2011年2月22日火曜日
東京公電2010年：日本企業によるイランとのウラン取引疑惑
原文翻訳
-------------------
要件：イランとのウラン取引の可能性について、日本への調査要請


代理EMIN（恐らくEconomic Minister Counselorの略　経済担当公使）は外務省、軍縮不拡散・科学部の中島明彦氏に1月4日、外交政策に関するメッセージを渡した。
そして、カザフスタン政府とのアスタナでの議論についての詳細には立ち入らずEMINは12月30日付のカザフスタン政府による公式表明のコピーを彼に渡すことにより、この問題についてのカザフスタン側の断固とした否定について知らせた。
中島氏はこの情報について感謝の念を表して、外務省はこの取引について調査をするとのことで、経済産業省にも相談してみると言った。
さらに彼はアメリカ政府がこの問題について、取引の状態や出荷予定日などのさらに詳しい情報を提供できないかと聞いてきた。
中島氏によると、日本政府はイランの天然ウランがもうすぐに底をつくというのを知っていて、イランが他の入手元を探すものと考えていた。今後、この種の取引について警戒し続ける必要性があると彼は提案した。
だが、一旦日本の企業がこの問題に関与している可能性について気が付くと、安全保障貿易国際室長の高畠昌明氏は速やかに調査を開始すると言った。　
彼が言うには彼の部署はこの問題に関連しているこれらの企業については余り詳しく知らないとのことで、そのため経済産業省の原子力部門と協力してこの問題に取り組むとし、恐らくこの部門はすでに今回必要とされている情報を持っているであろうとのこと。

原文：http://www.xs4all.nl/~aebr/wl/aftenposten/10TOKYO11.html

の件ですが・・・

イラン物理学者を射殺　テロか、首都テヘランで
2011.7.24 14:21

イラン学生通信によると、同国の原子力庁と関係がある物理学者で大学教授のダリウシュ・レザイ氏（３５）が２３日、首都テヘランでバイクに乗った人物に銃撃され、死亡した。国営イラン通信は同日、「テロリスト」による殺害と報じた。

イランでは昨年１月、テヘラン大学の原子物理学の教授がバイクに仕掛けられた爆弾で死亡、同１１月にもテヘラン北部にあるベヘシュティ大学の原子力工学の教授で核科学者の男性２人が車に仕掛けられた爆弾で死傷する事件があった。（共同）

