Control of the Air

Securing control of the air is the RAF's paramount duty: not only in defence of the United Kingdom itself, but also on expeditionary operations, where control of the air guarantees the freedom of manoeuvre and action of friendly air, land and naval forces, while curtailing the activities and options open to our adversaries. Control of the air is a fundamental prerequisite for any planned military endeavour in the twenty-first century. It enables all other activities and without sufficient control of the air, it would be impossible to deploy a fighting force - ­in its vulnerable transport ships and aircraft - to a crisis zone in the first place, let alone move it freely around a theatre of operations after arrival. Equally, without sufficient control of the air, an enemy has freedom to deploy surveillance systems, such as remotely piloted aircraft, limiting the option of surprise and rendering friendly forces vulnerable to attack. The fundamental importance of control of the air is recognised and understood by the enemies of the West, who contest it repeatedly with every means at their disposal. This may result in air battles between opposing fighter (sometimes known as 'combat air') aircraft, for example in the early stages of the Gulf War in 1991; a contest between aircraft and enemy ground-based missiles and anti-aircraft guns; or attacks on air power's essential ground infrastructure.

Because of its investment in first-class training and capable equipment, the RAF has been successful in ensuring that British forces have not suffered any casualties from enemy air attack since the Falklands War in 1982, where the images of Sir Galahad burning at Bluff Cove provide the starkest possible illustration of the consequences of a loss of air control. Although there has been a perception of easy victories in the air since the Falklands conflict, in reality the RAF has had to fight hard for control of the air in all of its recent campaigns: in the Gulf War in 1991, against Iraqi Air Force aircraft and a dense network of missile and gun defences; against the highly effective Serbian air defence system during the Kosovo War in 1999 when, despite NATO's superiority in the air, some 230 missiles were fired at Alliance aircraft; and again, as recently as 2003, when the Baghdad missile engagement zone remained an active threat to coalition aircraft until the final fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. These examples demonstrate that control of the air can never be assumed or taken for granted and without it, the provision of the broad range of other air power capabilities that are essential to the success of all military operations is likely to be compromised. This is why combat aircraft, such as Typhoon, are necessary to provide a competitive, multirole capability to insure against future contingencies, not least in deterring potential adversaries in a global environment where highly capable, state-of-the-art, 'fifth-generation' Russian and Chinese fighter aircraft, and increasingly sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, are freely available and widely exported, often to unstable and potentially problematic states.

Furthermore, in all of these cases, some of the niche capabilities that have been developed primarily for use in current counter-insurgency operations would have been of limited use; for example, in the Balkans, many of the remotely piloted air systems that are proving to be so useful in Afghanistan were lost to either poor weather or enemy action, and the vulnerability of remotely piloted aircraft to even rudimentary air defences was underlined by the Russian experience in the conflict with Georgia last year. While remotely piloted air systems will clearly make an increasingly important contribution in the future, their inherent limitations and vulnerabilities mean that a balanced investment in a 'capability-mix' of air platforms-piloted and remotely piloted, combat air (or 'fast jet') aircraft and helicopters and transports is essential, if the United Kingdom is to retain the ability to conduct military interventions beyond the level of limited stabilisation or counter-insurgency operations in the most benign air environments.

Even when adversaries lack a conventional air force, they will still contest control of the air. For example, an RAF Hercules transport aircraft was downed by groundfire in Iraq in 2005, and RAF helicopters in Afghanistan are often engaged by insurgents with small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades. Additionally, aircraft have been attacked on the ground by rockets and mortar fire, and this is why specialist force protection is essential. The RAF Regiment is familiar with air operations and flight profiles, and provides the essential capability to secure operating bases and landing areas. The advent and wide availability of small and increasingly capable manportable anti-aircraft missiles - often provided indirectly to insurgent groups by state sponsors such as Iran and Syria -exacerbates this threat, and demands continuing investment in suitable defensive aids and counter-measures, particularly for slower (and inevitably more vulnerable) transport aircraft and helicopters. The acquisition of Stinger man-portable missiles by the Taliban during the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the early 1980s marked a sudden step-change in capability which the Soviet Air Force could not counter; this meant that it was no longer able to support land forces effectively, and was one of the most significant factors driving the Kremlin's final political decision to abandon the campaign and withdraw. This provides a further, salutary lesson about the need to invest in control of the air, and the consequences of failing to do so.

Photography: RAF/MOD Crown Copyright 2010.