New Futenma eco-impact study not needed

SINGAPORE--The U.S. government wants to avoid conducting a fresh environmental impact study following the bilateral agreement reached in late May on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture.

So says Wallace "Chip" Gregson, assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs. He spoke to The Asahi Shimbun in an exclusive interview here on Saturday.

"We want to stay within the current environmental impact assessment so that we don't have to start this all over again," he said.

The joint statement of May 28 remained vague on the issue, stating to the effect that both countries agreed to ensure that the environmental impact assessment procedures and the construction of the replacement facility will be "completed without significant delay."

As for the re-examination of the unit composition of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) that will remain in Okinawa, when 8,000 of them will move to Guam based on the Roadmap Agreement of 2006, Gregson said Washington will abide by the obligation on the numbers. However, he said there is a possibility that the configuration could be changed for both strategic and political considerations.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

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Question: For the duration of the eight months since the Democratic Party of Japan took power, Tokyo and Washington conducted a policy review of the Roadmap Agreement (the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation). Looking back on it, what are your views of this process?

Answer: The review was not only on the part of the government of Japan. There are many aspects to this agreement, as you know. There are 19 separate parts, and some of the bigger parts have smaller parts. There was a lot of misunderstanding in some places on the American side.

But, really, going through all this for the last eight months proved, in the end, to be useful for the fact that we searched through virtually every possible alternative, which was a shortened repeat of what we had done for the past 15 years; and we came back and, essentially, revalidated the original plan. So, I think that was very helpful.

Q: Do you see any problems or lessons learned from that process?

A: I think the only one I would point out is that one can never assume that large, complicated, questions have been adequately explained to constituents, that we need to explain what we're doing, as often as we can, to all of our constituents.

Q: Looking at the process of the joint statement being made, one thing I really didn't understand was this; that the U.S. side has been saying one of the most important conditions was "operational viability and political sustainability." And Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that as late as May 21, seven days before the joint statement. But, the joint statement and the Henoko option for that matter, apparently have not gained overall consensus in Okinawa Prefecture, nor within the ruling coalition. Why did the United States decide to go ahead and go into this renewed agreement, without getting Okinawan support, which is apparently the political sustainability that the U.S. government has been advocating? Did you drop it?

A: No, we came back, as I said, to essentially the original plan, after searching through all the other alternatives. There are many different opinions on Okinawa.

Our understanding, from polling figures, is that the closer one gets to Henoko, the stronger the support becomes for the current plan.

I would also add that one of the things that is rarely mentioned is that, within this plan are a lot of things to address, longstanding issues on Okinawa. Along with the movement of the air facility and the movement of Marines to Guam, we close all or portions of every base south of Kadena, which is 895 hectares, 2,148 acres, return to the government of Japan, return to Okinawa, ostensibly for use in economic development in Okinawa, or whatever they decide.

And, it's the best combination of things for Japan, for Okinawa, as was addressed in the original goal for the DPRI (Defense Policy Review Initiative), to reduce the burden on Okinawa but also maintain operational capability. That was the charge that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi gave President George W. Bush.

And, through this entire torturous cycle, we've come back to, essentially, the same plan.

I would add that one of the things that we hope to accomplish, along with this, are a number of measures to increase Okinawan prosperity and quality of life. The introduction of information technology. The United States and Japan have talked about a "green alliance." We want to introduce renewable energy technology to Okinawa, in cooperation with educational institutions in Hawaii and Guam, and we hope that this will enhance the educational opportunities for the young people on Okinawa.

Q: You're working on that, right?

A: Yes, working very hard on it. And it will enhance their career opportunities and their professional opportunities. In this way, the strategic importance of Okinawa can mean strategic importance in economic viability, economic standing, as well as the obvious security things.

There are also many people interested in helping to make Okinawa into a center of excellence for high-tech medicine. And, I'm sure you know, the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology recently had its grand opening, after 10 years of development. So, we hope to leverage this into cooperative U.S.-Japanese programs to address the educational and human capital development needs of not only Okinawa Island, but the whole prefecture.

Q: So, you can get the support of the people, the Okinawan people, for this Henoko option, with that kind of package of those positive initiatives?

A: From my experience of living on Okinawa and my association with my friends from Okinawa since I departed Okinawa, the thing that they would like most, like most parents, is for their children to have more opportunities than they had. It's the same way we all feel about our children.

This, I think, is a golden opportunity for the United States and Japan to expand those sinews that bind our alliance, so it's not just economic any more, it's not just political, it's not just security, but it's a people-to-people bond.

