Editorial
Evidence of secret U.S.-Japan nuke pact raises more questions than it answers
The minutes of a secret agreement concerning Okinawa's return to Japan, which provide for the introduction of nuclear weapons by the U.S. to Japan, have been found. It is a historical document proving that the agreement existed -- but further verification is needed to identify the document's significance.
The pact was signed behind closed doors in November 1969 by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon, during a summit meeting in Washington D.C. While the meeting brought about the official agreement of "kaku nuki, hondo nami" (reversion of Okinawa to Japan without nuclear weapons, giving it the same status as the mainland), the two heads of state secretly agreed to a possible re-entry of nuclear weapons into Okinawa.
"(In) order to discharge effectively the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan, in times of great emergency the United States Government will require the re-entry of nuclear weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan," the document reads, to which Sato's response was recorded as: "The Government of Japan, appreciating the United States Government's requirements in time of great emergency as stated above by the President, will meet these requirements without delay when such prior consultation takes place."
Furthermore, the document indicated explicitly that both Sato and Nixon would each hold on to a copy, and is signed with their names in full at the end.
Sato was a strong advocate of "kaku nuki, hondo nami" due to strong anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public at the time. Meanwhile, Nixon was unwilling to let go of American nuclear weapons in Okinawa because of the escalating war in Vietnam. The reversion of Okinawa and the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Okinawa under the condition that nuclear weapons may be re-introduced in times of great emergency appears to have been a compromise between two parties.
The existence of the pact was revealed by the late Kei Wakaizumi, a former professor at Kyoto Sangyo University who served as Sato's former secret emissary to Washington, in a book he published in 1994. But the document itself had not been found at that point, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to deny that such an agreement existed.
The latest discovery is evidence that the pact did, in fact, exist. But whether it was inherited by subsequent prime ministers and foreign ministry officials is still unknown. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has indicated that a ministry committee will be entrusted to further pursue the matter. We strongly hope that a thorough investigation will be conducted.
What is also problematic is the fact that the significance of the document remains unclear. Shinji Sato, Sato's son and a former minister of international trade and industry, said that when he approached several former officials at the Foreign Ministry about storing the document at the ministry, he was told that it was a personal document, which was why he had kept it at home. The insistence that a document signed by the heads of both the Japanese and U.S. governments is "private" is difficult to understand. There is some explaining to be done here.
It is also important that we find out what the U.S. take on the effectiveness of the document is. We cannot afford to have a difference in interpretation. It is the job of Minister Okada -- who instructed secret documents at the ministry be uncovered -- to confirm this with the U.S. government.
(Mainichi Japan) December 28, 2009