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OSS - The Psychology of War
Morale Operations Branch (1941-1945)
Japan
MO PLANS FOR JAPAN
GENERATING PANICCausing Panic During Bombing RaidsINTIMIDATION
Nuclear Earthquake Plan
TerrorismDEMORALIZATION
Superstition
Hypochondria
Poisoned Cigarettes
Atrocity Pictures
Pearl Harbor Attack
The P-for-Peace Plan
Unconditional Surrender
Discrediting Leaders
Rumors of Military Coup
Messages of Despair
Appeals to Religion
Japanese Appeals to Religion
Other
MO PLANS FOR JAPAN
Target Operations Japan, Oct. 5, 1942
Letter from Maj. Herbert S. Little to Frederick Oechsner, April 23, 1943
Methods for using propaganda, May 10, 1943
The Japanese soldier is an MO target wherever he is located. So is the Japanese civilian located in Japan proper. Japanese agents, puppets and the collaborationists on the China coast, in Formosa and the Philippines can also profitably be made the target for subversive activities based on the Pacific theatres. The peoples located in territories occupied by the Japanese can also be stimulated into resistance against the Japanese and are therefore an MO target. ... Psychologically the Japanese people are susceptible to subversive operations. Even the Japanese soldier is subject to effective psychological attack whenever he believes his situation is hopeless. These weaknesses in the psychology of the Japanese should be exploited by subversive operations. Currently there are the following basic vulnerable points in the Japanese psychological make-up: dissention between the branches of the armed forces; political differences, especially concerning the conduct of the war; anxiety over Russia joining the Allies in the Pacific war; fear of Chinese and Russian communism spreading to the Japanese mainland; failure of the greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere to secure complete native cooperation; fear of hostility of the natives of the occupied territory; dissension between Japanese troops of rural and urban backgrounds; class distinctions on the home front and in the armed forces; anxiety among the leaders over the effect of the military defeat of Germany; fear of disease; fear of an air blitz against Japan's principal cities. The hostility toward Japan of certain groups of the native populations in Formosa and the Philippines provides a good target for anti-Japanese rumors and for developing cooperation with the American forces by the use of various subversive methods. These activities could be so directed that they would harrass the Japanese and their puppets and would reduce the flow of aid to Japanese troops. An Overall MO plan for the Pacific area, circa 1944
Report on Status of and Potentialities for MO in the Far East, May 28, 1944
GENERATING PANIC
Causing Panic During Bombing Raids The Railroad Pass project was initiated a few months ago. Three hundred thousand pieces of counterfeit Japanese railroad passes have been printed. These passes give to the holder the right to travel on all railroads in Japan. The passes are distributed by all planes. They are dropped into Japan after a bombing. To whomever picks them up they give the incentive to get out of whatever area they may find themselves in, to a safer area. Thus, all affordable transportation is cluttered up and production in factories is slowed down through absence of employees. ... The current severe bombings of Japanese cities leave in their wake wide-scale disruption of the means of communication and transportion in addition to confusion and panic. An excellent opportunity is thus created for the use of MO tactics and techniques to augment this confusion and aggravate the transportation problem. The Railroad Pass Project, Aug. 1944
Strategic Mission: To impair the morale of the enemy by deceiving him into believing that his own official radio stations are broadcasting instructions for procedure during bombing raids which, in reality are false transmissions promulgated by ourselves. Results should be evidence in increased casualties among enemy personnel, through panic, confusion, dissension, distrust, and misdirection of effort. Tactical mission: During bombing raids, to simulate official Japanese radio transmissions by stations which have actually signed off during the raids, by carrying light-weight broadcasting equipment in one of the planes of the group. This material will be broadcast directly to the population of the cities involved. Orion Plan, circa 1944