When I lived in Okinawa, and I'm sure it's still the same way now: the guards at our bases were Okinawans; our paramedics were Okinawans; the fire department consisted of Okinawans; and we had Japanese doctors doing their internship at the naval hospital. These kinds of human, people-to-people ties developed very strong relationships and very strong bonding.

I would like to see us build on these types of connections so that they develop ever more into one larger community.

Q: I want to ask you to make some clarifications on the joint statement. The first one is about the modification to the Henoko option. Is the United States government willing to accept a change or modification to the Roadmap Agreement, beyond what Secretary of Defense Gates said last October? He said "some modest change in the runways of a few tens of meters or whatever" could be worked out.

With this new joint statement, is the United States saying that it is ready to go beyond this modification or is the position still the same?

A: We're always open for ways to improve things, but we want to stay within the current environmental impact assessment so that we don't have to start this all over again.

Q: So, no new EIS (environment impact study)?

A: Correct.

Q: Another point for clarification is that part of the joint statement said the United States will examine the unit composition of III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel remaining on Okinawa. Does this mean that some combat units will move to Guam, while some command components stay in Okinawa? Is there going to be a change in the configuration of the III MEF in terms of who is going to stay and who is going to go?

A: We're saying we're going to look at it. We will abide by our obligations on the numbers (that about 8,000 Marines will move to Guam and about 10,000 will remain in Okinawa), but if there is a way to improve the mix of what's within those numbers, both in the sense of adapting to the security conditions that may or may not have changed since we signed the agreement in 2006, and adapting to the local political conditions then, yes, we would like to be able to consider that.

But, as you already heard Secretary Gates say today, we're doing a force posture review, across the globe, to include the Pacific, to include forces on Guam, forces on Okinawa.

Q: A new GPR, Global Posture Review?

A: Correct. It may come up with the same answer; it may change. So, we just wanted to make sure that there was a section in the agreement there that said, just as in the modifications that we talked about up here, that may or may not be included. We may or may not, depending on how this study comes out, want to change the composition, within the numbers that would remain on Okinawa.

Q: The purpose of this examination of the unit composition is to reduce the footprint further than the Roadmap Agreement?

A: That would be a benefit. I'm not sure that when the recommendation comes out that it will reduce the footprint. Moving 8,000 Marines off (to Guam) leaves about 10,000 on Okinawa. Regardless of what we change, we're going to have about 10,000 on Okinawa.

Q: Is it correct to understand that this implies a possibility of reducing the number of combat units in Okinawa? In other words, more combat units could move from Okinawa to Guam while some command units might stay?

A: That's one possibility. There's also combat service support that could go up or down. There's also aviation that could go up or down, as far as numbers of forces.

But, again, there's no recommendation yet, out of the Global Posture Review, so we'll have to see.

Q: When will the result of this next round of Global Posture Review come out?

A: By the end of the year.

Q: So, this review of the Roadmap Agreement can wait until the end of the year?

A: That part of it, yes.

Q: What is your assessment of overall Japan-U.S. relations right now? Is the relationship deteriorating? I hear that some governments in Southeast Asia are expressing concern.

A: It's always a very interesting topic in the academic and think tank community for people to voice opinions on the health of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Almost always, regardless of what year it is or what day it is or what we're discussing, the opinion is always, "Oh, the alliance is in trouble."

And I would say, I would offer, that the persistent rumors of the demise of the U.S.-Japan security alliance are greatly exaggerated.

Q: About China and the South China Sea, there are some reports that China has been harassing Vietnamese fishing boats and that a similar situation is happening to the Philippines. And perhaps I should also refer to the 10-ship surface action group passing through between Miyakojima island and Okinawa. Some point out that these are the indications of stepped-up Chinese maritime activities in the region. What should we read into the situation?

A: I wouldn't want to postulate what we should read into this situation. The facts are pretty straightforward, as you laid them out, and you heard our secretary this morning state our position. We favor no single claimant in these disputed claims, in any area. We favor a peaceful resolution and we stand on the tenets of accepted international law and the right of free passage, and the traditional rights associated with freedom of the seas.

Q: Experts point out that China is expanding its so-called anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in Western Pacific. What kind of impact is this having on the efficiency of U.S. deterrence capabilities?

A: I think we must very carefully watch developments, not just in the Pacific but around the world, for their effect on our deterrence and our operational capabilities, and we must make adjustments as we see fit, in order to maintain and enhance our capabilities.