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POINT OF VIEW/ Yoichi Kato: Hatoyama must have strategic talks with U.S.

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

2009/12/29

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The Hatoyama administration's delay in deciding where to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has created the possibility that the 2006 Japan-U.S. agreement to build a substitute facility off the coast of Henoko, Okinawa Prefecture, could be scrapped and fresh bilateral negotiations might be initiated.

This has triggered doubts in the United States that the administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is trying to downscale the bilateral alliance.

A solution to this policy dilemma can only be reached through fundamental strategic talks on the alliance, even though this may seem to be a roundabout approach.

The government's decision, confirmed on Dec. 15 by the three parties in the ruling coalition, has effectively killed the current relocation plan. The move will force the U.S. government, which has insisted that the plan is the only feasible option, to make a 180-degree about-face--which would surely cause U.S. frustration.

Washington has become even more distrustful of Hatoyama, who just last month asked Barack Obama to trust him when the U.S. president pressed him for early implementation of the current plan during summit talks in Tokyo.

Hatoyama's waffling since that meeting has so seriously damaged his credibility with Washington that U.S. officials now say bluntly, "We don't trust him."

This is unprecedented.

The cause of such a rapid and sharp deterioration in bilateral ties lies in the Hatoyama government's basic stance on maintaining the alliance.

The Hatoyama administration has been working to fix issues that touch on the fundamentals of the alliance, such as the Futenma problem, bilateral secret nuclear deals, the Status of Forces Agreement and Japan's outlays to host U.S. troops and bases in the nation.

The Hatoyama administration regards these issues as "negative legacies" inherited from previous governments led by the Liberal Democratic Party and is working to correct and modify these problems.

While from Japan's point of view, there are many issues that need to be rectified, the problem is that Washington doesn't necessarily view these elements of the bilateral alliance as "negative legacies."

Sheila Smith, a senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Democrat with close ties to the Obama administration, warns against confusing the discontent with the LDP with its dissatisfaction with the U.S. government.

In particular, there is strong feeling within the U.S. government that it agreed to the current Futenma relocation plan because Japan proposed it and guaranteed its implementation.

That's the perception of the Obama administration as well.

In contrast, the Hatoyama government's position is that the transfer of power through an election could naturally lead to a major review of government policies. There seems to be little common ground between the two sides on this point.

Given the complications surrounding the issue, even if Tokyo could start fresh negotiations on the Futenma problem with Washington early next year, focusing only on a new relocation site, they are unlikely to produce a workable solution.

The U.S. government is increasingly concerned and suspicious that the move by the Japanese government to clear "negative legacies" may signal Hatoyama's inclination to downgrade and downsize the bilateral alliance.

In a magazine article he wrote in 1996, when he headed the old DPJ, Hatoyama described the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as "a Cold War relic" and said he would seek to wean Japan from "excessive dependence" on the United States and establish a new bilateral security regime not based on the permanent presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

He apparently believed then, as he apparently does now, that the current framework and capability of the alliance are excessive and place an unnecessarily heavy burden on Japan.

On the other hand, the United States has openly claimed the security framework is a "great bargain" for Japan, as Lt. Gen. Edward Rice, the commander of U.S. Forces Japan, has put it. Japan can enjoy a high level of deterrence and security while spending only about 5 trillion yen (about $54.7 billion), or less than 1 percent of its gross domestic product, on defense thanks to its alliance with the United States.

There is an enormous gap in perceptions of the two sides about their alliance.

A closer look at the arguments presented by both sides reveals another perception gap between Tokyo and Washington. It concerns the question of what kind of security threats Japan needs to prepare itself for. The only threats to Japan's security mentioned by the DPJ's election manifesto are North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

In contrast, Washington regards the changes brought about by the rise of China as a great power, along with the risks posed by North Korea, as key challenges facing the alliance, as U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos said recently. The U.S. administration sees Okinawa as a key strategic base for dealing with such an expanding China.

If Hatoyama and his government really intend to reduce Japan's dependence on the United States for security, the administration should have an honest and open debate with the U.S. government over the issue in a way that Japanese people can hear the arguments of both sides.

Hatoyama's past article on the alliance argued that a new framework for multilateral security talks in East Asia would create an international environment that prevents military contingincies in the "Far East," leading to a possible reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

This thinking is apparently behind Hatoyama's proposal to create an East Asian community.

Last month, Hatoyama and Obama agreed to kick off "a new process of deliberation" to deepen the bilateral alliance. But the start of the process has been delayed by the stalemate of the Futenma issue.

What the two countries should do is start the process as a forum for fundamental discussions about the future of the alliance, holding it prior to or in parallel with negotiations over the Futenma relocation.

That could help allay doubts and suspicions that Washington has about Tokyo's attitudes and policies, while giving the Hatoyama administration a fresh opportunity to regain the trust of Washington.

Such a forum can also make it possible for the two countries to "frankly discuss with each other the outstanding issues between the two countries" within the "relationship of trust," as Hatoyama said in his policy speech at the Diet.

* * *

The author is a senior staff writer of The Asahi Shimbun.(IHT/Asahi: December 29,2009)

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