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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/J 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: DPJ SHOWS PRE-ELECTION AMBIGUITY TOWARDS THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 1755 
     ¶B. TOKYO 1731 
     ¶C. TOKYO 1706 
 
TOKYO 00001811  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM RON POST, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Media portrayals of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) as pro-U.S. and the opposition 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as less friendly to our 
interests are overly simplified.  While DPJ politicians have 
been more vocal in questioning issues related to the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance than their LDP counterparts, domestic 
political considerations and the presence of DPJ leaders with 
American experience and favorable attitudes towards the 
United States make the reality more nuanced.  The DPJ 
encompasses a wide spectrum of political ideologies and must 
unify its membership and possible partners under a common 
foreign policy agenda vis--vis the United States if it wins 
the general election on August 30.  Recent statements from 
DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama calling for a more independent 
foreign policy, while attaching ""utmost importance to the 
U.S.-Japan alliance,"" typify the DPJ's current ambiguity on 
U.S.-Japan relations.  However, Hatoyama clearly seeks to 
work quickly to build a ""relationship of trust"" with 
President Obama.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
RECENT DPJ POSITIONS ON U.S.-RELATED ISSUES 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) As part of its campaign for ""political change,"" the 
DPJ has sought to differentiate its policies from those of 
the LDP, and DPJ leaders have made public statements that 
seem to indicate hesitation and ambivalence concerning 
various aspects of U.S.-Japan relations.  Perhaps the 
broadest -- and least well understood -- pronouncement has 
been the DPJ's call for a more ""equal relationship"" between 
the two countries.  President Hatoyama said Japan should be 
more independent from the United States, particularly in 
foreign policy and security issues.  Although not anti-U.S. 
himself (Hatoyama has strong personal ties to the United 
States, including graduate work at Stanford, and is 
politically conservative), Hatoyama has to portray his party 
as one that will emphasize a foreign policy different from 
the LDP's as well as maintain his credibility with party 
members who harbor doubts about security cooperation with the 
United States. 
 
¶3. (C) DPJ members have focused on a number of alliance 
initiatives as easy political targets for attacking the 
LDP-led government and its defense and security policies. 
Many have expressed displeasure about the Japanese 
government's commitment to finance parts of the bilateral 
plan to relocate U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, both in 
terms of actual funding and the perceived lack of 
transparency and unwillingness to disclose detailed 
information by the Japanese government.  They have also 
criticized the roadmap agreement for relocating Futenma Air 
Station to a replacement facility elsewhere in Okinawa. 
Finally, many DPJ members have criticized Japan's host nation 
support for maintaining U.S. forces, often citing as a 
problem the inadequate disclosure of information by the 
Japanese government, as well as the notion that Japan should 
not fund programs that focus more on the morale and welfare 
of U.S. personnel than on operational and capabilities 
aspects of the alliance. 
 
¶4. (C) Without a majority in the Upper House and no guarantee 
that it will carry a majority on its own in the August 30 
election, the DPJ also has to consider the stances of smaller 
parties including the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which in 
particular is ideologically opposed to various aspects of 
U.S.-Japan security cooperation.  After DPJ Secretary General 
Katsuya Okada announced that the Indian Ocean refueling 
 
TOKYO 00001811  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
mission by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) 
would continue under a new DPJ administration, President 
Hatoyama was forced to respond to the SDP's strong opposition 
to Okada's statement by clarifying that although the mission 
would not be terminated immediately upon the DPJ's accession 
to power in September, it would not be renewed when it 
expires in January 2010.  (Refs A and B). 
 
¶5. (C) That said, as the Lower House election has drawn 
closer, and the prospects for a DPJ victory have grown 
increasingly favorable, the party has noticeably toned down 
its often strong rhetoric on a number of these issues.  The 
absence of some of the DPJ's more anti-U.S. stances in its 
recently released ""manifesto"" (party platform), for example, 
indicates a shift to a more pragmatic line on alliance 
issues.  ""This is a reflection of our party's realization 
that we actually might win and thus must make our policy 
positions more responsible,"" DPJ policy planning advisor 
Kiyoshi Sugawa told Embassy Tokyo August 6. 
 
----------------------------------- 
BROAD RANGE OF VIEWS WITHIN THE DPJ 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Among the DPJ's foreign and security policy experts, 
there are a number of heavyweights who generally exhibit 
favorable attitudes towards the United States and the 
Alliance.  Among them are Ichiro Ozawa (former DPJ President 
and current Acting Vice President in charge of election 
strategy), who throughout his career has been a friend of the 
Alliance but occasionally uses anti-U.S. foreign policy 
pronouncements to score domestic political points.  Current 
DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama (Stanford alum), 
Secretary-General Katsuya Okada, and Vice President Seiji 
Maehara also have conservative backgrounds and generally 
espouse pro-Alliance lines.  Other DPJ leaders who have close 
ties with and sympathies towards the United States include 
Akihisa Nagashima (DPJ Deputy Secretary-General, former 
Council of Foreign Relations Fellow, and SAIS alum), Shu 
Watanabe (DPJ Deputy Secretary-General, Columbia alumi), 
Yoshinori Suematsu (Chairman of the Lower House Committee on 
Youth Affairs, Princeton alum), Kazuya Shimba (Middle East 
expert, Oberlin alum), and Shinkun Haku (Shadow Vice Foreign 
Minister, former President of Chosun Ilbo Japan office, 
frequent official and personal travel to the U.S.). 
 