Objective: to create wide-spread confusion and panic among civilians in bombed areas; to incite terror, confuse and demoralize troops defending an attacked position. Implementation: recorded horror noises; recorded pleas for cooperation addressed to Japanese troops or natives, using faked news; recorded simulated noises such as destruction of Japanese patrols, approach of Allied tanks and beached landings, small arms or artillery fire; recorded diversions to distract the enemy and screen Allied movements. Operations: MO suggests sonic deception device known as Junior Heaters, a super-amplifying, high fidelity sound system consisting of a generator, recording mechanism, amplifier and loud speaker to be installed in B-29s for us during or immediately after raids. The device can produce the human voice and such sounds as moving trucks and tanks, marching troops, boats, beach landings, animal noises, bugle call, etc. Junior Heaters, circa 1944
Severe winds accompany incendiary raids against Japanese cities. ... Comparable winds in Germany are known to have suffocated persons who, while neither burned nor injured, died as a result of the withdrawal of oxygen from the air available in dugouts for respiration. Persons directly exposed to the wind died in Germany by a combination of burning and suffocation, and following death the bodies were dehydrated in a manner which (although having no effect on the already-deceased victim) was astounding and nauseous to observers. ... Japanese attribution of the salvation of Japan from the Mongol invasions of A.D. 1274-1282 to the intervention of a divine wind (kamikaze) may render them peculiarly vulnerable to the indirect psychological effects of fire winds and to rumors concerning artificial winds created by official action of the United States government. The Meteorology of Incendiary Raids Against Japan, June 30, 1945
Nuclear Earthquake Plan The attached plan to correlate earthquakes in Japan with our bombing of that country was proposed as an MO project by Dr. Norman Brown of OSS's planning staff. ... The atomic bombing of Japan, our latest military weapon, is recognized as the most powerful of outward forces. Its effect if used for penetration bombing is exploited by MO in this project. The Earthquake Plan, circa 1945
Scientifically, can heavy bombing, pinpointed on known earthquake areas, bring about an underground condition within fault sections which would step up the expectancy and possibly bring about a calamitous earthquake in a selected area? ... "All that could be applied is trigger forcem and this can only advance and set the time for an earthquake which is about to occur. It is conceivable, however, that an explosion at exactly the right time and place might have the correct effect. It would have to be very large and it would be necessary to know where to place it, and the latter cannot be determined at all from outside Japan." ... "we would have to get (bomb) within less than 5 miles of that place on the fault which is destined to break within a year, no help being offered it ... if we could get (bomb) within a mile of a point on a fault destined to break within 90 years we might set it off." ... Impetus is greatly added to the already established scientific plausibility of triggering this earthquake potential by the recent revelation of the atomic bomb. With a manifoldly greater amount of destructive force in a single atomic bomb the plausibility of triggering the earthquake potential is brought further toward the realm of practicality. ... On the basis of the scientific plausibility of triggering this earthquake potential by atomic and large scale intensified bombing lies the foundation for our psychological plan to combine, within the minds of the Japanese, the additional fear of earthquakes being caused by the radio-active destructiveness of the atomic bomb. Psychological Warfare Earthquake Plan Against Japanese Homeland, circa 1945
Psychological Warfare Earthquake Plan Against the Japanese Homeland, Aug. 17, 1954
INTIMIDATION
Terrorism The Japanese fishing boats employ huge wicker baskets for fishing purposes. These are floated in the water and are also carried on boats and contain nets. They are, naturally, sometimes lost overboard. ... It might be possible to work out a plan with the Navy by which we might conceal floating mines in these wicker baskets. There are a number of Japanese who were formerly on the West Coast and are now in camps who, I am sure, know how to weave these baskets. They could be woven around the outside of the mines themselves. Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Majors Little and Stevens, Sept. 16, 1943