で、コレが肝心の重大疑惑の原文＠ノルウェーのサイト。（ｗ

From: Aftenposten Date: 31.12.2009
S E C R E T ASTANA 002273
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, JA, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN STRONGLY DENIES REPORT OF POTENTIAL
URANIUM TRANSER TO IRAN
REF: A. ASTANA 2257 B. SECSTATE 131723 C. ASTANA 2158
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)
1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan publicly and privately denied allegations of negotiations between Iran and KazAtomProm for the purchase of yellowcake uranium (refs A-B).
During a December 31 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov told the Ambassador that an extensive interagency investigation found no evidence of discussions with, or even a proposal from, Iran. He stressed Kazakhstans strong commitment to non-proliferation and stringent export-control regime. Umarov requested further details to assist the investigation and a public statement of support from the United States (see suggestion in para 13). Umarov passed the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press release and a non-paper (see paragraphs 11-12). END SUMMARY. "NO STONE UNTURNED"
2. (S) In response to the Ambassadors December 30 demarche regarding possible negotiations between a Kazakhstani subsidiary of KazAtomProm (KAP) and Iran for the sale of a large quantity of yellowcake uranium, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov requested an urgent December 31 meeting with the Ambassador. Umarov first emphasized the Kazakhstani governments serious and immediate response to the allegations, stating, "All agencies have
worked together to leave no stone unturned." He then passed the Ambassador the Foreign Ministrys December 30 press release and a non-paper on the governments investigation (see paragraphs 11-12). Summarizing the non-paper, he thanked the U.S. government for providing information about the allegations and underlined the Kazakhstani governments strong commitment to non-proliferation. Umarov further reaffirmed support for the prevention of uranium exports to Iran, in accordance with UNSCR 1737. Highlighting U.S. assistance, he stressed Kazakhstans strong export-control regime, which precludes the possibility of a uranium shipment to Iran.
Umarov asserted, "There are no negotiations on an uranium shipment. We have quickly checked all questions and are taking additional measures, but there are no leads to confirm the intention to transfer uranium." Umarov concluded by requesting "documents and materials, with names and data, on those conducting the negotiations."
NO CONTRACTS, NO CONTACT, AND NO NEGOTIATIONS
3. (S) Umarov then turned to his private report on the interagency investigation, which concluded that KAP has neither contracts nor contact with Iran on any possible uranium shipment. Furthermore, he asserted, "No one has received a proposal from Iran, and a check of all potential
mediators has not shown any evidence of a request from Iran."
Turning to Baiken-U, owned jointly by KAP and Energy Asia Limited, a consortium of Japanese power companies, Umarov underlined its 95% Japanese ownership. "Even with that, KazAtomProm has no information that negotiations are in  process," he stated.
ONE-THIRD OF KAZAKHSTANS URANIUM PRODUCTION
4. (S) To emphasize the improbability of the sale, Umarov then recited detailed information on Baiken-Us limited mining operations and small stock of unprocessed uranium ore -- 70
tons. The volume of yellowcake under alleged negotiations, he continued, equals one-third of all Kazakhstans production. "To ship that amount unaccounted is crazy," he argued.
Highlighting the regular inventory of stockpiles by the competent Kazakhstani agencies, he revealed, "They have checked half, nothing is missing, and no documents have been distorted."
MANDATORY END-USE CERTIFICATES
5. (S) About transportation, Umarov told the Ambassador that all uranium exports occur exclusively by railway, and that no shipments have ever passed through Kazakhstani sea ports [on the Caspian Sea]. Kazakhstans multi-layered, strict export controls would ensure immediate identification of any shipment of any amount of uranium, he argued. Furthermore, he said, "No Kazakhstani company has requested a license to export uranium to Iran, and we never ship uranium to a non-nuclear power
without an end-use certificate."
REPUTATION AT STAKE
6. (S) "This investigation led to our statement, and now we have big questions for you and Washington. Information is very important because Kazakhstans reputation has been put at
stake," he asserted. "If you consider us a strategic partner, as you say, you must share information. We are working for one and the same goals, and we have always been helpful on Iran.
The appearance of this article and the mention of intelligence leads to questions about trust." Umarov then underlined the governments "disappointment" that the State Departments statement (drawn from press guidance) did not more firmly support Kazakhstan and underline Kazakhstans staunch support
for non-proliferation. "Now, we are in a damage-control situation," he concluded with real chagrin.
INCIDENT ORCHESTRATED?
7. (S) Umarov relayed the Kazakhstani governments request to the IAEA for the report. "The IAEA says that they do not have the report, which leads us to the conclusion that it was orchestrated." He then repeated his request for additional information in order to continue the investigation in greater
detail. "As partners, we must work together constructively to stop activity confidentially. Our previous experiences have shown the effectiveness of this approach. You trusted us before with such sensitive projects as Operation Sapphire."
STRONGER, BROADER INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WELCOMED
8. (S) After thanking the Ministry and government for its serious, speedy response, the Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. government is not accusing the Kazakhstani government of involvement in the alleged negotiations. He asserted that he met with the Foreign Minister in advance of the article,
because the U.S. government sees Kazakhstan as a strong partner. The Ambassador mentioned the U.S. governments recognition and praise for Kazakhstans long history of positive cooperation, especially on non-proliferation.
Recalling his meeting with the new head of the National Security Committee (KNB) (ref C), the Ambassador welcomed stronger, broader intelligence cooperation.
PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT?
9. (S) Looking for a way to restore Kazakhstans image, Umarov concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a public statement of support, "We have strenuously worked on
our non-proliferation reputation, and now it is being questioned, now the word has gone out. We would appreciate strong support from our partners." The Ambassador agreed to relay the request.
10. (S) In a private pull-aside, Umarov told the Ambassador
that Kazakhstan has some degree of suspicion that a third nation (unnamed) might have fabricated the initial report and, for its own purposes, leaked it to the Associated Press.
11. (U) BEGIN DECEMBER 30 PRESS STATEMENT:
STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically repudiates certain news media reports alleging Kazakhstans connection to a possible deal to supply uranium to Iran and considers them
groundless insinuations damaging the reputation of our country.
As is known, Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the worlds fourth largest nuclear and missile arsenal, shut down the worlds second largest Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and is one of the recognized leaders of the global process of disarmament and nonproliferation.
Kazakhstan is firmly committed to the principles of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and tough control over the turnover of dual use materials. As a non-nuclear weapon state, Kazakhstan has been unwaveringly committed and remains committed to the principles of the
Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the UN Convention on physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as the principles and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
All the operations with nuclear materials in Kazakhstan, including our cooperation regarding peaceful use of atomic energy with foreign countries, are subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
In this connection, Kazakhstan expects the IAEA to give an appropriate assessment of the information being disseminated by the news media.
END STATEMENT.
12. (S) BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION
OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NON-PAPER:
Thank you for providing the information on the attempts of Iranian company Nur Afzar Gostar (NAG) to purchase uranium ore from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan unwaveringly fulfills its tight
export-control obligations with respect to nuclear materials and is committed to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. We fully support your efforts to prevent the export of nuclear materials to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with UN Security Council
resolution 1737. Kazakhstans export-control system excludes any possibility of illegal deliveries of uranium products to that country. Kazakhstans government agencies and private companies are not conducting, nor have they ever conducted, official negotiations for the delivery of uranium ore to the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on your inquiry, the government conducted a thorough investigation of the companies you identified and took additional steps to prevent the illegal transfer of purified uranium ore, including yellowcake. To date, no evidence of an illegal export of significant amounts of uranium ore have been found. From our side, we request that you provide copies of materials
containing further information on the companies and individuals engaged in the negotiations to transfer uranium ore from Kazakhstan.
END NON-PAPER.
13. (S) COMMENT: We know from other sources that Kazakhstans initial investigation was indeed swift and relatively thorough. Nonproliferation is one area where the United States and Kazakhstan have consistently and successfully cooperated for nearly two decades, and sensitive nonproliferation
programs still continue. Given the very strong disappointment, almost chagrin, that Umarov expressed, we suggest it would not be remiss for the Department to issue a press statement (or
for Embassy Astana to be authorized to issue one) that notes the government of Kazakhstans full cooperation in the investigation of this current allegation, as well as our long and successful partnership to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Please advise. END COMM
http://aebr.home.xs4all.nl/wl/aftenposten/09ASTANA2273.html

