EDITORIAL: U.S. subcritical nuke test

We learned last week that the United States conducted a subcritical nuclear test at an underground site in Nevada in mid-September. It was the first such test since August 2006, and the 24th time since the initial experiment in 1997.

It was also the first subcritical test under the administration of President Barack Obama, who in April last year in Prague announced his quest for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Familiar with the stated goals of Obama, expressions of regret and dismay at the news have poured in from Japan. There are also concerns about the impact on Russia, which conducted a similar test in 2004.

We fear the test may be viewed as selfishness on the part of a major power, giving countries aspiring for nuclear development a pretense to push ahead.

To prevent such a scenario from unfolding, the United States needs to enter a nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia while mobilizing multilateral diplomacy and other means to get serious about shrinking the specific role played by nuclear weapons in global affairs.

Obama also says he wants to pursue the goal of zero nuclear weapons while maintaining nuclear capabilities, as long as such arms exist, for the security of America and its allies. Most of the nuclear warheads produced in large volume during the Cold War are deteriorating.

Obama's thinking is that subcritical testing is necessary to monitor major declines in explosive power, weakened safety system functions and other concerns.

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), for which the Obama administration is seeking early ratification and enforcement, testing accompanied by nuclear detonation is banned. No clear ban is stipulated, however, for subcritical tests.

Washington explains that because last month's test used a quantity of plutonium incapable of causing a nuclear fission chain reaction, no atomic explosion occurred.

Facing opposition from Congress and other quarters, the CTBT has yet to be approved in the United States. In a statement made in April, however, Obama vowed that no nuclear testing would occur on his watch.

Regarding subcritical testing, there is also deep-rooted criticism that the real purpose is to collect data for developing new types of nuclear warheads.

Again, however, Obama has stressed that no new warheads will be developed. Taking that pledge at face value, there are two areas that we wish to see realized.

The first is the effectuation of the new nuclear arms reduction treaty agreed upon by Washington and Moscow this April. Under those terms, the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads would be cut by about 30 percent within seven years of the treaty's start. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the pact, there are no current prospects for it being ratified by a full session of the Senate.

Efforts to pass this proposal should be accelerated, setting aside concerns about the outcome of next month's midterm elections.

Secondly, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which has continued nuclear weapons research, reports that data from subcritical tests is useful in creating simulation systems to investigate nuclear warhead firing power without actual nuclear testing. The Obama administration should support moves to elevate the reliability of such systems as a top priority, and use that progress to win congressional endorsement of the CTBT.

Although subcritical tests are being conducted, the work to promote nuclear disarmament is making little headway. If such conditions persist, suspicions will emerge about Obama's leadership in striving to eliminate nuclear arms. We look forward to the resolve for a nuclear weapons-free world he voiced last year being steadily put into action.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 17