... concerning the terroristic Japanese organizations which could be instigated by us secretly. It is to be born in mind that these organizations in the past had recourse to assassination in order to remove Officers or Officials who they claim have failed in "properly advising the Emperor." The loss of the Solomons or any large setback incurred by the Japanese Army and Navy would fall into this category and it might be possible to instigate "incidents" where they would start putting some of their own higher officials out of the way on the plea that the Emporer has been badly advised. Japanese Organizations, Jan. 10, 1944
Superstition Psychological Warfare Proposals Against the Japanese, March 19, 1943
Memorandum from Edgar Salinger, circa March 1943
Status of Various Projects, April 30, 1943
Salinger's Fox Proposal, May 12, 1943
I am enclosing an article regarding the famous French magician, Houdin, from whose name the more recent well-known magician, Houdini, took his name. As you will see from this French article, the French Government employed the talents of Houdin to greatest advantage in their dealings with the natives of North Africa. I have some additional data on this subject which relates how Houdin showed his tricks before a large gallery of North African sheiks who were completely baffled by his efforts. The tricks were quite beyond the scope of their own sorcerers and indicated that the French possessed superior magic powers. The result was that they accepted French domination. This idea might be the basis for our thinking somewhat along these same lines and employing magicians and presdijigators [sic] to send to certain strategic sections where we could impress native populations. Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Frederick Ochesner, May 12, 1943
Use of Demonology Against the Japanese, circa May 1943
Psychological warfare proposals against the Japanese, circa May 1943
Letter from Philip S. Olt to Edgar Salinger, Nov. 12, 1943
The question of teaching our Korean and Chinese allies how to simulate epilepsy might be very carefully considered. The reason for this is that they could be taught how to utter subversive ideas while apparently in an epileptic trance. To the superstitious natives of some of the oriental countries, these trances might carry the force of prophesy. Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Major Harley Stevens, Dec. 16, 1943
We must always remember that the Japanese soldiers are 85% peasant, and therefore certain symbolisms with which they are familiar, as conating either good or evil portents, should be employed in propaganda directed towards them. ... The writer refers to the coming out of the God of the Shihokama Shrine and that the sacred horse of the shrine was moist with sweat; and that the Goddess of Mercy guided a certain Higashikura to safety. If Mrs. MacDonald would weave this type of symbolism into her propaganda in a negative way. i.e. to make the omen evil instead of a good one, it might accomplish a purpose. Propaganda Material, Jan. 20, 1944
Supernatural Phenomenon, Jan. 27, 1944
... I suggest concocting stories to the effect that "certain unheard of colors were found in the rice fields; that monstrosities, such as double headed fowl or animals were born; that there has been a tremendous increase in the cases of men and women who have been bewitched and changed into foxes in certain sections of Japan"; all of which points to evil things to come and the anger of the Gods. Japanese Propaganda, Jan 31, 1944
Wind God's Protection is Recalled, Feb. 11, 1944
Spirits of Departed Heroes, Feb. 23, 1944
Psychological Warfare -- Mythical Societies, April 11, 1944
Suggestions for Leaflets or a Booklet on "A New Japanese Mythology," June 17, 1944
Hypochondria Kusuri Campaign, Feb. 22, 1944
Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Major Harley C. Stevens, March 20, 1944
These will be exaggerated and misleading accounts of diseases which Japanese soldiers may suffer or are already suffering in the tropics, with some reference to their effect on the home populations. Reference will be made in these articles to the outbreak of epidemic, tropical diseases in Japan, caused by returning soldiers. This is part of a "fear" psychosis program which is being developed. Dr. Morton C. Kahn, June 9, 1944
OWI and other Intelligence Reports indicate that in the past two years there has been a rising disease rate in Japan. In matters of disease the Japanese are equally, if not more, hypochondriacal than Westerners. Witness the large patent medicine and vitamin industries flourishing in Japan. With regard to tuberculosis particularly, the Japanese are extremely fearful and in many sectors of the country it is considered a disgrace to have contracted the disease. This situation can be exploited by MO in combination with B-29 raids. Objective: to decrease production by spreading fear of a tuberculosis epidemic and increasing absenteeism because of this fear. Deirdre Plan, circa 1945
