Interview with Andrew Krepinevich/ YOICHI FUNABASHI, Editor in Chief: China's emergence sparks concerns for global military map

Editor's note: This is the sixth installment of an interview series that appeared in the vernacular Asahi Shimbun under the title "Brave, grave new world."

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Will the strengthening of China's Navy one day result in anti-access capabilities that prevent U.S. aircraft carriers from entering Asian waters? How is Washington responding to that potential threat? Those questions were posed to the father of the concept of "AirSea Battle."

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Question: What will be the most salient feature of the global military map over the next 20 years?

Answer: I would say three main trends will shape changes in military competitions.

One is demographics. If you look at the local demographic trends right now in the developed world, particularly in Western Europe and Japan, two long-standing allies of the United States, you have rapidly aging populations, economic difficulties and fairly generous social welfare systems that are making demands on budgets. The ability of these allies to help the United States maintain the international system that they have established together may be more difficult.

When you look at the demographics trends in the developing world, what you see is, in parts of Latin America, most of Africa, the Middle East, Central South Asia, there's a "youth bulge" that is occurring--large numbers of young people who have yet to reach adulthood.

What you will have is a need to absorb these large numbers of young people as they come to adulthood, but in many cases these people will be competing in a global economy. But they'll be undereducated, they'll be living in countries where the governments are corrupt or incompetent or both. And that is a prescription for instability.

If you say that America, Europe and Japan are forces for stability and order in the world, and they're experiencing increasing difficulties, at the same time the forces for instability are rising. And when you combine that with advances in technology, so even people in the poorest parts of the developing world, because of the spread of information technology, understand with much greater clarity than their ancestors did just how badly they have it relative to other parts of the world. That tends to increase frustration.

Information technologies also allow radical groups to proselytize, to mobilize and to recruit people from these disaffected populations.

There is the technology that allows even small groups to create large-scale destruction--what we saw in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and less than two dozen Arabs attacking the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as concerns about cyber-attacks from small groups.

And so, I think even if we are successful in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, of restoring some level of stability, one of the long-term trends is going to be the ability of small, disaffected groups to pose problems, even for major states like Japan and the United States.

Secondly, there's the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.

What we're seeing right now, especially if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, is what I would call an "atomic arc of instability," the potential for a solid string of countries, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan, all armed with nuclear weapons--Iran, Pakistan, India, China, North Korea--with the prospect that we could see a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East.

There are Arab countries that say if there's going to be a Shia Persian bomb, then there needs to be a Sunni Arab bomb. The Turks have intimated that if there is going to be a Shia bomb and a Sunni bomb, an Arab bomb and a Persian bomb, there must be a Turk bomb.

The issue of proliferation during the Cold War focused primarily on competition between two states, the United States and the Soviet Union. What happens when it's Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the complications that come from that?

There's the possibility of nuclear state failure, a nuclear-armed state that becomes destabilized and the potential consequences for what that might mean, both in terms of their use or their falling into the hands of nonstate groups.

Third, I would say, is the rise of China and how that proceeds.

On the one hand, there are those who talk about China's rise just being sort of a straight line to greater and greater power and influence. I think, looking at different scenarios, there are some strongly negative trends in China.

One is demographics. China is an aging society. Unlike Japan, Europe and the United States, who became rich before they started to become old, China is becoming old before China is rich. That could cause internal stability.

In terms of demographic trends, you have sex ratio imbalances. We're talking about tens of millions of men that really have no hope of finding a spouse, and there are some indications that they tend to become alienated from society and tend to be sources of internal disruption.

There are concerns about what is happening to the environment, in particular the potential for water shortages. They already are polluting water at a rapid rate, especially in the northern part of China.

They are relatively inefficient in their use of water for industrial purposes. The water in the south is even becoming polluted, as they try and engage in engineering projects to move the water north.

I think the other issue is raw materials. China has an enormous demand for raw materials. China's population is over 10 times the population of Japan. As raw material prices rise, that could exert a real brake on Chinese economic growth.

So, if you have a regime that rests on two pillars, one is economic growth and the other is nationalism. If the pillar of economic growth falls away, does the regime in Beijing blame itself for economic mismanagement, or does it use nationalism to blame other countries or to seek to redirect the attention of the people to problems other than the economic problems?

The Chinese are engaged in a military buildup. And the area where the Chinese are focused on right now is the Western Pacific.

This may be something that comes naturally to China and to other powers, but it's not something the United States has to accept. It's not something we and our allies have to accept.

If China has enjoyed two decades of peace and prosperity, why a military buildup to try and push the Americans out of the Western Pacific and perhaps create the conditions where China can coerce its neighbors or intimidate them?

The other is the Chinese move to deny the United States access to what we call "the global commons," space, cyberspace, the sea and the undersea. Particularly in the area of space, where they have anti-satellite missiles, they have used lasers to target satellites. They've also used cyber-weapons, not only against satellites but also we're constantly under attack from sources in China, whether it's government-sponsored or not.

Q: Among the new threats of China's military buildup, what do you think will pose the gravest challenge to the liberal internationalist order?

