Three proposals for the Syrian crisis
by Haluk Özdalga*

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has acquired a broad sphere of maneuvering in a vast geography from Syria to Iran. This is the primary reason for the growing terror and the PKK’s self-confidence. Our trade with neighboring countries including Syria has been on the decline. Our Syrian politics should be revisited. At this point, I would like to make three major points.

Attempts to bring democracy to Syria via a domestic war that is externally supported should be given up. Practices and policies including protecting defectors from the Syrian army and hosting the headquarters of the Free Syrian Army as well as supplying logistical support should be reviewed. There are, of course, major ethical and strategic reasons for Turkey to support a democratic transformation in Syria. However, ethical and strategic reasons are not enough to resort to military methods. Regime change by external intervention is always a problem. The minimum conditions of an intervention are as follows: strong international agreement; the possibility for the establishment of a democratic order after the collapse of the old regime; and the attainment of the goals of the intervention within a short period of time.

These are not met in the case of Syria. An agreement to change the current regime will only lead to another internal war even if the current regime collapses. This is one of the greatest risks in Syria because the opposition does not have a leader, a central military plan and a political strategy. On the other hand, even if all conditions are met and an external intervention is made, Turkey should stay away from such an initiative because of its special status. The Bashar al-Assad regime brutally repressed the initial protests in Syria in March of 2011; the protests were peaceful. Despite brutality and repression, the National Coordination Committee (NCC) -- the most influential element within the Syrian opposition back then -- opposed the militarization of the Syrian revolution.

The proposals of the NCC were as follows: Revolt should not be taken to the military sphere because this would lead to domestic war; the peaceful aspect of the revolt should be preserved; defection from Syrian army should be encouraged, but they should not be allowed to reorganize against the Syrian army; and they would remain cautious for self-defense alone. However, those who favored reliance on military power within the opposition defined the terms. In the end, Syria is no closer to democracy now than it was back in March 2011.

Our allies in this business

Second, we should also review our alignment with friends such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Instead of an enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend approach in a complicated issue like Syria, the allies should be chosen by reliance on more comprehensive analyses. The Saudi state is based on a dual historical alliance: the radical Wahhabi ideology, which seeks the purification of stranger elements from religion, and the Saudi dynasty holding the power in military and political spheres. And the Saudi state (and some other Gulf countries) is in fierce competition and conflict with Iran. Above all, the survival of the Saudi state depends on US support.

On the other hand, Iran holds that the US is the great Satan and should stay away from the region. The Saudis have always been suspicious of the Shiite people in its Eastern Province and the Shiite communities in Gulf countries including Bahrain due to the Iranian support to these people. The Saudis have become more concerned by the growing cooperation between Iran and Iraq and the visible influence of Tehran in Iraq. The ability of Iran, which is already a strong conventional power, to acquire nuclear arms is perceived as an existential threat by the Saudi state. They are lobbying in Washington to initiate a military operation against Iran. These two countries are in conflict on every major issue, including Lebanon, Palestine and the amount of oil to be produced. For Saudis, the greatest impact to Iran is, in addition to a regime change in Teheran, detachment from the Syrian connection. They will prefer this option even if this means a great number of causalities in Syria or even its partition.

The Saudis have strong tendencies to express their conflict with Iran in reference to the Sunni-Shiite division. Leading Saudi clerics make harsh statements about the Shiite faith. The second goal of the Saudis in the Syrian crisis is the emergence of ground where the Wahhabi ideology would gain strength. For their failed attempts in Bosnia, Lebanon, Iraq and Central Asia, there might be a better environment in Syria. As the domestic war continues, the radical groups close to the Saudis will become more powerful and they will get fresh opportunities in the event Syria is divided. The Egyptian media hold that the Qatari emir lobbies for the partition of Syria. Not only the justifications of the Saudis but also the conclusions they are seeking are entirely different than our justifications and ends; for this reason, problems may erupt at different stages of the crisis.

Third, Turkey should clarify its demands and expectations from the US. There is a strong impression that Turkey is encouraging the US and NATO to get involved in military action in Syria. Every Western intervention in the Middle East has exacerbated the situation there. One of the primary reasons for the ongoing problems in the Middle East today is the longstanding involvement of the West in the regional affairs for the past two centuries. An impression that it is inviting military intervention in Syria undermines Turkey’s image and becomes detrimental to its interests.

American intervention?

In fact, a US intervention in Syria is a remote possibility. This has nothing to do with the presidential election. Regardless of who wins, most probably the US will extend limited support to the opposition, which will be enough for them to stay in the fight but not enough to win victory because the first preference of the US is the fall of Assad and the opposition as well. The US pursued a similar strategy in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. It manipulated the support to Iraq depending on the course of the war. Henry Kissinger made the following statement on that war, which lasted eight years and claimed 750,000 lives: “Unfortunately, there is no possibility that both lose.”

The preservation of the current policy may cause Turkey to pay a greater bill. In addition, our image may be permanently undermined in the region. The solution is based on negotiation and political process rather than domestic war. This implies that diplomatic channels should be opened to maintain ties with Syria. This is why diplomacy exists. For instance, Russia and Iran support Assad, but they also talk to the opposition. Finally, it could be said that the proposals made here are consistent with the overall stance and policy of the Egyptian administration under Muslim Brotherhood rule vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. Despite the fact that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is one of the warring parties in Syria, Egypt seeks to end the domestic war and attain a political solution. They are strongly opposed to a US intervention. They are even opposed to military action by Arab states. It is not easy to understand why Turkey has been pursuing a harsher strategy than Egypt’s policy in the Syrian crisis. Up until recently, Turkey has been viewed as an example and model in Egypt. Maybe now it is time for us to take Egypt as an example.

*Haluk Özdalga is an AK Party Ankara deputy. haluk.ozdalga@tbmm.gov.tr