Poisoned Cigarettes In implementing the Chesterfield Project, we should manufacture cigarettes patterned upon the cigarettes manufactured by the Japanese and packaged in identical containers, each cigarette to contain a tasteless drug which would react upon the smoker within ten to twenty minutes. The reaction of the drug should cause violent retching and vomiting but not be fatal. These cigarettes should be planted by agents under suitable cover so that they would reach the native populations of occupied areas. The rumor would immediately follow that the Japanese by means of their tobacco monopoly were seeking to poison the native populations and thus obtain control of their land and money. Chesterfield Project, June 21, 1944
Atrocity Pictures Chinese Atrocity Pictures, May 27, 1944
Earthquake Pictures, June 29, 1944
A three-reel film lasting 30 minutes, reduced from 225,000 feet long documentary bombings-of-Germany films. Finished film shows dramatically dovetailed sequences of American and British bomber and fighter action over Germany together with closeups of shattered German cities and marshalling yards and pinpoint strafings. The shots were blended by Field Photographic Branch after MO techniques were applied to their selection and editing along with slanted coments. Some of the narration was written by the MO staff designed to illustrate with cumulative force the futility of continuing to resist Allied air might which leads only to annihilation. The film with narration stresses precision of raids in destroying ground installations and defending enemy aircraft, Allied care in avoiding bombing of cultural and religious institutions, enemy helplessness and complete vulnerability to inevitable consequences of raids, and deploying of airmight from European to Pacific Theatre to reinforce crescendo of B-29 raids on Jap homeland. The film purporting to be a secret American "Staff Report" designed only for certain American military personnel, will be carefully "lost" by MO agents at appropriate spots where it will be "captured" by the Japanese and brought to high ranking Japanese military officers and political leaders for their review. Spurious Film - Method of Infiltration - Project F1, July 27, 1945
Undoubtedly many of these men have seen ruins in the wake of bombing attacks, and undoubtedly they have heard reports of the destruction in Germany. It is hoped they will be even more impressed by these actual scenes of aerial warfare and resultant devastation, and may reflect much more seriously on the fate that awaits Japan if she does not ask for peace before our attacks reach their full fury. Quite possiblty some of the Japanese who view this picture will change their minds on the value of resistance to the end. It is quite possible that these Japanese may be those whose opinions can alter the course of the entire war, bringing the end materially closer. Introductory Remarks on F1, circa 1945
OSS native agent to carry personally to Japanese Commandant, claiming he stole films from Americans, and wants to sell them to Japs. This infiltration to take place on Jap held coastal areas in China. ... Films to be boxed and addressed to Capt. _____, etc., and thrown from hedge-hopping U.S. plane near Tokyo at night, along with other heavy objects normally carried by U.S. planes and normally ditched in distress. Cover is that the films happened to be aboard a U.S. plane which was hit by flak and were thrown overboard to reduce load. ...Films to be enclosed in Jap courier pouch with accompanying enclosed letter stating they were captured in China and were being flown to Tokyo to Jap Intelligence. ... If properly waterproofed (as most celluloid is for shipment to the tropics), and box were made light enough to float, box of films could be planted on Jap beach by U.S. submarine or plane, looking like floating wreckage from U.S. ship. Alternate Plans for Infiltration Film Reels, circa 1945
Pearl Harbor Attack The attacks by Japanese armed forces on Hawaii and the reported flight of planes near San Francisco may have significance in two directions. First, such action has a military value, but in the present instance such value must be relative [sic] small. This would seem a reasonable assumption considering the small force used in the attack and the relatively small amount of damage which was done. The second value that this action may have is of a "propaganda" nature. There would seem real reason to believe that this second value may have been much greater than the first. The effects of such propaganda may be exerted in two directions. On the one hand, while the action resulted in a widespread unity in the American public, there are evidences of considerable unrest and worry especially on the west coast. On the other hand, actions so near the American coast may well arouse a public clamor that the Pacific fleet be kept in home waters for the protection of coastal cities -- the result of which might hamper the operation of the Navy. Before it is too late both of these effects should be combated by public education through radio broadcasts and the press. On the immediate need to inform the people by press and radio of the "propaganda by intimidation" character of the Japanese attacks, Dec. 9, 1941
