EDITORIAL: Reorienting diplomacy

The rapidly changing global landscape doesn't allow countries to be idle on the diplomatic front. Regrettably, the government led by the Democratic Party of Japan which was supposed to take effective political leadership in foreign policy has proved to be disappointing.

The diplomatic performance of the administration of Prime Minister Naoto Kan has been little better than that of the previous administration of Yukio Hatoyama, whose diplomatic track record was dismal. It is hard not to worry that Japan may be losing its ability to protect its interests in the international community.

Take Japan's relations with South Korea, for example. Aug. 29 marks the 100th anniversary of the annexation treaty that Japan imposed on the Korean Peninsula. While some longstanding issues concerning the history between the two countries remain unsolved, the bilateral relationship is generally in pretty good shape. The diplomatic challenge facing the two countries is how to take advantage of this historic milestone to ensure that bilateral ties evolve to a new stage.

Thus, we must question the wisdom of the government's sudden decision to postpone publication of its annual defense white paper to September or even later. The government cited the need to update descriptions in the report of the developments related to the sinking of a South Korean warship in March.

But it appears there was another reason for the move. Traditionally, the government's defense white paper describes the Takeshima islets in the Sea of Japan as part of Japanese territory. It is customary for South Korea, which claims sovereignty over the isles it calls Dokdo, to lodge a protest each time Japan releases the annual report.

The Kan administration decided to put off publication of the document to avoid creating fresh friction with its neighbor on the eve of this historically important anniversary. It was obviously necessary to give consideration to South Korean sentiment toward Japan at this time. But postponing the release of the report is an example of an escapist approach that doesn't help to strengthen bilateral relations.

The government needs to show its commitment to deepening mutual trust between the two countries, despite the discord over Takeshima, through efforts based on a broad perspective of Asia's future. It needs to come up with a plan of action to achieve this goal.

Unfortunately, Kan's remarks have not been encouraging. The government also made a misstep when it started talks with India to forge a civilian nuclear cooperation pact. India developed nuclear weapons without signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Kan administration, which regards promoting exports of nuclear power technology as a key component of its strategy for economic growth, has followed in the footsteps of the United States and some European countries in seeking a nuclear power deal with India. If these developments lead to an increase in India's nuclear power plants and uranium-producing countries begin to export to its nuclear power facilities, the country will be able to use some of the uranium it produces to make atomic bombs.

Then, China and Pakistan could use India's nuclear buildup as an excuse for ramping up their production of materials for nuclear arms.

What does the Kan administration think of these risks? Japan could have contributed to international efforts to bring peace to Sudan by dispatching Self-Defense Forces troops to that country. But the government decided not to do so as the Defense Ministry was hesitant. Kan has provided little leadership on this issue.

The Hatoyama administration collapsed mainly as a result of its mishandling of the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture that left it caught between its relations with Washington and anger among Okinawans.

A diplomatic initiative that is not supported by sufficient political coordination at home tends to fail. That was the principal lesson to be gleaned from the Futenma fiasco. How does Kan intend to build on the lesson? In terms of diplomacy as well as security policy led by politicians, it is crucial to provide a comprehensive judgment that goes beyond the parochial interests of ministries as well as to implement sustainable policy that is not at conflict with internal politics.

Important achievements in these areas can only be possible if the prime minister becomes "the real highest commander" to define the basic direction and leads proactive steps from a broad perspective. This requires a system to support the prime minister in such efforts. The government should consider entrusting the foreign minister with the task of foreign policy coordination instead of relying entirely on the chief Cabinet secretary for laying the political groundwork.

We hope Kan will exercise steady and powerful political leadership to guide the nation through this age of drastic and constant change.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 2