A: The Chinese missile forces, if they can target America's forward bases, that really reduces the ability we have to operate in the Western Pacific and to reassure and cooperate with our allies.

Even if the bases aren't threatened, if we lose our satellites, then our military loses a major part of the battle networks it needs to coordinate the forces that we have.

And then the issue of cyberwarfare. That's another way to disrupt the battle networks that are required and needed for the American military to operate effectively.

For example, many of the precision-guided bombs that are used in conflict today are guided by satellites. It's not just a matter of coordinating and communication; it's also the ability to strike targets effectively.

I think, a little bit further into the future, there are concerns about the Chinese VF-21 missile. That missile is one that we believe is being tested, along with what we call "scouting" or reconnaissance-capability satellites that scan the oceans and over-the-horizon radars that can look out deep beyond China's shores to identify where our aircraft carriers are.

If you can track the carrier and launch a missile and the missile can maneuver through space--the kind of warheads on those missiles are MARV, maneuverable re-entry vehicles--then a little bit further into the future our Navy becomes vulnerable, as well as our bases.

Then there's the concern about China's submarine force. Will it remain a force that operates only off the coast of China? Or, over the next 10 to 20 years, assuming China engages in developing access to overseas resources and as it develops ties with countries in Africa, Venezuela, Pakistan and Burma, will it begin to establish overseas bases from which you can operate submarines?

If that happens, it could enable the Chinese to threaten the supply lines, for example, oil coming out of the Persian Gulf, not only to Japan but to the United States, other forms of trade. And so that could be part of a Chinese capability that, in a crisis, could be used for coercion, to say, "We can cut your access to the global economy."

The Americans have controlled the world's oceans, for example, for decades now, and they haven't used it to try to cut off the trade of any country. So the question keeps coming back, "Why do the Chinese feel the need to spend considerable resources to change the situation?"

Q: Why?

A: I think it goes back to the desire, historically, of countries to create greater security for themselves. So if I am from China and I am richer, then I have the resources to push other militaries further from my border.

Another tradition of rising powers has been to say, "I depend on overseas resources, but I do not control the sea lines of communication where those resources move from their origin to the destination in my country." If I can't control those, for example, sea lines of communication, or if I can't control space, or cyberspace, then I at least need to be able to deny it to everyone else. And so I will create anti-satellite capabilities. I will create cyberwarfare capabilities. I will, maybe in the future, create overseas naval bases to threaten commerce lines so that we are mutually vulnerable. I'm vulnerable but the United States is vulnerable. Japan is vulnerable.

The concept of "AirSea Battle," essentially, is the Navy and the Air Force because the Western Pacific is much more of a domain of the Air Force and the Navy. And it says, "How do we cooperate together, and also with our allies, to maintain stability in this part of the world so that China is not tempted to commit aggression or coercion or intimidate its neighbors in order to achieve its national goals, and that it should achieve its national goals through norms that are accepted by the international community?"

Q: If the Chinese are insecure or dissatisfied about their legitimate place in the world, then perhaps you should explore ways to cope with that in more political or diplomatic terms?

A: Yes. Certainly, there should be diplomatic engagement. Perhaps the more we understand one another, there'll be less need, in the minds of China, for new military capabilities.

On the other hand, there are many cases in history where getting to know someone better hasn't really reduced tensions.

Another question is: Do the Chinese want to live by the rules that were established at the end of World War II, the Breton Woods system, and the international institutions created, like the International Monetary Fund?

The Chinese have shown a tendency to be more mercantilist. If you have the power to seize or to control or to buy resources, and lock out everyone else, then that is what you do. So we would not want to accept that kind of circumstance. It would have profound implications for our security, our economic security, our political security.

If you have a system that works for you and your allies, that provides for your security, why would you allow a potential rival, whose intentions are unclear, to have a major vote in whether or not you will be secure or insecure?

Maybe China is interested in a peaceful rise. But we want to make sure that we do what we can so that we assure ourselves that we can maintain stability in a part of the world that is critical to us, critical to our security and critical to our allies' security.

Q: Perhaps the fundamental conflict between the U.S. and Japan on the one hand, and China on the other, may lie in this concept of "global commons." We have regarded the global commons as a universal value for us to share. But from the Chinese perspective, that's not global commons; it's American-designed and American-based commons.

So perhaps they may feel that it has to be negotiated. Perhaps they have a strong incentive to have a say over how to determine and define the global commons. Isn't that the case?

A: I tend to take a more direct view. Somebody controls the oceans, for example, or you don't. And I think we have gotten used to the idea that this is not a problem.

During the Cold War, the American Navy dominated and the Soviets didn't trade very much with the West. I remember, as a youngster, it was a big debate over whether we should sell wheat to the Russians, or whether the Russians should be allowed to export natural gas to Western Europe.

So in a sense, there wasn't this big debate about trade, the global commons and the oceans. And, of course, since the end of the Cold War, the American Navy has dominated these waters.

