SHARING AMERICAN VALUES WITH JAPAN
By
Mindy L. Kotler
Asia Policy Point
August 28,
2006
Animosities
between China and Japan have grown deeper as Washington has strengthened
its ties with Tokyo. Central to the Bush Administration’s security
policy in Asia is expanding the US-Japan alliance. As the United States
works more closely with Japan it has become increasingly affected by
and accountable to political decisions made in Tokyo. This symbiosis
played out recently in the censorship of a think tank supervised by
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In August,
shortly before Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s 6th
visit to the Yasukuni Shine, the Sankei Shimbun criticized a
new English-language commentary series by the Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA). The conservative newspaper’s Washington-based editorial
writer Yoshihisa Komori castigated the Institute’s director and the
series’ editor as being leftist and out of touch with Japanese government
policy. Komori took offense at some of the commentaries that suggested
that Japan may also hold some blame for the recent deterioration in
Sino-Japanese relations. He was alarmed that the series’ editor Masaru
Tamamoto thought that foreigners might describe Japan’s China policies
as “mindless and provocative, self-righteous and gratuitous” and
the country, itself, as being nationalistic, militaristic, or hawkish.”
The last essayist in the JIIA series even questioned the sincerity of
Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits as intended to generate controversy in order
for Japan to finally debate its history issues.
Interestingly,
the JIIA commentaries were viewed in the West as the first sensible,
balanced, and thoughtful opinion pieces on Japanese foreign policy to
come out of official Japan. Unlike most Japanese essays, they were not
only readable, but were actually read and discussed. YaleGlobal,
a respected online foreign policy journal republished every one of the
four essays released. The commentaries did what so many in Japan wanted:
they impressed Westerners with their reason.
Nevertheless,
Komori’s attack was successful. It was not the first time that he
used his pen to end projects, especially in Washington, toward reconciliation
and understanding between Japan and its neighbors. Indeed, he has done
this many times against academics. His identification of scholars and
writers in Japan and the West as “anti-Japan” has lead to death
threats and intimidation from Japanese Rightists and the cut off of
research funding.
In the JIIA
case, retribution was swift. Within hours of the publication of Komori’s
Sankei condemnation, the Commentary articles were removed from the
JIIA website, the editor suspended, and a letter drafted to the newspaper
by JIIA’s president apologizing for his lack of oversight. An editorial
board is to be established to ensure that JIIA stays on message in the
future.
For Americans, it is significant that the “message” that Komori wanted to ensure projected by JIIA is one popularized by the Bush Administration managers of US-Japan policy. This message is composed of the “China threat” to regional stability and of portraying Japan as a leader in the international community. Supporters of the message routinely cite a February 2006 BBC survey measuring international opinion as to which country has the “most positive influence” on the world.
The BBC poll,
however, is questionable. The previous year’s effort found that Japan
was far from having the most positive global influence--France was and
Japan was so statistically insignificant that it was not noted. The
poll mainly focused on countries that had a “negative influence in
the world” and only took a sample of 1000 respondents from 33 countries.
Of countries viewed as having a “positive influence on the world”
only 53% noted this was Japan and 55% said it was Europe. Japan’s
average was tipped by very high ratings from its major aid recipients
Afghanistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Also, no control question
was asked to probe deeper into the answers. One wonders if this year’s
positive rating reflects more of a “Cool Japan” effect than an actual
understanding of Japan’s political role.
Komori also
dismisses the possibility that anyone serious might see Japanese policies
toward China as “foolish, provocative, self-righteous and unjust”
as suggested in one of the JIIA commentaries. Instead, he defends Tokyo
by noting that a “majority of Japan-watchers in [Washington] DC who
are also knowledgeable about China attribute the reason for current
tension between Japan and China to “Confrontational Stance of the
Chinese,” “Collision between the strategic interests of Japan and
China,” or to “China’s national policy of Anti-Japan.” Komori,
sets himself apart from his JIIA protagonist, by citing, confirming,
and supporting the Bush Administration’s world view.
What makes
today’s intimidation by the Right in Japan important is that it is
working. What makes it important to Americans is that it appears to
be justified in the name of the alliance with the United States. To
be sure, the Japan-savvy in Washington are well aware of the how effective
and pervasive politics by innuendo and intimidation work in Tokyo. Although
it is good to have allies that support us in word and deed, it should
not be at the cost of fundamental American values.
The Bush White
House bases the US alliance with Japan on America’s shared values
with Japan such as democracy and freedom of expression. To be sure,
Vice President Cheney’s office admits that this maybe premature. The
values are believed, they say, “co-terminous”—meaning that they
will eventually be similar. This outcome, however, seems remote as Japan’s
Right gathers strength and stifles debate in America’s name. For the
Japan Institute for International Affairs that is supposed to advise
the Foreign Ministry, it is already too late.