DEMORALIZATION
The P-for-Peace Plan This plan could have its original introduction through our black radio program. The program should suggest that many Japanese have wanted to do something concrete to end the war, but have not known exactly what to do. "The Voice of the People" will now tell them just how they can start operations towards winning the war, and the announcers can suggest that during the night they paint on the walls of military buildings and on the gateways of wealthy people's homes the symbol P-for-Peace. Among themselves they can greet each other with the sign made by the crossed fingers. Explanation should be given just how to make the symbol with the fingers, which is very simple, and should be outlined in the broadcast. It should be pointed out that throughout the history of Japan, there have been many revolutions against injustices, and now the time has come to bring pressure on military and political leaders to bring peace to Japan. ... I feel sure this plan once started would roll along at tremendous speed. It's simple, it's logical, and it is the sort of thing the Japanese people like to do. Their lives are symbolic, and here is a symbol offered to them as national salvation at a time when undoubtedly millions of them are thinking about some logical way of bringing peace to Japan. The P-for-Peace Plan, circa 1945
To stimulate the growth of a national peace movement, with chances of increasing success when general economic conditions deteriorate, appears to be an eminently worthwhile aim. Corollary aims, more likely to succeed at the present time, would include creating further friction between the authorities and the people because of necessarily increased controls, and undermining the faith of civilians and troops in the government's conduct of the war to such an extent that American statements and promises would be more widely accepted as true. ... If the plan is to be carried out in cooperation with OWI it would be more effective to have to done by MO well in advance of OWI. This timing would serve to keep the cover intact, since OWI could "discover" this "spontaneous" peace campaign in Japan after it was planted. P-for-Peace Plan, July 6, 1945
Unconditional Surrender Japanese propagandists have been using the unconditional surrender phrase to convince the Japanese that there is no alternative but to fight. To be really convincing they have been associating this phrase with the terrible catastrophes sure to fall upon Japan if Japan were to surrender. Such horrible prospects as eternal enslavement, practical extermination, suppression of the Shinto religion, loss of the cherished Emporer system, starvation, and a general reign of inhuman cruelty have been presented to the Japanese by their leaders as the inevitable aftermath of unconditional surrender. It must be taken for granted that this propaganda has had a considerable measure of success, and that the spirit to fight to the bitter end rather than surrender has unquestionably been strengthened. ... Develop the theme that unconditional surrender is nothing but a term, meaning principally that the United States will not accept dictation of any conditions by Japan. In actuality, every surrender always has and must have conditions of some sort, or the surrendering force could not be instructed on how to go about a cessation of hostilities. The steadily improving situation in Italy, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Germany shows that the Japanese militarists' interpretation of unconditional surrender is not true. ... Unconditional surrender applies only to the war leaders who have misled the Emperor and to the army as an entity, and not to us as individual soldiers and civilians. Only militaristic criminals fear unconditional surrender; the Japanese people would not be affected. The Allies fully recognize that Japan's industrial production, properly guided, is absolutely necessary for stability in the Far East, so there is no slightest intent to de-industrialize Japan. Special MO Directive on Unconditional Japanese Surrender, circa 1945