¶7. (C) While not security and foreign policy experts, a 
number of DPJ leaders and up-and-coming members maintain 
favorable views of the Alliance and the United States, and 
are thus well positioned to help advance our goals behind the 
scenes.  They include: Kenji Yamaoka (DPJ Diet Affairs 
Committee Chairman), Jun Azumi (DPJ Diet Affairs Committee 
Principal Deputy Chairman), Yukio Edano (former DPJ Policy 
Research Committee Chairman), Koichiro Genba (former DPJ 
Acting Secretary General), Yoshito Sengoku (former DPJ Policy 
Research Committee Chairman), Yoshihiko Noda (former DPJ 
Secretary General), Sakihito Ozawa (DPJ National Movement 
Committee Chairman), Yorihisa Matsuno (DPJ Shadow Vice 
Finance Minister), and Tetsuro Fukuyama (DPJ Upper House 
Policy Research Council Chairman).  Yamaoka, Azumi, and 
Fukuyama are known for their ability to negotiate with the 
current LDP-New Komeito ruling coalition.  Edano, Genba, 
Sengoku, and Noda all enjoy the confidence of DPJ Secretary 
General Okada.  Ozawa (Sakihito) and Matsuno serve as key 
advisors to DPJ President Hatoyama and are also close 
contacts of Embassy Tokyo. 
 
¶8. (C) Because of their sometimes antagonistic stances on 
some issues of importance to the U.S.-Japan alliance, some 
DPJ members are often seen as anti-U.S.  However, the reality 
of their positions is more complex.  For example, Tsuyoshi 
Yamaguchi (former DPJ Shadow Vice Foreign Minister) walks a 
fine line between being pro-U.S. on the one hand and strongly 
suspicious of U.S. policy and intentions on the other.  A 
 
TOKYO 00001811  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
former bureaucrat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Yamaguchi served in Washington, D.C., Beijing, and London, 
where he met Ichiro Ozawa and decided to run for a Diet seat. 
 Yamaguchi sees the current U.S.-Japan alliance as an unequal 
relationship between a ""big brother"" and ""little brother,"" 
and would like to see an expanded Japanese role. He has 
argued forcefully for revision of the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Japan, as well 
as against the current plan for Futenma relocation.  Other 
DPJ members in this grouping include Yoshio Hachiro (DPJ 
Shadow Foreign Minister) and Takahiro Yokomichi (former Lower 
House Vice Speaker), both former Socialist Party members who 
oppose overseas missions by the Japanese Self Defense Force 
(SDF).  Hirotaka Akamatsu (Chairman of DPJ Election Strategy 
Headquarters), Seiichi Kaneta (DPJ Deputy Director General of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Organizations Bureau), and 
Katsuhiro Yokomitsu (former Social Democratic Party member 
who left the SDP in August 2005) are others who have spoken 
out against certain aspects of the Alliance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
HATOYAMA WANTS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT OBAMA 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶9. (C) Despite the range of stances within the DPJ towards 
U.S.-related issues, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama and other 
party leaders have made it clear that a DPJ government would 
continue to value and work with the United States while 
striving to develop a ""more independent"" foreign policy for 
Japan.  In a July 31 interview with domestic media, Hatoyama 
said, ""While we attach utmost importance to the Japan-U.S. 
alliance, it is necessary not to rely on the U.S. and develop 
a more independent foreign policy.  A diplomatic posture of 
giving importance both to Asia and the U.S. is required.  It 
is possible that we may seek an appropriate 'distance' in 
security.""  This first part of Hatoyama's statement seemed to 
indicate a shift away from the United States in terms of 
security and foreign policy, but the conclusion of his 
remarks showed otherwise:  ""The most important thing is how 
to build a relationship of trust with President Obama.  Based 
on this relationship, we will gather information and conduct 
a comprehensive review.  I have no intention to change the 
basic policy line.""  Further supporting the DPJ leader's 
desire to engage with the United States, media reported 
August 1 that Hatoyama expressed his eagerness to attend UNGA 
and the Pittsburgh Summit.  ""The DPJ sees these two events as 
good opportunities for Hatoyama to start building a personal 
and early relationship with President Obama,"" Sugawa told 
Embassy Tokyo. 
ZUMWALT