Maliki has Nothing to Lose

It is likely under Iran’s instigation that Maliki is trying to create havoc in the disputed territories of Iraq’s northern provinces.

By that, he may want to kill two birds with one stone. One is to divert Kurdish attention from the situation in Syria. The other is to gain support from Iraq’s Sunni and Shia communities with this kind of action.

The Shia will stand by him, and the Sunnis will too since most of his officers are former Baathist Sunnis.

Then, he thinks, if everything goes according to plan, he will turn on the Kurdistan Region and what the Kurds have achieved so far. Maliki wants to show the Kurds that Kurdistan is part of Iraq, and he does not conceal this sentiment.

At this time, Kurds and their political groups have reached a unanimous conclusion that this is Maliki’s intention. In the meantime, they have admitted that they lack a united voice.

However, when the Dijla Operations Command deployed, the leader of the Change Movement (Gorran) -- who had previously sided with keeping Maliki in his seat -- went to Kirkuk and vehemently rejected the actions of the forces.

Judging from the tone of its media, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is waging a full war against Maliki. The party’s secretary general, Jalal Talabani, concurs with President Barzani that Maliki is a threat to both Iraq and Kurdistan.

Territories defined as “disputed” through constitutional Article 140 include 43 percent of Kurdish land. According to international laws, when an area is considered disputed, no one side has the right to make decisions about it unilaterally. If the two sides do not trust each other, then a third force -- often an international one -- comes to mediate.

Maliki’s actions began exactly after the Americans withdrew irresponsibly from the area without a clear roadmap and unconditionally handed over all the areas to Maliki.

It is possible that, in the case of a confrontation, America might intervene and stand between the Kurds and Arabs, but that would not change anything in reality. The Dijla forces will stay where they are and Maliki is not the kind of man to swallow defeat.

Therefore, the Kurds have only two options before them. One is to declare war and expel the Dijla Operations Command from the area by force -- which is easier said than done, even though there has never been stronger evidence that the Iraqi Army is a threat to the Kurdish population in those areas. The second option is to make a deal and create a joint administration for those areas and advocate for the deployment of international forces.

America itself isn’t interested in seeing another conflict in the area, and for that reason the second option is more likely. Some kind of compromise and negotiation towards that end now appears to be on the horizon.

What is important for the Kurds is to be able to bring in an international force such as NATO or the Americans into the game. In the end, it is obvious that even though the problem of Kirkuk is a domestic one, the roots of the issue are in fact too deep and complicated to be solved by a constitutional article.

Enthusiastic speeches and calls for war are not wise. Maliki has nothing to lose and the Kurds shouldn’t walk into his trap.