But now, think about periods where that hasn't happened--in the period between the two world wars and, in particular, the Imperial Japanese Navy. It wasn't clear who was going to control the waters in the Western Pacific.

In the period leading up to World War I, between the Imperial German Fleet and the Royal Navy, it wasn't clear. And the British were saying before World War I: "We have to control the oceans. It's the link to our overseas possessions. It's the way we prevent starvation because we depend on food imports."

For Japan, leading up to World War II, one can debate the motive, but for Japan, it was key to have access to overseas resources because Japan couldn't generate the resources internally to ensure its economic development. So we had the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and so on.

In periods where no country has dominated the commons, or in periods where a country has dominated the commons but sought to use it against the others, that is a very tense, nasty environment.

We were fortunate in that, for much of the 19th century, when the British controlled the oceans, it was in their interest to promote free trade. I think it's been beneficial that, in the case of the Americans more recently, they have not tried to use their control of the oceans to curtail trade or to use it as a means of coercing a country.

But if that goes away, it becomes a case of potentially hostile powers controlling the oceans or other parts of the global commons. I think you risk the loss of stability and you risk the prospect that other countries that may control parts of the oceans or other parts of the global commons may seek to rewrite the rules in their own interests in ways that may not be in Japan's interest or the United States' interest or, broadly speaking, the interest of the international community.

Q: Do you think that the Washington Naval Treaty model could be applied to the new vision of maritime regime building in the South China Sea or even in the East China Sea, consisting of the U.S., Japan and Australia on the one hand, and China and ASEAN countries on the other?

A: I think it becomes very difficult. It's much more difficult now to have a treaty that simply, as the Washington Naval Treaty did, says, "OK, how many battleships, how many cruisers, how many tons of aircraft carriers?"

If I'm the Chinese and I want to blockade Taiwan, all I have to do is say my missiles are targeted on those ports. I don't need one ship to do that.

I don't need a fleet to blockade Japan. I don't need a fleet to blockade Taiwan or South Korea.

So how do you work that into an arms control agreement that is designed to limit naval or maritime competition? It becomes very difficult.

Q: Perhaps, at the same time, we could explore some confidence-building measures among the concerned parties, particularly with regard to anti-piracy or rescue or disaster relief?

A: One of the problems that exists with respect to talk about confidence-building measures and transparency is if you look at Japan, India, Europe, the United States, China--as great powers--and maybe Brazil coming up, China is the only one of those countries that is not a democracy.

Democracies have built-in transparency. They have a free press. They have an opposing party that challenges the government. It's very hard to keep secrets in our country, as you know. And, of course, it's very difficult, as we find, to change policies very quickly.

Essentially, what you have is a small group or a dictatorship in China. It's a lot easier to keep secrets, much easier to change policies very quickly. I think that is going to be a problem in terms of our ability to build confidence with one another because authoritarian states can act much more freely against the will of their people. They have an easier time deceiving other countries.

Quite frankly, there are no signs that China's regime is looking to move toward a more open society, a more democratic society. That's unfortunate obviously not only for the Chinese people but for China's neighbors and for the global community.

Q: What are the strategic implications of the increasing anti-access and area denial capabilities that China and others have recently acquired for America's forward presence structure and force structure?

I'm particularly interested in the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan's Okinawa base structure. What implications do you see in the near future?

A: In the case of forward bases, I think there's a realization that if we are going to cooperate with our allies and work closely, we cannot be in Hawaii, for example, and have close coordination with our Japanese allies and our Korean allies.

In the event a conflict starts, you can take out some of the Chinese over-the-horizon radars, you can take out their satellites, the things that they would use to identify where American forces are located, then it may be possible to not just have Kadena and Anderson, but there are several dozen air bases in the Western Pacific. And so it becomes a case of, "If I can blind the Chinese, they don't know what bases I'm operating from."

Q: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs' opinion poll report published last summer said 40-some percent of Americans now feel that America is overextended. This can be interpreted as a new sign of isolationism. If that's the case, what implication do you see for America's place in the world?

A: Right now, if you look at the polls, the American people are concerned about jobs, about getting the economy growing, about the deficits. (It's) just like during the Great Depression, when the American people were concerned about fixing their own circumstance.

In the 1930s, the United States was the world's leading producer of oil. Now, we are too dependent upon what happens overseas.

If you're worried about your economic well-being, you're worried about the Persian Gulf and what goes on in East Asia, where we have so much of our trade.

I think two key areas where we're beginning to see the rise of these anti-access capabilities, the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf, are areas where we have extremely important interests.

It's incumbent upon the president and the political leaders of the United States to explain to the American people why you cannot just ignore the rest of the world.

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Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research institute, advises not only the Pentagon, but also the governments of Japan, Britain, France, Australia and other countries. His new strategic concept is reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released in February by the Obama administration. Krepinevich also currently serves as a member of the Defense Policy Board at the Pentagon.

A graduate of West Point, he holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

In his recent book "7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century," he analyzes factors behind possible major conflicts, such as nuclear attacks on the United States, a disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and escalation of an Arab-Israeli conflict toward a nuclear showdown.