A Japanese agent to be parachuted into Japan in an isolated spot at night, using Jap parachute, dressed in work clothes. He will carry no papers and if stopped, explain his papers were lost in a bomb raid. There are doubtless large numbers of Jap civilians in the same predicament, and his lack of papers will not be considered unusual. Agent should be a well-educated man, able to present a story he will be drilled in, forcibly and clearly. He must be able to enact the role of a workman. He must be courageous, tenacious, and ardently convinced of the usefulness of his mission. He will make his way afoot or as best he can to an address to be provided him. He will make himself known to a person believed to be in favor of surrender, at that address. This person is to be in a position to carry a message directly to the emperor, and to others who are in sympathy with the need for peace. ... If the agent is captured he will commit suicide by poison. Random Notes re Unconditional Surrender, July 30, 1945
Discrediting Leaders Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Major Harley C. Stevens, March 6, 1944
Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Major Harley C. Stevens, April 13, 1944
Rumors of Military Coup A number of leaflets prepared beforehand by the MO Branch "announcing" to the Japanese people that either the navy or the army has taken over the government and appealing to the people for support against any other group that may rise to challenge it. Distribution of leaflets to be followed after a short interval by announcements over the radio that whichever group has announced control over the government through the leaflets has not done so legally and therefore is not to be recognized, thus giving the subversive propaganda even wider currency. Pluto Plan, circa 1945
Military collapses, like panics, can be engendered by confusion; and this confusion can be abetted by breaking down, with every available means, those established authorities, myths, and national ideals from which the enemy derives his moral support. Destroy the idea and symbols of national unity, the bonds which unite a people to defend sacrosanct ideals, and the fanaticism and will-to-fight suffer corresponding diminuitions, with a resulting saving of American lives. Emperor of Japan, circa 1944
Messages of Despair Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Murry Gurfein, April 7, 1943
It Pays to be Ignorant Campaign, March 21, 1944
Appeals to Religion Are there any passages from the gospels which from your own experience are of a nature which any Japanese Christian soldier would understand as having a Christian significance? Christian Soldiers, May 23, 1944
Japanese Appeals to Religion The mobilization and integration of religion as a poltiical and military weapon, Nov. 24, 1943
Study of Japanese Use of Religious Movements for Political Purposes
Religion as a Political Weapon
Other The enclosed photograph of Japanese workingmen in a munitions factor, chained to their work, has turned out extremely well in my opinion, and should be an excellent item of use for our purposes. ... The picrure could purport to be Koreans who have been brought from Korea to work in Japanese munitions plants. Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Major Harley C. Stevens, April 17, 1944
Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Col. Kenneth D. Mann, July 14, 1944
Memorandum from Edgar Salinger to Maj. Harley C. Stevens, July 14, 1944
Unsorted Suggestions for Black Cable Based on OWI Directive, June 20, 1944
Suggestions for Black Cable Based on OWI Directive, June 6, 1944
Over-All Program for Employment of Rumors Against the Japanese
Over-All and Special Programs for Employment of Rumors Against the Japanese, July 29, 1944
Special Program No. A-1 - Rumors, July 29, 1944
Special Program No. B-1 - Rumors, July 29, 1944
Special Program No. C-1 - Rumors, July 29, 1944
Special Program No. C-2 - Rumors, July 29, 1944
Draft of OSS/MO Directive Against Japan to be Sent Aug. 9, 1944
Script for Documentary Motion Picture on Phillipines, June 9, 1944
Projects for OSS, Sept. 13, 1943/a>
Notes on Mr. Salinger's Demonstration of 12 August 1943, Aug. 17, 1943
Secret Memorandum from Edward Salinger, Sept. 2, 1943
Secret Letter from Edgar Salinger, Aug. 13, 1943
The Use of the Culture and Personality Approach, Aug. 26, 1943 (25 pages)
Salinger's Secrets, April 15, 1944
Fluorescent Smoke - Fox Images, Oct. 25, 1943
Request for Approval of Trip to Alaska Department by OSS Representative, March 10, 1944
Proposed Investigation of the "Japanese People's Anti-War League"
Memorandum regarding Salinger's connection with the New York Office, Aug. 23, 1943
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2004. For educational use only. No copyright to original government works.