で、更に・・・

S E C R E T TOKYO 000011

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/RA, ISN/CPI, EAP/J, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2035 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, KZ, JA SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: JAPAN TO INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL IRAN URANIUM TRANSFER

REF: A. ASTANA 02273 B. ASTANA 02257 C. STATE 131723

Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S) Acting EMIN delivered the demarche and non-paper contained in ref C to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Deputy Director General for Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Science Akihito Nakajima January 4. (Note: The Government of Japan had been officially closed since December 29 for New Years holidays, delaying our delivery of this demarche. End note.) Without getting into details of Astanas discussions with the government of Kazakhstan, A/EMIN also made him aware of Kazakhstans strong denials on this issue by sharing a copy of the December 30 public statement from the GOK.

2. (S) Nakajima expressed appreciation for the information and said MOFA would look into the transaction, including by consulting with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industrys (METI) colleagues. He requested any additional information the USG could provide, especially that which relates to the status of the transaction and the dates of the shipment. Nakajima said the GOJ understands that Iran will soon run out of yellowcake, and has expected Iran to search for another source. He suggested there will be a continued need to keep a look out for this type of transfer in the future.

3. (S) Econoff also delivered separately the demarche and nonpaper to METIs Security Export Control and Trade Control Policy Divisions. These offices are typically responsible for investigations into Japanese companies on security and export control issues, and likely will coordinate the GOJ investigation with MOFA. Since press articles about the uranium transfer have not included any details on East Asia Limited or Baiken-Us involvement, METI officials were unfamiliar with the issue and initially confused by our request to discuss a uranium transfer involving Iran. However, once made aware of the potential role of a Japan-owned firm, Security Export Control Division Director of International Affairs Masaaki Takabatake said that his office would begin an immediate investigation. He noted his office was unfamiliar with the companies involved, but would work with METIs nuclear energy division, which should already have the required corporate contacts.

4. (SBU) Post will provide updates on the results of GOJ investigations as soon they are received. We would welcome any additional information that can be shared with the GOJ on this issue. ROOS

＞Masaaki Takabatake said that his office would begin an immediate investigation.
＞He noted his office was unfamiliar with the companies involved,







知らないはずは無いと思いますが・・・（爆ｗ







http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu07_j/images/070424a.pdf











、、、（爆ｗ

Baiken-U
Baiken-U LLP was established in March 2006, with a 100% equity share of Kazatomprom (within the framework of the “15 000 U, MT by 2010” program, aimed at increasing uranium production volumes in Kazakhstan), and re-registered due to changes in the Founders’ list. Kazatomprom and Energy Asia Limited (a consortium of Japanese power companies) have shares in the Company.

略 

Murat Murtazayev is acting Director General of Baiken-U.

Contact information:
168, Bogenbai Batyr St.,
Almaty, the Republic of Kazakhstan
Tel.: +7 (727) 232 43 24
Fax: + 7 (727) 232 43 25

で、非常に微妙なタイミングで・・・





日本の電力各社と商社のコンソーチウムなのにEnergy　Japan　Ltd.じゃなくてEnergy Asia　Ltd.としてる時点でマン臭くさい確信犯ですね

、、、（爆ｗ