additional partner to the “central pillar” of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In doing so, he made it clear that he views South Korea not as an equal—which is how Seoul views the trilateral alliance—but as a junior.

The prime minister’s critics—of which there are many—will lament his speech before Congress as a missed opportunity to make progress across a range of issues negatively effecting the South Korea-Japan relationship. But these laments will not change the fact that the pressure is now squarely on Ms. Park to start mending fences.

Before Congress, Mr. Abe was poignant, reflective, and emphasized his own appreciation and admiration for the United States. He made a point—by singling out an American World War II veteran shaking hands with the grandson of a legendary Japanese World War II veteran—that the history of conflict between the two is now in the distant past. In doing so, he likely improved his standing in the eyes of Congress and many Americans.

More importantly, Mr. Abe made sure to emphasize that he is delivering on U.S. security interests in the region by presiding over the first revision in 20 years of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines.

As the prime minister has wooed the U.S., frustration has grown in Washington with the disrepair of the South Korea-Japan relationship. Much of the blame has been placed on Ms. Park. In contrast to the forward-looking Mr. Abe, the perception is that this has become a personal issue for her rather than one of current and future national interests.

Compounding this perception is the fact that public opinion in South Korea remains largely in favor of holding a South Korea-Japan summit, a fact which U.S. policymakers are aware of. Claims by the Blue House that it is public sentiment which prevents them from moving forward with Japan are questionable.

When Ms. Park travels to Washington in June, she should be prepared to face U.S. insistence that public cooperation between South Korea and Japan improve. The culmination of which should be a bilateral summit.

If she does agree to an eventual summit with Japan, she would be doing so with Mr. Abe conceding almost nothing. Should she refuse, she will further fuel the perception that it is South Korea and its stubbornness—not Mr. Abe and his historical revisionism—that is the problem.

Karl Friedhoff is a Fellow in Public Opinion & Foreign Policy at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a Korea Foundation-Mansfield Foundation U.S.-Korea Nexus Scholar.

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