EDITORIAL: NPT framework in peril

China is interested in cooperating on nuclear power plant construction with Pakistan, a country that not only armed itself with nuclear weapons without joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NTP) but also has suspected ties to the world's "black nuclear market."

Should China go ahead with this cooperation, it will further strain the already frayed seams of the NTP.

To contain India's growing presence in Asia as an emergent powerhouse, China has been supplying neighboring Pakistan with weapons and other forms of aid while deepening its ties with Sri Lanka and Myanmar (Burma) through port construction and other joint projects.

But exporting nuclear power plants is on a totally different plane from these forms of cooperation. It will further weaken the NTP framework, which would be unacceptable.

Japan is one of 46 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multinational body that controls the export and transfer of nuclear technology and materials that could be applied to nuclear weapons development.

The NSG was formed in keeping with the basic principle of the international community to withhold cooperation with non-NTP countries, even with respect to peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

China joined the NSG in 2004. But China now justifies its cooperation with Pakistan on the construction of two nuclear power stations in central Pakistan on the grounds that the deal is based on a bilateral agreement before China became an NSG member. We must say China is deliberately obfuscating the issue.

Pakistan is suspected of having armed itself with nuclear weapons through espionage activities and other means and later passing on its nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran via the black market.

And given the infiltration of Islamic extremists into areas bordering Afghanistan, there are also serious security concerns about the planned nuclear power stations.

The exclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) from negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament owes primarily to Pakistan's objection to this treaty. Naturally, the United States and Japan do not support nuclear cooperation with such a nation.

But the NSG created a problem for itself two years ago when it exempted India, a nuclear power that has not joined the NTP, from its own rules banning nuclear technology export to non-NTP members. This enabled the United States to conclude a civil nuclear agreement with India.

Japan under the Naoto Kan administration has also begun negotiating with India on a civil nuclear agreement, although the administration has yet to figure out how to reconcile this move with its anti-nuclear diplomacy. Tokyo is obviously eyeing the huge business opportunity presented by the nuclear power generation market.

China will definitely point out the NSG's 2008 decision concerning India as another justification for its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. President Hu Jintao's position was clearly set during his summit last week with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardani in Beijing.

As cases continue to pile up concerning nuclear cooperation involving countries that conduct nuclear tests and refuse to join the NTP, the treaty's basic premise--that nuclear cooperation is extended only to non-nuclear nations that are NTP members--will erode steadily.

And we must not forget that lax export controls are responsible for nuclear proliferation to India, Pakistan and North Korea. Exporting nuclear power plants is big business, and it can also help curb global warming. But is it right to develop this business at the price of damaging the NTP?

We need to discuss this question comprehensively and not lose sight of the sort of 21st century civilization we should be seeking.

--The Asahi Shimbun, July 14