Point of View/ Jennifer Lind: Virginia's lessons for East Asia's 'history problems'

Relations in East Asia are haunted by history.

In what has become a frequent occurrence, Tokyo has come under criticism for its approval of a history textbook that is said to gloss over Japan's wartime atrocities.

Lingering historical tensions impede regional security cooperation--for example, diplomacy about North Korea, disaster relief and anti-piracy efforts. Analysts fear the prospect of confrontation between Japan and a rising China because of Chinese resentment over Tokyo's supposed failure to admit to its atrocities before and during World War II.

Many commentators argue that to solve the region's historical problems, Tokyo must apologize to its neighbors. Previous Japanese apologies, however, created a backlash at home that aggravated rather than healed its foreign relations. A better solution for East Asia's history problems comes from a recent American controversy about the memory of the Civil War.

Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell touched off a firestorm by proclaiming April as Confederate History Month. Critics decried the proclamation for failing to mention slavery. In response, the governor fumbled to explain that the proclamation had focused on those issues that he thought "were most significant for Virginia."

Oops. "Is slavery not significant?" queried the Chicago Tribune's Clarence Page. The Washington Post lambasted the governor's "airbrushing of Virginia history." President Barack Obama said, "I don't think you can understand the Confederacy or the Civil War unless you understand slavery." McDonnell subsequently apologized, saying, "The failure to include any reference to slavery was a mistake."

He inserted into the proclamation a paragraph that condemned slavery as "an evil and inhumane practice," and called upon Virginians to "reflect and learn from this painful part of our history."

The important thing to understand about the resolution of this episode is that everyone is dissatisfied with it--and that this is good. Liberals resent the idea of celebrating Confederate history at all. Commentator Eugene Robinson objected to honoring soldiers who defended "a system built upon 'constant, deliberate, unflinching cruelty.'" Many argue that the Confederacy should be remembered in disgrace--as an insurgency that fought to destroy the union.

Conservatives are just as upset. Groups like the Sons of the Confederacy (which requested the commemoration from McDonnell's office), criticize the portrayal of the period in public education: They want more attention paid to the honorable sacrifices of the Confederate soldiers. Brag Bowling, leader of the Virginia chapter, praises them as "the finest infantry soldier America's ever had in any war." Many conservatives saw no problem with McDonnell's proclamation as originally written. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour eyerolled that the controversy "isn't worth diddly."

But tellingly, many Republican leaders acknowledged that McDonnell had erred, and supported the revision. For example, Ed Gillespie, former chairman of the Republican National Committee, said that McDonnell "made a serious mistake" and praised him for his apology. By commending McDonnell's repair efforts, such leaders agree that there was something that needed to be repaired in the first place.

Therefore, in the midst of this fracas lay a tenuous but meaningful compromise: Though mainstream American conservatives and liberals disagree on how they want to remember the Confederacy, they agreed that its memory should not be detached from the evil of slavery. The initial backlash, the governor's apology, and his party's approval of it, sent an important signal about acceptable dialogue about America's past.

Just as the Virginia episode drew a red line in how the past could be remembered, East Asians want Japan to draw similar lines, and to discipline politicians and intellectuals who cross them. To date, Japan's failure to do so--its tolerance of lies about wartime atrocities--has poisoned Japan's foreign relations and hamstrung its ability to lead. Neighbors fear increases in Japanese power, because they remember the era, whose atrocities the Japanese apparently do not repudiate, when Japan wielded it irresponsibly.

What would a Virginia compromise look like in East Asia? For their part, Japan's former victims must recognize Tokyo's previous efforts to acknowledge past wrongs (which in the politicization of the issue they often obscure). Japan's neighbors must allow the Japanese people to honor their ancestors as heroes--a bitter pill to swallow indeed for Koreans, Chinese, and others who suffered from atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers. In other words, Japan's former victims must accept Japan's equivalent of Confederate History Month.

But while Japanese conservatives should be allowed to honor their country, and the soldiers who died for it, they cannot distort historical truths. The bitter pill for Japan's conservatives is that--in the interest of creating an official historical record and in healing regional relations--conservatives cannot revere Japan's 20th-century history without also remembering the aggression and atrocities that were indisputably part of it. As Robinson opined about Southern conservatives: "They're entitled to their own set of opinions, but they're not entitled to their own set of facts."

Japanese society may be unwilling to compromise. The politics of memory within countries (such as the American Civil War), may be very different than between countries. The impetus to recognize foreign victims, who after all are not citizens and constituents, is weaker than to recognize domestic victims. Japan's liberals may thus be less motivated to take a stand, and pressure from foreign victims may not be heeded.

Even if Japan compromises, perhaps its neighbors won't. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to prop itself up with anti-Japanese propaganda, it may not want to let the past go: refusing to recognize efforts Tokyo has already made, and demanding more apologies. Likewise, if South Korean politicians wrap themselves in flags over the Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean) island dispute or other issues, compromise will be elusive.

This compromise would be a far smaller victory than what Japan's victims want (namely, official apologies, reparations, and so forth). But it is likely to be just what Japanese conservatives might accept. Moderates on both sides should thus welcome it: It would help calm Asia's frequent storms over history, and would facilitate Japan's leadership in the region and in the world.

As Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, said to Vladimir Putin, during their historic commemoration at Katyn forest on April 7: "A word of truth can mobilize two peoples looking for the road to reconciliation. Are we capable of transforming a lie into reconciliation? We must believe we can."

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Jennifer Lind is assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, and a fellow with the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future, run by the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation and the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership.